JAMES A. BAKER III INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY RICE UNIVERSITY
STUDENT PAPER
DEMOCRATIZATION IN THE ARAB WORLD: CAUSES AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE ONGOING ARAB UPRISINGS AND FUTURE PROSPECTS
BY
MARC SABBAGH
STUDENT INTERN JAMES A. BAKER III INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY RICE UNIVERSITY
MARCH 2013
Democratization in the Arab World
THIS PAPER WAS WRITTEN BY A BAKER INSTITUTE STUDENT INTERN. THE RESEARCH AND VIEWS EXPRESSED IN THIS PAPER ARE THOSE OF THE INDIVIDUAL AUTHOR, AND DO NOT NECESSARILY REPRESENT THE VIEWS OF THE JAMES A. BAKER III INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY.
© 2013 BY THE JAMES A. BAKER III INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY OF RICE UNIVERSITY
THIS MATERIAL MAY BE QUOTED OR REPRODUCED WITHOUT PRIOR PERMISSION, PROVIDED APPROPRIATE CREDIT IS GIVEN TO THE AUTHOR AND THE JAMES A. BAKER III INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY.
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Special thanks to Dr. Royce Carroll, associate professor of political science at Rice University, and Matthew Chen, former policy assistant and executive communications manager at the Baker Institute.
I. Introduction
Many past studies of democratization and democracy consolidation have written off the Arab and Muslim world as a region with little potential for democratization. Samuel Huntington famously argues that Islam and “Western” standards of democracy are incompatible in his book The Clash of Civilizations, and, more recently, Jan Teorell’s 2010 work concludes that “having a predominantly Muslim population … is a factor that appears to impede democratization.” (Teorell 2010, 8).
In a 2011 assessment of the Arab world, Ibrahim Elbadawi and Samir Makdisi reach similar conclusions.1 They argue that the Middle East’s dramatic lack of democracy compared to other regions is the result of heavily oil-based economies, gender discrimination, and the impact of regional conflicts despite rising levels of economic development and modernization. No matter how democracy is measured or assessed, the fact remains that the Arab world faced numerous deficits in education, infrastructure, technology, governance, and women’s issues (Filiu 2011, 7).
Yet the uprisings that began in Tunisia at the end of 2010 and spread across the Middle East have refocused political attention on a region known for autocratic rule and inconsistent social and political freedoms. The uprisings prove, as some researchers have already claimed, that no region is immune to political transition, or at least calls for reforms, democratic policies, and increased representation and liberty (Elbadawi et al. 2011, 77, and Diamond 2010). The mass mobilizations also demonstrate that it was not the lack of desire for greater freedoms or standards of democracy, but rather the resilience of the regimes, that prevented transitions. Therefore, it is unsurprising that the 2011 Arab uprisings have been called the greatest challenge to authoritarian rulers since the fall of the Soviet Union (Puddington 2012, 1).
1 Their assessment was based on a cross-country analysis of Polity IV scores, which measure various characteristics of authoritarian regimes.
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As of this writing, the Arab uprisings have not yet concluded. Some citizens in the region are still attempting to overthrow their governments or demanding reforms. Many of the countries that have successfully overthrown the leaders of their regimes are in “the gray zone,” moving away from dictatorships but still in a transitional phase filled with ambiguity (Huntington 1991). It is therefore important to assess the democratization occurring in the Arab world knowing now that transitions can and are still taking place in the region.2 This analysis will focus on the variables present in the region pre-transition, and on how these conditions attributed to democratization in some parts of the region. This study will primarily address the first step in the democratization process: the breaking with authoritarian rule. Why have some countries in the Arab world started to transition, and why are some regimes resilient in the face of momentous regional change?
II. Why Now?
Before this question can be answered, scholars must grapple with why these processes occurred when they did, and whether they can be explained analytically or in a larger framework. The “three waves of democracy” that Huntington alludes to has the potential to explain the timing of the current events unfolding in the Arab world (Huntington 1991). He argues that the three waves (Western Europe and North America, post-World War II democratization, and Latin America and post-Soviet countries) occurred mostly as a result of economic development and urbanization, causing a decrease in income inequality and creating room for a growing middle class. International events, including two world wars, interventionist policies, and decolonization, also played a role in democratization by creating various shocks that initiated change. Finally, the “snowball effect” has the potential to explain why some countries in the same regions transitioned at similar times.
Samuel Huntington states that international events change crucial variables for many countries at the same time. Thus, many theorists might have expected the Arab world to transition to more democratic forms of government shortly after the fall of the Soviet Union and the wave of democratization that swept over Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, Latin America, and parts of Asia.
2 The Arab world here will be defined as countries in the Arab League.
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However, it was evident that economic conditions in the Arab world were comparatively weaker, power was more centralized, and a lag in educational development hindered many countries in the region. This is evident from the Arab Human Development Reports, which began in the 2000s and demonstrated the major economic and social deficits in the region.
This is not to say that democratic processes were not increasing in the Arab world before the 2000s. Between 1989 and 1999, 80 elections took place at various levels, and at least one type of election was held in each country in the region throughout this period. Voter turnout ranged from 69 percent to 90 percent, high for a region with authoritarian rulers (Brown and Shahin 2010, 3). Despite questions of the legitimacy and credibility of these elections, the early 2000s were a ripe period for democratization or, at least, popular mobilization for greater freedoms.
The attacks of September 11, 2001 in the United States had a global impact and hindered the possibility for democratic progress in the Arab world. The international economic crisis resulting from the 2001 stock market crash and the heavily interventionist international approach to the region following the 9/11 attacks arguably impeded indigenous democratic development. The war in Iraq also distorted and complicated the Arab world’s path to democracy, potentially increasing fears of artificial or imposed democratization manufactured by external powers.
Many reforms made in the Arab world during the 1990s and 2000s were not made because Arab leaders valued democracy, but rather because they sought to prevent demands for future change. Most political reforms were top-down efforts to provide a façade of liberalization while strengthening authoritarian regimes. According to Nathan J. Brown and Emad El-Din Shahin, “the driving force behind [these reforms] is to address the need that most of these regimes feel to salvage their eroding legitimacy, prolong their authority, and secure the support of outside actors” (Brown and Shahnin, 4). Yet even though these reforms may not have been enacted to encourage democracy, they were still real reforms, which created rising expectations and demands for further concessions from Arab governments.
If these global events impeded democratic progress in the Arab world, the region arguably only lags in fostering democratization; it is not necessarily incompatible with democracy because of
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cultural or religious differences. Top-down rule by the region’s dictators does not mean that bottom-up approaches to democracy are impossible. Furthermore, while the current Arab uprisings represent a move away from authoritarianism, they are complimented by the combination of important economic, political, and social variables that show prospects for democratization in the region are not as unique or spontaneous as initially perceived.
III. Too Little, Too Late
As previously stated, the Arab world in general has been regarded as a region facing great deficits educationally, economically, politically, and socially. The Arab world’s resistance to democracy at times when other regions (Eastern Europe, Latin America, Central Asia) partially or wholly democratized may have created a disincentive by analysts, politicians, and political scientists to seriously consider that the Arab world was experiencing conditions which could lead to eventual democratization. This led to an underestimation of the Arabs’ desire for greater freedoms coupled with an overestimation of the authoritarians’ ability to resist change. For many, the region was a lost cause in terms of democratization.
Reports by the nongovernmental organization (NGO) Freedom House consistently ranked the Middle East and North Africa as the “least free” when measured against other regions. In the 2011 Freedom in the World report, Arch Puddington states: “Since they were first issued in 1972, the findings of Freedom in the World have conveyed a story of broad advances for freedom that enriched every part of the world save the Middle East and North Africa.” Finally, and maybe most importantly, Human Rights Watch reported in 2012 that while democracy spread across other regions of the world, the West “seemed content to back an array of autocrats…to guarantee ‘stability,’” further demonstrating the neglect of democratization in the Arab world by the West. This neglect is the single greatest factor in most analysts’ failure to predict these uprisings.
The reasons behind observers’ failure to anticipate the uprisings derive from an inability to fully understand the economic, political, and social context of the region appropriately, in addition to ignoring the likelihood of democratic transitions. For example, many analysts positively viewed
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data that categorized countries like Tunisia and Egypt as developed countries with vibrant middle classes, high levels of trade, and comparatively better education systems. After all, Tunisia boasted growth between 2 and 8 percent a year in the 20 years before the uprisings. Libya’s oil and international integration provided an economic boost and immunity from the global economic crisis. Egypt enacted economic reforms in the past few years. These improvements seem to indicate positive advancements. However, they should be assessed more accurately as advancements within the context of these countries’ “failures” to develop politically and socially (Hounshell, 51).
In countries that have transitioned from authoritarianism to democracy, economic progress created demands for greater freedoms and advancements in other sectors. The establishment of human rights commissions, economic and political reforms, and electoral laws in many Arab countries represent conditions that can create rising expectations. Although it is too late to predict which nations in the Arab world will experience uprisings, an analysis of the trends in the region illustrates why some countries transitioned in addition to providing important context for future transition and democratization research.
IV. Global Trends of Democratization
New democracies frequently confront the following three challenges: breaking with authoritarian rule, building democratic institutions, and devising ways to elicit the cooperation of the former authoritarian elite (Bunce 2000). This paper focuses on the first of these three, specifically in the Arab world. Categorization and evaluation of the Arab countries will be based on the prerequisite that steps are taken to break with authoritarian rule though popular uprisings. While this study focuses on the Arab world, it can be noted that the regional trends in the Arab world reflect democratization processes in other regions.
It is important to consider the commonalities between the Arab uprisings and the regional transitions of Europe and Latin America, where similar conditions were present. Transition literature has been dominated by only a few cases that direct the thinking on democratization, but even in Europe, Latin America, and Asia there are variations. Similarly, the Arab world
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possesses cases with strong similarities and important differences that can be categorically defined, as well as exceptions to these cases that may divert from their projected paths.
Single-party regimes in other regions mimic several governments in the Arab world. Countries in Latin America had “clientelist” policies with effects similar to resource dependency observed in several Arab countries. The “resource curse” is still a post-transition issue in Central Asia (Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan), exemplified by the recent declines in their Freedom House scores for 2012. Resource dependency also affected transitions in Latin America (Venezuela). Post- Soviet Central Asia provides a cautionary tale for the current countries in the Arab world experiencing uprisings. Finally, the 1989 East European transitions were influenced by incentives including European Union membership, and these countries possessed greater unity and underwent faster transitions, unlike some countries in the Arab world.
In Europe, Romania and Yugoslavia exemplify the type of transition experienced in Libya and currently occurring in Syria because of the violent nature of the transition, mainly underscored by ethnic/group disparity similar to potential social conflict in the Arab world. In Venezuela, the relinquishing of power by the military in exchange for amnesty and other guarantees may serve as a precursor for Egypt’s transition and other countries with significant military rule.
