Forms in Plato's Later Dialogues Forms in Plato's Later Dialogues

FORMS IN PLATO'S LATER DIALOGUES FORMS IN PLATO'S LATER DIALOGUES by EDITH WATSON SCHIPPER University 01 Miami Springer-Science+Business Media, B.V. 1965 ISBN 978-94-017-5790-4 ISBN 978-94-017-6209-0 (eBook) DOI 10.1007/978-94-017-6209-0 Copyright 1965 by Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht Originally published by Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, Netherlands in 1965 AH rights reserved, including the right to translate or to reproduce this book or parts thereof in any form CONTENTS Preface VII I. INTRODUCTION: FORMS IN THE EARLIER DIALOGUES I The Unitary Forms 2 Sensed Things and Their Relation to Forms 5 II. THE PROBLEM: FORMS IN THE PARMENIDES II Criticism of the Relation of Forms to Things 12 The Problem 16 III. FORMS IN THE THEAETETUS 20 Perception, Knowledge, and the Forms 21 Error, Logos, and the Forms 25 IV. FORMS IN THE SOPHIST 31 The Interrelated Forms 31 The Interrelated Things 35 False Logos, Doxa, and Phantasia 38 V. FORMS IN THE PHILEBUS 43 The One Form and the Many Things 44 The Mixture 51 VI. FORMS AND ATOMS IN THE TIMAEUS 57 The Changing Things and their Formal Pattern 58 Necessity, Atoms, and the Forms 63 CONCLUSION 71 Bibliography 78 PREFACE This little book is concerned with one problem, that of whether and in what respects Plato continued to hold his earlier theory of forms of the Phaedo and Republic in his later dialogues. The earlier theory is first considered; since those who deny that Plato continued to hold his theory base their contention on an interpretation of it which is inadequate to explain even the arguments of the earlier dialogues. The later dialogues are then examined, in an attempt to show that the earlier theory is continually assumed, in all its essentials; although it is developed and modified to make it more consistent and adequate to ex perience. Special attention is given to Plato's treatment of the problem of the relation of the forms to the perceived things, left unexplained in the earlier dialogues, but clearly recognized and wrestled with in the later ones. This problem is the perennial one of how the objects of intellectual argument and explanation are related to the things of experience. A solution to that problem is brought out in Plato's reconsideration of his theory of forms. Plato's modified view of forms and their relation to experience is fragrnentarily and briefly indicated, often in easily overlooked details, which have been obscured in translation. However, the different dialogues together throw light on each other, and on an underlying metaphysical and epistemological view. That view is assumed to be consistently maintained throughout the later dialogues, when discrepancies have been explained. This assump tion of the consistency of the later dialogues with each other has usually been made by Platonic scholars, and has proved fruitful in expounding Plato's thoughts. Moreover, Plato's view is presupposed to be a significant one, having something to say to philosophers concerned with the same problems, today. As VIII PREFACE Socrates says of Protagoras in the Theaetetus, "it is likely that a wise man is not talking nonsense." In attempting to formulate Plato's view, I rely entirely on the evidence of the dialogues, following them as closely as possible, so that he may speak for himself. Hence, at least initially, the references of Aristotle to the Platonic theory are not considered. Later, in connection with the Philebus and Timaeus, they are taken up and compared with what the dialogues reveal. But, at least, they would seem to constitute no objection to, but rather to reinforce, the view that Plato continued to hold his theory of forms throughout the dialogues. Since F. M. Cornford's commentaries and translations of the Parmenides, Theaetetus, Sophist, and Timaeus are widely known, I have thought it necessary to justify divergencies of my inter pretation from his. However, notwithstanding my frequent exceptions to his commentaries, lowe a great debt to his careful analyses of Plato's often intricate arguments. The bibliography does not pretend to be a complete list of works on Plato's later dialogues. It includes those books and articles which have contributed to the "question and answer" resulting in this little book. Since the bibliography gives the dates and publishers of the books referred to, their titles, only, are designated in the footnotes. Burnet's text, in Platonis Opera, Bibliotheca Oxoniensis, is used. The translations are mine, although I have compared them with the standard translations. I wish to thank my colleagues of the philosophy department of the University of Miami for discussions, especially in the departmental colloquia, of my interpretations of the Platonic theory, as they have developed through the years. I am grateful to my husband, Professor Gerrit Schipper, for reading and criticising parts of the manuscript. I wish to thank the editors of Phronesis for permission to use, in the chapter on the Sophist, some material from my article, The Meaning of Existence in Plato's SOPHIST, which appeared in vol. ix, no. I, 1964. EDITH WATSON SCHIPPER University of Miami Coral Gables, Florida .

Load more