Introduction

INTRODUCTION LLIANCE with Britain had never been popular in France A under the Regency, and the defeat of Spain in 1719 offered the French government an opportunity of developing a policy more agreeable to their own feelings and more consonant with popular sentiment. Orleans and Dubois, therefore, at the close of 1720, entered upon negotiations with Spain for a defensive alliance. Of this intrigue no information was given to the British, whose atten- tive ears nevertheless received the news.1 But for ministerial preoccupation over South Sea Stock and belief that Austrian ambi- tions still constituted a menace to the peace of Europe, it might well, by revealing Dubois' lack of "openness and sincerity," have heralded the rupture of the alliance of 1717. Stanhope, unwilling to break with France, seems to have decided to neutralise the effects of this new turn in French policy, for in January 1721, after divining the French negotiations, he proposed to Destouches, the French charge d'affaires, that the three powers, Britain, France and Spain, should go to the Congress with a concerted plan, and the better to secure the adhesion of the Bourbons, declared his readiness at some future date to surrender Gibraltar, as " use- less and dangerous.'' Though British confidence in Dubois appeared 1 That the first news of the negotiations was given by Peterborough is clear from Craggs' private letter to Sutton of 18 November 1720 in P.R.Q., France, 169, but Sutton's answer, which is not in its proper place, seems to have allayed the suspicions of Whitehall. The French government were also informed by Destouches on 28 November (N.S.) that the British knew of the negotiations ; and that British ministers were either successfully hoodwinked by the French or were deceiving Destouches is clear from a despatch of the latter subsequent to Stanhope's death in which he states that " Mylord Stanhope et M. Craggs nous croyoient brouilles irreconciliablement aveo l'Espagne, et sur cette idee ils n'apprehendoient aucune variation de notre part." (Destouches to Dubois, London, 23 April 1721, N.S. Aff. Etr. Angl. 336, fo. 60.) vii

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 170.106.40.219, on 29 Sep 2021 at 17:57:44, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S2042171000009584 viii INTRODUCTION unshaken at the time of Stanhope's death,1 the bases of the Franco- Spanish alliance had by then been laid, and on 27 March 1721, N.S., a convention was signed at Madrid in which all the important clauses were secret. These provided inter alia that the rights of French traders with the Spanish dominions should be confirmed and that France should use her good offices in obtaining the cession of Gibraltar. The composition of the new ministry of George I may be reckoned as one of the factors which facilitated the change in French policy. The unanimity of Stanhope and Sunderland gave way to an uneasy partnership between Sunderland and Carteret, the heirs of Stan- hope, and Townshend and Walpole, the leaders of the Whig opposition. Dubois may well have expected that France could play the part of the first power in Western Europe, now that British councils were so divided; but in this he was destined to be dis- appointed, for an anti-Austrian policy was common to both sec- tions of the Whigs. The first act of Carteret, the new Secretary of State for the Southern Department, was to despatch an agent to Paris to strengthen the British representation at a vital spot, where it was deplorably weak.2 It was an advantage that Sir Luke Schaub ,the person chosen for this purpose, could claim acquaint- ance and even intimacy with Dubois, nor perhaps did the Towns- hend party view his withdrawal from England with any feeling other than equanimity. The first news which he sent to Carteret was such that the Secretary of State became filled with alarm (see p. 5). The words in which Dubois had expressed to Schaub his wish to retain the alliance had not convinced Carteret, who suspected Dubois of " acting insidiously," and of desiring to " cheat " the British court "by false appearance of confidence." Dubois, though himself mistrusting Carteret and Townshend, had no desire that the Franco-British alliance should break down. 1 " Mylord Stanhope est a votre egard, Monseigneur, tel qu'est vn amant delicat a 1'egard d'une maitresse qu'il adore. II veut des marques frequentes d'amitie et d'attention. Quand elles manquent, il s'inquiete, il s'impatiente, il boude mesme quelques fois; mais au moindre signe de votre part, il est plus satisfait que jamais, et si vous allegues vne excuse pour vous justifier, il y en ajouste vingt autres." (Destouches to Dubois, London, 3 February 1721, N.S. Aff. Etr. Angl. 335, fo. 90.) 2 Even before Stanhope's death it had been intended to replace Sutton, and Carteret had been chosen for the post. His draft instructions, which are purely formal, may be seen in P.K.O., F.O. 90/13.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 170.106.40.219, on 29 Sep 2021 at 17:57:44, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S2042171000009584 INTRODUCTION ix To him the chief enemy was always Austria, and he viewed with no small anxiety the possibility of an Anglo-Austrian entente. Satisfied if France could direct the policy of the allies, and no longer play second fiddle to Britain, he proposed that Stanhope's suggestion of an entente with Spain should be taken up in the form of a new triple agreement in anticipation of the congress of Cam- bray. The British ministers agreed that the somewhat startling suggestion embodied good policy, and though Sunderland voted for delay,1 Townshend urged acceptance of the proposal, and Car- teret concurred, disliking the idea of being " left alone with the Imperialists who will never hear reason when it tends to moderate their pretensions " (p. 7). Rumours, however, of a possible Austro- Spanish alliance spurred Dubois to isolate Austria, but while there was no obstacle to an agreement between France and Spain, Gibraltar proved a serious difficulty (see p. 6). Both Britain and Spain were adamant: Philip V would hear of no equivalent for the Rock; and William Stanhope repeated the statements of British ministers that a demand for Gibraltar was tanta- mount to a refusal of peace.2 Dubois intervened between these resolute parties with a suggestion of William Stanhope's that George I should write a letter to Philip V on the subject. On 1 June 1721, with his tongue in his cheek, George I told Philip V that he had no hesitation in assuring him of his readiness to satisfy the demand for the restoration of Gibraltar, and promised to seize the first favourable opportunity to settle this matter with the consent of Parliament. Judging from the attitude of the Com- mons in 1720, there was small chance of such a consent being forthcoming, but the Spaniards professed themselves satisfied with this nugatory promise ; and the new triple alliance was signed on 13 June 1721, N.S., at Madrid.3

1 See Aff. Mr. Angl. 336, ff. 17 et seqq., two letters from Dubois to Destouches dated 12 April 1721, N.S. Destouches seems to have not quite grasped the situation (see Emile Bourgeois, Le secret de Dubois, Paris, n.d., p. 269), which is expounded in Carteret's despatch to Schaub of 13 April 1721 (see below, p. 6). 2 Brit. Mus. Add. MS. 22521, ff. 10-15., enclosed in Sutton to Carteret dated Paris, 2 May 1721, N.S. See also Destouches to Dubois, London, 3 March 1721, N.S. Aff. Etr. Angl. 335, fo. 180 v. 8 It may be worth referring to Newcastle's words to Horatio Walpole on this transaction six years later. " I send . . . the copy you desire of His Majesty's letter to the King of Spain of the 1st. of June 1721 about Gibraltar.