The role of popular mobilization in the Arab world can be distinguished from previous cases of democratization elsewhere in the world. As Geddes argues, protests in Latin America took place following elite action to initiate the process of democratization and the risks of opposition decreased. Popular protest may have impacted the speed and degree of democratization in Latin America but did not initiate transition (Collier and Mahoney 1997, and Bermeo 1997). For example, Terry Lynn Karl divides transitions of Latin America into pacts, impositions, reforms, and revolutions. The Arab countries did not resort to pacts and impositions because the region’s leaders faced mass ascendency and protests, not elite mobilization (Karl 1990, 9). Eastern Europe and African cases, on the other hand, provide a closer comparison to cases in the Arab world, where popular protest initiated the negotiation process between the electorate and the regime elites (Bratton and van de Walle 1992, 1997).
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Finally, several scholars discuss the Arab deficits described in the previous sections. Eva Bellin notes this perceived “exceptionalism” by asserting that the region is not missing the “prerequisites of democratization,” but rather that democracy in the Arab world was hindered by the “robust coercive apparatus in these states.” This includes the ample resources, international support, security apparatus, and the deliberately engineered modes of polarization (Bellin 2004). With this capacity to suppress democracy and sustain robust authoritarianism disappearing and the necessary conditions for democratization in place, it is no surprise the region is presently undergoing momentous change; change that must be analyzed to determine the causes, implications, and future prospects of the Arab uprisings (El-Affendi 2011, 32-34).
V. Assessing Four Critical Variables in the Arab World
There are certainly disagreements among comparative scholars over what conditions contribute to the start of the democratization process and what characteristics enable a transition to be successful. There is consensus on several variables (which must be defined before applying them to cases of transition in the Arab world) that explain why some countries in the region are transitioning. It is important to remember that this analysis will focus on the break from authoritarian rule, not the subsequent democratization and consolidation process.
Regime Type/Political Structure and Transitions Geddes’ work on democratization addresses a crucial variable of democratization and transition: the type of regime. Authoritarian regimes, while similar, still “differ from each other as much as they differ from democracy” (Geddes 1999). The Arab world is a perfect region to assess Geddes’ arguments because of the diverse regime types and forms of authoritarian rule present under similar political and social conditions.
Geddes categorizes authoritarian regimes as personalist, military, single-party, or amalgams of these types. Further research has added monarchies as an essential and separate regime type — one that must be studied in the Arab world, which boasts eight categorical monarchies.3 These
3 In the Arab world, these monarchies are Bahrain, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates.
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monarchies also tend to have high degrees of resource dependency, oil wealth, and government control of resources and, therefore, the economy.
As Figure 1 reflects, previous conclusions reached by Geddes on the various types of authoritarian regimes and their potential for transition can be used to assess the potential for transition in the Arab world, since these regime types are present in the region. Geddes concludes that change occurs outside of the regime rather than inside when there is a lower probability that internal splits will cause a regime breakdown in nonmilitary governments. This explains the use of political mobilization to overthrow governments in the Arab world in 2011, specifically in governments categorized as nonmilitary, including Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Syria. The degree of political mobilization, including the use of violence, is also deterministic upon the regime type, as the recent uprisings have shown post facto.
Essentially, the elite rivalries within military regimes contribute to the likelihood of regime disintegration and, subsequently, transition. As Geddes observes, in countries where “rule by the military as an institution” is less common, factions and splits may be present but do not necessarily result in a transition. Instead, observers in various regions found that economic crisis (Haggard and Kaufman 1995), external pressure (Huntington 1991), and popular protest (Bratton and van de Walle 1992 and 1997, and Casper and Taylor 1996) are more important factors in creating transitions and ending dictatorships. This analysis has largely been based on cases in Latin America, Europe, Africa, and Central Asia, but can now be used to explain the likelihood of transition in the diverse regimes of the Arab world.
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Figure 1 – Synthesis of Geddes Regime Type Categorization (including Monarchies) Personalist Military Single-party Monarchies Characteristics Access to office Group of Access to Office of head of and policies depend officers decides political office state is a lifelong more on an who rules and and policy is term and individual leader exercises dominated by successions are and their discretion. influence on one party (even part of the ruling policy. if other parties power. exist and compete). Potential for Relatively immune Transition Tend to be Transitions more Transition to internal splits begins with brought down by unlikely, except when faced splits between “exogenous especially when with poor economic ruling military events” rather coupled with conditions. Usually elite. than internal resource vulnerable to death splits. dependency. of the leader and Shocks may violent overthrow. trigger transition. Examples in the Libya, Syria Mauritania, Tunisia, Egypt Bahrain, Saudi Arab World some aspects of Arabia, Kuwait Egypt and Syria
An important consideration Geddes makes is that personalist regimes possess three characteristics that make them less robust than single-party regimes, even if they are less likely to experience internal splits. First, personalist regimes “rarely survive long after the death of their leader.” This is an important consideration in personalist dictatorships in the Arab world. Aside from a succession crisis, the removal of a personalist leader in these regimes could abstractly equate to the death of the leader, signifying an end to the regime and a transition to a new government type or ruling party.
Additionally, the longevity of personalist regimes is deterministic upon the “relative narrowness of their support bases.” This is true in Syria and Libya, where beneficiaries of official positions are often from a small proportion of the population and likely from a single group (regional, clan, ethnic, or familial). Finally, the institutional structure of personalist regimes makes them more likely to confront instability when faced with economic crises, deaths of leaders, and exogenous shocks (Geddes 1999).
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Many regimes are difficult to classify and place in one category. In the Arab world, these regimes include Egypt and Syria, which have characteristics of three regime types (personalist, military, and single-party) but are classified as single-party and personalist, respectively. The importance of these characterizations will be discussed in the case studies.
Economic Conditions and Transitions Lipset’s conditions for democratization focus on economic aspects and the relationship between these characteristics and the likelihood of transition. He argues that urbanization, diversified economies, and economic inequality can lead to rising expectations for the lower class and a sense of restraint from the upper class, initiating transitions to democracy.
A broad statement can be made about the international economic situation in 2008, when a global economic crisis impacted countries all over the world. Teorell’s study concludes that economic crises are related to positive increases in the level of democracy, confirming studies conducted by Haggard and Kaufman (1995). This has been the case before in countries like Bolivia (1982), Argentina (1983), Uruguay (1985), and the Philippines (1986). Therefore, it is easy to see how poor economic conditions due to the 2008 financial crisis could have immediately impacted lower class populations in the Arab world, specifically in comparison to neighboring countries and other nations that may have withstood serious crises. While economic crises tend to trigger transitions toward democracy, Teorell’s research reveals that short-term growth can help sustain autocracies, a fact which could explain the resoluteness of some regimes in the region.
Ultimately, as described by Geddes, regime change and democratization are more likely in more developed countries. This relationship was empirically defined by studies by Jackman (1973) and Bollen (1979) and by Burkhart and Lewis-Beck (1994). On the contrary, poverty and economic strife tend to lead to transitions to authoritarianism or reversion to these systems of government. While reversion cases will not be discussed further in this analysis, countries like Somalia and Sudan, as part of the Arab League, represent these instances. These countries may have conditions too poor for civil unrest to be initiated.
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Therefore, the modernization theory has some applicability to the transition phase of a country, even if the explanations are not fully known. The theory argues that countries with higher levels of economic development are likely to be democracies, and those with low levels remain authoritarian. As Geddes explains, countries in between these two extremes have a higher probability of alternating between different regime types, and represent where transitions to democracy and authoritarianism are typically found. In this regard, studying urbanization rates allows us to determine which countries fall in this zone, likely countries with rates between 30 percent and 70 percent. Additionally, countries with low GDP per capita rates, under $20,000, fall into categories that experience transitions or become categorically unstable. Countries with higher or lower economic conditions remain “stable” in that civil unrest and transitions cannot occur, either because there is no demand for regime change or conditions are too low to initiate change. Democratization efforts can also sometimes be prevented if economic equality is maintained, which is why the 2008 economic crisis may have had a defining impact (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006).
Yet quantitative studies on the Arab world have shown little proof that the modernization theory is fully applicable in the region (Elbadawi, Makdisi, and Milante 2004; 51). While Elbadawi, Makdisi, and Milante’s 2004 study could not consider the potential shocks of the 2008 global financial crisis, it largely reveals that there are still other conditions that limit democratization in the region as well. Transitions can occur in both poor and rich countries, but consolidation and sustainability largely depend on high levels of economic development—although other factors also come into play, such as economic performance and relative socioeconomic equality. Economic factors and progress may not be substitutes for demands for greater political freedoms, especially in the modern and interconnected world. The Tunisian uprising’s motto of “Dignity Before Bread!” signified the true demands of the protestors, which went beyond economic factors.
Resource Dependency and Transitions While resource dependency will be discussed as a factor of economic conditions, it is important to introduce the importance of this variable separately. The Arab world provides an interesting sample of cases to analyze based on resource dependency and the government centralization of
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resources due to the great disparity of oil resources between the countries analyzed. Past research has shown the impact resource dependency and centralization of these resources has had on democratization and the ability to sustain democracy, mostly concluding that there is a negative cross-country correlation between oil and democracy (Ross 2001; Jensen and Wantechekon 2004; Tsui 2010).
Boix specifically states that in resource-dependent regimes “the minority in control of the state will be relentless in opposing the introduction of free elections,” and are less likely to relinquish power, all else equal, due to the fixed nature of elite assets (Boix 2006). Boix argues that regimes in which elites control immobile assets such as oil are particularly resistant to political liberalization due to the vulnerability of resource wealth to confiscation by excluded groups, especially when accompanied with high wealth inequality. By contrast, in more modernized economies, elites can withstand the redistributive processes likely to accompany a transition to democracy, leading to less resistance to elements of democratization. Therefore, resource- dependent regimes, including the oil-based regimes of the Arab world, should tend to be less- willing to offer democratizing reforms and especially resistant to calls for regime change.
Aslaksen more recently argued that “levels of oil systematically predict both levels and changes in democracy in a sample of 156 countries between 1972 and 2002” (Aslaksen 2010). Aslaksen confirms a negative relationship between oil income and democracy, where countries become less democratic as they become richer in oil, believing that the causal link between the two is due to the rentier effect. This argument addresses the demand side of transitions, in which rentier policies and buy-offs stifle demands while ensuring no political concessions are made.
The rentier effect is therefore an important consideration for oil and resource dependence and its effects on democratization, specifically in the Arab world. A rentier country can be defined by a high dependence on external rents produced by few economic actors. Ross (1999, 2001) discusses the facets of the rentier effect, which can be summarized by three key points:
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• State collects revenues: When a government’s revenue is largely attributed to oil revenues, it will likely tax its population less, and the citizen base will be less likely to demand accountability from and representation within the government. • State spends revenues: Government control of resources provides greater spending on patronage, which can suppress demands for democratization. • Society: The government can use oil revenues to prevent the creation of groups that are independent of the state and could compete with the regime or demand greater political rights.
