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International

Stéphane Paquin

Most specialists date international political in the 1970s, newly independent countries economy’s (IPE) birth to the year 1970 when called for a different international economic British scholar published an order. These actors gradually became mem- article entitled ‘International Economics and bers of various international organizations, : A Case of Mutual which made it more difficult, not only for Neglect’ (Strange, 1970). In this article, the but also for the other west- Strange criticized the fact that, in most uni- ern countries, to exercise leadership on the versities, courses in international relations international scene and to adopt norms that were inadequate to understand the changes would achieve consensus in international occurring in international economics and organizations. vice-versa. Other factors helped launch IPE. The first The field of IPE emerged in the 1970s oil shock in 1973, the problems of economic in the UK and the United States and sub- growth and stagflation in the 1970s and the sequently in other parts of the world. Why debt crisis of Latin American countries, such then? In the 1960s and 1970s, several inter- as Mexico, Brazil and Argentina during the national factors contributed to the growth of 1970s and 1980s, caused great anxiety over IPE as a field of research. The decline of the international economic stability. Added to that United States, at least in relative terms, com- was the economic interdependence and inter- bined with the emergence of new economic nationalization of major corporations from the giants such as Germany and Japan, sparked a Western world. With the collapse of the Soviet series of debates on the decline of US power Union and the accelerated development of or . The post-war period was fur- new information technologies, IPE reached a ther marked by a wave of independencies tipping point in the 1990s. The multiplication among former European colonies. Starting of studies on permitted IPE to

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become enduringly institutionalized in politi- well. In his major work published in 1987, cal science departments. Hence, the debates The Political Economy of International about economic interdependence, globaliza- Relations, Gilpin himself presented IPE as tion and the decline of US power marked the the study of interactions between states and birth of IPE as a field of inquiry. markets (Gilpin, 1987: 8). Joseph Grieco and Despite its relatively young age, IPE has John Ikenberry also chose this formulation since grown dramatically. It is now an aca- (Grieco and Ikenberry, 2003). Likewise, the demic discipline with a coherent set of founding mother of IPE, Susan Strange, titled concepts, theories, research programs and her textbook, published in 1988, States and reference works. It has its founding authors, Markets: An Introduction to International and many professors describe themselves as Political Economy (Strange, 1988). However, specialists in this discipline. In the United in her book Retreat of the State, Strange States alone, more than 30% of university declares her regret over the choice of this title professors, in the broad field of international (Strange, 1996: 3). She would have preferred relations, list IPE as their first or second field ‘Authority and Markets’ as, according to of research, making it the second most popu- her, the state is no longer the main source of lar field in international relations after secu- authority in the international system. rity issues. The situation is similar in Canada Jeffry Frieden and Lisa Martin believe that with 26% and in the UK with 24% (Maliniak the emphasis placed on economic dimensions et al., 2012: 28–9). most distinguishes this field of research from other fields looking at international issues. According to these authors, the field of IPE includes ‘all work for which international What is IPE? economic factors are an important cause or consequence’ (Frieden and Martin, 2002: Although the definition of IPE is still the 118). In contrast, Stephen Krasner, one of subject of debate, researchers generally agree the most important realist theorists of IPE that IPE is concerned with international poli- in the United States, maintains that IPE ‘is tics and international economics, that is to concerned with the political determinants of say, beyond state borders. One of the most international economic relations’ (Krasner, cited definitions of IPE comes from one of its 2008: 108). founding fathers, the late . For According to , those who him, IPE is ‘the reciprocal and dynamic consider IPE a sub-discipline of interna- interaction in international relations of the tional relations (the orthodox) would prefer pursuit of wealth and the pursuit of power’ to call their discipline ‘international political (Gilpin, 1975: 43). In 2000, Jeffry Frieden economy’, while those with a more multidis- and David Lake defined IPE more simply as ciplinary conception of IPE (the heterodox) ‘the study of the interplay of economics and would prefer the term ‘global political econ- politics in the world arena’ (Frieden and omy’, in order to show that global political Lake, 2000: 1). In the Routledge Encyclopedia economy does not focus solely on the politics of International Political Economy, R. J. of international economic relations (Palan, Barry Jones offers a similar definition of IPE. 2000). But this distinction is not rigorously According to Jones, IPE ‘addresses the com- respected. For example, the flagship journal plex interrelationship between political and of the heterodox school is entitled Review economic activity at the level of international of International Political Economy. Certain relations (IR)’ (Jones, 2001: 813–14). authors with heterodox leanings also use the While these definitions are the most term ‘new international political economy’ agreed upon, other definitions exist as to distinguish it from the orthodox approach.

