Balfour Declaration

Not to be confused with the Balfour Declaration of 1926. 1 Background

The Balfour Declaration was a letter dated 2 Novem- The basis for British support for an increased Jewish ber 1917 from the United Kingdom’s Foreign Secretary presence in Palestine was primarily linked to geopolitical Arthur James Balfour to Walter Rothschild, 2nd Baron calculations.[1] 19th-century evangelical Christian beliefs Rothschild, a leader of the British Jewish community, for that the country should play a role in the Advent of the transmission to the Zionist Federation of Great Britain Millennium and Christ’s Second Coming were not a pri- and Ireland. It read: mary motivating factor,[2] although they were later used as a retrospective justification.[lower-alpha 1] Early British political support was precipitated in the late 1830s and led by Lord Palmerston, following the His Majesty’s government view with favour Eastern Crisis after Muhammad Ali occupied Syria [4][5] the establishment in Palestine of a national and Palestine. French influence as protector of the home for the Jewish people, and will use their Catholic communities began to grow in the wider re- best endeavours to facilitate the achievement gion, as Russian influence began to grow as protec- of this object, it being clearly understood that tor of the Eastern Orthodox, leaving Britain without a [4] nothing shall be done which may prejudice the sphere of influence. The British Foreign Office worked civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish to encourage Jewish emigration to Palestine, exempli- communities in Palestine, or the rights and po- fied by Charles Henry Churchill's 1841-42 exhortations litical status enjoyed by Jews in any other coun- to Moses Montefiore, the leader of the British Jewish [6][lower-alpha 2] [6] try. community. Such efforts were premature, as Zionism was not to emerge within the world’s Jewish communities until the last decades of the century, spear- headed by the efforts of Theodor Herzl, a Jewish journal- The text of the letter was published in the press one week ist living in Austria-Hungary, whose efforts to gain international support for his ideas were not to succeed in his later, on 9 November 1917. The “Balfour Declaration” [7] was later incorporated into both the Sèvres peace treaty lifetime. with the Ottoman Empire, and the Mandate for Palestine. With the geopolitical shakeup occasioned by the outbreak The original document is kept at the British Library. of World War I, the earlier calculations, that had lapsed The Sharif of Mecca Hussein ibn Ali al-Hashimi and for some time, led to a renewal of strategic assessments and political bargaining regarding the Middle and Far other Arab leaders considered the Declaration a violation [5] of previous agreements made in the McMahon-Hussein East. correspondence. Palestine is not explicitly mentioned in the correspondence, and territories which were not purely Arab were excluded by McMahon and Hussein, 1.1 Early Zionism although historically Palestine had always formed part of Syria. The Arabs, taking Palestine to be overwhelmingly Further information: Zionism Arab, claimed the declaration was in contrast to the letters, which promised the Arab independence movement Zionism arose in the late 19th century in reaction to control of the Middle East territories “in the limits and anti-Semitic and exclusionary nationalist movements in boundaries proposed by the Sherif of Mecca” in exchange Europe.[lower-alpha 3][lower-alpha 4] Romantic nationalism in for revolting against the Ottoman Empire during World 19th century Central and Eastern Europe had helped to War I. The British claimed that the McMahon letters did set off the Haskalah or “Jewish Enlightenment”, creating not apply to Palestine, therefore the Declaration could not a split in the Jewish community between those who saw be a violation of the previous agreement. The issuance Judaism as their religion, and those who saw it as their of the Declaration had many long lasting consequences, ethnicity or nation.[lower-alpha 3] The 1881–84 Anti-Jewish and was a key moment in the lead-up to the Arab–Israeli pogroms in the Russian Empire encouraged the growth conflict, often referred to as the world’s “most intractable of the latter identity, resulting in the formation of the conflict”. Hovevei Zion pioneer organizations and the publication

1 2 1 BACKGROUND

of Leon Pinsker's Autoemancipation.[lower-alpha 3] the Central Powers (Germany, Austria-Hungary and later [17] In 1896 Herzl published Der Judenstaat (“The Jews’ that year, the Ottoman Empire). State” or “The State of the Jews”), in which he asserted Following Britain’s declaration of war in November 1914 that the only solution to the "Jewish Question" in Europe, on the Ottoman Empire, of which the Mutasarrifate of including growing antisemitism, was the establishment of Jerusalem – often referred to as Palestine[18] – was a com- a state for the Jews. This marked the emergence of polit- ponent, Weizmann’s efforts picked up speed.[lower-alpha 8] ical Zionism.[10] A year later, Herzl founded the Zionist On 10 December 1914 he met with the British cabinet Organization (ZO), which at its first congress called for member Herbert Samuel, a Zionist,[lower-alpha 8] who be- “the establishment of a home for the Jewish people in lieved Weizmann’s demands were too modest.[lower-alpha 9] Palestine secured under public law”. Proposed measures Two days later, Weizmann met Balfour again, for the first to attain that goal included the promotion of Jewish settle- time since 1906.[lower-alpha 10] ment there, the organisation of Jews in the diaspora, the A month later, Samuel circulated a memorandum enti- strengthening of Jewish feeling and consciousness, and tled The Future of Palestine to his cabinet colleagues. The preparatory steps to attain those necessary governmental [10] memorandum stated that “I am assured that the solution grants. Herzl died in 1904 without the political stand- of the problem of Palestine which would be much the ing that was required to carry out his agenda of a Jewish [7] most welcome to the leaders and supporters of the Zionist home in Palestine. movement throughout the world would be the annexation Zionist leader Chaim Weizmann, later President of the of the country to the British Empire”.[22] It was the first World Zionist Organisation, moved from Switzerland to time in an official record that enlisting the support of Jews the UK in 1904 and met Balfour during his 1905–06 elec- as a war measure was proposed.[23] [11] tion campaign in a session arranged by Charles Drey- Many further discussions followed, including a meeting fus, his Jewish constituency representative.[lower-alpha 5] between Lloyd-George and Weizmann in 1916, of which During the first meeting between Weizmann and Bal- Lloyd-George described in his War Memoirs that Weiz- four in 1906, Balfour asked what Weizmann’s objections mann: "... explained his aspirations as to the repatria- were to the 1903 Uganda Scheme. The scheme, which tion of the Jews to the sacred land they had made fa- had been proposed to Herzl by Colonial Secretary Joseph mous. That was the fount and origin of the famous dec- Chamberlain following his trip to East Africa earlier in laration about the National Home for the Jews in Pales- the year,[lower-alpha 6] had been subsequently voted down tine... As soon as I became Prime Minister I talked the following Herzl’s death by the Seventh Zionist Congress whole matter over with Mr Balfour, who was then Foreign in 1905,[lower-alpha 7] after two years of heated debate in the Secretary.”[24] Zionist Organization.[15] According to Weizmann’s mem- oir, the conversation went as follows: 1.3 Other British commitments “Mr. Balfour, supposing I was to offer you Paris instead of London, would you take it?" Main articles: McMahon–Hussein Correspondence and He sat up, looked at me, and answered: “But Sykes–Picot Agreement Dr. Weizmann, we have London.” “That is In 1915 the British High Commissioner to Egypt, Henry true,” I said, “but we had Jerusalem when Lon- McMahon, had exchanged letters with Hussein bin Ali, don was a marsh.” He ... said two things which Sharif of Mecca, in which he had promised Hussein I remember vividly. The first was: “Are there control of Arab lands with the exception of “portions many Jews who think like you?" I answered: of Syria" lying to the west of “the districts of Damas- [25][lower-alpha 11] “I believe I speak the mind of millions of Jews cus, Homs, Hama and Aleppo". Palestine whom you will never see and who cannot speak lay to the southwest of Damascus and wasn't explicitly [25] for themselves.” ... To this he said: “If that is mentioned. After the war the extent of the coastal ex- [27] so you will one day be a force.” Shortly before clusion was hotly disputed. I withdrew, Balfour said: “It is curious. The Lord Grey had been the Foreign Secretary during the Jews I meet are quite different.” I answered: McMahon-Hussein negotiations. Speaking in the House “Mr. Balfour, you meet the wrong kind of of Lords on 27 March 1923, he made it clear that he en- Jews”.[16] tertained serious doubts as to the validity of the British government’s interpretation of the pledges which he, as foreign secretary, had caused to be given to Hussein in 1.2 World War I 1915. He called for all of the secret engagements regarding Palestine to be made public.[28] Many of the rel- Further information: Timeline of World War I evant documents in the National Archives were later de- classified and published.[lower-alpha 12] Among them were In 1914, war broke out in Europe between the Triple the minutes of a Cabinet Eastern Committee meeting, Entente (Britain, France and the Russian Empire) and chaired by Lord Curzon, which was held on 5 December 1.3 Other British commitments 3

The interpretation of the British Government regarding the 1915 correspondence with Hussein changed between 1918 and 1922. The left hand page is from CAB 24/68/86, November 1918, whilst the right hand page is from the Churchill White Paper of 1918 British Government map entitled “Map illustrating Territo- June 1922 rial Negotiations between H.M.G. and King Hussein”, referring to the 1915 correspondence with Hussein ternationalisation of Palestine,[31][32] and that the form of the Palestine administration would be confirmed after consultation with both Russia and Hussein.[31] Three 1918. Balfour was in attendance. The minutes revealed months prior to the agreement of the memorandum, that in laying out the government’s position Curzon had Sykes has been approached with a plan by Samuel in explained that: “Palestine was included in the areas as the form of a memorandum which Sykes thought prudent [lower-alpha 13] to which Great Britain pledged itself that they should be to commit to memory. Sykes commented to Arab and independent in the future.”[29] Palestine is not Samuel on the boundaries marked on a map attached to explicitly mentioned in the correspondence, and territo- the memorandum, noting that with the exclusion of He- ries which were not purely Arab were excluded by McMa- bron and the “East of the Jordan” there would be less to [lower-alpha 14] hon and Hussein, although historically Palestine had al- discuss with the Muslim community. ways formed part of Syria. The Arabs, taking Palestine to be overwhelmingly Arab, claimed the declaration was in contrast to the letters, which promised the Arab independence movement control of the Middle East territories “in the limits and boundaries proposed by the Sherif of Mecca” in exchange for revolting against the Ottoman Empire during World War I. The British claimed that the McMahon letters did not apply to Palestine, therefore the Declaration could not be a violation of the previous agreement.[27] On the basis of McMahon’s assurances, the Arab Revolt began on 5 June 1916. However, in May 1916 the governments of the United Kingdom, France and Russia had also secretly concluded the Sykes–Picot Agreement, a secret agreement which was primarily negotiated between Mark Sykes, a British MP who had grown from his seat on the 1915 De Bunsen Committee to have a significant influence on British policy in the region including initiating Sykes-Picot Agreement Map, showing Palestine under “interna- the creation of the Arab Bureau, and François Georges- tional administration”. It was an enclosure in Paul Cambon’s Picot, a French diplomat and former consul-general in letter to Sir Edward Grey, 9 May 1916. Beirut.[30] It defined their proposed spheres of influence and control in Western Asia should the Triple Entente Hussein learned of the agreement when it was leaked succeed in defeating the Ottoman Empire during World by the new Soviet government in December 1917, but War I.[31][32] It divided many Arab territories into British- was satisfied by two disingenuous telegrams from Sir and French-administered areas and allowed for the in- Reginald Wingate, High Commissioner of Egypt, assur- 4 2 MOTIVATION FOR THE DECLARATION

ing him that the British government’s commitments to the Arabs were still valid and that the Sykes-Picot Agree- ment was not a formal treaty.[32] Following the publication of the Declaration the British had dispatched Com- mander David George Hogarth to see Hussein in January 1918 bearing the message that the “political and economic freedom” of the Palestinian population was not in question.[32] Hogarth reported that Hussein “would not accept an independent Jewish State in Palestine, nor was I instructed to warn him that such a state was contemplated by Great Britain”.[35] Continuing Arab disquiet over Allied intentions also led during 1918 to the British Declaration to the Seven and the Anglo-French Declara- tion, the latter promising “the complete and ﬁnal libera- tion of the peoples who have for so long been oppressed by the Turks, and the setting up of national governments and administrations deriving their authority from the free exercise of the initiative and choice of the indigenous populations.”[32][36]

