Scalable Algorithms for Data and Network Analysis
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On Likely Solutions of the Stable Matching Problem with Unequal
ON LIKELY SOLUTIONS OF THE STABLE MATCHING PROBLEM WITH UNEQUAL NUMBERS OF MEN AND WOMEN BORIS PITTEL Abstract. Following up a recent work by Ashlagi, Kanoria and Leshno, we study a stable matching problem with unequal numbers of men and women, and independent uniform preferences. The asymptotic formulas for the expected number of stable matchings, and for the probabilities of one point–concentration for the range of husbands’ total ranks and for the range of wives’ total ranks are obtained. 1. Introduction and main results Consider the set of n1 men and n2 women facing a problem of selecting a marriage partner. For n1 = n2 = n, a marriage M is a matching (bijection) between the two sets. It is assumed that each man and each woman has his/her preferences for a marriage partner, with no ties allowed. That is, there are given n permutations σj of the men set and n permutations ρj of the women set, each σj (ρj resp.) ordering the women set (the men set resp.) according to the desirability degree of a woman (a man) as a marriage partner for man j (woman j). A marriage is called stable if there is no unmarried pair (a man, a woman) who prefer each other to their respective partners in the marriage. A classic theorem, due to Gale and Shapley [4], asserts that, given any system of preferences {ρj,σj}j∈[n], there exists at least one stable marriage M. arXiv:1701.08900v2 [math.CO] 13 Feb 2017 The proof of this theorem is algorithmic. A bijection is constructed in steps such that at each step every man not currently on hold makes a pro- posal to his best choice among women who haven’t rejected him before, and the chosen woman either provisionally puts the man on hold or rejects him, based on comparison of him to her current suitor if she has one already. -
On the Effi Ciency of Stable Matchings in Large Markets Sangmok Lee
On the Effi ciency of Stable Matchings in Large Markets SangMok Lee Leeat Yarivyz August 22, 2018 Abstract. Stability is often the goal for matching clearinghouses, such as those matching residents to hospitals, students to schools, etc. We study the wedge between stability and utilitarian effi ciency in large one-to-one matching markets. We distinguish between stable matchings’average effi ciency (or, effi ciency per-person), which is maximal asymptotically for a rich preference class, and their aggregate effi ciency, which is not. The speed at which average effi ciency of stable matchings converges to its optimum depends on the underlying preferences. Furthermore, for severely imbalanced markets governed by idiosyncratic preferences, or when preferences are sub-modular, stable outcomes may be average ineffi cient asymptotically. Our results can guide market designers who care about effi ciency as to when standard stable mechanisms are desirable and when new mechanisms, or the availability of transfers, might be useful. Keywords: Matching, Stability, Effi ciency, Market Design. Department of Economics, Washington University in St. Louis, http://www.sangmoklee.com yDepartment of Economics, Princeton University, http://www.princeton.edu/yariv zWe thank Federico Echenique, Matthew Elliott, Aytek Erdil, Mallesh Pai, Rakesh Vohra, and Dan Wal- ton for very useful comments and suggestions. Euncheol Shin provided us with superb research assistance. Financial support from the National Science Foundation (SES 0963583) and the Gordon and Betty Moore Foundation (through grant 1158) is gratefully acknowledged. On the Efficiency of Stable Matchings in Large Markets 1 1. Introduction 1.1. Overview. The design of most matching markets has focused predominantly on mechanisms in which only ordinal preferences are specified: the National Resident Match- ing Program (NRMP), clearinghouses for matching schools and students in New York City and Boston, and many others utilize algorithms that implement a stable matching correspond- ing to reported rank preferences. -
Curriculum Vitae