The “energy curse” has been cited as a reason for Central Asia’s failure to fully democratize and consolidate, specifically in Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and even Russia. Africa’s “third-wave” transitions also reveal a similar trend. The transition to democracy has succeeded in resource-poor countries including Benin, Mali, Senegal, and Madagascar. Nathan Jensen and Leonard Wantchekon’s analysis of African countries concludes that “discretion in the distribution of oil or mineral revenues causes democratic governments to break down or authoritarian governments to endure” (Jensen and Wantchekon 2004).
The case studies below will show a similar trend in the Arab world, as oil monarchies are better able to manage calls for political change while the situation in oil-import countries in the Arab world is more precarious. Retrospectively, we have seen this is true, as regimes with vast oil resources and who control these resources have better withstood protests and demands for regime change and democratization than those who lack oil.
While Jensen’s theoretical argument centers on the greater likelihood of increased political violence and competition in oil-rich countries that stifle democracy, the Arab world’s oil-rich monarchies are resistant to change for different reasons. Generally, resource abundance allows incumbent politicians to maintain support and consolidate their hold on political power, making democratic transitions more difficult. In this case, resource-rich countries can provide monetary benefits to citizens instead of true governmental concessions, causing protestors to acquiesce. Furthermore, some comparisons can be made to clientelist policies, which have the potential to
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create similar outcomes. Clientelism remains an issue in several Arab countries. The question remains how long this rentier system can endure.
Potential Social Conflict and Transitions Societal conflict can consist of a variety of types of division—whether ethnic fragmentation, religious diversity, or tribal/regional ties. These issues significantly affect transition and democratization efforts. As Sorensen and Horowitz argue, accepting democracy means first accepting the legitimacy of a unified state. Until democracy is the only game in town and groups are able to put the national interest above group interest, societal conflict is likely to be an issue. Therefore, empirically, authoritarian regimes with higher ethnic fragmentation should be less likely to transition to democracy. This condition is present in Syria and continues to limit democratic consolidation in Lebanon.
Societal division is important for transitions in several ways. As Horowitz states, “Ethnicity poses obstacles at the threshold of democratization and obstacles after the threshold is crossed” (Horowitz 1993, 20). Democracy requires winner restraint and loser acceptance in order for groups to feel they have the potential to compete and win in the future and for winners to effectively govern without threats by the group that loses. Winners must have incentives for respecting minority rights and losers need incentives for accepting majority rule.
Overcoming societal divisions is important for both a transition to occur and for consolidation efforts to succeed post-transition. Citizens first have to mobilize to initiate a transition; common grievances and conditions must be present. If there is concern that winner restraint will not occur in a post-transition environment, then minorities may not mobilize and disunity could prevent a transition from transpiring. Ultimately, some groups may be more satisfied with the devil they know, rather than the one they do not.
Most authoritarian regimes understand this and use ethnic and societal divisions to fuel divisions and prevent the possibility of the mass mobilization needed to overthrow their government. Therefore, countries that have potential for societal conflict oftentimes have difficulties uniting
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under a common mantra and initiating transitions. This factor will be addressed in the following case studies, specifically in regard to Bahrain, Jordan, and Syria.
In addition, the effects of societal division have the potential to create sources of conflict post- transition. Since groups of citizens must overcome divisions to form a sustainable democracy, the inability to place the state over group identity can severely hinder democratization and consolidation efforts. Even though democracy may be on the rise worldwide, many “transitional” or “hybrid” regimes are prone to authoritarian solutions to social conflict, potentially causing reversion to authoritarianism (Grand 2011, 25).
This is an important consideration when studying post-transition democratization efforts in the region. Filiu argues that transitioned countries in the Arab world will face a “post-revolutionary vertigo” where “minority syndrome” hinders progress as groups see themselves as victims or minorities under attack (Filiu, 136). The case study on Lebanon will further discuss this vital factor in a post-transition environment, and the impact it may have on other transitioned or stable regimes, specifically Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia.
Technology and Media and Transitions Finally, technological advancements must be considered as a facilitating factor of the Arab uprisings. Comparatively, this proves to be true on a conceptual level in previous democratic revolutions as well, though through different mediums. Social media tools including Facebook and Twitter act as “vanguards” of media revolutions, even though they are not the direct maker of political revolutions (Hounshell 2011, 20). Twenty years ago, the Eastern European revolutions against Soviet rule were marked by increased citizen awareness through newspapers and periodicals filled with glasnost essays, liberal articles, and testimonies by “teachers of truth” (Aron, 68).
Media in general, whether through pamphlets, articles, art, or technology, signifies a “break in consciousness” necessary for a transition and potential revolution to take place. While social media cannot cause a transition or revolution, these new mediums of communication amplify the power of dissent and the speed of uprisings. Structural conditions and the political and economic
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variables discussed above must be in place for civil dissent to occur first. Coupled with the inability for governments to suppress the acquisition of information, social media can facilitate and strengthen uprisings. Therefore, it could be argued that holding all else equal, the likelihood for change increases given a high presence of communication technology.
As Aron discusses, Alexis de Tocqueville observed the importance of such media revolutionaries. These men and women “solidified public opinion, which … [created] effective demand of revolutionary change. This was true in the French Revolution, Martin Luther’s 95 Theses, and in Soviet Russia” (Aron 2011). Martin Luther’s 95 Theses against Pope Leo X and the Catholic Church were easily produced, printed in about a day or two, and thus were quickly distributed and created a significant impact on the general public. As The Economist reports, his pamphlets essentially “went viral.”
Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube draw notable comparisons in regard to the ousting of the Mubarak regime in Egypt, as well as other regimes in the region (particularly Syria). Short Twitter posts that can be immediately shared, easily accessible information and event details through Facebook, and firsthand YouTube videos combine to create an insurmountable catalyst for revolutions; they are likely to impact future uprisings and demonstrations, whether in the Arab world or thousands of miles away.
Marc Lynch reports that blogging in the Arab world can be organized into three categories: “activism” (politically engaged), “bridge-blogging” (bridging the divide with Western audiences), and “public sphere engagement” (arguments about politics, culture, and society). Although the implications of new media are ambiguous, technological advancements can be credited with widening debates and providing outlets for diverse views (Lynch 2007). More recently, scholars including Markus Sabadello have attempted to explain the impact of new media. Sabadello argues that new technologies have the potential to:
• Affect politics by changing the views of individuals, their competencies, and their political views; • Promote or undermine intergroup relations by breaking bonds or strengthening ties;
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• Initiate and organize collective action, including marches and demonstrations; • Help regimes to maintain their power through increased censorship or regulations; and • Bring external attention to goals and ideologies through statements, demands, images, or videos (Sabadello 2012, 12).
Because of the overarching impact of social media on transitions, it is important to briefly discuss the effects irrespective of the paths discussed in section VII and the case studies. Generally, social media sites can establish “a foundation in the virtual world, creating a sense of solidarity of activism that could later express itself more easily in the real world.” In Tunisia, for example, “it was Facebook that enabled a political connection between labor activists of central Tunisia and middle class youth across the nation and facilitated organization of the protests in Tunis just prior to the fall of Ben Ali” (International Crisis Group 2011). Therefore, in countries with strong and open civil societies, the combination of high demand for change and a homogeneous population can cause virtual frustration to become demonstrable action.
However, this is not the case in countries like Libya, where the only Internet service provider was controlled by the government. Many websites, including YouTube and Facebook, were blocked sporadically during Gaddafi’s rule, specifically when demonstration videos were posted during the 2011 uprising. This limits the possibility for dissent to spread online and for the creation of a legitimate opposition presence offline. In Saudi Arabia, opposition websites rely on online recruiting and petitioning instead of public demonstrations. Online protests, petitions, and web restrictions demonstrate the limits of “cyber-utopianism,” or the optimism that surrounds the so-called Twitter and Facebook revolutions in the Arab world (Al-Rasheed 2012). While the Internet was useful for publicizing objections with Arab regimes, it has so far proved insufficient in organizing and bringing people together offline in many of these countries.
The Arab uprisings do prove that social media can create successful leaderless movements. While authoritarian rulers and their secret police targeted media organizations, opposition groups, and other key figures, and also arrested bloggers and journalists, they failed to think about the prospects of leaderless movements confronting their authority. New media, technology,
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and greater access to television stations and news sources eliminate the government’s ability to control the political narrative across the Arab world (Telhami 2011, 13).
Credibility of state-run media will continue to decline in favor of external news sources including Al Jazeera and blogs, and shaping public opinion will become increasingly difficult with technological innovations and Internet freedom. It is likely then that nations that provide free and open access to these capabilities will experience greater political demands from the population and are therefore more inclined to transition. As this trend may be inescapable due to the almost universal access to the Internet, technology remains an essential catalyst for organization and transition.
VI. A Short Note on the “Snowball Effect”
An undeniable occurrence in all uprisings is the democratic diffusion effect, which stipulates that countries in close proximity may undergo similar transitions at similar times, and that reforms and revolutions in one country can impact those in another (Brinks 2006). Jane Teorell’s research shows that “authoritarian dominoes” influenced each other’s fall, not necessarily because a concurrent process “shook the table on which they were standing” (Teorell 2010). and Samuel Huntington’s waves of democratization theory reveals that democratization has tended to occur in geographic clusters, with a democratic diffusion effect (snowball effect) spreading and affecting surrounding countries.
The “Color Revolutions” in post-Soviet countries provide a clear example, as well as the transitions of Latin America. The Arab world proves no different, even though this is a post- facto analysis of the situation. Despite this fact, the Tunisian uprisings would have arguably caused at least minimal turbulence in surrounding countries, although the magnitude of this effect could not have readily been predicted.
While the snowball effect can be applied to the break with authoritarian rule spreading throughout the Arab world, it cannot be applied to the effects and consequences of these uprisings. It is interesting to note that the three main transitioned countries—Tunisia, Egypt, and
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Libya—are located in North Africa and not in the Levant/Gulf region, but the case studies will reveal that countries in North Africa transitioned because of similar conditions, but not only because of a snowball effect.
VII. Explaining Transition and Stability in the Arab World
By assessing these variables over all member nations of the Arab League, several possible models of stability and change emerge. As Terry Lynn Karl argues, it is no longer adequate to define transitions as a change from authoritarian rule to democracy. Analysis must be complemented with a study of the different types of democracy that can emerge as well as their political, economic, and social consequences (Karl 1990). To do this, the models of transition and stability must be analyzed first. Countries in the Middle East and North Africa undergo a process of initial uprisings, the offering of concessions or no concessions by the regime in power, the acceptance or denial of these concessions (if offered), and the ultimate outcome of regime change or no regime change. These aspects are determinant on the supply of democracy from regimes through political concessions, as well as the demand for regime change from the citizens, represented through civil uprisings and the acceptance or denial of proposed concessions. This is shown graphically in Figure 2.
