The NGO Safety Office Issue: 57 1-15 September 2010

ANSO and our donors accept no liability for the results of any activity conducted or omitted on the basis of this report. THE ANSO REPORT -Not for copy or sale-

Inside this Issue COUNTRY SUMMARY Central Region 2-6 The ill-advised plan of a mi- and formulaic, with night assessed central command 6-11 Northern Region nority group in the US to letters and verbal intimida- and control of AOGs in Eastern Region 11-13 mark the anniversary of Sep- tion the primary vehicles. the region. tember 11 by burning the While some groups, like the Western Region 14-15 Contravening the popula- Holy Quran became the im- Hezb-e-Islami, are more tion centric nature of Southern Region 16-19 petus for a widespread civil invested in this process, the COIN, the use of airstrikes reaction. The emotive nature IEA and others have a ANSO Info Page 20 is steadily increasing. With of this issue coupled with the more limited investiture and 13 reported this period, relentless national and inter- as such have expended little September is set to well national media coverage re- tactical effort. As for the exceed figures from 2009. YOU NEED TO KNOW sulted in demonstrations actual election day (18 Sep- While the use of these in countrywide, with an esti- tember), it is expected that the South and East is a • Anticipated increase in at- mated 30 separate occur- there will be a renewed em- tacks on election day regular feature of the land- rences reported between the phasis on attacking the elec- scape, the increased use in • NGO abductions in the 9th and 15th of September. tions infrastructure (as seen the North is a testament to North Opportunistic agitators also in the Presidential Elec- growing scope of the con- utilised this opportunity, en- tions). This will likely in- flict there. • Increase use of IMF air- couraging crowds to voice volve a combination of in- strikes broader concerns regarding direct fire and direct fire For most parts of the country this period noted a • Widespread civil unrest ISAF and the elections. Of (small arms) as well as a note, demonstrations in widespread deployment of decreased momentum in Badakhshan and re- IEDs. These attacks, how- AOG activity, though the sulted in violence with 8 ci- ever, will be more about province of Paktika (in the

vilians killed and 16 wounded media coverage rather than south) was an exception. This downturn can be par- ANSO is supported by and in Kapisa, NGO staff an actual disruption of the were accosted and their of- democratic process. tially attributed to the in- fice damaged. clusion of the end of The regularity of NGO Ramadan and Eid in this As campaigning for the im- staff abductions in the period along with standard minent parliamentary elec- Northern Region continues seasonal downturn pat- tions winds down, so has the to shape the operating envi- terns. That being said, in- volume of incidents directly ronment there with inci- cident volumes for Septem- related to these efforts. dents in and Faryab ber are still expected to Though campaign measures this period. While the scope eclipse those from last year, of a more violent nature still of these incidents range attesting to the armed op- occurred (direct attacks & from temporary detentions positions operational ca- IEDs), at this stage the major to standard abductions, all pacity and leaving little rivalries are more or less set- have concluded with a posi- room for optimism. tled. AOG opposition to the tive resolution, speaking to election has remained steady the professionalism and THE ANSO REPORT Page 2

NGO Incidents KABUL KABUL Year to Date 5 50 This Report Period 1 An attempted robbery targeting 40 an INGO car passing by the Kote with attacks being recorded on the 30 Sangi traffic circle in PD 5 was 2nd, 6th and 13th. NGO should 20 recorded on 4 September. An ex- note that stand-off rocket attacks 10 patriate driver and two other ex- will most likely remain the AOG 0 patriates on board were transiting tactical method of choice for dis- in an unmarked white Ford ruption of the Election Day in Ranger thru the traffic circle in Kabul City. KABUL AOG KABUL ACG the afternoon peak hours when AOGs intent and capacity to stage two men in local dress jumped in close-range attacks in Kabul City robust movement control by ANSF inside Ka- front of the car in order to stop it, remain of concern; though ANSF bul City. upon which a third man ap- and INF have attempted to main- The ultimate stages of the pre-election period proached the car from behind and tain pressure on AOG networks were overshadowed by spontaneous protests stabbed the back right tyre four in the capital during the past pe- and organized demonstrations echoing the times before disappearing into the riod. A half dozen ANSF and planned, and cancelled, Quran-burning cere- crowd. Adhering to the INGO’s IMF operations resulted in arrests monies in the USA. The subsequent extensive policy, the driver did not stop and or killings of several prominent national and global media coverage paved the proceeded to a safe location in AOG leaders. For example, on 10 way for the message to be largely interpreted as Karte Seh before the tyre was September an AOG commander, an outrageous attack against Islamic values in changed. The incident is another known for his involvement in co- the mosques across the region. In total, 6 large variation in the series of “flat- ordination and execution of IED demonstrations in reaction to the news took tyre” schemes typical for organ- attacks in the capital, was killed place in from 9 to 15 Septem- ized groups active in PD 5 that together with another 2 AOGs in ber. The demonstrations typically featured be- specialize in the theft of valuables an IMF precision airstrike in tween 200 and 600 protesters voicing out their from higher-profile vehicles and Hasan Khel, Musaye. On 2 Sep- condemnation of the events in the USA, taxis. The usual methodology in- tember, three AOG, reportedly alongside with the appeals for the GOA to cludes pre-arranging a flat tyre, including a foreign national, in take action on the international level. The pro- following the vehicle till it stops possession of several BBIED tests sporadically provided ground for expres- to have the tyre changed, and ulti- rigged vests and other explosives sion of other grievances ranging from anti- mately distracting the driver’s and were apprehended in a combined IMF sentiments to condemnation of particular the occupants’ attention in order ANSF operation while in transit election candidates and political parties. Dur- to snatch valuables from inside thru Saraye Shomali, Kabul City. ing all but two of the demonstrations, ANP the vehicle. Despite the assumption that some showed restraint and prevented escalations of With the exception of two attacks of the election-related incidents, force. A demonstration in Qarabagh on 10 initiated by AOG in Musaye Dis- particularly intimidation cases, September, however, saw ANP units fire warn- trict, attributed to mobile units remain unreported, the province ing shots into the air in an attempt to contain operating alongside the Kabul – has seen little explicit election- the demonstration. A disconcertingly heavy- Logar highway, (an IED and a related incidents. Reports from handed ANP reaction was also recorded dur- SAF attack against ANP) overt suggest an on- ing a demonstration staged in the morning AOG activity in Kabul City and going public campaign against the hours of 15 September in PD 5, when ANP its environs has remained limited elections carried out by local units fired into the crowd, reportedly provoked to IDF attacks. These are primar- AOG networks and the case of a by armed demonstrators. This resulted in the ily directed towards the city centre hand grenade tossed into the of- killing of three and wounding of eleven pro- fice of an election candidate in testers; while ANP confirmed thirty-four in- PD 9 are the exceptions. With the jured servicemen on ANP side. An investiga- KEY THREATS & CONCERNS election day approaching, NGOs tion has been launched by ANP to determine Violent demonstrations should expect increased enhance- the possible presence of AOG elements Spectacular attacks ment of security measures with among the demonstrators as claimed by the Criminality strict checks at entry points and ANP units on the ground. THE ANSO REPORT Page 3

NGO Incidents KAPISA KAPISA Year to Date 2 50 This Report Period 1 40 During a demonstration that was 30 sparked in reaction to the Quran- turning against the members of burning plans announced and the NGO community in the Cen- 20 lately abandoned in the USA, tral Region. 10 Mahmud Raqi DAC witnessed an The eastern districts continue to 0 INGO office being attacked and host numerous AOG and ACG an expatriate staff member ac- networks which enjoy consider- costed by passing-by protesters able freedom of movement in KAPISA AOG KAPISA ACG on 9 September. The demonstra- conjunction with only a limited tion originated after the prayers in imprint by ANSF and IMF. Com- patrols in Tagab and Qarghal. On 3 Septem- the early afternoon when a group bined to the low NGO presence ber, a PSC guard was shot and killed in the of circa 60 protesters made their in the East, the aforementioned bazaar in Tagab DAC by attackers recognized way from the mosque towards the factors seem to be the main rea- to be members of an AOG network. Given District ’s HQ. In the son behind the low numbers of the preponderance of AOG influence in the consequent altercations with hard security incidents reported. eastern districts, it can be assumed that intimi- ANP, 1 ANP staff member and 3 Similarly to the two previous cy- dation against participation in the parliamen- protesters were injured. This inci- cles, Kapisa witnessed only 5 tary election has been going apace, but re- dent marked the only case of a AOG initiated attacks during the mained unreported. violent repercussion related to the reporting period, distributed be- Factional clashes among the supporters of Quran-burning cause explicitly tween the Tagab and Alasay dis- Jamiat, Hezb-e-Islami and other Pashtun par- tricts with 3 and 2 incidents re- ties in the western districts as well as alterca- spectively. Stand-off rocket and tions between major AOG networks in the KEY THREATS & CONCERNS mortar attacks were directed eastern part of the province remain a factor in AOG in Alasay, Nijrab, & Tagab against both Districts’ Administra- local security environment, although no related Factional disputes in west tion Centres; while 2 SAF assaults incidents along such conflict lines were re- AOG expansion targeted ANP and ANP/IMF ported during the present cycle.

