IDEAS REGARDING FEDERALISM IN THE PROVINCE OF ,

1861; - 1867.

by

Peter B. Waite.

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of MASTER OF ARTS in the department of History.

University of

September, 1950. ABSTRACT Z-

This thesis studies the nature of the ideas on federal government in the Canadian discussion of Confederation, 1864-1867. It is held that a federal state as such was not intended by the Canadian government, nor was it expected by the Canadian people. A federal state may be defined as a system of government wherein central and provincial authority is co• ordinate and independent, each of whose powers within a given legislative field are plenary. This thesis maintains that such a system of government was not what Canadians intended when they applied the word "federal" to the constitution framed at Quebec in October, 1861;. What Canadians wanted was, by and large, a legislative union coupled with local guarantees for local rights and local privileges. Their intention was to form a strong central government and to relegate sectional issues to semi-dependent sectional institutions. Thus all the elements of strength in the existing legislative union were to be preserved, while the problems which had weak• ened the union would be removed by being taken up in the elasticity of of a "federal" system.

In their consideration of a new constitution, Canadians turned in• stinctive!^ to their own past experience in an essentially British system of government. The idea of legislative union remained predominant in the minds of Canadians. Quite simply, they preferred to walk in old paths as long as possible. Canadian ideas regarding federalism clearly reveal the limitations imposed by the Canadian political inheritance.

The example of American federalism only reinforced Canadian prej•

udice. The effect of American ideas was largely to make Canadians cling the more uncritically to their own traditions of government. They saw in the United States disruptive forces clearly manifest in the Civil War.

Federalism, they reasoned, was therefore dangerously centrifugal in its implications. Thus they sought rather to avoid federalism than to follow it.

Canadians tended to follow the old way as much as possible. Un• doubtedly the French required concessions and guarantees, but they were given no more than would be necessary to carry the project in Lower Canada.

The intention of the Canadian reflects the basic feelings and the basic limitations of Canadians on the subject of federal government. This thesis attempts to show in detail the ideas regarding federalism which lay behind the policy of the Canadian government, to show by reference to con• temporary opinion how deeply Confederation was rooted in Canadian exper• ience and in British political tradition. CONTENTS

Page

Chapter I. The general nature of Canadian political speculation 1

Chapter II. The desire of the leaders for strong central govemment-23

Chapter III. Ideas in Canada West regarding federalism U3

Chapter IV. French ideas in Canada East regarding federalism 81

Chapter V. English ideas in Canada East regarding federalism 121

Chapter VI. Conclusion 151 I feel bound at the outset to repeat the expression of regret... that the designation "Federal" was ever applied to the proposed union—not merely because I think it a misapplication of terms... but because I fear that the use of this word as descriptive of the intended union is calculated to direct into a wrong channel the minds of persons who have not carefully considered the terms of ... "The Quebec plan" and mislead them as to the intention of those who prepared that scheme— Viscount Monck to the Earl of Carnarvon, September 7th, 1866 . CHAPTER I

THE GENERAL NATURE OF CANADIAN POLITICAL SPECULATION (1)

One Saturday late in October, 1864, at a luncheon in Montreal, Thomas D'&rcy MoGee rose to speak.

He reviewed the steps taken leading to the Quebec Con• ference and the work of the Conference itself; in summing up the accomplishments of the last three weeks, he said:

We had acted not in an empirical spirit. We had consulted the oracles of history and of our race. We strove to build upon an old foundation, not to run up a strong edifice for ourselves, but a piece of solid British Masonry, as solid as the foundation of Eddystone, which would bear the whole force of democratic winds and waves,1 and resist the effect of our corrosive political atmosphere, consolidate our interests, and prove the legitimacy of our origin.

One may quarrel with McGee*s juxtaposition of empiricism and appeals to history, but in most other respects his

speech is a lucid interpretation of the purpose of the

Quebec resolutions. By and large, opinion in the Province

of Canada concurred heartily with the spirit which: animated the Fathers. The people of the Province may have disagreed with some details of the form of government suggested at

Quebec, but they gave general approval to the perpetuation of British ideas and the British connection. The corro•

sive influence of American republican and democratic

ideas would not affect the solid piece of British masonry (3)

which McGee believed had been created. To prove the legit• imacy of our originl That cry was from the heart of

Canada and indeed of British North America. This desire for the continuation of British institutions and British forms of government, for the preservation of the British methods of political practice, this concept of British legitimacy, was the fundamental assumption of Canadian politioal ideas. Political discussion as a whole took its beginning from the premise of British responsible gov• ernment, the British Crown, and the British connection.

There were realities imposed by a North American environment and which were bound to make themselves felt.

But Canadian ideas, if they did not ignore this environment, tried to exclude it from legitimate political considerations.

The federalism characteristic of the United States had been regarded by writers as a type of government indigenous to the North American environment; Canadians tended to ignore the facts of rivers and mountains and forest in their new political institutions. The Act of 1867 was suoh that they might rightly claim to have succeeded. If they did succeed, they could hardly expect to perpetuate an exclus• ion of such elemental dimensions. That Canada may be con- 2 sidered a federal state today, is in part due to environ• ment impinging its iron law on the will and the ideas of men. 7 (3)

The general nature of Canadian political spec• ulation is characterized by the predominance of British political traditions and the desire to perpetuate those traditions. To some considerable degree this was an un• critical allegiance, reflecting an emotional and intel• lectual commitment above and beyond appeals to reason or practicability. In this sense McGee was right.. It is in this sense that Canadian political speculation can be considered raised above the level of a practical solution to an urgent problem. In this sense, confederation was not empirical because it appealed more to emotion than to political experience. A shrewd analysis of the history of the union could not have sanctioned some of the features of the Quebec Resolutions or the British North America Act.

It was this shrewd analysis which Christopher Dunkin supplied and was precisely the reason he would not support

Confederation.3 There is a good deal in the argument that

Confederation was a supremely practical approach to a pol• itical problem. But to emphasize this unduly is to ignore the fact that men are sometimes more emotional than they are reasonable. Any reader of Bagehotfs English Constitu• tion or Wallaa1 Human Nature and Politios can hardly fail to be aware of the political implications of this aspect of human nature. In this respect, the Canadian appeal to their British inheritance at a critical period in Canadian history must be carefully considered. It is doubtless true (4)

to say that his appeal was essentially a matter of the practical. But such an appeal is overlaid with emotional factors which sometimes tend to ignore practical consider• ations. John A. MacDonald has been considered a practical politician. Yet MacDonald again and again appealed to the

British institutions in terms which could not be described except as emotional. If he was "a natural empiricist in action",4 he was also capable of being quite emotional about his political allegiance. Canadian political spec• ulation had its lofty moments, and those who suggest it was severely practical neglect the powerful emotions set loose by a vital and far-reaching change in Canadian pol• itical life. The high-lights in Canadian speculation do not come from a bright intellectualism, or by the judicious and balanced discussion often brought out in the American ratification of the Constitution. There is nothing in

Canada to compare with the Federalist. The great moments in Canadian speculation come from appeals to the Canadian inheritance, the long history of their relationship with

Britain, and obversely from their fear and distrust of

American ideas and American influences.

The general level of political discussion was, however, basically practical with an emphasis on solutions that would satisfy immediate needs. There was little general desire to examine principles. This stems perhaps from the fact that discussion of principles was hardly (5)

deemed necessary, or perhaps from what Alexander Brady calls a "British diffidence" in formulating political principles at all.5 Politics, said^Minerve in a reflective moment, is not an abstraction; it is represented by men, men who leave their mark upon it not through their principles so much as through their own personal qualities, good or bad, their emotions — even their caprices.

Although Canadian opinion on federalism was gen• erally pitched to a practical level, it varied considerably in intellectual content• In some quarters there was an almost frontier contempt for intellectual discussion.7

Generally speaking the Conservative journals were the most distinguished intellectually, with the Toronto Leader and the Montreal Gazette setting the pace. The Rouge journals of Canada East were a close second, though with more \ earnestness, more virulence, and a strong didactic flavour.

The newspapers were fairly sinoere in their writing, not apparently trying to impress their readers with either their ability or their ignorance on intellectual questions.

That is more than can be said for the Confederation debates; there was a rather obvious erudition displayed on occasion by members eager to see their words preserved for posterity.8 Men like Dunkin and McGee and Dorion were usually above this sort of thing, and MacBonald, Brown,

Cartier, Gait were too proud to attempt a display of A" Q intellectuality. Macdonald did mention DeTocqueville * at (6)

the Quebec Conference, but it is likely that he knew him more by hearsay than by direct acquaintance. Gartier was more intimately acquainted with literature and history than with political theory.10 MoGee was a more enigmatic figure intellectually, but he considered the ideas of John

Stuart Mill, John Locke, exploded and antiquated;11 certainly he was out of sympathy (if not out of touch) with contemporary liberal political theory in England. Not one of the Fathers of Confederation, says Lionel Groulx, was a doctrinaire, or indeed a truly transcendent spirit. They were, for the most part, men "d'honnete talent".

The active discussion of federalism and its im• plications for the province of Canada oentred principally 13 in fall and winter 1864-1865, with variations according to circumstances. The Rouge papers took it up with veh• emence again and again after it became apparent that the defection of New Brunswick was not going to affect the policy of the Canadian government on actively pushing through

Confederation.

It might be supposed from the magnitude of the subject that Canadians would have been greatly agitated by it. This indeed may have been the case, but If so, it was not manifested through the usual means of political ex• pression. The fact seems to be that Canadians were almost too self-satisfied with what the Quebec Conference had produced. Canada West often looked no further than the (7)

happy fact that representation by population had been con•

ceded. Canada East was not quite so sanguine. In any case

Canadians could not help noticing that a great calm had

descended over the domestic political scene. The widespread

comment on this calm is striking to one first approaching 14 newspaper comment during the confederation period. The

explanation is not hard to seek. It was the coalition.

Richard Cartwright remarks how bitter the politics had been

prior to coalition, and the strain which it placed on every•

one; then, after this prolonged strain, Canadian politics had

reached a quiet harbour• Canadian politicians "enjoyed the

quiet amazingly". Moreover, Cartwright adds, having taken

in hand a question of the first magnitude which must greatly

affect Canada's whole future, it had both an elevating and a

tranquillizing effect on Canadian political life.15 So tranquil was it that on September 14, 1865 the London Times

accused the Canadian public of being completely apathetic to their political future. The response from the Canadian "Lfi press was immediate. Most journals admitted that there was now very little agitation of the subject; that there was

indeed very little discussion in the press; the reason for

this was wrongly attributed to apathy. The battle for con•

federation, said the Montreal Gazette, has been fought and won. What need then of further discussion?17 This was not

the case; confederation was touch and go in the winter and (8)

spring of 1865-1866; but it is an indication of a general confidence on the part of Canadians late in 1865 that the confederation for better or worse was considered over and settled.