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Specifically, Figure 2 indicates that the current uprisings can be understood through five pathways and four outcomes that explain why some countries broke with authoritarian rule and others did not: transition (negotiated), collapse, enduring unstable regimes, and enduring stable authoritarian regimes. These outcomes are contingent on the levels of popular demand for regime removal and the level of government resistance to offering concessions. The case studies analyze the best examples of these categorizations, and demonstrate the key variables and conditions that allow us to conclude these outcomes. Countries with citizens who are not demanding regime change or reform and countries with unconsolidated or consolidated democracies cannot be included in this chart, since initial demands are a requirement. It will be important, through the cases analyzed, to understand why some countries in the region start the process of uprisings, while some do not.
Figure 3 shows the full categorization of Arab countries’ transitions that are not consolidated, determinant on the cross between the level of the government’s cost in pursuing concessions and the level of popular demand within the country for a break from authoritarian rule. As discussed, the difference between moderate and high popular demand is the willingness to accept anything short of full governmental regime change. The government’s cost in pursuing concessions is the ability for the government to stifle demand through buy-offs and rentier policies, or the regime characteristics that prevent regime splits.
A brief application of the four variables discussed above to these patterns of regime and societal interaction in the Arab world will be presented using the best cases from the region. Tunisia has been shown to possess the most adequate characteristics for a “transition” country. Libya’s conditions exemplify a “collapse.” Jordan fits the standard of an “unstable authoritarian” regime, while Saudi Arabia best represents a “stable authoritarian” regime. The appendix provides information on the countries analyzed and the respective data.
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Figure 3: Outcomes in the Arab World: Cost of Concessions and Level of Popular Demand Low Government Cost of High Government Cost of Concessions Concessions High Popular Transition (Negotiated) Collapse Demand for • Tunisia • Libya Regime Change • Egypt • Syria • Yemen Moderate Unstable Authoritarian Stable Authoritarian Popular Demand • Jordan • Saudi Arabia for Regime • Algeria • Djibouti* Change • Bahrain • Kuwait • Morocco • Mauritania* • Oman • Qatar • United Arab Emirates Unconsolidated: Comoros, Iraq, Lebanon Uncategorized: Somalia, Sudan *See page 42 for additional discussion of Djibouti and Mauritania.
VIII. Negotiated Transition: Tunisia
The two processes shown on Figure 2 that result in transitions—negotiated transition or collapse—face high citizen demand for regime change and democratization, but take different paths (1 and 4) due to the regime’s level of resistance to political concessions. Path 1 is based on a high popular demand for regime change and a low cost and resistance by the government to offer concessions, resulting in eventual transition. Since the demands ultimately overpower the costs of the government to initiate a transition, negotiations and a break from authoritarian rule become possible. These Arab countries typically have non-personalist regime types with increased governmental diversity, and usually have modernized economies and fixed assets.
As Tunisia best exemplifies, transition countries tend to begin with uprisings due to economic conditions and exogenous events. As civil unrest increases, regimes usually respond with concessions because these leaders are more responsive to their citizens than personalist dictators and cannot provide the buy-offs like resource-dependent monarchies. Additionally, minimal societal conflict allows the citizens to organize under a common mantra and objective, usually economic demands due to a rise in expectations. Therefore, the presence of credible institutions
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that are more independent from the regime (essentially non-personalist regime types), higher economic integration and development, and minimal societal conflict, result in a different transition than regimes without these conditions.
Institutions that are independent from the authoritarian ruler mean that splits are more likely to occur and endure without support of the leader, providing alternatives of support for the masses. The citizens in transitioned cases are more likely to accept aspects of the old regime to implement the transition and potentially contribute to a post-transition environment since there are credible institutions in place. Transition cases are defined by high citizen demands for regime change on the ground and a low resistance to change by the government because of regime diversity and a lack of economic centralization and resource dependency.
The distinguishing factor between negotiated transitions and collapses is the use of concessions to facilitate transition. In negotiated transitions, the regime is more responsive to citizen demands for democratization because of the possibility for regime split due to government decentralization and the inability to buy-off citizens. The governmental elites have less to lose than those in personalist regimes, where access to office and the policies depend more on an individual leader and their discretion, and elites in countries with high government control of resources. While the protesters may have high demands and fight for the fall of the regime, they are more likely to accept aspects of the old regime and members of the old guard to facilitate transition. Through a negotiated transition, government concessions ensure a transfer of power without force and with the understanding that old aspects of the regime may survive the transition.
Tunisia, a single-party regime with a mid-level urbanization rate, average degree of economic decentralization, no resource dependency, and little potential for societal conflict, is a prime case for a negotiated transition based on concessions. Throughout his rule, Ben Ali found ways to further consolidate his power and prolong his term. Ben Ali is said to have ruled with an “iron fist in a velvet glove.” Tunisia’s (and Egypt’s) government enacted policies of “hesitant liberalization” to maintain a closed political system while meeting some of the citizen demands. This was similar to Gorbachev’s policies under the Soviet Union’s “moral empire,” according to
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John P. Entelis. As Samuel Huntington argued, “liberalized authoritarianism is not a stable equilibrium; the halfway house does not stand” (Huntington 1991, 174). Therefore, this gradual liberalization combined with the openness and diversity of the regime made it possible for fissure within the regime and a negotiated transition.
The conditions under Ben Ali prove that calls for democratization were brewing beneath the surface of the president’s corrupt policies and masked reforms. Tunisia under Ben Ali was labeled by Geddes as a single-party regime, and Entelis described Tunisia as “a one-party state governed by an unaccountable autocrat.” The government lacked the patronage system of personalist regimes like Muammar Gaddafi’s or Bashar al-Assad, and had a more intricate governmental structure involving close consultation with experienced professionals and advisers. In most non-personalist regimes, the military is loyal to the state, not the regime. This creates an important distinction between countries like Tunisia and Egypt and countries like Libya and Syria, where power is more consolidated. Therefore, transitions occur (as opposed to a collapse) because the military and even the ruler’s political party can survive without the leader as distinct and separate institutions. Personalist regimes thrive on the leader, while single-party regimes do not. In the case of Tunisia, the mid-level and senior officials of the Constitutional Democratic Rally (RCD), the ruling party, abandoned the regime, politically isolating Ben Ali’s regime and ensuring a split and negotiated transition.
Therefore, in non-personalist countries, the ruling class does not lose as much as in personalist regimes, allowing a negotiated transition to take place. Internal regime diversity makes it possible for a regime to have divisions needed to provoke political concessions. Non-personalist regimes see a transition as less costly and are more willing to allow a transition. While Ben Ali was a strong ruler in power for a long period of time, the diversity within the regime—somewhat due to his hesitant liberalization policies—created the possibility for a split within the regime, sparking a transition.
The international community largely believed the citizens of Tunisia would accept a closed political system and authoritarian government in exchange for economic progress and stability. In 2007, Hochman argued that “if there is an authoritarian social contract sustaining Ben Ali's
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regime in Tunisia and preventing society from demanding greater freedom, it is entirely dependent on the state’s continued economic success” (Hochman 2007, 73). The global financial crisis changed this perception. Tunisia’s dependence on the European Union for exports and its economic structure based on tourism revenues and remittances made the country vulnerable to external shocks caused by the global financial crisis (Paciello 2010).
Tunisia’s mid-level urbanization rate and economically liberal society provoked protests and demands caused by rising expectations amidst an economic crisis. The country provides subsidies to staple foods, ensures free health care and education, and enacts comparatively liberal social policies. The Tunisian government also spent a substantial amount on social programs, increasing expenditures on social welfare by 214 percent between 1986 and 2002 (Paciello 2011, 4). In 2008, the head of the International Monetary Fund named the Tunisian economy as an “example for emerging countries,” and the World Bank named it a “top reformer” in regulatory reform (Hamid 2011, 111).
Still, both poor citizens and members of the business community believed the country’s political conditions were stifling innovation and creativity and therefore limiting economic opportunity. As Entelis states, prior to the uprisings, Tunisia contained a “well-educated population with access to foreign travel, satellite television, the Internet, and other modes of communication,” but the country’s citizens were “becoming restless with its authoritarian leadership.” He rightly predicted that due to the economic growth and lingering disparities, “in the near future, [Tunisians] will demand Western standards of democracy” (Entelis 2011).
The gap between the high urbanization and education rates and low economic and social standards created a restless civil society and the political consciousness needed to spark an uprising and make room for democratization. The unemployment was increasing, especially among educated and young citizens. In the last decade, unemployment in Tunisia declined, but the unemployment rate among the young, specifically those with higher education, increased dramatically. Therefore, the demand for democracy in Tunisia was high.
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The economic conditions in Tunisia could not be met through rentier policies. The government was more amenable to a transition because there was not a dependency on resources or economic control that would be lost through regime change. The lack of resources and higher degree of decentralization prevented the government from stifling demands through buy-offs or other rentier policies. In addition, these conditions provided the willingness for a negotiated transition among the elite class, while the economic crisis and lack of rentier policies fueled the complementary demand needed to spark a transition.
Tunisia’s economic conditions are similar to those in Algeria, Comoros, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Syria, and Yemen, where rentier policies cannot be enacted to prolong a regime’s rule. When economic conditions are coupled with regime type, it becomes clearer which specific countries in the Arab world have a higher potential to transition, as the regime type can indicate the diversity of the government, the potential for splits within the regime, and the ability to meet demands for liberalization through negotiation and concessions.
Morocco and Jordan are unstable authoritarian regimes (see page 35) because they are monarchies with greater economic liberalization than the stable authoritarian regimes like Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries (see page 30). These countries’ transition phases are somewhat unpredictable, but given government centralization in monarchies, the path may be more similar to collapse countries. There is a high demand for democratization in these countries, but it is coupled with high resistance from the government. In Syria and Yemen, personalist dictatorships incite violent transitions and increase the likelihood of collapses because of high demands and an equally high unwillingness to negotiate or provide concessions. Therefore, Algeria, Egypt, and Tunisia are countries likely to undergo stable transitions given their liberal economic conditions and decentralized regime types.
As opposed to the stable authoritarian regimes, where it is difficult to create activism through media, countries like Tunisia have more liberal conditions that allow social media sites to successfully “[lay] a foundation in the virtual world, creating a sense of solidarity of activism that could later express itself more easily in the real world” (International Crisis Group 2011, 8). Activism is able to translate into action in regimes with strong and open civil societies.
