The Democratic Republic of Congo (Drc) Conflict Insights

PEACE & SECURITY REPORT

THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO (DRC) CONFLICT INSIGHTS

APRIL 2021

The purpose of this report is to provide analysis and recommendations to national, regional and continental decision makers in the implementation of peace and security-related instruments. The opinions expressed in this report are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Institute for Peace and Security Studies. www.ipss-addis.org/publications

CONTENTS

SITUATION ANALYSIS 2 CAUSES OF THE CONFLICT 3 ACTORS 5 CONFLICT DYNAMICS 9 CURRENT RESPONSE ASSESSMENT 11 SCENARIOS 13 STRATEGIC OPTIONS 14 REFERENCES 16 CONFLICT TIMELINE 17

CONTRIBUTORS

JESUTIMILEHIN O. AKAMO (AUTHOR) DR. MESFIN GEBREMICHAEL (EDITOR IN CHIEF) CYNTHIA HAPPI (ASSOCIATE EDITOR)

© 2021 Institute For Peace And Security Studies | Addis Ababa University. All Rights Reserved. Institute for Peace and Security Studies (IPSS) DRC Conflict Insights Report 2 89.98M SITUATION ANALYSIS https://undocs.org/S/2020/272 the Region. Report oftheSecretary General S/2020/272.Retrieved from Cooperation Framework for theDemocratic Republic of theCongo and 3 Journal onConflict Resolution, 8(3),57-84. in Post-conflict Democratic Republic oftheCongo: Aprognosis. African 2 country/drc/overview Congo. Retrieved Where WeWork. from https://www.worldbank.org/en/ 1 from theMiddleEast, hasmadeanintroduction while vulnerable.3 TheIslamicState (IS),aterrorist group isfragileThe country andtheeastern part isthemost beginning to evolve. are linksandcontinuities from thepast, context a new is democratic anddiplomatic Thus,althoughthere outlook. and militarised approach whilethelatter hasamore and after. The former ischaracterised by authoritarianism before thepeaceful power 2019, transition inJanuary Tshiluba. DRC’s conflict can besplitinto two periods: four national languages —Lingala, Kikongo, Swahili, and others.2 While French is DRC’s official language, there are and theBantusare themajorityethnic group among many export. Christians make upover 94%ofthepopulation, sector whichallaccount for its internal economy and of agriculture, fishing, mining,forestry andtheinformal producer, aprimary countries.1 As its economy ismadeup Western Europe, andoneoftheworld’s most resourced largest withasurface country area comparable with The Democratic Republic ofCongo (DRC)isCentral Africa’s FIGURE 1.COUNTRY PROFILEANDDEMOGRAPHICS SUDAN RWANDA, UGANDA, SOUTH BURUNDI TANZANIA ZAMBIA ANGOLA CONGO (BRAZAVILLE) CAR POPULATION NEIGHBOURS UNSCR(2020).Implementation ofthePeace, Securityand Whetho, A.,andUzodike, U. O.(2008).Religious Networks Democratic WorldBank(2020).Overview: Republic of INDEX: 0.459 60.4 HUMAN DEVELOPMENT INDEX(HDI) LIFE EXPECTANCY AT BIRTH (YRS) Congo. CrisisWatch: Tracking Conflict Worldwide. 9 armed-groups-agree-to-end-hostilities-in-dr-congo/1976763 DR Congo. [BlogPost] Retrieved from https://www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/70- 8 June, 2020and22June-July 6,2020 Democratic Republic ofTheCongo. Bi-Weekly Emergency Update, 8-22 7 https://www.thedefensepost.com/2020/08/05/dr-congo-armed-groups/ Groups Killed1,300inFirst Halfof2020:UN.[BlogPost] Retrieved from 6 Watch (2020).WorldReport 2020:Events of2019.HumanRights Watch. en/latest/campaigns/2016/06/drc-cobalt-child-labour/; andHumanRights child-labor/congo-democratic-republic-drc; https://www.amnesty.org/ 5 from https://www.thedefensepost.com/2020/09/10/adf-kill-58-ituri/ Militia Kill58inEastern DRCongo’s IturiProvince. [BlogPost] Retrieved 4 North Kivuprovinces asofSeptember 2020.89 controlled areas, the conflict has intensified in Ituri and groups inSouth Kivupledged to endthecrisisintheir million from South Kivu provinces.7 While some armed 1.6 millionfrom Ituri,1.9millionfrom NorthKivu,and1 Over 4.5millionpeoplehave beeninternally displaced: what was recorded withinthesametime frame in2019.6 killed in the first half of 2020 is about three times that of based violence (SGBV) isrampant.5 Thenumberofpeople mining—about 40,000children— andsexual andgender- situation isleveraged to employ child(cheap) labourfor other armedgroups continue to operate.4 The conflict International CrisisGroup (2020).Democratic Republic of Fork, R.(2020).70armedgroups agree to endhostilities in UNHCR(2020).Ituri,NorthKivuandSouthKivuprovinces: TheDefense Post (2020,August 5). DRCongo Armed Seehttps://www.dol.gov/agencies/ilab/resources/reports/ TheDefence Post (2020,September 10).Notorious ADF $511.6 SADC ECCAS COMESA GDP PERCAPITA RECS Ibid Congo: ArmsFlow. Africa inFact 52. 15 14 an Affairs (2019).2019Annual DRCHumanitarianReport. Fund 13 Perceptions,Development. 4(2) Democratic Republic ofCongo: AnAnalysisofInternational Barriers to 12 Tshilombo. Fletcher F. WorldAff., 43(2),131. cratic Republic ofCongo: Challenges Ahead for President Félix Tshisekedi 11 School ofSocialSciences, September 20,2020 via WhatsApp Call 10 support for armedgroups.15 impact, encouraged thecreation, remobilisation, and networks, withtheir socio-economic andsocio-political responding to dissent.14However, fragmentation and Tshisekedi does not engage state-led repression when informal networks are muchpresent, still President very While political fragmentation andeconomically driven and oppositionthrough theseyears speak to this. repression was rampant. Responses to critiques, dissents until 2019,whenJoseph Kabila handedover, state-led Pooled Funds (CBPF).1213Inaddition,from the1960s International Monetary Fund (IMF)andCountry-Based the Force Brigade Intervention (FIB),theWord Bank, Democratic Republic oftheCongo (MONUC/MONUSCO), United Nations Organisation Stabilisation Missioninthe of security, financialandhumanitarian aidfrom the the heavy dependence onforeign interms intervention further weakened thecapacity ofthestate;11 hence, also informed the protraction oftheconflict to date and factions were totally onthesamepage. Thefragmentation governments, asthere hasnot beenanytimewhenall the weak legitimacy suffered by allDRC’s central and its effects constitute a large part of what underlies (1996-97 and1998-2003),for example. Thisfragmentation Kasai wars ofsecession (1960-65),andtheCongo Wars These were common threads withtheKatanga andSouth were created and exploited to perpetuate violence.10 armed groups and economically driven informal networks against orsupportfor thecentral government’s interest, the central government whileothers didnot. Inrebellion ideological differences. Because ofthis,somesupported by resource distribution, identity(ethnicity) and Post-independence political fragmentation was provoked Political Factors CAUSES OFTHECONFLICT Misser, F. (2020).Rivers ofArms, Democratic Republic of United Nations Office for theCoordination ofHumanitari- Smith,A.N.(2018).Foreign inthe AidandDevelopment Ntung,A.