Canadian discussion of federalism and the con• federation can only be completely understood in the light of a basic desire on the part of Canadians to perpetuate

British institutions, a desire overlaid with emotional connotations for both English and French; further, given the British inheritance, Canadians appealed to the practical in their solution of their problems. That the principle of was a strange partner to the princi• ple of federalism does not seem to have perplexed the

Fathers of Confederation nor Canadians as a whole. Dunkin had a field-day on the possible conflicts of these two principles and was greatly respected for his able presen• tation; but it seemed to have little effeot on Canadians* thinking. The obvious thing to do was to have responsible government; the next thing was to add a very mild admixture of federalism. That it was a possible conflict of principles deterred the Fathers not a whit• Le Courier du Canada con• sidered that confederation was good or bad depending on the details.^8 Statements such as this clearly indicated fun• damental principles relatively unimportant.

Thus Canadian political speculation was naturally limited by Canadian political tradition. That this tradi- '4' (9)

tion was inimical to an understanding and an appreciation of federalism is easily demonstrated. The conditions of res• ponsible government do not normally lend themselves to the division of powers that must occur in a federal state, or to the within the central government which often occurs in a federal state. The methods and practices of responsible government are based on a compre• hensive responsibilty of the to the legislature and the people. This is, in a large degree, alien to the tradition of the federal state with its splintering of responsibility directly based upon the splintering of auth• ority.

There was, therefore, an understandable failure adequately to grasp the ideas of federalism. This could have been remedied in part. There was a near-federal system in the cabinet of Canada already; a sympathetic understand• ing of American ideas and practice would have gone a long way to preparing Canadians for the acceptance of a genuine federal system.

This sympathetic understanding of American ideas was rare indeed. Alexander Brady once said that the United

States was both a model and a warning to Canada. At the time of confederation, American institutions were regarded with almost universal abhorrence. They may have been ex• cellent for their own country at one time — even perhaps at present — but as far as Canada was concerned there was '6 (10)

little in the United States which could escape the appalling taint of rationalism, republicanism, democracy, corruption.

Imagine, said the Globe. the dignified and learned wearer of the ermine, whose proud distinction it is to be inde• pendent of popular prejudice, becoming a "roaring political partisan", securing Ms position "by.the grace of the un- i • • - washed multitudes who boast of universal suffrage"! Why it is something so abhorrent to our traditions that we cannot think of it.19 The Globefs argument was in respeot of annexation, but it is illustrative of the deep repugnance of many Canadians to American institutions.

This attitude was transferred easily to federal- ism, and was particularly reinforced by Canadian opinion of by the American Civil War. There is nothing more characteristic of Canadian opinion on federalism than the realization that federalism had conspicuously failed in the

United States, and the determination not to import any doctrine which would have similar consequences in Canada.

This attitude did not prevent Canadians from seeing the power and adaptability of the United States in its spread across the North American continent. But they reasoned they could do the same under the aegis of responsible, central government, without encumbering themselves with the doctrine of states rights. It was because of states rights the United States was in the travail of civil war.

Macdonald's point of view on this matter is (11) classic and was repeated with variations by every party except the Rouges. His solution was to transfer the residuum of power from the state to the General Government, and to leave the state with but enough power to legislate 20 for local prejudices. There are a great number of ram- ifications to Mac-Donald's position; not the least of these is resultant Canadian commitment to a strong central gov• ernment •

The obverse of Canadian opinion about the United

States was allegiance to the British connection, British tradition and British institutions. In this respect there was more unanimity than on any other issue of Canadian political life. The British connection was appealed to by all parties, by those opposed to confederation as well as its supporters. The French as a whole respeoted

England for the preservation of their nationality. Cartier quite frankly said that without British institutions French nationality would have long since perished.21 Confedera• tion, he said, has for its root cause our common love for the political institutions of England; the purpose of confederation is to surround those institutions with guarantees for their future preservation. "G'est done pour reserver davantage les biens qui nous unissent a la metropole, et pour mieux sauve^garder nos institutions que mes compatriotes ont appuye si oordialement la confedera• tion".22 The Rouges argued quite readily that the British (12)

connection would be threatened by Confederation; that the protection so long accorded to French cultural autonomy was now threatened. Confederation could only atrophy the ties which now hold the French people loyally to Britain,23

All the French ask is to be allowed to develop peacefully under the British flag in their own way untrammelled by 24 continual social quarrels with the English. Frenoh opinion as a whole saw in the British connection a guaran• tee of their rights as a cultural group. Confederation was placed before them by Gartier as a recognition on the part of Britain and of English Canada of their right to their own cultural existence. "La confedOration," saidta»

Mlnerve, "serait le coup de graoe donne' a l'oeuvre de Lord

Durham..,."25

John A.Macdonald, as earnest a British subject as anyone in Canada, echoed Gartier*s argument that con• federation was the only way of maintaining>the British connection. Macdonald was not above appealing to prejudice when the occasion arose, but his political agility could not hide the sincerity of his admiration for British forms of government. MacPonaH's allegiance to the British flag and all that it meant was of Immeasurable importance. In

Hamilton in October, 1866, before leaving for England with the Canadian delegation, MacDonald concluded a long speech with these ringing words: (13)

"But I must not appropriate as an honor to myself the magnificent demonstration in which I have now participated, for that I know is intended for all those men who are going to England to fight your battles and the battles of your children and the children's children, to build for them upon this continent a British nation under the British flag and under British institutions,"

MacDonald was applauded to the echo.26

The significance of this resounding patriotism is twofold. First it reflects the basically colonial condition of English-Canadian society; its patriotism, its ideas were turned toward its primary allegiance, Great Britain. It 27 was, as Creighton suggests, a section of the larger

British community, which culturally and spiritually was a unity in itself. This does not mean the absence of a

Canadian patriotism; but it was a local patriotism which was confined to local issues. The British connection gave

Canadians a broader and a wider field for their vision.

Comparisons are sometimes misleading but perhaps the atti• tude of Canadians to the Britain of 1866 was not unlike the present attitude of British Columbians to Canada.

The purpose in bringing out antipathy to the

United States and loyalty to Britain and her institutions is not especially to illustrate the social feeling of the period; it is to show how such fears and loyalties would affect Canadian political ideas, more particularly their ideas on what the federal state should be. In this connec• tion, the great significance of English-Canadian, as well (14)

as French-Canadian, loyalty to British institutions is that it warped their conceptions of federalism, Canadians were prevented from viewing their political problems in a light favourable to decentralized institutions; further, their political traditions made it extremely difficult for them to understand the true nature of federal government. The very heart of the federal idea lies in the dualism of co- ordinate powers. Canadians nowhere seemed to have grasped this conception. It is possible of course to form a fed• eral constitution without being aware of the theory behind it. It could even be said that Canadians have a federal constitution in spite of themselves. But this is due rather to subsequent interpretation and development than to an inadvertent stumbling on to a federal system. The most characteristic trait of MacDonald and the Canadian coalition as a whole is certainly not inadvertence. They knew where they were going and had every intention of arriving there. But when it came to applying words to their project they adopted as much by design as by conven• ience, the word "federal". It was a very shrewd choice.

It allowed French Canadians to look for considerable advantages to their autonomy without committing the gov• ernment definitely as to how far this autonomy would go.

In the discussion of confederation there are interesting differences between Government organs in the French language and those in the English as to the relative strength of (15)

central and local governments suggested by the Quebec reso•

lutions. The word "federal" was also a matter of convenience

how else could you describe a legislative union which al•

lowed for local district governments with local powers of

their own?

The opposition were well aware that the word

"federal" meant different things to different groups. At

once they tried to pin the government down on just what was meant by the "well-understood principles of federal govern• ment".28 The definitions of federalism which resulted from

Helton's questioning are illuminating. Cartier replied

that "the honoured gentleman knew quite well what was meant

by the 'principles of Federal Government'. The replies

evinced from both Gartier and MacJJonald conceded that the

federal principle was based on equality of sectional inter•

ests in one branch of the general legislature, and repres•

entation by population in the other branch. MacDonald added

in respect of the Lower House, that representation by members did not of course commit them to "universal suffrage

or anything that would interfere with class interests . . ."

In the Legislative Council Tache refused to commit himself

on the explanation of the principles of federal government.

All he would say was that he would stick by the record, and

the hon. members should "take out of the words their fair 29 and proper meaning". The Government's attitude on fed•

eralism was thus an emphasis on the functions of the Central (16)

Legislature. Federalism with them was primarily a question then of the constitution of the Upper and the Lower House, especially the former. That this point of view was due to

British habits of political thinking there can be little doubt. Such habits account also for the great importance which the Legislative Council had in the work of the 5G Quebec conference. The Central Legislature was thus con• sidered to be the real heart of the federal scheme. Local governments were conveniences for the absorption and dis• sipation of sectional prejudices.

It is thus understandable why the critical question of the division of powers involved comparatively little dis• cussion in Canada. Canadian speculation on federalism took the division of powers as given by the Quebec Resolutions.

If the proliferation of thought on the subject be any cri• terion, the constitution of the legislative council was far more important in the future Canada^ federal state than the division of powers. Where minority rights stood in danger there was considerable disoussion; but such discus• sion was aimed at securing protection in the central legislature for such rights. Everything hinged on this great king-pin: the General Government.

The explanation for this attitude on the part of

Canadians lies in part in the nature of the Union Government,

1841-1867. It was,.constitutionally, a legislative union.

Though there had been many vicissitudes, Canadians as a (17)

whole were prepared to pay tribute to the progress the

country had made under this system. In certain quarters,

notably the Rouges, there was a claim that the Union had

not yet lived out its usefulness; that with more tolerance

and generosity, coupled with a few minor concessions to

Canada West, the system could be made to work. Whether

this was the case or not, there can be little doubt that

the system in use since 1861 had conditioned Canadians to

expect a great deal of any new General Legislature. They

saw the new central government as but an extension of the men and the politics and the system they had known for so long, with added flourishes from the Maritimes, and an

exalted sense of national power.

It is true that the Union government was a fed•

eral system as far as its operation was concerned. The

British government conceded equal representation from the old provinces of Upper and Lower Canada in the Union Act;

the line of least resistance was followed, and the effect was rather to federate the Ganadas than to fuse them. x

Confederation was an attempt to mitigate the federal

character of the union government by enough conceBsions to local legislatures to enable a strong .new central govern• ment to be established. It is one thing to have sectional prejudices legislated for by small local governments as in

confederation; it is quite another to have the whole

government union split on every issue involving local (18)

ramifications. There is some ground for saying that con• federation merely recognized an existing federal condition in the two Ganadas. But it did so as an attempt to bring an even stronger government into being, by relegating sec- tional prejudices to local bodies* MacDonald put. it this way. We must strengthen the General Government and confer on the Provincial bodies "only such powers as may be re• quired for local purposes. All sectional prejudices and interests can be legislated for by local legislatures".32

This theory was foreshadowed by Lord Durham.