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Approaches to IPE on the two pillars of traditional hard science. The orthodox school values the scientific To describe a global and cross-area perspec- method based on the natural science model tive of IPE debates that has been neglected in and causal theories. political science because of the domination With the passing of time, it has adopted a of the US and Eurocentric approaches, we scientific culture closer to that of neoclassical can adopt ’s concepts economists. The style is reductionist and dem- of core, semi-periphery and periphery. Based onstration is nowadays often quantitative. The on the research of a team of professors work- majority of its authors favour methodological ing on the project Teaching, Research, and individualism and rational choice theory. The International Policy (TRIP) who conducted school’s orthodoxies have a predominantly several studies on international relations and materialist and neo-utilitarian vision of the IPE around the world, and on the introduc- world. Constructivism and reflective ideas- tory textbooks, we can conclude that the core based analyses are largely absent from the of the theoretical production in IPE indisput- analysis. The orthodox school is becoming ably consists of the US orthodox school. more and more focused on quantitative meth- Even critics of orthodox IPE concede it is the ods and increasingly on formal modelling school that has produced the principal (Paquin, 2008, 2013a, 2013b, 2016; Cohen, debates and theories and has dominated the 2007, 2008, 2014). discipline since the 1970s (Paquin, 2016; The orthodox school is divided into many Cohen, 2014). theoretical approaches: realist, liberal (the The semi-periphery is constituted of the predominant perspective in IPE) and domes- Neo-Gramscian and the British school, which tic politics, also sometimes referred to as are part of a larger heterodox approach. The ‘open economy politics’ (Paquin, 2016). periphery is constituted of the green and the The constructivist approach, apart from a feminist IPE. They are heterodox in their few exceptions, remains marginal in IPE. epistemological conception of IPE. These According to Abdelal et al., who published a last theories or approaches tend to be ignored collective work in 2010 in which they sought in the major textbooks and in the training to introduce constructivism in IPE, construc- of young scholars, especially in the United tivism is progressing everywhere ‘except States. In many cases, these theories are in the mainstream of international political labelled ‘critical theories’. economy, which has remained resistant to The orthodox school, which is massively this trend. As used to be the case elsewhere, concentrated in the United States, derives the view of the world that still informs much largely from political science departments. political economy scholarship is materialist Its level of analysis nowadays lies mostly at and rationalist’ (Abdelal, Blyth and Parsons, that of medium-range theories. Its research 2010: 3). agenda focuses on subjects such as coop- The semi-periphery is formed from the eration, international institutions, power works of the heterodox school: the Neo- relations, globalization and especially US Gramscian school and the British school. hegemony. Its objective is to understand how The Green and the feminist IPE make up the the world works without passing norma- periphery. All of these approaches, with the tive judgments. The orthodox school is not exception of some of the (liberal) green theo- very open to disciplines other than econom- ries, can be labelled ‘heterodox’. Heterodox ics, political science and international law. approaches are characterized by their criti- It also bears a dual allegiance to positivism cal orientation with regards to IPE and to and quantitative methods. This school has a the works of the orthodox school. The het- bias for rationalism and positivism; it resides erodox school does not accept the world as

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it is (Cox, 1981; Strange, 1984). Compared traits in the thinking of several authors and to the orthodox school, the heterodox school link ideas that make it possible to give mean- is more explicitly normative and focuses ing to the reality. This typology forms and on questions of justice, ethics, morality and structures ideas in a more logical and homo- equity in IPE. Robert Cox once wrote: ‘The geneous way than the reality. In other words, point is not just to explain the world but to orthodox authors are orthodox to varying change it’ (Cox, 2008). The heterodox school degrees, just as heterodox authors propound does not believe in the idea of adopting the varying degrees of heterodoxy. Therefore, scientific culture of the hard sciences model instead of seeing this divergence between (Paquin 2013a, 2013b, 2016). That approach orthodox and heterodox in terms of two is deemed inadequate for understanding the totally opposed schools, it is preferable to real world in which we live: the world of the imagine it as a continuum on which the ortho- social sciences. The heterodox school is pre- dox approach is on one end and the heterodox dominantly post-positivist. It tends to reject on the other. In the end, however, the division quantitative methods and formal modelling. with regard to IPE theories is very real and is It is also very critical of rational choice theory based on different scientific cultures that are and willingly develops holistic approaches. It largely incompatible and irreconcilable. is much more open to the role of ideas, iden- tity and values. Its works are closer to the tradition of research in interpretive , quite the opposite of reductionism. Basic Theories and Concepts It is also explicitly interdisciplinary. The het- erodox school concentrates on very big ques- The main themes that have structured the tions such as: who has power in the global core researches in IPE since the 1970s are economy?; what is hegemony?; and how does globalization and interdependence and international finance work? To answer these hegemonic stability theory, in which the much bigger questions, researchers must con- United States has the leading role and regime sider a much wider range of factors. Positivist theory and international institutions (for the epistemology is thus largely useless, as the debates about globalization see Helen V. parameters are changing and all relevant fac- Milner, Chapter 73, this Handbook). tors must be analysed (Paquin, 2013a, 2013b, International finance, environmental issues 2016; Cohen, 2007, 2008, 2014). and gender are also very important topics. A warning is necessary: it is true that these debates and this opposition between the sci- entific culture of the orthodox school and Hegemonic Stability Theory the heterodox school give a good overview of what the IPE discipline is today, but they Since the 1970s, the principal analytical do not do justice to the great diversity of the debate in IPE, with globalization, was cen- work since its foundation. As an example, tred on hegemonic stability theory. For many Robert Gilpin or Peter Katzenstein (1998), scholars, the declinists, the US leadership of the US orthodox school, never abandoned was in decline in the early 1970s because, on their historical analyses. In addition, the dif- 15 August 1971, US President Richard Nixon ferences appeared only gradually and they suspended the monetary system established are now at their peak. They are especially by the Bretton Woods Agreement in July visible among the new generation of ortho- 1944 during II. With this action, dox authors. the US head of state planted a seed of doubt: The orthodox and heterodox schools are had the world’s most powerful country begun ideal types, that is, they exaggerate certain its decline, just like the British before