Curriculum Vitae Prof. Michal Feldman School of Computer Science, Tel-Aviv University Personal Details • Born: Israel, 1976 • Gender: Female • email: [email protected] Education • Ph.D.: Information Management and Systems, University of California at Berkeley, May 2005. Thesis title: Incentives for cooperation in peer-to-peer systems. • B.Sc.: Bar-Ilan University, Computer Science, Summa Cum Laude, June 1999. Academic Positions 2013 - present: Associate Professor, School of Computer Science, Tel-Aviv University, Israel. Associate Professor, School of Business Administration and Center for 2011 - 2013: the Study of Rationality, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel. 2007 - 2011: Senior Lecturer, School of Business Administration and Center for the Study of Rationality, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel. Additional Positions 2011 - 2013: Visiting Researcher (weekly visitor), Microsoft Research New England, Cambridge, MA, USA. 2011 - 2013: Visiting Professor, Harvard School of Engineering and Applied Sciences, Center for Research on Computation and Society, School of Computer Science, Cambridge, MA, USA (Marie Curie IOF program). 2008 - 2011: Senior Researcher (part-time), Microsoft Research in Herzliya, Israel. 2007 - 2013: Member, Center for the Study of Rationality, Hebrew University. 2005 - 2007: Post-Doctoral Fellow (Lady Davis fellowship), Hebrew University, School of Computer Science and Engineering. 2004: Ph.D. Intern, HP Labs, Palo Alto, California, USA. 1 Grants (Funding ID) • European Research Council (ERC) Starting Grant: \Algorithmic Mechanism Design - Beyond Truthfulness": 1.4 million Euro, 2013-2017. • FP7 Marie Curie International Outgoing Fellowship (IOF): \Innovations in Algorithmic Game Theory" (IAGT): 313,473 Euro, 2011-2014. • Israel Science Foundation (ISF) grant. \Equilibria Under Coalitional Covenants in Non-Cooperative Games - Existence, Quality and Computation:" 688,000 NIS (172,000 NIS /year), 2009-2013. -
Limitations and Possibilities of Algorithmic Mechanism Design By
Incentives, Computation, and Networks: Limitations and Possibilities of Algorithmic Mechanism Design by Yaron Singer A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Computer Science in the Graduate Division of the University of California, Berkeley Committee in charge: Professor Christos Papadimitriou, Chair Professor Shachar Kariv Professor Scott Shenker Spring 2012 Incentives, Computation, and Networks: Limitations and Possibilities of Algorithmic Mechanism Design Copyright 2012 by Yaron Singer 1 Abstract Incentives, Computation, and Networks: Limitations and Possibilities of Algorithmic Mechanism Design by Yaron Singer Doctor of Philosophy in Computer Science University of California, Berkeley Professor Christos Papadimitriou, Chair In the past decade, a theory of manipulation-robust algorithms has been emerging to address the challenges that frequently occur in strategic environments such as the internet. The theory, known as algorithmic mechanism design, builds on the foundations of classical mechanism design from microeconomics and is based on the idea of incentive compatible pro- tocols. Such protocols achieve system-wide objectives through careful design that ensures it is in every agent's best interest to comply with the protocol. As it turns out, however, implementing incentive compatible protocols as advocated in classical mechanism design the- ory often necessitates solving intractable problems. To address this, algorithmic mechanism design focuses on designing -
Matchings and Games on Networks
Matchings and games on networks by Linda Farczadi A thesis presented to the University of Waterloo in fulfilment of the thesis requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Combinatorics and Optimization Waterloo, Ontario, Canada, 2015 c Linda Farczadi 2015 Author's Declaration I hereby declare that I am the sole author of this thesis. This is a true copy of the thesis, including any required final revisions, as accepted by my examiners. I understand that my thesis may be made electronically available to the public. ii Abstract We investigate computational aspects of popular solution concepts for different models of network games. In chapter 3 we study balanced solutions for network bargaining games with general capacities, where agents can participate in a fixed but arbitrary number of contracts. We fully characterize the existence of balanced solutions and provide the first polynomial time algorithm for their computation. Our methods use a new idea of reducing an instance with general capacities to an instance with unit capacities defined on an auxiliary graph. This chapter is an extended version of the conference paper [32]. In chapter 4 we propose a generalization of the classical stable marriage problem. In our model the preferences on one side of the partition are given in terms of arbitrary bi- nary relations, that need not be transitive nor acyclic. This generalization is practically well-motivated, and as we show, encompasses the well studied hard variant of stable mar- riage where preferences are allowed to have ties and to be incomplete. Our main result shows that deciding the existence of a stable matching in our model is NP-complete. -