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Furthermore, the combination of high demand among a homogeneous population translated the virtual frustration into demonstrable action. Social media also created a successful “leaderless movement” in Tunisia. As Doran states, “Ben Ali was on the plane into exile before he could even correctly identify his true enemy” (Doran 2011, 42).
What defines a transition versus a collapse? Through this categorization, government concessions are seen as the way to ensure a transfer of power without force and the possibility of maintaining some of the governmental structure post-transition. In a collapse, this is almost impossible, as no concessions are offered by the government, and protestors demand a complete removal of the leader and any patrons. If a government does not offer concessions in line with demands of the protestors, whether those demands are calls for further liberalization or calls for the authoritarian leader to step down, then the regime will likely collapse following its period of unstable authoritarianism.
In the end, the demands of the protestors (the resignation of Ben Ali as well as free and fair elections) were met by the regime without added force from the masses to meet these demands. As stated, this was due to the greater potential for regime split and lack of economic centralization needed to pursue rentier policies. Still, the country is not home free. This transition only signifies a break from authoritarian rule, and the inevitable post-transition instability as well as the fact that Tunisia has been governed by only two authoritarian rulers may increase prospects for reversion. But why is Tunisia a better case study than a country like Egypt, which has similar economic, political, and societal conditions?
Most variables indicate similarities between Egypt’s path to democratization and Tunisia’s. Yet even though Egypt has made significant gains, the role of the military and the greater potential for societal conflict are two possible hindrances. Ben Ali was a military officer, but Egypt’s government has greater political dominance by the military, potentially creating greater resistance. Women’s rights and the society’s struggle with Islamist groups and conservative Islamist policies will also be a greater factor in Egypt, already demonstrated by the constitutional process at the end of 2012. With a 10% Coptic Christian population of 8.7 million and a less homogenous society than in Tunisia, economic problems and unfulfilled expectations could
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increase the conflict between Islamists and modernists in Egypt and severely impact the country’s future. While Egypt has lagged in Freedom House’s annual reports, Tunisia recently made the greatest gain, between 2010 and 2011, in the history of the reporting. Finally, as the International Crisis Group explains, Tunisia’s “heterogeneous blend of institutions, political forces, trade unions, and associations” allows its citizens to find their way through “trial and error, negotiations, and compromise” and avoid unwanted political centralization.
Therefore, Tunisia is arguably the model country when assessing the Arab uprisings. As outlined by the International Crisis Group, Tunisia was the first to stage a revolt that sparked protests across the region. The causes of the Tunisian uprisings have “many points of convergence with the rest of the Arab world now plagued by internal dissent over nepotism, authoritarian rule, corruption, and glaring social inequalities” (International Crisis Group 2011, 2-3). While it may have taken a different path to break with authoritarian rule due to the country’s internal structure and homogeneity, Tunisia will set an important precedent for other countries throughout the region.
IX. Collapse: Libya
Regimes that do not offer political concessions and are resistant to democratization experience prolonged uprisings and potential violence, resulting in an eventual “collapse” of the regime (path 4). High demands by the population are met with high resistance by the government to transition, signifying that these regimes have a lot to lose due to centralization of power and resources, are unable or unwilling to buy-off citizens, or are more capable of preventing regime splits. Since the general population is not willing to accept anything short of a break with authoritarian rule, the country faces an eventual government collapse. These regimes are characterized by more personalist dictators, diversified economies, and a high probability of deep divisions due to tribal or ethnic diversity or extreme socioeconomic disparities. In addition, protestors tend to argue for complete removal of the regime, with no involvement of the old guard in the post-transition environment.
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Collapse countries are characterized by greater instability, largely the result of personalist dictators who control almost all aspects of society through patronage, therefore limiting the potential for strong and sustainable opposition groups and institutions. Civil unrest can also be sparked by demands for economic progress and human rights, but societal conflict affects the ability of citizens to unite under common objectives. The inability to unite and the lack of alternative groups and institutions distinguish this transition type from a negotiated process. This has been the case in Syria, where there are still supporters of the regime, not necessarily due to their loyalty to Assad but because of their fear of what could follow his rule. While Tunisia and Egypt were able to make the distinction between the state on one hand and the regime on the other, allowing the armies to act as mediators, this distinction is almost impossible in personalist regimes like Libya and Syria (International Crisis Group 2011, ii).
Ultimately, concessions are not part of the transition process, largely because the regime believes they can endure popular uprisings by instituting a government structure that hinders opposition movements. What these authoritarian regimes may not realize is that protestors eventually will not accept anything but a complete collapse of the old guard, where no aspects of the previous regime have the potential to contribute post-transition. Libya best exemplifies this case, and the fortitude of Gaddafi’s personalist rule explains the difficulty of overthrowing the regime. In the case of Libya, the government was unwilling to concede and provide liberalization efforts.
A collapse outcome does not mean no concessions are offered at all throughout the uprising process. Rather, this process comes to a point where concessions are not being accepted by the protestors, and demand increases to the point where the masses are only willing to accept the full removal of the regime. Therefore, demands in these cases are high, not moderate, and the resistance of the regime to relinquish power is equally high. This volatile combination prevents a negotiated transition from occurring or stability to be maintained.
According to Geddes, personalist regimes are the most resilient types of governments assessed in her work (which did not include monarchies). This is confirmed by further research on personalist regimes that argues that “violent overthrow is much more likely to end personalist
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than military or single-party regimes. The modal ending for personalist regimes is a coup, and insurgency, assassination, popular uprising, or invasion” (Skocpol and Goodwin 1994).
Libya demonstrates why this is the case. Gaddafi was able to centralize power through family ties and a system of patronage. He continually played tribes and neighborhoods against each other and kept the military weak to prevent challenges to his rule. He ruled using a “cult of personality” that dominated all aspects of Libyan life and alienated a majority of the conservative Libyan population. This included using his own particular ideology and vision in a state he constructed as the leader of the 1969 revolution. His role in history is therefore very different from the leaders of single-party regimes of Tunisia and Egypt.
Gaddafi kept the military weak and divided, making it unlikely to act as a buffer between the protestors and the regime. With no institutions to challenge him, Gaddafi is one of the best representations of the personalist regime structure and how this government type can sustain itself longer than single-party regimes like Tunisia and Egypt. These characteristics show why the Gaddafi regime did not pursue tactics of concessions and negotiations. Compared to Tunisia, Egypt, and other single-party regimes, personalist dictators have more to lose and are therefore more resistant to change. The high levels of centralization within personalist regimes make internal splits less likely, and therefore these regimes are able to thrive and are more difficult to overthrow.
A collapse is contingent on the level of demands by the population. In the case of Libya, citizens had high demands and would not be satisfied until Gaddafi was out of power and no aspects of his regime remained in place. With the government’s equally high level of resistance to liberalization and change, the regime was unwilling to ensure its position as a “stable authoritarian” country by distributing resource wealth, and did not provide political concessions needed for a negotiated transition. That is why Skocpol and Goodwin’s findings that violent overthrow is much more likely to end personalist regimes is valuable and pertinent in this context.
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The high demands of the Libyan citizens were the result of the country’s economic conditions. Outside of Libyan’s energy sector, the economy is not very developed. By assessing Libya’s social conditions (high literacy rates, life expectancy rates) in conjunction with its economic conditions (high GDP growth rates and high per capita income), it becomes evident why there were increased demands for liberalization and political change, since these economic gains were not being felt by the fairly urbanized society.
While Libya may not have the abundant resources of the Gulf countries, the country still possesses substantial oil resources and the degree of decentralization is the same as Gulf countries with major oil reserves. What makes Libya different from cases in the Gulf? The difference is best described by a finding by the International Crisis Group, which states that Libyan citizens feel their country’s oil and resource wealth should cause Libya to resemble places like Dubai. While the differences between Libya and Gulf monarchies may ultimately prove unimportant in the long run if the stable, oil-rich countries in the Gulf collapse, it is important to assess the economic differences to understand what caused Libya to collapse early.
Gaddafi did not use resource wealth in Libya to pursue rentier policies or expand other sectors of the economy like most Gulf countries do. Instead, when Gaddafi came to power, he expanded his control over oil production in Libya and used threats of nationalization to get companies to agree to his conditions. By giving Libya’s government control of a majority of profits, production declined but revenue for the Libyan government increased.
Therefore, Libya possesses conditions of the Gulf countries, including resource wealth, but not the stabilizing elements that are keeping countries like Saudi Arabia calm during the turbulence facing the region. While the governments of Saudi Arabia and Libya may control a majority of the resources and state wealth, the Gulf countries and other stable authoritarian regimes use this wealth to enhance the lives of their citizens to deter any possible protests or dissent. Therefore, resource wealth makes it possible to engage in regime stabilizing activity, but it makes the cost of losing power higher in the end. In Libya, Gaddafi did not engage in stabilizing activity, creating an environment where infinite resistance of the government forced a collapse instead of
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a negotiated transition when demand finally translated into civilian uprisings. This should serve as a cautionary tale for monarchies in the region that possess some personalist characteristics.
The contentious issues embodied by the National Transitional Council (NTC) represent the future issues facing Libya. Created by defectors from the regime, the NTC is the established successor to the Gaddafi regime. Citizens, rebels, and militias are already questioning the legitimacy of the NTC, paving the way for future conflict. Islamists consider the council to be too secular. Western Libyans argue that there are too many eastern Libyans represented. Militias, who suffered most during the collapse, do not believe the NTC represents their demands. These divisions represent the new questions facing a post-Gaddafi Libya. As the International Crisis Group states: “Gaddafi centralized power without building a central state. His successors must do the reverse.”
Countries like Syria face potential sectarian conflict, making a collapse more likely than a transition. Syria’s minority groups, including the Alawites and Christians, have created greater fragmentation and limited the unity in society needed to create a successful transition. This was the case in Yugoslavia and other Eastern European countries that had to deal with ethnic fragmentation. Libya’s tribal dimension and the new militia conflicts will pose great threats to the consolidation phase.
New media, technology, and greater access to television stations and news sources eliminated the government’s ability to control the political narrative in Libya and across the Arab world (Telhami 2011, 13). Credibility of state-run media has declined in favor of external news sources including Al Jazeera and blogs. Shaping public opinion becomes increasingly difficult with technological innovations and Internet freedom. This was the case in both transitioned and collapsed countries, where the state was not able to censor media sources, whether it was news coming in to the country or videos and news escaping from within.
Finally, while Libya best represents a collapse, it possesses some unique factors not found in other unstable authoritarian countries. Libya’s oil wealth distinguishes the country from Syria, which matches Libya in regime type and will likely experience a collapse. The resources provide
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some financial support in the interim, but the transitional government must emphasize the democratic process and facilitate a diversified economy in order to prevent reversion or a political vacuum. The Syrian opposition has had more time to organize because of the prolonged conflict there, but they will still confront similar issues of institutional and power deficits if the Assad regime falls. Societal divisions will also severely impact Syria’s democratization efforts. While transition countries like Tunisia and Egypt still have distinct militaries, electoral systems, and institutional mechanisms in place, countries like Libya, Syria, and even Yemen will have to manage these deficits going forward. Whether or not starting from scratch will be an advantage to collapsed countries remains an unanswered question.