2 Motivation for the Declaration

2.1 Progress of the War in late 1917

The decision to release the declaration was taken by the British War Cabinet on 31 October 1917. This followed discussion at four War Cabinet meetings (including the 31 October meeting) over the space of the previous two months.[37] During the discussions, the wider war was in a period of stalemate. On the Western Front the tide would first turn in favour of the Central Powers in spring 1918,[38] before decisively turning in favour of the Allies from July 1918 onwards.[38] Although the US had declared war on Germany in the spring of 1917, they would not suffer their first casualties until 2 November 1917,[39] by which point President Wilson would still be hoping to avoid the dispatch of large contingents of troops into the war.[40] The Russian forces were known to be distracted by the Ahead of the American entry into World War I, it became clear ongoing Russian Revolution and the growing support for that Woodrow Wilson and his advisors were in favor of Zionism. the Bolshevik faction, but Alexander Kerensky's Russian Six months before the Declaration, this front page article from Republic had remained in the war, and would only with- the Charlotte Observer notes the announcement that Balfour and draw after the final stage in the revolution on 7 November Wilson had “informally discussed” the project. 1917.[41] In the Middle Eastern theatre, there had been an ongoing stalemate in Southern Palestine since April 1917,[42] and the Sinai and Palestine Campaign would not tors that the War Cabinet had considered: make any substantial progress until 31 October 1917.[43] • 3 September 1917: “With reference to a suggestion that the matter might be postponed, [Balfour] 2.2 War Cabinet discussions pointed out that this was a question on which the Foreign Office had been very strongly pressed for a In order to aid the discussions, the Cabinet Secretariat so- long time past. There was a very strong and enthu- licited interministerial clarification as well as the views of siastic organisation, more particularly in the United President Woodrow Wilson, six Zionist leaders and three States, who were zealous in this matter, and his be- non-Zionist Jews.[37] Excerpts from the minutes of these lief was that it would be of most substantial assis- four meetings provide a description of the primary fac- tance to the Allies to have the earnestness and en- 5

ing the view that a Jewish presence in Palestine would strengthen Britain’s position on the Suez Canal and re- inforce the route to Great Britain’s imperial dominion in India.[48] Weizmann had argued that one consequence of such a public commitment by Great Britain, making the establishment of a Jewish homeland in Palestine, one of the Allies’ war aims, was that it would have three ef- fects: it would swing Russia to maintain pressure on Germany’s Eastern Front, since Jews had been prominent in the March Revolution of 1917. It would rally the large Jewish community in the United States to press for greater funding for the American war effort, under- way since April of that year; and, lastly, that it would undermine German Jewish support for Kaiser Wilhelm II.[49] Some historians argue that British government’s de- British War Cabinet Minutes approving the release of the Decla- cision reflected what James Gelvin calls 'patrician anti- ration, 31 October 1917 Semitism' in the overestimation of Jewish power in both the United States and Russia.[48] Issuing the Balfour Declaration was considered to strongly appeal to two thusiasm of these people enlisted on our side. To do of Woodrow Wilson's closest advisors, who were avid nothing was to risk a direct breach with them, and it Zionists.[lower-alpha 15][lower-alpha 16] was necessary to face this situation.”[44] The cabinet believed that expressing support would ap- • 4 October 1917: "...[Balfour] stated that the Ger- peal to Jews in Germany and America, and help the war man Government were making great efforts to cap- effort;[52] they also hoped to encourage support from the ture the sympathy of the Zionist Movement. This large Jewish population in Russia.[53] Movement, though opposed by a number of wealthy Jews in this country, had behind it the support of a American Zionism was still in its relative infancy; in 1914 majority of Jews, at all events in Russia and Amer- the Zionist Federation had a small budget of c.$5,000 and only 12,000 members, despite an American Jew- ica, and possibly in other countries... Mr. Bal- [lower-alpha 17] four then read a very sympathetic declaration by ish population of three million. However, the the French Government which had been conveyed Zionist organizations had recently succeeded in a show to the Zionists, and he stated that he knew that of force within the American Jewish community in ar- ranging a Jewish congress to debate the Jewish problem President Wilson was extremely favourable to the [lower-alpha 18] Movement.”[45] as a whole. This impacted British and French government estimates of the balance of power within the • 25 October 1917: "...the Secretary mentioned that American Jewish public.[lower-alpha 19] he was being pressed by the Foreign Office to bring In addition, the British intended to preempt the forward the question of Zionism, an early settlement [46] expected French pressure for an international of which was regarded as of great importance.” administration.[lower-alpha 20] • 31 October 1917: "[Balfour] stated that he gath- David Lloyd George, who was Prime Minister at the time ered that everyone was now agreed that, from a of the Balfour Declaration, told the Palestine Royal Com- purely diplomatic and political point of view, it was mission in 1937 that the Declaration was made “due to desirable that some declaration favourable to the as- propagandist reasons.”[58] Citing the position of the Al- pirations of the Jewish nationalists should now be lied and Associated Powers in the ongoing war, Lloyd made. The vast majority of Jews in Russia and George shared this conclusion.[lower-alpha 21] In his Mem- America, as, indeed, all over the world, now ap- oirs, published in 1939, Lloyd George further elucidated peared to be favourable to Zionism. If we could his position.[lower-alpha 22] make a declaration favourable to such an ideal, we should be able to carry on extremely useful propaganda both in Russia and America.”[47] 3 Drafting The geopolitical calculations behind the decision to release the declaration were debated and discussed in the 3.1 Authors and evolution of the draft following years. Lloyd George listed nine factors motivating his decision Under the new Conservative government which took as Prime Minister to release the declaration,[48] includ- power in October 1922, attempts were made to identify 6 3 DRAFTING

3.2 Jewish national home vs. Jewish state

Further information: Homeland for the Jewish people

“This is a very carefully worded document and but for the somewhat vague phrase “A National Home for the Jew- ish People” might be considered sufficiently unalarming... But the vagueness of the phrase cited has been a cause of trouble from the commencement. Various persons in high positions have used language of the loosest kind cal- culated to convey a very different impression to the more moderate interpretation which can be put upon the words. President Wilson brushed away all doubts as to what was intended from his point of view when, in March 1919, Lord Balfour’s desk, in the Museum of the Jewish Diaspora, in he said to the Jewish leaders in America, “I am more- Tel Aviv over persuaded that the allied nations, with the fullest con- currence of our own Government and people are agreed that in Palestine shall be laid the foundations of a Jewish the background to the drafting.[60] In December 1922, Commonwealth.” The late President Roosevelt declared Sir John Evelyn Shuckburgh of the new Middle East de- that one of the Allies peace conditions should be that partment of the Foreign Office discovered that the cor- “Palestine must be made a Jewish State.” Mr. Winston respondence prior to the declaration was not available in Churchill has spoken of a “Jewish State” and Mr. Bonar the Colonial Office, 'although Foreign Office papers were Law has talked in Parliament of “restoring Palestine to understood to have been lengthy and to have covered a the Jews”." considerable period'.[60] A Foreign Office note in a Cab- inet Paper from January 1923 stated that: Report of the Palin Commission, August 1920[66] The phrase “national home” was intentionally used instead of “state” because of opposition to the Zionist little is known of how the policy repre- program within the British Cabinet,[lower-alpha 25] although sented by the Declaration was first given form. the chief architects of the Declaration considered that a Four, or perhaps five men were chiefly con- Jewish State would emerge in time.[lower-alpha 26] The term cerned in the labour – the Earl of Balfour, “national home” was intentionally ambiguous.[68] For ex- the late Sir Mark Sykes, and Messrs. Weiz- ample, the phrase 'national homeland' had no legal value mann and Sokolow, with perhaps Lord Roth- or precedent in international law,[lower-alpha 25] so its mean- schild as a figure in the background. Nego- ing was thus unclear when compared to other terms such tiations seem to have been mainly oral and as 'state'.[lower-alpha 25] The choice of stating such a home- by means of private notes and memoranda of land would be found 'in Palestine' rather than 'of Pales- which only the scantiest records seem to be tine' was also no accident.[lower-alpha 25] available.[lower-alpha 23] Explication of the wording has been sought in the correspondence leading to the final version of the declaration. Declassification of Government archives have allowed Following discussion of the initial draft the Cabinet Sec- modern scholarship to piece together the choreography retary, Mark Sykes, met with the Zionist negotiators to of the drafting of the declaration. In his widely cited clarify their aims. His official report back to the Cabi- 1961 book, Leonard Stein published four previous drafts net categorically stated that the Zionists did not want “to of the declaration.[62] Stein illustrated the evolution of the set up a Jewish Republic or any other form of state in drafting from the original proposal by the Zionist Orga- Palestine or in any part of Palestine.”[69] but rather pre- nization, followed by various iterations. Subsequent au- ferred some form of protectorate as provided in the Pales- thors have debated as to who the “primary author” re- tine Mandate.[69] In approving the Balfour Declaration, ally was. In his posthumously published 1981 book The Leopold Amery, one of the Secretaries to the British War Anglo-American Establishment, Georgetown University Cabinet of 1917–18, testified under oath to the Anglo- history professor Carroll Quigley explained his view that American Committee of Inquiry in January 1946 from the primary author of the declaration was Alfred, Lord his personal knowledge that: Milner,[lower-alpha 24] and more recently, William D. Ru- binstein, Professor of Modern History at Aberystwyth The phrase “the establishment in Palestine University, Wales, wrote that Conservative politician and of a National Home for the Jewish people” pro-Zionist Leo Amery, as Assistant Secretary to the was intended and understood by all concerned British war cabinet in 1917, should be considered the to mean at the time of the Balfour Declara- main author of the Declaration.[64] tion that Palestine would ultimately become a 3.4 Civil and religious rights of non-Jewish communities in Palestine 7