BAMYAN NGO Incidents The only event noted during the present cycle Year to Date 0 pertained to a peaceful march of circa 400 local This Report Period 0 residents on 11 September in Sarosyab, staged With no security incidents re- in reaction to the Quran-burning ceremony across both districts presents ele- ported during the last five weeks, announced, and abandoned, in the USA. As vated risks of exposure to hostile Bamyan can be singled out as the well, election campaigning in the province has AOG activities, and should be safest NGO operational environ- continued without significant hampering, al- avoided. While AOG presence ment in the Central Region. The though hard information is lacking on the ac- seems to be well entrenched in main areas of concern to NGO tual situation. In the North-East, among the Kahmard, the extent of AOG safety remain Kahmard and Shi- Pashtun communities, several former Jihadi imprint in the and bar districts, which continue to commanders compete for seats in Wolesi Jirga, its eventual longer-term impacts witness convergence of local either as independent candidates, or under the on NGO safety are yet to be seen AOG and ACG structures with wings of Hezb-e-Islami. The Hazara commu- since hard evidence has not been external armed groups commuting nities in the rest of the province follow in ma- corroborated recently. The last between the neighbouring dis- jority local candidates with more or less pro- violent incident in the province tricts, namely Tala wa Barfak in nounced ties to Hezb-e-Wahdat, while Hezb-e- directly linked to the conflict , and sporadically the Harakat (dominated by a former Jihadi com- henceforth remains the AOG am- district in Parwan. It is mander and current parliamentarian) seems to bush of an IMF convoy in the of note to NGOs that movement maintain its position in Waras. Eshpushta Area of Kahmard on 3 KEY THREATS & CONCERNS August, during which one IMF Instability in Kahmard & Shibar serviceman was killed and another wounded. THE ANSO REPORT Page 4

WARDAK NGO Incidents WARDAK Year to Date 3 100 This Report Period 1 80 Pervasive AOG and ACG activity 60 sparking sporadic ANSF/IMF casualties among the personnel or 40 operations continued to dominate the clients of the clinic, a part of 20 the NGO security environment in the CHC building was directly hit 0 Wardak. The conjoining of these and destroyed. actions was illustrated on 2 Sep- Abductions of passengers travel- WARDAK AOG WARDAK ACG tember in an incident which saw ling along the Kabul – an INGO sustain collateral dam- highway continued unabated with personnel by AOG in Chaki Wardak, Jalrez age in Sadat Khel, Jaghatu Dis- 7 cases reported, 2 of them in- and Maydan Shahr point to the assumption trict. An IMF-led cordon and volving more than 5 hostages that abductions have been increasingly used as search operation evolved into a taken in a single incident. Al- a political weapon by AOG members since the two-hour clash with AOG, during though at least 3 of the reported past two weeks. which a projectile (believed to be cases seem to have been perpe- a mortar fired by IMF) impacted Besides the AOG-ACG activity and the mili- trated by AOG targeting ANSF, the compound of the INGO- tary operations, the province witnessed 5 dem- the abduction business on the supported Community Health onstrations related to the announced and aban- highway is where the stakes and Centre (CHC) in the village. While doned Quran-burning ceremonies in the USA. agendas of AOG and ACG the blast did not result in any Most of the protests took place in the DACs strongly converge, making it diffi- without any major incidents, the exception KEY THREATS & CONCERNS cult to differentiate between po- being the demonstration held in Khwaja Deh Attacks along Hwy 1 litically motivated attacks and Golan, Jalrez, on 10 September, which saw criminal activities. Nevertheless, AOG attacks against DAC angry protesters set an ANP checkpoint on three unrelated cases of abducted Abductions fire. and subsequently killed ANSF

NGO Incidents with an intensive influx of wealthy travellers DAYKUNDI Year to Date 0 (by local standards) expected to transport This Report Period 0 Assumptions made about the se- higher amounts of cash and Eid gifts for their curity dynamics in Daykundi are an anti personnel mine, exploded families. On 7 September, three armed men on based the 5 incidents reported when an ANP team came to in- motorcycles robbed the passengers of a public during the present cycle. These vestigate the site. As a result of transport minibus en route thru the Qarawdal dynamics continue to be defined the two explosions, one ANP, the Area in Sangi Takhti district; while in the early mainly by the security vacuum motorcyclist and two children evening hours on 10 September, another group that spans over large swathes of died while another ANP member of five armed men blocked the road in the the predominantly rural districts, a was wounded. The incident Obagag Pass, Khadir District, and robbed cash factor, when coupled with the lack marked the third IED attack in and valuables from drivers of 6 trucks caught of reliable reporting structures, the province since the beginning on the road. Latest reporting from the provin- distort the threat picture relative of this year, with the 2010 account cial capital Nili indicates that night letters were to NGO operations. of AOG-initiated attacks against distributed in the Bazaar Area on 14 Septem- ANSF/IMF related targets reach- ber, discouraging the community from sup- An atypical IED ambush set up in ing 16 cases. It is of note that one porting a local prominent figure that stands for Dowazda Imam Pass, Kajran Dis- of the two previous IED attacks his second term in the Wolesi Jirga elections. trict was the only AOG-initiated was staged in the same area on 30 attack during the report cycle. In As reported previously, the negotiations in January, when a single IED explo- the afternoon hours on 2 Septem- Khadir and Gizab between GoA authorities sion killed a local civilian known ber, a motorcyclist transiting thru and a particular Hazara AOG commander for his business ties to the local the pass was struck by an IED. A (regarding his disarmament and reintegration) ANP. second device, later identified as have failed to produce any results. The com- The province also witnessed two mander continually refuses the GoA’s condi- criminal attacks typical for the Eid tion to disarm and reinsert his estimated 50 KEY THREATS & CONCERNS period, that are best ascribed to fighters into the ANSF structures in Gizab. Ethno-political tensions pre-Eid financial pressure faced The potential impacts of this development on  Spoilers-to-peace in Gizab by local households combined the security environment are yet to be seen. THE ANSO REPORT Page 5

NGO Incidents LOGAR LOGAR Year to Date 0 50

This Report Period 0 40 During the reporting period, (with one caches consisting of 21 30 AOG initiated attacks decreased 20 rockets); and a successful ANSF- by 50% in comparison to the pre- 10 lead rescue operation in Azra Dis- vious report cycle, standing for 6 0 out of 22 combined security inci- trict resulting in freeing 3 ab- dents. AOG and ACG activity in ducted telecom engineers and an the vicinity of the Kabul – unspecified number of ANA LOGAR AOG LOGAR ACG highway remains the main area of members from captivity in an On 12 and 13 September, 3 large demonstra- concern for NGO safety and free- AOG base in Komak Area. tions were held in the DACs of , dom of movement in Logar. In terms of territorial distribution, Baraki Barak and Khushi in reaction to the Looking at the array of tactical 45% of the combined security Quran-burning affair in the US. While the methods displayed by AOG incidents concentrated in Baraki course of action taken by the demonstrators against ANSF/IMF/PSC, IED Barak, while the second half of and the security forces in Puli Alam and emplacements on the main roads the incidents was evenly distrib- Khushi avoided any escalations of force, represent the main risk for uted between the remaining dis- crowd control measures enhanced by the ANP NGOs. For instance, AOG suc- tricts. In Baraki Barak, AOG initi- units during the demonstration in Baraki Barak cessfully conducted 3 IED strikes ated 2 IED strikes and a SAF am- on 12 September escalated into SAF clashes against ANSF and IMF, while 4 bush targeting ANSF/IMF pa- between the demonstrators and ANP, resulting other IEDs were defused by the trols, while ANSF and IMF search in the injuring of 4 demonstrators. According security forces. Besides the IED operations concluded in 3 arrests to official sources, AOG elements were recog- strikes and discoveries, the con- of AOG members and 3 discover- nized by ANP among the demonstrators; how- flict patterns encompassed 2 ies of IED placed on the district ever, no additional evidence has been brought AOG-initiated SAF attacks roads. Mohmand village came to to the fore in support of this statement so far. against ANSF installations; 2 tar- the fore on 3 September, when 2 Reports indicating a broad AOG intimidation geted assassinations (including a IEDs placed on the link road were campaign against participation in the parlia- bodyguard of an election candi- found and defused by IMF in the mentary elections were recorded in most of the date); 5 ANSF/IMF search opera- morning hours. Later on in the districts. In light of the pervasive AOG out- tions resulting in arrests of AOG; afternoon, 3 IMF servicemen reach in Logar, and following AOG tactical 2 discoveries of AOG rocket were injured when another IED choices of the recent months, NGO can ex- launch sites and storage places detonated under their vehicle in pect a spike in IED placements on the main the same village. 11 days later, roads as well as an increased occurrence of KEY THREATS & CONCERNS ANSF/IMF conducted a search stand-off IDF attacks targeting DACs during, Road side IED operation in the area during which and immediately fore and aft, the election day. Abduction 3 AOG members were arrested.

