DOCSLIB.ORG

Verifying Warhead Dismantlement: Past, Present, Future

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text

Load more

Verifying Warhead Dismantlement Past, present, future David Cliff, Hassan Elbahtimy and Andreas Persbo 2 MATTERSVERTIC RESEARCH REPORTS NUMBER 9 • SEPTEMBER 2010 TheVerification Research, Training and Information Centre of Foreign Affairs, Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, is an independent, not-for-profit non-governmental organization. Norwegian Radiological Protection Authority, Ploughshares Fund, Our mission is to support the development, implementation and Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, UK Foreign& Common- effectiveness of international agreements and related regional wealth Office, World Resources Institute. and national initiatives. We focus on agreements and initiatives in the areas of arms control, disarmament and the environment, This report is funded by the Carnegie Corporation of New with particular attention to issues of monitoring, review and York under project title ‘The UK-Norway Initiative: Report verification. of the Independent Observer’. VERTIC conducts research and analysis and provides expert advice and information to governments and other stakeholders. Research contributions by Hugh Chalmers, Sonia Drobysz, We also provide support through capacity building, training, Timothy Collins, William Eichler and Martin Groarke. legislative assistance and cooperation. Special thanks to James M. Acton, Marius Bjørningstad, Glenn We engage closely with governments, policy-makers and Kelly, Morten Bremer-Maerli, Kathleen McNamara, Jasper international organizations, as well as with the private sector Pandza, Ole Reistad and Carl Robichaud. Thanks also to our and technical, academic and non-governmental communities reviewers, who travelled many miles to join us in London for two worldwide. days in June 2010. International Verification Consultants Network Editor: Andreas Persbo Dr Nomi Bar-Yaacov; Ambassador Richard Butler; Ms Joy Hyvarinen; Dr Edward Ifft; Dr Odette Jankowitsch-Prevor; Design & Layout: Rick Jones, Studio Exile Dr David Keir; Mr Robert Kelley; Dr Robert J. Matthews; Professor Colin McInnes; Professor Graham Pearson; Dr Arian VERTIC L. Pregenzer; Dr Rosalind Reeve; Minister Victor S. Slipchenko. Development House, 56–64 Leonard Street London EC2A 4LT, United Kingdom Board of Directors Phone +44 (0)20 7065 0880 Gen. Sir. Hugh Beach; Dr Wyn Bowen; Dr Owen Greene; Fax +44 (0)20 7065 0890 Dr Edwina Moreton; Dr Ronald Nelson; Mr Nicholas A. Sims. E-mail [email protected] Current funders Website www.vertic.org Canadian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Carnegie Corporation of New York, Foundation for Environmental Law and Develop- Printed in the United Kingdom by XXXX ment, Joseph Rowntree Charitable Trust, Netherlands Ministry ISSN 1474-8045 © VERTIC 2010 3 Contents List of figures............................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................................. 5 Abbreviations ................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................ 6 1. Preface ............................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 8 2. Introduction .......................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 10 3. Inside the Dismantlement Process ........................................................................................................................................................................................... 16 3.1 Retirement and transportation to disassembly plant 17 3.2 Mechanical disassembly of warheads 18 3.3 Disassembly of the physics package 18 3.4 Waste streams and disposition 19 4. The Early Days: Field Test 34 (1967)......................................................... ........................................................................................................................... 22 4.1 The three stages of dismantlement 22 4.2 Test objectives 24 4.3 Inspection exercises 25 4.3.1 Exercise one: the overall destruction exercise 26 4.3.2 Exercise two: the special uranium assay exercise 29 4.3.3 Exercise three: the scientists’ uranium assay exercise 29 4.4 Results 30 4.5 Conclusions and recommendations 33 5. Taboo-breaking in the 1980s: the Black Sea Experiments ......................................................................................................................... 