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World War I? If so, would history repeat As all countries can profit from public goods itself? Would the decline of the United States without assuming the costs, the multiplica- plunge the world into a maelstrom of insta- tion of free riders overwhelms the benevolent bility marked by a new economic crisis like leader, which is no longer able to keep up this that of 1929 and a global conflict like World responsibility. Thus, for Kindleberger, the War II? problem for the United States in the 1980s A contrario, to remain stable, does the inter- was not too much power but not enough – national system require a ‘stabilizer’ – that is not an excess of dominance but, instead, too to say, a hegemony that has enough power to many free riders. ensure the system operates smoothly? These In IPE, this debate was initiated by Stephen debates gave rise to hegemonic stability Krasner in a 1976 article. For Keohane, even theory, one of the founding theories of IPE. though Krasner was not the first to discuss The answers to these questions, and to many the subject, his article was the one to most others, would structure the evolution of the clearly set the terms of the debate that has debates in IPE from the time of its foundation engaged IPE researchers since the 1970s. in the early 1970s until today. In this article that appeared in the journal Historical economist Charles Kindleberger World Politics, Krasner maintained that an (1973) was the first to formulate the terms open economy on the international level is of the debate in his book The World in more likely to come about ‘during periods Depression, 1929-1939. He ascribed the when a hegemonic state is in its ascendency’ depression that followed the 1929 crash to (Krasner, 1976: 323). the US government’s hesitations to assume This article is highly critical of the the leadership of the world after World War approach developed by and I, when it seemed evident that the British about interdependence in Empire was in decline and no longer able to world politics. Krasner wrote: fulfil this role. Kindleberger believed that to work properly, the needs one The basic conventional assumptions have been undermined by assertions that the state is trapped stabilizer – and only one. In the context of the by a transnational society created not by sover- inter-war years, it could only be the United eigns, but by nonstate actors. Interdependence is States. not seen as a reflection of state policies and state According to Kindleberger’s theory, the choices (the perspective of balance-of-power- benevolent leader is a powerful state that theory), but as the result of elements beyond the control of any state or a system created by states. assumes responsibility for the common or This perspective is at best profoundly misleading public goods on the international stage. In (Krasner, 1976: 317). his opinion, to avoid prolonging of the cri- sis of 1929, the United States should have While this approach may explain the devel- shown leadership to keep markets open for opments within an international economic distress goods, set itself up as a long-term structure, as Krasner argued, it cannot explain or counter-cyclical capital lender, adopted how the structure was actually created. In a more stable exchange rate system, coor- his article, Krasner aimed to show that the dinated macroeconomic policies and served structure of international trade is in fact as a last resort lender in order to provide the determined by the interests and power of international financial system with the neces- states acting to maximize their own national sary liquidities. interests. In summary, it is not because free Kindleberger contended that the problem trade is theoretically good for all players – with world public goods is that the responsi- even the less productive, as Ricardo main- bility for them lies essentially in the hands of tains – but that it is perceived as such by each the country that plays the role of world leader. state taken individually. The distribution of

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power between states is the key factor. His for the international system. For him, the article’s most important conclusion is that a hegemonic power acts on the international hegemonic power distribution is conducive stage in its own national interest. to an open trade system. Krasner called this In 1987, Robert Gilpin published his the ‘state-power’ argument (Krasner, 1976). major synthesis The Political Economy of A second author who has contributed sig- International Relations, the most widely used nificantly to the realist version of hegemonic reference work in IPE courses in US univer- stability theory is Professor Robert Gilpin sities during the years following its publica- of Princeton. In 1981, Gilpin published War tion. In it, Gilpin argued that US hegemony in and Change in World Politics. One objective the international system had been in decline of this book was to adapt Kindleberger’s the- since the 1970s, and that this was affecting sis to the realist IPE perspective. However, the liberal order formed after 1945. Gilpin Gilpin’s greater ambition was to explain saw two reasons for this decline: first, the the growth and decline of hegemonic power exporting of US technologies to other coun- and to explain change in IPE (Gilpin, 1981: tries in the world, which accelerated the 10–11). Gilpin devised the theory of hegem- reconstruction of Western Europe and Japan; onic power cycles. and second, the dramatic rise in the costs of Gilpin’s general thesis is implicitly ration- containing the USSR. In this context, the US alist and utilitarian. He argues that an inter- government was no longer able to impose its national system is built because social actors supremacy or retain its competitive advan- (states) enter into relationships and create tages in the world. structures while at the same time pushing for In this increasingly difficult economic con- their own self-interests. The system’s struc- text, which began with the Vietnam War and ture reflects the distribution of power within continued into the Reagan administration, the international system. As power and inter- Americans were more and more reluctant to ests are not static factors, the system trans- bear the cost of the international public good, forms and forces actors to re-examine their as a number of countries profited from the strategies. The system is in equilibrium when system put in place by the United States after no player can hope to gain from a change in 1945, increasing their own wealth and power the system. When a state believes it can gain, by free-riding on the back of the United i.e., when the benefits of the change outweigh States. Consequently, the United States, the costs, the system can change. guided by their national interest, no longer The central point of Gilpin’s book is that acted as Kindleberger’s benevolent leader but when equilibrium is achieved, it probably as a ‘predatory hegemon’. For Gilpin, this will not last, as the costs of maintaining the meant that the United States was less disposed system outweigh the benefits. If the domi- to subordinate its own interests to those of its nant power(s) cannot restore equilibrium, the allies, and that in its international actions, it new system will reflect the new distribution tended to exploit its hegemonic status to reap of power. Gilpin’s thesis is in keeping with advantages in keeping with its national inter- Kindleberger’s idea, especially regarding the ests, which it defined increasingly narrowly necessity for the hegemonic power to assume (Gilpin, 1987: 345). This situation prompted responsibility for the international public a new era of neomercantilism. goods. Furthermore, the hegemonic power This transformation had critical conse- must add order and security to its respon- quences for the international system. It sig- sibilities (Gilpin, 1981: 10–11). Unlike nalled first, the return of protectionism and Kindleberger, Gilpin does not think of the mercantilist policies on the part of the declin- hegemonic power as a benevolent leader ing hegemonic power and, second, the return whose role is to stabilize and be responsible of regionalism and aggressive bilateralism