REMINDER: NGO are advised to implement a ‘soft’ in-country hibernation for all international staff for the period covering the 17th through to the 19th of September 2010. National staff taking part in the vote should be advised to avoid the peak 06:00-09:00 period at the polling stations. Movement outside of the agency compound should be restricted to emergency only while even within the compound consideration should be given to the possibility of an accidental rocket strike, however unlikely. If your agency compound is located in the vicinity of a likely target (polling station, Government facility, Police post) then it would be advisable to seek alternative housing for this period. ANSO would not recommend moving in to hotels or guesthouses during this period as many of these are currently loaded with election related consultants and may be targeted. All ANSO staff will be present and on duty throughout the period and will be focused on providing immediate updates on any changes in situation. Ensure that all ANSO connected VHF, Email and phones are present, charged and permanently monitored. THE ANSO REPORT Page 6

NGO Incidents PARWAN PARWAN Year to Date 1 50

This Report Period 0 40 has enjoyed a considerable drop in incidents linked to the victim’s involvement 30 during the report cycle with both in numerous personal disputes 20 AOG/ACG and ANSF/IMF ap- that plausibly rule out the likeli- 10 pearing to scale down their activi- hood of the murder being politi- 0 ties. Whether this lull will hold cally motivated. On 11 September thru the election period, or again, another in the series of PARWAN AOG PARWAN ACG whether it was rather a reflection demonstrations in protest against of temporary hold of operations the Quran-burning affair was works seem to have a potential to expand into during the last days of Ramadan staged in the Area of adjacent districts. The potential for similar spill and subsequent Eid festivities, is Kohi Safi district. 500 protesters -over of instability exists for Kohi Safi which yet to be seen. Only 2 hard secu- marched towards the Bagram borders the restive Tagab (Kapisa) and Surobi rity incidents were reported and DAC, where the demonstration (Kabul) districts, possibly attracting AOG at- AOG activity remained confined dispersed without any escalation tention due to its strategic proximity to the to an imprecise stand-off rocket of violence reported following capital. Since June 2010, 7 incidents involving attack against the Bagram Air negotiations with the District IDF attacks or rocket seizures by ANSF have Field IMF base on 11 September; Governor; several small-scale pro- been recorded in the district. tests and public rallies related to while ANSF/IMF operations No direct clashes related to the Wolesi Jirga have not translated into any secu- the cause were also recorded in Ghorband DAC. elections were recorded during the report cy- rity incidents at all. A targeted cle, although unconfirmed accounts of con- killing of a local prominent mullah Despite the lull in security inci- certed intimidation of female candidates by in Chaharikar, a former member dents, NGOs operating in Parwan local power-holders were reported to IEC. of the Provincial shura, recorded should note that the security envi- Due to the existence of extensive powerbroker on 5 September, was most likely ronment remains extremely vola- (warlord) networks, with many of the promi- tile in the western districts located nent leaders standing as election candidates, KEY THREATS & CONCERNS along the Ghorband Valley. Be- and a correspondingly high level of political AOG in Ghorband Valley sides hindering NGOs freedom of activism in the urban centres, Parwan may see Elections related violence movements on the Parwan- increased political tensions during and in the Criminality in Chaharikar Bamyan road, local AOG net- aftermath of the election period.

NGO Incidents SAMANGAN Year to Date 1 SAMANGAN This Report Period 1 50 Two national staff members of an 40 the last bi-weekly report, over the INGO were temporarily detained 30 by AOGs in Bayanan Village of past month some NGOs have 20 Dara-e Suf Payan District, who proactively engaged local authori- demanded that the INGO assist ties and community leaders in the 10 the AOGs by giving them food district in order to re-start their 0 items. The AOGs threatened to activity with a local security guar- burn the INGO vehicle until an antee. As NGOs are returning to SAMANGAN AOG SAMANGAN ACG agreement was reached through the area, AOGs may attempt to negotiations with the local elders. gain more information on the rescue operation in which the four road con- This is the first NGO encounter identities, activities, and accep- struction company staff were recovered after with AOGs since NGOs started tance levels of the NGOs. AOGs having been abducted in Balkal Village. Two returning to the area after many will also likely continue to “test” SAF attacks against IMF have been reported in left the district in late June due to the NGOs’ willingness to cooper- Bayanan Village in the past month. On both reports of insecurity. As noted in ate with AOGs, and pressure occasions IMF were conducting reconnais- NGOs to cooperate with them sance missions on polling centres in the area, KEY THREATS & CONCERNS directly. The site of the temporary and no casualties or damages were reported. NGO detention detention, Bayanan Village, was The security situation elsewhere in the prov- the location of the 24 July ANP ince remains stable. THE ANSO REPORT Page 7

NGO Incidents BAGHLAN Year to Date 4 BAGHLAN 50 This Report Period 0 The security situation in Baghlan 40 Province remains volatile, with sponded, resulting in a three hour- 30 continued daytime attacks on the long fire fight. The second clash 20 was prompted by an AOG attack main roads running through the 10 on an ANP checkpoint, resulting province, as well as an increasingly 0 active AOG presence in Burka in the deaths of three AOGs. District. In an unusual develop- Along the Pul-e Khumri- BAGHLAN AOG BAGHLAN ACG ment, the first suicide bomber in Road incidents have occurred the province since January 2009 more frequently, targeting both of Police, abducted an IEC field coordinator was deployed against a pro- high-profile individuals as well as and shot dead five members of a family, re- government militia commander in ANP positions and patrols. De- portedly because the family had requested legal Dand-e Shahabuddin Area of Pul- spite the presence of ANP check- assistance from an independent government- e Khumri District. The com- points along the road, within the funded human rights commission to settle a mander managed to escape un- past two weeks the Nahrin Dis- domestic issue. An increase in AOG presence harmed; however, his two body trict Governor was killed in a tar- was noted in following ANSF- guards were killed in the attack. geted attack north of Baghlan Old led operations in Baghlani Jadid in March During this two-week period, two City, the newly appointed Kunduz 2010, and their level of influence has since day-time clashes were reported on ANA commander managed to steadily increased. Though several polling cen- the Pul-e Khumri-Mazar Road in escape a targeted attack, and a tres have been projected to close in the most Cheshmashir and Bagh-e Shamal Kabul Bank vehicle was stolen. volatile areas of the province, election-day vio- Areas. One of these clashes was The frequency of targeted attacks lence may still be seen throughout areas of the reportedly sparked when AOGs in this area suggests the presence province where AOGs are present but rela- established an illegal checkpoint of a mature communication sys- tively inactive such as Nahrin, Burka, Khinjan, on the main road, and ANSF re- tem between Pul-e Khumri City and Tala Wa Barfak districts. Areas with open and the area north of Baghlan Old polling centres in districts where AOG influ- City, where these incidents have KEY THREATS & CONCERNS ence is prevalent (Pul-e Khumri, Dahan-e all occurred. In Burka District, an Ghori and Baghlani Jadid) will probably also Illegal checkpoints increase in AOG activity is noted, Increased activity in Burka Dis- witness further pre-election and election-day where AOGs attacked the resi- violence. trict dence of the acting District Chief

NGO Incidents JAWZJAN Year to Date 0 JAWZJAN 50 This Report Period 0 Compared to last year’s pre- 40 election spike in violence, Jawzjan dle of the province, election-day 30 Province has remained quiet out- violence may occur in some iso- 20 lated areas which host a small de- side of , which saw 10 gree of AOG presence such as a second coordinated attack on 0 the district centre in the past Feyzabad and Mingajik districts. Aside from election-related con- month. The confirmed closure of JAWZJAN AOG JAWZJAN ACG all of the Darzab’s polling centres, cerns, AOGs attacked an ANP as well as those in neighboring checkpoint to the far west of the province to neighboring . , will further Shibirgan District in the Dasht-e Despite the heavy fighting in Darzab and undermine GOA influence in this Laylee Area. The desert area saw a Qush Tepa, it should be noted that the rest of area which has been widely per- predictable increase in AOG pres- Jawzjan has seen an over 50% decrease in ceived to be “lost” to AOG con- ence coming up from Darzab/ AOG-initiated incidents in the past year. The trol. Beyond the southern panhan- Qush Tepa following the ANSF- decrease is primarily attributed to the complete led operation in April 2010. Con- absence of IED incidents thus far in 2010, KEY THREATS & CONCERNS tinued attacks on ANSF in this compared to a series of seven IED strikes Attacks in Darzab area may signify a push for con- which occurred during the same period in Closing of polling stations trol of the route which connects 2009. THE ANSO REPORT Page 8