(2019).DynamicsofLocal Conflict intheDemo withAnalyst, Bremen Interview International Graduate - Inequalities Socio-economic Dearthand the Parliament, Jeanine Mabunda.18 and successful vote to remove thepro-Kabila Speaker of towards thisistheendofhiscoalition withJosephKabila attempts at amore favourable parliament. Hislatest win to institutional reforms. Thispartly explains hispolitical controlled parliament has been a problem with respect For President Tshisekedi, therefore, aKabilacoalition- in anattempt to tamper withjudicial independence.17 power intheMinister ofJustice, anexecutive officer, controversial billonjudicialreform. Thebillvests more President Tshisekedi’s oppositionto theparliament’s corruption whichrender itweak. Thispartly informs to absence ofjudicialindependence and,uncontrolled This indicates lackofconfidence inthejustice system due from justice or reporting excessiveness ofsecurity forces.16 Furthermore, inactions andfear ofreprisals prevent many 20 Economic Commissionfor Africa Congo: Causes,impact andimplications for theGreat Lakes region. UN 19 justice-risk-democratic-republic-congo Watch [Blogpost] Retrieved from https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/07/08/ of Congo: Draft LawsEndanger Independence ofCourts. HumanRights 18 dependence-power-complicity-protest/ blogs.lse.ac.uk/africaatlse/2020/06/30/60-years-of-congo-anniversary-in- dence: Power, ComplicityandProtest [BlogPost] Retrieved from https:// 17 tice-pledge-leaving-victims-in-despair/ democratic-republic-of-congo-president-tshisekedi-reneges-on-jus ing victims indespair https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2020/06/ Republic ofCongo: President Tshisekedi reneges onjustice pledge, leav 16 until after hisdeath.20 Laurent Kabilainherited andthere was noGDPgrowth 511% whilePer Capita Income was $100.Thiswas what Because ofthis, DRC’s inflation rate became ashigh economic activity andhuge debt maderecovery difficult. currency crisis,andcollapse ofpublicandprivate sectors’ Economicout. mismanagement, lack of infrastructure, wasthe country yet to recover whentheCongo Wars broke copper. Theshockrecurred inthe1980s,andby the1990s, commodity price shockthat affected DRC’s main export— ally-elites in the 1970s. During this period, there was a policies, President Mobuturedistributed wealth to his for hissuccessor, Laurent Kabila.Undertheguiseofthose those policies. This created a faulty economic foundation and businesseswere expropriated from foreigners using haunts today.19 thecountry For instance, farms, factories policies plunged theDRC into economic crisisandthat still Mobutu SeseSeko’s Zairianisation andnationalisation Gebrewold, B.(2016).Anatomy ofviolence: Understanding UNECA(2015).Conflicts intheDemocratic Republic of Fessy, T. (2020).Justice at RiskinDemocratic Republic Hoebeke, H.et. al.(2020).60Years ofCongo’s Indepen- SeeAmnesty International (2020,June16).Democratic - - 3 Institute for Peace and Security Studies (IPSS) DRC Conflict Insights Report Institute for Peace and Security Studies (IPSS) DRC Conflict Insights Report 4 natural resources.27 beneficiaries’ (external actors andwarlords) access to and writineastern DRC.Peace andorder threaten conflict- like Rwanda interfere to benefitfrom theabsence oforder to landandnatural resources.26 Lastly, external actors and Lendu (Ituri region) also clash over communal access forces over miningsquares.2425 Ethnic groups inHema informal groups clashwithone another orwithsecurity coffee, gold, anddiamonds illegally. Likewise, different compete andfueltheconflicts intheirregions to export conflicts. For example, warlords inNorthandSouthKivu resources that affect theoccurrence andduration of This isinadditionto theproblems associated withnatural economic alternative andsocialspace.23 to joinarmedgroups asanattractive andreasonable opportunities is restricted. Youths are thus motivated and education are poorandlimited; access to economic Furthermore, socialinfrastructures suchashealth care disinterest onthepart ofinvestors worsen thesituation.22 and natural resources withoutindustrial capacity andthe isrankedin thecountry low.21 Thereliance onagriculture improve macro-economic stability andeconomic freedom Since then,theDRChasnot beenableto recover to Academy to theFord Foundation. International Peace Academy tions: AReport submitted by theAfrica Program oftheInternational Peace Peace thePeacebuilding inAfrica, Assessing Capacity ofAfrican Institu- 27 inIturi’ Intervention 26 ment inthe21st century. Global Reports HumanDevelopment income, averages, beyond today: beyond Inequalitiesinhumandevelop 25 International Understanding Alert: Conflict. BuildingPeace. Natural Resources inFuelling andProlonging CrisesintheEastern DRC. 24 Congo. JournalofRefugee Studies 00(0),1-21. gating socialspaces: armedmobilization andcircular return inEastern DR 23 Ibid which account for over 80%ofthecountry’s exports ‘. WorldBank(2020). owing to thedrop incommodity prices, particularly for cobalt andcopper, ‘After reaching 5.8%in2018,economic growth slowed to 4.4%in2019, 22 The Heritage Foundation 21 tradingeconomics.com/congo/gdp the systems ofconflict andviolence inAfrica. Routledge; seealsohttps:// Juma,M.andMengistu, A.(2002).TheInfrastructure of SeeICG Africa Report No. 64titled ‘Congo Crisis:Military Report UNDP(2019).HumanDevelopment 2019-Beyond International (2010).The Role Alert. oftheExploitation of Vlassenroot, K.,Mudinga, E.,andMusamba, J. (2020). Navi- DRCcannot withstand economic Seefor example: shock. Miller, T. et. al.(2020).2020Index ofEconomic Freedom. - to fuelandleverage theconflict.36 These soldiers builtandexplored cross-border networks neighbouring countries to theresources ineastern DRC. In addition,theCongo Wars exposed soldiers ofthe denies it.35 extraction; hence Rwanda’s interference, thoughit even conflict allegedly Rwanda’s serves interest inillicitcoltan hascontinuedrivalry to date. therivalry, Beyond the began to pursue other interests.34 TheHutu-Tutsi ethnic a form ofresistance. However, after sometime, others confrontations.33 SomeMai-Maimilitiaswere created as in thecreation ofMai-Maimilitiasandrelated violent meddlesomeness, for instance, played a significant role interference ledto eventually theCongo wars.32 Rwanda’s neighbours (Rwanda especially) to meddleinthefray. The support from Rwanda.31 Thisisusedasanexcuse by other opportunists followed suit by creating theirs with Mobutu formed armedgroups30 whiletheTutsis and Rwanda. Hutugénocidaires whoalliedthemselves with In addition,there was a huge refugee influxfrom opposed to theTutsis. of Rwandan rebels now active intheDRC;group is FDLR isaHuturebel group and isoneofthelast factions perceive to beadomination attempt from Rwandan Tutsi. The group aimsto emancipate Uganda from what they in Uganda since 2007 and is now based in eastern DRC. ADF isaUgandan rebel group that hasfailed to operate Democratic Forces for theLiberation ofRwanda (FDLR). such rebels includetheAlliedDemocratic Force (ADF)and and interact with vulnerable communities.29 Examples of use DRC’sThus, they porous borders for hideouts to attack do not have astrong base intheirrespective countries. with their governments on theother side of DRC’s borders of thecountry.28 Rwandan andUgandan rebels fighting its institutional andoperational crisisintheeastern part grassroots, theDRCgovernment has struggled to manage Despite its weak presence at ordistance from the External Factors 29(93-94), 463-480. flict? Diamonds andwar in theDRC.Review ofAfrican Political Economy, 36 Contributor, CNN,September 22,2020viaEmailExchange. 