“Jewish Commonwealth” or a “Jewish State”, 3.4 Civil and religious rights of non- if only Jews came and settled there in sufficient Jewish communities in Palestine numbers.[70] The Declaration’s protection against prejudicing the civil and religious rights of non-Jews proved to be David Lloyd George, who was Prime Minister at the time untenable.[77] The British Mandate for Palestine was con- of the Declaration, told the Palestine Royal Commission firmed in 1922 as the vehicle for delivering the promises in 1937 that it was intended that Palestine may become a of the Declaration.[78] Fifteen years later, the 1937 Pales- Jewish Commonwealth if and when Jews “had become a tine Royal Commission report, the first official proposal definite majority of the inhabitants": for partition of the region, referred to the requirements as “contradictory obligations”[79][80] and to the wider situation that had arisen in Palestine that the “disease is so The idea was, and this was the interpre- deep-rooted that, in our firm conviction, the only hope tation put upon it at the time, that a Jewish of a cure lies in a surgical operation”.[81] It had proven State was not to be set up immediately by the impossible for the British to pacify the two communi- Peace Treaty without reference to the wishes ties in Palestine by using different messages for different of the majority of the inhabitants. On the audiences.[lower-alpha 29][lower-alpha 30] other hand, it was contemplated that when the This obligation was commonly compared against the time arrived for according representative in- commitment to the Jewish community, and a variety of stitutions to Palestine, if the Jews had mean- terms were used to refer to these two obligations as a while responded to the opportunity afforded pair. The term “twofold duty” was used by the Permanent them by the idea of a national home and had Mandates Commission in 1924,[83] the phrase “double become a definite majority of the inhabitants, undertaking” was used by Prime Minister Ramsey Mac- then Palestine would thus become a Jewish Donald in his April 1930 House of Commons speech,[84] Commonwealth.[58] the Passfield white paper and his 1931 letter to Chaim Weizmann, and the 1937 Peel Commission used the term [85] Both the Zionist Organization and the British govern- “dual obligation”, ment devoted efforts to denying that a state was the in- A particularly heated component of this debate was tention over the following decades, including in Winston whether these two obligations had “equal weight”. Bal- Churchill’s 1922 White Paper.[lower-alpha 27] However, in four stated that the British had no intention of consulting private, many British officials agreed with the interpreta- the existing population of Palestine,[lower-alpha 31] and the tion of the Zionists that a state would be established when results of the American King–Crane Commission consul- a Jewish majority was achieved;[71] in particular, at a pri- tation was suppressed for three years until it was leaked vate meeting on 22 July 1922 at Balfour’s home, both Bal- in 1922.[88] Balfour acknowledged that this was incon- four and Lloyd-George admitted that an eventual Jewish sistent with the principle of self-determination, as later state had always been their intention.[72][lower-alpha 28] set out in President Wilson’s Fourteen points, writing in 1919 that Palestine was an exceptional case in which “we deliberately and rightly decline to accept the principle of self-determination.”[lower-alpha 32] 3.3 Scope of the National Home “In Pales- tine” 3.5 Rights and political status of Jews in With respect to the scope of the Jewish National Home, other countries the initial draft of the declaration, contained in a letter sent by Rothschild to Balfour, referred to the princi- The original drafts of Rothschild, Balfour and Milner did ple “that Palestine should be reconstituted as the National not include the commitment that nothing should be done Home of the Jewish people.”[74] In the final text, follow- which might prejudice the rights of the non-Jewish coming Lord Milner’s amendment, the word that was replaced munities in other countries outside of Palestine. These with in.[75] changes came about partly as the result of the urgings of This text avoided committing the entirety of Palestine to Edwin Samuel Montagu, an influential anti-Zionist Jew the Jewish National Home, resulting in controversy in fu- and Secretary of State for India. Montagu, the only Jew- ture years over the intended scope.[75][65] This was sub- ish member of the British cabinet, voiced his opposition sequently clarified by the 1922 Churchill White Paper, by declaring: which wrote that “the terms of the Declaration referred to do not contemplate that Palestine as a whole should be The policy of His Majesty’s Government is converted into a Jewish National Home, but that such a anti-Semitic in result and will prove a rallying Home should be founded 'in Palestine.'"[76] ground for anti-Semites in every country of the 8 4 REACTION TO THE DECLARATION

world.[90] Valley of Jezreel, whose redemption as the breadbasket of Palestine became the priority of the Third Aliyah set- Lord Rothschild took exception to the new proviso on tlers, mainly from Eastern Europe.[94] the basis that it presupposed the possibility of a danger to The declaration spurred an unintended and extraordi- [91] non-Zionists, which he denied. nary increase in adherents of American Zionism; in 1914 the 200 American Zionist societies comprised a total of 7,500 members, which grew to 30,000 mem- 4 Reaction to the Declaration bers in 600 societies in 1918 and 149,000 members in 1919.[lower-alpha 19] Whilst the British had considered that See also: Balfour Day the Declaration reﬂected a previously established domi- nance of the Zionist position in Jewish thought, it was the Declaration itself which was subsequently responsible for The text of the letter was published in the press one week Zionism’s legitimacy and leadership.[lower-alpha 33] after it was signed, on 9 November 1917.[92] In August 1919, Balfour approved Weizmann’s request to name the ﬁrst post-war settlement in Mandatory Pales- 4.1 Zionist reaction tine,"Balfouria", in his honor.[96][97] It was intended to be a model settlement for future American Jewish activity in Palestine.[98] From 1918 until World War II, Jews in Mandatory Pales- tine celebrated Balfour Day as an annual national holiday on 2 November.[99] The celebrations included ceremonies in schools and other public institutions and festive articles in the Hebrew press.[99]

4.2 Arab opposition

The local Christian and Muslim community of Pales- tine, who constituted almost 90% of the population, strongly opposed the Declaration.[66] As described by the Palestinian-American philosopher Edward Said in 1979, it was made "(a) by a European power, (b) about a non- European territory, (c) in a flat disregard of both the presence and the wishes of the native majority resident in that territory, and (d) it took the form of a promise about this same territory to another foreign group.”[lower-alpha 34] According to the 1919 King-Crane Commission: “No British officer, consulted by the Commissioners, believed that the Zionist programme could be carried out except by force of arms.”[101] A delegation of the Muslim-Christian Association, headed by Musa al-Husayni, expressed public disapproval on 3 November 1918, one day after the Balfour Declaration as published in The Times, 9 November Zionist Commission parade marking the first anniversary 1917 of the Balfour Declaration.[102] They handed a petition signed by more than 100 notables to Ronald Storrs, the The publication of the intent galvanized Zionism, which OETA military governor: finally had obtained an official charter. It was first published in newspapers on 9 November, and leaflets were We have noticed yesterday a large crowd circulated throughout Jewish communities. These leaflets of Jews carrying banners and over-running the were airdropped over Jewish communities in Germany, streets shouting words which hurt the feeling Austria as well as the Pale of Settlement which had and wound the soul. They pretend with open been given to the Central Powers following the Russian [93] voice that Palestine, which is the Holy Land of withdrawal. our fathers and the graveyard of our ancestors, In the ongoing Sinai and Palestine Campaign, both Gaza which has been inhabited by the Arabs for long and Jaffa fell within several days. Once under British mil- ages, who loved it and died in defending it, is itary occupation, large transfers of funds were possible, now a national home for them... We Arabs, and a major effort began to drain the marshy land of the Muslim and Christian, have always sympa- 4.4 Evolution of British opinion 9

Federation of Germany, promising that his Government would influence the Turks once the war was over.[107] On 12 December, the Ottoman Grand Vizier, Talaat Pasha, gave an interview to German newspaper the Vossische Zeitung,[107] which was published on 31 December and subsequently released in the German Jewish periodical Jüdische Rundschau on 4 January 1918,[108][107] in which he referred to the Declaration as “une blague”[107] (a de- ception) and promised that under Ottoman rule “all jus- tifiable wishes of the Jews in Palestine would be able to find their fulfilment” subject to the absorptive capacity of the country.[107] This Turkish statement was endorsed by the German Foreign Office on 5 January 1918.[107] A German-Jewish Society was formed to advocate for further progress on 8 January 1918, named the Union of German Jewish Organizations for the Protection of the Rights of the Jews of the East (VJOD).[lower-alpha 35][109]

4.4 Evolution of British opinion

“It is said that the effect of the Balfour Declaration was to leave the Moslems and Christians dumbfounded... It is impossible to minimise the bitterness of the awakening. They considered that they were to be handed over to an oppression which they hated far more than the Turk’s and were aghast at the thought of this domination... Promi- nent people openly talk of betrayal and that England has The most popular Palestinian Arab newspaper, Filastin (La Palestine), published a four-page editorial addressed to Lord sold the country and received the price... Towards the Balfour in March 1925. Administration [the Zionists] adopted the attitude of “We want the Jewish State and we won't wait”, and they did not hesitate to avail themselves of every means open to them thized profoundly with the persecuted Jews and in this country and abroad to force the hand of an Admin- their misfortunes in other countries... but there istration bound to respect the “Status Quo” and to com- is wide difference between such sympathy and mit it, and thereby future Administrations, to a policy not the acceptance of such a nation...ruling over us contemplated in the Balfour Declaration... What more and disposing of our affairs.[103] natural than that [the Moslems and Christians] should fail to realise the immense difficulties the Administration was The group also protested the carrying of new “white and is labouring under and come to the conclusion that the and blue banners with two inverted triangles in the openly published demands of the Jews were to be granted middle”,[104] drawing the attention of the British authori- and the guarantees in the Declaration were to become but ties to the serious consequences of any political implica- a dead letter?" tions in raising the banners.[104] Report of the Palin Commission, August 1920[66] Balfour’s stance was seen as a betrayal of British under- In October 1919, Lord Curzon succeeded Balfour as For- standings with Arabs.[49] Later that month, on the first eign Secretary. Curzon had opposed the Declaration anniversary of the occupation of Jaffa by the British, the prior to its publication and therefore determined to pur- Muslim-Christian Association sent a lengthy memoran- sue a policy in line with its “narrower and more pru- dum and petition to the military governor protesting once dent rather than the wider interpretation”.[110] Following more any formation of a Jewish state.[105] Bonar Law’s appointment as Prime Minister in late 1922, Curzon wrote to Bonar Law that he regarded the Bal- four Declaration as “the worst” of Britain’s Middle East 4.3 Response by Central Powers commitments and “a striking contradiction of our pub- licly declared principles.”[111] Curzon had been a mem- Immediately following the publication of the declara- ber of the 1917 Cabinet which approved the declaration, tion, it was met with tactical responses from the Cen- and according to Sir David Gilmour, Curzon had been tral Powers.[106] Two weeks following the Declaration, “the only senior figure in the British government at the Ottokar Czernin, the Austrian Foreign Minister, gave time who foresaw that its policy would lead to decades of an interview to Arthur Hantke, President of the Zionist Arab–Jewish hostility”.[112] 10 7 NOTES