You know so well the history of that letter that all I shall trouble you with concerning it is to observe that it was then universally lookt upon as a civil refusal, the condition of obtaining the consent of Parliament being what was hardly to be expected." (Newcastle to Walpole, Whitehall, 6 March 1726/7. Brit. Mus. Add. MS. 32749, fo. 266 v.) The Spaniards can scarcely have been under any illusions. W. Stanhope, besides u3ing the language above reported, told Maulevrier and Grimaldo that the restoration of the place was impossible (Maulevrier to Dubois, Madrid, 7 April 1721, N.S. Aff. Etr. Espagne 301, fo. 128 v.,andibid. 310, fo. Ill, memorandum by Grimaldo) ; but it may be that the suggestion he threw out deceived them at the moment: " on ne pouvoit rien proposer a present pour le [Parliament] ramener et le faire consentir a cette restitution, mais quand il seroit dissous, on prendroit des mesures pour satisfaire a Sa Majeste Catholique (Maulevrier to Dubois ut sup., ibid. 301, fo. 130). 1 Schaub to Carteret, Paris, 21 May 1721, N.S., Brit. Mus. Add. MS. 22521, fo. 89 et seqq. a " S'il en consultoit le conseil de Regence, l'on resoudroit infailliblemenfc de vous declarer la guerre sur le champ " (ibid. fo. 93 v.).

1 According to Destouches, Sunderiand and Carteret put the whole blame of this unfortunate proposal on Townshend and said that they had foreseen the consequences of advancing it. (Destouches to Dubois, London, 12 June 1721, N.S., Aff. Etr. Angl. 336, fo. 244.) For an estimate of the value of the treaty of Madrid to France see Bourgeois, Le secret de Dubois, pp. 262—90, traversing the opinion expressed in Baudrillart, Philippe V etla cour de France, Vol. II, p. 463. Dom Henri Leclercq, Histoire de la Rigence, Vol. III. cap. xlix., follows M. Bourgeios. 2 Destouches to Dubois, London, 21 May 1721, N.S. Aff. Etr. Angl. 336, fo. 176. 3 Dubois to Destouches, 25 May 1721, N.S., ibid. ff. 181 and 187. 4 Destouches to Dubois, London, 29 May 1721, N.S., ibid. fo. 213.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 170.106.40.219, on 29 Sep 2021 at 17:57:44, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S2042171000009584 xii INTRODUCTION p. 10). All through the summer George was urging that Campredon should be sent to Russia " to negotiate the great alliance between France, Great Britain, Muscovy and Prussia " 1; but on learning the final terms of the treaty of Nystadt, his disappointment and anger were bitter (see p. 24). Peter had indeed included him in the treaty, but in terms so " loose and equivocal " as to be of no value whatever. All efforts to induce the Regent to secure a modification were vain: Peter and George were in the position of the elephant and the whale, and Orleans, who saw perhaps without great grief the rebuff administered to the would-be dic- tator of the north, was at the moment more interested in the affairs of the south, where a flash of mistrust between France and Great Britain was generated by the announcement of the Spanish marriages. That some intrigue was on foot the British ministers were convinced from the long Franco-Spanish conversations at Madrid,2 and believing that they concerned Gibraltar (see p. 19), they were taken aback at the proposed marriages of Louis XV and the Prince of Asturias. Willing though they were to welcome them if they were the work of the Regent and the Cardinal (see p. 20), they made exceedingly cautious comments, until Schaub's assurances removed their apprehensions and unlocked their tongues in congratulations. To the Emperor the treaty of Madrid and the marriages had been serious disappointments. Till now he had opposed every possible obstacle to a settlement with Spain. He had refused to accept any document in which Philip was denominated as Arch- duke of Austria and Count of Hapsburg; he even saw nothing absurd in claiming for himself the title of Catholic King and, supreme insult, creating at Vienna a number of grandees of Spain (see p. 21). But now, unable to divine the provisions of the secret articles of the treaty of Madrid, he began to clamour for the open- ing of the congress of Cambray, and in December he launched what was virtually an ultimatum, threatening withdrawal.3 The congress accordingly opened in February 1722, and under the joint mediation of Great Britain and France, began to discuss the petty

1 Destouche3 to Dubois, London, 11 August 1721, N.S. "See Carteret to W. Stanhope, 6 August 1721, B.M. Add. MS. 22515, fo. 235. "Destouches to Dubois, 29 December 1721, N.S., Aff. Etr. Angl. 337, fo. 248.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 170.106.40.219, on 29 Sep 2021 at 17:57:44, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S2042171000009584 INTRODUCTION xiii problems of the titles, the Catalans, Castro and Ronciglione, and the precise conditions under which Don Carlos was to receive the investitures of Tuscany and Siena. Beyond the congress, the year 1722 proved to be singularly unproductive of great events in the diplomatic world. A Spanish armament at Cadiz early in the year caused anxiety among the statesmen who remembered the escapades of 1717 and 1718 and led Carteret to urge that France and Britain, as joint mediators at the congress, should act in a similar capacity in preventing a rupture between the Emperor and the King of Spain (see p. 27). Franco-British relations are mainly concerned with the domestic affairs of Britain, in which Destouches opined that the Hanoverian government was on the verge of collapse, and galled Carteret not a little by his reports to this effect. Dubois, however, considered the government worth saving, and in the middle of April he put into Schaub's hands information that a Jacobite attack was to be made when the King left for Hanover. He showed that he believed the matter to be serious by saying that the government should be warned by express ; but he made the request that the British government should never reveal the identity of their informant.1 Schaub acted at once ; on 19/30 April he sent his servant with the news. The man made an extra- ordinarily quick passage, and handed the despatch to Carteret on the 21st. Two days later a committee of the Council met at Devonshire House ; the Guards were ordered to go into camp, and other regiments were brought into the neighbourhood of London ; while, in accordance with the information sent by Dubois, orders were given to search all the French and Flanders mails. The sequel was the sending of Colonel Churchill to Paris " to get intelligence " and the postponement of the enterprise by the Jacobites within three weeks of the order to encamp the Guards. A mass of information, not entirely consistent, fell into the government's hands, and it is curious to observe that not the least valu- able part of it was passed by two princes of the Holy Roman Church, lately rivals on the European stage, but now united in