The project for legislative union was brought forward by

Durham when he saw that the recalcitrance and bitterness of Lower Canada was too strong to enable a government to function under a quasi-federal system. The French would, he thought, use whatever power they had to obstruct Govern• ment rather than to further it. But prior to this con• clusion Durham conceived a kind of federal government which would both conciliate the French and yet provide for a strong central government. There is a revealing passage in the report which just about summarizes what MaqBonald and the Canadian government were trying to do:

"I thought that it would be the tendency of a federation sanctioned and consolidated by a monarchical government gradually to become a complete legislative union; and that thus, while conciliating the 3french of Lower Canada, by leaving them the government of their own Province and their own internal legislation, I might provide for the protection of British (19)

interests by the general government, and for the gradual transition of the Provinces into an united and homogenous community"• 6

It is hardly likely that the Canadian government was con•

sciously following Durham, or would have admitted it if

they had. His name was an anathema to French Canadians;

it would have been fatal to unite it with Confederation.

The Rouge opposition used the report largely to show that

Durham always had the aneantissement of the French in mind

and that Confederation was probably a logical conclusion

to his work. They did not apparently use this particular

passage; perhaps they had not even read it. Very few

French Canadians had read Durham thoroughly; they usually

found the early chapter on Lower Canada more than enough

for their sensitive natures to stand. The significance of

Durham in this context is his reflection that federation

sanctioned by monarchical government tends to legislative union. Durham understood the disparagement between the

federal principle and the monarchical principle; he under•

stood that other things being equal, a prerogative power would tend to vitiate a federation so much that eventually

it would function as a legislative union. MacJDonald must

have thought of this when he voiced his hopes for confed•

eration becoming eventually a legislative union.

The union of the is significant for Canadian

federalism in two respects. First, it gave Canadians a

background in working together, a conception of a united (20)

government, which they carried over into their formulation of confederation. Secondly, it showed them difficulties of a federalized union; how obstruction by one group could virtually stop the constitutional machinery. Therefore they decided to remove sectional prejudices by banishing them to the nether realm of the local governments, and by giving to the central government the high powers whioh it had had under the union constitution.

The predominant characteristic of Canadian ideas on federalism is that strictly speaking they were not ideas on federalism at all. Canadian ideas were an inter• pretation of federalism; federalism seen through the eyes of convinced British subjects, of anti-democrats, of men who believed in property and responsible government.

Canadians were not seeking a new federal union so much as trying to get rid of the evils of the union they had.

They wanted to make a strong North American country, to elevate their political and social life, and to have sec• tional friction cooled by the oil of sectional concessions.

It was hardly likely that they would probe for just princ• iples; they lacked the revolution which had spurred

Americans so nobly to look for theirs. Even if Canadians had any desire to set up a system of government upon theoretical principles, they might have found it extremely difficult to set such principles in a concrete form. In the British tradition they had a rooted aversion to setting (21)

principles of government down in writing. A written con•

stitution, said the Quebec Chronicle. providing for all

contingencies "marks revolution, checks progress, and keeps 34 a nation in the swaddling clothes of its birth".

Canadians were unable to conceive the dual nature

of a federal state. To them sovereignty must reside some• where. If it did not belong to the central government, it must belong to the provincial governments. This latter arrangement must have appeared positively ludicrous. How

could you have local sovereign governments acknowledging

and a central government in between? There is an underlying Austinian theory in Canadian political thought which made it impossible for Canadians to understand just what federalism really did involve. The amusing debate on

the "well-understood principles of federal government" is

a case in point. Sovereignty must rest somewhere, and the

central government was the obvious place. Laski comments that the United States' constitution would have provoked 35 the vehement derision of John Austin. There must have been something like this in Canadian scorn (though on occasion sadness) at the spectacle of the Civil War* It was a lesson only too clearly writ; and Canadians condi• tioned as they were needed no second bidding to profit by 36 such a lesson. The general nature and background of Canadian

ideas on federalism predisposed them to frame a oonstitu- (22)

tion which was not in the strict sense of the word, federal.

Their own experience, their dislike of United States insti• tutions and ideas, the British tradition in their political life, oombined to produce a political state of mind which was in essence inimical to federal institutions.

The implications of this attitude follow in sub•

sequent chapters. There was variation in opinion of course; there was opposition where the government moved too ruth• lessly and too quickly; there is much to suggest that

English Canadians were too sanguine about the success of

Confederation; but in all the party and regional divisions of opinion, Canadian political thought was strongly con• ditioned by their experiences in British political tradi• tions and institutions, and this experience inevitably affected their ideas about the nature of the federal state. Notes

1. This speech was on Saturday, Oct. 29th, l861j, and was reported in the Globe the following Monday. Thisftparticular phrase was report• ed by the Globe as, "would bear the tempst and the waves", but the report is otherwise the same was that in /McGee, T.D./ Speeches and Addresses chiefly ihn the subject of British American union. London, Chapman, 1865. P« HO. The general tenor of the Globe's editorials makes it unlikely that there was any significance in the change/

2. It may be as well to define what a federal state is. In this definit• ion I concur which K. C. Whearis theory expounded in Federal Govern• ment, London, Oxford University Press, 19h7. A federal state is that state whose general and provincial governments are independent of each other, each within a given sphere of legislative power. That is, the powers given to each are plenary. Needless to say, "federalism" as used in the title of this thesis need not refer specifically to this definition. In this more general sense it pertains to the general division of central and local powers in a national state. It is, in this sense, a matter of convenience rath• er than logic. See also Chapter VI.

3. See Chapter V. k- Macdermot, T.W.L. "The political ideas of John A. Macdonald" in the Canadian Historical Review(CHR) E Vol. XIV.3(Sept. 1933) p. 26U .

5. Brady, A. Democracy in the dominions University of Toronto Press, 19U7. p. 6I|.

6. Montreal, La Minerve mercredi, 15 fev., 1865. There is also an illumin• ating dissenting opinion in the liberal opposition paper, the Montreal Herald, Thurs., March 15, 1866:"We know that constitutional questions of this short excite very little popular interest; but there ought to be some men connected with our politics who are able to understand that in order to have good results, we must act in accordance with sound principles."

7. There is a good example of this in the Ottawa Tine s Wed., March 21, ±§1866. "Mr. John Stuart Mill has recently given to the worslld a very learned examination of Sir William Hamilton's theory of ethics, which has much criticism and gobemoucherie andngst the Logicians, Metaphysic• ians and Vulgaricians of the physical and metaphysical world." There follows a ribald poem on a similar theme.

8. The confederation debates were the first debates on a major issue in the Province of Canada, which were fully reported. See Perrault's speechj Canada, Province of, Legislature. Parliamentary debates on the subject of the confederation of the British North American proviic es Quebec, Hunter Rose, 1965. pp. 59U-620. Also McGivern's speech, pp. U67-U72.

9. Pope, Sir J. Confederation; being a series of hitherto unpublished documents. Toronto, Carswell, 1895- P» 86. (Mon. Oct. 2i|th, 186U.) -ii-

10. Cooper, J.I. "The political ideas of Geocge Etienne Cartier" CHR XXIII. # 3 .(March.19U2) p. 29h.

11. The precise phrasing rests on rather shaky authority, although the con• text is not out of keeping with McGee's thought. The phrasing is taken from a letter to the Editor, printed in the Monreal Gazette for Thurs., Nov. 15, 1866 and signed, "M.P.P." This letter was considered by the Montreal Herald Fri. Nov. 16, 1866, to have te en from McGee.

12. Groulx, L. La confe'deration canadienne Montreal, Devoir, 1918. p. $9.

13. Gerin, E. in La foyer canadienne /fev. 1866 ?/:"Ces evenements se passaient / the Quebec and the Charlottetown conferences/ dans l'au- tomme de l861i, en septembre et en octobre. C'est alors qjie la question de 1'union flderale fut chaudement discutee dans la presse et dans les assemblers publiques...."

111. Quebec, Le Canadien Vendredi, 16 juin, 1865 is a typical example:, "D'un bout a 1'autre de la province 1'opinion publique est plongee dans un repos profond." See also infra, note 15.

15. Cartwright, R.J. Reminscences Toronto, Briggs, 1912. p. I4O. Cf. also with the Quebec Morning Chronicle Tuesday May 29, 1866;" Never, per• haps, in the history of the country, did an approaching session of Parliament cause so little speculation.... .Not a breath of partisan• ship ruff He s the calm Burface of Canad'in politics. The spirit of con• tention is dead, or at least in a state of suspgnded animation.... Party ensigns have gxmm gone down, overshadowed by the magnitude and importance of the project to unite and consolidate the British CD lon- ies on this continent." Note the use of the word "consolidate". It is significant that this word was frequently used to describe confedera• tion.

16. The Canadian press was rather sensitive to criticism from Britain. It was rather a stab in the back to be criticized by the Mother Country. Criticism from the HXS American press howelsret aroused Canadian fight- - ing instincts and was fair game.

•> 17. Montreal, Gazette Fri., Oct. 6, 1865- Sec also Chapter V. The excep• tion to his attitude was taken by the St. Thomas Weekly Dispatch, which said: "There can be no doubt a great deal of apathy exists on the ques• tion of Confederation on the part of the people of Canada, notwith- standing that every means have been resorted to, to bias their minds in its favour." Thurs., Oct. $, 1865. The Weekly Dispatch was ultra conser- vat ive.

18. Quebec, Le Courrier du Canada, lundi, 12 sept., 186U.

19. Globe, Fri., May 19m,1865.

20. There are a great number of illustrations of Macdonald's attitude on this point. One of the most interesting is the discussion at Quebec when Macdonald introduced the resolution calling for a federal union under the Crown of Great Britain. See Pope, J. Conf. Documents pp. 54-55. . -iii-

21. Boyd, J. Sir George Etienne Cartier, Bart. Toronto, MacMillan, 1917. P. 357.

22. Speech given at Cornwall, C.W. May 1st, 1866. im Discours ed. J. Tasse, Montreal, Senecal, 1893• P« 481.

23. Montreal, L1Union Nationale lundi, 6 fev., 1865. Report of the meeting of the meeting of L'Institut Canadien for the previous Monday. Resolution: "Qu'un semblable projet, s'il etait adopte n'aurait d'autre resultat que d'affaiblir les liens qui attachent le Bas-Canada a. la Grande-Bretagne en creant dans 1'esprit de ses habitants de justes alarmes sur la conserv• ation de tout ce qui est cher a. un peuple loyal et capable d'appre'cier les droits d'un sujet anglais."

2J|. Ibid, samedi, 3 sept., I86I4.. "...ce que nous desirons, c'est de continuer de grandir et de nous developper sous la protection du drapeau Anglais,

dans etre arretes dans ce developpement par les difficultes et s crises sociales que tout systeme de confederation produira infailliblement."