NGO Incidents FARYAB FARYAB Year to Date 12 50 This Report Period 2 A notable trend in NGO abduc- 40 tions continued in Faryab Prov- ducted while travelling from 30 ince, where staff members of two Qaramqul to Qurghan District in 20 separate NGOs were released this an NGO ambulance when they 10 period, bringing the total number were hijacked and brought to an 0 of confirmed NGO abduction unknown location. Within 24 hours, the abductors demanded cases to four in the past two FARYAB AOG FARYAB ACG months. Recent information con- that male family members of the firms that these abductions have female staff come to their location tion on the NGO community, mirroring a been centrally directed by AOG in order to stay with the women similar process taking place in Northern Tak- leadership who have given the throughout the abduction. The har, where AOGs have requested NGOs to directive to target NGOs for ab- AOGs held the group in various report their activities and movements directly duction in the overall province. locations until they were released to the AOG shadow government. The process The purpose of this directive is on 9 September from Almar Dis- may also be used to elicit a reaction among still unknown; however, it is sus- trict. Also in late August, two beneficiary community leaders, who are forced pected that AOGs are utilizing INGO national staff (driver and to acknowledge the authority of the AOGs in NGO abductions in order to rein- mechanic) were abducted with an their area in order to secure the release of the force and project a provincial or INGO rented vehicle from in NGO and ensure the continuation of the regional “unity of effort.” As evi- front of a private residence in Aq NGO’s activities. This trend in abductions is dence, in each case of abduction Mazar Village. They were held in expected to continue for the foreseeable fu- AOGs have referred the fate of Khwaja Kenti Village of Qaysar ture, and will not likely recede following the their abductees to a regional deci- District until the evening of 6 parliamentary elections as none of the abduc- sion-making body made up of September when they were re- tions have been assessed to be related to local AOG leaders who are authorized leased, unharmed. political rivalry. to determine whether the abduc- In each case of abduction, the Armed clashes continue to occur during the tees should be released. Thus, the abducted NGO staff have been day-time on the Ring Road in Dawlatabad and authority of the aforementioned questioned regarding their organi- Shirin Tagab districts. An air operation in AOG “commission” is subse- zation’s activities, donors, areas of resulted in the deaths of quently extended to each area, operation, and relationship to the five AOGs, signifying the first recorded air forcing the acknowledgement of government, security forces and strike to take place within the northern dis- the affected communities, as well international community. In the tricts. Also in Centre, an as reinforcing a unified command latest abduction of female staff, RCIED prematurely detonated. In addition, an structure among Faryab’s newly the abductors also questioned the unusual spike in AOG activity was reported in mobilized sub-provincial leader- NGO whether it had been pro- Khwaja Sabz Push this period, where AOGs ship. moting human and women’s attacked two ANSF patrols and harassed a To highlight the most recent rights. In the three abductions group of women who were celebrating Eid. cases, in late August four national which occurred north of May- The increase in AOG activity in these areas female medical NGO staff mem- mana City (Khwaja Sabz Push, suggests the potential for further AOG- bers and a male driver were ab- Dawlatabad and Qaramqul dis- initiated attacks within the central and north- tricts) AOGs also emphasized ern districts ahead of the elections, and a con- concerns about proselytizing. KEY THREATS & CONCERNS certed agenda to expand AOG influence in Given the systematic questioning, these areas in the future. NGO abduction threat it is possible that the abductions are being used to collect informa- THE ANSO REPORT Page 9

NGO Incidents TAKHAR Year to Date 4 TAKHAR This Report Period 0 50 This period in , a 40 controversial air operation under- an influential village elder from the district, and that none of the 30 mined civilian support for interna- 20 tional military forces, when a tar- convoy’s party was involved in 10 geted air strike killed two mem- AOG activity. The incident un- bers of an election campaign con- derscores what is seen to be a per- 0 voy and injured ten others, includ- sistent dilemma in the northeast- ing the parliamentarian candidate. ern region, where at least three TAKHAR AOG TAKHAR ACG The air strike, which took place in highly controversial air strikes Rustaq District, was reportedly have undermined GOA and local tain control, AOGs have gained considerable intended for a senior-level AOG relations with IMF in the past influence in much of Darqad and neighbouring leader from Khwaja Bahawuddin thirteen months. districts. While polling centres in Darqad Dis- District, according to IMF A second IMF air operation in the trict are projected to close, a recent report indi- sources. Local and GOA sources, northern district of Darqad re- cates that AOGs have intimidated locals in however, assert that the individual sulted in eight AOG deaths and neighboring districts from participating in the who was killed in the attack was nine arrests. Due to the difficulty elections. Clashes continue between pro- of Darqad’s terrain, IMF may government militias and AOGs, presenting an continue to conduct air operations increased risk of collateral involvement to civil- KEY THREATS & CONCERNS where they are unable to have ian bystanders, as one civilian was killed and IMF airstrikes ground access. Where security four others injured in one reported clash in Clashes in the north forces have been unable to main- Yangi Qala Old City.

BADAKHSHAN NGO Incidents BADAKHSHAN Year to Date 3 50 This Report Period 1 40 Activity in 30 was defined by civil unrest sur- ANSO received reports as early as 20 rounding the issue of Quran- May 2010 of an increasing AOG 10 burning, and slight displays of influence in the district, originat- 0 AOG force ahead of elections in ing from Northern Takhar. Simi- Kishim and Shahri Buzorg Dis- lar attacks may occur in the fu- tricts. In Shahri Buzorg District, ture, particularly in the coming BADAKHSHAN AOG BADAKHSHAN ACG AOGs fired three RPGs toward days, as AOGs would be intent on discouraging local participation in dissent against the proposed Quran-burning the District Centre, one of which ceremony in the , despite the fact impacted the outer compound the parliamentary elections. In Kishim District as well, a joint that the ceremony did not take place. The wall of an INGO field office, but largely peaceful demonstration ended in vio- did not explode. The target of the IMF/ANSF search operation re- sulted in an armed clash, killing lence, when a segment of the demonstrators attack was assessed to be the ANP proceeded to the PRT and were shot at by na- headquarters, marking the first one AOG. Further violence may take place within Kishim in ad- tional security guards, resulting in the deaths of RPG attack in the district, where two demonstrators and the injury of five oth- IEDs have previously been used vance of the upcoming elections, as several dozen AOGs have re- ers. The killings sparked a second demonstra- on occasion against ANSF targets. tion, as well as small-scale attacks on IMF in- While in the past the small degree portedly gathered in the district in order to attack ANSF and GOA terests: RPGs were fired against the PRT in the of anti-security force activity has following days, and a hand grenade was been associated with the criminal targets. As evidence, one RCIED was discovered and removed from thrown into the private residence of an IMF intent to protect the drug- national employee. The killings of the demon- smuggling route from Badakhshan the main Kishim-Tagab Road this period. strators, compounded by the controversial to northern Takhar Province, IMF air strike in neighbouring Takhar, may Dominating local news in Badakh- contribute to an increased atmosphere of hos- KEY THREATS & CONCERNS shan this period, several thousand Demonstrations tility toward the international military in the demonstrators gathered in the northeastern region. Instability in Kishim provincial capital to voice their THE ANSO REPORT Page 10