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(Gilpin, 1987: 363). This type of behaviour context of the decline of US hegemony (Oye, garnered sanctions from the other members 1986). of GATT, risking further deterioration of the Initially, liberal institutionalists accepted situation. These transformations posed a seri- realist theorists’ idea that cooperation is ous threat for the international trade system sometimes difficult due to the anarchic nature and for the survival of the liberal order. The of the international system. They maintained, exacerbation of rivalries complicated post- however, that institutions can facilitate inter- hegemonic cooperation. In the new edition national cooperation. Therefore, Keohane of his book in 2001, Gilpin uses the same asked the following question: ‘how can coop- type of analysis but targets China as the eration take place in world politics in the new potential rival of the United States. For absence of hegemony?’ (1984: 14). Gilpin and realist theorists, these changes are Contrary to some realist theorists’ predic- not good news, especially due to the fear of a tions, the role of international institutions did hegemonic transition war. not diminish with the decline of US hegem- One recent contribution to the debate ony that began in the 1970s, according to the comes from Graham Allison with his book orthodox school of IPE. Rather, these insti- ‘Destined for War’ (Allison, 2017). According tutions tended to become more important in to Allison, when a rising power like China international affairs. Realism and neorealism threatens to take the place of the hegemonic were confronted with an ‘ocean of anoma- power like the United States, it can lead to lies’ in terms of international cooperation a very dangerous situation similar to the one (Keohane and Martin, 2003: 75). This para- described by the Greek historian Thucydides dox needed to be explained. in his history of the Peloponnesian War. Liberal institutionalists believe that inter- The rise of Athens and the fear it instilled in national cooperation became increasingly Sparta created a situation where a war was important after t World War II. It became seen as inevitable. This situation is known more institutionalized and extensive, as the as being the ‘Thucydides’s trap’. According following organizations demonstrate: the UN, to Allison, over the past 500 years, there are the GATT (and later the WTO), the World 16 precedents of a rising power threatening a Bank, the IMF and, on a regional basis, the hegemonic power. In 75% of those cases, the European Union, in addition to many interna- final outcome was war. The goal of Allison’s tional regimes. For Robert Keohane, poten- book is not to predict the future but to prevent tial collective gains explain the considerable a war between two superpowers. Since wars increase in the number and reach of institu- did not occur in 25% of these cases, it is pos- tions of multilateral cooperation (Keohane, sible to avoid a war between China and the 1999: 36). United States, but, according to Allison, that According to Robert Keohane and Lisa will require a statecraft capable of dealing Martin, institutions are ‘persistent and con- with a rising power. nected sets of rules (formal and informal) that prescribe behavioural roles, constrain activity, and shape expectations’ (Keohane Liberal Institutionalism and Martin, 2003: 78). Institutions establish, to varying degrees, the rules of the game. The other major debate that has been domi- These international institutions may take sev- nating IPE debates since the 1980s is about eral forms: an international or formal non- the role of international institutions and governmental organization, an international cooperation. Its main objective is, to para- regime or informal agreements. It is the phrase the title of a book by Kenneth Oye, to degree of institutionalization that differenti- explain ‘cooperation under anarchy’ in the ates institutions.

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The multiplication of international institu- For their part, liberal institutionalists tions indicates a growing institutionalization consider information a fundamental vari- of world politics, which seems to be to every- able for explaining interstate cooperation. one’s advantage, even that of the superpowers. Information, they say, may be influenced by Keohane believes that superpowers, because human actions. While a lack of information they seek to influence events throughout the may limit cooperation in an anarchic system, world, need rules that are generally accepted nothing prevents states from acting to improve by other states. Even an uncontested super- the quality of the information available in power like the United States could not achieve order to promote cooperation. Liberal insti- its objectives by exercising its influence only tutional theories, therefore, pertain to the role through bilateral relations: a policy of persua- of international institutions in the production sion carried out on such a scale would have and propagation of information. These insti- too high a cost (Keohane, 1999: 37). tutions may perform this role in many ways. According to Robert Keohane and Lisa They may help make the behaviour of states Martin (2003: 81), liberal institutionalism understandable by providing information on is a criticism of, and an amendment to, real- the intentions of other states, by establishing ism. Initially, liberal institutionalism adopted standards or by providing reliable causal the- practically all the basic assumptions of neo- ories on the relationship between an action realists, except that it treated information as a and a result. In all cases, they reduce both variable. Liberal institutionalists did this less the costs of the exchange and the uncertainty. out of conviction than as a research strategy. They are at once an independent variable and As Keohane and Martin write (1995: 43), a dependent variable, because they change ‘this decision was admittedly taken more for as a result of human actions and transform analytical convenience and rhetorical effect the processes and expectations, which may than out of deep conviction. It was a tacti- profoundly impact the behaviour of states cal decision, later reversed, rather than part (Keohane and Martin, 1995: 46). of institutional theory’s hard core’. The landmark work that structured the States are thus utilitarian and rationalistic neo-neo debate is , by Robert and exist in an environment where interna- Keohane, published in 1984. In this book, tional agreements cannot be hierarchically Keohane aims to demonstrate that states can enforced. Therefore, institutionalists antici- cooperate even when the hegemonic power, pate that states will cooperate only if they after playing an important part in setting up have enough interests in common. The crucial cooperation institutions, has begun a period difference between neorealism and liberal of relative decline. According to Keohane, institutionalism is the role of information. repeated attempts at cooperation in the 1970s Neorealists believe that information about the suggest that the hegemon’s decline does not intentions of states is important but of poor necessarily mean the death of cooperation quality. States must therefore assume the (Keohane, 1984: 9). International institutions worst and act accordingly. They may cooper- are crucial in IPE because they make commu- ate, but this cooperation is not durable and nication easier, thereby reducing uncertainty takes place on an ad hoc basis. Neorealists caused by the lack of information. doubt that it is possible for states to system- Neorealist authors who are critical of lib- atically improve the quality of information eral institutionalism suggest that if there coming from the international environment. was no hegemonic power, no country would Thus, the lack of information and the impos- follow up on or enforce international agree- sibility for states to fundamentally change the ments and, consequently, none would apply international system force them to opt for a sanctions against free riders. For institutional defensive strategy. neoliberals, the question presents itself only