In August 1920, the report of the Palin Commission, the “most intractable conflict”.[120][121][122] The Arab-Israeli first in a long line of Commissions of Inquiry on the ques- conflict in a wider sense ran primarily from 1948–73, but tion of Palestine during the Mandate period,[113] noted continues today, mainly in the form of the more local- that “The Balfour Declaration... is undoubtedly the start- ized Israeli–Palestinian conflict. Britain’s involvement in ing point of the whole trouble”. The conclusion of the re- this became one of the most controversial parts of its Em- port mentioned the Balfour Declaration three times, stat- pire’s history, and damaged its reputation in the Middle ing that “the causes of the alienation and exasperation of East for generations.[lower-alpha 36] the feelings of the population of Palestine” included: Jonathan Schneer’s 2010 study concluded that because the buildup to the declaration was characterized by “con- • Inability to reconcile the Allies’ declared policy tradictions, deceptions, misinterpretations, and wishful of self-determination with the Balfour Declaration, thinking”, the declaration sowed dragon’s teeth and “pro- giving rise to a sense of betrayal and intense anxiety duced a murderous harvest, and we go on harvesting even [114] for their future; today.”[lower-alpha 37][124] The foundational stone for mod- • Misapprehension of the true meaning of the Balfour ern Israel had been laid, but the prediction that this would lay the groundwork for harmonious Arab-Jewish cooper- Declaration and forgetfulness of the guarantees de- [125] termined therein, due to the loose rhetoric of politi- ation proved to be wishful thinking. cians and the exaggerated statements and writings of The implementation of the declaration fed a disenchant- interested persons, chiefly Zionists;[114] and ment among the Arabs that alienated them from the British administrators in Mandatory Palestine.[49] Pales- • Zionist indiscretion and aggression, since the Bal- [114] tinian historian Rashid Khalidi has argued that following four Declaration aggravating such fears. the Balfour Declaration there ensued “what amounts to a hundred years of war against the Palestinian people.”[126] British public and government opinion became increasingly less favourable to the commitment that had been made to Zionist policy. In February 1922, Churchill tele- graphed Samuel, who by then had been appointed High 6 See also Commissioner for Palestine, asking for cuts in expendi- ture and noting: • Proposals for a Jewish state

In both Houses of Parliament there is grow- • British Mandate for Palestine (legal instrument) ing movement of hostility, against Zionist policy in Palestine, which will be stimulated by recent Northcliffe articles.[115] I do not attach 7 Notes undue importance to this movement, but it is increasingly difficult to meet the argument that it is unfair to ask the British taxpayer, already [1] The idealistic idea of evangelical Christian or similar ideas overwhelmed with taxation, to bear the cost of playing a significant role in the decision to release the Bal- four Declaration has been discarded by historians. James imposing on Palestine an unpopular policy.[116] Renton described this as follows: “A crucial aspect of this depiction of the Declaration as a product of British benev- Following the issuance of the Churchill White Paper in olence, as opposed to realpolitik, was that the British had June 1922, the House of Lords rejected a Palestine Man- a natural and deep-rooted concern for the rights of Jews date which incorporated the Balfour Declaration by 60 and specifically their national restoration, which was an votes to 25, following a motion issued by Lord Isling- ingrained part of British culture and history. Presented in ton.[117][118] The vote proved to be solely symbolic as this way, the Declaration was shown to be a natural, al- it was subsequently overruled by a vote in the House most preordained event. Hence, Zionism was presented of Commons following a variety of promises made by not just as the ‘’telos’’ of Jewish history but also of British history. The tendency of nationalist and Zionist histo- Churchill.[117][119] ries to develop towards a single point of destiny and redemption allowed for, indeed required, such an explanation. The myth of British 'proto-Zionism’, which has had 5 Longer-term impact such a longstanding influence on the historiography of the Balfour Declaration, was thus produced, so as to serve the needs of Zionist propagandists working for the British The declaration had two indirect consequences, the emer- Government.”[3] gence of a Jewish state and a chronic state of conflict [49] between Arabs and Jews throughout the Middle East. [2] Montefiore was the wealthiest British Jew, and leader of Starting in 1920, the Intercommunal conflict in Manda- the Board of Deputies of British Jews. Charles Henry tory Palestine broke out, which widened into the regional Churchill’s first letter, in 1841, intended to catalyse an in- Arab–Israeli conflict, often referred to as the world’s terest in Jewish emigration to Palestine: “Supposing that 11

you and your colleagues should at once and earnestly in- of the idea, Chamberlain received Herzl in his office just terest yourselves upon this important subject of the recov- weeks after the Kishinev pogroms. He fixed Herzl in his ery of your ancient country, it appears to me (forming my monocle and offered his help. “I have seen a land for you opinions upon the present attitude of affairs in the Turkish on my travels,” Chamberlain told him, “and that’s Uganda. Empire) that it could only be as subjects of the Porte that It’s not on the coast, but farther inland the climate be- you could commence to regain a footing in Palestine.”[6] comes excellent even for Europeans… [a]nd I thought to myself that would be a land for Dr. Herzl.” "[13] [3] LeVine and Mossberg describe this as follows: “The par- ents of Zionism were not Judaism and tradition, but anti- [7] Rovner wrote that: “On the afternoon of the fourth day Semitism and nationalism. The ideals of the French Rev- of the Congress a weary Nordau brought three resolutions olution spread slowly across Europe, finally reaching the before the delegates: (1) that the Zionist Organization di- Pale of Settlement in the Russian Empire and helping to rect all future settlement efforts solely to Palestine; (2) that set off the Haskalah, or Jewish Enlightenment. This en- the Zionist Organization thank the British government for gendered a permanent split in the Jewish world, between its other of an autonomous territory in East Africa; and those who held to a halachic or religious-centric vision (3) that only those Jews who declare their allegiance to the of their identity and those who adopted in part the racial Basel Program may become members of the Zionist Or- rhetoric of the time and made the Jewish people into a na- ganization.” Zangwill objected… When Nordau insisted tion. This was helped along by the wave of pogroms in on the Congress’s right to pass the resolutions regardless, Eastern Europe that set two million Jews to flight; most Zangwill was outraged. “You will be charged before the wound up in America, but some chose Palestine. A driv- bar of history,” he challenged Nordau… From approx- ing force behind this was the Hovevei Zion movement, imately 1:30 p.m. on Sunday, July 30, 1905, a Zionist which worked from 1882 to develop a Hebrew identity would henceforth he defined as someone who adhered to [8] that was distinct from Judaism as a religion.” the Basel Program and the only “authentic interpretation” of that program restricted settlement activity exclusively [4] Gelvin wrote: “The fact that Palestinian nationalism de- to Palestine. Zangwill and his supporters could not accept veloped later than Zionism and indeed in response to it Nordau’s “authentic interpretation” which they believed does not in any way diminish the legitimacy of Palestinian would lead to an abandonment of the Jewish masses and of nationalism or make it less valid than Zionism. All na- Herzl’s vision. One territorialist claimed that Ussishkin’s tionalisms arise in opposition to some “other”. Why else voting bloc had in fact “buried political Zionism”."[14] would there be the need to specify who you are? And all nationalisms are defined by what they oppose. As we have [8] Weizmann wrote in his memoirs that: “The entry of seen, Zionism itself arose in reaction to anti-Semitic and Turkey into the fray and the remarks made by the Premier exclusionary nationalist movements in Europe. It would in his Guildhall speech were an additional impulse to- be perverse to judge Zionism as somehow less valid than wards proceeding with the reconnoitring work at a higher European anti-Semitism or those nationalisms. Further- speed... An opportunity offered itself to discuss the Jew- more, Zionism itself was also defined by its opposition to ish problems with Mr. C.P. Scott (Editor of the Manch- the indigenous Palestinian inhabitants of the region. Both ester Guardian)… Mr. Scott, who has, I believe, given the “conquest of land” and the “conquest of labor” slogans the whole problem a very careful and sympathetic atten- that became central to the dominant strain of Zionism in tion, was good enough to promise that he would talk to the Yishuv originated as a result of the Zionist confronta- Mr. Lloyd George on the subject… As it happened, Mr. tion with the Palestinian “other”."[9] Lloyd George, having several engagements for the week [5] Defries wrote that: “Balfour had, at the least, acquiesced suggested that I should see Mr. Herbert Samuel, and an in Chamberlain’s earlier efforts to assist the Jews in finding interview took place at his office. [Footnote: 10 Dec. [19] a territory to establish a Jewish settlement. According to 1914]" his biographer he was interested enough in Zionism at the end of 1905 to allow his Jewish constituency party chair- [9] Weizmann wrote in his memoirs that: “He believed that man, Charles Dreyfus, to organise a meeting with Weiz- my demands were too modest, that big things would have mann. It is possible that he was intrigued by the rejection to be done in Palestine; he himself would move and would by the Zionist Congress of the 'Uganda' offer. It is unlikely expect Jewry to move immediately the military situation that Balfour was 'converted' to Zionism by this encounter was cleared up… The Jews would have to bring sacri- despite this view being propounded by Weizmann and en- fices and he was prepared to do so. At this point I ven- dorsed by Balfour’s biographer. Balfour had just resigned tured to ask in which way the plans of Mr. Samuel were as prime minister when he met Weizmann. Despite his more ambitious than mine. Mr. Samuel preferred not to subsequent dramatic defeat at the polls by the Liberals and enter into a discussion of his plans, as he would like to his ultimate resignation as Party leader in 1911, he was to keep them ‘liquid’, but he suggested that the Jews would stage a renaissance politically. His advice was sought by have to build railways, harbours, a university, a network the Liberal administration on matters of defence and with of schools, etc… He also thinks that perhaps the Temple the outbreak of the First World War his opinion was in may be rebuilt, as a symbol of Jewish unity, of course, in [20] even greater demand. In December 1914 Weizmann met a modernised form.” Balfour again.”[12] [10] Weizmann wrote in his memoirs that: “On the sugges- [6] Rovner wrote that: “In the spring of 1903 the fastidiously tion of Baron James, I went to see Sir Philip Magnus with dressed sixty-six-year-old secretary was fresh from a trip whom I had a lengthy conversation, and he expressed his to British possessions in Africa... Whatever the genesis willingness to cooperate, provided that great discretion 12 7 NOTES