35 atviews https://www.hrw.org/reports/2002/drc/Congo0602-03.htm 34 state-making. Manchester University Press. militias inEastern resistance, DRC.InEveryday peacebuilding and 33 32 Republic ofCongo. Geneva Academy 31 cratic-republic-congo here: https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/violence-demo 30 Rwanda (FDLR) Resistance Army(LRA), andtheDemocratic Forces for theLiberation of 29 lic_congo_geopolitical_briefing_nkunda_civil_war_rwanda_africa/ exploringgeopolitics.org/interview_spittaels_steven_democratic_repub civil war/Interviewer: van L[Transcript]. Efferink, Retrieved from https:// 28 Samset, I.(2002).Conflict ofinterests orinterests incon- withCorrespondent, TheAfrica Interview Report and SeeHumanRights Watch Report after aseriesofinter deHeredia, violence M. I.(2017).Everyday andMai-Mai Ibid, Ahere, J. (2012). Marcucci, G.(2019).TheWar Report 2018:TheDemocratic SeeCouncilonForeign Relation’s Global Conflict Tracker For Examples AlliedDemocratic Force (ADF),theLord’s Steven Spittaels: Congo (Democratic Republic) –acomplex - - - FIGURE 2.ACTORS MAPPING Key 38 tion oftheDemocratic Republic ofCongo 37 parliamentarynew election.38 (FCC), there are threats to dissolve theParliament for a coalition withthepro-Kabila Commonfront for theCongo independence. However, amidst thecrisis over the shaky doing so, hedidnot violate thesanctity ofthelegislature’s to anexecutiveJudiciary office—The ofJustice. Ministry By as proposed by theLegislature which tends to subject the For instance, President Tshisekedi didnot supportreforms efforts have gone into maintaining theirindependence. of President Tshisekedi 2019,however, inJanuary more impeding checksandbalances. Since thecoming to power struggled for independence since the 1960s,thereby constitution.37 Thelegislature (parliament) andjudiciary who make, interpret and execute laws according to the This ismadeupoftheExecutive, Legislature andJudiciary Congo (DRC) Democratic Republicofthe Government ofthe ACTORS Predominant Direction ofInfluence Broken Alliance Discord/Conflict Links/Close Relationships Seehttps://www.africanews.com/2020/12/07/dr-congo- TheDemocratic Republic ofCongo (2005).TheConstitu - Governments Foreign DRC’s Mineral Heartland 40 States. and Future Conflict Projections. RAND Corporation Santa Monica United Conflict of Historical Drivers: AnEmpirical Assessment Conflict Patterns Frederick, B.,Norlen,T. C.,andVoorhies, P. (2017).Conflict Trends and 39 opposition-fights-move-to-scrap-shaky-coalition/ border networks that fueltheconflict. communities andpartly informs thesuccess ofcross- the situation exacerbates existing structural gaps inthe which weakens their provincial authority. Altogether, also struggle withtheproblem oflegitimacy andsecurity to provide socialinfrastructure.40They thenecessary undermines theirfinancialcapacity leaving themunable less revenue oughtto than they from thenational tax. This Constitution whichcontributes to theprovinces’ receiving fiscal decentralisation inrelation to Article175ofthe provincial/local governments, for instance, dispute over perform its functions leaving its peoplevulnerable. The of insufficient resources; theDRC state isobliged to similar conflict drivers.39 Thedistance ismostly because the conflict andcreates conducive atmosphere for The distance between thestate andgrassroots drives International CrisisGroup (2016).Katanga: Tensions in Szayna, T. S.,O’Mahony, A.,Kavanagh, J., Watts, S., 5 Institute for Peace and Security Studies (IPSS) DRC Conflict Insights Report Institute for Peace and Security Studies (IPSS) DRC Conflict Insights Report 6 DDRC success are instances. over theM-23rebellion in2013,ADF2020,andtheCIAP- the ground), for instance, hasbeenanadvantage. Victory to theconflict. Partnership withUN-MONUSCO (boots on Mechanisms (RMs),andother foreign actors withrespect Regional Economic Communities(RECs)/Regional Republic ofCongo (MONUSCO), theAfrican Union(AU), Organisation Stabilisation MissionintheDemocratic The Government works with the United Nations hostilities.41 active armed groups in South Kivu pledged to withdraw South KivuinOctober 2019.By September 2020,seventy (CIAP-DDRC) was formed after President Tshisekedi visited Demobilization, andCommunityReintegration Process Commission to SupporttheAwareness, Disarmament, of thestate-grassroots nexus, theInter-provincial state hadbeensubstantial. To emphasisetheimportance in thepost-Congo War years ifthewritandinfluence ofthe Also, theinter-ethnic would likely rivalry not have worsened 47 46 45 drc1204/3.htm 44 Gordian knot ofinsecurity. Rift InstituteValley national armyandarmedgroups intheeastern Congo: Untangling the 43 cratic-republic-of-the-congo firepower.com/country-military-strength-detail.asp?country_id=demo 42 dia-review/africa-media-review-for-september-18-2020/ African Centre for Strategic Studies at https://africacenter.org/daily-me 41 deals.4647 sales ofarmsandammunition,ornon-aggression domestic armedgroups for mutualeconomic benefits, fights armedgroups, someofits commanders work with other humanrights violations.45 Moreover, whileFARDC engaged inSexual andGender-Based Violence (SGBV) and Furthermore, aUNSecurityCouncilreport shows that it MONUSCO inoffences against armedgroups. the demandsby theconflict. However, itpartners with but its capacity andprofessionalism is too weak to handle President Tshisekedi struggles withcontrol over FARDC, withHumanRights Watch.44during aninterview Overall, and lackofcooperation asreported by aFARDC officer identity differences.43 This causes ariskofdisloyalty political elites withinthemilitary, andpeoplewith command adopted after theintegration of ex-militias, networks. This isprimarily caused by themixed chain of by internalIt isoverwhelmed crisisbecause ofpatronage (FARDC) comprises approximately 134,000personnel.42 Armed Forces oftheDemocratic Republic oftheCongo Congo (FARDC) Democratic Republicofthe Armed Forcesofthe Verweijen,J. (2018).Soldiers withoutanarmy?Patronage UNSecurityCouncil,S/2010/596. UNSecurityCouncilA/HRC/30/32 Seehttps://www.hrw.org/legacy/backgrounder/africa/ Stearns, J., Verweijen, J., andErikssonBaaz,M.