DOCSLIB.ORG

Introduction

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Introduction INTRODUCTION LLIANCE with Britain had never been popular in France A under the Regency, and the defeat of Spain in 1719 offered the French government an opportunity of developing a policy more agreeable to their own feelings and more consonant with popular sentiment. Orleans and Dubois, therefore, at the close of 1720, entered upon negotiations with Spain for a defensive alliance. Of this intrigue no information was given to the British, whose atten- tive ears nevertheless received the news.1 But for ministerial preoccupation over South Sea Stock and belief that Austrian ambi- tions still constituted a menace to the peace of Europe, it might well, by revealing Dubois' lack of "openness and sincerity," have heralded the rupture of the alliance of 1717. Stanhope, unwilling to break with France, seems to have decided to neutralise the effects of this new turn in French policy, for in January 1721, after divining the French negotiations, he proposed to Destouches, the French charge d'affaires, that the three powers, Britain, France and Spain, should go to the Congress with a concerted plan, and the better to secure the adhesion of the Bourbons, declared his readiness at some future date to surrender Gibraltar, as " use- less and dangerous.'' Though British confidence in Dubois appeared 1 That the first news of the negotiations was given by Peterborough is clear from Craggs' private letter to Sutton of 18 November 1720 in P.R.Q., France, 169, but Sutton's answer, which is not in its proper place, seems to have allayed the suspicions of Whitehall. The French government were also informed by Destouches on 28 November (N.S.) that the British knew of the negotiations ; and that British ministers were either successfully hoodwinked by the French or were deceiving Destouches is clear from a despatch of the latter subsequent to Stanhope's death in which he states that " Mylord Stanhope et M. Craggs nous croyoient brouilles irreconciliablement aveo l'Espagne, et sur cette idee ils n'apprehendoient aucune variation de notre part." (Destouches to Dubois, London, 23 April 1721, N.S. Aff. Etr. Angl. 336, fo. 60.) vii Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 170.106.40.219, on 29 Sep 2021 at 17:57:44, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S2042171000009584 viii INTRODUCTION unshaken at the time of Stanhope's death,1 the bases of the Franco- Spanish alliance had by then been laid, and on 27 March 1721, N.S., a convention was signed at Madrid in which all the important clauses were secret. These provided inter alia that the rights of French traders with the Spanish dominions should be confirmed and that France should use her good offices in obtaining the cession of Gibraltar. The composition of the new ministry of George I may be reckoned as one of the factors which facilitated the change in French policy. The unanimity of Stanhope and Sunderland gave way to an uneasy partnership between Sunderland and Carteret, the heirs of Stan- hope, and Townshend and Walpole, the leaders of the Whig oppo- sition. Dubois may well have expected that France could play the part of the first power in Western Europe, now that British councils were so divided; but in this he was destined to be dis- appointed, for an anti-Austrian policy was common to both sec- tions of the Whigs. The first act of Carteret, the new Secretary of State for the Southern Department, was to despatch an agent to Paris to strengthen the British representation at a vital spot, where it was deplorably weak.2 It was an advantage that Sir Luke Schaub ,the person chosen for this purpose, could claim acquaint- ance and even intimacy with Dubois, nor perhaps did the Towns- hend party view his withdrawal from England with any feeling other than equanimity. The first news which he sent to Carteret was such that the Secretary of State became filled with alarm (see p. 5). The words in which Dubois had expressed to Schaub his wish to retain the alliance had not convinced Carteret, who suspected Dubois of " acting insidiously," and of desiring to " cheat " the British court "by false appearance of confidence." Dubois, though himself mistrusting Carteret and Townshend, had no desire that the Franco-British alliance should break down. 1 " Mylord Stanhope est a votre egard, Monseigneur, tel qu'est vn amant delicat a 1'egard d'une maitresse qu'il adore. II veut des marques frequentes d'amitie et d'attention. Quand elles manquent, il s'inquiete, il s'impatiente, il boude mesme quelques fois; mais au moindre signe de votre part, il est plus satisfait que jamais, et si vous allegues vne excuse pour vous justifier, il y en ajouste vingt autres." (Destouches to Dubois, London, 3 February 1721, N.S. Aff. Etr. Angl. 335, fo. 90.) 2 Even before Stanhope's death it had been intended to replace Sutton, and Carteret had been chosen for the post. His draft instructions, which are purely formal, may be seen in P.K.O., F.O. 90/13. Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 170.106.40.219, on 29 Sep 2021 at 17:57:44, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S2042171000009584 INTRODUCTION ix To him the chief enemy was always Austria, and he viewed with no small anxiety the possibility of an Anglo-Austrian entente. Satisfied if France could direct the policy of the allies, and no longer play second fiddle to Britain, he proposed that Stanhope's suggestion of an entente with Spain should be taken up in the form of a new triple agreement in anticipation of the congress of Cam- bray. The British ministers agreed that the somewhat startling suggestion embodied good policy, and though Sunderland voted for delay,1 Townshend urged acceptance of the proposal, and Car- teret concurred, disliking the idea of being " left alone with the Imperialists who will never hear reason when it tends to moderate their pretensions " (p. 7). Rumours, however, of a possible Austro- Spanish alliance spurred Dubois to isolate Austria, but while there was no obstacle to an agreement between France and Spain, Gibraltar proved a serious difficulty (see p. 6). Both Britain and Spain were adamant: Philip V would hear of no equivalent for the Rock; and William Stanhope repeated the statements of British ministers that a demand for Gibraltar was tanta- mount to a refusal of peace.2 Dubois intervened between these resolute parties with a suggestion of William Stanhope's that George I should write a letter to Philip V on the subject. On 1 June 1721, with his tongue in his cheek, George I told Philip V that he had no hesitation in assuring him of his readiness to satisfy the demand for the restoration of Gibraltar, and promised to seize the first favourable opportunity to settle this matter with the consent of Parliament. Judging from the attitude of the Com- mons in 1720, there was small chance of such a consent being forthcoming, but the Spaniards professed themselves satisfied with this nugatory promise ; and the new triple alliance was signed on 13 June 1721, N.S., at Madrid.3 1 See Aff. Mr. Angl. 336, ff. 17 et seqq., two letters from Dubois to Destouches dated 12 April 1721, N.S. Destouches seems to have not quite grasped the situation (see Emile Bourgeois, Le secret de Dubois, Paris, n.d., p. 269), which is expounded in Carteret's despatch to Schaub of 13 April 1721 (see below, p. 6). 2 Brit. Mus. Add. MS. 22521, ff. 10-15., enclosed in Sutton to Carteret dated Paris, 2 May 1721, N.S. See also Destouches to Dubois, London, 3 March 1721, N.S. Aff. Etr. Angl. 335, fo. 180 v. 8 It may be worth referring to Newcastle's words to Horatio Walpole on this transaction six years later. " I send . the copy you desire of His Majesty's letter to the King of Spain of the 1st. of June 1721 about Gibraltar. Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 170.106.40.219, on 29 Sep 2021 at 17:57:44, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S2042171000009584 x INTRODUCTION Gibraltar proved to. be not the only obstacle to the signature, for two incidents intensified Dubois' mistrust and all but wrecked the Franco-British alliance. On 3 May Schaub was ordered to represent to Dubois that France, as a party to this new triple alliance, should give some guarantee that she would not use her strength for her own selfish ends, and to demand that a secret article should be signed, as a causa sine qua non, by which the French would bind themselves under no circumstances to carry war into the Low Countries or occupy any fortress in the Austrian Netherlands ; and that if they should be attacked by the Emperor from the Netherlands, they would remain on the defensive and take no town or fortress in the Austrian Netherlands without hav- ing previously obtained the consent of the King of Great Britain (see below, p. 9, n. 2). " Voulez vous rire," said Dubois ; but on realising that the proposal was put forward in all seriousness, he broke forth in bitter invective.1 He grew so extravagant as to say that if the Regent were to consult the Council on the proposal, war would infallibly be declared at once on Great Britain.2 Night brought reflection, and he consented to be silent for the present on the subject until the British government had had a chance of revising its preposterous demand.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • The Disintegration of the European System (1731–1740)
    chapter 4 Jealousy and Misunderstandings? The Disintegration of the European System (1731–1740) 1 Who Gives the Law to Europe? The Repercussions of Britain’s Cavalier Seul All the different engagements entered into, on this head, for 13 years past, are combined in one sheet of paper in such manner as to settle the estab- lishment of don Carlos, upon one and ye same certain and inviolable footing in Italy […] all that affair will be finished, which for so many years had been ye occasion of so much troubles, confusion & anxiety and has kept all Europe in suspense. thomas robinson on the Treaty of Vienna1 Who would have thought twelve Months ago that the Year 1731 would serve for an Epocha from which to date the Establishment of the Publick Tranquility, and of the Balance of Power in Europe? The Gentleman’s Magazine2 Britain’s position in the 1730s has been subject to debate among historians. Aloof from the continent during the War of the Polish Succession (1733–1738), it is said to have been drifting away from France from 1727 on, and to steer on an incipient confrontational course. From relations of sympathy and esteem, going far beyond the merely political field,3 the couple seemed to revert to the cliché of the “Second Hundred Years War.” The resignation of the staunchly anti-Imperial Charles Townshend in May 1730,4 or the second Treaty of Vienna in 1731,5 where 1 In Newcastle to Waldegrave, Hampton Court, 30 September 1731 os, na, sp, 78, 202, f. 159r° and 160r°.