1 At the meeting of Parliament in the autumn, the British made a request that the King's speech might reveal the fact that their source of information was France. Schaub, apparently without even consulting Dubois, said the request was hopeless (P.R.O., France, 177, fo. 275 v.). It may be observed that in June, Pentenriedter knew the essential parts of the story (Destouches to Dubois, London, 4 June 1721, N.S., Ajf. Etr. Angl. 341, fo. 113 v.).

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 170.106.40.219, on 29 Sep 2021 at 17:57:44, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S2042171000009584 xiv INTRODUCTION thwarting the desires of the Catholic claimant and of the Sacred College, Cardinal Alberoni and Cardinal Dubois.1 In the north, however, trouble was always brewing, and here Orleans seems sincerely to have wished to bring about a reconciliation between George and Peter; but his efforts in 1723 were not to make for harmony between the two courts, for George at the end of 1722 had been angling once more for an alliance of all the northern powers to the exclusion of Russia. It was known in December 1722 that Dubois was not likely to find such a proposi- tion to his taste (see p. 32), and the visit of Prince Kurakin to Paris gave Carteret an opportunity to state what was the British attitude on northern affairs. The fundamental points were that George I must be a party to any general treaty for the peace of the north (see pp. 33-6); that France must not attempt to use her influence in Russia without consulting Britain ; and that the treaty to be made must contain a general guarantee of all the treaties of peace made with Sweden since the death of Charles XII. Peter, however, showed himself in no hurry to be reconciled ; and an armament, fitted out with the intention, as was supposed, of dethroning the King and Queen of Sweden in favour of the Duke of Holstein, seemed to the British ministers all the more formidable in view of the Czar's express reluctance to include George I in the proposed treaty. It was unfortunate, too, from the point of view of a good accord between the two crowns, that the French minister Campredon, of whose honesty and ability Carteret had formed a high opinion (see p. 6), was laying himself open to the criticism that, although the instructions sent by Dubois had been perfectly clear, consistent, and agreeable to Great Britain, he had not carried them out with firmness and zeal, and consequently the negotiation had been spun out to an unnecessary length (see p. 43). And whereas the Cardinal had been strongly of opinion that a separate Franco-Muscovite treaty was not in the interests of France,2 Orleans committed himself to the policy of making peace in the north by means of a Franco-Russian alliance to which George I

1For all this see the papers in P.R.O., 8.P. Dom. Oeorge I, 31, 38, and 71 and B.M. Stowe MS. 250. The aftermath of this plot was the bill for special taxation of Roman Catholics, which became law after long debates in 1723. This bill was perhaps the most serious subject of difference between the two courts during the end of 1722 and the summer of the following year. a See Chavigny'sinstructions dated 4 August 1723, N.S.in Aff. Etr. Angl. 345.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 170.106.40.219, on 29 Sep 2021 at 17:57:44, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S2042171000009584 INTRODUCTION xv was to be admitted afterwards if he would not come in at the time.1 The comments of the British government were such as- might have been expected. When confronted with this proposal for a northern alliance, they said that, if the alliance were satisfactory to George I, they would raise no objection (see p. 43), They were convinced there was no urgent need for an agreement, as the idea of an alliance between the Czar and the Emperor was- a chimera.2 But Chavigny was constantly trying to persuade ministers to allow Orleans an entirely free hand in these northern negotiations,3 and all this looked very black against Orleans, though Carteret chose to put the blame on Morville, the new French- foreign minister, or on Chavigny, whom he compared to Destouches, recalled earlier in the year because of his gloomy despatches on the prospects of the British government. So, if Orleans persisted in his scheme, a rod must be put in pickle for him, and the affairs of the north provided a good opportunity for this. In October a treaty had been concluded at Charlottenburg 4 whereby the King of Prussia by one of his usual political somersaults had reconciled himself with his father-in-law and put 10,000 men at his disposal for the affairs of Germany. In return George promised support to the Prussian claims on Neufchatel, Jiilich and Berg. The treaty was looked upon by the British ministers with great satisfaction, and it was anticipated that the news would bring the Duke to a more accommodating frame of mind and cool his passion for an alliance with the Czar (see p. 45). The effect was electrical; Orleans ate all his words to Chavigny,5 and at the moment when his sudden death fluttered the diplomatic dovecotes in December 1723, the project of a separate alliance with Russia appears to have been shelved, and the British and French courts had once more drawn together. But no understanding was effected between