(2013).The Seedetails ofassets andfirepower at https://www.global- SeeAfrica MediaReview for September 18,2020by the - - work together loosely. Sometimes, different factions have decentralised; andwhilesomefactions clash,others are scattered across the region.52 The group is highly community-based andabout20,000to 30,000ofthem exploit the protracted conflict. TheMai-Mai militias are to Rwanda, whilethemore recent oneswere created to invasion ofRwandan forces andarmedgroups affiliated Many oftheMai-Maimilitiaswere formed to resist the constitute athreat to sustainable peace intheDRC. negotiation withtheRwandan government continues to Their continued attack against Tutsis andunsuccessful FDLR likely receives supportfrom Uganda andBurundi. to justify its interference intheDRC.Itisvital to note that combatants.51 Rwanda usesFDLR’s continued existence it seeksto overthrow FDLRismadeupofover it. 2,000 open dialoguewiththeRwandan government butsecretly over its objective because openlyitappears to pushfor an ousted in1994andRwandan refugees. There isdispute foreign armed group in the DRC. It is madeup of Rwandans FDLR alsooperates inNorthKivuanditisthelargest have inMONUSCO forces. Other reprisal attacks before them affected the trust locals those intheIturiregion through theirreprisal attacks. most recent defeat suffered they sparked insecurity for areThey most active inBeniterritory, NorthKivu.The have coordinatedThey attacks together inrecent years.50 IS andalignedwithFDLRinterms ofits hatred for Tutsis. secretive andits strength isunknown. Itisaffiliated with officials accuse Rwanda ofsupportingthem.ADFishighly external funding from anunknown source, albeit Ugandan religious tactics for recruitment, andseemto bereceiving President employ economic DadaIdi-Amin.They and because felt they alienated after the overthrow of Former Mountains ofeastern DRCongo. Thegroup was formed ADF isaUgandan rebel group based alongtheRwenzori the 1960sbutreappeared inforce in1993).49 and Mai-MaiMilitias(acommunity-based group formed in Forces for theLiberation ofRwanda (FDLR)formed in1994, Allied Democratic Force (ADF)formed in1998,Democratic alternatives for locals. The main armed groups include associal,economic, alsoserve andsecurity crisis. They These groups cooperate, clash, and experience internal bred and foreign, and their membership is young.48 There are over 130active armedgroups intheDRC:home- Non-state ArmedGroups atviews https://www.hrw.org/reports/2002/drc/Congo0602-03.htm 52 at https://monusco.unmissions.org/en/foreign-armed-groups 51 Force Brigade. Intervention ISS Today 50 atviews https://www.hrw.org/reports/2002/drc/Congo0602-03.htm 49 upenn.edu/Hornet/irin-120899c.html 48 Forces andSociety, 44(4), 626-646. networks andcohesion inthearmedforces oftheDRCongo. Armed SeeHumanRights Watch Report after aseriesofinter SeeabriefonADFandFDLRMONUSCO’s official page Fabricius, P. therightquestions aboutthe (2020).Asking SeeHumanRights Watch Report after aseriesofinter SeeIRINSpecialReport onADFat https://www.africa. - - Police (PNC)enabledsecure return ofdisplaced persons. MONUSCO’s partnership withFARDC andtheNational when called upon.59 Despite thesenegative experiences, of engagements whichdonot supportrapid intervention financial, personnel and logistical capacity, andtherules civilians. Thepoor effectiveness was due to weakened its ineffective response to reported attacks against of Beni demandedMONUSCO’s departure because of Irumu andIturiincreased.58 2020,thepeople InFebruary This hasamixed result because thenumberofattacks in aresult, ADFfledto Irumu,near2019. As Ituriregion. One ofMONUSCO’s operations devastated ADFinOctober Nations (UN). contributed by thevarious memberstates oftheUnited key governance andsecurityreforms.57 Personnel are and strengthening ofstate institutions intheDRCand protection ofciviliansandsupportto thestabilization as anupgrade onMONUCwithtwo strategic priorities: established by theUNSecurityCouncil(UNSC)in2010 1999 whenMONUCwas created. MONUSCO was later Governmental Institution (IGI)intheDRCconflict since tions-troops-monusco-from-the-democratic-republic-of-the-congo/ exasperated-the-people-of-beni-demand-the-departure-of-the-united-na- Centre [BlogPost] Retrieved from https://africaupclose.wilsoncenter.org/ from theDemocratic Republic oftheCongo. SouthernVoices, Wilson of BeniDemandtheDeparture oftheUnited Nations Troops (MONUSCO) 59 armed-group-may-amount-crimes-against-humanity-and-war-crimes 58 S/RES/2409; S/RES/2502 57 Activities ofADF?Non-State Actors 56 and armedgroups intheCongo. Rift InstituteValley 55 Workshop. International Peace Institute (IPI) and SequencingofPeacekeeping Mandates: TheCaseofMONUSCO. 54 nter.org/spotlight/medley-armed-groups-play-congo-crisis/ Groups PlayonCongo’s Crisis[BlogPost]. Retrieved from https://africace 53 T the Congo(MONUSCO) the DemocraticRepublicof The UnitedNationsMissionin and intellectual resources.56 and access to resources, intelligence gathering, logistics, is leveraged for recruitment, local intelligence, financing andengagelevel, thediaspora whennecessary.55 This run orparticipate inaparallel administration at local areThus, they ableto participate insociallife, sometimes sphere ofoperation, andexploit local communities.54 exercise influence over elites withintheirgeographical These armed groups have kinship ties with communities, Gideon attacked FDLRduringelections.53 and FDLRcoordinate attacks together whileMai-Mai different alliesorenemies. For example, Mai-MaiNyatura he United Nations (UN)hasbeenthe majorInter- Minani, R. (2020, February 18).Exasperated, Minani,R.(2020,February thePeople Seehttps://monusco.unmissions.org/en/drc-attacks-adf- UNSecurityCouncil,S/RES/1925;S/RES/2053;S/RES/2147; Akamo, J. O.(2020).How CanMONUSCO Contain the Verweijen,J. (2016).Stable Instability Political settlements International Peace Institute et. al.(2019).Prioritization Nantulya, P. (2017,September ofArmed 25).AMedley - aidprofenasbl.wordpress.com/ FEN, September 19,2020viaWhatsApp CallandChat. Seealsohttps:// 63 org/spotlight/interview-prospects-peace-drc-katunga/ ProspectsInterview: for Peace intheDRC[Blogpost] https://africacenter. 62 Republic ofCongo duringtheCOVID-19 Emergency. Faith inAction. 61 sured-presence-peacekeepers-and-army-families-have-returned-home North Kivu.63 helped prevent manyfrom joiningarmedgroups inGoma, education campaign for abandoned girlsandboys has (INGOs) andtheUS Embassy, amongothers. Theequal from International Non-governmental Organisations focuses onwomen and children andreceives support Pour laProtection delaFemme et del’Enfant (AIDPROFEN) Furthermore, Actions et Initiatives deDéveloppement administration operates withadifferent approach. Kabila informed hismobiliser’s role butTshisekedi’s Human rights violations anddemocratic deficits under of President Tshisekedi at theVatican 2020. inJanuary focussed on its mediator role. An indication is its hosting Since Tshisekedi became a president, the church has which thechurch playsavital role, andeastern DRC. There isalinkbetween thepoliticsinKinshasa, the importance oftheirinclusioninthepeace process. as anopportunityto escalate violence anddemonstrate eastern saw Kabila’s DRC and they weakening legitimacy affected Kabila’s legitimacy. Most armedgroups are inthe infiltrated by pro-government supporters. Thisadversely Out ofthese,133were attacked by government forces or There were 149peaceful marches mobilisedby thechurch. were provoked by thedelayed election andrepression.62 participation (mobiliser).61Actions mediation beyond as aneutral party (mediator) andfacilitates political It engages inDRC’s peace process by presenting itself is theleading civilsociety organisation inthenation. accounts for more than50%ofthecountry’s population, The Catholic Church intheDRC,whosecongregation Civil Society Walikale territory ofNorthKivu.60 A recent example is the case of late October 2020 in Pinga, 60 Interview withFounder andExecutive Interview Director ofAIDPRO- Africa Center for Strategic Studies 17). (2017,February Vail, C.