was used… I asked Sir Philip his opinion of the advis- [17] Brysac and Meyer wrote: “As the lawyer and historian ability of seeing Mr. Balfour, and he thought that an in- David Fromkin has shrewdly noted, out of an estimated terview with Mr. Balfour would be of very great interest three million Jews living in the United States in 1914, and value… At one of my visits to London I wrote to Mr. a mere twelve thousand belonged to an amateurishly led Balfour and got an appointment with him on Saturday the Zionist Federation, which claimed but five hundred mem- same week at 12 o’clock in his house.[Footnote: 12 Dec. bers in New York. Its annual budget prior to 1914 never 1914] I spoke to him practically in the same strain as I did exceeded $5,200, and the largest single gift it received to- to Mr. Samuel, but the whole turn of our conversation was talled $200.”[54] more academic than practical.”[21] [18] Reinharz described this as follows: “At the Zionist Emer- [11] See the original 25 October 1915 letter here. George An- gency Conference in August 1914, Poalei-Zion demanded tonius − who had been the first to publish the correspon- the convening of a Jewish congress which would debate dence in full − described this letter as: “by far the most the Jewish problem as a whole... During a year of fruit- important in the whole correspondence, and may perhaps less discussions, the AJC would only agree only to a lim- be regarded as the most important international document ited convention of specific organizations, rather than a in the history of the Arab national movement... is still in- congress based on democratic elections. In March 1916, voked as the main piece of evidence on which the Arabs therefore, the Zionists invited a number of other organiza- accuse Great Britain of having broken faith with them.”[26] tions to set up a congress. The internal strife among Amer- ican Jewry, which had been so widely feared, broke out in [12] Primarily following the Public Records Act 1958 full force... The elections were held in June, two months after the United States had entered the war; 325,000 [13] In reference to a 27 February 1916 letter, Kamel quotes: voted, 75,000 of whom were from the Zionist workers’ "'I read the memorandum', clarified Sykes to Samuel camp. This was an impressive demonstration of the ability shortly before departing for Russia, 'and have committed of the immigrant Zionists to rally massive support. Imme- it to memory'"[33] diately after came President Wilson’s suggestion to Wise not to hold the congress while the war was on, and the [14] Sanders quotes Sykes’s letter as follows: “By excluding opening session was thus postponed from September 2, Hebron and the East of the Jordan there is less to discuss 1917, until “peace negotiations will be in prospect”. The with the Moslems, as the Mosque of Omar then becomes PZCs acceptance of the deferment again aroused the ire the only matter of vital importance to discuss with them of supporters of the congress, who described it as a de- [55] and further does away with any contact with the bedouins, grading surrender.” who never cross the river except on business. I imagine [19] Reinharz wrote: “British and French estimates of the bal- that the principal object of Zionism is the realization of ance of power in the American Jewish public were greatly the ideal of an existing centre of nationality rather than affected by this success in the struggle for a congress. It boundaries or extent of territory. The moment I return I [34] was a victory for Zionists under the leadership of close will let you know how things stand at Pd.” advisers to the Wilson Administration, such as Brandeis and Frankfurter, against the desires of the bankers from [15] The British did not know quite what to make of President Wall Street, the AJC, and the National Workers’ Commit- Woodrow Wilson and his conviction (before America’s tee. It spurred an impressive growth in organized mem- entrance into the war) that the way to end hostilities was bership: from 7,500 in 200 Zionist societies in 1914 to for both sides to accept “peace without victory.” Two of 30,000 in 600 societies in 1918. One year later, the num- Wilson’s closest advisors, Louis Brandeis and Felix Frank- ber of members reached 149,000. In addition, the FAZ furter, were avid Zionists. How better to shore up an un- and the PZC collected millions of dollars during the war certain ally than by endorsing Zionist aims? The British years. This demonstration of support for Zionism among adopted similar thinking when it came to the Russians, the masses of American Jews played a vital role in the who were in the midst of their revolution. Several of the British considerations which led to the Balfour Declara- most prominent revolutionaries, including Leon Trotsky, tion. The American Government (or, at least, the State were of Jewish descent. Why not see if they could be per- Department), which did not particularly want to support suaded to keep Russia in the war by appealing to their la- the Declaration, did so almost in spite of itself – appar- tent Jewishness and giving them another reason to con- ently because of the growing strength of Zionists in the tinue the fight? ... These include not only those already United States.”[55] mentioned but also Britain’s desire to attract Jewish financial resources.[50] [20] Grainger writes: “It was later lauded as a great human- itarian gesture and condemned as a wicked plot, but the [16] Thus the view from Whitehall early in 1916: If defeat was preceding Cabinet discussions about it show that it was not imminent, neither was victory; and the outcome of the the product of hard-headed political calculation… It was war of attrition on the Western Front could not be pre- argued that such a declaration would encourage support dicted. The colossal forces in a death-grip across Europe for the Allies in the United States and in Russia, the two and in Eurasia appeared to have canceled each other out. countries in the world which had very large Jewish pop- Only the addition of significant new forces on one side or ulations. But behind it all was the knowledge that, if the other seemed likely to tip the scale. Britain’s willing- Britain promoted such a policy, it would necessarily be up ness, beginning early in 1916, to explore seriously some to her to implement it, and this would in turn mean that kind of arrangement with “world Jewry” or “Great Jewry” she would have to exercise political control over Pales- must be understood in this context.[51] tine. One aim of the Balfour Declaration was thus to 13

freeze out France (and anyone else) from any post-war what exactly do “view with favour” and “use their best en- presence in Palestine.”[56] and Barr writes: “To ward oﬀ deavours” mean? The seeming ambiguities of the declara- the inevitable French pressure for an international admin- tion reﬂect debates not only within the British government istration once Palestine had been conquered, the British but within the British Zionist and jewish communities as government now made its support for Zionism public.”[57] well.”[48]

[21] In this critical situation it was believed that Jewish sympa- [26] Norman Rose described this as follows: “There can be thy or the reverse would make a substantial difference one no doubt about what was in the minds of the chief archi- way or the other to the Allied cause. In particular Jewish tects of the Balfour Declaration. The evidence is incontro- sympathy would confirm the support of American Jewry, vertible. All envisaged, in the fullness of time, the emer- and would make it more difficult for Germany to reduce gence of a Jewish state. For the Zionists, accordingly, it her military commitments and improve her economic po- was the first step that would lead to Jewish statehood. Yet sition on the eastern front... The Zionist leaders gave us a for Weizmann – a confirmed Anglophile – and the Zion- definite promise that, if the Allies committed themselves ist leadership there proved to be adverse repercussions. to giving facilities for the establishment of a national home As the British attempted to reconcile their diverse obliga- for the Jews in Palestine, they would do their best to rally tions, there began for the Zionists a period full of promise Jewish sentiment and support throughout the world to the but also of intense frustration. One cynic noted that the Allied cause. They kept their word.[58] process of whittling down the Balfour Declaration began on 3 November 1917.”[67] [22] The Balfour Declaration represented the convinced policy of all parties in our country and also in America, but the [27] See the report of the United Nations Special Committee launching of it in 1917 was due, as I have said, to propa- on Palestine, UN Document A/364, 3 September 1947 gandist reasons.... The Zionist Movement was exception- [28] Richard Meinertzhagen wrote in his diary that “L.G. and ally strong in Russia and America.... It was believed, also, A.J.B both said that by the Declaration they always meant that such a declaration would have a potent influence upon an eventual Jewish State”[73] world Jewry outside Russia, and secure for the Entente the aid of Jewish financial interests. In America, their aid in [29] As James Renton described it in 2007: “The attempt to this respect would have a special value when the Allies had create different messages for different audiences regarding almost exhausted the gold and marketable securities avail- the future of the same place, as had been attempted since able for American purchases. Such were the chief consid- the fall of Jerusalem, was untenable.”[77] erations which, in 1917, impelled the British Government towards making a contract with Jewry.[59] [30] In 1930, on learning that King George V had requested his views about the state of affairs in Palestine, John Chan- [23] Full text of note included CO 733/58, Secret Cabinet Pa- cellor, the High Commissioners for Palestine, wrote a 16- per CP 60 (23), 'Palestine and the Balfour Declaration, page letter via Lord Stamfordham, the King’s Private Sec- January 1923. FO unofficial note added 'little referring to retary. The letter concluded that: “The facts of the sit- the Balfour Declaration among such papers as have been uation are that in the dire straits of the war, the British preserved'. Shuckburgh’s memo asserts that 'as the offi- Government made promises to the Arabs and promises to cial records are silent, it can only be assumed that such the Jews which are inconsistent with one another and are discussions as had taken place were of an informal and incapable of fulfilment. The honest course is to admit our private character'.[61] difficulty and to say to the Jews that, in accordance with the Balfour Declaration, we have favoured the establish- [24] Quigley wrote that: “This declaration, which is always ment of a Jewish National Home in Palestine and that a known as the Balfour Declaration, should rather be called Jewish National Home in Palestine has in fact been estab- “the Milner Declaration,” since Milner was the actual lished and will be maintained and that, without violating draftsman and was, apparently, its chief supporter in the the other part of the Balfour Declaration, without preju- War Cabinet. This fact was not made public until 21 July dicing the interests of the Arabs, we cannot do more than 1937. At that time Ormsby-Gore, speaking for the gov- we have done.”[82] ernment in Commons, said, “The draft as originally put up by Lord Balfour was not the final draft approved by the [31] In an August 1919 memo discussing the Covenant of the War Cabinet. The particular draft assented to by the War League of Nations, Balfour explained: “The contradic- Cabinet and afterwards by the Allied Governments and by tion between the letter of the Covenant and the policy of the United States...and finally embodied in the Mandate, the Allies is even more flagrant in the case of the 'inde- happens to have been drafted by Lord Milner. The ac- pendent nation' of Palestine than in that of the 'indepen- tual final draft had to be issued in the name of the Foreign dent nation' of Syria. For in Palestine we do not propose Secretary, but the actual draftsman was Lord Milner.”[63] even to go through the form of consulting the wishes of the present inhabitants of the country, though the American [25] Gelvin wrote that: “The words of the Balfour Declaration Commission has been going through the form of asking were carefully chosen. It was no accident that the decla- what they are. The four Great Powers are committed to ration contains the phrase “in Palestine” rather than “of Zionism. And Zionism, be it right or wrong, good or bad, Palestine”, nor was it an accident that the foreign office is rooted in age-long traditions, in present needs, in future would use the words “national home” rather than the more hopes, of far profounder import than the desires and prej- precise “state” – in spite of the fact that “national home” udices of the 700,000 Arabs who now inhabit that ancient has no precedent or standing in international law. And land.”[86][87] 14 8 CITATIONS

[32] 19 February 1919, Balfour wrote to Lloyd-George that: 8 Citations “The weak point of our position of course is that in the case of Palestine we deliberately and rightly decline to ac- [1] Renton 2007, p. 2. cept the principle of self-determination. If the present inhabitants were consulted they would unquestionably give [2] Lewis 2014, p. 380. an anti-Jewish verdict. Our justiﬁcation for our policy is that we regard Palestine as being absolutely exceptional; [3] Renton 2007, p. 85. that we consider the question of the Jews outside Pales- [4] Stein 1961, p. 5-9. tine as one of world importance, and that we conceive the Jews to have an historic claim to a home in their ancient [5] Liebreich 2004, p. 8-9. land; provided that home can be given them without either dispossessing or oppressing the present inhabitants.”[89] [6] Friedman 1973, p. xxxii.