1 Louis XV to Chavigny, 7 September 1723, N.S. {Aff. Etr. Angl. 345, fo. 334 v. " Votre objet principal qui consiste a gagner sur l'esprit de ce prince qu'il me voye tranquillement signer vn pareil traite, si de mon cost6 je n& puis gagner sur le Czar que le Roy dela Grande Bretagne y intervienne pre- sentement.") 2 Carteret to Schaub, London, 18 April 1723. (B.M. Add. MS. 22519, fo. 41). 'See Carteret to Schaub, Hanover, 19 September 1723, N.S. Secret. (B.M. Add. MS. 22519, fo. 109). « 10 October 1723. 6 See especially Aff. Etr. Angl. 345, fo. 334 v. ; 346, ff. 69 v. and 282. The last especially shows Chavigny's bewilderment at so many contradictory orders. b Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 170.106.40.219, on 29 Sep 2021 at 17:57:44, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S2042171000009584 xvi INTRODUCTION George and Peter, for although Sweden proposed joining the alliance which suggested a guarantee of security against Peter's wiles, it soon appeared that Sweden wished to act as mediator, a duty which in her weak state it was impossible to ascribe to her, and the reconciliation of the rival monarchs seemed as distant as ever. We must now revert for a moment to the death of Dubois, which affected Franco-British relations by cutting away the chief support of Schaub, whose intimacy with Dubois had been the main justification for keeping at Paris a somewhat wayward representative. Carteret warned Schaub of the danger of losing the King's favour,1 but there is no evidence that he realised the peril that arose from the return of Noce, a boon companion of the Regent's, full of spleen and venom against Schaub, to whose influence he attributed the exile decreed against him by Dubois. Rumours of this disposition of Noce, who was alleged to be specially intrusted with English affairs, reached Hanover, and, assuredly not without suggestion from Townshend, George I " turned his thoughts " on Horatio Walpole for a mission to Paris to discover how matters stood with the French government. He was to give no suspicion that he had been sent by the King ; he was to dissemble the object •of his mission from Schaub, but otherwise be frank with him"; he was only to see Orleans if he should be sent for; but he was to see as many of the ministers as possible and enlarge on the King's desire for a continuance of the entente.* This strict incog- nito (if such it can be called) was eventually not insisted on, for Walpole received credentials, which he duly presented. Considering the quality of his services, Horatio Walpole was the most eminent of the line of ambassadors accredited from this country to the French Court since 1689. No other ambassador could bring so sagacious a judgement to bear upon the problem •of European politics, appraise a situation with such accuracy, or direct the vacillating Court where he resided with such constant 1 See Carteret to Schaub, Gohre, 24 October, 1723, N.S. " Ecrivez ponctuellement tous les ordinaires, quand ce ne seroit que nouvelles courantes. j'ay mes raisons pour cela. Le Roy m'a dit deux ou trois fois depuis peu : * Schaub ecrit fort rarement: il ecrit bien quand il s'y met, mais il ne le fait pas ponotuellement. Aussi pouvez-vous compter qu'il ne passera point d'ordinaire, que Walpole n'ecrive quelque.1 Ainsi, mon cher Schaub, soyez -fort assidu." (B.M. Sloane MS. 4204, fo. 94 et seq.) 2W. Coxe, Memoirs of Sir Robert Walpole, London, 1798. Vol. II, pp. 567-69. (Townshend to Sir R. Walpole, Hanover, 21 September 1723.)

1 A very full selection from his letters to the Secretaries of State can be found in Coxe's Memoirs of Lord Walpole, London, 1802. 2H. Walpole to Townshend, 5 January 1724, N.S. B.M. Add. MS. 37634, fo. 214. 3 " My friend who is perfectly acquainted with the British cabinet, takes upon him, as I am well informed, to paint to the chief minister here the characters of the respective ministers in England : Walpole understands the domestick affairs, but is utterly ignorant of those abroad; Townshend has some knowledge and application, but is intirely devoted to the Imperial court; Lord Carteret is the minister of confidence and has the sole conduct of the foreign affairs. The consequence, if Schaub is supported and continues here, is plain, not only in regard to his credit and mine, but in regard to the opinion that the court here must have of His Majesty's ministers at home." (Ibid. fo. 215 v.)

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 170.106.40.219, on 29 Sep 2021 at 17:57:44, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S2042171000009584 xviii INTRODUCTION corollary to his friend's disgrace, Carteret was removed to the honourable exile of Dublin Castle. Walpole entered into Schaub's- inheritance as the accredited representative of George I, while in. England the Duke of Newcastle received the seals that were sur- rendered by Carteret. The next task before Walpole was to take stock of the condition, of affairs at the French court, and his powers of discernment soon showed their worth. So long as Orleans lived, there could be no- doubt who was the most important person in the government, but when the Regent died, Walpole was quick to discern the weakness- of his successor, the Duke of Bourbon.1 By the end of March he seems to have made up his mind where power really lay. It cannot have escaped his notice that Monsieur le Due's administration was going to suffer from the fatal weakness that the King gave him neither affection nor confidence, but that both were bestowed, so- far as it was possible to Louis XV's selfish nature, on his old tutor Fleury; and at the beginning of 1724 Walpole had not found Fleury wanting. For one thing emerged from the many conversations to which the abdication of Philip V gave rise, and that was that Fleury, for all his " bigotry " and his attachment to the vieille cour, was convinced that the Anglo-French alliance founded by Dubois and Orleans was the only policy which gave any guarantee of European peace. This, with the personal attraction which Fleury's mild and gentle character seems to have exercised on the rough East Anglian, and Walpole's arguments, which, expressed in inaccurate French spoken with a strong Norfolk accent, were heard by Fleury with much respect, speedily brought the two men into something like intimacy.2 By the end of March we find Wal- pole always consulting Fleury before Bourbon or Morville, but in obedience to Fleury's wishes, this intimacy was kept secret, and the former Bishop of Frejus is denoted in the correspondence by the cypher " 672." In this, as well as in the intrigues which brought about the fall of Schaub, Walpole owed not a little to Bolingbroke, who saw here a chance of personal advancement by serving the

1 For the Duke of Bourbon's relations with this country the best studyis J. Dureng, Le Due de Bourbon et I'Angleterre, Paris, 1911. 2 H. Walpole's consideration for Fleury on the occasion of the retreat to Issy in December 1725 merely confirmed the intimacy. Walpole's account of the incident is in his letter to Townshend of 13/24 December 1725 in B.M. Add. MS. 32744, fi. 623 et seqq.