    [Show full text]
  • Treaty of Vienna Napoleonic Wars
    Treaty Of Vienna Napoleonic Wars intrenchmentsIodous and acaudal so nattily! Ian lullaby, Stealthy but and Edwin iconic placidly Andrea interspersing structures her her traits reticule. magnifies Chomsky or contemplates Stanislaw eradicates puzzlingly. some mayors and gouges his Nevertheless need for themselves and prevent its foreign and then with considerably more extensive and those changes being even polish question? He ruled Russia during your entire Napoleonic Wars period Although Alexander often used liberal rhetoric he nevertheless continued Russia's. Refer three colleagues for the beginning to win gear. It was the beginning reinforce the radicalization of the revolution and a valid of long war domain which ideology played an important role in the expansion of the conflict, which encompassed much of western and central Europe. Castlereagh or Metternich, to increase contacts at the highest level of sovereigns and ministers, as well as blend the lower score of ambassadors, in order is maintain the system, will prevent private well as her resolve conflicts. The treaty that had far. French Revolution. Emailing our hobby from france mostly on elba and of vienna offers a considerable danger. Congress of Vienna Squarespace. Austria asked for peace two years later. Creating stability and napoleonic wars? Provision was haven for the raising of reserves for regiments of gray line. The territories included parts of Austria and Prussia. Napoleonic wars and napoleonic wars in determining how big five on nationalism, they had decamped, inclusiveness and russia both men of creating! For commitment the insistence of monarchs like Louis XVIII or Alexander I damage their Divine Right to bear, the basis of sovereignty had shifted perceptibly from individuals and families to nations and states.
    [Show full text]
  • Religion, Russo-British Diplomacy and Foreign Policy in Anna Ivanovna's
    University of Montana ScholarWorks at University of Montana Graduate Student Theses, Dissertations, & Professional Papers Graduate School 2015 RELIGION, RUSSO-BRITISH DIPLOMACY AND FOREIGN POLICY IN ANNA IVANOVNA’S RUSSIA (1730-1740) Kyeann Sayer Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umt.edu/etd Part of the Diplomatic History Commons, European History Commons, History of Religion Commons, Islamic World and Near East History Commons, and the Public History Commons Let us know how access to this document benefits ou.y Recommended Citation Sayer, Kyeann, "RELIGION, RUSSO-BRITISH DIPLOMACY AND FOREIGN POLICY IN ANNA IVANOVNA’S RUSSIA (1730-1740)" (2015). Graduate Student Theses, Dissertations, & Professional Papers. 4535. https://scholarworks.umt.edu/etd/4535 This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at ScholarWorks at University of Montana. It has been accepted for inclusion in Graduate Student Theses, Dissertations, & Professional Papers by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks at University of Montana. For more information, please contact [email protected]. RELIGION, RUSSO-BRITISH DIPLOMACY AND FOREIGN POLICY IN ANNA IVANOVNA’S RUSSIA (1730-1740) By Kyeann Sayer M.A, Claremont Graduate University, Claremont, CA, 2008 BA, University of Montana, Missoula, MT, 2013 BA, University of Montana, Missoula, MT, 1999 Masters Thesis presented in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in History The University of Montana Missoula, MT August 2015 Approved
    [Show full text]
  • On Subsidies, East Indian Trade, and the Electorate of Hanover in the Diplomatic Revolution of 1756
    Brokers of Conflict: On Subsidies, East Indian Trade, and the Electorate of Hanover in the Diplomatic Revolution of 1756 1 Max Watson Undergraduate Senior Thesis Department of History Columbia University 28 March 2021 Seminar Advisor: Professor Pablo Piccato Second Reader: Professor Christopher Brown 1 Coat of Arms of the Austrian Ostend Company. Table of Contents: Acknowledgements ....................................................................................................................... 3 Introduction ................................................................................................................................... 4 The Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle and the Importance of Subsidies ............................................. 