36 5.1 Access and different warhead measurements 36 5.2 Results and conclusions from the experiments 37 6. Optimism in the 1990s: the DOE Study (1996–1997) ................................................................................................................................. 40 6.1 Monitoring activities 40 4 6.2 Monitoring options 44 6.3 Conclusions 46 7. Intergovernmental Involvement: the Trilateral Initiative (1996–2002) ................................................................................... 49 7.1 Rationale for the Initiative – why IAEA safeguards were inadequate 49 7.2 Progress under the Initiative 50 7.2.1 Development of the information barrier 52 7.2.2 Other technical research areas 53 7.3 The end of the Initiative 54 8. Studies in the United Kingdom (1998–2005) ............................................................................................................................................................ 56 8.1 Authentication 57 8.2 Dismantlement 59 8.3 Weapons complexes 61 8.4 Summary of conclusions 63 9. The UK-Norway Initiative................................................................................................................................................................................................................ 64 9.1 Peer review 64 9.2 The start of the Initiative 66 9.3 The information barrier project 68 9.4 The managed access project 69 9.5 Exercise scenario 71 9.5.1 Familiarization visit 72 9.5.2 Monitoring visit 77 9.6 Post-exercise reporting 82 9.7 Conclusions 82 9.8 Future work 84 10. Report Conclusions ................................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 86 11. Sources ........................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................ 93 12. Endnotes ................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 96 5 List of figures 1. The warhead dismantlement process in the USA 19 2. A hypothetical scenario of warhead dismantlement in Russia 20 3. A possible dismantlement facility arrangement drawn up ahead of the FT-34 exercise 23 4. Flow chart showing division of the dismantlement process during FT-34 26 5. Table showing evasion, access and team size variables for each of FT-34’s five dismantlement phases 28 6. Table showing amount of classified items exposed during FT-34 at each stage of the demonstrated dismantlement 30 7. Correct calls with regard to weapon authenticity 31 8. Monitoring options identified by the Department of Energy 44 9. Monitoring options set against the seven evaluative criteria identified by the DOE 46 10. Flow chart showing levels of verification considered as part of the Trilateral Initiative 51 11. Summary table of inspection techniques not necessarily requiring direct or visual inspector access 60 12. Participating institutes 67 13. Legal architecture for the monitoring visit held under the UK-Norway Initiative 77 6 Abbreviations ACDA (US) Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (now part of the US State Dept) AEC (US) Atomic Energy Commission (defunct since 1974) AWE (UK) Atomic Weapons Establishment CBMs Confidence-building measures CCTV Closed-circuit television CSA Canned Sub Assembly DoD (US) Department of Defense DOE (US) Department of Energy FFI Norwegian Defence Research Establishment HEU Highly-enriched uranium IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency IFE Norwegian Institute of Energy Technology IFS Norwegian Institute of Defence Studies NDA Non-Destructive Assay NWS Nuclear-weapon state (under the NPT) NNWS Non-nuclear-weapon state (under the NPT) NORSAR Norwegian Seismic Array NPT Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (opened for signature 1968) NRPA Norwegian Radiation Protection Authority PMDA Plutonium Management Disposition Agreement PPCM Portal Perimeter Continuous Monitoring RD/FRD Restricted Data/Formerly Restricted Data 7 RPIT Random Particulate Identification Technique SDR (UK) Strategic Defence Review SLCM Sea-launched cruise missile SORT Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (signed 2002) START Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (signed 1991) TIEs Tamper Indicating Enclosures
Recommended publications
  • The Alpha and Omega of Deadly Heresies: a Treatise on the Cause and Effect Relationship in the Teachings of Kellogg and Ballenger 1