1Whitworth at Cambray was full of suspicion as to French designs in the north. See the letter of the plenipotentiaries to Newcastle dated Cambray, 12/23 August 1724 inP.R.O., .France, 175, fo. 94. " The conduct of the French court has for some time been very different from what it was about a year ago. There seems to be neither the same steddiness in their councillsnor the same j udgement and exacteness in the dispatch of their orders. The Duke of Bourbon has yet little experience in forreign affairs nor has Mr. Morville who . . . has a trifling genius and a little misteriousness in his temper, with a love of chicane, which makes it difficult to act with him in confidence. . . . From several observations on his manner of proceeding at The Hague, I, Whitworth, when there, was oblidged to be on my guard with him. ... It is farther plain that even whilst France was in the best dispositions for His Majesty, they never lost their views of preparing themselves against future accidents, but were laying out for an after game. For this end they took so much pains at first to establish the Czar on the Baltick in the neighbourhood of Germany, and they have taken no less now to keep him from being embroiled with the Porte, that he may have his hands at liberty to act by their directions. . . . Wee beleive the French are sincere in their desire to have these negotiations ended by a treaty ; but wee are far from being convinced that they wish it to be on the footing of a good and lasting peace."

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 170.106.40.219, on 29 Sep 2021 at 17:57:44, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S2042171000009584 xx INTRODUCTION At the end of May it was thought advisable to send to Walpole, for the information of the French ministers, an account of Anglo- Russian relations and a general criticism of Peter's behaviour from the siege of Wismar in 1716 to the insults levelled at George by Bestucheff in 1724.1 As no notice was taken of this, Townshend despatched an angry note to Walpole reciting the grievances of the British against French policy; the support given to the Czar by the French at Constantinople " and everywhere else " and their failure to support vigorously Great Britain in the north, were all encouraging the wayward Emperor to imagine that the union between the crowns had broken down. Further, their " unaccount- able coolness " in the matter of Ostend, and worst of all, the diffi- culties about the adherence to the treaty of Charlottenburg, had the same effect and were leading to a break-up of the congress.2 In support of this Newcastle drafted a letter to Walpole, the tone of which fully betrays the indignation of the British ministers. But through Broglie, the new French ambassador, whose chief object was the reconciliation of George and Peter into an alliance for the peace of the north, Fleury was able to prevent anything rash being done ; Campredon also, at St. Petersburg, worked with all his might to effect a reconciliation, and at last, in August, Kurakin in Paris was able to tell Walpole that the Czar was ready to be reconciled. Again George had no objection in principle, provided his own terms were accepted (see p. 82) ; the French Court was overjoyed and poured out congratulations to the British ambassador, but once more Schleswig proved to be a difficulty. At the beginning of the next year, Peter, sick and ill at ease, fell under the influence of the Duke of Holstein's party, and drew back from an alliance which should include George : the work of months was therefore all undone, when at the end of January the death of the Czar completed the ruin of the scheme. Before the news of the failure of the negotiations in the north had filtered through, Monsieur le Due and Morville, believing that the alliance was secure, began to contemplate other schemes. The congress of Cambray, under the joint mediation of Great Britain and France, was deep in the Serbonian bog of the investitures of Parma and Tuscany, nor can it be denied that on the whole 1 Newcastle to Walpole, Whitehall, 28 May 1724. Brit. Mus. Add. MS. 32739, fo. 63. 2 The letter is printed in J. Dureng, Le Due de Bourbon, pp. 491-5.

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1 See Newcastle to Walpole, 15 January 172$, Brit. Mus. Add. MS. 32742, fo. 54, and id. eid.28 January 172^, ibid., fo. 132. See also G. Syveton, Une cour et un aventurier au dix-huitieme sie.de, Paris, 1896, pp. 93 et seqq., and also Baudrillart, Philippe V et la cour de France, Vol. Ill, pp. 133-6. "See Walpole to Newcastle, Fontainebleau, 4 November 1724, N.S. Brit. Mus. Add. MS. 32741, fo. 118. See also Aff. Etr. Angl. 348 and 349, passim-

1 An instance of this propensity is reported in detail by Robinson to Delafaye •on 31 July 1726, N.S. (P.R.O., France,, 184, fo. 89). " This illness was caused by an eating-debauch at the Muette, a little house belonging to the crown in the wood of Bologne near Paris where His Most Christian Majesty often comes in an afternoon to take a collation of his own dressing. This last entertain- ment was of that kind, and it is prodigious the great quantity of melons, figgs And unripe walnuts that are said to have been devoured, besides an omelet, that the King and Count Clermont drest themselves, in which they put no less, as is reported, than fourscore eggs." a The idea was not exactly novel. See W. Coxe, Memoirs of Horatio Lord Walpole, p. 88, where reference is given to a letter of Newcastle to Walpole -of 25 May 1724 as authority for the statement that Schaub on his return offended George I by proposing a match between Louis XV and a British princess.

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1 For all this see Dureng, Le Due de Bourbon, pp. 315-23, and Aff. Etr. Angl. 351, ff. 326-344, for the despatch of Louis XV to Broglie of 12 August, N.S., covering the counter-project.

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1 The extremely severe French criticisms of Hedges' instructions may be found in Aff. Mr. Turin 145, ff. 153-156. The gentlest description of them is "waste paper." (Ibid. Angl. 356, fo. 110.) 2 Hedges to Newcastle, Fontainebleau, 10 September and 15 October 1726, N.S. (P.R.O., Savoy and Sardinia, 32.) The French were determined that whatever happened, he was not to have Sicily, hence the difference between the two courts, though concealed, was deep. Cf. Memo, of 5 October 1726, N.S., in Aff. Etr. Angl. 356, fo. 110, after the interview with Walpole and Hedges. " L'on se garda bien de luy [Walpole] laisser penetrer les trop importantes raisons qui doiuent empecher la France de consentir a la conquests directe de la Sicile." a Hedges to Newcastle, Turin, 9 November 1726, N.S. (P.R.O., Savoy and Sardinia, 32.) 4 See Chance, Alliance of Hanover, pp. 561-72

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1 See Chance, Dipt. Instr. Sweden, p. 210. a It may be remarked that Count Hoym, the Polish minister at the court of Versailles, had no high opinion of British policy in the Baltic at this con- juncture. On 12 September 1726, N.S., he wrote to his master from Bourbon l'Archambaut : " L'ambassadeur de Sardaigne qui s'y trouve aussi . . . m'a dit qu'il n'y avoit aucune nouvello que celle de l'accession de la Czariene au traitte de Vienne et la signature du traitte de l'Empereur avec l'Electeur palatin. La premiere avoit un peu allarm£ cette cour, mais les Anglois ont eu soin de la rassurer, et pourvu, dit-on, que l'accession de la Suede aille son train comme on l'espere, on compte que celle de la Czariene sera sans effet. J'avoueray ingenuement a V.M. que je n 'ay point encore pu comprendre la force- ni la solidite de ce raisonnement." (P.R.O., Confidential, 1 A.)