NGO Incidents KUNDUZ KUNDUZ Year to Date 3 100 This Report Period 0 A reported influx in the number 80 of foreign fighters into Kunduz other members this period. In 60 Province has reinforced the wan- addition to continued clashes, as 40 ing capacity of local AOGs to seen primarily in and 20 Aliabad districts this period, this withstand a series of successful 0 IMF air strikes and arrest opera- steady infiltration of non-local tions over the past month. The AOGs may present additional series of security force operations security challenges, such as the KUNDUZ AOG KUNDUZ ACG occurrence of suicide bombings has temporarily inhibited AOG the aim of the letter was to discourage the which have proliferated in the capabilities in Chahar Dara Dis- PDO from resuming its activities in the north. past three months. This period an trict, where AOG-initiated inci- While some INGOs in Kunduz are imple- SVBIED killed five ANP and dents were limited to two IED menting partners of this specific foreign gov- three civilians and injured two attacks against IMF. In addition, ernment donor, INGOs are not likely targets ANP and ten civilians outside a the recent introduction of a new for such attacks given their longstanding local commercial meat market con- ANA commander and Provincial acceptance. That being said, the increased tracted by ANSF. ANSO has re- Chief of Police will likely usher in presence of non-local AOGs could potentially corded twelve suicide attacks in a period of increased military op- disrupt the social contracts which have previ- over the course erations throughout the province. ously ensured NGOs security, and possibly of the past four years, a third of A significant increase in support forcing NGOs to renegotiate access in certain which have taken place in the past for pro-government militias will areas of the province. also attempt to offset the steady three months. A second SAF attack within Kunduz City in growth of non-local AOG rein- A night letter was widely distrib- the course of three weeks highlights the poten- forcements. Pro-government mili- uted in Kunduz City, discouraging tial for further direct-fire incidents to take tias remain the primary targets for local cooperation with ISAF and place, particularly in the more vulnerable areas AOG attacks in Khanabad Dis- ISAF-affiliated foreign govern- to the west of the city, such as Zakhil. Suicide, trict, where an RCIED killed a ment donors, specifically prohibit- IED and direct-fire attacks will likely inhibit militia commander and three ing locals from seeking employ- election-day proceedings within the city, as ment with these organizations or well as rocket fire from neighboring Chahar KEY THREATS & CONCERNS renting them property. The letter Dara District. Outside the provincial capital, praised the 2 July complex attack Non-local AOG influence IED, direct-fire and indirect-fire attacks will on a Private Development Or- Renewed ANSF efforts likely continue in Archi and ganization (PDO), suggesting that Suicide attacks centres ahead of the elections.

NGO Incidents The reported closure of up to six polling cen- SAR- E PUL Year to Date 0 tres outside the district capital serves as an- This Report Period 0 other indication of the district’s continued in- In Sar-e Pul Province, the security stability. Along the southeastern border of Say- situation outside of Sayyad Dis- volved simultaneous attacks yad District, AOGs continue to patrol Jerghan trict remained stable this period, against four ANP checkpoints in and Alef Safed areas of , with the exception of the presence the vicinity of the district centre, which has prompted the arrival of additional of illegal checkpoints during the signaling a reemergence of AOG- ANP and ANA reinforcements ahead of the night on the Sar-e Pul-Shibirgan initiated activity in the district fol- elections. Beyond , no further Road. Within Sayyad District, lowing a six-month period of rela- polling centres have been projected to close; AOGs carried out an offensive tive quiet, onset by the ANSF-led however, a handful of polling centres in Sar-e attack against static ANSF posi- operation in April 2010. Contrary Pul and Gosfandi districts have been assessed tions for the first time since to the lack of kinetic activity in as insecure. In addition to the threat of general March 2010. The incident in- the district, AOGs have quietly cultivated a safe haven in Sayyad, attacks in opposition to the elections, last- KEY THREATS & CONCERNS which is now reportedly used to minute closings of polling centres in insecure Attacks on ANP coordinate activities in neighbor- areas may prompt civil unrest by those who are AOG checkpoints ing Jawzjan and Faryab provinces. unable to vote. THE ANSO REPORT Page 11

NGO Incidents BALKH Year to Date 9 BALKH 50 This Report Period 2 Two attempted NGO abductions 40 were reported this period in Balkh seen in Quchi Village, west of the 30 district centre. Outward kinetic Province this period. In Sholgara 20 District, to the west of the district attacks and reports of intimidation 10 centre, four national staff mem- or tax collection have yet to be bers were stopped by a group of seen; however, the attempted ab- 0 armed men riding on motorcycles duction may have been a sign that while driving in an unmarked Surf AOGs are intent on expanding BALKH AOG BALKH ACG vehicle. The armed men forced their influence into these areas. It the NGO driver to follow them; is also possible that the attempted local authorities ahead of the elections, where however, the NGO driver sped abduction was criminally, rather two IEC field workers were shot dead. In an up and managed to escape un- than politically, motivated. effort to establish security in the district, the harmed. The incident marks the A second attempted abduction provincial government has sponsored the de- first NGO-direct incident to take occurred in Balkh District, ap- velopment of pro-government militias, led by place on the western side of the proximately 20 kilometres outside local former Jihadi commanders. While the river. AOGs are known to be ac- the district centre, where an additional IMF and ANSF troops deployed tive east of the river; however, a INGO driver was abducted with throughout the problematic areas of Chahar handful of villages in the remote two national staff members of an Bolak, Chimtal and Sholgara districts may im- areas west and southwest of the international consulting company. pede AOG movements ahead of the elections, district are also at risk of AOG While areas of Balkh District have projected polling centre closures and election- infiltration from eastern Sholgara, reported an increase in AOG day violence in these areas may be expected. Kishindeh and Chimtal districts. presence coming from Chahar Election-related violence was also seen in As evidence, on 25 August, a well- Bolak District, this particular inci- Dawlatabad District, where an election cam- known AOG commander was dent may have been criminally paign vehicle came under small arms fire, and motivated and specific to this again in Marmul District, where a campaign KEY THREATS & CONCERNS INGO. vehicle was set on fire. In such cases, it is diffi- NGO abductions cult to discern between attacks carried out by Insecurity in Chahar Bolak Dis- political rivals and those carried out by AOGs. Instability in Chahar Bolak trict dominated the concerns of

NGO Incidents PAKTYA PAKTYA Year to Date 0 100 This Report Period 0 80

AOG incidents in this period 60 were tactically and geographically related to the planned Holy Quran diversified with direct attacks burning in the US, a third one was 40 against ANP, a private road con- more about the insufficient num- 20 struction company, IED attacks ber of polling stations in the Prov- 0 against IMF, as well as the abduc- ince. In this demonstration, the tion of PSC personnel all being crowd threatened to block the PAKTYA AOG PAKTYA ACG recorded. Eight out the fourteen main road unless their demands districts recorded incidents, were met. A similar complaint though preponderance was noted was lodged in Nangarhar and elections, with local communities being threat- in Gardez, Zurmat, and Sayid both of these closure plans were ened against participating in the elections. As Karam Districts. reported to be the result of pre- well, they ordered the removal of campaign vailing instability and the inability posters otherwise locations displaying these As seen throughout the Eastern to properly secure the sites. would be burned. These incidents are repre- Region, three demonstrations sentative of typical AOG efforts to counter the were conducted in Paktya Prov- Occurrences of AOG intimida- election, with only very few incidents involving ince. While two of them were tion attempts continued in this period with night letters being armed action. An AOG checkpoint, searching KEY THREATS & CONCERNS distributed in Chamkany, Wuza for GoA and IMF and other associated per- sonnel, was also established in Sayid Karam Direct attacks against ANSF , and Sayid Karam Dis- District. IEDs tricts. The focus of these efforts has surrounded the upcoming THE ANSO REPORT Page 12

NGO Incidents LAGHMAN LAGHMAN Year to Date 1 50

This Report Period 0 40

Following a steady upwards trend 30 in incident volumes during the Eid in this period can also be par- 20 past few months, the opening tially responsible for this trend. 10 weeks of September are indicative The most significant incident to of a reduction in this momentum. occur during this period was the 0 Unlike the majority of the ER, September 4th attack on a police AOG activity within Laghman station within Mitharlam city. This LAGHMAN AOG LAGHMAN ACG peaked in August, the only other brazen attack appears to have with only a few attacks recorded. Of note, province trending this way being been an opportunistic effort un- there was one attempted ‘magnetic IED’ inci- Kunar. This downturn can be dertaken by an AOG during a dent, a tactic that has developed and been de- mostly attributed to standard sea- period of political unrest and con- ployed throughout the Eastern Region, primar- sonal activity patterns; patterns flict between various factions ily in Nangarhar. This tactic, however, pre- that mark a downturn beginning within the city. This is suggestive sents little risk to NGO as they are almost ex- in September and continuing into that elements within this province clusively utilized against fuel convoys and are the winter months. As well, the have developed a keen situational rarely successful. as they are typically discov- inclusion of end of Ramadan and awareness, allowing them to ex- ered and removed prior to detonation. Avoid- ploit opportunities when they pre- ance of these targets should be a sufficient KEY THREATS & CONCERNS sent themselves. IEDs in Alingar & Alishing mitigation measure to prevent collateral in- Activity along the -Kabul volvement in such attacks. Armed clahses highway was also understated,