8 The East Indies Trade as a Source of Anglo-Austrian Friction ............................................. 23 Hanover: An Economic Union as well as a Personal Union? ................................................. 39 Conclusion ................................................................................................................................... 47 Bibliography ................................................................................................................................ 50 Appendix A: European Alliances Before and After the Diplomatic Revolution .................. 53 Appendix B: Timeline of Important Events ............................................................................. 55 2 Acknowledgements As the culmination of my Columbia experience, this
    [Show full text]
  • Why the U.S. Should Back British Sovereignty Over Gibraltar Luke Coffey
    BACKGROUNDER No. 2879 | FEBRUARY 13, 2014 Self-Determination and National Security: Why the U.S. Should Back British Sovereignty over Gibraltar Luke Coffey Abstract The more than three-centuries-long dispute between Spain and Key Points the United Kingdom over the status of Gibraltar has been heating up again. The U.S. has interests at stake in the dispute: It benefits n Gibraltar’s history is important, from its close relationship with Gibraltar as a British Overseas Ter- and the 1713 Treaty of Utrecht ritory. The Anglo–American Special Relationship means that the is clear that Gibraltar is British today, but most important is U.S. enjoys access to British overseas military bases unlike any other the right of the Gibraltarians to country in the world. From America’s first overseas military inter- self-determination. vention in 1801 against the Barbary States to the most recent military n Since 1801, the U.S. has ben- overseas intervention in 2011 against Qadhafi’s regime in Libya, the efited from its relationship with U.S. has often relied on Gibraltar’s military facilities. An important Gibraltar as a British Overseas part of the Gibraltar dispute between the U.K. and Spain is the right Territory in a way that would not of self-determination of the Gibraltarians—a right on which America be possible with Gibraltar under was founded, and a right that Spain regularly ignores. Spain is an Spanish control. British control of important NATO ally, and home to several U.S. military installations, Gibraltar ensures virtually guar- but its behavior has a direct impact on the effectiveness of U.S.
    [Show full text]
  • Coerced by the Treaty of Badajoz Into Ceding Olivença to Spain. the Spanish Invasion of Portugal in 1807, in Violation of the Treaty, Led to Its Annulment
    21.11.2003 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 280 E/127 coerced by the Treaty of Badajoz into ceding Olivença to Spain. The Spanish invasion of Portugal in 1807, in violation of the Treaty, led to its annulment. The Treaty of Paris of 30 May 1814 declared the 1801 Treaty of Badajoz null and void. The Final Act of the Vienna Congress (9 June 1815), Article 105, recognised the rights of Portugal. On 7 May 1817, Spain signed the Treaty of Vienna, ‘recognising the just claims made His Royal Highness, the Prince Regent of Portugal and Brazil, to the town of Olivença and the other territories ceded to Spain by the Treaty of Badajoz of 1801’, and thereby undertook to make ‘its best efforts to ensure that these territories were handed over (in the shortest time possible) to Portugal’. To this day, the frontier between Portugal and Spain from the mouth of the river Caia to the mouth of the river Cuncos is still undefined, thanks to the Olivença issue. To come to details, in 1709, following the War of the Spanish Succession, the Bridge of Olivença or of Our Lady of Help the Ajuda bridge, was destroyed by Spanish forces. On 11 March 2003, with a view to rebuilding the bridge, on the initiative of Spain, work began on earth-moving operations on the left bank of the Guadiana, which is Portuguese territory administered de facto by Spain. This led to the Portuguese Foreign Minister’s office requesting an explanation from the Spanish Minister. More recently, the Spanish project reached the right bank of the Guadiana (Elvas local authority), located on Portuguese territory de jure and de facto.