Four Results of Jon Kleinberg a Talk for St.Petersburg Mathematical Society
Four Results of Jon Kleinberg A Talk for St.Petersburg Mathematical Society Yury Lifshits Steklov Institute of Mathematics at St.Petersburg May 2007 1 / 43 2 Hubs and Authorities 3 Nearest Neighbors: Faster Than Brute Force 4 Navigation in a Small World 5 Bursty Structure in Streams Outline 1 Nevanlinna Prize for Jon Kleinberg History of Nevanlinna Prize Who is Jon Kleinberg 2 / 43 3 Nearest Neighbors: Faster Than Brute Force 4 Navigation in a Small World 5 Bursty Structure in Streams Outline 1 Nevanlinna Prize for Jon Kleinberg History of Nevanlinna Prize Who is Jon Kleinberg 2 Hubs and Authorities 2 / 43 4 Navigation in a Small World 5 Bursty Structure in Streams Outline 1 Nevanlinna Prize for Jon Kleinberg History of Nevanlinna Prize Who is Jon Kleinberg 2 Hubs and Authorities 3 Nearest Neighbors: Faster Than Brute Force 2 / 43 5 Bursty Structure in Streams Outline 1 Nevanlinna Prize for Jon Kleinberg History of Nevanlinna Prize Who is Jon Kleinberg 2 Hubs and Authorities 3 Nearest Neighbors: Faster Than Brute Force 4 Navigation in a Small World 2 / 43 Outline 1 Nevanlinna Prize for Jon Kleinberg History of Nevanlinna Prize Who is Jon Kleinberg 2 Hubs and Authorities 3 Nearest Neighbors: Faster Than Brute Force 4 Navigation in a Small World 5 Bursty Structure in Streams 2 / 43 Part I History of Nevanlinna Prize Career of Jon Kleinberg 3 / 43 Nevanlinna Prize The Rolf Nevanlinna Prize is awarded once every 4 years at the International Congress of Mathematicians, for outstanding contributions in Mathematical Aspects of Information Sciences including: 1 All mathematical aspects of computer science, including complexity theory, logic of programming languages, analysis of algorithms, cryptography, computer vision, pattern recognition, information processing and modelling of intelligence. -
Prahladh Harsha
Prahladh Harsha Toyota Technological Institute, Chicago phone : +1-773-834-2549 University Press Building fax : +1-773-834-9881 1427 East 60th Street, Second Floor Chicago, IL 60637 email : [email protected] http://ttic.uchicago.edu/∼prahladh Research Interests Computational Complexity, Probabilistically Checkable Proofs (PCPs), Information Theory, Prop- erty Testing, Proof Complexity, Communication Complexity. Education • Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) Computer Science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2004 Research Advisor : Professor Madhu Sudan PhD Thesis: Robust PCPs of Proximity and Shorter PCPs • Master of Science (SM) Computer Science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2000 • Bachelor of Technology (BTech) Computer Science and Engineering, Indian Institute of Technology, Madras, 1998 Work Experience • Toyota Technological Institute, Chicago September 2004 – Present Research Assistant Professor • Technion, Israel Institute of Technology, Haifa February 2007 – May 2007 Visiting Scientist • Microsoft Research, Silicon Valley January 2005 – September 2005 Postdoctoral Researcher Honours and Awards • Summer Research Fellow 1997, Jawaharlal Nehru Center for Advanced Scientific Research, Ban- galore. • Rajiv Gandhi Science Talent Research Fellow 1997, Jawaharlal Nehru Center for Advanced Scien- tific Research, Bangalore. • Award Winner in the Indian National Mathematical Olympiad (INMO) 1993, National Board of Higher Mathematics (NBHM). • National Board of Higher Mathematics (NBHM) Nurture Program award 1995-1998. The Nurture program 1995-1998, coordinated by Prof. Alladi Sitaram, Indian Statistical Institute, Bangalore involves various topics in higher mathematics. 1 • Ranked 7th in the All India Joint Entrance Examination (JEE) for admission into the Indian Institutes of Technology (among the 100,000 candidates who appeared for the examination). • Papers invited to special issues – “Robust PCPs of Proximity, Shorter PCPs, and Applications to Coding” (with Eli Ben- Sasson, Oded Goldreich, Madhu Sudan, and Salil Vadhan). -