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1 Morville to Broglie, 5 September 1726, N.S. (Aff. Etr. Angl. 356, fo. 332.) 2H. Walpole to ? Tilson, Fontainebleau, 10 September 1726, N.S. (Brit. Mus. Add. MS. 32747, fo. 271.) SH. Walpole to Townshend, same date (ibid. fo. 280). 4 See J. G. Droysen, Geschichte derpreussischen Politik, Leipzig, 1870, Vol. IV, part 2, p. 404.

1 See below, p. 170, and Walpole to Newcastle, Paris, 26 June 1726, N.S. (B.M. Add. MS. 32746, fo. 296). " The nicest part of our affairs and what requires my greatest attention is the reconciliation between France and Spain, that it may not be brought about to His Majesty's prejudice." *Ibid 3 Memoranda and despatches to Broglie strongly criticising the action of the British in despatching Hosier, but applauding the mission of Wager, may be found in Aff. Etr. Angl. 355, ff. 144-61, dated 1 May 1726, N.S. 4 " Nor," he added, " can I see the great use of Sir John Jennings appearing off of Naples ; it will make a noise, but when he comes home again without doing anything, I doe not think the laugh will be on our side either in England or in Europe, for I do not at all apprehend the Emperor's encampment in Silesia. ... I must beg Mr St Saphorin's pardon if I think the sending a fleet into the Mediterranean to prevent an encampment in Silesia will appear ridiculous." (B.M. Add. MS. 32746, fo. 296 v. Paris, 26 June 1726, N.S.)

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 170.106.40.219, on 29 Sep 2021 at 17:57:44, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S2042171000009584 INTRODUCTION xxxiii dream of reconciliation with Spain seemed further than ever from realisation, for, simultaneously with the fall of Bourbon, Ripperda, who had been unable to supply the voracious court of Vienna with the needed pistoles, was driven from power and took refuge with Stanhope to whom he made some sensational revelations before being dragged from his sanctuary. Into his place stepped Konigsegg, the Imperial ambassador, and with Imperial influence supreme at Madrid, Fleury could have no objection to measures which, while aimed in the first place at Spain, were calculated ultimately to thwart the designs of the principal enemy, Austria. Morville's language to the Imperial ambassador gave the British no ground whatever for complaint; he said plainly that " the erecting of the Ostend East India Company was certainly contrary to the conditions by which the Emperor possesses the Low Countries, which ought to be on the same foot as they were enjoyed by Charles the 2d of Spain, when the people of the Netherlands had no right and could have no right given them to trade to the Indies," x and it might therefore have been supposed that there was no ground of anxiety as to the union between the two crowns against the treaty of Vienna. And such indeed was Walpole's opinion at the end of July,2 when he exerted himself to allay the doubts entertained by the home government (see p. 178), which, believing Ripperda's revelations of a Jacobite clause in the Vienna treaty, continued to complain of the weakness of the French government's measures, and to appeal for vigour, pointing out what good effects had been produced in Spain merely by the alarming appearance of the British fleets on the coast and in the Indies (see p. 195). The European situation now resolved itself into a series of attempts by the principals on either side to make a breach between the opposite allies. Thus the Emperor made advances to France

1 Walpole to Newcastle, Paris, 13 August 1726, N.S. (B.M. Add. MS. 32747, fo. 131 v.) 2 " Thus I believe the correspondence and application from hence to Spain is entirely at an end, unless His Catholick Majesty shall declare that he is willing to be reconciled with this King without any mediation or conditions what - ever on either side, for I am persuaded the Bishop, now he has satisfyed his own conscience and is able to satisfye the whole nation here that he has done all that was reasonable on his part, will take no one step further in it, being convinced that the King of Spain is entirely under the absolute power of the Queen, and she under the directions of the Imperial Court " (to Newcastle, Paris, 30 July 1726, N.S., B.M. Add. MS. 32747, fo. 48).

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 170.106.40.219, on 29 Sep 2021 at 17:57:44, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S2042171000009584 xxxiv INTRODUCTION in August,1 when Fonseca, the Imperial ambassador, suggested to Morville that the two powers should sign an agreement to commit no hostilities against each other and jointly oppose any other power that should offer to disturb the public tranquillity—an obvious reflection upon the proceedings of the British fleets. Mor- ville rejected the advance saying he saw no purpose in the proposal : Fleury, after consulting the Dutch, followed suit. At the same time Spain offered terms of agreement to Great Britain which Townshend was obviously prepared to consider, but only if the French agreed, which he thought doubtful (see p. 188), and indeed the Bishop did not consider the project " seasonable." 2 Neverthe- less French diplomacy caused grave suspicion to the British, who suspected their allies of desiring to evade their undertaking to supply 30,000 men as a corps de reserve in the north, and the yearning for Spain, which soon asserted itself, was not to British taste. As early as 6 August (N.S.) Huxelles was telling Walpole how much he wished Stanhope would "by the means of the Spanish fryers, officers, secretaries and by all sorts of people, endeavour to have the advantage of Spain's being reconciled to France," 3 and in September Walpole announced with regret that Fleury had opened a correspondence with Father Bermudez, the King of Spain's confessor,4 reproaching him on the unchristian temper betrayed by Philip V towards his nephew, Louis XV, and expressing his surprise that Spain would consent to be duped by the Emperor.5 But at the end of September it was the turn of Spain to adopt an attitude of righteous indignation. News of Hosier's proceedings had reached Europe, and the nuncio at Madrid forwarded a proposal to Cardinal Fleury that it was the duty of France to break with Britain, the disturber of the peace of Europe, and to join with Spain against this lawless power. On 9 October (N.S.), Walpole

1 That advances had been made in March seems clear from the language used by Louis XV to Broglie : " Quand la cour de Vienne voudroit, par vn impossible, me faire vn aussy grand sacrifice, je ne l'accepterois pas " (Versailles, 20 March 1726, N.S. Aff. Etr. Angl. 354, fo. 204). 2 Walpole to Townshend, Paris, 26 Aug. 1726, N.S. (Brit. Mus. AM. MS. 32747, fo. 198.) 3 Walpole to Newcastle, Paris, 6 August 1726, N.S. (Brit, Mus. Add. MS. 32747, fo. 110). 4 Walpole to Newcastle, Fontainebleau, 2 September 1726, N.S. (ibid., fo. 219). 5 Fleury to Bermudez, 26 July and 1 September 1726, N.S. {Aff. Etr. Espagne, 343, ff. 409 and 426).