    The Alpha and Omega of Deadly Heresies: a Treatise on the Cause and Effect Relationship in the Teachings of Kellogg and Ballenger 1

    The Alpha and Omega of Deadly Heresies: A Treatise on the Cause and Effect Relationship in the Teachings of Kellogg and Ballenger 1 During the earliest years of the twentieth century, the Seventh-day Adventist church experienced one of its greatest crises. Leading men within the ministry and medical fields began believing and teaching a God that was in all nature. The belief in God as a personal Being was replaced with a spiritualised essence which had much in common with pantheism. Riding at the head of this tide of false teachings was John Harvey Kellogg, a leading physician. He was a brilliant man, who, full of ambition and unsubmitted to God, sought prominence and power within the church. His pantheistic teachings were made prominent and popularised in his book titled The Living Temple , which was published in the first months of 1903. This period of Adventist history is often spoken of as the Kellogg Crisis. The ministry of Ellen White was integral in meeting the errors of Kellogg and his associates as well as the spirit behind them. She spoke of the principles they used in coming to their teachings as “the alpha of a train of heresies,” 2 and “the alpha of deadly heresies.” 3 She spoke of an “omega” that would follow, “in a little while.” 4 Hot on the heels of this falling away came Albion Fox Ballenger. Ballenger was a powerful preacher in the church and a leading figure in the work in Great Britain before he departed from the truth. He accepted and taught the Protestant understanding that Christ entered the Most Holy Place upon His ascension, denying the two-apartment Sanctuary ministry in Heaven as the church taught.
  • Irwin St. John Tucker

    Irwin St. John Tucker

    Irwin St. John Tucker POEMS OF A SOCIALIST PRIEST BY IRWIN ST. JOHN TUCKER. Illustrated by DPROTHY O’REILLY TUCKER. PUBLISHED BY THE AUTHOR. 68 W. Washington St. CHICA’GO, ILL. PRICE 25 CENTS. Copyright, 1915, by Irwin St. John Tucker. Irwin St. John Tucker, author of these poems, is a priest of the Protestant Episcopal Church, and is editor of THE CHRISTIAN SOCIALIST, of Chicago. He was for seven years a newspaper reporter, working in many of the large cities of the Middle West and South. The poems are in two divisions. First, the Lyrics of a Tramp Reporter, containing verses written during this time and published in vari- ous newspapers, chiefly the New Orleam Item and the New York Call. The second division, Poems of a Socialist Priest, from which the book takes its name, contains those written since entering upon the profession of the ministry. Many of these have been printed in the Living Church of Milwaukee. I. LYRICS OF A TRAMP REPORTER The Song of the Press The Old Doctor The Sacrifice Queer, Isn’t It? To a Girl Reporter The Drama (F.H. L.) / Skies The Copy Readers Deeps Festal Ode Sea-Caves The Litany of Lovers Over the Hills Justice a la Mode chivalry Elegy Ballad of a Blind Reporter An Example My Lady Consolation Maxims for a Budding The Answer Youth II. POEMS OF A SOCIALIST PRIEST Foam Sacrament The Sinner The Chalice In Chapel Spring Dawn At Nazareth Christmastide Temples Litany of Remembrance Evicted Mother The Unemployed Worker Father to the Preacher of the Exsurgat Deus Gospel Hunger The Price Pal-o’-Mine I.
  • Explosive Weapon Effectsweapon Overview Effects

    Explosive Weapon Effectsweapon Overview Effects

    CHARACTERISATION OF EXPLOSIVE WEAPONS EXPLOSIVEEXPLOSIVE WEAPON EFFECTSWEAPON OVERVIEW EFFECTS FINAL REPORT ABOUT THE GICHD AND THE PROJECT The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) is an expert organisation working to reduce the impact of mines, cluster munitions and other explosive hazards, in close partnership with states, the UN and other human security actors. Based at the Maison de la paix in Geneva, the GICHD employs around 55 staff from over 15 countries with unique expertise and knowledge. Our work is made possible by core contributions, project funding and in-kind support from more than 20 governments and organisations. Motivated by its strategic goal to improve human security and equipped with subject expertise in explosive hazards, the GICHD launched a research project to characterise explosive weapons. The GICHD perceives the debate on explosive weapons in populated areas (EWIPA) as an important humanitarian issue. The aim of this research into explosive weapons characteristics and their immediate, destructive effects on humans and structures, is to help inform the ongoing discussions on EWIPA, intended to reduce harm to civilians. The intention of the research is not to discuss the moral, political or legal implications of using explosive weapon systems in populated areas, but to examine their characteristics, effects and use from a technical perspective. The research project started in January 2015 and was guided and advised by a group of 18 international experts dealing with weapons-related research and practitioners who address the implications of explosive weapons in the humanitarian, policy, advocacy and legal fields. This report and its annexes integrate the research efforts of the characterisation of explosive weapons (CEW) project in 2015-2016 and make reference to key information sources in this domain.
  • Article Thermonuclear Bomb 5 7 12