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when two actors are involved in a single-round orthodox theorists, the neo-Gramscian situation. In the contemporary international approach has an explicit normative aim. The system, however, international cooperation neo-Gramscian school also has an affiliation between states takes place on many issues with the Marxist and neo-Marxist approaches. and over a long period. Consequently, as the The neo-Gramscians’ greatest contribution to probability that the actors will meet again is the debates in IPE is their concept of hegem- sufficiently high, the issue of the next interac- ony, which they see as a form of structural tion will be important to them. Therefore, it is power based not just on military strength and in their interest to play the cooperation game possession of the means of production, but (Axelrod, 1984). also on ideas and civil society. Hegemony The political market failure approach in becomes an intersubjective process. IPE has been applied to other issues related Inspired by the analyses of Antonio to international trade, finance and the envi- Gramsci, Cox built his theory on the idea ronment (Stein, 1990). A state might, for of hegemonic control in capitalist societies example, hesitate to conclude a free-trade in order to explain how the dominant ideas agreement, though economic theory says that about the social order help to maintain that all countries signing the agreement will win, order. In his works, Cox transposes Gramsci’s even those at a disadvantage in all sectors of ideas and concepts regarding domestic production. The best strategy for each state is politics (hegemony, historic bloc, organic to apply an optimal tariff, but if all countries intellectuals, etc.) in order to construct and behave the same way, they are all at a dis- explain his own conception of world order. advantage. If one country does not impose a The neo-Gramscian approach in IPE projects tariff while others do, this country will prob- Gramsci’s ideas onto the international scene ably be in an unfavourable situation. These (Cox, 1996: 124). For Cox, hegemony at the political market failures could be diminished, international level is: even eliminated, by the creation of interna- tional institutions such as the World Trade […] is an order within a world economy with a dominant mode of production which penetrates Organization. This institution can determine into all countries and links into other subordinate the norms of what is acceptable behaviour modes of production. It is also a complex of inter- for a state, establish and enforce the rules of national social relationships which connect the the game, conduct studies and follow-up on social classes of the different countries. World important issues and provide a dispute reso- hegemony can be described as a social structure, an economic structure, and a political structure; lution process. and it cannot be simply one of these things but must be all three. World hegemony, furthermore, is expressed in universal norms, institutions and mechanisms which lay down general rules of Neo-Gramscian Hegemony behaviour for states and for those forces of civil The neo-Gramscian approach, originally the- society that act across national boundaries, rules which support the dominant mode of production orized by Robert Cox, is a perspective in IPE (Cox, 1996: 137). that focuses on change in historical pro- cesses, social structures and social dynamics For Cox, since 1945, a hegemonic order has in order to understand world order and IPE. been built in response to the capacity of the Fundamentally non-determinist, this United States – the dominant power – to approach concentrates on the historical con- define the norms of the desired order in uni- ditions for the emergence of a particular versal terms that are compatible with the social order within a country and its effects interests of other states. This form of political on world order. Contrary to the problem- domination is not experienced as such by solving theories that Cox identifies with those who are under it. The dominant power

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instead manages to have others adhere to this of pragmatism and moral philosophy. The het- order, sometimes at the cost of certain sacri- erodox school adopts a less formal methodol- fices. Once implemented, neo-Gramscian ogy that is closer to interpretive historical hegemony moves from a relational to a struc- sociology. This method is more compatible tural power relationship. with the larger ambitions of heterodox International institutions are the product of researchers. The orthodox school is more hegemony. The characteristics of international intensive while the heterodox school is more institutions that strengthen the hegemon’s extensive. power are: ‘(1) the institutions embody the In 1994, with the publication of the first rules which facilitate the expansion of hegem- issue of the Review of International Political onic world orders; (2) they are themselves Economy (RIPE), the bias for a multidiscipli- the product of the hegemonic world order; nary approach became the norm. The inaugu- (3) they ideologically legitimate the norms ral editorial stated: of the world order; (4) they co-opt the elites RIPE’s raison d’être is to bring together these excit- from peripheral countries; and (5) they absorb ing new attempts to understand contemporary counterhegemonic ideas’ (Cox, 1996: 138). social change by facilitating dialogue and debate International organizations such as the UN, the across existing academic divides. This will be our World Bank, the IMF, GATT and, nowadays, contribution to nurturing a new IPE. The implica- the WTO are mechanisms through which the tions of this are that, in traditional terms, the journal will inevitably be ‘multidisciplinary’ in scope universal norms of the hegemonic power are and ‘interdisciplinary’ in spirit (RIPE, 1994: 2). expressed and diffused. For Cox, interna- tional organizations have contributed to the One important contribution of the British particular structure of the international order school is Susan Strange’s theory of structural by strengthening the dominant forms of state. power. In the second half of the 1980s, Susan International organizations become organs for Strange joined the debate on the decline of spreading the interests of the dominant power. US hegemony with a thesis that was a direct response to the ‘declinist school’, whether represented by Robert Gilpin, Stephen The British School: Structural Krasner or Robert Keohane. For Strange, Power hegemonic stability theory is vague and ambiguous, as the existence of a hegemonic The institutionalization of IPE in the UK power only partially explains why one order owes a great deal to Susan Strange, and her prevails at certain times, but not at others. desire to build IPE on multidisciplinary foun- She also disagreed with the observation dations became a distinctive trademark of the that the United States had lost power and British School. The British School’s lack of a that this decline of US power explained the coherent research paradigm has led to a great disorder within the international system. diversity of works from globalization to the For Strange, this idea that had dominated relations between markets and the states to the debates in the United States since the international finance. Causal theories are 1970s was largely a myth. The theory of the often absent and formal modelling non- decline of hegemonic stability served simply existent. The main strength of these works is to excuse the refusal of the United States to that they target problems, underscore injus- assume its role as the leading world power, tices and show up areas of absence of gov- a position which, according to Strange, it ernance, order or authority. While the still held in the 1980s. In contradiction to orthodox approach aspires to scientific declinist theories, she proposed a new theory ‘objectivity’, the heterodox approach is of power in IPE, that of ‘structural power’ more openly normative in the tradition (Strange, 1987; 1988a).