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 170.106.40.219, on 29 Sep 2021 at 17:57:44, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S2042171000009584 INTRODUCTION xxxv described how in a private interview with Fleury he had again gone over all the arguments in favour of preventing the money from reaching Austria. As to what France was likely to do, he thought that " though the Cardinal appears to be a good deal embarrassed and disconcerted, ... I really think (his) intentions in this affair are good at the bottom, though his courage is not always equal to his intentions." 1 But six days later the prospect clouded. A messenger from Stanhope having arrived, Walpole found Fleury even more perturbed than before, greatly concerned as to the construction that would be put on Hosier's action, and anxious above all things to prevent a casus fcederis which would bring about a rupture between Spain and France. Knowing how the home government would construe this hesitation, Walpole forwarded some intercepted papers of Atterbury's correspondence which Fleury had handed to him in order to prove that the Cardinal was sincere in his professions of attachment to the alliance. But the fact remained that the French ministry disliked Hosier's proceedings, not least because some of the commodities he had stopped belonged to private French subjects who might well raise an outcry against British actions and lend strength to the pro-Spanish party.2 So when Walpole in October put forward a suggestion (see p. 209) that the British fleet should make a fourth blockade, this time of Ostend, Fleury on 12 November (N.S.) rejected the proposal; but he had more solid grounds than the mere dislike of British adven- tures at sea which had already caused so many complications in 1726. The fact was that on 1 November (N.S.) Fonseca hinted to Fleury at the possibility of an agreement whereby the number and activities of the vessels of the Ostend Company might be limited. This, it is true, was less than what the Emperor had offered early in September when he had sounded the British govern-

1 Walpole to Newcastle, Fontainebleau, 9 October 1726, N.S. (Brit. Mus. Add. MS. 32747, fo. 457). 2 According to Hoym (P.R.O., Confidential, 1 A) the suspension of the galleons had already caused " several " bankruptcies both in Prance and Spain. He continues his report to the King of Poland (dated 12 September 1726, N.S.) that the British were likely to do what they could to prolong this confusion, for they alone profited by it, and would throw every obstacle in the wayof reconciliation between the powers. On 25October 1726 (N.S.) Broglie reported to Morville that although they would not admit it, the British ministers felt some qualms as to Hosier's proceedings (Aff. Etr. Angl. 356, fo. 159 v.).

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 170.106.40.219, on 29 Sep 2021 at 17:57:44, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S2042171000009584 xxxvi INTRODUCTION ment on suspending the Company for a term of years (see pp. 198-9), but his demands had not unnaturally risen in view of the defections of the King of Prussia and the Duke of Wolfenbuttel from their kinsman's alliance. Fleury was not blind to the fact that this was a fresh attempt to detach France from Great Britain and rejected the overture with every sign of indignation, so that the angry Fonseca exclaimed that the Cardinal was no more for peace than the rest of them1; but at any rate it was an overture, and Fleury was not of that habit of mind to hurry on a war with powers which were showing a readiness to negotiate. But the time was coming when all Fleury's patience and skill were to be put to the test in preserving peace with Spain at the same time as harmony with the British. For Hosier's action was interpreted by Spain as justifying an outbreak of hostilities, and in the last quarter of 1726 the air was full of reports of a forthcoming attack on Gibraltar, while Vienna talked much of a declaration of war.2 Fleury frankly disliked the prospect, and it is clear that he distrusted British diplomatic methods. On 3 December (N.S.) even Walpole was inspired by doubt whether in the event of an attack on Gibraltar France would stand by her ally,3 though he did not think the matter so urgent as to make him forgo attend- ance in Parliament and remain in Paris. Newcastle for his part took the alarm. Letter after letter was sent to Walpole's secretary, Robinson, urging that an attack on Gibraltar would be a casus fcederis (see pp. 215, 217, 225), and when at the end of Decem- ber the Spanish ambassador in London demanded his passports, it was clear that a crisis in Fleury's diplomacy was at hand. Unlike the British, Fleury was able to see that the Emperor's enthusiasm for the Vienna treaties had greatly cooled, and that the Ostend East India Company, the suspension of which was being freely discussed at Vienna, was now of secondary importance in the Imperial eyes. His view of the Imperial policy was that the Imperialists were to act as secondaries. The more therefore the British urged war with Spain, the more they were helping to realise

1 Walpole to Newcastle, Paris, 1 Nov. 1726, N.S. (Brit. Mus. Add. MS. 32748, fo. 192 v.) 8 Newcastle to Walpole, Whitehall, 14 November 1726 (Brit. Mus. Add. MS. 32748, fo. 323 «.). 3 Walpole to Newcastle, Paris, 3 December 1726, N.S. (Brit. Mus. Add. MS. 32748, ff. 369-70).