    Article Thermonuclear Bomb 5 7 12

    1 Inexpensive Mini Thermonuclear Reactor By Alexander Bolonkin [email protected] New York, April 2012 2 Article Thermonuclear Reactor 1 26 13 Inexpensive Mini Thermonuclear Reactor By Alexander Bolonkin C&R Co., [email protected] Abstract This proposed design for a mini thermonuclear reactor uses a method based upon a series of important innovations. A cumulative explosion presses a capsule with nuclear fuel up to 100 thousands of atmospheres, the explosive electric generator heats the capsule/pellet up to 100 million degrees and a special capsule and a special cover which keeps these pressure and temperature in capsule up to 0.001 sec. which is sufficient for Lawson criteria for ignition of thermonuclear fuel. Major advantages of these reactors/bombs is its very low cost, dimension, weight and easy production, which does not require a complex industry. The mini thermonuclear bomb can be delivered as a shell by conventional gun (from 155 mm), small civil aircraft, boat or even by an individual. The same method may be used for thermonuclear engine for electric energy plants, ships, aircrafts, tracks and rockets. ----------------------------------------------------------------------- Key words: Thermonuclear mini bomb, thermonuclear reactor, nuclear energy, nuclear engine, nuclear space propulsion. Introduction It is common knowledge that thermonuclear bombs are extremely powerful but very expensive and difficult to produce as it requires a conventional nuclear bomb for ignition. In stark contrast, the Mini Thermonuclear Bomb is very inexpensive. Moreover, in contrast to conventional dangerous radioactive or neutron bombs which generates enormous power, the Mini Thermonuclear Bomb does not have gamma or neutron radiation which, in effect, makes it a ―clean‖ bomb having only the flash and shock wave of a conventional explosive but much more powerful (from 1 ton of TNT and more, for example 100 tons).
  • Jihadists and Nuclear Weapons

    Jihadists and Nuclear Weapons

    VERSION: Charles P. Blair, “Jihadists and Nuclear Weapons,” in Gary Ackerman and Jeremy Tamsett, eds., Jihadists and Weapons of Mass Destruction: A Growing Threat (New York: Taylor and Francis, 2009), pp. 193-238. c h a p t e r 8 Jihadists and Nuclear Weapons Charles P. Blair CONTENTS Introduction 193 Improvised Nuclear Devices (INDs) 195 Fissile Materials 198 Weapons-Grade Uranium and Plutonium 199 Likely IND Construction 203 External Procurement of Intact Nuclear Weapons 204 State Acquisition of an Intact Nuclear Weapon 204 Nuclear Black Market 212 Incidents of Jihadist Interest in Nuclear Weapons and Weapons-Grade Nuclear Materials 213 Al-Qa‘ida 213 Russia’s Chechen-Led Jihadists 214 Nuclear-Related Threats and Attacks in India and Pakistan 215 Overall Likelihood of Jihadists Obtaining Nuclear Capability 215 Notes 216 Appendix: Toward a Nuclear Weapon: Principles of Nuclear Energy 232 Discovery of Radioactive Materials 232 Divisibility of the Atom 232 Atomic Nucleus 233 Discovery of Neutrons: A Pathway to the Nucleus 233 Fission 234 Chain Reactions 235 Notes 236 INTRODUCTION On December 1, 2001, CIA Director George Tenet made a hastily planned, clandestine trip to Pakistan. Tenet arrived in Islamabad deeply shaken by the news that less than three months earlier—just weeks before the attacks of September 11, 2001—al-Qa‘ida and Taliban leaders had met with two former Pakistani nuclear weapon scientists in a joint quest to acquire nuclear weapons. Captured documents the scientists abandoned as 193 AU6964.indb 193 12/16/08 5:44:39 PM 194 Charles P. Blair they fled Kabul from advancing anti-Taliban forces were evidence, in the minds of top U.S.
  • Belles Lettres, 1946 Eastern Kentucky University, the Ac Nterbury Club