NGO Incidents NANGARHAR Year to Date 2 NANGARHAR This Report Period 0 100 Nangarhar remains the epicentre 80 for ‘magnetic’ IED activity within is just as likely that the ultimate 60 goal is to infiltrate such a device the ER. This tactic surfaced in 40 the first quarter of this year and onto an IMF facility in order to maximize impact. Having said 20 has since gained in frequency, 0 though not efficacy. These types that, these efforts may be the re- of IED are typically attached to a sult of intense competition regard- fuel tanker and subsequently deto- ing the rewarding of such supply NANGARHAR AOG NANGARHAR ACG nate, damaging the targeted contracts. tanker, and in some instances, Indirect fire attacks within Jala- At least four demonstrations were also re- others travelling within the con- labad, primarily targeting JAF, corded during the reporting cycle, all sporting voy. This disruption of IMF fuel remain another regular aspect of a similar a motivation (the planned burning of supplies has been a recurrent the security context within this the Holy Quran), location (Kuz Kunar), and AOG tactical goal and it is not province (est. 2-4 per reporting effect (blocking the Asadabad-Jalalabad high- surprising that Nangarhar is the period) with 2 instances of multi- way). As demonstrations are a regular occur- focal point for such efforts. Jala- ple launches being recorded this rence within this province, this reaction comes labad represents the primary con- period. Of note, the rocket attack as little surprise and these regular events pose centration of IMF forces within on the 12th of September resulted one of the greatest concerns for NGO operat- the ER. While the destruction of in numerous civilian casualties. ing in this province. Beyond the immediate the fuel tankers is itself an end, it Casualties resulting from these effects of movement restrictions when they attacks are exceedingly rare, occur, there always remains the risk of escala- tion KEY THREATS & CONCERNS though considering the frequency and established inaccuracy of IDF attacks in Jalalabad City rocket attacks; such collateral Magnetic IEDs damage remains a threat. Demonstration THE ANSO REPORT Page 13

NGO Incidents KUNAR KUNAR Year to Date 6 200 This Report Period 0 There was one NGO incident 150 during this period. On September suspected to have suffered various 100 degrees of injury by the subse- 2 in Shegal District, a private vehi- 50 cle was ambushed by small arms quent vehicle crash. It still re- fire from unknown assailants. Of mains unclear as to what was the 0 the total 6 passengers in the vehi- trigger of this attack, or who con- cle, 2 were NGO national staff ducted it. It is worth noting that members (1 male, 1 female). at the time of the incident, the KUNAR AOG KUNAR ACG While all passengers were injured vehicle was travelling for reasons in the incident, only 1 (the female unrelated to the NGO. In addi- incidents serves as a reminder to the inherent staff member) has been confirmed tion, NGOs from this province risks of operating in such environments. to have been wounded by the tend to enjoy a pervasive accep- This reporting period has also marked the weapons fire with the remainder tance and the extensive AOG downturn in incident trending noted through- presence minimizes the preva- out the region, with the District of Sirkanay lence of criminal actors. However, hosting the highest level of AOG direct ac- KEY THREATS & CONCERNS as continues to Pervasive AOG presence tions, primarily attacks against security force remain the most violent and vola- static positions. Attacks along the main routes tile province in the region, such

NGO Incidents Year to Date 0 KHOST This Report Period 0 100 The most significant incident dur- 80 ing this reporting period occurred though the device partially failed 60 on September 1st, marking the first and only succeeded in killing the 40 suicide attack since the large scale, bomber. 20 multiple tactic attacks against 2 The security situation has re- 0 IMF facilities on the 28th of Sep- mained volatile with this province tember. An SVBIED attack at- consistently reporting the second KHOST AOG KHOST ACG tempted to target an IMF convoy highest incident levels within the East. AOG activity has continued KEY THREATS & CONCERNS unabated across the province, IEDs with incidents being concentrated in Mando Zayi, Khost City and Suicide attacks Sabari Districts. Indirect fire attacks

NOTICE: Your input is invaluable for the production of this report. While we appreciate information on incidents, we also need general information on the security situation and context in your area. So please remember to call or email us regularly. Contact details of ANSO staff are provided on the last page.

ANSO: “..by NGOs for NGOs..” THE ANSO REPORT Page 14

NGO Incidents GHOR Year to Date 5 GHOR 50 This Report Period 0 Further and more detailed infor- 40 mation on the armed clash on 30 safe until a government delegation 30 arrived from City to August in Jandak Village, 20 help escort the INGO staff out of Murghab Area of Chaghcharan 10 District, shows that the clash was the area. According to reports, 0 not directly linked to tensions be- one AOG member was acciden- tween election candidates. AOG tally shot and killed by his own tried and failed to abduct INGO men during the failed attempt to GHOR AOG GHOR ACG staff members in the village. The abduct the INGO staff. The pos- apparent intention was to abduct sibility of reprisal attacks in the The IED discovery on 14 September is not NGO staff in order to exchange area is uncertain, as there are ru- that unusual for , as it them for AOG members being mours circulating of such actions typically records the highest number of IED held by the government. The fact being directed at NGO staff, discoveries in . In addition, that they were INGO staff was however, as in this incident, stead- there were two abductions in , only relevant insofar as their per- fast local acceptance may help both occurring along the main road to Pasa- ceived political value. One posi- mitigate this threat. Nonetheless, band district. tive aspect of the incident is that there is a risk for NGOs working Election related incidents were also recorded. members of the village protected or moving in the area to be per- In Lal Wa Sarjangal, the vehicle of an election the INGO staff, and kept them ceived as potential targets – candidate was burned, and in Tulak, the vehi- probably in order to influence cle of an election candidate was attacked with specific political situations or KEY THREATS & CONCERNS SAF. In addition, ANP seized 50 voting cards power structures. AOG activity in Murghab in Chaghcharan City on 14 September. In gen- AOG activity in Ghor Province eral, similar incidents are reported countrywide IED activity has been in decline compared to in regard to the elections and are not specific Abductions the previous reporting periods. to Ghor Province.

NGO Incidents HERAT Year to Date 11 50 This Report Period 1 saw a decrease in 40 NGO related incidents this pe- (i.e. why this member was tar- 30 geted). Previous intimidation ac- riod, with only 1 incident directly 20 involving an NGO. On 9 Septem- tivities by AOGs in Herat have ber, a national INGO staff mem- been election related and not spe- 10 ber received a threatening phone cifically targeting NGOs or NGO 0 call requesting him to quit his job staff and at present it is assessed with the INGO or face conse- that this isolated incident does not HERAT AOG HERAT ACG quences. The caller identified him- indicate a general threat to the self as AOG and also mentioned wider NGO community. three ANP officers. At the time of the explo- that a letter had been sent, a letter During this period the use of sion, a concert in the Park Stadium had ended which reiterated the threat though IEDs has been the preferred tactic with people in the process of leaving the sta- this never materialized. Despite of AOGs province wide. Shin- dium. This resulted in a panic and subse- the self-identification of the caller dand District hosted the highest quently ten civilians were wounded in the as AOG, this cannot be con- number of the IED related inci- crowd. Despite the devices proximity to ANP firmed and the specifics surround- dents followed by Herat City and vehicles, the timing of the detonation is com- ing this incident remain unclear Kushk. Perhaps the most signifi- pelling, suggesting that it was intentional with cant incident occurred in Herat the purpose of causing widespread fear and the KEY THREATS & CONCERNS City where an RCIED detonated impression of instability, a common element of IED in the vicinity of the Park Sta- such incidents within Herat. Intimidation efforts dium, apparently targeting two Direct attacks against ANP parked ANP vehicles, wounding THE ANSO REPORT Page 15

NGO Incidents BADGHIS Year to Date 0 BADGHIS This Report Period 0 50 During the current reporting pe- 40 riod Murghab District witnessed creation and deployment of such devices) and logistical support, it 30 the majority of incidents. Besides 20 a direct attack against an ANP may be that there has been a re- cent influx of new talent into the 10 patrol in Sinyha Area, all other 0 incidents were IED discoveries; area though only time will indicate this period marking an increase in the sustainability of such efforts. the use of IEDs. It is worth not- More data is required to assess if BADGHIS AOG BADGHIS ACG ing, however, that the efficacy of this shift in the increased use of these devices remains low. IED is permanent as direct at- This recent incident was not election related, tacks against security elements but the result of intra-AOG fighting. A similar In Ghormach, IED related inci- have been the preferred tactic till case had been also recorded this April this dents constituted the majority as now. year. well. Two IED detonations were recorded, with one targeting IMF Of note, Qadis District, one of After the incident at the PRT base in the city and the second affecting civilians. the typically quieter areas, saw centre on 25 August, the situation in Qala-I- As IEDs require a certain level of both IMF/ANSF operations Naw City remains calm, with both authorities technical expertise (both for the along with a direct attack against and community leaders addressing public con- ANP in Sarak-E-Qarchaghai. cerns in regards to that incident. At this time, it During the current reporting cy- seems as the impact of the incident will remain KEY THREATS & CONCERNS cle, Jawand district saw its fourth limited due to these interventions, as they in- Intra-AOG clashes incident in 2010, half of which cluded public expression of support for PRT taking place in the last four weeks. efforts.