(2020).Catholic Peacebuilding intheDemocratic Seehttps://monusco.unmissions.org/en/pinga-reas - 7 Institute for Peace and Security Studies (IPSS) DRC Conflict Insights Report Institute for Peace and Security Studies (IPSS) DRC Conflict Insights Report 8 ADF against Museveni’s Uganda. South Kivuagainst Burundiandbacking insurgents like Rwanda islinked to supportingrebel groups operating in linked withUganda andBurundiagainst Rwanda. fight proxy wars amongeach other. FDLR,for instance, is These countries have usedmilitiasoperating intheDRCto as their internal crises prove to be a threat to the DRC. amongUganda,The rivalry Rwanda, andBurundiaswell DRC’s EasternNeighbours YorkNew Review ofBooks,24.Global Policy Forum. 65 the Eastern DRCongo andGreat Lakes. CrisisGroup Africa BriefingN°150 64 Uganda andBurundifor arapprochement. hence, thequadritite arrangement between Rwanda, President Tshisekedi hopesto diplomatically resolve; French, H.W. (2009).Kagame’s HiddenWar inCongo. The International CrisisGroup (2020).Averting Proxy Wars in 65 Thisdynamiciswhat 64 Inturn, 70 69 68 Support to theMarch 23Movement (M23).Amsterdam LF, 5,106 67 Republic ofCongo”, S/2012/843,15November 2012. 66 2020, according to theUN,additional1,300 fatalities were 2019, fatalities have risento 3,300.70Inthefirst halfof date, andJuly2019.Fatalities were 1,900. By theendof 2019,Tshisekedi’sDRC between 24January inauguration violence events across more than420locations inthe Records show that there were 790organized political resource conflict andexternal interference.69 restricted access and absence ofeconomic opportunities, violence, weak capacity ofthestate andits institutions, the state ofaffairs. This was accompanied by inter-ethnic in administration didnot guarantee evidently ashiftin of legitimacy is still at the nexus of the conflict and a change in thesub-regional conflicts duringthetime.Theproblem statement asstakeholders andthat resulted inanupsurge force. Armedgroups took thisasan opportunityto make a protests against Kabila who responded with the use of Catholic Church that played acritical role inmobilising the political uprisings ascribed to the delay. It was the In fact, Kabila’s legitimacy hadalready suffered due to in December 2018withoutJosephKabila’s candidacy. repression anddelay, elections took eventually place After aseriesofpressure from civilsociety due to allowed itdueto political pressure. Kabila, whohadrather delayed theelection andonly what President Tshisekedi inherited from hispredecessor, proxy war whenDRC’s 2018election was held.Thiswas the regional context andthepossibilityofa oftherivalry officials andoperate freely inKampala.68 Thissummarises mutineers who meet regularly withUgandan military Rwanda that believed Uganda was using the ex-M-23 to thetension between Rwanda andUganda because two years before the2018election. Theirreturn added DRC andreintegrated themselves into theconflict about to Rwanda andUganda.67 Later, returned they to eastern neither captured nor killed were split into two andfled M-23 was defeated inApril2013andthosethat were Nkunda in 2006. It was backed by Rwanda and Uganda.66 CNDP was another rebellion group established by Laurent of thePeople (CNDP)whogot integrated into theFARDC. by former members ofNational Congress for theDefense confrontations in North Kivu. The rebellion was formed 2012 namedtheM-23rebellion whichsparked violent There was a violent mutiny within FARDC in April CONFLICT DYNAMICS Ibid. French (2009) Ibid. International CrisisGroup (2020). Ibid. International CrisisGroup (2020). theSingle Story: Muleefu,A.(2013).Beyond Rwanda’s FinalReport oftheUNGroup ofExperts ontheDemocratic . members ofthegroup andforced theothers to retreat.78 of Dragon fighters inthevillage ofLiboyo, captured eight militias, clashed.Thiswas after RNL attacked Congo Ebebi the Resistance Nationale Lumbiste (RNL),both Mai-Mai and Hemumilitias.77Also, theCongo EbebiofDragon and spread around andledto afightingbetween theLendu The struggle for power ledto violentconfrontations that 2020, andleftapower vacuum that needed to befilled. FARDC killedCODECO’s leader, Justin Ngudjolo, inApril entertain internal crisis.Arecent instance was when Apart from regular activities, thesearmedgroups also within armedgroups.76 (CODECO) case in2020isanexample ofinternal crisis Notably, theCooperative for ofCongo theDevelopment Tutsi’s wholater formed Raia Mutomboki for self-defence. Nyatura focus onideological differences— attacking the to recover whenlossissuffered.75 FDLRandtheMai-Mai to maintain strong presence in the region and manage economic sentiments. Because of this, it has been able side.74 Italsoleverages social,cultural, religious and borderlands oftheDRCsiderather thantheUgandan grievance to maintain its presence intheRwenzori ADF exploits theabsence ofstate institutions andlocal intrusion andrecognised ADFasanaffiliate.73 (eastern DRC).Inaddition,theIslamicState hasmadean were from Ituri, North Kivu, and South Kivu provinces within thesameperiodin2019.72Over 90%ofthecases recorded.71 Thefigure outnumbers what was recorded kivu-province-october-1 alerts/385426/drc-rival-mai-mai-militias-clash-in-lubero-territory-north- 78 ture/2020/05/05/Ituri-Congo-Hema-Lendu-CODECO-demobilisation Post] Retrieved from https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/fea- splits andfailed peace talks violence drive new inCongo’s Ituri.[Blog 77 Ituri-Congo-Hema-Lendu-CODECO-demobilisation fromtrieved https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/feature/2020/05/05/ and failed peace talks violence drive new inCongo’s Ituri.[BlogPost] Re 76 Forces. JournalofEastern African Studies, 6(1),154-176. borders intheRwenzori borderland? Abiography oftheAlliedDemocratic 75 cy/ nter.org/spotlight/the-ever-adaptive-allied-democratic-forces-insurgen- Democratic Forces Insurgency [BlogPost]. Retrieved from https://africace 74 public-of-the-congo/ www.state.gov/reports/country-reports-on-terrorism-2019/democratic-re 73 go-armed-groups/ 72 Emergency. Factsheet 71 Seethealertat https://www.garda.com/crisis24/news- Kleinfield,P. andFlummerfelt, R.(2020,May5). Rebel Kleinfield,P. andFlummerfelt, R.(2020,May5).Rebel splits Titeca, K.,andVlassenroot, K.