25. La Minerve sam., 23 juillet, I86I4..

26. Dinner toot place Monday, Oct. 29, 1866. Reported in the Montreal Gazette on Friday Nov. 2, I966.

27. Creighton, D.G. "Sir John Macdonald and Canadian historians" CHR XXIX. #. 1. (March, 19fi8) p. 13.

28. The phrase was used in Macdonald's explanations to the House on June 22, 1864. Mr. Brown kd asked what remedy Macdonald and Gait had. "Mr. Mac• donald and Mr. Gait replied that their remedy was a federal union of all the British North American Provinces,—local matters being committed to local bodies, and matters common to all to a general legislature, const• ituted on the well-understood principles of federal government." This debate was reported in the Globe, Thurs. June 23, If 64. "Mr. Holton wished to know what was meant by the expression, 'according to the well-understood principles of Federal Government.' Was it meant that in a Federal Legislature there sishould be representation according to numbers ? Mr. Cartier said the hon. gentleman knew quite well what was w ant by the 'principles of Federal Government' and so did his colleague Mr. Dorion....The details had not been arranged but he conceived that the principle of federation involved equality in one branch and that both population and territory should be taken into account in the o&her branch. Mr. Dprion ...Was the House to understand that, as in the United States, there, was to be equality in one branch, and representation according to population in the other ? Atty.Gen. Macdonald. Yes.^ (Cheers) Mr. Dorion said that acceding to the explanation of the Attorjmey Gener• al East in one branch there would be equality of representation and in the other representation according to population and territory. Mr. Cartier said that he had already stated his opinion of what was in- volved in the federal principle. Mr. Dorion x/Thus ijower Canada having larger teeritcry and less popula• tion than Upper Canada would have equal representation?/ -iv-

28. (cont'd)."Mr. Gait: No, no. Atty. Gen. Macdonald said Mr. Der ion, surely, did not need to be infor• med! what the 'well-understood principles of federal government' were. They were exemplified on this continent,and included—equality in the upper branch of the legislature and/the lower branch representation based upon population. (Loud cheers) /What the Atty. Gen. East meant added Macdonald, was to make clear his opposition to universal suff• rage./ "

29. Reported in the Globe for Firday/ June 2[|, I86I4.. This took#place in the House on the 23rd.

30. Six days, from Oct. 13th to Oct. 19th, were devoted to the discuss• ion of the upper chamber, its constitution, distribution of members, and the method of their appointment.

31. Lucas, C.P. Lord Durham's report of the affairs of British North Amer• ica Oxford, Clarendon, 1912. ( 3 Vols.) i. 288-289. See also Turcotte, L.-P. Le Canada sous 1'Union Quebed, Canadien, l8?li "La constitution de I8I4O avait un caractere f e'deral...." p. 3I1I.

32. Pope, Sir J. Conf. Doc, p. 55.

33- Lucas, C.P. op. cit. ii. 305.

3h. Quebec Morning Chronicle Mon., Oct. 17, 186U. The Chronicle was argu• ing, for a legislative union.

35. Laski, H.J. Studies in the problem of sovereignty New Haven, Yale Un• iversity Press, 1917. p. 267.

36. It would be a mistake, however, to assume that it was the Civil War alone which discourgged Canadians from adopting a more decentralized constitution. Such an example as the Civil War did give the movement toward centralization in Canada considerable popular support; but the general frame of confederation existed already in the confidential

despatch of Cartier, Ross and Ga]_t to Bulwer-Lytton, Oct. 25th, frftgfy? 1858. See Chapter V. Great Britain, Colonial Office, Question of federation of the British Provinces of North America. HMSO. Nov. If58. Also in Skelton, P.P. The life and times of Sir Alexander Tilloch Gait Toronto, Oxford University Press, 1920. pp. 239-2UU. (23)

CHAPTER II

THE DESIRE OF THE LEADERS FOR STRONG CENTRAL GOVERNMENT (24)

It was only by the "concurrence of most prop• itious circumstances", said George Brown before the Housej 1 "that this movement could have been accomplished". More than once in the course of the debates on Confederation were members moved to reflect, like Brutus, that there was a tide in the affairs of men which taken at the flood led on to fortune. Canadians felt the flood of the tide and in the fullness of this elemental call launched their ship.

"We were taught," said McGee, "that the days of the colon• ial comedy of government were over and gone, and that politics had become stern, and almost tragic for the New g World". Canadians saw four new nations in North America, three nations to the south, and one, they hoped, of their own. There was a feeling in Canada that the New World was in the throes of transition to a new age, stern and strong; a great new empire in Mexico under Maximilian; a new slave- owning southern confederacy; a new and truculent North; surely the destiny of British North America was as obvious peaceful colonisation is over, said LsftRevue Canadienne; as it was inevitable: union or oblivion. The age of now an age of militarism is beginning in the history of the people of the New World.3 The impression was wide• spread that a great dividing line had been reached; that

Canadians must leave behind the "paltry littleness of isolation", and that they must direct their attention seriously to the building of a great nation. (25)

These sentiments might have been no more than interesting evidence of popular feeling had it not been that the government had taken in hand a measure to build a great nation. The result was that the events outside

Canada strengthened enormously the hand of the Government.

The government was not always judicious; being predomin• ately conservative it could have easily alienated support from Canada West even over an issue that would give "rep. by pop.1* to an avid electorate. But events tended to force the public to the conclusion that it was a case either of confederation or annexation. Even as it was the government alienated support both in Canada East and

West on its policy of ignorning the electorate on such a major issue as confederation, and in bringing in what many considered to be a retrograde measure - the appointive

Upper Chamber. Events, in most eases outside Canada, allowed the government to proceed full steam with a measure and a method which ordinarily would have been subjected to considerable criticism, if not amendment.

Confederation was, says one student, "largely a by-product 5 of catastrophic events foreign to British America". It would be difficult to deny the weight of such a thesis; it is however misleading. If events affected the fact of the confederation in the Maritimes, they tended in Canada to affect its form. (26)

There is nothing more instructive in this regard

than to watch the effect of the Fenian invasion on the

moderate Rouges. An organ such as L'Ordre was strongly-

affected and the Fenian invasions produced a conspicuous

change in its attitude. The opposition of L'Ordre to

confederation was based on a sincere regard for French-

Canadian autonomy, rather than a doctrinaire liberalism

which characterized its confrere, Le^ays. But like Lefcays

it had not been above advocating annexation to the United

States as an alternative to Confederation. After the

Fenian invasion at Ridgeway, the tone of L'Ordre toward

the Government softened considerably; its shrillness was

lost and it assumed a position of continued suspicion of 6 the United States after June, 1866.

This example is an Indication of what must have

been happening to opposition to confederation in Canada,

not only as a result of the Fenian invasions, but also of

the general truculence of the United States. Nor did the

"little Englandism" of the Manchester Sohool and the

London Times encourage Canadians in the belief that England would be a better proteotor of their rights and privileges

than a Confederation. All these events combined to pro•

duce a state of mind which would acquiesce in a measure 7 that might normally have called forth disapproval. In

1866 the country was indeed almost on a war footing. The

writ of habeas corpus was suspended; there were militia (27)

musters and troop movements; there were Invasions, and

rumours of invasions whioh gave the press little else to

talk about• The Quebec Morning Chronicle analysed this

state of mind a few days after the Niagara invasion.

"Fenianism continues to be the absorping topic of the day.

Nothing else Is heard on any side. In the hotels, in the

streets, on the public promenades, groupjaifsicl of persons

may be seen seriously disoussing the situation".0 Such

a condition of public opinion must have had considerable

influence in crystallizing an alternative already before

the public: confederation or annexation.

There are then two main factors which conditioned

Canadian opinion on federation. First, the general nature

of the Canadian political inheritance; secondly the impact

of events in the world outside Canada. In respeot of

Canadian ideas about federalism both these factors tended

toward the same end. In normal times Canadians would have

been predisposed to a reasonably strong central government

in a federal system; in the series of chronic crises with 9 the United States which began about 1861, they were nat• urally ready to accept a stronger measure. This introduces the question of the policy of

the Canadian government itself. Was that policy a general reflection of Canadian ideas on federalism? The answer is yes and no. In the first place it is difficult to get judicious opinions on confederation, for it was presented as a complete measure to be passed as it stood or not at all. (28)

This limited both comment and improvement. Generally

speaking, Canadian opinion favoured the government measure,

though there were dissentient voices in respect of the

appointive legislative council. There was more opposition

to government methods. The failure to appeal to the people

aroused considerable conservative opposition. The

apparent coercion of the Maritime provinces aroused fears

in Quebec as to government policy after Confederation had

passed.

The policy of the Canadian government was that

of strong conservatism. The government was sometimes

ruthless, sometimes canny, sometimes dilatory; but always

it was conservative. Its conservatism was due as much to

Cartier and Brown as to MacDbnald. MacDonald himself

could only follow his conservative instincts as long as

he carried his colleagues with him. This maxim applies

generally to all cabinet government but it bears with

peculiar force on the coalition of 1864. To begin with

it was a coalition. That meant concessions. More impor•

tant, Brown and Cartier both carried with them the majority of their respective sections. That meant they

could practically dictate how far MacDonald could go.

The interaction of these three men is fascinating, and

of considerable significance. Cartwright's Reminiscences

throw many interesting lights on this subject; his work

in fact provides some of the most absorbing reading that (39)

on© can find on the confederation period. Behind it all lie the circumstances and the causes of the coalition.

It is difficult to believe that the coalition was formed under any other circumstances than that of ab• solute political necessity. One cannot read the history of the period and escape the conclusion that some consti• tutional remedy was imperative. There is a prevalent custom among writers on this period to disparage Goldwin i Smith's dictum that the real father of confederation was deadlock. This compound of cynicism and realism comes closer to the truth than perhaps any other generalization.

That confederation came when it did is undoubtedly due to political exigencies of the most pressing kind in the

Province of Canada.10 Gait's plan for confederation in

1858 could only have passed under the greatest difficulties I The Globe dismissed it at the time as "half smoke, half air

The political difficulties of the two Ganadas in 1858, though apparent, had not yet come to a head. There are indeed other arguments as to why confederation failed in

1858 and succeeded in 1864; but the constitutional dif• ficulties in Canada in 1864 were such as to sweep away the mass of popular inertia which normally accompanies a change of such vast proportions. We can probably take it for granted, said the Quebec Mercury in March 1864, that the existing constitutional arrangements of the province cannot last much longer. "They were confessedly perilous (30)

In 1859; and assuredly time has not mitigated their danger, nor rendered more safe the policy of indefinite delay".