NGO Incidents FARAH Year to Date 0 FARAH 50 This Report Period 0 IEDs remain the major security 40 Along with the motorcycle borne concern in . Farah 30 BBIED in Delaram (targeting the City still accounts for nearly one 20 third of all IEDs recorded in Delaram Chief of Police), there 10 Farah Province. District 1 figured were numerous other IED inci- prominently in reporting with two dents throughout the province. 0 IED discoveries, one being di- The majority of these resulted in rectly on the airport road. Fur- civilian casualties, highlighting the FARAH AOG FARAH ACG thermore, in the Baghe Pol Area ongoing risk of collateral involve- of Farah City, an IED targeted an ment in such incidents. companies and PSCs. In addition, AOG at- ANP vehicle and in District 3, The beginning of the current re- tacked the ANSF/IMF base in Massaw Area ANP seized an RCIED while ar- porting cycle recorded several of Pusht Rod twice with indirect fire. resting two AOG members. direct attacks in Bakwa, Gulistan As with other areas, Farah was also affected by and Lash Wa Juwayn as well as in civil discontent over the planned burning of KEY THREATS & CONCERNS Pusht Rod. These attacks tar- the Quran, with a demonstration at the IMF Direct attacks along Ring Road geted the entire gamut of actors base in Farah Rod Area of Bala Buluk District IED within the area, encompassing turning violent. ANSF, IMF, road construction THE ANSO REPORT Page 16

NGO Incidents GHAZNI Year to Date 1 GHAZNI This Report Period 0 250 Although the overall number of 200 tively infrequently, with only 12 incidents dipped slightly as a re- 150 sult of Eid celebrations, the secu- recorded strikes, in the districts of rity environment in Ghazni Prov- Qarabagh, Ghazni and . 100 ince continued to be characterized The vast majority of these inci- 50 by a high degree of aggressive dents consisted of RCIEDs, 0 AOG activity, and a correspond- which were detonated to signal ing lull in IMF/ANSF operations. the start of a follow-on SAF at- GHAZNI AOG GHAZNI ACG tack. District Administration Centers mentary candidate, wounding the candidate, (DACs) throughout the province Andar Province continued to wit- one of his bodyguards, and a local civilian; sec- were targets of AOG attacks, us- ness civil unrest, as a demonstra- ond, a meeting between a parliamentary candi- ing both SAF, mortars and rock- tion of approximately 150 people date and his supporters was attacked by SAF; ets. The next most common tar- gathered in front of the DAC to and third, 3,000 fake voters cards, supposedly gets were ANP posts and to this protest IMF airstrikes that has manufactured in , were seized in end such attacks in the districts of allegedly killed civilians earlier in Ghazni City and one individual was arrested. Ghazni (three attacks), Qarabagh September. There is no record of (two attacks), Khogyani (two at- such deaths in Andar, which indi- Finally, there were three serious road accidents tacks), Muqur (two attacks) and cates that either IMF/ANSF are during the reporting period, in which a total of Gelan (two attacks). IMF facilities underreporting such incidents or 18 people were killed and 39 people injured. and convoys were attacked on 11 that the demonstration was An ANA vehicle rolled due to extreme speed, separate occasions, primarily in planned and encouraged by those injuring five soldiers. An IMF vehicle rolled, Andar, Ghazni and Qarabagh Dis- wishing to stir up anti-IMF/GOA again due to speed, injuring seven IMF sol- tricts. sentiment, which is, quite frankly, diers. Lastly, in the most serious accident, a not difficult to do in Andar as it is civilian bus rolled, once again due to high As usual IEDs were used rela- dominated by very active AOG speed, and the resulting crash killed 18 passen- units. gers and seriously injured another 23. These KEY THREATS & CONCERNS incidents are a reminder that, statistically, the IDF attacks against DAC Election-related violence surfaced in the province in the form of number one threat to life and limb in Afghani- Attacks against convoys stan still remains vehicle accidents. IMF airstrikes several incidents: first, a grenade attack on the office of a parlia-

NGO Incidents ZABUL Year to Date 0 ZABUL 100 This Report Period 0 continued to dis- 80 play slightly reduced levels of se- tricts of Naw Bahar, and Qalat, 60 hitting ANP and IMF targets in curity incidents during the report 40 Naw Bahar a total of five times, period, with only a handful of 20 AOG-initiated incidents and a and twice in Qalat. In total, four 0 similar number of IMF/ANSF AOG and three ANP were killed operations. It appears, as was during these actions, none of mentioned in the last report, that which were prolonged engage- ZABUL AOG ZABUL ACG the primary focus of operations ments. for both sides has been shifted to Supporting the idea that Zabul is the areas of Naw Khez in , as other areas of the south, with a now being used primarily as a well as the villages of Poli Sangi and Omaki, few notable exceptions. transit / storage point for opera- also in Qalat District. AOG launched attacks in the dis- tions elsewhere, IMF/ANSF Lastly, IEDs continue to play a minor role in search operations uncovered a the province, with only four strikes recorded, KEY THREATS & CONCERNS substantial amount of weapons, mainly against ANP and ANA vehicles, result- AOG attacks explosives and IED-making mate- ing in a total of three ANP wounded and two IMF activity rials on four separate occasions, in vehicles badly damaged. THE ANSO REPORT Page 17

NGO Incidents HELMAND Year to Date 1 HELMAND This Report Period 0 200 AOG maintained the vigorous 150 pace of activity established attempts by AOG to down an throughout the summer period in IMF helicopter with SAF. Both 100 attempts failed to cause damage to , as units initi- 50 ated attacks on a variety of IMF, the aircraft. ANSF and civilian targets. Targeted killing and intimidation 0 ANP posts were attacked by both appeared to increase during the SAF and RPGs in the districts of report period, as AOG killed two HELMAND AOG HELMAND ACG Sangin (seven attacks), Nahri Sar- elders, an IMF contracted driver, for several reasons, including the fact that IMF raj (six attacks), Lashkar Gah and three other civilians in sepa- operations have resulted in a turnover of mid- (four attacks) Marja (four attacks) rate incidents for collaborating level commanders, thus weakening command and Nad Ali (four attacks). IMF with IMF/GOA. In Garmser, a and control of local units. facilities and convoys came under family was attacked after they re- SAF and RPG fire on 13 separate fused to let AOG stay in their Lastly, a demonstration took place in Marja in occasions, primarily in Marja, house, with two of the family front of the DAC to protest the improper ac- Nahri Sarraj, and Nad Ali, with killed, and another two wounded. tions of IMF soldiers at a local mosque. It was witnessing two This incident reinforces the view determined that the incident never took place, that AOG units operating in Hel- indicating that the demonstration was most KEY THREATS & CONCERNS mand have historically been less likely generated by those seeking to create AOG prevalence disciplined than their counterparts problems for the IMF/AMSF units during the in Province, most likely celebration of Eid.

NGO Incidents PAKTIKA Year to Date 0 PAKTIKA 140 This Report Period 0 120 was one of the 100 provinces which did not seem to District Administration Centers 80 (DACs). The DACs of Ziruk, 60 enjoy even a slight decrease in 40 incidents during the Ramadan / Sharan, Jani Khel, Barmal, Yosuf 20 Eid period. AOG initiated attacks Khel, Yahya Khel, Khair Kot, and 0 remained extremely high, as did Gayan all endured some rocket the number of IED strikes occur- attacks, with the vast majority ring in the province. IMF/ANSF causing minimal damage and no PAKTIKA AOG PAKTIKA ACG operations remained somewhat loss of life reported. Direct AOG subdued; however as with other attacks occurred against IMF/ five separate incidents. provinces, there is an increasing ANSF convoys in the areas of IMF operations were few in number, however number of airstrikes employed Sarobi, Khushamand and Gayan, airstrikes were employed on several occasions, during operations. resulting in a total of three IMF representing a continuation of the shift in ap- wounded and a number of AOG Paktika-based AOG have always proach by the US since the departure of Gen- arrested. enjoyed a steady supply of rockets eral McChrystal over the summer. Airstrikes and mortars originating from IED use remained high, and in Yahya Khel, Yosuf Khel (on three occa- Pakistan and during the report strikes were reported against ANP sions), and Districts resulted in over 13 period these continued to be em- vehicles, road construction vehi- AOG killed however they also prompted sev- ployed against high-profile static cles and, unfortunately, on three eral demonstrations by local villagers, of which targets such as IMF facilities and occasions against civilians, primar- the most prominent occurred in the Maswas ily in the districts of Sharan, Ur- area of Sharan District as protesters demanded KEY THREATS & CONCERNS gun and Khair Kot. As a result, a the end of IMF operations and airstrikes in AOG attacks against DAC total of three ANP and seven ci- their area. IEDs vilians were killed and another eight wounded, within a total of THE ANSO REPORT Page 18

