what nato for what threats? warsaw and beyond Edited by enrico fassi Sonia Lucarelli Alessandro Marrone Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of the contributors and do not necessarily represent the views of Istituto Affari Internazionali, the University of Bologna, Allied Command Transformation or any other agency of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. “What NATO for what threats? Warsaw and Beyond” Editors: Enrico Fassi, Sonia Lucarelli, Alessandro Marrone © 2015 NATO HQ - Boulevard Léopold III, 1110 Brussels – Belgium ISBN: 978-92-845-0195-3 2 What NATO for what threats? Warsaw and Beyond Acknowledgments This publication is the result of the Conference ““What NATO for what threats? Warsaw and Beyond”, organized by NATO Allied Command Transformation (ACT), the University of Bologna and Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) of Rome. The Conference was the fourth iteration of ACT’s Academic Conference series, and it took place at the Centro Residenziale Universitario of the University of Bologna in Bertinoro (Italy), from the 4th to the 6th of October 2015. The success of the event was due to the joint efforts of the three institutions, and particularly of LTC Alfonso Alvarez and CDR Matteo Minelli of the ACT’s Academic Outreach Team; Michela Ceccorulli, Enrico Fassi and Sonia Lucarelli of the University of Bologna; and Alessandro Marrone and Anna Gaone of the Institute of International Affairs. Special thanks go also to Federico Casprini (FCAC) for his valuable advice. NATO Allied Command Transformation Università di Bologna Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) 3 Contents What NATO for What Threats? An Introduction p. 5 Enrico Fassi, Sonia Lucarelli & Alessandro Marrone Plenary One - Roundtable on “Hybrid Threats: What NATO Should Stand Ready for?” p. 9 Enrico Fassi Focus Area I What persistence and transformation in the strategic cultures of NATO member states? The More Things Change… A European Perspective on Persistence and Transformation in the Strategic Cultures of NATO Member States p.13 Heiko Biehl Understanding the Public Security Discourse- an Attempt by the Evocs Project p.25 Miloš Jovanović Working Group 1 – Report p.36 Francesco N. Moro Focus Area II NATO Readiness: What military and political issues? What Is NATO Ready for? Making the Case for ‘Strategic Readiness’ p. 42 Olivier de France NATO’s Readiness in the post-Crimea Security Environment: Political and Military Challenges p. 60 Margarita Šešelgytė Working Group 2 – Report p. 76 Alessandro Marrone Focus Area III NATO Partnership Policy: What instruments for what purposes? Handle With Care: The Limits And Prospects Of Nato Partnership Policy p. 82 Andrea Locatelli Forging The Future Of Nato’s Partnerships p. 97 Nicola Nasuti, Jeffrey Reynolds and Cristina Siserman Working Group 3 – Report p. 113 Christian Moelling Plenary Two - Roundtable on “What Political Guidance for NATO?” p. 118 Enrico Fassi What NATO for What Threats? An Introduction Enrico Fassi, Sonia Lucarelli, Alessandro Marrone he relatively rapid transformation of the security environment in the past 15 years has seen NATO involved in what has become the keyword to effectiveness: adaptability. Throughout T time this has taken different forms, but three have been its main avenues: a redefinition of the concept of security, the development of core tasks that have been added to collective defence (crisis management operations and cooperative security) and the Alliance’s enlargement. All three venues have contributed to make NATO more apt to the changed security scenario, but each of them needs to be constantly assessed for its contribution to NATO’s effectiveness as a security Alliance and integrated with a reflection on dynamics internal to the Alliance itself. The spirit of the fourth Academic Conference organized in Bertinoro on October 4-6, 2015, was to contribute to the reflection on NATO’s adaptability with respect to security challenges (with a special attention to hybrid threats), its internal cohesion, its readiness, and cooperative security in particular with regards to partnerships1. Redefining security in the post-Cold War scenario has been the concern of the new Strategic Concepts since the end of bipolarism2. Parallel to a broadening of the concept of security in the academic context,3, during the 1990s NATO significantly broadened the range of what it now considers to be security challenges: cybersecurity, instability beyond NATO’s borders, terrorism, energy security, health risks, climate change and water scarcity are explicitly mentioned in the 2010 Strategic Concept, something probably unthinkable only fifteen years before. Nonetheless, the adaptation of the theoretical lenses to the evolving reality, as well as the redefinition of concrete