About two weeks later Sandfield Macdonald revealed that

there had been informal negotiations with Tache over a possible coalition. Cartier would have nothing to do with

it at this time and the project failed. Right to the end

Macdonald opposed any solution. The day of the defeat of

the Tachekaodonald ministry, June 14th, the Journals list

Macdonald*s name as one of the three dissenting opinions 13 on Brown's constitutional committee. Cartier had by this time realized that the situation could hardly go on much longer. In the negotiations for a coalition which followed the defeat of the government the night of the 14th, Cartier informed Macdonald in no uncertain terms that he would either have to accept Brown's suggestion or lose his

(Cartier's) support. At this threat, Macdonald reluotantly agreed. Thus began a most curious association. The presence of Brown was of the utmost importance, but his action seriously compromised the position of the Lower

Canada liberals. These had been far more willing to make concessions to Upper Canada than had the Bll»s, and yet they were thrown now into opposition. Brown himself was largely vindicated by his own party, but Cartier took con

siderable risks, and was never wholly rewarded for the risks he ran. Macdonald alone stood to gain the most and (31)

in fact did so. His new-found strength in Canada West was most satisfying,

Of the two leaders of u£cx and L>C?Trespectively, Cartier is perhaps the most significant in affecting the nature of the Canadian federal state. Brown carried Upper Canada pretty solidly behind him on the "rep, by pop," theme. Even his defection in 1865 did little to shake Upper Canada's support of a measure which would give them in essence their long desired goal, Cartier however had no such support, French Canada had everything to lose and little to gain by support of confederation. It stood to lose the strong position it held in United Canada and to gain only the status of a local government in an English- dominated confederation. Confederation was forced on Frenoh Canada by dire necessity, and it is to Cartier's credit that he was able to concede as much as he did to the central government in the face of known opposition at home. At the same time the extent of centralization was quite clearly dictated by Cartier. Macdonald and Brown and Gait all wanted a considerable measure of centralization. It was Cartier and French Canada that were the measure of how far the process of centralization could go. Without Cartier, no measure could have been possible. There is little disagreement on the opinion of Morlson that Cartier 15 was the "accepted leader of French opinion". (33)

Cartier's political ideas and opinions are thus of considerable- significance. Confederation might have been stronger as far as his personal opinion was concerned, but he recognized that he was in dangerous position; he could not go too far. Nevertheless, Cartier*s ideas gave him a desire to see a healthy measure of central govern• ment with enough guarantees to French Canada to enable her to preserve her cultural autonomy. In addition, of course, he had to be sure that he could carry the main body of

Bleu opinion in Lower Canada. His main support in this regard was clearly the Church. The Church was looking for religious guarantees and protection for her system of education; but she was prepared to sanction a measure of conservatism, of order, of authoritarianism even, once the required guarantees were given.

These guarantees are what Cartier insisted on, and what he got. Cartier was a staunch conservative, and • having received the guarantees he desired he was prepared to acquiesce in a measure which gave considerable power 16 to the central administration. He was "intensely British" himself; and he once desoribed his countrymen as "English- 17 men speaking Frenoh". This predisposed him to accept a measure as far removed from a decentralized federation as his position as leader of French Canada would allow him.

4 Brown, too, had deep conservative, leanings. It might be said that he was a conservative by instinct, a (33)

liberal by profession. If. the leading causes of his agit• ation are removed he becomes a conservative. Confederation conceded "rep. by pop."; the implication naturally follows that George Brown would have been content with a conserva- tive wfre>» This is to some extent true but the matter was more complex. Brown was forced to work with Macdonald whom he disliked personally; and Brown himself was a most dif• ficult man to work with? and did not get along with some of the other members of the Cabinet, notably Gait. In this regard the rapprochement with Cartier was the real tie which held Brown in the Cabinet. True he was held there by the policy of the government, but unless he became part of the team he was doomed eventually to leave-.

There was considerable similarity between Brown and Cartier in temperament; moreover each was the dominant political figure in their respective parts of the province; a rapprochement between them was fraught with the utmost danger to the Upper Canada conservatives. This contingency frightened Macdonald and he was at considerable pains to avert it. That he did so was due as much to Brown's im• petuosity as to his own astuteness, though there is little doubt Macdonald was playing a very canny game,

Macdonald emerges as the dominant political figure only by force of his own personality. Had Cartier and Brown come to a political as well as a personal (34)

rapprochement. there is little doubt that the days of

Macdonald»s political future would have been numbered.

The significance of Macdonald in this context is quite

important; the Canadian federal system was undoubtedly based more on his active participation than on that of

anyone else. If it was foreshadowed by Gait in 1858, it was implemented by Macdonald in a practical way in 1864.

It is curious indeed that Cartier, who had been instru• mental in introducing the question in 1858, took such a

small active part in introducing the concrete terms of

confederation at the Conference. The answer is that

Cartier did not have the grasp of political realties that Macdonald had. Cartier was more visionary and had the defects of such a characteristic: he found it dif• ficult to transform his ideas to concrete institutions.

This was indeed Macdonald*s function and he performed it

ably. Brown had helped to bring the constitutional pro• blem into the immediate forefront of Canadian affairs, but Brown did not have the constructive turn of mind required, by a problem such as confederation. George

Sheppard*s opinion of Brown is instructive. "Take him

onto the ground of abuses, financial blunders and wrongs,

sectionalism, and so forth; and he is the strongest public man in Canada ... But off this ground he is an

ordinary man. He has never studied political principles,

and knows nothing of constitutional questions save such (35)

as have arisen from time to time in Canada. He is a vig• orous colonial politician - no less and certainly no more".'

In 1865 Brown became the dominant figure in the House, due to the continued absences of Macdonald. In time he might have been able to bring the same constructive ability as Macdonald to bear on political problems. Macdonald himself could have been described in terms very close to those which Sheppard used to describe Brown. Brown's trouble was that he had been in opposition for so long he was unable to use his very real talent to advantage in a project such as confederation. Macdonald had had a long apprenticeship in administration; Brown's appren• ticeship had been in agitation.

It is no discredit to Cartier or Brown to say that Macdonald emerged as the man who really influenced

Confederation. Confederation was possible only through

Brown and Cartier and Macdonald would have been the last person to deny it. But when it came to the question of concrete realities Macdonald, who knew what he wanted, who had a shrewd idea of how far he could go, was bound to take an assertive place at the Conference table at Quebec.

And the minutes and proceedings of the Conference reflect his dominance.

Macdonald's desire for a legislative union of 2Q all British North America is well known. It was only with the utmost reluctance that he would consent to a (36)

resolution suggesting federal union as the remedy for the political difficulties of the Province. Once having taken such a project in hand Macdonald became increasingly aware of the political value of the word "federal". Under its protection he could proceed with a measure which in many respects would bear the impress of Ms ideas on leg• islative union. He made oratorical gestures to the 21 excellence of the American constitution, but as far as

Canada was concerned the less concessions that were made to local government, the better. Macdonald was too astute not to realize that there would have to be concessions and in some cases considerable concessions. Had Macdonald been anything less than practical in this respect he would have sanctioned a much stronger measure. His caution is well illustrated in his consideration of the problem of minorities. He saw the central government as the protector of minorities and he was quite right in the light of the political problems of the time. Both the

Catholics of Upper Canada, and the English Protestants of

Lower Canada looked to the Central Government for protec• tion of their rights.22 But at the same time he was careful not to arouse antagonism in other groups by too strong a measure of centralization. "The people of every section," he said at the Conference on October 11th,

"must feel that they are protected, and by no constraining of the central authority should such guarantees be over• ridden".23 (37)

This is just about as far as Macdonald would go in his poliey of decentralization. He did not intend to cover the whole field of government in the Quebec resol• utions, nor did he want to. He wished nothing stated unless it had to be, nothing specific unless there was a plain necessity to specify. He wanted as small a con• cession to the federal idea as possible; equally he wanted as small a concession to written constitutions as possible. He wanted the principles of the British Con• stitution kept continually to the forefront, with a minimum amount of commitments in writing. Our constitu• tion, he said, "should be a mere skeleton and framework that would not bind us down. We have now all the elas• ticity which has kept England together".

With Macdonald virtually leading the Conference at Quebec, it is little wonder that the British North

America Act included a central over provincial leg• islation, central appointment of the chief provincial executive, central appointment of senators, central appoint• ment of judges. There is even a suggestion that the financial arrangements were aimed at making the Provinces dependent on Federal authority.24

Macdonald was thus quite unsympathetic to fed• eral government. He did not believe that the British

North American environment necessarily implied a federal state. He was induced to accept federation only by pol- (38)

itieal necessity, and was resolved to have as little to do

with it as possible. The "mere framework of a system",

"elasticity", "responsible government", these were the

ideas of Macdonald on federalism. The contrast is obvious.

He was not prepared to disregard the electorate; but he

believed, and with some justification, that the word

"federal" could cover a multitude of sins.

For the French especially, the word "federal"

would be the sweet nectar which would conceal the bitter

draught of legislative union, or something very close to

legislative union. Cartier was not unaware of what was

in the back of Macdonaldfs mind; but he was naturally

conservative, and strongly British, and he was perhaps

not averse to having the French electorate believe that

confederation was more federalized than it actually was

or was intended to be. There are instructive differences

in this respect between CartierTs own personal views and

OR Jthose of .his paper, La Minerve.

The policy of the Canadian government might

have come to naught had it met any real opposition from

the Maritime leaders. But the Maritime leaders were

relatively unopposed to a project of legislative union.

In fact most of them relinquished it with obvious signs

of regret; they reluctantly recognized that Lower Canada

would almost certainly have to be granted special rights

and privileges which would, technically, make a legisla- (39)

tive union impossible* It is a mistake to assume that because the Maritimes came reluctantly into confederation they were necessarily opposed to legislative union. This may have been true, yet it may not. The opinions of the

Maritime leaders at Quebec certainly tended towards legis• lative union.26 It is not improbable that Maritime people were opposed more to the fact of confederation than any lack of guarantees to local governments in the confederation project itself. Whatever public opinion in the Maritimes, their leaders offered no objections to

Macdonald*s conception of the high functions of the central 27 government in the confederation. There was on the whole surprisingly little disagreement at Quebec on the general nature of the new government. It is a little difficult to establish just what the background of Maritime policy was, lacking access to the Ministerial and opposition 28 papers; but at Quebec it offered no real opposition to the centralizing policy of the Canadian Government.

The influence of Monck and Carnarvon on the measure for the union of British North America is less tangible. It perhaps was merely a rubber stamping of the proceedings at Quebec and later at the Westminster

Palace Hotel. There is some reason to believe that it was not. Monck was appealed to by William MacDougall in terms suggesting that he could exert some considerable influence of imperial policy.29 Undoubtedly Monck did a (40)

good deal to carry confederation as a political measure.

But he was hardly a significant figure in Canadian fed• eralism except in the negative sense of the famous lines of Bagehot*s: the right to be consulted, the right to encourage and the right to warn. Monck was not a brilliant man, but he had an observant eye, and a liking for the conservative party. He and Macdonald got along very well.

Monck shared Macdonaldfs views as to the proposed confed• eration. The substance of Monck*s opinion is in a long 30 confidential despatch to Carnarvon, dated September 7, 1866. This despatch is invaluable, not so much, for what it re• flects of Monck*s own views, as for Monck*s keen analysis of the purpose of the leaders of Confederation-: **• . .it will I think be apparent that the intention of the framers of the Quebec plan was to constitute a strong central authority - the power of which should be supreme and per• vading throughout the Union with Prov. bodies of a completely subordinate and municipal character for the administration of purely local affairs. **I think it is also equally apparent that so far from the word "Federal" being an apt desig• nation of such a form of govt its general meaning

conveys an idea the direct contrary of that whioh 3, I have shown to be the intent of the Quebec plan.**

In this conclusion Lord Monck and Goldwin Smith were In complete agreement. Goldwin Smith stated that the inten• tion of the Quebec Conference was to create a kingdom, not 32 a federation. Lord Monck however approved of this pol• icy; Goldwin Smith did not. (41)

The British government and its officials were not in the least interested in a federal government for

British North America. Like the Canadian government they had little sympathy with this strange alliance of the

British Crown and federalism. Carnarvon followed Cardwell 33 in this respect. Monck aided and abetted as well as he could the policy of Her Majesty's Government in regard to the union of British North America; there is little doubt that he and Macdonald and Carnarvon proved to be a most harmonious little group.