X. Stable Authoritarianism: Saudi Arabia
Paths 4 and 5 are both contingent on a lack of government concessions, but countries defined as “stable authoritarianism” take path 5 because they possess a low popular demand for a full transition of power. This is due to clientelist and rentier policies that buy off citizens and remove popular demands for regime change. Since monetary buy-offs do not constitute political concessions, this shows that the proper use of resource wealth can provide a unique alternative to concrete political concessions, increasing the government’s resistance to change.
This can be viewed as the use of natural versus artificial ways to ensure economic development and progress. Typically, this is due to government control of resources, which allows a country to pursue rentier policies, thus maintaining stability. While countries in both categories may have higher urbanization rates than transition and collapsed countries, if rentier policies are not possible or not used by the regime, they will likely be categorized as unstable authoritarian because the regimes may be less responsive to initial demands for real economic support. Stable authoritarian regimes can therefore maintain low citizen demand for change but at the same time have a lot to lose if demand increases, making them highly resistant to liberalization efforts in the long run. In addition, stable authoritarian governments have a lot to lose given their regime’s control and centralization of government resources.
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These nations tend to be monarchies in the Arab world with high resource dependency and government control over these resources. Saudi Arabia represents the countries in the region that can be categorically defined as stable authoritarian regimes. Geographically, these countries are situated in the Arab Gulf, and are known as the Eastern Arabian states. Saudi Arabia is made up of a deeper political history and is a regional power player that can impact the democratization of other Gulf countries, including Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, and Oman.
The Middle East oil monarchies, specifically those in the Gulf, have had the ability of balancing tradition and modernization, as well as separating economic and political freedom and development. They have been able to maintain a low demand for regime change because of resource wealth, and have high stakes that cause them to provide some liberalization but be especially resistant to regime change and democratization, as argued by Boix.
Generally, call for reforms in these countries has, and will continue to be, more so a demand for constitutional limits to royal rule instead of the overthrow of monarchies. Protestors are likely to pursue demands for a “constitutional monarchy” so that the king transfers some power to elected governments. Bahrain may be seen as an exception because of the sectarian situation stemming from a party of the minority population ruling over the Shiite majority, but the demands would still likely be similar to the other oil monarchies. This is why it is currently categorized as an “unstable authoritarian” regime.
The situation in Saudi Arabia throughout the past two decades has been defined by challenges of measuring up to economic and political expectations while coping with social changes. Its history has been defined by increased economic and social development, and the policies enacted in Saudi Arabia and in most of the Gulf region ensure economic liberalization without political democratization. According to Sebastian Maisel, these pressures can be seen as a “creeping crisis” for the regime. He continues by saying that “with the breathtaking pace of modernization in the past few decades, the miracle of Saudi society is not how it has changed but how resilient it has been in the face of change” (Maisel 2011). Therefore, with oil resources and a sustainable monarchy, Saudi Arabia is likely to remain a stable authoritarian regime for the foreseeable future.
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In addition, the regimes are able to immediately satisfy demands and are therefore as resilient as personalist regimes. However, this may prove to be a downfall because it creates higher stakes that will cause regimes to be highly resistant to change when the demands become present. These dictators, like those in personalist regimes, have more to lose and are therefore more resistant to democratization. Currently, Saudi Arabia is able to maintain low demand for regime change through economic liberalization.
The importance of technology has been demonstrated in Saudi Arabia and may point to future prospects for liberalization and democratization efforts, but presents an example of the limits of “cyber-utopianism,” defined as the optimism surrounding the so-called Twitter and Facebook revolutions (Al-Rasheed 2012). While the Internet was useful for creating online petitions and drawing attention to rising demands in Saudi Arabia, it has so far proved impossible to organize and bring people together offline. These websites relied on online recruiting and petitioning instead of public demonstrations, representing the difficulty of sparking demand.
In general, the countries within this category possess high rates of urbanization (over 80 percent) and low degrees of economic decentralization due to resource wealth and the government ownership of these resources. However, development and economic policies have been hindered by a philosophy of “modernization without secularization,” limiting the extent to which the urbanization can cause the population to demand more democratic change. Without economic demands similar to those of the citizens of Tunisia, Egypt, Syria, and Jordan, it is less likely the citizens will risk their lives to protest. This low demand for democratization helps sustain the regimes.
Resource dependency must be presented as a substitutable comparison to other types of conflict or dependency. There can be similar dynamics in certain countries even if resources and oil are not the issue. The most common case would be external influence, clientelist policies, or ethnic divisions, which create conditions similar to those that result from rentier policies. The resource dependency and its stabilizing effects are dependent on the prevalence of resources. Ultimately, oil prices and quantities of resources are the linchpin of the entire system.
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Elsewhere in the region, social divisions remain between citizens and expatriates who live and work in the countries, but are not originally from the land. This is true in Kuwait and Qatar. Bahrain becomes the most notable exception because around 70 percent of Bahrainis are Shiite despite the face the country is ruled by Sunnis. The Shiites continue to face discrimination in housing, education, and employment, creating a divisive atmosphere for the ruling elite. In addition, less than 20 percent of senior government positions are held by Shiites. As Crystal describes, these stable authoritarian regimes have many commonalities. They are ruled by monarchs in the form of “dynastic monarchism,” which allows the countries to retain power even during economic growth. Limited political liberalization has occurred since the Gulf War, although economic progress remains the top priority to limit demands for democratization. All are dependent on oil revenues, as discussed above, and have government control over these revenues. While economic diversification has occurred, these countries are highly urbanized but contain a small private sector (Crystal 2011, 165). This makes citizens dependent on the regime, creating high levels of government resistance to change. Ethnic, sectarian, or religious differences are not a major point of contention in these countries, with the exception of Bahrain.
Even if Bahrain is presented as a separate unstable authoritarian case, the region is very close- knit, making it difficult for substantial change to occur in one of the periphery Gulf countries without change first occurring in Saudi Arabia, the powerhouse of the Gulf. Therefore, Bahrain is an unstable authoritarian regime. Shiite dissent in the 1980s and the mid-1990s proves this. Yet a transition may not yet be possible because of the societal fragmentation and unity and coordination of the Gulf countries through the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). Bahrain has the least amount of oil out of the GCC members. The country manages revenues with Saudi Arabian and Bahraini refineries processing Saudi oil.
Therefore, it is unlikely a movement in Bahrain would be successful at the present time, just as it has not been in the past, unless substantial change occurs elsewhere in the region and in Saudi Arabia specifically. Since democratization is currently unlikely in Saudi Arabia, it is doubtful any major liberalization efforts will occur in the rest of these neighboring regimes in the near future. Still, these countries must grapple with diversifying their economies as well as adapting
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to citizen demands for human rights and equal privileges, even if there are not calls to overthrow or topple the regime itself.
There is little doubt these regimes will remain stable for the time being due to relatively abundant resources and wealth and the stabilizing elements possessed by the respective governments. Factors that can affect the conditions of these regimes include a significant decline in oil resources or wealth, and societal conflict that may arise and spur democratic movements. Because the power structure within the oil monarchies determines the origins of reform, top- down reform may be the only viable option at this time, specifically because power is held firmly by the government elites.
Global comparisons can be made, specifically to the current regime in Venezuela, and other authoritarian regimes in Africa. Congo is one example of a country that uses oil revenues to consolidate political power in Africa. This has also been the case in Zambia and Cameroon, although to a lesser extent. Empirical tests by Jensen and Wantchekon on African cases have demonstrated that natural resource dependency had a negative effect on government performance (Jensen and Wantchekon 2004, 829).
At the same time, Lipset attests that political competition in wealthier societies tends to be less fierce, creating room for a more consensual form of politics if it were to occur. If this is the case, it may be that continued liberalization could increase citizen pressure to the point that regimes may not be able to stop development. Gradualism and incremental change may therefore be feasible in this region at this time (Nonneman 2008, 33). It remains unlikely that these governments will change unless an economic or social crisis affects a country, specifically Saudi Arabia, the main power-player in the region.
XI. Unstable Authoritarianism: Jordan
Paths 2 and 3 both lead to forms of unstable authoritarianism. Path 2 is an intermediary phase taken if concessions are not accepted by the population but demand for governmental change is still growing for one reason or another (possibly the inability to fully unite or relatively stable
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economic conditions). This path can also result from a government’s willingness to provide certain concessions not demanded by the population and short of regime change. Therefore, this pathway is taken by most countries in which citizen demand is rising and governmental resistance is weakening, leading to a cyclical path of popular uprisings until an eventual negotiated transition or collapse occurs. Therefore, path 2 denotes an intermediary outcome.
Path 3 on the other had denotes an unstable authoritarian country where demands for regime change remain moderate and are sometimes suppressed by the government’s willingness to offer political concessions. This outcome contains regimes that have incentives to offer some concessions but also allows them to prevent regime change by matching the level of demand of the population. Still, conditions make a cyclical process possible, and it remains a question of how long the government can suppress citizen demands and keep them at a moderate level. These unstable authoritarian nations are therefore in limbo, either awaiting the acceptance of concessions by the population after initial uprisings or still experiencing uprisings after concessions given by the government were not accepted by the masses.
This explains why paths 2 and 3 can both lead to a categorical unstable authoritarianism. If concessions are accepted, demand for regime change is decreased and suppressed. However, unstable regimes are defined by the regime’s inability to completely remove popular demands for governmental change and its willingness to offer at least some concessions. Unstable authoritarian regimes are distinctly separate from stable authoritarian regimes because they cannot revert to the status quo after popular uprisings occur and cannot pursue rentier policies instead of concessions. If demands continue in the future (i.e., concessions are not fully accepted), the process may repeat itself with new popular uprisings, creating an unpredictable and cyclical path. Unstable authoritarian countries are characterized by diversified economies, potential societal divisions, and are more urbanized; however, they have the most disparity in the variables analyzed.
Unstable authoritarian regimes also have greater potential for societal conflict since demands vary greatly among populations and sometimes conflict. Jordan and Bahrain are perfect examples. They are unable to create the high demand needed for a transition to occur. Stable
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authoritarian regimes like Saudi Arabia are likely to be more homogeneous with more united demands and grievances. The unstable authoritarian regimes are important because their process is continuous – they could theoretically return to stable authoritarian countries, or break with authoritarian rule through a transition or collapse. These unstable regimes ultimately have high or rising demands for liberalization or political change coupled with low resistance to change from the governments due to the regime type or inability to pursue rentier policies. Monarchies like Jordan and Morocco are important because they could tip the balance of other unstable authoritarian regimes like Bahrain, which would then affect Gulf countries.
