The Future of : Some Comparative Reflections

James J. Sheehan

Abstract: This essay provides a historical and comparative perspective on contemporary American mili- tary institutions. It focuses on the origins, evolution, and eventual disappearance of conscription in West- ern Europe. By the 1970s, Europeans had developed civilian states in which the military’s traditional role Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/daed/article-pdf/140/3/112/1829938/daed_a_00102.pdf by guest on 29 September 2021 steadily diminished; the formal abolition of conscription after 1989 was the ½nal step in a long, largely silent revolution. A brief survey of military institutions outside of Europe suggests why mass conscript armies will remain politically, culturally, and militarily signi½cant in many parts of the world. Seen in a global context, the American experience appears to combine aspects of Western European civilian states with the willingness and ability to project military power.

[Conscription] is always a signi½cant index of the society where it is found; to view it solely as a method of conducting war is to see very little of it. –Victor Kiernan1

When Alexis de Tocqueville listed the advan- tages of democracy in America that came “from the peculiar and accidental situation in which Providence has placed the Americans,” he had no doubts about which was most important. Ameri- cans, he wrote, “have no neighbors, and conse- quently they have no great wars. . . nor great armies, nor great generals.”2 Shielded from potential ag- JAMES J. SHEEHAN, a Fellow of the American Academy since 1992, gressors by its two great ocean glacis, the United is the Dickason Professor in the States was, for much of its history, able to avoid Humanities and Professor of building those mass armies on which European Modern European History, Emeri- states lavished so much energy and resources. tus, at Stanford University. His When, during the Civil War and World War I, great publications include Where Have armies were built, they were dismantled as soon as All the Soldiers Gone?: The Transfor- the war was over. We should not underestimate the mation of Modern Europe (2008), Museums in the German Art World reluctance with which Americans abandoned this from the End of the Old Regime to the tradition: the Selective Service Act of 1940 was Rise of Modernism (2000), and Ger- renewed a year later with a one-vote majority in the man History, 1770–1886 (1989). House of Representatives and included a prohibi-

© 2011 by the American Academy of Arts & Sciences

112 tion on sending draftees out of the West- tence, of the nation might be at stake. James J. ern Hemisphere. The abolition of the Among the great powers, only Britain did Sheehan draft and the creation of an all-volunteer not adopt conscription, relying instead army in 1973 were in response to the on naval power and a small professional immediate crisis of Vietnam, but these army. Outside of Europe, Japan was the actions also represented a return to ½rst non-Western state to adopt con- deeply rooted traditions in American scription, based on a careful study of the political culture. Prussian model. In 1873, as part of a larg- In the 1830s, as Tocqueville was writing er program of political and social mod- his great book on American democracy, ernization, Japan introduced compulsory European states were in the process of , including three years on

creating new kinds of armies, founded on active duty and four in the reserves. From Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/daed/article-pdf/140/3/112/1829938/daed_a_00102.pdf by guest on 29 September 2021 e some form of conscription. The term then on, the army became the key instru- y itself ½rst appeared in a French law of ment in Japan’s initially successful but t 1798 that called for compulsory military ultimately doomed attempt to be a great service for all young men between twen- power. In the twentieth century, govern- ty and twenty-½ve. The system evolved in ments throughout the world imported the nineteenth century, ½rst in Prussia the idea of conscript armies, which, like and then throughout Europe. The theory so many other European institutions, and practice of conscription were insepa- seemed to be an essential part of what it rable from the larger ideals and major meant to be a modern state.4 institutions of the modern state. First, conscription is essentially democratic Although the creation of mass armies because every male (in theory, although was an essential function of European rarely in practice) is liable to be called on states, their uses were limited. Through- to ½ght. Military service is linked to citi- out the nineteenth and early twentieth zenship, that complex blend of rights and centuries, governments were unwilling obligations that binds people to their to dispatch their citizen-soldiers to ½ght state. The citizen army, therefore, is not “small wars” of colonial conquest or simply a military institution, but also a paci½cation. “Conscripts,” the German way of expressing and acquiring those statesman Otto von Bismarck once re- patriotic commitments essential for the marked, “cannot be sent to the tropics.” nation’s survival. Second, conscription Like Britain, whose army was constantly requires the administrative capabilities deployed in defense of its empire, every and material resources that states did not colonial power left these overseas battles possess until the modern era. For the sys- to professionals or, whenever possible, to tem to work, governments had to be able native forces recruited from local popula- to identify, select, assemble, train, equip, tions but usually commanded by Euro- and deploy a signi½cant percentage of pean of½cers.5 their male population, retaining some of Yet conscripts fought the two world them on active duty for several years with wars of the twentieth century and, the rest on reserve status for several despite the horrendous losses suffered by more.3 their citizen armies between 1914 and In the nineteenth century, European 1918 and again between 1939 and 1945, states developed conscript armies to pre- every European state either retained or pare for massive territorial conflicts in restored conscription after World War II. which the fate, perhaps even the exis- Britain, which had only belatedly and