(2012). Rebels without Nantulya, P. 8).TheEver-Adaptive (2019,February Allied Seeareport from theUS Department ofState: https:// Seehttps://www.thedefensepost.com/2020/08/05/dr-con- USAID (2020).Democratic Republic oftheCongo -Complex - - - 9 Institute for Peace and Security Studies (IPSS) DRC Conflict Insights Report 10 Institute for Peace and Security Studies (IPSS) DRC Conflict Insights Report front-the-kabilists/ com/43502/drc-to-survive-tshisekedi-is-trying-to-outmanoeuvre-not-con- Administration. [BlogPost] Retrieved from https://www.theafricareport. Tshisekedi to outmanoeuvre, not istrying confront theKabilists’. Young 83 82 biruta/ rwanda-our-rapprochement-with-the-drc-cant-please-everyone-vincent- [Blog Post] Retrieved from https://www.theafricareport.com/44287/ with theDRCcan’t please –Vincent everyone’ Biruta. Chat. Diplomacy 81 ocratic-republic-of-congo/48118-kagames-hidden-war-in-the-congo.html security-council/index-of-countries-on-the-security-council-agenda/dem- 24. Global Policy Forum. Retrieved from https://www.globalpolicy.org/ (2009). Kagame’s HiddenWar inCongo. York TheNew Review ofBooks, go-a-mapping-of-non-international-armed-confl; Seealso:French, H.W. from https://www.rulac.org/news/democratic-republic-of-the-con- national ArmedConflicts inKivu,KasaiandIturi [Blog Post] Retrieved crusade. controversies around judicial reforms andanti-corruption away from the previous regime.83 inthe Thisisevident the 1960-2018 realities. However, he struggles to break Tshisekedi’s thrust policy favours a reconfiguration from Rwanda’s role inprolonging theconflict. President community isyet to take concrete action concerning receive from DRC’s neighbours.82 Theinternational to handlethecase ofexternal supportarmedgroups neighbours. However, heseemsto bealoneinhisattempt to reduce orstop thesupportarmedgroups receive from middle ground andbuildingcordiality can beleveraged advantage ineastern DRC’s peace process.81 Reaching He recognises the need for regional andgeo-political to bridge thegap between Rwanda-Burundi/Uganda. diplomatic approach. Thisincludes acting athird party Tshisekedi, unlike hispredecessor, adopted amore While thesesituations remain unchanged, President assist thearmedgroups.80 and external actors like Rwanda (for natural resources) where local communities (dueto someform ofaffiliation) lost confidence inthem.79Thisisadditionto cases for their departure as locals, especially those in Beni, have to rescue calls hasnot beenimpressive. Thisledto calls procedural limitations. Dueto this,MONUSCO’s response and itrelies onMONUSCO whichalsohaslogistical and protection. FARDC is structurally and operationally weak, objectiveresponse is civilian in theDRCand their primary MONUSCO andFARDC are at thevanguards ofconflict 80 ties andtheFuture ofMONUSCO. Featured Intelligence Report. 79 Smith,P. (2020,September 29).DRC:‘To survive, Ibid.Ntung(2019) Gras, R.(2020,October 2).Rwanda: ‘Ourrapprochement RULAC (2019, February 5).DRC:AMappingofNon-Inter RULAC (2019,February Akamo, J. (2020).Depleting Trust: Threatened Communi- - groups andforge aunited front. neighbours discontinue give to thesupportthey armed demonstrates that thechances ofpeace are highifthe with its eastern neighbours to stabilise theregion. He is focussed onbuildinglegitimacy andbrokering peace civilian population. Despite this,President Tshisekedi groups receive isyet to cease, still andthey attack the intensified. Theexternal supportthefightingarmed while unrest intheregions ofNorthKivuandIturihas Some armedgroups have surrendered inSouthKivu is yet to receive dueattention. Despite this,theYouth, Peace andSecurity(YPS) agenda corroborating sources report that majorityare youth.84 on theage distribution ofmembers ofarmedgroups, their vulnerability. While there isnoaccurate statistics victims, tools, andperpetrators; thereby reiterating Lastly, DRC’s youths are at thenexus ofthisconflict as number ofyouths that joinarmedgroups. long run, it is thought that contribute they to reducing the it maynot provide immediate impact. However, inthe are others. Theirfocus isonabandoned girlsandboys and CSOs onthescene. OneofthemisAIDPROFEN,andthere there interventions, are thepopularandmilitary Beyond November 18,2020viaWhatsApp Chat. 84 Interview withSecrétaire Interview Général, Generation Epanouie, democratic-republic-congo/b148-new-approach-un-stabilise-dr-congo 90 lash-in-beni/ [Blog Post] Retrieved from https://civiliansinconflict.org/blog/back Understanding Anger against theUNPeacekeeping MissionintheDRC. 89 troops-in-congo-could-be-good-thing.html Retrieved from https://unu.edu/publications/articles/why-cuts-to-un- Why Cuts to UNTroops in Congo CouldBeaGoodThing.[BlogPost] 88 Gordian knot ofinsecurity. Rift InstituteValley national armyandarmedgroups intheeastern Congo: Untangling the 87 86 Institute ofInternational Affairs. the United Nations MissionsintheDRC (MONUC-MONUSCO). Norwegian 85 them. reprisals.90 Yet, there isnostrategy inplace to prevent itself, communities andcivilians.89Anexample isADF’s has attracted anumberofreprisal attacks against groups. Inaddition, MONUSCO’s intervention military its abilityto respond to retaliatory attacks from armed organisational andlogistical capacities which limits MONUSCO currently struggles withshortage of enemy outofsuchcommunities.88 An offensive against thesearmedgroups maycreate an Luba community supportoneormore armedgroups.87 and communities. The Bembe community and the Lulua- that limits the mission is the tie between rebel groups support in some communities like Beni.86 A complexity them for someoftheattacks.85 Thiscosts MONUSCO local communities would expect blames andthepubliceven responsiveness to regular attacks is not as impressive as is focussed oncivilianprotection. However, its In response to theconflict, MONUSCO’s mandate MONUSCO ASSESSMENT CURRENT RESPONSE Seehttps://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central-africa/ Levine-Spound, D.(2019,December 18).BacklashinBeni: Day, A.(2017,May15).TheBest Defence Is No Offence: Stearns, J., Verweijen, J., andErikssonBaaz,M.(2013).The Ibid. Akamo (2020). Novosellof, theEffectiveness A.et. al.(2019).Assessing of - commitment to peace intheDRCisthusquestionable. Without aconcrete action, AU’s political willand Constitutive Act andthusrequires anAU’s reaction. tangible step. Rwanda’s interference violates theAU’s Rwanda’s involvement. It is critical, yet, ithastaken no The AU falls short in terms of action with respect to AU 11 Institute for Peace and Security Studies (IPSS) DRC Conflict Insights Report 12 Institute for Peace and Security Studies (IPSS) DRC Conflict Insights Report reprisal attacks oncitizens withinthelast oneyear. militarisation maynot behelpfuldueto theincrease in good step to strengthen boots ontheground, further reconfiguration oftheFIB.91Whilethisseemedlike a commitment positionisthe inMay2020andits primary In response to worsening conditions, SADC restated its SADC Operations inaChangingGlobal Order. Springer Nature 91 De Coning,C.,andPeter, M.