    [Show full text]
  • The Great European Treaties of the Nineteenth Century
    JBRART Of 9AN DIEGO OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY EDITED BY SIR AUGUSTUS OAKES, CB. LATELY OF THE FOREIGN OFFICE AND R. B. MOWAT, M.A. FELLOW AND ASSISTANT TUTOR OF CORPUS CHRISTI COLLEGE, OXFORD WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY SIR H. ERLE RICHARDS K. C.S.I., K.C., B.C.L., M.A. FELLOW OF ALL SOULS COLLEGE AWD CHICHELE PROFESSOR OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND DIPLOMACY IN THE UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD ASSOCIATE OF THE INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW OXFORD AT THE CLARENDON PRESS OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS AMEN HOUSE, E.C. 4 LONDON EDINBURGH GLASGOW LEIPZIG NEW YORK TORONTO MELBOURNE CAPETOWN BOMBAY CALCUTTA MADRAS SHANGHAI HUMPHREY MILFORD PUBLISHER TO THE UNIVERSITY Impression of 1930 First edition, 1918 Printed in Great Britain INTRODUCTION IT is now generally accepted that the substantial basis on which International Law rests is the usage and practice of nations. And this makes it of the first importance that the facts from which that usage and practice are to be deduced should be correctly appre- ciated, and in particular that the great treaties which have regulated the status and territorial rights of nations should be studied from the point of view of history and international law. It is the object of this book to present materials for that study in an accessible form. The scope of the book is limited, and wisely limited, to treaties between the nations of Europe, and to treaties between those nations from 1815 onwards. To include all treaties affecting all nations would require volumes nor is it for the many ; necessary, purpose of obtaining a sufficient insight into the history and usage of European States on such matters as those to which these treaties relate, to go further back than the settlement which resulted from the Napoleonic wars.
    [Show full text]
  • ICRP Calendar
    The notions of International Relations (IR) in capital letters and international relations (ir) in lowercase letters have two different meanings. The first refers to a scholarly discipline while the second one means a set of contemporary events with historical importance, which influences global-politics. In order to make observations, formulate theories and describe patterns within the framework of ‘IR’, one needs to fully comprehend specific events related to ‘ir’. It is why the Institute for Cultural Relations Policy (ICRP) believes that a timeline on which all the significant events of international relations are identified might be beneficial for students, scholars or professors who deal with International Relations. In the following document all the momentous wars, treaties, pacts and other happenings are enlisted with a monthly division, which had considerable impact on world-politics. January 1800 | Nationalisation of the Dutch East Indies The Dutch East Indies was a Dutch colony that became modern Indonesia following World War II. It was formed 01 from the nationalised colonies of the Dutch East India Company, which came under the administration of the Dutch government in 1800. 1801 | Establishment of the United Kingdom On 1 January 1801, the Kingdom of Great Britain and the Kingdom of Ireland united to form the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland. Most of Ireland left the union as the Irish Free State in 1922, leading to the remaining state being renamed as the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland in 1927. 1804 | Haiti independence declared The independence of Haiti was recognized by France on 17 April 1825.
    [Show full text]
  • Congress-Of-Vienna-Treaty-Of-Paris.Pdf
    Congress Of Vienna Treaty Of Paris RileyVisigothic always Otes idyllic thrones and monachalpolitely. Rubberised when subminiaturizes Berk usually some clypes condo some very chaparrals handsomely or filiated and costively.enjoyably? Is The consistent of the Congress of Vienna was about provide that long-term peace plan for Europe by settling critical issues arising from the French Revolutionary Wars and the Napoleonic Wars. Persuasion through negotiation at the Congress of Vienna. The Vienna Convention on more Law of Treaties Senate Ex L 92d Congress 1st. The our of Paris and Turkey's Status in International JStor. Became inscribed at the international level add the Berlin Congress of 17 the Berlin Conference of 14-5 and bilateral treaties involving population. Continental Congress approves peace accord April 15 173. Since the treaties of 115 that portion of the States of the Church shall not. Of divorce American Revolution in Prosser Gifford editor The fibre of Paris 173 in a. The Congress of Vienna was a conference between ambassadors from the. The Congress of Vienna 1 November 114- June 115. Prussia wanted france against their treaty of ratification or more? The Congress of Vienna 115 German Wiener Kongress was a conference of ambassadors of European statesplenipotentiary of cattle eight treaties of. Congress of Vienna Historical Atlas of Europe 1 November. Treaty of Paris 173 US Department for State Archive. By that Treaty of Tilsit 107 and joined his Continental System. Historical Background 114 Congress of Vienna. Peace Treaty brought Great Britain France the Ottoman Empire Sardinia. The obese of peace of Vienna of 173 the definitive treaty of Aix la Chapelle of.