    Belles Lettres, 1946 Eastern Kentucky University, the Ac Nterbury Club

    Eastern Kentucky University Encompass Belles Lettres Literary Magazines 5-1-1946 Belles Lettres, 1946 Eastern Kentucky University, The aC nterbury Club Follow this and additional works at: http://encompass.eku.edu/upubs_belleslettres Recommended Citation Eastern Kentucky University, The aC nterbury Club, "Belles Lettres, 1946" (1946). Belles Lettres. Paper 12. http://encompass.eku.edu/upubs_belleslettres/12 This Newsletter is brought to you for free and open access by the Literary Magazines at Encompass. It has been accepted for inclusion in Belles Lettres by an authorized administrator of Encompass. For more information, please contact [email protected]. ^U'lv'^ ttre JD4S t>c> An annual anthology of student writing sponsored and published by the Canterbury Club of Eastern Kentucky State Teachers College at Richmond, Kentucky Editor Margaret Jessee Associate Editor Burna Dean Talbott Business Manager Jo Marilyn Morris Faculty Sponsor Roy B. Clark, Ph. D. VOLUME TWELVE NINETEEN FORTY-SIX Cowtetm DEATH Eugene Tolson 3 THREE THINGS TO KEEP A NATION FREE.._Bert Lana 3 LAST NIGHT I TALKED TO YO-YO Jim Litsey 4 DESPAIR Eugene Tolson 5 SHE GOT HER MAN Herbert Searcy 6 FALSE APPEARANCE Downie Case 7 TAR BARREL BOOGIE Philip Hodge 8 HENRY Frances Burns 9 TABLEAU Philip Hodge 10 A MOTHER'S WATCH Bert Lana 11 I LIKE Teena Osborne 12 A SPRING EVENING Jean Cloyd 12 ALICE Louise McCrosky 13 VICISSITUDE Philip Hodge 13 SUMMARY Shirley Clouse 14 QUEST Herman Oldham 14 WEST OF FRISCO BAY Allan White 15 WHENCE Juanita England 15 THE MISTAKE Love Clarke 16 THE BLACKENED KEY juanita England 17 THE FARMER Randy Stevens 18 MY SON Charles "Chuck" Miller_19 BE CAREFUL WHAT YOU SAY Bert Lana 20 THE WINDS FROM THE NORTH Lois Reynolds 21 RUTH Eugene Tolson 21 I LOVED BO .
  • Nuclear Reactors Fuelled with Uranium Inevitably Produce Plutonium As a By-Product

    Nuclear Reactors Fuelled with Uranium Inevitably Produce Plutonium As a By-Product

    The Secretary Joint Standing Committee on Treaties Inquiry into Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament Dear Sir/Madam, I would like to submit the following submission to the Parliamentary Committee Inquiry into Nuclear Non- proliferation and Disarmament. Yours sincerely, Frank Barnaby. A submission to the Parliamentary Committee Inquiry into Nuclear Non- proliferation and Disarmament. Frank Barnaby Nuclear reactors fuelled with uranium inevitably produce plutonium as a by-product. This plutonium can be used by countries and by nuclear terrorists to fabricate nuclear weapons. The operation of nuclear-power reactors, therefore, has consequences for national, regional and global security. The more nuclear reactors there are the greater the security risks. Australia should recognise that these security risks outweigh the befits of producing electricity by nuclear power especially because the use of renewable sources of energy, combined with improvements in energy efficiency and the conservation of energy make the use of nuclear power unnecessary. As the world’s second largest exporter of uranium, Australia has a major responsibility to adopt policies to minimise the risks to security from nuclear proliferation and terrorism. To this end, Australia should use its influence to bring the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) into effect. It should not supply uranium to countries, like the USA and China, which have not yet ratified the CTBT. Moreover, Australia should promote the negotiation of a Comprehensive Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty to prohibit the further production of fissile material usable for the production of nuclear weapons, prohibit the reprocessing of spent nuclear-power reactor fuel that has been produced by Australian uranium and should not support or encourage the use of Mixed Oxide (MOX) nuclear fuel or the use of Generation IV reactors, particularly fast breeder reactors.
  • OSP11: Nuclear Weapons Policy 1967-1998