140 (3) Summer 2011 113 The reluctantly introduced a draft in both amount of lethal hardware in history. Future of world wars, preserved Nevertheless, to more and more Euro- Conscription until 1960. Perhaps even more remark- peans, the possibility of a continental ably, ’s three postwar suc- land war seemed increasingly remote. cessor states–West and East Germany The sort of limited war that had been and the Austrian Republic–eventually fought in Korea and was still going on in reintroduced conscription. On both sides Vietnam hardly seemed possible in the of the Iron Curtain, therefore, the mem- only place in the world where the super- bers of nato and the Warsaw Pact pre- powers directly confronted one another. pared mass armies in anticipation of a The risk of escalation to nuclear catastro- new land war between East and West. At phe was simply too high.6

the same time, Western European states These changing assessments of the mil- Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/daed/article-pdf/140/3/112/1829938/daed_a_00102.pdf by guest on 29 September 2021 all sent conscripts in a succession of ½nal, itary situation are clearly reflected in futile efforts to defend their overseas pos- public opinion polls: when asked what sessions. Of the 135,000 troops dis- they wanted their governments to do, patched to the Dutch East Indies in 1945, Europeans consistently stressed domes- two-thirds were draftees; conscripts also tic issues–a stable currency, education, represented a signi½cant percentage of health care, retirement bene½ts, law and the French army stationed in Algeria in order–and rarely mentioned national 1961. Political opposition engendered by defense or effective military institutions. the loss of citizen-soldiers in defense of These polls do not suggest that Euro- colonial rule was one reason why govern- peans no longer cared about being con- ments were forced to abandon those quered; they simply didn’t think that it campaigns–as well as, eventually, their was going to happen.7 empires. Not accidentally, Portugal, the The end of imperial wars and the wan- least democratic of the colonial powers, ing salience of security concerns pro- was also the last to surrender its overseas duced a silent revolution in European possessions. politics, a revolution that can be mea- By the end of the 1960s, the security sured in budgets, where defense spend- environment in Europe had begun to ing stagnated, in popular attitudes to- change. Except for Portugal’s struggles in ward the military, and in the symbols and Africa, the colonial powers had already ceremonies of public life. The army, once liquidated their imperial enterprises, regarded as essential for both national some of them centuries old, and had defense and national identity, moved to done so with remarkable speed and rela- the margins of most people’s conscious- tively little political resistance. Equally ness. “Security” ceased to denote issues important, the Cold War order imposed of national defense and came to be iden- by the two superpowers essentially ti½ed with individual welfare. removed the danger of conventional war This revolution in Europeans’ views between European states; in the West, of security gradually–and once again, this new state of affairs made possible silently–transformed their conscript the growing cooperation of national armies. Every Continental country re- economies and rising aspirations for tained conscription until the 1990s. But political integration. Of course, the everywhere its character changed. Ar- potential for armed conflict persisted, mies reduced the time required in active especially on the German-German bor- service as well as conscripts’ reserve obli- der, which bristled with the largest gation. Exemptions from the draft be-