[33] James Renton wrote that: “Overall, it is clear that the [7] Cleveland & Bunton 2016, p. 229. Declaration, the Anglo-Zionist propaganda campaign, the [8] LeVine & Mossberg 2014, p. 211. public support from international labour and President Wilson gave the Zionists a powerful position from which [9] Gelvin 2014, p. 93. to further their influence in American jewry. However, this could not have been further from the effect intended [10] Rhett 2015, p. 107-8. by the British Government. The Balfour Declaration was certainly not meant as a tool to aid the growth of the Zion- [11] Weizmann 1949, p. 93-109. ist movement, or to exacerbate communal divisions. Its [12] Defries 2014, p. 51. issuance was supposed to reflect a shift that had already taken place within world Jewry, but in fact was responsi- [13] Rovner 2014, p. 51-52. ble for the Zionists claim to legitimacy and leadership.”[95] [14] Rovner 2014, p. 81. [34] Edward Said wrote in his 1979 The Question of Palestine: “What is important about the declaration is, first, that it [15] Rovner 2014, p. 51-81. has long formed the juridical basis of Zionist claims to [16] Weizmann 1949, p. 111. Palestine and, second, and more crucial for our purposes here, that it was a statement whose positional force can [17] Schneer 2010, p. 32. only be appreciated when the demographic or human re- alities of Palestine are kept clearly in mind. That is, the [18] Büssow 2011, p. 5. declaration was made (a) by a European power, (b) about a non-European territory, (c) in a flat disregard of both the [19] Weizmann 1983, p. 122. presence and the wishes of the native majority resident in [20] Weizmann 1983, p. 122b. that territory, and (d) it took the form of a promise about this same territory to another foreign group, so that this [21] Weizmann 1983, p. 126. foreign group might, quite literally, make this territory a national home for the Jewish people. There is not much [22] Kamel 2015, p. 106. use today in lamenting such a statement as the Balfour [23] Huneidi 2001, p. 83. Declaration. It seems more valuable to see it as part of a history, of a style and set of characteristics centrally con- [24] Lloyd George 1933, p. 50. stituting the question of Palestine as it can be discussed even today.”[100] [25] Huneidi 2001, p. 65.

[35] In the original German: Vereinigung jüdischer Organisa- [26] Antonius 1938, p. 169. tionen Deutschlands zur Wahrung der Rechte der Juden des [27] Huneidi 2001, p. 65-70. Ostens” [28] Report of a Committee Set Up To Consider Certain [36] Norman Rose noted that: "...for the British the Bal- Correspondence Between Sir Henry McMahon and The four Declaration inaugurated one of the most controver- Sharif of Mecca Archived 30 January 2009 at the sial episodes in their imperial history. Undone by the Wayback Machine. complexities of wartime diplomacy, unable to bridge the gap with either of the interested parties, the Declara- [29] Ingrams 2009, p. 48: Ingrams cites the UK Archive ﬁles tion impaired their relations with both Palestinian Arabs PRO CAB 27/24 and Zionists. And no less, it stained Britain’s reputation throughout the Arab Middle East for generations to [30] Ulrichsen & Ulrichsen 2014, p. 155-156. come.”[67] [31] Schneer 2010, p. 75-86. [37] Schneer wrote that: “Because it was unpredictable and [32] Khouri 1985, pp. 8–10 characterized by contradictions, deceptions, misinterpretations, and wishful thinking, the lead-up to the Balfour [33] Kamel 2015, p. 109. Declaration sowed dragon’s teeth. It produced a murderous harvest, and we go on harvesting even today”[123] [34] Sanders 1984, p. 347. 15

[35] Huneidi 2001, p. 66. [65] Halpern 1987, p. 163.

[36] Report of a Committee Set up to Consider Certain Corre- [66] Wikisource:Palin Report spondence Between Sir Henry McMahon and the Sharif of Mecca in 1915 and 1916 Archived 24 October 2015 at [67] Rose 2010, p. 18. the Wayback Machine., UNISPAL, Annex A, paragraph [68] Makovsky 2007, p. 76: “The deﬁnition of “national 19. home” was left intentionally ambiguous.” [37] Hurewitz 1979, p. 102. [69] Strawson 2009, p. 33. [38] Zieger 2001, p. 97-8. [70] The Palestine Yearbook of International Law 1984. [39] Zieger 2001, p. 91. Martinus Nijhoﬀ. 1997. p. 48. ISBN 9789041103383.

[40] Zieger 2001, p. 58. [71] Mansﬁeld 1992, p. 176–77.

[41] Zieger 2001, p. 188-189. [72] Gilmour 1996, p. 64.

[42] Grainger 2006, p. 81-108. [73] Meinertzhagen 1959, p. 104.

[43] Grainger 2006, p. 109-114. [74] Stein 1961, p. 470.

[44] Hurewitz 1979, p. 103. [75] Friedman 1973, p. 257.

[45] Hurewitz 1979, p. 104. [76] Caplan 2011, p. 74.

[46] Hurewitz 1979, p. 105. [77] Renton 2007, p. 151.

[47] Hurewitz 1979, p. 106. [78] Peel Commission Report, p.31

[48] Gelvin 2014, p. 82ﬀ. [79] Peel Commission Report, p.363

[49] Watts 2008, p. 190 [80] Cleveland & Bunton 2016, p. 244.

[50] Gelvin 2014, p. 82-83. [81] Peel Commission Report, p.368

[51] Schneer 2010, p. 152. [82] Shlaim 2005, p. 251-270: Shlaim quotes: Sir John R. Chancellor to Lord Stamfordham, May 27, 1930, Middle [52] Wall Street Journal review of Jonathan Shneer, Balfour East Archive, St. Antony’s College, Oxford. Declaration “As Mr. Schneer documents, the declaration was, among much else, part of a campaign to foster world- [83] League of Nations. PERMANENT MANDATES COM- wide Jewish support for the Allied war eﬀort, not least in MISSION. Report on the Work of the Fifth (Extraordi- the U.S.” nary) Session of the Commission (held at Geneva from October 23rd to November 6th, 1924) [53] Ingrams 2009, p. 16. [84] Prime Minister’s Statement: HC Deb 03 April 1930 vol [54] Brysac & Meyer 2009, p. 115. 237 cc1466-7

[55] Reinharz 1988, p. 131-145. [85] Peel Commission Report, p.218

[56] Grainger 2006, p. 178. [86] Lewis 2009, p. 163.

[57] Barr 2011, p. 60. [87] Memorandum by Mr. Balfour (Paris) respecting Syria, Palestine, and Mesopotamia, 132187/2117/44A, August [58] Palestine Royal Commission Report, Cmd 5479, 1937, 11, 1919 pp23–24. [88] Gelvin 1999, p. 13–29. [59] Lloyd George 1939, p. 724-734. [89] Friedman 1973, p. 325: Friedman quoted F.O. [60] Huneidi 2001, p. 61-64. 371/4179/2117, Balfour to the Prime Minister, 19 Febru- ary 1919 [61] Huneidi 2001, p. 256: “The 'most comprehensive explanation' of the origin of the Balfour Declaration the For- [90] Makdisi 2010, p. 239. eign Office was able to provide was contained in a small 'unofficial' note of Jan 1923 affirming that...” [91] Ingrams 2009, p. 13.

[62] Stein 1961, p. 664: “Appendix: Successive drafts and [92] Schneer 2010, p. 342. ﬁnal text of the Balfour Declaration” [93] Peel Commission Report, 1937, p.23 [63] Quigley 1981, p. 169. [94] Rafael N. Rosenzweig, The Economic Consequences of [64] Rubinstein 2000, p. 175–196. Zionism, BRILL, 1989 pp.25–28. 16 9 BIBLIOGRAPHY

[95] Renton 2007, p. 148. [122] Avner Falk, Fratricide in the Holy Land: A Psychoana- lytic View of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, Chapter 1, page [96] Tomes 2002, p. 198. 8, “Most experts agree that the Arab-Israeli conflict is [97] Glass 2002, p. 199. the most intractable conflict in our world, yet very few scholars have produced any psychological explanation— [98] Glass 2002, p. 200. let alone a satisfactory one—of this conflict’s intractabil- ity” [99] Sorek 2015, p. 25. [123] Schneer 2010, p. 370. [100] Said 1979, p. 15-16. [124] Review: ‘The Balfour Declaration: The Origins of the [101] Friedman 2000, p. 273. Arab-Israeli Conflict’, Jim Miles, April 4, 2012, “The con- [102] Wasserstein 1991, p. 31. clusion reached by Schneer, stated twice, “Because it was unpredictable and characterized by contradictions, decep- [103] Wasserstein 1991, p. 32; Wasserstein quotes Storrs to tions, misinterpretations, and wishful thinking, the lead- OETA headquarters, 4 Nov. 1918 (ISA 2/140/4A) up to the Balfour Declaration sowed dragon’s teeth…. It produced a murderous harvest, and we go on harvesting [104] Huneidi 2001, p. 32 even today."" [105] Huneidi 2001, p. 32a, Huneidi cites: 'Petition from the Moslem-Christian Association in Jaffa, to the Military [125] Schneer 2010, p. 361. Governor, on the occasion of the First Anniversary of [126] Ian Black,'Middle East still rocking from first world war British Entry into Jaffa', 16 November 1918, Zu'aytir pa- pacts made 100 years ago ,' The Guardian 30 December pers pp. 7–8 2015. [106] Friedman 1997, p. 340-343.

[107] Cohen 1946, p. 120. 9 Bibliography [108] Friedman 1997, p. 379.

[109] Toury 1968, p. 81-84. • Antonius, George (1938). The Arab Awakening: The Story of the Arab National Movement. Hamish [110] Gilmour 1996, p. 66; Gilmour quotes: Curzon to Allenby, Hamilton. ISBN 9780710306739. 16 July 1920, CP 112/799 • [111] Gilmour 1996, p. 67; Gilmour quotes: Curzon to Bonar Barr, James (2011). A Line in the Sand: Britain, Law, 14 December 1922, Bonar Law Papers, 111/12/46 France and the struggle that shaped the Middle East. Simon & Schuster. p. 60. ISBN 978-1-84983-903- [112] Gilmour 1996, p. 67. 7. [113] Huneidi 2001, p. 35. • Brysac, Shareen Blair; Meyer, Karl E. (2009). [114] Kattan 2009, p. 84. Kingmakers: The Invention of the Modern Middle East. W. W. Norton. ISBN 978-0-393-34243-7. [115] Defries 2014, p. 103. • [116] Huneidi 2001, p. 57, Huneidi cites: CO 733/18, Churchill Büssow, Johann (2011). Hamidian Palestine: Pol- to Samuel, Telegram, Private and Personal, 25 February itics and Society in the District of Jerusalem 1872- 1922 1908. BRILL. ISBN 978-90-04-20569-7. Re- trieved 2013-05-17. [117] Huneidi 2001, p. 58. • Caplan, Neil (2011). The Israel-Palestine Conflict: [118] Palestine Mandate, HL Deb 21 June 1922 vol 50 cc994- Contested Histories. John Wiley & Sons. ISBN 978- 1033 (outcome of the vote cc1033 on next page) 1-4443-5786-8. [119] Colonial Office, Hansard, HC Deb 04 July 1922 vol 156 cc221-343 (outcome of the vote cc343) • Cleveland, William L.; Bunton, Martin (2016). A History of the Modern Middle East. Avalon Publish- [120] Chris Rice, quoted in Munayer Salim J, Loden Lisa, ing. ISBN 978-0-8133-4980-0. Through My Enemy’s Eyes: Envisioning Reconciliation in Israel-Palestine, quote: “The Palestinian-Israeli divide • Cohen, Israel (1946). The Zionist movement. Edited may be the most intractable conflict of our time.” and rev. with supplementary chapter on Zionism in [121] Virginia Page Fortna, Peace Time: Cease-fire Agreements the United States. Zionist Organization of America. and the Durability of Peace, page 67, “Britain’s contra- OCLC 906137115. dictory promises to Arabs and Jews during World War I sowed the seeds of what would become the interna- • Defries, Harry (2014). Conservative Party Attitudes tional community’s most intractable conflict later in the to Jews 1900–1950. Routledge. p. 51. ISBN 978- century.” 1-135-28462-6. 17

• Friedman, Isaiah (1997). Germany, Turkey, and • Khouri, Fred John (January 1985). The Arab-Israeli Zionism 1897–1918. Transaction Publishers. ISBN Dilemma. Syracuse University Press. ISBN 978-0- 978-1-4128-2456-9. 8156-2340-3.