Satisfiability and Evolution
2014 IEEE Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science Satisfiability and Evolution Adi Livnat Christos Papadimitriou Aviad Rubinstein Department of Biological Sciences Computer Science Division Computer Science Division Virginia Tech. University of California at Berkeley University of California at Berkeley [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] Gregory Valiant Andrew Wan Computer Science Department Simons Institute Stanford University University of California at Berkeley [email protected] [email protected] Abstract—We show that, if truth assignments on n variables genes are able to efficiently arise in polynomial populations reproduce through recombination so that satisfaction of a par- with recombination. In the standard view of evolution, a ticular Boolean function confers a small evolutionary advan- variant of a particular gene is more likely to spread across tage, then a polynomially large population over polynomially many generations (polynomial in n and the inverse of the initial a population if it makes its own contribution to the overall satisfaction probability) will end up almost surely consisting fitness, independent of the contributions of variants of other exclusively of satisfying truth assignments. We argue that this genes. How can complex, multi-gene traits spread in a theorem sheds light on the problem of the evolution of complex population? This may seem to be especially problematic adaptations. for multi-gene traits whose contribution to fitness does not Keywords-evolution; algorithms; Boolean functions decompose into small additive components associated with each gene variant —traits with the property that even if I. INTRODUCTION one gene variant is different from the one that is needed The TCS community has a long history of applying its for the right combination, there is no benefit, or even a net perspectives and tools to better understand the processes negative benefit. -
Navigability of Small World Networks
Navigability of Small World Networks Pierre Fraigniaud CNRS and University Paris Sud http://www.lri.fr/~pierre Introduction Interaction Networks • Communication networks – Internet – Ad hoc and sensor networks • Societal networks – The Web – P2P networks (the unstructured ones) • Social network – Acquaintance – Mail exchanges • Biology (Interactome network), linguistics, etc. Dec. 19, 2006 HiPC'06 3 Common statistical properties • Low density • “Small world” properties: – Average distance between two nodes is small, typically O(log n) – The probability p that two distinct neighbors u1 and u2 of a same node v are neighbors is large. p = clustering coefficient • “Scale free” properties: – Heavy tailed probability distributions (e.g., of the degrees) Dec. 19, 2006 HiPC'06 4 Gaussian vs. Heavy tail Example : human sizes Example : salaries µ Dec. 19, 2006 HiPC'06 5 Power law loglog ppk prob{prob{ X=kX=k }} ≈≈ kk-α loglog kk Dec. 19, 2006 HiPC'06 6 Random graphs vs. Interaction networks • Random graphs: prob{e exists} ≈ log(n)/n – low clustering coefficient – Gaussian distribution of the degrees • Interaction networks – High clustering coefficient – Heavy tailed distribution of the degrees Dec. 19, 2006 HiPC'06 7 New problematic • Why these networks share these properties? • What model for – Performance analysis of these networks – Algorithm design for these networks • Impact of the measures? • This lecture addresses navigability Dec. 19, 2006 HiPC'06 8 Navigability Milgram Experiment • Source person s (e.g., in Wichita) • Target person t (e.g., in Cambridge) – Name, professional occupation, city of living, etc. • Letter transmitted via a chain of individuals related on a personal basis • Result: “six degrees of separation” Dec. -
A Decade of Lattice Cryptography