114 Dædalus, the Journal ofthe American Academy of Arts & Sciences came much easier to get, as did the right mission. As Bismarck had warned in the James J. to perform alternative service, both of nineteenth century, such missions were Sheehan them ways to drain off potential political not for conscripts.9 opposition to the military. The percent- In The Netherlands, where the number age of those actually conscripted and of conscripts had plummeted since the the size of the armed forces declined 1950s, the draft was abolished in 1993; throughout Europe. Within the armies two years later ended it. , themselves, regulations were eased, pun- despite the powerful historical memories ishments made less severe, and training of the revolutionary nation in arms and a less rigorous. In a few states, enlisted deep distrust of professional soldiers, men were allowed to form unions, work a announced the end of the draft and intro-

forty-hour week, and even receive over- duction of an all-volunteer army in 1996. Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/daed/article-pdf/140/3/112/1829938/daed_a_00102.pdf by guest on 29 September 2021 time pay. The semi-of½cial motto of the Spain, Italy, and most of the former Com- Dutch armed forces was said to be “As munist states of Eastern Europe soon fol- civilian as possible, as military as neces- lowed. By the beginning of the twenty- sary.” In fact, where European armies ½rst century, the overwhelming majority had once been seen as a way of instilling of nato’s armed forces were profession- discipline and patriotic commitment in als. The speed and ease with which Euro- civilian society, by the 1970s they were pean states abandoned compulsory mili- becoming increasingly “civilianized,” tary service reflected the long erosion of the products of a gradual but unmistak- conscription’s political, cultural, and able readjustment of the citizen’s sense military signi½cance.10 of obligations to the nation.8 Germany has held onto conscription longer than the other major European During the 1990s, after more than two states. In part this is because of postwar decades of gradual decline, conscript Germany’s historically rooted anxiety armies were ½nally abolished in most of about professional soldiers and pride in Europe. The most obvious reason was the the democratic army created after the end of the Cold War and the subsequent war. Signi½cantly, as the proponents of withdrawal of Soviet forces, which re- conscription also pointed out, the in- moved even the remote possibility of a creasing number of those choosing alter- territorial threat from the East. Fiscal native service provided the relatively pressures, too, encouraged governments inexpensive caregivers and hospital or- to take a hard and critical look at their derlies who are essential for the Federal defense budgets. Most important, it had Republic’s welfare system. Without a become painfully clear that Europe’s military draft, Germany’s civilian insti- armed forces, while quite large, were mil- tutions might suffer. In practice, howev- itarily worthless, especially for the kind er, conscription in the Federal Republic of technically sophisticated, fast-mov- has already come close to disappearing: ing, and intensive combat made possible between 2000 and 2009, the total num- by the so-called Revolution in Military ber of men performing military service Affairs. European states no longer need- dropped by more than half, from 144,647 ed mass armies to defend the homeland, to 68,304. In any case, it was dif½cult to but rather a relatively small number of describe as compulsory a system in professionals who could, if necessary, be which a civilian alternative was now sent on expeditions abroad, perhaps as granted automatically, making the Ger- part of a multinational peacekeeping man army what one expert called “an all

140 (3) Summer 2011 115 The volunteer force in disguise.” Needless to the army has always had a signi½cant Future of say, the German troops serving as part of role, as a deterrent to aggression and as a Conscription the nato contingent in Afghanistan are source of national identity. There are all professionals.11 indications, however, that in the current At present (February 2011), conscription security environment, both of these in Germany seems to be on the way out. functions are losing their central place in Under severe pressure to cut his budget Swiss politics. It may be that among and recognizing the need for a smaller European states, only Finland retains a but more effective force, the energet- conscript army on the traditional model. ic minister of defense, Karl-Theodor zu In a country where 80 percent of the male Guttenberg, sought to suspend the draft population has served in the military, the