tools and strategies, 1 The conference, the fourth organized by NATO Allied Command Transformation, the University of Bologna and the Istituto Affari Internazionali in Rome, was part of series of activities organized in the context of the Memorandum of Understanding between the University of Bologna and NATO Allied Command Transformation. The event was organized by ACT (in particular LTC Alfonso Alvarez and CRD Matteo Minelli), the University of Bologna (in particular Enrico Fassi and Sonia Lucarelli) and the Institute of International Affairs (in particular Alessandro Marrone). A great contribution to the editing of the papers (and ultimately of this publication) was given by Michela Ceccorulli, while Anna Gaone from IAI coordinated the secretariat of the event. 2 http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_56626.htm 3 Barry Buzan, People, states and fear: the national security problem in International Relations, London, Harvester Wheatsheaf,1983; Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, Jaap de Wilde, Security: a New Framework for Analysis, Boulder, London, Lynne Rienner, 1998; Barry Buzan, Lane Hansen, The Evolution of International Security Studies, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2009 5 inevitably constitute a never-ending process. In the specific domain of security and defence, the width, the depth, and the rapidity of this adaptation dynamic seems to depend on a combination of different variables: to what extent the new threats are different from the previous ones?; to what extent they challenge existing frameworks, assumptions and understandings, thus creating a sense of unpreparedness and inadequacy?; how new threats are perceived to be both imminent and directed towards the vital interests of the actors concerned?. No surprise then that NATO is now in the midst of an adaptation effort. The evolution of security concerns in the past two years (2014-5) has led the Alliance to focus attention particularly on ‘hybrid warfare’ - the combined use of the full-spectrum of modern warfare tactics, tools and domains by an enemy within a complex and coherent strategy. If the combination of conventional and non conventional weapons has always been a reality in warfare, the specific form of the current hybrid menace, and the way it is embedded in a highly coherent strategy, pose new and specific problems to the target (NATO’s countries in this case). The relevance of the issue for the Alliance today explains the central place that this year’s Academic Conference has devoted to hybrid threats, which were the topic of the first Plenary Session (whose results are summarised at the beginning of this publication). However, it is clear that hybrid threats do no exhaust all sources of insecurity. The shocking terrorist attacks to several targets in Paris, on 13 November 2015, have reminded all of us that security is a complex and articulated reality, which requests to focus not only on the instruments to deter and prevent terrorist attacks in the short term, but also on the cooperation among the intelligence and police agencies of the member states; on a coordinated external response in destabilized (if not warring) contexts in the surroundings of NATO’s borders;and on an effective range of partnerships with other states and international organizations - let alone on social policies that would deprive terrorists support in our societies. In order to deal with the internal issue of coordination among NATO members, one session of the Conference, and the first part of this publication, was devoted to explore the implication of the differences in terms of strategic culture among member states, broadly defined as the set of values, norms and convictions that orient security policy preferences and decisions. The latter is of great relevance in threat assessment as well as in strategic decisions with respect to the use of force. In other words, part of NATO’s effectiveness depends on the compatibility of member states’ understanding of security challenges and legitimate responses. A specific attention to the different dimensions of readiness was devoted by Working Group Two (here in the second part of the publication), that explored tactical, operational, strategic and cultural readiness and provided policy-advice to enhance them all. In particular, the strategic and cultural dimensions of readiness emerged as useful theoretical tools in order to discuss pressing issues such as the effectiveness the existing decision-making mechanisms to face current hybrid threats, the perceptions of the challenges posed by Russia among the Allies, or the interpretation of the exact boundaries of article 5. Moreover, no reflection on NATO’s ability to adapt to the changed circumstances could avoid thinking about partnerships. The