Full text available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1561/0400000074 A Decade of Lattice Cryptography Chris Peikert Computer Science and Engineering University of Michigan, United States Boston — Delft Full text available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1561/0400000074 Foundations and Trends R in Theoretical Computer Science Published, sold and distributed by: now Publishers Inc. PO Box 1024 Hanover, MA 02339 United States Tel. +1-781-985-4510 www.nowpublishers.com [email protected] Outside North America: now Publishers Inc. PO Box 179 2600 AD Delft The Netherlands Tel. +31-6-51115274 The preferred citation for this publication is C. Peikert. A Decade of Lattice Cryptography. Foundations and Trends R in Theoretical Computer Science, vol. 10, no. 4, pp. 283–424, 2014. R This Foundations and Trends issue was typeset in LATEX using a class file designed by Neal Parikh. Printed on acid-free paper. ISBN: 978-1-68083-113-9 c 2016 C. Peikert All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission of the publishers. Photocopying. In the USA: This journal is registered at the Copyright Clearance Center, Inc., 222 Rosewood Drive, Danvers, MA 01923. Authorization to photocopy items for in- ternal or personal use, or the internal or personal use of specific clients, is granted by now Publishers Inc for users registered with the Copyright Clearance Center (CCC). The ‘services’ for users can be found on the internet at: www.copyright.com For those organizations that have been granted a photocopy license, a separate system of payment has been arranged. -
Constraint Based Dimension Correlation and Distance
Preface The papers in this volume were presented at the Fourteenth Annual IEEE Conference on Computational Complexity held from May 4-6, 1999 in Atlanta, Georgia, in conjunction with the Federated Computing Research Conference. This conference was sponsored by the IEEE Computer Society Technical Committee on Mathematical Foundations of Computing, in cooperation with the ACM SIGACT (The special interest group on Algorithms and Complexity Theory) and EATCS (The European Association for Theoretical Computer Science). The call for papers sought original research papers in all areas of computational complexity. A total of 70 papers were submitted for consideration of which 28 papers were accepted for the conference and for inclusion in these proceedings. Six of these papers were accepted to a joint STOC/Complexity session. For these papers the full conference paper appears in the STOC proceedings and a one-page summary appears in these proceedings. The program committee invited two distinguished researchers in computational complexity - Avi Wigderson and Jin-Yi Cai - to present invited talks. These proceedings contain survey articles based on their talks. The program committee thanks Pradyut Shah and Marcus Schaefer for their organizational and computer help, Steve Tate and the SIGACT Electronic Publishing Board for the use and help of the electronic submissions server, Peter Shor and Mike Saks for the electronic conference meeting software and Danielle Martin of the IEEE for editing this volume. The committee would also like to thank the following people for their help in reviewing the papers: E. Allender, V. Arvind, M. Ajtai, A. Ambainis, G. Barequet, S. Baumer, A. Berthiaume, S. -
Inter Actions Department of Physics 2015
INTER ACTIONS DEPARTMENT OF PHYSICS 2015 The Department of Physics has a very accomplished family of alumni. In this issue we begin to recognize just a few of them with stories submitted by graduates from each of the decades since 1950. We want to invite all of you to renew and strengthen your ties to our department. We would love to hear from you, telling us what you are doing and commenting on how the department has helped in your career and life. Alumna returns to the Physics Department to Implement New MCS Core Education When I heard that the Department of Physics needed a hand implementing the new MCS Core Curriculum, I couldn’t imagine a better fit. Not only did it provide an opportunity to return to my hometown, but Carnegie Mellon itself had been a fixture in my life for many years, from taking classes as a high school student to teaching after graduation. I was thrilled to have the chance to return. I graduated from Carnegie Mellon in 2008, with a B.S. in physics and a B.A. in Japanese. Afterwards, I continued to teach at CMARC’s Summer Academy for Math and Science during the summers while studying down the street at the University of Pittsburgh. In 2010, I earned my M.A. in East Asian Studies there based on my research into how cultural differences between Japan and America have helped shape their respective robotics industries. After receiving my master’s degree and spending a summer studying in Japan, I taught for Kaplan as graduate faculty for a year before joining the Department of Physics at Cornell University.