(abolition would require a constitution- prestige and importance of the armed Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/daed/article-pdf/140/3/112/1829938/daed_a_00102.pdf by guest on 29 September 2021 al amendment) and introduce substan- forces remains high. Moreover, the Finn- tial reforms in the composition of Ger- ish military’s strategic objective remains many’s armed forces. It is striking that in territorial defense, a purpose persistently the current German discussions, as had nourished by memories of the heroic been the case in debates about ending Winter War against the Soviet Union in conscription in other European states, 1940 and recently reinforced by the the level of engagement, both among example of Russia’s invasion of Georgia politicians and their constituents, is low. in 2008.12 Well before they were abolished formal- With few exceptions, European mili- ly, Europeans’ conscript armies had tary institutions continue to be pro- ceased to be politically or culturally foundly affected by the global economic salient, either as a source of positive com- crisis that began in 2008. In fact, expendi- mitment or a target of active opposition. tures for defense, which were stagnant If, as seems very likely, the German for decades, have been in sharp decline parliament agrees to suspend conscrip- since the turn of the century: the Euro- tion, then only a handful of Western Eu- pean members of nato spent 2.05 per- ropean states will still have a draft. These cent of gdp for defense in 1999, 1.65 per- include Norway and Denmark, where cent in 2008. This trend is not likely to military service continues to be a part of be reversed in the austerity budgets now a citizen’s duty to the nation. In neither being formulated throughout Europe. country, however, does conscription The British government, for example, have a military purpose. There are, for announced drastic cuts in troop strength example, no conscripts in the small, but and equipment in a comprehensive de- quite effective, unit that Denmark has fense review published in October contributed to the nato mission in Af- 2010.13 One result of these budgetary ghanistan. In addition to Norway and pressures may be greater cooperation Denmark, three of the ½ve Cold War neu- among European states. Britain and trals–Austria, Switzerland, and Finland France, Europe’s two most important –still have conscript armies. (Ireland military powers, have already taken steps always had a small professional force; in this direction. But since the road to Sweden abolished conscription in Sum- effective transnational military institu- mer 2010.) Austria requires six months of tions is bound to be long and dif½cult, active duty in what has traditionally been the most likely consequence of these an underfunded and poorly equipped budgetary problems is a continuation army. In Switzerland, on the other hand, of Europeans’ dependence on the United

116 Dædalus, the Journal ofthe American Academy of Arts & Sciences States, a dependence most dramatically ill-de½ned–frontiers are, by de½nition, James J. expressed in the remarkable survival of contested and imprecise–there is good Sheehan nato decades after the disappearance of reason to suppose that it runs directly the common adversary against which the through the former Soviet imperium. On alliance was founded.14 the peaceful side are the Soviet Union’s An unspoken assumption behind Euro- former Eastern European satellites and peans’ budgetary debates is that military the three newly autonomous Baltic re- spending has become discretionary, an publics. Despite some hesitation and expense to be weighed against a variety of reluctance on both sides, these states other demands on the state’s resourc- eventually joined nato; with the excep- es–not, as was long the case, a necessary tion of Latvia and Lithuania, they, like

price to ensure national survival. Euro- their new allies in the West, have abol- Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/daed/article-pdf/140/3/112/1829938/daed_a_00102.pdf by guest on 29 September 2021 pean governments recognize that they ished conscription in favor of small pro- still face profound dangers: terrorism, fessional forces. In 2008, there were only organized crime, and in some countries, 4,000 conscripts among the 317,000 mili- increasingly violent social protests. And tary personnel in the new nato mem- there are occasions when states may want bers from the East. Moreover, again as in to project power by sending an expedi- the West, military expenditure in the tionary force abroad. But the preserva- East has continued to decline: except for tion of order and the deployment of Bulgaria (2 percent), Poland, and Roma- troops on some distant mission are very nia (each 1.9 percent), the Eastern Euro- different from the defense of the nation pean states are well below the stated from existential threats, the purpose for nato goal of allocating 2 percent of gdp which the mass conscript army had orig- to defense. What the eminent military inally been created. sociologist Martin Shaw once called “the last bastions of classical militarism in the Soon after the end of the Cold War and northern industrial world,” the former the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Communist regimes of Eastern Europe American political scientist Robert Keo- have become, within little more than a hane remarked that “one of the most vex- decade, civilian states on the Western ing questions in Europe today is where European model.16 the frontier between the West European On the other side of the frontier are the zone of peace and Eurasian zone of con- remaining Soviet European and Central flict will be.”15 On the western side of Asian successor states. All these states this line, conscription has largely disap- retain conscript armies. Some, such as peared and military service has become Belarus, are among the most militarized limited to a relatively small group of pro- states in the world. Where there are still fessionals who are compensated, like external threats and ongoing territorial ½re½ghters and police of½cers, for the disputes, as in Georgia, Armenia, and risks they are asked to take on behalf of Azerbaijan, military institutions have an their fellow citizens. On the other side of importance far greater than in the civil- the line, however, where the survival of ian West. the nation might still be at stake, military With just over half of the old Soviet service remains both a political obliga- Union’s population and three-fourths tion and a strategic necessity. of its territory, the Russian Federation But while the line between the peaceful is far and away its most important suc- and conflictual parts of Eurasia may be cessor state. Russia’s military capacity