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Strange’s theory aimed to demonstrate penetrating power of US influence. Strange’s that the US empire was not in decline, but, thesis is not incompatible with the one on the contrary, that it held the power nec- Joseph Nye would develop on soft power in essary to exercise leadership at the world 1990 (Nye, 1991). scale, not only for its own interest, but also Strange also argued that declinists’ funda- for the international system as a whole. To mental error is that they adopt an exclusively prove her argument, Strange explained how relational conception of power. They estab- US power was deployed without overt coer- lish a relationship between resources and cion and why, despite an increasingly persis- outcomes that is too direct. Outcomes cannot tent impression of the erosion of US power, be predicted based only on knowing that the the United States was still the dominant United States holds such and such resources power in the world economy. The result is compared to another state. Furthermore, a theory of structural power, not just of rela- according to Strange, two types of power tional power as is common amongst realists can be exercised in IPE, structural power and and liberals. relational power. In the competitive game, it Strange found absurd the notion that US is increasingly structural power that prevails. power was in decline, because in the world as Relational power is a Weberian concept and we know it, structural power is also shaped manifests as the ability of an actor to have by the economy, finance, knowledge and its will prevail, even against resistance. communication and the size of an army. Strange gave the example of the German The United States forms a ‘non-territorial army in 1940, who obtained Sweden’s con- empire’ organized around large transnational sent to cross their ‘neutral’ country (Strange, firms. The US trade balance deficit should 1988: 24-25). Instead, declared Strange: not be understood as a sign of the decline of ‘Structural power, on the other hand, is the the Empire as the subsidiaries of US firms power to shape and determine the structures abroad repatriate their profits through finan- of the global political economy within which cial circuits, which allows them to pay their other states, their political institutions, their shareholders and to minimize, or even can- economic enterprises and (not least) their cel, the effects of the trade deficit on the US scientists and other professional people economy. have to operate’ (Strange, 1988: 24–25). For According to Strange, in the competition Strange, the four dimensions of structural between the USSR and the United States, power are: security, knowledge, production the Soviet empire developed according to and finance. For Strange, the four structures a classical political, territorial and military have the same ontological status. No struc- logic, while that of the US is fundamentally ture has precedence over the others. In the a deterritorialized power that goes beyond 1980s, according to Strange, the United the military framework to have an economic, States incontestably held the highest struc- financial and social dimension. Contrary tural power. to the USSR, which reached the level of superpower based essentially on its military strength and its relational power, the United The Periphery: Green and States attained superpower status by build- Feminist IPE ing a structural power and, contrary to the USSR, the United States did not fail miser- This last section is about two peripheral het- ably on the economic, financial and social erodox theoretical approaches in IPE: Green levels. The USSR lost the battle due to its and Feminist IPE. These are not emerging territorial millstone and because it could no theories – some articles date from the 1980s – longer keep up with the deterritorialized and and though they are very important, they

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nevertheless remain peripheral, as the major- draws our attention away from the real driver ity of IPE specialists address them only of environmental degradation, the capitalist rarely, or never. These perspectives are gen- and industrialization dynamic. Green theo- erally absent from introductory textbooks, rists criticize the ‘rational’ overexploitation syllabuses and reading lists for general of the Earth. Liberals, as a framework for examinations (Paquin, 2016). action, accept capitalism and are favourable to and more generally to the world as it is. Critical Green theorists in IPE are Green IPE skeptical of the economic planning so dear to mercantilists, and they are opposed to trade Environmental issues are increasingly influ- liberalization projects as proposed by liberals encing IPE theories. The acceleration of (Bernstein, 2001). globalization is having a considerable effect Critical Green IPE authors are more clearly on the environment. The importance of the in the category of pessimists. For them, envi- environmental issue, in particular the issue of ronmental degradation caused by human biodiversity, climate change and the decar- activity has a long history. The problem bonization of economies, inevitably lead to has reached such a level that some authors the integration of environmental issues in question not only the secondary effect of IPE debates. economic growth, but also economic devel- A great many Green IPE theories are opment itself. A key influence in this debate compatible with the debates of the liberal has been the Club of Rome report published orthodox school. For the orthodox, the envi- in the 1970s and entitled ‘The Limits to ronmental issue has become a new topic that Growth’. While liberals contend that envi- can be analysed using analytical tools and ronmental problems are the consequence of existing theoretical frameworks. Another a political market failure that can be solved school also exists in Green IPE theory and by enforcing a carbon tax or by establish- it shares many points in common with het- ing international regulatory institutions, for erodox approaches. This approach may be example, critical Green theorists tend to see qualified as critical as it is ‘problem-posing’ environmental problems in apocalyptic terms rather than ‘problem-solving’, to use Robert of biblical proportion. The industrial era life- Cox’s terms. They are essentially multidis- style is the problem. ciplinary and, above all, are very obviously More radical approaches promote zero normative in their orientation. Critical Green growth – a position that goes further than IPE theorists aim to promote environmental the proposal to make development sustain- justice and seek to theorize the ecological able, which was advocated by the Brundtland injustices of the industrialization and globali- Report. Many critical Green theorists criti- zation eras. cize the sustainable development approach To begin, Green theorists criticize realists because the report assumes that sustainable for having only marginally integrated envi- development can be achieved through the ronmental issues in their reflection. Their acceleration of economic growth. Critical silence or their relegation of environmental Green economists reject the position of neo- issues to the realm of ‘low politics’ is seen classical economists who believe that by by the Green theorists as a form of implicit putting a price on pollution, we will change support for the unbridled exploitation of the the behaviour of actors and thereby reduce planet. Then again, critical Green theorists are pollution (Schlosberg, 2007). Better envi- also skeptical of rationalist analyses based on ronmental standards cannot be arrived at by liberal . Analysing environmen- achieving greener growth, but by changing tal problems in terms of international regimes the system (Eckersley, 2010: 262).

