Verifying Warhead Dismantlement: Past, Present, Future
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Verifying Warhead Dismantlement Past, present, future David Cliff, Hassan Elbahtimy and Andreas Persbo 2 MATTERSVERTIC RESEARCH REPORTS NUMBER 9 • SEPTEMBER 2010 TheVerification Research, Training and Information Centre of Foreign Affairs, Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, is an independent, not-for-profit non-governmental organization. Norwegian Radiological Protection Authority, Ploughshares Fund, Our mission is to support the development, implementation and Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, UK Foreign& Common- effectiveness of international agreements and related regional wealth Office, World Resources Institute. and national initiatives. We focus on agreements and initiatives in the areas of arms control, disarmament and the environment, This report is funded by the Carnegie Corporation of New with particular attention to issues of monitoring, review and York under project title ‘The UK-Norway Initiative: Report verification. of the Independent Observer’. VERTIC conducts research and analysis and provides expert advice and information to governments and other stakeholders. Research contributions by Hugh Chalmers, Sonia Drobysz, We also provide support through capacity building, training, Timothy Collins, William Eichler and Martin Groarke. legislative assistance and cooperation. Special thanks to James M. Acton, Marius Bjørningstad, Glenn We engage closely with governments, policy-makers and Kelly, Morten Bremer-Maerli, Kathleen McNamara, Jasper international organizations, as well as with the private sector Pandza, Ole Reistad and Carl Robichaud. Thanks also to our and technical, academic and non-governmental communities reviewers, who travelled many miles to join us in London for two worldwide. days in June 2010. International Verification Consultants Network Editor: Andreas Persbo Dr Nomi Bar-Yaacov; Ambassador Richard Butler; Ms Joy Hyvarinen; Dr Edward Ifft; Dr Odette Jankowitsch-Prevor; Design & Layout: Rick Jones, Studio Exile Dr David Keir; Mr Robert Kelley; Dr Robert J. Matthews; Professor Colin McInnes; Professor Graham Pearson; Dr Arian VERTIC L. Pregenzer; Dr Rosalind Reeve; Minister Victor S. Slipchenko. Development House, 56–64 Leonard Street London EC2A 4LT, United Kingdom Board of Directors Phone +44 (0)20 7065 0880 Gen. Sir. Hugh Beach; Dr Wyn Bowen; Dr Owen Greene; Fax +44 (0)20 7065 0890 Dr Edwina Moreton; Dr Ronald Nelson; Mr Nicholas A. Sims. E-mail [email protected] Current funders Website www.vertic.org Canadian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Carnegie Corporation of New York, Foundation for Environmental Law and Develop- Printed in the United Kingdom by XXXX ment, Joseph Rowntree Charitable Trust, Netherlands Ministry ISSN 1474-8045 © VERTIC 2010 3 Contents List of figures............................................................................................................................... .................................................................................................................................. 5 Abbreviations ................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................ 6 1. Preface ............................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 8 2. Introduction .......................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 10 3. Inside the Dismantlement Process ........................................................................................................................................................................................... 16 3.1 Retirement and transportation to disassembly plant 17 3.2 Mechanical disassembly of warheads 18 3.3 Disassembly of the physics package 18 3.4 Waste streams and disposition 19 4. The Early Days: Field Test 34 (1967)......................................................... ........................................................................................................................... 22 4.1 The three stages of dismantlement 22 4.2 Test objectives 24 4.3 Inspection exercises 25 4.3.1 Exercise one: the overall destruction exercise 26 4.3.2 Exercise two: the special uranium assay exercise 29 4.3.3 Exercise three: the scientists’ uranium assay exercise 29 4.4 Results 30 4.5 Conclusions and recommendations 33 5. Taboo-breaking in the 1980s: the Black Sea Experiments ......................................................................................................................... 36 5.1 Access and different warhead measurements 36 5.2 Results and conclusions from the experiments 37 6. Optimism in the 1990s: the DOE Study (1996–1997) ................................................................................................................................. 40 6.1 Monitoring activities 40 4 6.2 Monitoring options 44 6.3 Conclusions 46 7. Intergovernmental Involvement: the Trilateral Initiative (1996–2002) ................................................................................... 49 7.1 Rationale for the Initiative – why IAEA safeguards were inadequate 49 7.2 Progress under the Initiative 50 7.2.1 Development of the information barrier 52 7.2.2 Other technical research areas 53 7.3 The end of the Initiative 54 8. Studies in the United Kingdom (1998–2005) ............................................................................................................................................................ 56 8.1 Authentication 57 8.2 Dismantlement 59 8.3 Weapons complexes 61 8.4 Summary of conclusions 63 9. The UK-Norway Initiative................................................................................................................................................................................................................ 64 9.1 Peer review 64 9.2 The start of the Initiative 66 9.3 The information barrier project 68 9.4 The managed access project 69 9.5 Exercise scenario 71 9.5.1 Familiarization visit 72 9.5.2 Monitoring visit 77 9.6 Post-exercise reporting 82 9.7 Conclusions 82 9.8 Future work 84 10. Report Conclusions ................................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 86 11. Sources ........................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................ 93 12. Endnotes ................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 96 5 List of figures 1. The warhead dismantlement process in the USA 19 2. A hypothetical scenario of warhead dismantlement in Russia 20 3. A possible dismantlement facility arrangement drawn up ahead of the FT-34 exercise 23 4. Flow chart showing division of the dismantlement process during FT-34 26 5. Table showing evasion, access and team size variables for each of FT-34’s five dismantlement phases 28 6. Table showing amount of classified items exposed during FT-34 at each stage of the demonstrated dismantlement 30 7. Correct calls with regard to weapon authenticity 31 8. Monitoring options identified by the Department of Energy 44 9. Monitoring options set against the seven evaluative criteria identified by the DOE 46 10. Flow chart showing levels of verification considered as part of the Trilateral Initiative 51 11. Summary table of inspection techniques not necessarily requiring direct or visual inspector access 60 12. Participating institutes 67 13. Legal architecture for the monitoring visit held under the UK-Norway Initiative 77 6 Abbreviations ACDA (US) Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (now part of the US State Dept) AEC (US) Atomic Energy Commission (defunct since 1974) AWE (UK) Atomic Weapons Establishment CBMs Confidence-building measures CCTV Closed-circuit television CSA Canned Sub Assembly DoD (US) Department of Defense DOE (US) Department of Energy FFI Norwegian Defence Research Establishment HEU Highly-enriched uranium IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency IFE Norwegian Institute of Energy Technology IFS Norwegian Institute of Defence Studies NDA Non-Destructive Assay NWS Nuclear-weapon state (under the NPT) NNWS Non-nuclear-weapon state (under the NPT) NORSAR Norwegian Seismic Array NPT Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (opened for signature 1968) NRPA Norwegian Radiation Protection Authority PMDA Plutonium Management Disposition Agreement PPCM Portal Perimeter Continuous Monitoring RD/FRD Restricted Data/Formerly Restricted Data 7 RPIT Random Particulate Identification Technique SDR (UK) Strategic Defence Review SLCM Sea-launched cruise missile SORT Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (signed 2002) START Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (signed 1991) TIEs Tamper Indicating Enclosures