University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform Volume 40 2006 The NSA Domestic Surveillance Program: An Analysis of Congressional Oversight During an Era of One-Party Rule Tara M. Sugiyama University of Michigan Law School Marisa Perry University of Michigan Law School Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjlr Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Law and Politics Commons, and the National Security Law Commons Recommended Citation Tara M. Sugiyama & Marisa Perry, The NSA Domestic Surveillance Program: An Analysis of Congressional Oversight During an Era of One-Party Rule, 40 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 149 (2006). Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjlr/vol40/iss1/5 This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform at University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
[email protected]. THE NSA DOMESTIC SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM: AN ANALYSIS OF CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT DURING AN ERA OF ONE-PARTY RULE Tara M. Sugiyama* Marisa Perry** On December 16, 2005, the New York Times sounded a fire alarm when it re- vealed that, in response to the September I1, 2001 attacks, President George W Bush had issued a secret executive order permitting the National Security Agency (NSA) to conduct warrantlesssurveillance on individuals to unearth nascent ter- rorist activity. Congress responded to the disclosure of the NSA domestic surveillance program largely by shirking its oversight duties.