The purpose of the Canadian government was to secure a strong central government. That they succeeded in doing so was in the first instance due to the character of the men in the Cabinet, and their relation to each other. Of these men, Macdonald, Cartier, Brown, and Gait, stand out clearly as guiding decisively the course of the project of British North America union. Cartier and

Brown, by virtue of their relation to their respective sections, were the sine qua non in any sweeping measure such as confederation. Macdonald, not necessarily indis• pensable politically, kept his place by the sheer power of his personality and his adroit handling of the men in the Cabinet. He was moreover a singularly able man when it came to constructive political institutions, a man who knew what he wanted and how he was going to get it. (48)

The policy of .the Canadian Government was reinforced by the policy of the Maritime leaders at Quebec; it was singularly encouraged by the active help of Lord

Monck and the British government. It is little wonder therefore that they succeeded in carrying their plan without too much difficulty. The main point is of course that neither the Canadian government, nor the Maritime leaders, nor the British officials, had any desire whatever to introduce federal government in British North America.

They wanted enough of the trimmings of federal government to satisfy the legitimate desires of Lower Canada; any• thing further-was only a matter of"inconvenience and danger. Notes

1. Conf. Debates p. 114, Column 2.(114.2) This was Brown's opening speech and took place on Wed. Feb 8, 1865.

2. In reply to the Speech from the Throne, Thurs. Nov. L4, 1867. Toronto, Leader Mon. Nov. 18, 1867.

3. La revue canadienne /March 1865/ P- 158 :"...Ia guerre entre les Etats du Nord et du Sud de la republique voisine a fait entrer la politique Internationale du continent americain dans les voies nouvelles. L'ere de la colonisation pacifique est finie et ial 'ere militaire commence pour l'histoire des peuples du Nouveau-Monde."

4. Toronto Leader Mon. March 25, 1867.

5. Gould, E.C. United States and Essay submitted for the All Souls Historical Essay Prize, 1934. Typescript at the Univ• ersity of Toronto Library.

6. See Chapter IV.

7. Stacey, CP. "Fenianism and the rise of national feeling in Canada at the time of confederation" CHR XII. #3 (Sept. 1931) P- 238.

8. Quebec Morning Chronicle Thurs. June 7th, 1866.

9. CP. Stacey says, "between 1815 and 1871 war between Canada and the United Slates was always possible and often probable," and that ai the height of this danger came between 1861 and 1871, which Stacey described as a "decade of chronic crisis". Lecture on "Canadian-American military relations, 1815-1871", University of Toronto, March 1950.

10. P. H. Moore speaking of his constituents, " They saidj 'The government of the country has come to a dead-lock; we have seen one strong party pitted against another strong party; we have seen two or three govern• ments forrred that were unable to pass a single important measure, and some change is therefore absolutely necessary.' " Moore was a life member of the Legislative Council, and his residence was in the tcwn of Philipsburg, C.E., in the border region of the eastern townships. Conf. Debates p. 326.1. Cartwright, R.J. Reminiscences p. 38 :"...his supporters /Brown's/ were right in considering the existing state of things as intoler• able. "

11. Globe Feb. /9 ?/, 1859. Cited in Skelton, O.D. Gait p. 254.

12. febafeeFrl. April 1, 1864.

13. The motion for this committee was introduced by Brown on March 14th, 1864, seconded by Scoble. "That a Si&ect Committee of twenty Members be appointed to enquire and report on the important aibjects embrac• ed in the said Despatch /Cartier, Gait and Ross to Bulwer-Lytton/ and the best means of remedying the evils therein set forth; with power to send for persons, papers and records, and to report from time to time; and that the said Committee shall consist of the following Mem• bers, of whom seven shall form a quorum, viz: Honorable Messieurs -ii-

13. (cont'd) "Cameron, Cartier, Cauchon, Messrs. Chapais and Dickson, Honor• able Mr. Dorion, Mr. Dunkin, Honorable Messrs. Foley, Gait and Holton, Mr. Joly, Honorable Messrs. Macdonald (Kingston), Attor• ney General J.S. Macdonald, McDougallx and McGee, Messrs. McKellar, Scoble and Street, Honorable Mr. Turcotteg, and the Mover."Canada, Legislative Assembly, Journals, 1861;. pp.90-91. The debate on the motion was adjourned at this time, and re-opened on the 19th of May when it was passed by a vote of 59-U8. Dorion then intreto- duced an amendemeht to the motion which had the effect of giving Upper Can• ada a numerical majority of one in the Legislative Assembly. This was def• eated 7U-32. pp. 223-226. The Committee held 8 meetings and reported on June lU th as follows: "...the Committee have held eight meetings, and h&ave endeavored to find some solution for existing difficulties likely to receive the assent of both sections of the Province. A strong feeling was found to exist among the members of the Committee in favor of changes in the direction of a Federative system applied either to Canada alone, or to the whole British Noth American Provinces, and such progress has been made as'to warrant the Committee in recommending that the subject be again referred to a Committ• ee A£ the next Session of Parliament." The Committee differed as to the adoption of this report, the three dissenting voices being J.A. Macdonald, Sandfield Macdonald, and Scoble. The opposition of J.A. Macdonald and Sandfield Macdonald to the federal system is known; Scoble's opposition is difficult to understand since he voted for confederation in March, 1865. It is all the more in• explicable since Scoble seconded the motion of March. lUth,i*C4.

Ii;. This is Cartwright's statement, Reminscences, p.65. Neither Boyd, the leading biographer of Cartier, nor Sir Joseph Pope mention this, but it seems not unlikely in view of Macdonald's well-known dislike for any kind of federation. The usual explanation of Macdonald's change of heart is that Macdonald was so cautious a politician that he did not wish to comm• it himself until he was absolutely sure it was the only way out. It is pos• sible, therefore, that in the few hours between the bringing down of the report of Brown's committee and the actual defeat of the governnent, Mac• donald was convinced that things could go on no longer as they had been. But Cartwright's interpretation of events carries more wej|jfcjjr, and I would be inclined to agree with it, without disparaging Macdonald's abil• ity to realize the inevitable.

15. Morison, J.L. "Parties and politics, 18UO-1867" in United Canada W.L. Grant, ed., p. 82. Vol. V. of Canada and its Provinces Shortt, A. &. Doughty, A.G. (eds.) Toronto, Glasgow Brook, 191k»

16. Bracq, J.C. The evolution of French Canada New York, MacMillan, 1921;. p. 113. "

17. Loc.cit.

18. "Leaving the /clergy/ reserves out of the question, George Brown is eminently conservative in his spirit. His leading principle...is to re• concile progress with preservation, change with stability. Coburg Star, 1853- Cited with approval by Lewis, J. George Brown London, Oxford, 1926. p. 73. (Makers of Canada Series, W.L. Grant, ed.) -iii-

19. Sheppard to Clarke, July 5, 1859- Clarke Papers Cited also in Brown, G.W. "The Grit prty and the great Reform convention of 1859" CHR XVI. # 3«(Sept. 1935) p. 21$. Sheppard was an editorial writer for the Globe at the time; he was widely read in political theory and in history, and had been educated in England.

20. Macdonald«s desire for legislative union reflects his profound alleg• iance to British institutions. To him, responsible government, legis• lative union, and conservatism were all part of the same cloth. See Macdonald's own statement, Conf. Debates p. 29.1.

21. "It is now the fashion to enlarge on the defects of the Constitution of the United States, but I am not one of those who look upon it as a failure, (hearm, hear) I think and believe that it is one of the most skillful works which human intelligence ever created; it is one of

the most perfeg£ragrganizations that ever governed a free people. To say that it has ^pa defects i& but to say that it is not the work of Omniscience, but of human intellects." Conf. Debates p. 32.2.

22. See Chapters III and IV respectively.

23. Pope, Sir J. Conf. Doc, p. 55•

2ii. Cartwrgght suggests this. "...I think that some of the leaders con• sidered that the Provinces would be mudi less disposed to dispute Federal authority if the bulk of their revenue came from that source —in which they were very much mistaken. Had more time be en given the matter might have been better arranged...." Reminiscences p. 16.

25. See Chapter IV.

26. Pope, Sir J. Conf. Doc. p. 59. Mr. Fisher (N.B.)"I should have preferred legislative union if it were feasible." p. 61. Mr. Whelan (P.E.I.)"There is an apprehension abroad in the Lower Provinces that Canada desires to swamp and extinguish their provincial character. Such ought not to be objected to. It is desirable that our mere provincia 1 character be lost and that we should form one great country." p. 8U. Mr. Tupper (N.S.) "If it were not for the peculiar condit- ion of Lower Canada, and that the Lower Provinces have not municipal systems such as Upper Canada, I should join for a Legislative Union instead of a Federal." p. 87. Mr. Henry (N.S.) "We should not define powers of General Leg- islature. I would ask Lower Canada not to fight foi?a xae[ shad• ow. Give a clause to give general powers (except such as given to Local Legislatures) to Federal Legislature. Anything beyond that is hampering the case with difficulties. If we are to have Confederation let us have one on the principle s suggested by Attorjmey-General Macdonald. " /Macdonald, A.A ./"Notes on the Quebec Conference, 1861*." Doughtyxi A.G. ed. CHR I. # 1. (March 1920) p.30. p. 30. Mr. McCully(N.S.) spoke on Legislative union which he said was the prevalent view in his province. The principal opposition to this attitude on legislative union was by -iv-

26. (cont'd) Chandler (N.B. ) and Coles (P.E.I.).

27. "...withpie exception of Prince Edward Island, there seemed no more tendency among the maritime delegates, even including those of Newfound• land, to seek to strengthen the local government at the expense of the new federal government, than there was among the Canadians." Whitelaw, ff.M. The Maritimes and Canada before conf ederation,Toronto, Oxford University Press, 1934. p. 253.

28. Notably Tupper's British Colonist (Halifax); Tilley's Morning News (Saint John); Whelan's Examiner (Charlottetown); McCully's Chronicle (Halifax); Pope's Isalander(Charlottetown.)

29. McDougall to Monck, Jan. 27, 1867• Bellemare Papers, Canadian Archives. McDougall wrote sugge st ing that ^Carnarvon be stiffened "against any possibility of his yielding to Tmpper's wish for a fixed upper House. See Chapter III. for further details on this letter. Monck was not the only one who influenced Carnarvon. Macdonald, so to speak, had got there first. There is a revealing letter to Mac• donald which Carnarvon wrote March 6, 1867: "I can only be very grate• ful to the official duties which have given me the oppurtunity mf mak• ing an acquaintance with you and have changed political into personal relations of so pleasant a kind....I hope/? much/ that when the sea is between us we shall not wholly lose sight of each other. You have made my work so easy for me that I shall always look back with pleasure upon it...." Macdonald Papers, Vol. 51, 1863-1874. Correspondence.