140 (3) Summer 2011 117 The was among the casualties of the Soviet tary budget has not dramatically de- Future of Union’s extraordinary implosion. Even clined; conscription remains in force, Conscription before the ussr disappeared in 1991, the exemptions are rare, alternative service is Soviet military suffered a series of stun- virtually impossible. Militarily and polit- ning blows, including defeat in Af- ically, the army played a central role in ghanistan and the loss of its bases in East- the emergence of the Republic from the ern Europe. After 1991, morale and cohe- ruins of the Ottoman Empire. Despite sion deteriorated precipitously, attended recent efforts by the Erdogan govern- by endemic corruption, criminality, and ment to limit the army’s influence, the brutality. At present, Russia is supposed generals continue to be a powerful politi- to have over one million men on active cal force. Indeed, the sharp differences

duty, with another twenty million reserv- between civil-military relations in Tur- Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/daed/article-pdf/140/3/112/1829938/daed_a_00102.pdf by guest on 29 September 2021 ists, but in practice only a small percent- key and Europe represent another barrier age of these forces are deployable. Since to Turkey’s absorption into the European the 1990s, there have been several efforts Union. Unlike the rest of the eu, Turkey at reforming the military, the latest and is not a fully developed civilian state; most ambitious of which was introduced the possibility of international and do- in September 2008, following the rather mestic violence remains very much a part mixed results of Russia’s brief invasion of Turkish political life.18 of Georgia that summer. Although con- In most of Eurasia, the political role of scription remains in effect (early in 2008 the army is closer to the Turkish model the length of service was reduced to one than to the civilian states of Western year), the reformers want to create a Europe. In a few places like Myanmar the smaller, better trained and equipped military rules directly; sometimes, as in force that is permanently ready for Thailand, its power is veiled by a di- deployment. But formidable barriers to aphanous curtain of civilian authority. effective reform remain, including the Most often, the army acts, as it tradition- pervasive weakness of the Russian ad- ally did in the Turkish case, as a kind of ministrative apparatus, the economic “deep state,” using the threat of a coup to problems created by the global decline in set limits on what governments can and energy prices, and, perhaps most serious cannot do. Nowhere is this situation of all, the long-term effects of Russia’s more dramatically clear than in the polit- devastating demographic decline. Ac- ical crisis now unfolding in Egypt. Thus cording to the Chief of the Russian Gen- far (early February 2011), the army has eral Staff, in 2012 the number of draft- played a cautious role, refusing to use eligible males will be half of what it was deadly force against demonstrators but in 2001.17 not abandoning the government. Where Among the members of nato, only the loyalties of Egypt’s conscripts lie Turkey clearly occupies a position on the remains uncertain, but for the army’s conflict side of Keohane’s frontier. Turk- leaders, more than three decades of pow- ish troops have long defended a contest- er and influence are at stake. (“It is,” ed border on Cyprus and fought a long, notes one well-informed observer, “an bloody civil war against the Kurds. How open question how much power the mil- the creation of a semi-autonomous Kurd- itary has, and they might not even know ish territory in Iraq will affect Turkey is themselves.”)19 by no means clear. In any case, unlike its In North Korea, where Kim Jong Il is European counterparts, Turkey’s mili- seeking to extend his family’s control