Jordan represents what transitioned and collapsed regimes once were. As the International Crisis Group reported, “the season of Arab uprisings neither engulfed Jordan nor entirely passed it by.” The unstable authoritarian regimes have the potential to transition but are currently “swing countries” because they have experienced some instability (causing them not to be stable authoritarian regimes) but citizens have not fully accepted proposed policies and concessions of their regimes (Smiley 2011, 74). For example, at the time of this writing, Syria would fall in this category, although it is increasingly likely to conclude as a “collapse.” The two paths to this outcome shown in Figure 2 reveal that most countries that have collapsed or transitioned were once unstable authoritarian regimes because the regime’s willingness to relinquish some power was increasing, as were popular demands for full removal of the regime.
These countries are the most diverse in their conditions, but the countries in this grouping have certain variables that characterize them as unstable. There typically remains moderate demand for a full overthrow of the regime (whether because of positive economic conditions or heavy societal fragmentation) and a lower resistance from the regime to provide concessions due to the inability to pursue rentier policies or the need to propose interim liberalization policies. Still, the reason they are unstable is because these variables can shift. Economic expectations can rise and increase demand and unity among the population. The government’s resistance could increase due to personalist aspects and would therefore compete with the rising demands, potentially leading these countries down a path of other collapsed transitions.
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Ultimately, the countries in this categorization—Jordan, Algeria, Bahrain, and Morocco—are very different, but are characterized by similar instability that can potentially lead to transition in the future. These unstable authoritarian regimes are houses made of cards: depending on the internal conditions of each country and the external effects of other countries experiencing uprisings, breaks from authoritarian rule are likely to happen in the near future.
While Jordan is governed similarly to countries in the Gulf, it is a very different monarchy because Amman cannot rely on government-controlled resources as a source of revenue and form of coercion. Monetary buy-offs, common in oil-rich monarchies in the region, are less of an option for Jordan’s government. Most countries that become unstable authoritarian regimes will not have substantial government controlled resources, specifically oil. They therefore are unable to pursue the three ideas established by the rentier effect (discussed above), making them more prone to democratization. It is therefore more likely for the country to provide solid concessions instead of monetary buy-offs. This is a key reason Jordan is categorized as an unstable authoritarian regime. As such, it can be expected that Jordan will attempt to align itself with the stable authoritarian resource-dependent nations (specifically in the Gulf) to increase domestic stability.
In addition to political and economic concerns, Jordan also contains fragmentation not seen in other monarchies (except Bahrain) but present in other countries including Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, and Libya. This potential for societal conflict is important because it demonstrates whether there is a substantial majority seeking transition, as well as the likelihood Jordan will be able to consolidate if it were to transition. Some countries are unstable because they lack the full demand needed to cause a break with authoritarian rule. Until a divided population can unite, the nation can only remain unstable.
East Bankers (the Jordanian community who lived in present-day Jordan before the arrival of the first Palestinian refugees in 1948) play an instrumental role in Jordan’s politics. Generally, East Bankers dominate the government, public-sector industries, and the military, while Palestinian- Jordanians are heavily concentrated in private-sector businesses (Ryan 2011, 304). The
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Palestinian-Jordanians make up around 60 to 65 percent of the population and a potential uprising’s success is contingent on their participation.
In addition, around 40 percent of the population is affiliated with a tribe, creating another potential source of division. As several tribal leaders begin to voice opposition and side with protestors in Jordan, the effects could prove detrimental to the regime if political reforms are not enacted. In addition, there is a small Christian minority present. This population, along with the Circassian minority, has backed the Hashemite authority, similar to minority populations backing Assad’s Alawite regime in Syria. The Hashemite regime has typically endured by dividing protestors and reinforcing communal divisions, since the East Bankers and the Palestinian refugee demands differ greatly. However, as the International Crisis Group reports, while “most East Bankers and Palestinian-Jordanians are still not united in their anger,” they “are simultaneously angry. That is a start.”
Jordan is particularly interesting because of the lack of historical examples of a transition from monarchy to democracy in the Arab world. In a sense, Jordan’s government is the only model for reform within this regime type due to the political changes of 1989 and elections of 2003. While some transitions between unstable authoritarianism and a collapse occur more quickly, Jordan’s path will be gradual and drawn out due to its government type.
The main uniting factor of these unstable authoritarian regimes seems to be a lack of government resources (oil) or the unwillingness to pursue rentier policies. This ultimately forces the government to provide concessions instead of monetary buy-offs, leading to greater demand for regime change from the citizens and a snowball effect whether or not these concessions are accepted. Finally, these types of regimes tend to have a society more prone for fragmentation, whether based on ethnic, religious, economic, or tribal dimensions. They are therefore categorized by increasing demands and a low resistance since the government can only provide concessions given its lack of resource wealth and higher degree of regime and economic decentralization.
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Within the region, Morocco seems to fit with Jordan’s characteristics, and may be classified as an unstable authoritarian regime. Saudi Arabia understands that Jordan and Morocco may be shaken by winds of change in the future, especially if the conditions in Syria deteriorate and President Assad is forced out. The Gulf states have therefore invited the two countries to join the GCC, both to exert influence and to prevent the disastrous consequences change in unstable monarchies could cause in other Arab monarchies. Bahrain also fits the unstable authoritarian categorization despite its great oil wealth. The main reason is the societal fragmentation that could overpower the rentier effect, given that the majority population is ruled by a minority.
The question becomes, what makes unstable authoritarian regimes fall? If concessions are not accepted, the process discussed in section VII and Figure 2 is likely to continue, and a break from authoritarian rule becomes possible (even though it is more likely to result in a collapse than a transition due to more personalist aspects of the regimes and inability to pursue rentier policies). This is the path countries like Yemen face. It seems that unstable regimes can only play the game of concessions and coercion for so long, after which a transition is likely to occur. It becomes a matter of time, when the population is unwilling to accept further concessions and has the means to organize and demand more from the government. In Jordan’s case, the only conditions sustaining the government seem to be the regime type (as a monarchy, democratization is less likely), societal differences that keep demand under control, and its cooperation with Saudi Arabia and Gulf states, the United States, and the European Union.
At the moment, concessions are enough to appease the population and the necessary conditions to create strong protests are still not present—united populace, economic demands, and severe political oppression—making the status quo viable for now. Without unmet demands, transitions are not possible, and the government understands these divisions. The unstable authoritarian regimes, for now, possess stable regime qualities and little demand for regime change from protestors, allowing equilibrium to be maintained.
While protestors have not reached the mass mobilization necessary to bring about substantive change (yet), the variables indicate that in a political vacuum free from the impact of Syria’s violent uprising, Jordan is on the path to experiencing a transition, likely similar to Syria’s.
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However, the current events taking place in its neighboring country may have caused Jordanian protestors to acquiesce in their appeal for a democratic transition. If events substantially change in Syria (and if the region is not overcome with fatigue after the long struggle in Syria), the effects will undoubtedly be felt in Jordan, sparking change and potentially initiating a break from authoritarian rule if citizen demands remain high.
XII. Conclusion
These cases seek to distinguish the pathways and outcomes for stability and transition in a region that has not been studied in depth for democratization and consolidation potential. The studies answer the question of why some Arab countries successfully broke away from authoritarian rule, and why they transitioned like they did. By answering this question, it is clear that several conditions are more likely to lead to certain types of transitions or to no transitions at all. It is also important to understand the Arab uprisings in this framework to show that there are various differences within the countries of the Arab world, which will be necessary to study the post- transition environment. Finally, and maybe most importantly, this study and the current democratization processes occurring in the Arab world suggest that any claims the region could not transition (mainly through “Arab dummy variables”) are spurious.
While predictions oftentimes prove incorrect, parallels can be drawn to the countries discussed with other countries in the region. The categorization of these cases is determinant on the occurrence of protests and civil uprisings, but if we assume they are to occur in some of these countries, some predictions may be made. For example, we can infer that Syria will end in a collapse due to its conditions—a personalist regime type without full-functioning independent institutions, high potential for societal conflict, and an economic situation that mimics most of the countries that have already transitioned or collapsed.
A more long-term prediction may be that uprisings and transitions will eventually occur in the categorical unstable authoritarian regimes of Jordan and Morocco, especially if Syria collapses. Although these countries are monarchies, Morocco, for example, has a lower urbanization rate than Libya and higher resource decentralization. This fits Geddes’ explanation that countries
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between two economic extremes have a higher probability of alternating between different regime types, and represent where transitions are found. Jordan’s population could experience societal conflict and has a higher degree of resource decentralization than some of the Gulf countries, and can therefore be distinguished from resource-dependent monarchies.
If Jordan and Morocco were to transition or collapse (no monarchy has transitioned yet, but the weak institutional structure and high economic centralization could warrant a collapse), countries like Bahrain would be impacted, possibly affecting other currently stable Gulf monarchies. It may be the case that spending on patronage and the prevention of independent groups may fail to suppress demands for democratization in the future, and citizens will find other outlets to demand greater rights.
The enduring stability of the stable authoritarian countries therefore remains questionable. If we were to hypothesize about uprisings in Jordan and Morocco, the effects of the uprisings would undoubtedly trigger a domino effect of protests across the monarchies. While this is all speculative and arguably determinant on the path Syria takes, it remains interesting to contemplate the effects one uprising and transition can have on the regional landscape. It must also be noted that the domino effect of protests may be predictable, but the outcomes of the uprisings may not be.
Finally, the less-discussed African countries, including Djibouti, Mauritania, and Sudan, are interesting cases for further study. Currently, Somalia is uncategorized because current conditions are too low to spark demand for change, and its government is ineffective and divided. This weak state capacity prevents bottom-up democratization efforts to succeed. In Sudan, the recent division of the country must be assessed separately for future categorization. Both countries could fall under the stable authoritarian regime categorization since conditions are too low, but in this case, they are distinguished from the stable authoritarian countries with certain economic and political conditions.
Djibouti and Mauritania can be considered stable authoritarian regimes because of the countries’ more defined political structures compared to Somalia and Sudan. These countries could have
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potentially been uncategorized since they do not currently possess the economic and social conditions needed to sustain civil unrest and create mass mobilization needed for a break from authoritarian rule. It must therefore be understood that Djibouti and Mauritania, while stable authoritarian regimes, fall on the other extreme of the stable authoritarian categorization, with very poor conditions distinct from the other countries in that category.
This study does not provide answers to lingering questions about the democratization and consolidation phases, but instead focuses on the transition phase. This phase, when completed through negotiations or a collapse, creates an environment for potential democratization and eventual consolidation. However, there is still an open question over what this environment will produce. For now, we can only conclude that the uprisings in the Arab world are transitions away from authoritarianism. One can only hope the protests will create transitions to a consolidation process and democracy. Countries like Algeria present cautionary tales for the region. Algeria had a break from authoritarian rule in 1991 only to revert back to an unstable authoritarian regime after Islamists won the first round of the country’s first multi-party elections, sparking military intervention and a consolidation of power throughout the country’s civil war.