30. This despatch is erroneously marked in the letterbooks as Sept. 7, I867. Much of this despatch is also given by 1/hitelaw, W.M."Lord Monck and the Canadian Constitution" CHR XXI. # 3 (Sept. 1940) See however G 12, Vol. 71. "Confidential Despatches" for the full text.

31. Ibid.

32. Smith, G. "The proposed constitution for British North America" in MacMillan's Magazine, March, 1865. P. 408: "The fact, however, seems to be,that they intend to create not a federation, but a kingdom, and prac• tically extinguish the independent existence of the several provinces... They hope, no doubt, that course of time will practically decided the ambiguity in favour of the incorporating union."

33• Cardwell and Monck must have agreed pretty well on this subject. There is a copy of a despatch, Cardwell to Monck, Dec. 3, 1864, in the Macdonald Papces Vol. $0, that is worth quoting! "The point of principal importance to the practical well working of the scheme is the accurate determination of the limits between the auth• ority of the Central and that of the Local Legislatures in their rel• ation to eactjother. It has not been faaxxtefca possible to exclude from the resolutions some provisions which appear to be lees consistent than might, perhaps, have been desired with the simplicity and unity of the system. But upon £he whole it appears to Her Majesty's Government that precautions have been taken, which are obviously intended to se• cure to the Central Government the means of effective action through• out the several Provinces,—and to guard against those evils which -V-

33. (cont'd) "must inevitably arise, if any doubt were permitted to exist as to the respective limits of Central and Local authority. They are glad to observe that, although large powers of legislation are intended to be vested in local bodies, yet the principle of central control has been steadily kept in view. The importance of this principle cannot be overrated. Its maintenance is essential the practical efficiency of the system, and to its harmonious operation bmth in the general government, and in the governments of the several Provinces." This despatch gives more succinctly than any paraphrase* the atti• tude of the British government towards federalism. (43)

CHAPTER 111

IDEAS IN CANADA WEST REGARDING FEDERALISM (44)

In Canada the reaetion to the plan of Confed• eration was mixed. As a whole it was regarded with benevolence. Canada West saw it as the achievement of an end long sought: nrep. by pop." Lower Canada viewed it with more mixed feelings, but generally as end to end sectional difficulties by aoknowliadging the rightful claim of French Canadians to their own institutions.

Within these two areas of opinion there was considerable variation. There was reaction against the supposed "fed• eral" union by those who wanted a complete legislative union, notably the Protestants of Lower Canada, and the

Catholics of Upper Canada. Some groups wanted a larger measure of federal union, especially the Rouges, but with Tory and Reform dissentients from all over the prov• ince as well. The middle ground was taken by the French

Bleus, the Brown Reformers, and the Macdonald tory Con• servatives. This group was prepared to follow the government fairly uncritically. A more critical middle ground was taken by the liberal Conservatives of Upper

Canada, who opposed government methods more than they criticized government policy.

In Canada West it was not the Reformers who took the liberal point of view on confederation. The Reformers were behind confederation almost to a man, and saw no nec• essity for any such measure as an appeal to the people, advocated by the liberal Conservatives. Whltelaw's state- (45)

ment that Conservatives tended to favour legislative union while Reformers leaned toward a looser federal type is in• correct on certain critioal points.1 The "conservative" dominance at the Quebec Conference, so effective in secur• ing a strong central government, was based on the alliance of groups forming the coalition. It included the Lower

Canada English Conservatives, the French Bleus, the

Macdonald tory Conservatives, and the Brown Reformers.

This is not to say that other groups did not support confederation. - They did; but with reservations. This is especially characteristic of the liberal Conservatives.

In the last analysis the reservations were not usually sufficient to prevent such groups from giving confedera• tion their support. In some cases it was only given under the pressure of outside events. In others, more extreme cases, it was never given at all.

Canada West has always been considered the solid block of opinion behind Confederation. The coalition united Macdonald and Brown in political harness; it followed that Upper Canada was therefore one politically.

This conclusion was reinforced by the fact that the pur• pose of the coalition was to give Upper Canada that which it had so long sought: "rep. by pop." This simple, rational interpretation of events is to a large extent borne out by the vote on Confederation itself. Only 7 out of a total of 65 members from Canada West voted against (46)

the motion Friday, March 10, 1865, Paul Cornell states

that the coalition was supported by all the Conservatives

and four-fifths of the Reformers •2»,

Unfortunately this interpretation is not en•

tirely true, and is certainly misleading when the general

opinions on federalism are considered. In the first place

the coalition was not supported by all the Conservatives,

nor was the support that it did have given uncritically.

After the formation of the coalition, the Upper Canada

Conservatives were in a rather anomalous position. They

had been contending against reformers in a bitter struggle

for the past ten years or more. Some of them were opposed

to "rep. by pop.", some of them opposed to George Brown; most of them used to getting scant courtesy from their

reform brethren, and giving little in return. Suddenly

this war was ended. The Reformers had gained their long-

sought end and the Conservatives had to swallow their

pride and accept the situation as best they could. It was not too difficult for many of them; "rep. by pop." was a tempting prize; it was worth swallowing the indig•

nity of coalition to obtain. But the general effect of

the coalition on the Upper Canada Conservatives was to

detach them from close allegiance to Macdonald, and to

set them free in a kind of happy world where they could

critioize if they chose. The Conservatives knew full well

that the disciplined Reform group were behind Confedera- (47)

tion; therefore they simply relaxed and took a good long look at the new Constitution, The Conservative opinions are therefore more judicious and not without shrewd crit• icisms of points which appeared to them peculiar or even retrogressive. They were often more democratic than the

Reformers, perhaps because it cost them nothing, perhaps because of a sincere desire not to be rushed into anything which had already the earmarks of considerable precipitancy.

The Reform party after coalition was filled with exuberance. There is very little evidence to indicate that Brown did not carry all his supporters with him.

They were quite ready to admit that Brown had done the right thing in order to secure "rep. by pop." The Reform group, so vigorously behind the new constitution, were necessarily rather uncritical in their acceptance of it.

They were opposed to postponement, to modifications, to anything that might detract from their immediate goal.

It is difficult to explain the Reform opposition to appeal to the people on any other ground. They probably felt it might be made an excuse for the postponing of Confederation.

There was an additional group of Reformers, the Sandfield

Macdonald "tail" as it was called, which did oppose con• federation. The country was not ready for it, they said; it could get along pretty well in the future, given a little more forbearance on the part of its political par- (48)

ties. This group was the only strongly dissentient group,

among Reformers until the great split of June 1867.

Nor were there any significant regional divisions

of opinion in Canada West. There was no real centre of opposition such as were the eastern counties in Canada

East. There is some suggestion that the central counties of Canada West offered some opposition; this is also re• inforced slightly by a more obvious localization of opposition in members of the Legislative Council. But there Is little which can be taken as concrete suggestions of regional opposition. There was of course the old con• flict between London and Toronto, born out of the rivalry for the old capital of Upper Canada. There was some fear among the citizens of Ottawa that confederation might be a deep dark plot to move the capital back to Montreal or 4 Kingston. But regionalism in Canada West did not provide any real focus for opinion on the. federal state.

-Apart from political alignments, the principal influence affecting ideas on federalism in the province 5 was religious belief and its concomitant, national origins.

Religious belief usually tended to follow certain prescribed political outlines, but in some cases it sought out a line for itself^and followed it. This is especially character• istic of the Irish Catholics. The Irish Catholios in

Canada East and Canada West show very well the peculiar nature of the attitudes of minority groups. In Canada ~7- (49)

West the Irish Catholics put their trust in the central government of Confederation, A strong union government

was the protector of their religious rights and their

educational freedom. They were convinced that the Central

government would concede far more to them than could ever

he expected from any local government. Consequently they were opposed to any decentralized system of federalism,

and in fact warmly supported arguments for legislative

6 union. The general political allegiance of religious groups was principally along lines suggested by the nature of their sect. Thus the Church of England, medium and high church, tended to be Conservative. So too did the Presbyterians of the Established Church of Scotland. On the other hand, low Church of England, Free Church of Scotland, and the Methodists and Baptists tended in the 7 direction of reform. Catholics were split. Some sup• ported S. MacDonald. Others, notably the Irish Catholics,

found themselves looking rather to MoGee than to S. Mac• donald. It is likely that they found the call of Irish vs. Scot, Conservative vs. Liberal, stronger than any

other feeling.

It is difficult to measure the strength of re• ligious convictions and how far these affected group ideas

on the future British American federal state. The Irish (50)

Catholics, and perhaps Catholics generally in the upper section of the Province, had a definite policy in rfigard to Confederation. In most cases however, religious be• liefs were concealed by the prevalent use of party labels and party differences which sprang easily Into being on every contentious issue. *

The-Conservatives were- somewhat restless in the coalition with Brown. They were not necessarily opposed to "rep • by pop."; but they were not -prepared to accept it uncritically. They were not prepared to accept it re• gardless of the institutions which accompanied it.

Some Conservative opinion refused to concede any degree of federalism at all. If it could not get legislative union it was not interested in a compromise with federalism. This position was taken by M. C. Q Cameron who carried it a l'outrance and voted against the Confederation resolutions. A good number of others such as J. H. Cameron were prepared to vote for Confed• eration; but they made it clear they did so under pressure of circumstances which, they felt, made it impossible for them to do otherwise. The position of such a group is instructive, for it illustrates how hard the ideal of legislative union died. In the face of a ministerial policy which conceded as little as it could to the federal principle, Conservatives were still prepared- to do battle (51)

for the perpetuation of what they conceived to he thor• oughly British institutions. They wanted neither truck nor trade with federalism. The position of this group rested on the assumption that federalism only meant a con• tinuance of sectional difficulties,9 They thought it a mistake to recognize sectional differences; it was taking the line of least resistance to give in to them. Such a method was hound in the nature of things to make matters worse rather than better. Every argument advanced for federal union applied doubly to legislative union; the latter is moreover better suited for the aims and purposes of a British people.10

J, H. Cameron, member for Peel, was not so extreme as his namesake. Cameron was a strong Conservative and commanded considerable support. He was a great ally of

Dr. Strachan, and was Grand Master of the Orange Order for

British North America. It was he who kept the Orange Order from breaking away from Macdonald and the Conservative alliance with the French. J. H. Cameron had been suggested for the leadership of the Conservative party by Sir Allan

McNab in 1855.11 His opinion therefore probably represents the great rank and file of the Orange Order. Cameron ad• mitted that confederation was a desirable measure; if it was not as desirable as a legislative union one should not insist on the impossible. You should, he said, "endeavour to obtain that which you can fairly reach, and by and by (58)

you may get that which, at a far distance, seems impossible.