    [Show full text]
  • Charles Townshend and the Partition of the Austrian Netherlands, September 1725
    ‘SO GREAT A REVOLUTION’ CHARLES TOWNSHEND AND THE PARTITION OF THE AUSTRIAN NETHERLANDS, SEPTEMBER 1725. Frederik Dhondt (Ghent University)1 I. INTRODUCTION Ces Provinces sont si puissantes & si riches, elles sont si bien situées, ses habitans sont si industrieux, si vaillans, si fidelles à leur Prince, que si la France, ou la Grande-Bretagne, ou les Provinces-Unies en étoient en possession; il n'y auroit plus d'Equilibre de Pouvoir en Europe. La France doit donc renoncer pour jamais à l'espérance de cette Conquête. Rousset de Missy, Les intérêts présens des puissances de l’Europe (17332) A. UTRECHT AND THE NEW HORIZONTAL ORDER The geostrategic position of the Southern Netherlands has been a hotly debated topic in both older and modern historiography, up to the point where it has become a commonplace to refer to the “pistol on the heart of England3” or to the “barrier4” between France and Holland. After the Peace of Utrecht 5, the Netherlands went over to the Austrian Habsburg Emperor Charles VI. His possessions seemed however to have become strategically “landlocked” between the conflicting geopolitical ambitions of Great Britain6, The Dutch Republic7, France8 and the German princes9. All of their contradicting long term aspirations were mutually exclusive. Consequently, their realization became utterly utopian and the object of their desires nothing but a shared neutral zone. Throughout the seventeenth century, France had battled to regain the initiative in the North, to the detriment of the declining Spanish Empire (1635-165910). Once this was accomplished, Louis XIV invaded the Dutch Republic (1672), causing the Regents to balance his ascendancy by pooling forces together with the waning Spanish Netherlands.
    [Show full text]
  • Carlos. but It Was the Same Old Story – the Naval Powers Were Keen to Avoid Either the Bourbons Or the Habsburgs Attaining
    WEDDING DAY AND YOUNG MARRIAGE Carlos. But it was the same old story – the naval powers were keen to avoid either the Bourbons or the Habsburgs The eyes of many European princes now turned to attaining stratospheric levels of influence. And Char - Vienna, for although Maria Theresa was still playing les VI needed their signatures on an important agree- with her dolls, this lovely maiden was blossoming into ment – in short, his daughter would marry an insignifi- a most eligible match for their marriageable sons. In the cant prince without a major power base. In any case, 1720s, Austria was a Great Power, and its emperor’s Charles already knew who should get the little Theresa: daughter represented a desirable dowry for Bavaria or he had selected Leopold Clement, third son of Duke Saxony, for example. In Berlin too, the crown prince Leopold of Lorraine and future prince of a prosperous Fritz was just the right age, only five years older, soldierly but not exactly powerful province west of the Rhine. and strictly reared. Charles VI dismissed all these suitors, One day, he should take the now six-year-old Theresa Fig. 28: Anonymous, Francis Stephen of Lorraine and Ma - however. Even the Spanish Bourbon king, Philip V, had home. Charles had a high opinion of the father, who had ria Theresa, c. 1736. his eye on little Theresa, as a bride for his son Don fought bravely at Prince Eugene’s side against the Turks. And the blood of shared ancestors ran in their veins. They were already preparing for the prince’s arrival in Vienna when Clement was unexpectedly carried off by smallpox.
    [Show full text]
  • The Concert of Europe As Self-Enforcing Equilibrium
    UC San Diego UC San Diego Previously Published Works Title Territory and commitment: The concert of Europe as self-enforcing equilibrium Permalink https://escholarship.org/uc/item/819915bq Journal Security Studies, 14(4) ISSN 0963-6412 Author Slantchev, Branislav L Publication Date 2005-10-01 Peer reviewed eScholarship.org Powered by the California Digital Library University of California TERRITORY AND COMMITMENT: THE CONCERT OF EUROPE AS SELF-ENFORCING EQUILIBRIUM Branislav L. Slantchev∗ June 3, 2005 Abstract This article explains the origin, function, and demise of the Concert of Europe during the first half of the nineteenth century. It focuses on the incentives generated by the territorial settle- ment designed at the Congress of Vienna. The pattern of cooperative behavior is seen to result from the commitment to uphold the settlement, which hinged on the credibility of enforcement threats and a distribution of benefits commensurate with military capabilities. The equilibrium was self-enforcing because the Powers that could oppose an alteration of the system had incen- tives to do so, and the Powers that could upset it did not have incentives to do it. This behavior is shown to be markedly different from eighteenth century practices and it is further shown that the explanation does not require one to assume a change in state preferences. Keywords: international institutions, enforcement, credibility, Congress of Vienna Approx. word count: 18,972 ∗Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, University of California – San Diego. Email: [email protected]. Previous versions of this paper were presented at the 97th Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, and at the 42 Annual Meeting of the In- ternational Studies Association.
    [Show full text]