(2019).United Nations Peace SCENARIOS cooperation withother groups suchastheLord’s ADF, agroup already affiliated withIS, could give way for in theregion. Thedispersal intheupnorthdirection of build more confidence, whileISwillseekto establish itself ADF isproblematic. ADFmayregain lost grounds and Furthermore, theentrance oftheISandits affiliation with are yet to adopt anational perspective to theinstability. almost impossible.Mistrust isstill highwhilemajority and legitimacy from allfactions. Unfortunately, thisis political history to ademocratic onethat requires loyalty transition from thedivisive landscape woven into DRC’s strike abalance. Thisbalance willaim to allow apeaceful Tshisekedi’s government andother actors would needto The worst-case scenario could involve stagnancy because Worst CaseScenario communities’ supportfor armedgroups. would beresponsive to present realities, andreduce local previous era, set a suitable governance structure that able to deliver thereforms required to delinkfrom the aresult,communities. President Tshisekedi As maybe in buildingsocialcohesion andsupportfrom somelocal beneficial insolvingthecrisis.Thiswould go alongway diplomatic success with its neighbours which will be (legitimacy). Itmayalsoincludefast-tracking DRC’s community to implementapopularpeace initiative support from thecountry’s Parliament andinternational support withinthegovernment, executive control, and the interest ofpolitical elites withcitizens, therequired consolidating thefollowing: publictrust by balancing This scenario mayinvolve President Tshisekedi Best CaseScenario symptomatic ofthesepolitical efforts. Kabila camp and the Speaker’s exit in December 2020 are reform agenda. Thecollapse ofthecoalition withthePro- have andmaintain asupportive Parliament to pursue his President Tshisekedi would intensify hispolitical efforts to resources andexternal interference. community interms ofproblems related to natural Tshisekedi; from andintervention theinternational distress calls; increasing ofdiplomatic efforts by President to deter retaliatory attacks andbemore responsive to three things: the bolstering ofMONUSCO’s capacity eastern DRC may gradually reduce depending on these driven informal networks will be sustained. Tensions in and armed groups will remain while the economically In thiscase, irregular confrontations between theFARDC Most LikelyScenario and membership ofexisting ones. go on to encourage the creation armed groups of new negotiations (asameans to extort government) could groups threatens theregion. Also, misconceptions over Resistance Army(LRA). Thelinkingofthesethree extremist FEN, September 19,2020viaWhatsApp Call. 92 peace agenda. aresult, there willbeasetbackpoliticians. As inDRC’s or by proxy, between Pro-Tshisekedi andPro-Kabila This effect mayendupasviolent confrontations, directly may kick-start adominoeffect that willend at grassroots. Tshisekedi coalition andexit oftheParliament’s Speaker attacks oncivilians.Lastly, thecollapse oftheKabila- continuous expedition military maylead to more reprisal Interview withFounder andExecutive Interview Director ofAIDPRO- 92 Inthesamevein, 13 Institute for Peace and Security Studies (IPSS) DRC Conflict Insights Report 14 Institute for Peace and Security Studies (IPSS) DRC Conflict Insights Report management intheregion. from DRC’s eastern neighbours. Thisiscritical to conflict continental withrespect levels to external interference More diplomatic effort is required at regional and oriented. diverted from violentconfrontation to development- environment where inter-provincial competition can be on aweak central government. Itwould alsocreate an system because themove would reduce thedependence the shiftinto amore productive economic andsocial of each province rather thantake ablanket approach; monitoring andevaluation ofpoliciesto suittherealities affairs oftheprovinces; themaking,implementation, society to appointingsuitable leaders to manage the by directing theattention oftheDRCcitizens andcivil adequate professional training; thepolitical participation communities into provincial securityforces ableto receive of armed groups that have connections with local Specifically, thiswould ease thefollowing: thetransition specificity shouldbeemphasised. Kivu in2019isrequired ineastern DRC,andits context Reintegration Process (CIAP-DDRC) inaugurated inSouth Demobilization,Disarmament, andCommunity Inter-provincial Commissionto SupporttheAwareness, more initiatives withthepolitical willto work like the In thisvein, especiallywithrespect to conflict resolution, Governance (ACDEG).93 of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and This would enhance institution buildingwhichisapriority the burden onthecentral government willbereduced. grassroots Through levels. thisdecentralisation process, governance, peace andsecurityinfrastructures at and management. This will encourage ownership of authorities at grassroots willlead to conflict prevention in terms ofeconomy andsecurity. Thus,legitimate cater for theirown affairs. This means decentralisation central government to onethat allows provinces to a structural transition from onethat overburdens the to fillthedearth. Hence, thegovernment shouldlead the national government doesnot have thebuoyancy demonstrated,As governance issuesare central and To theDRCGovernment STRATEGIC OPTIONS and Governance. 93 Union,A.(2007).African Charter onDemocracy, Elections To theAU,RECs,andICGLR public diplomacy. a way to prevent reprisal attacks andincrease efforts in further attacks would require that the UN MONUSCO find in local communities. Therefore, managingandpreventing detrimental to themuch-neededpublictrust andsupport framed to ofMOUNUSCO thedisservice anditwould be the armedgroups exploit. Thesegrievances can beeasily local grievances andtieswithlocal communities which for civilianprotection. There isalsoaneedto focus onthe However, thefocus shouldbeonstrengthening its capacity need to heedSADC’s call for thereconfiguration ofFIB. following its over victory hence, theM-23movement; the proven to betheonlyeffective force against armedgroups facilitate thetimelyreconfiguration ofFIB.94Ithassofar There is a need for UN member states to support and To theUN the Peace and SecurityCounciloftheAfrican Union. 