118 Dædalus, the Journal ofthe American Academy of Arts & Sciences into the third generation, his heir appar- once made military service inseparable James J. ent was made a four-star general before from citizenship. But in many parts of Sheehan he was appointed to the Central Commit- Eurasia, especially on the wrong side of tee of Korean Workers’ Party, a sequence the frontier separating zones of peace that underlined how the army has con- and conflict, conscript armies designed solidated its hold on political power. to protect the territorial interests of With terms of active duty from ½ve to states are still centrally important and a twelve years and reserve obligations up war between states remains a constant to the age of sixty, North Korea has what danger. Here, civilian states on the Euro- is perhaps the world’s most extensive and pean model have not developed: military socially intrusive system of conscription. service remains an important part of

The border between the two Korean young men’s lives, conscript armies have Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/daed/article-pdf/140/3/112/1829938/daed_a_00102.pdf by guest on 29 September 2021 states may be the most heavily forti½ed, political and cultural signi½cance, and but it is by no means the only contested the of½cer corps often plays an important frontier in East Asia. Some of the territo- role. In countries such as Egypt, North ries involved in these disputes are very Korea, Thailand, Burma, and Pakistan, small, and in others the conflict is largely conscription still has a future, which will inert; but there are some–Kashmir, for help shape the future of these nations. instance, or parts of the Sino-Indian bor- Where does the United States ½t into der–that remain volatile enough to this picture? With its massive military erupt into large-scale international vio- budget and globally deployed armed lence. With two major powers, India and forces, it is surely not a civilian state on China, and a number of unstable and the European model. However divided potentially aggressive smaller states, the they may be on the use of force in speci½c rivalries and tensions within East Asia situations, most Americans agree that as somewhat resemble the European inter- a world power, the United States must be national system before 1914. Not surpris- willing and able to project military power ingly, it is here that the mass conscript to defend its interests throughout a dan- army continues to provide the founda- gerous world. And yet, unlike those states tion of national defense. where military service remains a national obligation, the United States counts on In the past few years, a number of ex- professionals to meet its extensive global perts have argued that conscription, like commitments. The burden of America’s the modern state from which it devel- mission in the world, therefore, is carried oped, was on its way to historical obliv- by a relatively small portion of the popu- ion. The international studies scholar lation, whose sacri½ces are honored but Eliot Cohen, for example, recently de- not shared by the larger society. In a clared that “the age of the mass army is sense, the United States is a civilian state over.”20 Perhaps. There is no question with signi½cant military obligations. that in many parts of the world, conscript Many of the other essays collected in this armies have been dissolved or dimin- volume examine the tensions that arise ished; quality, represented by the ability from this uneasy mix of values and aspi- to use complex new weapon systems, has rations. replaced quantity as a measurement of military power. In much of Europe, the rise of civilian states has changed the bal- ance between rights and duties that had