NGO Incidents KANDAHAR KANDAHAR Year to Date 8 200 This Report Period 2 There were two incidents involv- 150 ing NGOs. In the first incident, of ANP and local 100 officials. In this same period local staff of a de-mining NGO 50 were verbally threatened by indi- IMF/ANSF operations also viduals claiming to be AOG in marked an increase, with height- 0 Daman District, and in the second ened activity in Kandahar City as well as the Arghandab and Zhari incident, a local driver for another KANDAHAR AOG KANDAHAR ACG de-mining NGO was shot and Districts. killed in District 1 of Kandahar Direct AOG attacks occurred in City. Although these incidents are the Districts of Zhari, Arghandab contractor and then stringing up his body in a extremely troubling it is too early and in Kandahar City, with the tree in the village of Sayedano in Arghandab to conclude that the current AOG vast majority conducted against District. In Berana village of the attitude towards NGOs has ANP posts and personnel. Five District Commissioner narrowly escaped assas- changed and that NGOs are now ANP were killed in Kandahar sination when his convoy was attacked with being actively targeted. While City, primarily shot while either in SAF. many de-mining NGOs are not the bazaar or while travelling to/ IMF/ANSF activity has markedly increased actively supporting IMF/ANSF from home. An RCIED claimed during the report period, especially in the west- operations, they have in the past the lives of four civilians when the ern edge of Kandahar City (District 6 and 8) been targeted as they are seen as device detonated as an IMF con- and in the districts of Arghandab and Zhari, neutralizing/negating AOG ef- voy was passing in the Durahi where IMF units have been pushing outwards forts in certain cases, especially area of District 5 of Kandahar and establishing new footholds along the ring when they operate close to areas City. In Zhari, three separate road. In Zhari, IMF/ANSF operations in the of active clashes between the two ANP posts were attacked with areas of Spin Masjid, Makwan and Birana re- sides, such as is the case in both both SAF and RPGs, resulting in sulted in six AOG killed and an unknown of these recent incidents. a total of four ANP killed and number arrested. In addition, airstrikes near During the report period Kanda- seven others wounded. Also in Pashmul village in Zhari claimed the lives of 14 har Province has witnessed a sus- Zhari, AOG attacked IMF patrols AOG during a large operation. In another tained level of vigorous AOG twice, without any significant airstrike, however, four civilians were killed activity, comprising of both direct damage on either side. In Ar- and another 11 wounded near the village of attacks on IMF/ANSF targets as ghandab the village of Tabin be- Birana. Four separate operations in the west- well as a continuing program of came a battleground several times ern districts of Kandahar City resulted in at as AOG attacked the ANP post least 11 AOG killed and the seizure of a sub- there on three separate occasions stantial amount of IED materials. Lastly, in KEY THREATS & CONCERNS over the past 10 days. Arghandab, Char Gholba village witnessed a AOG assassinations Intimidation efforts by AOG con- clash between AOG and a joint IMF/ANP Attacks against ANP tinued during the report period force; three ANP were wounded in the fight- IMF operations with AOG killing a local IMF ing.

NOTE: The graphs provided in this report are accurate as of the 15th of September 2010 THE ANSO REPORT Page 19

NGO Incidents URUZGAN Year to Date 1 URUZGAN This Report Period 0 100 incident levels have subsided somewhat, un- ANP personnel who were patrol- 80 doubtedly due to the overall drop ling in the area of Patrol Base 60 in incident levels over the Rama- Mashal. As with the previous re- 40 port period, we are seeing the dan / Eid period. IMF/ANSF 20 appeared to increase the tempo of gradual introduction of the use of 0 their activities however, and em- rockets in the province, and there ployed an increasing number of were several rockets used once airstrikes against AOG targets again against the town of Tirin URUZGAN AOG URUZGAN ACG Kot, which failed to land any- during the report period. IEDs eight AOG, including two mid-level and one where significant and caused no were used in larger numbers than high-level commander (in the Balochi area of damage whatsoever. However, it in the past, most likely to com- Tiron Kot and the Gharam area of Dihrawud, can be anticipated that should the pensate for the decreased level of respectively). In addition, at least 11 AOG supply of IDF weapons persist, kinetic activity by AOG during were arrested during these operations, includ- the skills to use them more effec- this period. ing two more individuals assessed as being mid tively were slowly be developed by Attacks initiated by AOG primar- -level commanders. It will be interesting to local AOG units. ily targeted ANSF posts in the track the actions of AOG units in the Uruzgan Dihrawud District of the prov- As mentioned above, IMF/ANSF area after the removal of such a substantial ince, although several attacks were patrols were increased during this number of their leadership; the structure of also launched in Chora against period and as such clashes be- AOG in the south is designed to withstand tween IMF/ANSF and AOG oc- such setbacks, however we can probably ex- KEY THREATS & CONCERNS curred a total of 13 times, primar- pect a momentary respite in AOG attacks as IED strikes ily in the area of Tirin Kot and new commanders are shifted into the vacant Attacks against security force pa- Dihrawud, with the resulting ac- positions. trols tions accounting for the deaths of

NGO Incidents NIMROZ NIMROZ Year to Date 0 This Report Period 0 100 Nimroz Province witnessed sev- 80 eral significant incidents during PK machine gun and various the report period. In the Rakin small arms. Also in Khash Rod, 60 Area of Khash Rod, AOG at- an RCIED detonated against a 40 passing ANP vehicle, containing tacked an ANP post for approxi- 20 mately one hour, although there the District CoP. He was not in- were no reports of serious injury jured, however two civilian pedes- 0 or death. Interestingly, in the trians were killed in the explosion. same area, two days later, ANP In District, approximately NIMROZ AOG NIMROZ ACG arrested 13 ANP officers accused 100 civilians staged a demonstra- ghan male civilians, and wounded seven others of joining AOG, confiscating one tion, and protested against the in the border area of . An in- planned burning of the Holy vestigation has been launched by the GOA of Quran in the US. The demonstra- this serious incident. KEY THREATS & CONCERNS tors burnt vehicles and broke win-  AOG checkpoints dows, and ANP arrested about 30 Attacks against ANP protesters. Lastly, Iranian border police shot and killed three Af- THE AFGHANISTAN NGO SAFETY OFFICE - CONTACTS AND INFORMATION

CONTACT ANSO MISSING This report ANSO could not provide analysis for the prov- CENTRAL REGION OFFICE (KABUL) inces of: ANSO is hosted by Tomas Muzik - [email protected] - 0799 323 792 Deutsche Welthungerhilfe Mukhtar - [email protected] - 0799 322 116 Nuristan Panjshir NORTH REGION OFFICE (MAZAR) Elizabeth Detwiler - [email protected] - 0799 404 617 Firoz - [email protected] - 0799 408 252 To Register with ANSO This is because we contact: EAST REGION OFFICE (JALALABAD) do not know enough [email protected] Vacant - [email protected] - 0799 248 362 about the area to Shohar - [email protected] - 0798 778 014 comment on the sig- nificance of the inci- dents occurring ANSO is managed by an NGO SOUTH REGION OFFICE (KANDAHAR) there. Board. If you have any Peter Dimitroff - [email protected] 0796 688 416

feedback, good or bad, let Noori - [email protected] - 0700 492 550 them know on: If you can help us [email protected] WEST REGION OFFICE (HERAT) understand the prov- ince better, please Rachel Adam - [email protected] - 0799 322 192 contact us. ANSO ACRONYMS Sayed Karim- [email protected] - 0707 474 135

ACG-Armed Criminal Group / COUNTRY MANAGEMENT (KABUL) AEF-Afghan Eradication Forces Nic Lee - [email protected] - 0799 325 349 / ANA-Afghan National Army / ANBP-Afghan National Border Nathan Ronaldson - [email protected] - 0797 165 017 Police / ANP-Afghan National Patrick Malach - [email protected] - 0793 230 118 Police / AOG-Armed Opposition Group / APPF-Afghan Public Protection Forces (local depu- tised militias) / DC-District Centre / GOA-Government of Afghanistan / IDF-Indirect Fire (ex: mortars) / IED-Improvised FEEDBACK ON ANSO SERVICES Explosive Device / IMF- International Military Forces / NDS-National Directorate of ANSO welcomes your feedback. To provide confidential feedback, please email the Security (Intelligence) / PRP- Previous Reporting Period / ANSO Advisory Board at [email protected]. PSC-Private Security Company / RPG-Rocket Propelled Gre- nade / SAF-Small Arms Fire / VBIED-Vehicle Borne Impro- vised Explosive Device