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 170.106.40.219, on 29 Sep 2021 at 17:57:44, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S2042171000009584 INTRODUCTION xxxvii the Imperial wishes by making the galleons the sole cause of war and thrusting Ostend into the background.1 If therefore the Emperor could be brought to an agreement on terms satisfactory to England and France, the Queen of Spain, whose hatred of France was subsiding, would hardly continue the siege single-handed, and so the catastrophe of a Franco-Spanish war would be avoided. Fleury therefore refused to be carried off his feet by British clamour. He protested without hesitation that the French King would make no difficulty of declaring war on Spain now that the siege had been begun, and Walpole, to induce him to a declaration of war, observed that if war came, the Emperor, as being the most formidable power, would be considered the chief enemy, while Spain was the secondary or " dupe." 2 He continued, however, that a joint declaration of war by Great Britain and France on Spain would " put the Emperor under this dilemma, either of refusing to declare war against the allies, which in all probability must open the eyes of Spain, and provoke that crown to abandon the Imperial court, or, in case the Emperor should declare war against the allies, they would be immediately justified to turn their main strength against him without distressing or reducing Spain any farther than may be necessary to prevent their being of any use or service to the Emperor. . . . And we should reap this farther advantage from the war beginning in this manner and on the account of Gibraltar, that the princes of the Empire, who begin to be convinced of the Emperor's dangerous designs and of the pacifick intentions of the allies . . . find that Spain has been the aggressor against England by besieging Gibraltar, and the Emperor the aggressor by declaring war against the allies for defending themselves when first attacked." 3 Fleury still shrank from extreme measures and ten days later was raising objections even to making the chief campaign on the Rhine. He was convinced that the court of Vienna had not said its last word, for in his position as Cardinal, he was able to conduct a correspondence both with the Emperor and with the Queen of Spain, and he had confidence in his powers of persuading the

1 Morville to Broglie, Marly, 9 March 1727, N.S. (Aff. Etr. Angl. 352, fo. 288). 2 Walpole to Newcastle, Paris, 10 March 1727, N.S. (Brit. Mus, Add, MS. 32749, fo. 21 6 v.). »Jbid- fo. 218.

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 170.106.40.219, on 29 Sep 2021 at 17:57:44, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S2042171000009584 xxxviii INTRODUCTION Emperor to suspend the Ostend Company.1 Consequently it would be criminal for the Hanover allies to continue to reply in the negative to the Austrian suggestions; on the contrary, it was necessary to treat them fairly.2 He was the less anxious for violence in that in March 1727 he was again in a state of great depression owing to the safe arrival in Spanish harbours of the flota, which, escorted by a Spanish squadron, had eluded Hosier, and a declaration of war by France on Spain might lead to the confiscation of the money in the flota which belonged to private persons and in largest measure to French subjects.3 The tempera- ture therefore of his interviews with Walpole began to rise rapidly. At the end of March the Cardinal was still harping on the mis- fortune of the flota's arrival. Walpole as usual urged vigorous action, but he came near to incivility by bluntly saying what he thought of the French council:— [I let] " him know that all depended entirely upon him . . . that he must forgive me if I said that without him and his vigour and good sense, the French King's Council was looked upon and known to be the weakest in Europe ; that the Marshal d'Huxelles was considered as an old, peevish, and selfish dotard, who, without any plan or knowledge of his own, affected to be popular and a patriot among his particular friends by declaring abroad against measures that he had neither sense nor courage enough to oppose in council; that Marshal Tallard was now dangerously ill, and though he had good intentions as well as understanding, had no great credit among the people ; that the ignorance, vanity, and talkativeness of Marshal Villars was insupportable, and that Mr. de Morville,with the best intentions for the present system.was so sensible of his own narrow genius, and of the endeavours to remove both him and his father,4 that he was obliged to observe some management with others, especialy if he found him, the Cardinal, at all waving (sic) and irresolute." 5 Three weeks passed, during which the Emperor, having expelled 1 See the letters quoted in M. Huisman, La Belgique commerciale sous VEmpereur Charles VI, Brussels and Paris, 1902, pp. 414 and 421. 2 Louis XV to-Broglie, 19 February 1727, N.S. (Aff. Mr. Angl. 358, fo. 156 v.) 3 Walpole to Newcastle, Paris, 21 March 1727, N.S. (Brit. Mus. Add. MS. 32749, fo. 296 v.) 4 Keeper of the Seals. 6 Walpole to Newcastle, Paris, 31 March 1727, N.S. (Brit. Mus. Add. MS. 32749, fo. 364.)

Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 170.106.40.219, on 29 Sep 2021 at 17:57:44, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S2042171000009584 INTRODUCTION xxxix St. Saphorin and Woodward from Austria, in retaliation for the expulsion of Palm from London, established magazines at certain cities near the Rhine, and began to move his troops westward through Germany, to the terror of the petty princes, and the mani- fest peril of the Landgrave of Hesse-Cassel, whose firmness in adhesion to the League of Hanover excited the admiration of the British ministry. At length an answer was returned from Vienna to the ultimatum of the allies demanding that the Ostend East India Company should be immediately suspended for seven years. The Cardinal indeed acknowledged that " far from being a satisfactory answer, it was very captious, and by no means fit to be received,"1 but, expressing the opinion that both the Emperor and Spain were inclined to peace, he suggested that the proper policy to pursue was to draw up a second ultimatum and give the Imperialists a month in which to reply. Walpole now lost heart, as may be seen from his private despatch of the same day.2 He was inconsolable, writing notes to Fleury in the middle of the night in which he flung out accusations of treachery against Richelieu, who had quarrelled with St. Saphorin and whose conduct at Vienna had been inscrutable. On the other hand Fleury besought Walpole to be calm and to trust him, and to remember that it was imperative that the Council of State should be convinced of the expediency of a war with Spain. Nothing would be done without Walpole being made cognisant of it. Yet the home government which, remembering the days of Dubois and Orleans, had always been prone to mistrust Fleury's sincerity, took a less gloomy view of the situation than Walpole, and, being doubtful as to the zeal of the Dutch, acquiesced (see p. 239) in the Cardinal's proposal to make one more attempt at a settlement by negotiation. Consequently one more ultimatum dated 2 May (N.S.) was drawn up to which Walpole had no objection, though he would have preferred that the term given for an answer should have been shorter than one month. Till then Britain undertook not to declare war on Spain, but on the other hand she would require in the event of no satisfactory answer being received, that France should join her in declaring war in not less than ten days' time.

1 Walpole to Newcastle, Paris, 21 April 1727, N.S. (Brit. Mus. Add. MS. 32750, fo. 51.) 2 See Chance, The Alliance of Hanover, p. 694, where it is printed in full.

1 Walpole to Newcastle, Paris, 28 May 1727, N.S. (Brit. Mus. Add. MS. 32750, fo. 337.)