140 (3) Summer 2011 119 The endnotes Future of 1 Conscription Victor Kiernan, “Conscription and Society in Europe before the War of 1914–1918,” in War and Society: Historical Essays in Honour and Memory of J. R. Western, 1928–1971, ed. M.R.D. Foot (New York: Barnes & Noble Books, 1973), 141. 2 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America (New York: Everyman’s Library, 1994), 288–289. 3 The classic analysis of conscription’s political signi½cance is Morris Janowitz, “Military Institutions and Citizenship in Western Societies,” in The Military and the Problem of Legiti- macy, ed. Gwyn Harries-Jenkins and Jacques Van Doorn (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publica- tions, 1976), 77–92. 4 See David Ralston, Importing the European Army: The Introduction of European Military Tech- niques and Institutions into the Extra-European World, 1600–1914 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990). Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/daed/article-pdf/140/3/112/1829938/daed_a_00102.pdf by guest on 29 September 2021 5 See Bruce Vandervort, Wars of Imperial Conquest in Africa, 1830–1914 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1998). 6 On the changing security environment in postwar Europe, see James J. Sheehan, Where Have All the Soldiers Gone?: The Transformation of Modern Europe (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2008), chap. 7. 7 For some examples, see the data in Ronald Inglehart, The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles among Western Publics (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1977). 8 See Sheehan, Where Have All the Soldiers Gone?, chap. 8. The best collection of information on military institutions is The Military Balance, published annually since 1959 by the Inter- national Institute for Strategic Studies in London. On The Netherlands, see F. Olivier and G. Teitler, “Democracy and the Armed Forces: The Dutch Experiment,” in Armed Forces and the Welfare Societies: Challenges in the 1980s, ed. Gwyn Harries-Jenkins (New York: St. Mar- tin’s Press, 1983), 54–95. 9 For changing patterns of conflict, see Lotta Harbom and Peter Wallensteen, “Armed Con- flicts, 1946–2009,” Journal of Peace Research 47 (4) (2010): 501–509; Andreas Wenger et al., Strategic Trends 2010 (Center for Security Studies, eth Zürich, 2010); and the essays in Isabelle Duyvesteyn and Jan Angstrom, eds., Rethinking the Nature of War (London: Frank Cass, 2005). 10 See James Burk, “The Decline of Mass Armed Forces and Compulsory Military Service,” Defense Analysis 8 (1) (1992): 45–59; and Curtis Gilroy and Cindy Williams, eds., Service to Country: Personnel Policy and the Transformation of Western Militaries (Cambridge, Mass.: mit Press, 2007). There is a careful study of the French case in J. Justin McKenna, “Towards the Army of the Future: Domestic Politics and the End of Conscription in France,” West Euro- pean Politics 20 (4) (1997): 125–145. 11 Enlistment data from Der Spiegel, July 29, 2010. Quotation from Gerhard Kümmel in Gilroy and Williams, Service to Country, chap. 8. 12 Henning Sørensen, “Conscription in Scandinavia during the Last Quarter Century: Devel- opments and Arguments,” Armed Forces & Society 26 (2) (2000): 313–334. Pauli Järvenpäa, “Finland’s Defence Policy: Sui Generis?” Baltic Defence Review 11 (1) (2004): 129–134. 13 See Judy Dempsey, “The Peril that nato Can’t Ignore,” The New York Times, November 10, 2010, and “Brie½ng. The Cost of Weapons,” The Economist, August 28, 2010, 20–21. 14 While the persistence of nato points to the enduring importance of the United States for European security, nato’s continuing effort to de½ne its military and political objectives underscores the inherent dif½culties in sustaining the Atlantic relationship. The most recent effort to shape the alliance to meet the challenges of a post–Cold War world was the Strate- gic Concept adopted at the Lisbon Summit in November 2010; for a concise analysis, see

120 Dædalus, the Journal ofthe American Academy of Arts & Sciences two ½ne articles on “The Future of nato,” in The Economist, November 13, 2010, 27–30, and James J. November 25, 2010, 24–25. Sheehan 15 Robert Keohane, Joseph Nye, and Stanley Hoffmann, eds., After the Cold War: International Institutions and Strategies in Europe, 1989–1991 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993), 6. 16 Martin Shaw, Post-Military Society: Militarism, Demilitarization, and War at the End of the Twentieth Century (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1996), 163. On the armed forces of the former Communist states, see the data in The Military Balance 2010 and the useful summary by Jeffrey Simon, “nato’s Uncertain Future: Is Demography Destiny?” Strategic Forum no. 236 (October 2008): 1–7. 17 On the dif½culties of reform, see Carolina Pallin, Russian Military Reform: A Failed Exercise in Defence Decision Making (London: Routledge, 2009). For the most recent efforts, see the

chapter on the Russian Federation in The Military Balance 2010. Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/daed/article-pdf/140/3/112/1829938/daed_a_00102.pdf by guest on 29 September 2021 18 On the Turkish armed forces, see The Military Balance 2010 and “A Special Report on Turkey,” The Economist, October 23, 2010. 19 Thanassis Cambanis, “Succession Gives Army a Stiff Test in Egypt,” The New York Times, September 12, 2010. 20 Quoted in Colin Gray, Another Bloody Century: Future Warfare (London: Weidenfeld & Nicol- son, 2005), 172.

140 (3) Summer 2011 121