To analyze future prospects in a post-transition environment, a regional example may be Lebanon, which possesses a variety of important variables applicable to most countries in the Arab world and can reveal potential limitations and struggles countries in the region may confront post transition. These factors include participation and competition struggles (Dahl 1971), ethnic fears and fragmentation on sectarian lines (Horowitz 1993), clientelist policies and wealth inequality, and a parallel example of government control over resources through the Syrian government’s influence in the country.
Lebanon’s 2005 “Cedar Revolution” serves as a precedent for the current Arab uprisings. Freedom House categorizes Lebanon as a “partly free” country, one of the few in the Arab world. Lebanon has been able to remain stable throughout the Arab uprisings, even given the current uprisings nearby in Syria. While the Syrian uprisings will ultimately influence Lebanon’s political situation, Lebanon’s greater freedoms in the media, in society, and in politics have
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provided relative stability. Lebanon provides some clear trends that can be compared to the countries currently experiencing transitions.
Some basic trends of consolidation include the theory that modernization and media prevent reversion as opposed to assist with democratic consolidation (Bois and Stokes 2003, and Przeworski et. al. 2003) Additionally, while democracy can be introduced in both poor and rich countries, it is more likely to endure in countries with higher levels of economic development (Przeworski and Limongi 1997). Among countries below a certain threshold, the likelihood of reversion to authoritarianism increases as the level of economic development decreases.
Lastly, it must be acknowledged that there is always a trade-off in pursuing case studies versus statistical and systematic analysis. These case studies are representative of certain countries in the Arab world, and the appendix seeks to provide some references for future work on analyzing various variables systematically. Recent cross-country and statistical studies by Elbadawi, Makdisi, and Milante, specifically on the Arab world, were highlighted in this study and contain conclusions based on systematic analysis of various variables also discussed in the cases above.
This study presents a causal argument using case studies in hopes of allowing scholars and researchers to reconsider ideas of Arab exceptionalism and resistance to democratization. By analyzing the diverse sample of the Arab world and comparing it regionally, it is evident that regional conditions vary widely and can be readily compared to other regions, whether Central Asia, Eastern Europe, or Latin America. This makes the Arab designation unessential to interpreting these events. Just as all post-Soviet countries are not studied together, it may be the case that Arab countries will not be studied together in future analyses on democratization and consolidation.
We can therefore support Bellin’s statement that the decisive factor in the Arab world is not the “absent prerequisites of democratization” in the respective countries, but rather the “robust coercive apparatus in these states” (Bellin 2004). Through resource control, regime centralization, and the deliberately engineered modes of polarization, the Middle East authoritarian regimes survived the previous global waves of democratization. In retrospect, the
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region seemed ripe for popular uprisings, but now the attention must turn to how to interpret these momentous changes. This study suggests that it is possible to categorize the transitions and conclude that there are certain paths that are likely given certain conditions.
Looking globally, it can be briefly noted that most countries that consolidate successfully had experiences with fair and open political systems in the past. Whether in Eastern Europe or Germany, authoritarianism was largely imposed and not desired by the respective populations. The Arab world, on the other hand, has “no ready model” for an open and democratic society, though Lebanon arguably comes close.
Therefore, many countries in the Arab world may stall in Huntington’s “grey area” and become “hybrid regimes” even after they potentially establish constitutions, electoral systems, free press, and civil society organizations. If real power is not ceded or a façade of democracy is created, democratization efforts may prove ineffectual. In addition, the consolidation process may result in the rotation of power among ineffective and weak political parties, or among very powerful parties under competitive authoritarianism. The quality of democracy must continue to be the measure of defining the consolidation process of the nations in the Arab world.
The categorization discussed above may provide some insight into the consolidation process. After all, the transitioned countries are immediately identifiable by their more established institutions, since they were not ruled by personalist dictators. This will help in the post- transition phase, while countries that endured collapses must start from the beginning to create strong institutions. If agreements cannot be made over the “rules of the game,” civil wars are more likely to erupt, especially if societal divisions are present. This scenario will therefore be more common in collapsed countries.
The post-Soviet landscape can also provide some potential parallels and conditions 20 years in the future. The post-Soviet countries initially possessed similar institutions and constitutions to each other, but as Freedom House notes, there have been varying results between the countries in the region. In fact, there has been a recent reversal in democratic trends in some parts of the former U.S.S.R. The Baltic States have maintained their ranking as “free” countries, while five
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countries were categorized as “partly free” and seven were ranked as “not free.” This demonstrates that the Arab countries, even if they are grouped similarly in this transitions study, may not democratize and consolidate similarly.
It is important to question why this regressive trend occurred in the post-Soviet countries. Freedom House calls Russia under Vladmir Putin an “enabler” for despots in surrounding countries. This statement can translate to the Arab world, where Russia is enabling the Syrian regime by hindering both international intervention and assistance to the opposition. By remaining in power, Assad is also acting as an “enabler,” demonstrating the potential staying power of authoritarian leaders throughout the region despite great demands and present conditions suitable for democratic transitions. Iran’s president, Mahmoud Ahmedinejad, has also been an enabler by supporting authoritarian rulers and parties in the Arab world to exert further Iranian influence in the region.
Another hindrance in the post-Soviet landscape is the resource curse, a factor discussed in the above case studies. In Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Turkmenistan, abundant resources have allowed the regimes to pursue rentier policies and prevent liberalization efforts. In addition, societal conflict through interethnic division or territorial disputes has plagued countries like Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, and Russia. Societal conflict and divisions will likely impact most countries in the Arab world during democratization and consolidation phases. The “color revolutions” in the post-Soviet countries also led to greater repression of independent media outlets and any other forms of opposition. Ten years later, as demonstrated by the Arab uprisings, it has proven more difficult to limit sources of dissent due to new media and technology, limiting the possibility of repression.
The international approach to the post-Soviet region also mimics the policies currently being pursued in the Arab world. Freedom House says that the international community and the United States have “oscillated between sharp criticism that lacked strategic grounding and an approach that effectively ignores violations of democratic standards” (Puddington 2011). These historical instances must serve as examples for current international policy in the Arab world, where conditions mirror those of the post-Soviet countries. Studies on the post-Soviet landscape can
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provide policymakers with examples of success and failure of democratic transitions and insight for future policies in the Arab world.
Ultimately, the goal of this study is to navigate the transitions that shook the Arab world and have significantly impacted the regional dynamics. The causes of the uprisings are important for determining the implications of the protests and may be applicable for other regions. An analysis of the Arab world using case studies shows that these countries are on different trajectories in the transition process, but that general trends can be found and may be useful to analyze the consolidation phase or interpret conditions of authoritarian regimes around the world. Future political prospects will be studied for years as the citizens of the Middle East and North Africa attempt to navigate a post-Arab uprising period.
People throughout the Arab world have shown that they are tired of the democracy deficit facing their countries and region. The conditions, variables, and demands presented in the case studies prove this. The question now becomes: will the Arab world readily embrace the responsibility that comes with the long and arduous democratization and consolidation process that follows a transition?
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4 Country Categorization Regime Type Degree of Resource GINI Urban GDP GDP Societal Voter Internet Usage Decentralization Score6 Population7 Real Per Conflict Participation per 100 (DD)5 Growth Capita Salient?10 in Last Inhabitants12 Rate8 ($)9 Elections11 Algeria Unstable Authoritarian Single Party 30 35-35.3 66% Increase 7,300 No Downturn 12.5 Military Bahrain Unstable Authoritarian Constitutional Monarchy 10 36 89% Decrease 40,300 Yes Downturn 55.0 Comoros Unconsolidated Federal Republic 30 64 28% Increase 1,000 Yes No data 5.1 Djibouti Stable Authoritarian Personal 20 40 76% Decrease 2,800 Yes Upturn 6.5 Egypt Transition Single Party 40 32 43.4% Decrease 6,200 Yes Downturn 26.74 Personal Military Iraq Unconsolidated Parliamentary Democracy 10* 31-42 66% Increase 3,800 Yes Downturn 5.6 Jordan Unstable Authoritarian Monarchy 50 39.7 79% Decrease 5,400 Yes No change 38.0 Kuwait Stable Authoritarian Monarchy 10 30 98% Decrease 48,900 No Downturn 38.25 Lebanon Unconsolidated Republic 50 45 87% Decrease 14,400 Yes Upturn 31 Libya Collapse Personal 10 36 78% Increase* 14,000 Yes No data 14.0 * Mauritania Unstable Authoritarian Military 20 39 41% Increase 2,100 No Upturn 3.0 Personal Morocco Unstable Authoritarian Monarchy 40 40.9-41 58% Decrease 4,800 No Downturn 49 .0 Oman Stable Authoritarian Monarchy 10 32 73% Increase 25,600 Yes No change 62.6 Palestinian Authority N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A No Data N/A Yes No data 37.44 Qatar Stable Authoritarian Monarchy 10 39-41.1 96% Increase 179,000 Yes No data 69.0 Saudi Arabia Stable Authoritarian Monarchy 10 32 82% Increase 24,200 No No data 41.0 Somalia Uncategorized No permanent government 15 30 37% No 600 No No data No data change Sudan Uncategorized Military (Ethnic) 15 51 40% Decrease 2,300 Yes No data No data Syria Collapse Personal 30 42 58% Decrease 4,800 Yes Downturn 20.7 Single Party Military Tunisia Transition Single Party 40 40 67% Decrease 9,400 No Upturn 38.6 United Arab Emirates Stable Authoritarian Monarchy 10 31 84% Increase 49,600 Yes No data 78.0 Yemen Collapse Personal 30 37.7-38 32% Decrease 2,700 No Upturn 10.85 *Score was determined before the U.S. invasion of Iraq **No data for 2011. Change is for 2009-2010.
4 Geddes 1999, Wright 2008, and Freedom House Freedom in the World 2011 to assess unconsolidated categorization. 5 Vanhanen 2003. 6 Most recent CIA, World Bank, or GPI estimate used. 7 Most recent CIA World Factbook data used, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2212.html. 8 CIA World Factbook data used to assess change between 2009 and 2011. Libya did not have 2011 data. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world- factbook/fields/2003.html#ag. 9 Most recent CIA World Factbook data used, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2004rank.html. 10 Self-assessed through CIA World Factbook https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2075.html#ag and https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the- world-factbook/fields/2122.html#ag. Salient countries possess either two ethnic groups/religions greater or equal to 10% of the population, or over three groups. 11 Most recent International IDEA Voter Turnout Website data used. 12 2010 data from the International Telecommunication Union ICT Data and Statistics, “Percentage of Individuals Using the Internet.” 51 Democratization in the Arab World
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