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Feminist IPE topics rarely studied by their male colleagues, topics such as unequal access to jobs; eco- Feminist approaches, for their part, are defi- nomic and social inequalities in developing nitely positioned on the fringes of IPE. Their countries; the implications of trade liber- affinity with heterodox approaches and their alization on the condition of poor women; rejection of positivism fosters this marginali- development issues where women are more zation. In IPE, none of the paradigms of the present than men; maternal mortality in the orthodox approach have been significantly world; unequal access to education; geni- influenced by feminist works, and, despite tal mutilation; inequities in family law; life signs of sympathy, the neo-Gramscian and expectancy and poverty rates among women; the British School do not use gender as a the condition of women refugees; human category of analysis. rights violations that afflict women such as Feminism entered the debates in interna- rape in wartime and sex trafficking (Peterson tional relations and in IPE theories almost and Runyan, 2010; Enloe, 2004). simultaneously towards the late 1980s These works have shed light on the fact and the early 1990s (Tickner, 1991, 2011, that, globally, women earn lower wages than 2013). The main goal of feminist theories men and occupy a disproportionate place is to make gender visible in the real world among the poor and vulnerable people in (Paul and Amawi, 2013: 294). Feminist theo- all societies. Even when women do get bet- rists analyse IPE through a gender lens, but ter jobs, they tend to earn lower wages than IPE feminists want not simply ‘an IPE with men. Women are also clearly marginalized at women in it, but the creation of a fully gen- the executive, legislative and judicial power dered IPE’ (Paul and Amawi, 2013: 294). levels in all countries, even in Scandinavian Peterson (2005: 309) further asserts that gen- countries, which have the best record of der ‘is constitutive of contemporary interna- reducing the gender gap. tional political economy itself’. To promote research on women in world politics, a spe- cialized journal was created, the Feminist Conclusion Journal Of International Studies. Feminists in IPE are concerned with the As we have seen in this article, the debates in subordination of women in world politics. IPE are broadly determined by two very dif- Feminist works deal notably with the gen- ferent and largely incompatible scientific dered division of labour. This division arose cultures: on one side the, orthodox school in 17th century Europe with the new division and, on the other, the heterodox school. The of labour produced by the creation of remu- latest generation of orthodox researchers in nerative work, essentially male, in the public IPE claim they are developing more rigorous sphere versus unremunerated work, essentially theoretical frameworks that better satisfy the female, in the private sphere. Men became demanding principles of positivism and ‘breadwinners’ while women became ‘house- empiricism. This approach, they believe, wives’. With the acceleration of industrializa- facilitates the generalization and accumula- tion, women who entered the labour market tion of knowledge. The orthodox school found themselves disproportionately in under- considers heterodox approaches too eclectic, paid jobs in the textile, services or subsistence or even eccentric, to be valuable. It con- farming sectors. The history of capitalism is demns them as unscientific and relegates also the history of the marginalization and them to the semi-periphery or periphery of subordination of women (Tickner, 2011). the debates in IPE. Starting from this idea of marginalization, The positivist approach, mobilizing quan- IPE feminists have focused on a variety of titative methods at will, finds its strengths