95 ries/202009070054.html Political Crises? PSC Report. Retrieved from https://allafrica.com/sto 94 the excesses oftheFARDC.95 more involved inhumanrights issues,especiallyto curb strategies to prevent genocide orsimilarcrimes;andbe international terrorism andviolentextremism; develop The AU PSC mayalsoneed to to intervene combat priorities oftheACDEG. youth’s idlenessto perpetuate violence. This furthers the would alsoreduce followership ofpoliticianswhoexploit useofviolencehelp themseebeyond to make aliving.It and divert theattention oftheyoung population soasto prevention andpeacebuilding asitwould helppreoccupy related normative framework(s). Thisiscritical to conflict Framework onYouth Peace andSecurityother African Youth Charter andtheAfrican UnionContinental the United Nations Security Council Resolution 2250, for theAU to increase its presence intheDRC inlinewith Furthermore, withrespect to theyouth, there isaneed conflict ineastern DRC. failed institutions partly underliethelongevity ofthe infrastructures. This is critical to peacebuilding because sense ofownership ofgovernance, peace andsecurity institutions at grassroots could sothey levels develop technical andcapacity-building assistance for Firstly, for peacebuilding, there isaneedto facilitate Union,A.(1993).Protocol relating to theestablishment of ISS (2020).Africa: WhyIsSADCSlow to in Intervene - without fuellingconflict orsabotaging state institutions. having ahealthy opposition,asexpected inademocracy, Pro-Tshisekedi shouldbeprioritized. Thiswould lead to facilitating successful dialoguebetween Pro-Kabila and Lastly, for theAU andRECs,maintaining peace and for regional security. Tshisekedi’s diplomatic approach to boost cooperation states need to increase their support for President youth agenda intheDRC.Inaddition,RECsandmember RECs and the ICGLR should partner with the AU on the 15 Institute for Peace and Security Studies (IPSS) DRC Conflict Insights Report 16 Institute for Peace and Security Studies (IPSS) DRC Conflict Insights Report Vlassenroot, K.,Mudinga, E.,andMusamba, J. (2020).Navigating socialspaces: Armedmobilization andcircular return inEastern DR Verweijen, J. (2018). Soldiers without an army? Patronage networks and cohesion in the armed forces of the DR Congo. Armed Forces Vail, C.(2020).Catholic Peacebuilding intheDemocratic Republic ofCongo duringtheCOVID-19 Emergency. Faith inAction. UNECA (2015).Conflicts intheDemocratic Republic ofCongo: Causes,impact andimplications for theGreat Lakes region. AddisAbaba: Stearns, J. (2018).InsidetheADFRebellion: AGlimpseinto theLife andOperations ofaSecretive JihadiArmedGroup. York New University Stearns, J., Verweijen, J. and Eriksson Baaz, M. (2013). The national army and armed groups in the eastern Congo: Untangling the Gordian Smith, P. (2020,September 29).DRC:‘To Tshisekedi survive, to outmanoeuvre, not istrying confront theKabilists’. Young Administration. Ntung, A.(2019).DynamicsofLocal Conflict intheDemocratic Republic ofCongo: Challenges Ahead for President Félix Tshisekedi Novosellof, the Effectiveness A. et. al. (2019). Assessing of the United Nations Missions in the DRC (MONUC-MONUSCO). Norwegian International CrisisGroup (2020).Averting Proxy Wars intheEastern DRCongo andGreat Lakes. CrisisGroup Africa BriefingN°150 Global Policy Forum. Retrieved from https://www.globalpolicy.org/security-council/index-of-countries-on-the-security-council-agenda/ French, H.W. (2009).Kagame’s HiddenWar inCongo. York TheNew Review ofBooks,24. De Coning,C.,andPeter, M.(2019).United Nations Peace Operations inaChangingGlobal Order. Springer Nature REFERENCES Congo. JournalofRefugee Studies 00(0),1-21. and Society, 44(4),626-646. United Nations knot ofinsecurity. Rift InstituteValley confront-the-kabilists/ [Blog Post] Retrieved from https://www.theafricareport.com/43502/drc-to-survive-tshisekedi-is-trying-to-outmanoeuvre-not- Tshilombo. Fletcher F. WorldAff., 43,131. Institute ofInternational Affairs. democratic-republic-of-congo/48118-kagames-hidden-war-in-the-congo.html August 1974 June 1999 August 1998–July2003TheSecond Congo War breaks outandends. October 1996–May1997TheFirst Congo War breaks outandends. November 1965 July 1964–October, 1965–MoiseTshombe becomes PrimeMinister. Katanga isreintegrated into theDRC. August 1960–SouthKasaideclares autonomy from central government. July 1960–Katanga isdeclared anindependentstate by MoïseKapendTshombe, markingthebeginning oftheCongo June 1960–DRCbecomes anindependentsovereign state. 1960-2020 CONFLICT TIMELINE December 2017–Protest isledby theCatholic Church (anditcontinues tillthefourth quarter of2018). April 2012–Mutineers from CNDPmembers whojoinedtheFARDC form theM-23rebellion group. November 2011/February 2012–Presidential election. JosephKabilaiselected again. July 2010–MONUCbecomes MONUSCO withadditional mandates. July 2009–FDLRandLRA execute retaliation attacks. 2009–Rwanda,January theDRCandMONUCplanconduct operation ajointmilitary against FDLR. November 2008–Rebels massacre anestimate of150peopleinKiwanji. 2008–TheDRCgovernmentJanuary and22armedgroups signtheGomaAccords. December 2006–CNDPisformed. July 2006–TheDRCholdsits first General Elections after theCongo Wars. May 2006–Theinsurgency incentral Katanga endsastheMai-Maileader, GédéonKyungu Mutanda and hiswife surrender. May 2005–DRC’s adopts National constitution. Assembly anew 2001 – LaurentJanuary Kabila is assassinated amidst violent confrontation between the DRC Government and armed November 1999–TheUnited Nations SecurityCouncilResolution (UNSCR)1279 isunanimouslyadopted andUnited August, 1999 crisis –acivilwar withexternal ramifications andinterventions. groups, andhis son,JosephKabila,takes over power 10 daysafter. Nations Organization Stabilization MissionintheDemocratic Republic oftheCongo (MONUC)isestablished. –SADC –MobutuSes –TheU

– MobutuSeseSeko replaces Kasa-Vubu inacoup. andUNrepresentatives meet inLusaka anddraft a ceasefire agreement. nited Nations SecurityCouncilResolution (UNSCR)1258isunanimously adopted. e Seko promulgates DRCConstitution. anew 17 Institute for Peace and Security Studies (IPSS) DRC Conflict Insights Report 18 Institute for Peace and Security Studies (IPSS) DRC Conflict Insights Report September armedgroups 2020–Seventy inSouthKivusurrender Felix Tshisekedi hosts thequadritite summitinGoma July 2020–DRC’s Justice Minister resigns after judicial reform dispute. May 2020–ADFkillsciviliansinaretaliatory attack. April 2020–ISclaimsits first attack (bombblast). November 2019–FARDC killsatop ADF leader. ThepeopleofBeniprotest against MONUSCO askingthemto leave. October 2019–TheInter-provincial Commissionto SupporttheAwareness, Demobilization, Disarmament, and 2019–FelixJanuary Tshisekedi issworn inasPresident oftheDRC. December 2018–Presidential elections are heldintheDRCandFelix Tshisekedi emerges winner. with Uganda, Rwanda armedgroups andBurundi.Seventy inSouthKivuagree to endhostilities intheDRC. Community Reintegration Process (CIAP-DDRC) inSouthKivuisformed.

Peace and Security Reports

Although key continental and regional institutions have their own early warning reporting systems, policy making within these institutions also benefit from a number of analytical and periodic reports generated by think tanks and research institutes. The Research Unit at IPSS provides brief and critical analyses of the state of peace and security in different African countries as well as critical appraisals of interventions by various African actors. The reports will cover African countries showing positive signs as well as those undergoing negative developments.