    OSP11: Nuclear Weapons Policy 1967-1998

    OPERATIONAL SELECTION POLICY OSP11 NUCLEAR WEAPONS POLICY 1967-1998 Revised November 2005 1 Authority 1.1 The National Archives' Acquisition Policy announced the Archive's intention of developing Operational Selection Policies across government. These would apply the collection themes described in the overall policy to the records of individual departments and agencies. 1.2 Operational Selection Policies are intended to be working tools for those involved in the selection of public records. This policy may therefore be reviewed and revised in the light of comments from users of the records or from archive professionals, the experience of departments in using the policy, or as a result of newly discovered information. There is no formal cycle of review, but comments would be welcomed at any time. The extent of any review or revision exercise will be determined according to the nature of the comments received. If you have any comments upon this policy, please e-mail records- [email protected] or write to: Acquisition and Disposition Policy Manager Records Management Department The National Archives Kew Richmond Surrey TW9 4DU 1.3 Operational Selection Policies do not provide guidance on access to selected records. 2 Scope 2.1 This policy relates to all public records on British nuclear weapons policy and development. The departments and agencies concerned are the Prime Minister’s Office, the Cabinet Office, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (Security Policy Department, Defence Department, Atomic Energy and Disarmament Department, and Arms Control and Disarmament Department), HM Treasury (Defence and Material Department), the Department of Trade and Industry (Atomic Energy, and Export Control and Non-Proliferation Directorate), the Ministry of Defence (MOD), the Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE) and the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority (UKAEA).
  • NUCLEAR WEAPONS Action Needed to Address the W80-4 Warhead Program’S Schedule Constraints

    NUCLEAR WEAPONS Action Needed to Address the W80-4 Warhead Program’S Schedule Constraints

    United States Government Accountability Office Report to Congressional Committees July 2020 NUCLEAR WEAPONS Action Needed to Address the W80-4 Warhead Program's Schedule Constraints GAO-20-409 July 2020 NUCLEAR WEAPONS Action Needed to Address the W80-4 Warhead Program’s Schedule Constraints Highlights of GAO-20-409, a report to congressional committees Why GAO Did This Study What GAO Found To maintain and modernize the U.S. The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), a separately organized nuclear arsenal, NNSA and DOD agency within the Department of Energy (DOE), has identified a range of risks conduct LEPs. In 2014, they began facing the W80-4 nuclear warhead life extension program (LEP)—including risks an LEP to produce a warhead, the related to developing new technologies and manufacturing processes as well as W80-4, to be carried on the LRSO reestablishing dormant production capabilities. NNSA is managing these risks missile. In February 2019, NNSA using a variety of processes and tools, such as a classified risk database. adopted an FPU delivery date of However, NNSA has introduced potential risk to the program by adopting a date fiscal year 2025 for the W80-4 LEP, (September 2025) for the delivery of the program’s first production unit (FPU) at an estimated cost of about $11.2 that is more than 1 year earlier than the date projected by the program’s own billion over the life of the program. schedule risk analysis process (see figure). NNSA and Department of Defense The explanatory statement (DOD) officials said that they adopted the September 2025 date partly because accompanying the 2018 appropriation the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2015 specifies that NNSA included a provision for GAO to must deliver the first warhead unit by the end of fiscal year 2025, as well as to review the W80-4 LEP.
  • Downloaded April 22, 2006