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chiefly in the construction of the research the methodological rigour and the standards methodology. Overall, what makes this of the orthodox school, they did, for example, school attractive is the fact that the methodol- anticipate the financial crisis of 2008. ogy is at the forefront, that it is clearly stated. Robert Keohane now also shares this point This makes it much easier for a student to of view. On the subject of the recent evolu- emulate an orthodox researcher in IPE than tion of IPE, he writes: ‘[…] I view it with a to emulate Robert Cox or Susan Strange. In gnawing sense of dissatisfaction’ (Keohane, heterodox IPE, there is no precise guide about 2009: 38). For Keohane, what is most lack- how to conduct research and about what con- ing in contemporary orthodox IPE is an inter- stitutes acceptable research. The demarcation pretation and an understanding of change. He line between ideology and scientific research continues: ‘Substantively, what is missing for is not always very clear. Few heterodox me in contemporary IPE is the synthetic inter- researchers are concerned about the falsifica- pretation of change’ (Keohane, 2009: 40). tion criterion, as advocated by Popper, which Heterodox approaches are multidiscipli- is crucial in orthodox IPE. nary, normative and very critical of ortho- That said, the quantitative turn and the doxy. It is difficult to pass global judgment recent obsession with formal modelling on the works of the heterodox school as these has led orthodox IPE to become increas- works are so varied and unequal in quality. ingly abstract and has reduced the complex- While some authors approach genius, others ity of the world to its simplest expression. are mediocre. Some problems arise from the The greatest problem with contemporary fact that, in many cases, the methodology is works in orthodox IPE is that the perverse not explained or the works do not take into quest for rationality and the overuse of sta- consideration the existing research in the tistical methods to explain how the world field. The analyses of Robert Cox or of criti- functions disconnects these works from the cal authors in Green IPE are hermetic for stu- real world. The sophistication of theoreti- dents, not to mention for practitioners. These cal models separates them from this reality works are fashioned to be on the fringes of rather than bringing them closer. In addi- mainstream debates due to their very critical tion, positivists are fundamentally incapa- approach and their eclecticism. ble of considering non-observable realities Is there a place for compromise and per- such as ideology, identity or the social con- haps even synthesis? In IPE, the two schools struction of social life. complement one another on the objects of For Benjamin Cohen, the major difficulty study, and the multidisciplinary approach of with the works of the mainstream approach the heterodox school would allow import- in orthodox IPE lies in the deficit of imagina- ing new ideas and new debates in the United tion amongst researchers, and more particu- States. Nevertheless, the heterodox could larly in their inability to envisage or even to develop sounder methodological approaches. consider radical systemic changes. Since the However, as we have seen, since the 1970s, 1990s, the new generation of IPE research- the orthodox and heterodox approaches have ers have completely forgotten or ignored steadily grown apart. For many years now, there key issues. They are no longer asking them- has been minimal dialogue between the two selves the big questions about world politics. schools. There is a US hegemony over the dis- Consequently, according to Cohen, the latest cipline and the majority of American research- IPE researchers are deadly dull and are failing ers are convinced of the superiority of their to see the fundamental and important issues approach. The progression of constructivism for the real world. Orthodox IPE is incapable in international relations may permit an open- of explaining change, contrary to heterodox ing and some form of reconciliation between works. Even if heterodox works do not have the schools in IPE. These rapprochements are,

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for the time being, rare. Yet they are desirable, Frieden, Jeffry A. and Martin, Lisa L. Interna- because, as Susan Strange suggested, in IPE, tional Political Economy: Global and Domes- Catholic complexity is often preferable to tic Interactions, in Ira Katznelson and Helen Protestant parsimony. V. Milner, eds. Political Science: State of the Discipline, New York: W. W. Norton & Com- pany, 2002, p. 118–146. Gilpin, Robert. Three Models of the Future, International Organization, 29(1), 1975, Selected References 37–60. Gilpin, Robert. War and Change in World Poli- Abdelal, Rawi, Mark Blyth and Craig Parsons tics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, ed. Constructing the International Political 1981. Economy, Ithaca and London, Cornell Uni- Gilpin, Robert. The Political Economy of Inter- versity, 2010. national Relations, Princeton (N. J.), Prince- Allison, Graham. Destined Can America and ton University Press, 1987. China Escape Thucydides’s Trap?, Boston, Grieco, Joseph and G. John Ikenberry. State Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2017. Power and World Markets: The International Axelrod, Robert, Evolution of Cooperation, Political Economy. New York: W. W. Norton Basic Books, 1984. & Company, 2003. Bernstein, Steven. The Compromise of Liberal Jones, R. J. Barry. International Political Econ- Environmentalism, New York: Columbia Uni- omy (EPI), in R. J. Barry Jones, ed. The Rout- versity Press, 2001. ledge Encyclopedia of International Political Cohen, Benjamin. The Transatlantic Divide: Economy, London and New York: Routledge, Why are American and British IPE so Differ- 2001, pp. 813–814. ent?, Review of International Political Econ- Katzenstein, Peter J., Robert Keohane and Ste- omy, 14(2), 2007: 197–219. phen D. Krasner (eds). International Organi- Cohen, Benjamin. International Political Econ- zation and the Study of World Politics, omy: An Intellectual History. Princeton: International Organization, 52(4), 1998, 645. Press, 2008. Keohane, Robert. After Hegemony: Coopera- Cohen, Benjamin. Advanced Introduction to tion and Discord in World Political Economy, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984. International Political Economy, Northamp- Keohane, Robert and Lisa L. Martin. The Prom- ton, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2014. ise of Institutionalist Theory, International Cox, Robert W. Social Forces, States and World Security 20(1), 1995: 39–51. Order: Beyond International Relations Keohane, Robert. Organisations internationales: Theory, Millennium: Journal of International quels fondements théoriques?, Problèmes Studies 10(2), 1981: 126–155. économiques 2611–2612, 1999: 36–40. Cox, Robert W. Gramsci, Hegemony, and Inter- Keohane, Robert and Lisa L. Martin. Institu- national Relations: An Essay in Method, Mil- tional Theory as a Research Program, in Colin lennium 12(2), (1983): 162–175. Elman and Miriam Fendius Elman, eds. Pro- Cox, Robert W. The Point is Not Just to Explain gress in International Relations Theory: the World but to Change It, in Christian Reus- Appraising the Field. Cambridge: MIT Press, Smit and Duncan Snidal, eds. The Oxford 2003, pp. 71–108. Handbook of International Relations. New Keohane, Robert. The Old IPE and the New, York: Oxford University Press, 2008: 84–93. Review of International Political Economy Enloe, Cynthia, The Curious Feminist: Search- 16(1), 2009: 34–46. ing for Woman in a New Age of Empire, Kindleberger, Charles P. The World in Depres- Berkeley: University of Berkeley Press, 2004. sion, 1929-1939. Oakland: University of Frieden, Jeffry A. and David A. Lake, eds. Inter- California Press, 1973. national Political Economy: Perspectives on Krasner, Stephen. State Power and the Struc- Global Power and Wealth. New York: Bed- ture of International Trade, World Politics, ford/St. Martin’s Press, 2000. 28(3), 1976: 317–347.

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