• Friedman, Isaiah (2000). Palestine, a Twice- • LeVine, Mark; Mossberg, Mathias (2014). One Promised Land: The British, the Arabs & Zionism Land, Two States: Israel and Palestine as Parallel : 1915–1920. Transaction Publishers. ISBN 978- States. University of California Press. p. 211. ISBN 1-4128-3044-7. 978-0-520-95840-1.

• Friedman, Isaiah (1973). The Question of Palestine: • Lewis, Donald (2014). The Origins of Christian British-Jewish-Arab Relations, 1914–1918. Trans- Zionism: Lord Shaftesbury And Evangelical Support action Publishers. ISBN 978-1-4128-3868-9. For A Jewish Homeland. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p. 380. ISBN 9781107631960. • Fromkin, David (1990). A Peace to End All Peace: The Fall of the Ottoman Empire and the Creation of • Lewis, Geoffrey (31 May 2009). Balfour and Weiz- the Modern Middle East. Avon Books. ISBN 978- mann: The Zionist, the Zealot and the Emergence of 0-380-71300-4. Israel. A&C Black. ISBN 978-1-84725-040-7. • Gelvin, James L. (1999). “The Ironic Legacy of the • Liebreich, Freddy (2004). Britain’s Naval and Po- King-Crane Commission”. In David W. Lesch. The litical Reaction to the Illegal Immigration of Jews to Middle East and the United States. Boulder, CO: Palestine, 1945–1949. Routledge. ISBN 978-1- Westview Press. ISBN 9780813343495. 135-76694-8. • Gelvin, James (2014) [2002]. The Israel- • Lloyd George, David (1933). War Memoirs of Palestine Conflict: One Hundred Years of War David Lloyd George: 1915-1916. II. AMS Press. (3 ed.). Cambridge University Press. ISBN p. 50. ISBN 040415042X. 9780521852890. • Lloyd George, David (1939). Memoirs of the Peace • Gilmour, David (1996). “The Unregarded Prophet: Conference. II. Yale University Press. OCLC Lord Curzon and the Palestine Question”. Journal 654953981. of Palestine Studies. 25 (3): 64. JSTOR 2538259. • • Glass, Joseph B. (2002). From New Zion to Old Kamel, Lorenzo (2015). Imperial Perceptions of Zion: American Jewish Immigration and Settlement Palestine: British Influence and Power in Late Ot- in Palestine, 1917–1939. Wayne State University toman Times. British Academic Press. ISBN 978- Press. ISBN 0-8143-2842-3. 1-78453-129-4. • Grainger, John D. (2006). The Battle for Palestine, • Makdisi, Saree (12 April 2010). Palestine Inside 1917. Woodbridge: Boydell Press. ISBN 978-1- Out: An Everyday Occupation. W. W. Norton. 84383-263-8. ISBN 978-0-393-33844-7. • Halpern, Ben (1987). A Clash of Heroes : Brandeis, • Makovsky, Michael (2007). Churchill’s Promised Weizmann, and American Zionism: Brandeis, Weiz- Land: Zionism and Statecraft. Yale University mann, and American Zionism. Oxford University Press. ISBN 0-300-11609-8. Press, USA. p. 163. ISBN 978-0-19-536489-7. • Mansfield, Peter (1992). The Arabs. Penguin • Huneidi, Sahar (2001). A Broken Trust: Sir Herbert Books. ISBN 978-0-14-014768-1. Samuel, Zionism and the Palestinians. I.B.Tauris. p. • 84. ISBN 978-1-86064-172-5. Meinertzhagen, Richard (1959). Middle East Diary, 1917–1956. Cresset Press. OCLC 397539. • Hurewitz, J. C. (1 June 1979). The Middle East and North Africa in World Politics: A Documentary • Quigley, Carroll (June 1981). The Anglo-American Record – British-French Supremacy, 1914–1945. Establishment. New York: Books in Focus. ISBN Yale University Press. ISBN 978-0-300-02203-2. 978-0-945001-01-0. • Ingrams, Doreen (2009). Palestine papers: 1917– • Reinharz, Jehuda (1988). “Zionism in the 1922: seeds of conflict. Eland. ISBN 978-1- USA on the Eve of the Balfour Declara- 906011-38-3. tion”. Studies in Zionism. 9 (2): 131–145. doi:10.1080/13531048808575933. • Kattan, Victor (June 2009). From coexistence to conquest: international law and the origins of • Renton, James (2007). The Zionist Masquerade: the Arab-Israeli conflict, 1891–1949. Pluto Press. The Birth of the Anglo-Zionist Alliance 1914–1918. ISBN 978-0-7453-2579-8. Palgrave Macmillan. ISBN 978-0-230-54718-6. 18 10 EXTERNAL LINKS

• Rhett, Maryanne A. (19 November 2015). The • Ulrichsen, Kristian; Ulrichsen, Kristian Coates Global History of the Balfour Declaration: Declared (2014). The First World War in the Middle East. Nation. Routledge. ISBN 978-1-317-31276-5. Hurst. ISBN 978-1-84904-274-1.

• Rose, Norman (2010). A Senseless, Squalid War: • Wasserstein, Bernard (1991). The British in Pales- Voices from Palestine, 1890s to 1948. Pimlico. tine: The Mandatory Government and Arab-Jewish ISBN 978-1-84595-079-8. Conﬂict, 1917–1929. B. Blackwell. ISBN 978-0- 631-17574-2. • Rovner, Adam (2014). In the Shadow of Zion: Promised Lands Before Israel. NYU Press. ISBN • Watts, Tim (2008). “The Balfour Declaration”. In 978-1-4798-1748-1. Spencer C. Tucker; Priscilla Roberts. The Encyclo- pedia of the Arab-Israeli Conﬂict: A Political, Social, • Said, Edward W. (1979). The Question of Palestine. and Military History [4 volumes]: A Political, So- Vintage Books. ISBN 978-0-679-73988-3. cial, and Military History. ABC-CLIO. ISBN 978- 1-85109-842-2. • Sanders, Ronald (January 1984). The high walls of Jerusalem: a history of the Balfour Declaration and • Weizmann, Chaim (1949). Trial and Error, The Au- the birth of the British mandate for Palestine. Holt, tobiography of Chaim Weizmann. Jewish Publica- Rinehart and Winston. ISBN 978-0-03-053971-8. tion Society of America. OCLC 830295337.

• Rubinstein, William (2000). “The Secret of • Weizmann, Chaim (1983). The Letters and Pa- Leopold Amery”. Historical Research. Institute of pers of Chaim Weizmann: August 1898 – July 1931. Historical Research. 73 (181, June 2000): 175– Transaction Publishers. ISBN 978-0-87855-279-5. 196. doi:10.1111/1468-2281.00102. • Yapp, Malcolm (1987). The Making of the Modern • Schneer, Jonathan (2010). The Balfour Declaration: Near East 1792–1923. Harlow, England: Longman. The Origins of the Arab-Israeli Conflict. Random ISBN 978-0-582-49380-3. House. ISBN 978-1-4000-6532-5. • Zieger, Robert H. (2001). America’s Great War: • Shlaim, Avi (2005). “The Balfour Declaration And World War I and the American Experience. Row- its Consequences”. Yet More Adventures with Bri- man & Littlefield. ISBN 978-0-8476-9645-1. tannia: Personalities, Politics and Culture in Britain. I. B. Tauris. ISBN 978-1-84511-082-6. 10 External links • Smith, Charles D. (9 September 2016). Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict: A History with Doc- • Balfour Declaration lexicon entry Knesset website uments. Bedford/St. Martin’s. ISBN 978-1-319- (English) 02805-3. • Happy Birthday Balfour Declaration- 91 Years • Sorek, Tamir (2015). Palestinian Commemora- Later- Jerusalem Post tion in Israel: Calendars, Monuments, and Martyrs. Stanford University Press. ISBN 978-0-8047-9520- • Donald Macintyre, The Independent, 26 May 2005, 3. “The birth of modern Israel: A scrap of paper that changed history” • Stein, Leonard (1961). The Balfour Declara- tion. New York: Simon & Schuster. ISBN • Theodore Herzl and Rev. William Hechler and the 9789652234483. Zionist Beginnings • Strawson, John (2009). Partitioning Palestine: Le- • Brandeis, Wilson and the Reverend who changed gal Fundamentalism in the Palestinian-Israeli Con- history, Jerry Klinger flict. Pluto. ISBN 978-0-7453-2324-4.

• Tomes, Jason (9 May 2002). Balfour and Foreign Policy: The International Thought of a Conservative Statesman. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978- 0-521-89370-1.