    Downloaded April 22, 2006

    SIX DECADES OF GUIDED MUNITIONS AND BATTLE NETWORKS: PROGRESS AND PROSPECTS Barry D. Watts Thinking Center for Strategic Smarter and Budgetary Assessments About Defense www.csbaonline.org Six Decades of Guided Munitions and Battle Networks: Progress and Prospects by Barry D. Watts Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments March 2007 ABOUT THE CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND BUDGETARY ASSESSMENTS The Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA) is an independent, nonprofit, public policy research institute established to make clear the inextricable link between near-term and long- range military planning and defense investment strategies. CSBA is directed by Dr. Andrew F. Krepinevich and funded by foundations, corporations, government, and individual grants and contributions. This report is one in a series of CSBA analyses on the emerging military revolution. Previous reports in this series include The Military-Technical Revolution: A Preliminary Assessment (2002), Meeting the Anti-Access and Area-Denial Challenge (2003), and The Revolution in War (2004). The first of these, on the military-technical revolution, reproduces the 1992 Pentagon assessment that precipitated the 1990s debate in the United States and abroad over revolutions in military affairs. Many friends and professional colleagues, both within CSBA and outside the Center, have contributed to this report. Those who made the most substantial improvements to the final manuscript are acknowledged below. However, the analysis and findings are solely the responsibility of the author and CSBA. 1667 K Street, NW, Suite 900 Washington, DC 20036 (202) 331-7990 CONTENTS ACKNOWLEGEMENTS .................................................. v SUMMARY ............................................................... ix GLOSSARY ………………………………………………………xix I. INTRODUCTION ..................................................... 1 Guided Munitions: Origins in the 1940s............. 3 Cold War Developments and Prospects ............
  • NSIAD-95-95 Weapons Acquisition: Precision Guided Munitions

    NSIAD-95-95 Weapons Acquisition: Precision Guided Munitions

    United States General Accounting Offhe -GAO Report to Congressional Committees June 1996 GAO/NSL4D-95-96 .-- _.-- United States General Accounting Office GAO Washington, D.C. 20548 National Security and International Affairs Division B-260458 June 23,1995 Congressional Committees The military services are spending billions of dollars to acquire new and improved munitions whose technical sophistication allows guidance corrections during their flight to the target. These weapons are referred to as precision guided munitions (PGM). We reviewed Air Force, Navy, and Army munitions programs in inventory, production, and development that could be defined as using precision guidance to attack surface targets.’ Our objectives were to determine (1) the costs and quantities planned for the PGMS, (2) the services rationale for initiating PGM development programs, (3) options available to the services to attack surface targets with PGMs, and (4) the extent to which the services are jointly developing and procuring PGMS. We conducted this work under our basic legislative responsibilities and plan to use this baseline report in planning future work on Defense-wide issues affecting the acquisition and effectiveness of PGMS. We are addressing the report to you because we believe it will be of interest to your committees. -ll.._-~ PGMS employ various guidance methods to enhance the probability of Background hitting the target. These include target location information from a human designator, global positioning system (GPS) satellites, an inertial navigation system, a terminal seeker on the munition, or a combination of these sources. Since PGMs can correct errors in flight, the services expect to need fewer rounds to achieve the same or higher probabilities of kill as unguided weapons, Additionally, the services expect PGM accuracy and lethality to reduce the number of launch platforms and soldiers required to counter specific targets.
  • DOE-OC Green Book

    DOE-OC Green Book

    SUBJECT AREA INDICATORS AND KEY WORD LIST FOR RESTRICTED DATA AND FORMERLY RESTRICTED DATA U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY AUGUST 2018 TABLE OF CONTENTS PURPOSE ....................................................................................................................................................... 1 BACKGROUND ............................................................................................................................................... 2 Where It All Began .................................................................................................................................... 2 DIFFERENCE BETWEEN RD/FRD and NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION (NSI) ......................................... 3 ACCESS TO RD AND FRD ................................................................................................................................ 4 Non-DoD Organizations: ........................................................................................................................... 4 DoD Organizations: ................................................................................................................................... 4 RECOGNIZING RD and FRD ............................................................................................................................ 5 Current Documents ................................................................................................................................... 5 Historical Documents ...............................................................................................................................