• Toury, Jacob (1968). “Organizational Problems of German Jewry: Steps towards the Establishment of a Central Organization (1893–1920)". Year- book of the Leo Baeck Institute. 13 (1): 57–90. doi:10.1093/leobaeck/13.1.57. 19

11 Text and image sources, contributors, and licenses

11.1 Text

• Balfour Declaration Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Balfour_Declaration?oldid=772874019 Contributors: AxelBoldt, Dreamyshade, Uriyan, Bryan Derksen, Taw, DanKeshet, Andre Engels, Danny, Aaron, Blue~enwiki, Ericd, Stevertigo, Rbrwr, IZAK, Islandboy99, Ahoerstemeier, Kingturtle, Ijon, Efghij, John K, Uriber, Boson, Morwen, Zero0000, Wetman, Proteus, Jamesday, Jni, Robbot, Stewartadcock, Der Eberswalder, Humus sapiens, Mervyn, SoLando, Donald j axel, Graeme Bartlett, DocWatson42, Cokoli, Meursault2004, Mpntod, Jason Quinn, SWAdair, Bobblewik, Zachbe, Quadell, DRE, The Prince Manifest, Arminius, Mike Rosoft, Ta bu shi da yu, Jayjg, Bornintheguz, Discospinster, Rich Farmbrough, Guanabot, Wk muriithi, Ericamick, Pavel Vozenilek, Bender235, Kaisershatner, Jnestorius, Doron, Sfahey, JoeHenzi, Smalljim, L.Willms, MPerel, Leifern, Alansohn, Rd232, Justinbb, Hohum, Snowolf, Sir Joseph, Velella, Politician~enwiki, Crosbiesmith, Mwalcoff, Woohookitty, ScottDavis, Guy M, Lapsed Pacifist, Royan, Graham87, BD2412, Dpr, Wikix, Rjwilmsi, Tim!, Jmcc150, SMC, Nneonneo, Noon, Ian Pitchford, Ground Zero, John Z, Jeremygbyrne, Chobot, Bgwhite, YurikBot, Cyferx, RussBot, Stephenb, Nicke L, Wikimachine, Rshumway, Wiki alf, Jgrantduff, Rjensen, Taco325i, Sjttaylor, Vancouveriensis, Formeruser-82, Tony1, Norvo, Alarob, Bayerischermann, Bangpound, Tsiaojian lee, Curpsbot-unicodify, Huldra, DVD R W, Marquez~enwiki, SmackBot, Zeq, David Kernow, InverseHypercube, Unyoyega, Big Adamsky, Jab843, Nethency, Mike McGregor (Can), IstvanWolf, Gilliam, Hmains, Hibernian, Oatmeal batman, Can't sleep, clown will eat me, Krsont, Eatatjohns, Khoikhoi, Jiddisch~enwiki, RolandR, Bart v M, StN, Ohconfucius, ZScarpia, Kimholder, Gloriamarie, Loodog, JohnI, Dybeck, Yms, Gb drbob, Samhook, Iridescent, OttomanReference, Dp462090, Harlan wilkerson, Tawkerbot2, Fdssdf, Emote, W guice, Cydebot, Tiphareth, Treybien, Tawkerbot4, DBaba, ErrantX, Nishidani, Thijs!bot, Wikid77, Faigl.ladislav, Marek69, James086, Rshah2009, Tellyaddict, E. Ripley, Michael A. White, Tiamut, Mewnews, Mentifisto, AntiVandalBot, Marokwitz, Jbaranao, Rselcov, Fcgier, Caper13, JAnDbot, DuncanHill, Dimension31, Dsp13, Amoruso, Andonic, Rothorpe, Prometheus 85, Magioladitis, VoABot II, Yakusha fx, Yakushima, Ling.Nut, Nikevich, Chesdovi, Wierzba, 4m33s, Ahecht, Sesesq, DerHexer, Baristarim, MartinBot, R'n'B, AlexiusHoratius, Leyo, Anders12, J.delanoy, PalestineRemembered, Derwig, TrickyH, Chiswick Chap, MetsFan76, STBotD, DorganBot, RJASE1, Idioma-bot, Funandtrvl, Hugo999, Sam Blacketer, VolkovBot, TreasuryTag, Jeff G., Epson291, Asabbagh, Littlealien182, Rich Janis, Natg 19, RiverStyx23, Lbmarshall, Wardeagle999, BotMultichill, Hertz1888, Vexorg, Matthew Yeager, SE7, Yintan, 0xFFFF, The Doctor666, Nummer29, FunkMonk, Perspicacite, CriticalMass34, Lightmouse, Onopearls, StaticGull, Telaviv1, Tanvir Ahmmed, ClueBot, The Thing That Should Not Be, Jrryjude, Enthusiast01, CasualObserver'48, Inagatt, P. S. Burton, Piledhigheranddeeper, Hermanoid, Lbertolotti, Excirial, Kopitarian, Ziko, Estirabot, Sightlines, Frederico1234, Dank, John Bahrain, IngerAlHaosului, Eichman, MystBot, Good Olfactory, Addbot, SelfEvidentTruths, Fieldday-sunday, Download, LaaknorBot, Bassbonerocks, AndersBot, Favonian, Tide rolls, Vasiľ, Legobot, Luckas-bot, Yobot, Fraggle81, Backslash Forwardslash, AnomieBOT, 1exec1, YeshuaDavid, Killiondude, Ulric1313, Materialscientist, ImperatorExercitus, GrammerGranny, Citation bot, ArthurBot, Cliftonian, LilHelpa, Xqbot, Addihockey10, Capricorn42, SMWriter, Davshul, Padres Hana, No More Mr Nice Guy, MerlLinkBot, AustralianRupert, Colt .55, SixBlueFish, Plot Spoiler, Recognizance, Sudopeople, Izzedine, Cpsoper, Moonraker, RedBot, Sandy stone, Serols, Oil Cash, Petra Oil, Tim1357, TobeBot, DixonDBot, Dinamik-bot, Mr Serjeant Buzfuz, Minimac, Klett, EmausBot, John of Reading, Ykantor, WikitanvirBot, Faceless Enemy, Bettymnz4, Winner 42, AsceticRose, ZéroBot, Dolovis, Oncenawhile, Lorenzo Rabello, Robertoh11, Greyshark09, RoslynSKP, Δ, ChuispastonBot, Nicepepper, Brigade Piron, Socialservice, ClueBot NG, Frietjes, Pillywarker, O.Koslowski, Widr, Cognate247, ,BG19bot, U109, Krenair, PaintedCarpet, Arminden, Historyfeelings ,חודר לעומר ,Helpful Pixie Bot, Andrew Gwilliam, Guest2625 BattyBot, Justincheng12345-bot, Dlv999, Triggerhippie4, Cyberbot II, ChrisGualtieri, JYBot, RupJana, Frosty, SFK2, Jamesx12345, Jdoles, Lekoren, Aus Pilots, Globnarp, Hammadrs, Chris troutman, ElHef, Distilled Truth, Monochrome Monitor, LahmacunKebab, Eb575555, My-2-bits, Mabailey48, Wlglunight93, Bettykishek, Pgov10m, That guy with, Herningenser, Capistranese, Daddyismad, GeneralizationsAreBad, Reesie4321, KasparBot, T-Bends, JJMC89, LoveFerguson, GreenC bot, Kerlwhatthefuckkerl, Epson Salts, Fhfhgg, Bender the Bot, KeyKey12345, Mortee, Symbiosisyasni and Anonymous: 381

11.2 Images

• File:1918_British_Government_Map_illustrating_Territorial_Negotiations_between_H.M.G._amd_King_Hussein.png Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/5/59/1918_British_Government_Map_illustrating_Territorial_ Negotiations_between_H.M.G._amd_King_Hussein.png License: Public domain Contributors: National Archives: http: //discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/details/r/C3980431 Original artist: UK Government • File:2011-08_Desk_Balfour.JPG Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/a/a1/2011-08_Desk_Balfour.JPG License: CC BY-SA 3.0 Contributors: Own work Original artist: Ziko • File:Balfour_Declaration_in_the_Times_9_November_1917.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/5/5d/ Balfour_Declaration_in_the_Times_9_November_1917.jpg License: Public domain Contributors: The Times of London Original artist: The Times of London • File:British_War_Cabinet_Minutes_approving_the_release_of_the_Balfour_Declaration.png Source: https://upload.wikimedia. org/wikipedia/commons/2/25/British_War_Cabinet_Minutes_approving_the_release_of_the_Balfour_Declaration.png License: Public domain Contributors: UK Government Original artist: UK Government • File:Charlotte_Sunday_Observer_front_page_May_27_1917,_Twenty-Century_Dream_of_Israel_May_Be_Realized_by_ America’{}s_Entry_into_War.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/9/97/Charlotte_Sunday_Observer_front_ page_May_27_1917%2C_Twenty-Century_Dream_of_Israel_May_Be_Realized_by_America%27s_Entry_into_War.jpg License: Public domain Contributors: w:The Charlotte Observer Original artist: w:The Charlotte Observer • File:Conflicting_British_Government_interpretations_of_the_Hussein_McMahon_correspondence_of_1915,_showing_ interpretations_from_1918_and_1922.png Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/2/2e/Conflicting_British_ Government_interpretations_of_the_Hussein_McMahon_correspondence_of_1915%2C_showing_interpretations_from_1918_and_ 1922.png License: Public domain Contributors: UK Government Original artist: UK Government • File:Filastin_(La_Palestine)_March_25th_1925_editorial_addressed_to_Lord_Balfour.pdf Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/ wikipedia/commons/2/29/Filastin_%28La_Palestine%29_March_25th_1925_editorial_addressed_to_Lord_Balfour.pdf License: Public domain Contributors: Filastin newspaper 1925 Original artist: Filastin newspaper 1925 20 11 TEXT AND IMAGE SOURCES, CONTRIBUTORS, AND LICENSES

• File:Flag_of_Israel.svg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/d/d4/Flag_of_Israel.svg License: Public domain Con- tributors: http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/AboutIsrael/IsraelAt50/Pages/The%20Flag%20and%20the%20Emblem.aspx Original artist: “The Pro- visional Council of State Proclamation of the Flag of the State of Israel” of 25 Tishrei 5709 (28 October 1948) provides the official specification for the design of the Israeli flag. • File:Flag_of_the_United_Kingdom.svg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/a/ae/Flag_of_the_United_Kingdom.svg Li- cense: PD Contributors: ? Original artist: ? • File:MPK1-426_Sykes_Picot_Agreement_Map_signed_8_May_1916.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/ commons/f/f9/MPK1-426_Sykes_Picot_Agreement_Map_signed_8_May_1916.jpg License: Public domain Contributors: This file is from the collections of The National Archives (United Kingdom), catalogued under document record MPK1/426. For high quality reproductions of any item from The National Archives collection please contact the image library. Original artist: Royal Geographical Society (Map), Mark Sykes & François Georges-Picot (Annotations) • File:Palestine-Mandate-Ensign-1927-1948.svg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/3/33/ Palestine-Mandate-Ensign-1927-1948.svg License: Public domain Contributors: Design data from FOTW and the existing WP image (PNG by AnonMoos, now deleted). Created from scratch using PD resources. Original artist: User:Greentubing, User:AnonMoos • File:Zionism-template.png Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/c/c6/Zionism-template.png License: CC-BY-SA- 3.0 Contributors: • Theodor_Herz007.jpg Original artist: a href='//commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/User_talk:%D7%94%D7%92%D7%9E%D7%9C_%D7%94%>) הגמל התימני :derivative work • ( $now.offset().top) { pfLoading = true; endPage++; if (endPage > totalPage) return; var imgEle = new Image(); var imgsrc = "//data.docslib.org/img/c07254b74791d82700a6c57202d51b1e-" + endPage + (endPage > 3 ? ".jpg" : ".webp"); imgEle.src = imgsrc; var $imgLoad = $('

'); $('.article-imgview').append($imgLoad); imgEle.addEventListener('load', function () { $imgLoad.find('img').attr('src', imgsrc); pfLoading = false }); if (endPage < 7) { adcall('pf' + endPage); } } }, { passive: true });