(Hear. Hear.) I believe the Confederation of the colonies 12 will lead hereafter to a legislative union." Cameron went on to suggest, however, that one means of ensuring such a desirable eventuality was to give: concurrent juris• diction on such local powers as property and civil rights, public lands, to the Central Government as well as the local governments. Thus, he said, "when all those smaller stars fall from the firmament", the General Gov• ernment will possess all the necessary powers for effec• tive legislative union. If Macdonald was sympathetic with this point of view, he was less so with the motion which

Cameron placed on the floor of the House. Cameron pro• posed a general election to ascertain and confirm opinion on confederation. Cameron's motion reflects indeed the opinion of a loose section of the Conservatives of Upper 13 Canada, although his motion went down to defeat 84-35.

The reason for conservative concern in this matter was principally to secure delay. The government had not been slow in applying themselves to the measure.

Barely nine months transpired between the fall of the

Conservative government in June 1864 and the passing of the Confederation resolutions in March 1865. Some con• servatives felt that haste could achieve nothing and could endanger the whole project. (53)

The government contended that no appeal was nec•

essary. Thet people had given their full approval of the measure; delay served no useful purpose, and threatening

events from the South made it decidely unwise. The real

reason behind the government's position was probably a 14 sound instinct to let sleeping dogs lie. There was some

danger that an appeal to the country would awaken the

Quebec electorate from their comfortable allegiance to

Gartier. Western Canada was certainly behind confederation.

Nothing was to be gained by the turmoil of a general elec•

tion. Such an election might destroy the conservative "set"

to the constitution. The New Brunswick election had also

given the government reason to believe that an appeal to

the people of Canada could hardly strengthen their position,

and might conceivably weaken it.

In addition there was the constitutional argument

against an appeal to the people. Cameron had suggested

late in 1864 that such an appeal should be made. The

Montreal Gazette took pains to answer It on November 2,

1864. The argument of the Gazette was based on the del•

egate vs. representative controversy, shrewdly calculated

to appeal to Canadian opinion biased against the American view. The people's representatives, said the Gazette, are not delegates, "but are, in fact the people in their pol•

itical capacity - - - it is passing strange how a politic•

ian so intensely British (Jr. H. Cameron] can talk as if 7 (54)

constitutional changes in Canada, fcr Britain, must hare

the sanction of ... a popular vote after the style of 15 our democratic neighbours"• The Globe quoted this

argument with great approval and threw in the *added warn•

ing that Canadians must be on their guard against such

"dreadful American heresies" about, which "we are so often

warned now-a-days".16

The Toronto Leader replied that it was no argument

at all to say it was un-British to appeal to the people. British practice could not hold for such a drastic circum- 17 stance as this. Not that we want anything like a Con•

stitutional convention. We are quite satisfied, it said, with the Parliamentary method. But Parliament should not make sweeping constitutional charges which the electorate had not indicated as desirable before the members were 18 elected.

The Leader was characteristic of a generous

section of Conservative opinion. It was not illiberal, but it was not democratic. It had an elevated sense of public liberty, and resented despotism of any kind. The

Leader was more judicious than the Globe and more ably written. Its sense of liberty was especially aroused over

the Government's vigorous methods in the House. On March

4th after observing the results of the New Brunswick

elections, the Leader pointed out that though the people

are not opposed to confederation, they are thoroughly (55)

opposed to the "high-handed way in which it is attempted to be carried • • • " Maritime dissent, the Leader added a week later, has certainly been aggravated by the atti• tude of the Canadian government. This is doubtless of

"a foretaste of the despotic temper likely to bear sway in the Confederate government".

Tne Leader was not averse to a continuance of the old union and believed that "rep. by pop." could now EG be carried. The old union had its advantages, and the

Leader did not consider it necessarily worn out. A little mutual forbearance and it could be made to work; the real difficulties have been immensely exaggerated by the strife of party. The Leader did not emphasize the fact, but "rep. by pop." was the sine qua non of such a continuance. Yet, it was fully aware that French Canada would only concede such an measure under great pressure.

The reason perhaps for its sanguine attitude was hints thrown out by the Rouge press. In December 1864 the

Rouges suggested that rather than have confederation

French Canada might be prepared to accept "la modification de nos rapports avec cette (Upper Canada] province, tout en oonservant 1'union".22 At any rate the Leader was interested in the continuance of legislative union; at the time Confederation in New Brunswick seemed to have failed. It would not accept federation of the Ganadas alone, and oontinuance of the Union was the only alternative. (56)

It might be expected from the general tenor of the Leader's thought on legislative union that it would have concurred generally in the Quebec resolutions. It did, but with reservations. Like most TJ.C. conservative** opinion, the Leader was not enthusiastic over federation, conceiving that it perpetuated differences instead of re• moving them. In Canada there was a "States rights" party already, and one that would certainly be jealous of any federal authority encroaching on the local. Evidences of 23 this were already apparent in August, 1864. But if there is to be a federation, letr.lt not be based on the principle that federalism is but a disguise for central• ization. There is a fear evidenced in the Leader of unoheeked power, the idea that all power corrupts. "It is the nature of all such unchecked power to run riot and 24- become despotic". It had admitted in September 1864 that local governments should be severely limited; it also admitted that the central government should have consider• able legislative freedom;25 but fear was gradually aroused by the actions of the coalition. The opinions which the

Leader had on federalism in September 1864 gradually shift.

By March 1865 it was sure that the design of Canadian con• federation was clearly inimical to any independence on the part of the local government. The Leader is not yet opposed to this trend irrevocably; but it does at least attempt to make clear where the policy of the Ministry is ftio

But one general tendency is too obvious to escape the attention of any observing person* There is an evident design to belittle the local governments as much as possible, to make them, even in their own spheres, subordinate to the federal authority. It only remains to make the local machinery as feeble as possible; and we shall be surprised if it does not turn out that this is the meaning of "the simple and inexpensive local governments" of which we hear so much. A single Chamber, without anything in the semblance of a responsible Administration, a sort of overgrown Municipal Council, will be the least formidable local machinery that could be established. It could never successfully contest power, in case of any dispute about jurisdiction, with the federal authority; and wherever such questions arose the latter might promise itself an easy victory.26

There is here something very close to a true

conception of the nature of the federal state. "Even

in their own spheres" suggests that local governments should be considered as independent within their own legislative field. The prospect of contesting power with the central authority is envisaged. In short, there is something approaching an understanding of what the federal state should be. This was a reaction against a strong-coalition policy of pushing through confeder• ation. It suggests that Macdonald was right at Quebec when he suggested caution on strong centralisation measures. The Leader objected, as did other Conserva• tives to the"monstrous haste" manifested by the Canadian government, to the refusal to allow amendments; it was therefore gratified that defeat in New Brunswick promised (58)

to delay the project, and that the Quebec resolutions had not been hurriedly pushed into Imperial legislation.27

-Brown's secession from the ministry_the follow• ing December, and events from outside effectively preven• ted the Leader from pursuing very strongly its opposition course. Brown's active opposition to the ministry was only on relatively minor issues. He still supported con• federation. But it tended to bring the Leader more closely back to the Conservative fold, and in September

1867 the editor, James Beatiy, ran as a Conservative in

Toronto East. There is little doubt that the Leader was behind confederation, but it was prepared to be critical and confederation was ably criticized. The Leader illus• trates perhaps a kind of regard for liberty characteristic of DeTocqueville, whom it quoted on several occasions.

If it was conservative, it was liberal-conservative in the best sense of the word.

The Leader and the Globe both carried with them a considerable following in smaller journals across

Canada West. A paper such as the Kingston Daily Mews would quote extracts from the Leader. More often it would write editorials echoing the editorial policy of the larger paper. How far the metropolitan (if one may use the word) press differed from the rural press on major issue such as confederation is difficult to say. T (59)

The small journals had their opinions. Their editorials were often on a par with those of the Globe, and in some cases as good as those of the Leader. But there is not much differentiation in opinion,29 The editorials, written looally, seem to embody ideas which, if not im• ported from the larger journals, at least tend to reflect their general policy, seen through the glasses of local issues. The Leader and the Globe were recognized as the two giants of Canada West; not other papers in the

Province had their circulation,29 and undoubtedly they exerted considerable influence.

If the Leader*s policy on confederation may be considered liberal conservatism, the Globe's policy was conservative reformism. The Leader suspected the policy of small inexpensive local governments; the Globe had, virtually initiated it• The Leader wanted an appeal to the people; the Globe said such an appeal was a waste of time and money. The explanation of such a juxtaposition of political ideas lies not only in the semi-detached nature of Conservative opinion in Canada West; it lies in the determination of Reformers to hang on to "rep. by pop." Now that it was conceded, they would secure, if they could, either Confederation of the British North 30 America or a federation of the Canadas. George Brown made this quite clear in his great opening speech before (60)

the House on February 8, 1865, The events of the past months, he said, can never be obliterated. The solemn

admission of men of all parties cannot be erased. Any•

one who opposes Confederation must not forget that there can never be any return to the status quo ante. No one

should oppose Confederation who cannot produce a better

scheme, a scheme acceptable to French as well as English

Canada. Everyone who raises his voice in hostility to this measure must bear in mind "all the perilous conse- 31 quences of its rejection • . ."OJ" Brown was not mincing his words; his whole speech was irradiated with a pro• digious sense of power.32 There was a deep satisfaction with what had been secured at Quebec; there was the sug• gestion of a formidable opposition if confederation were in any way compromised. The Reform position was clear enough. They had secured admission by the Conservative ministry and especially of French Canada that Vep. by pop. was a just and acceptable political contention; it remained only to see that such a principle was embodied in the new constitution. This accounts for Brown's policy of con• servatism in the coalition. Not all reformers agreed 33 with Brown, but most of them were disposed to be pleased with what they had secured and not to question too far (61)

their good fortune.

Brown's policy on federalism was curious. The

union, he said, at the Quebec Conference, must be a

federal union, not a legislative one.34 Brown meant

this; he knew from his past experience, as well as from

his contact with Cartier, that the constitution would

have to be federal to be acceptable to French Canada.

He himself had long been an advocate of federal union

in order to secure "rep. by pop." But he had not a

clear-cut doctrine about federalism and this lack was

manifest despite his obvious earnestness on the question.

His insistence on federal union was not because he wanted

federalism so much, but simply to carry through an honest

bargain with the French Canadians. Our union, he said,

will be federal because only on«those conditions would

Lower Canada have conceded representation by population.

For this concession, we shall give Lower Canada equality

in the Upper House. "On no other condition could we

have advanced a step".35 Here perhaps is elicited the

meaning of federalism for most English Canadians: rep•

resentation by population in the Lower House; represen•

tation by territory in the Upper. Here is the same

conception of federalism that was revealed in the debate

over the "well understood principles of federal govern• ment". Brown was quite sincere in believing he was

advocating federal government. The fact that local con- (62)

stitutions should he modelled on municipal institutions did not affect the issue as far as Brown was concerned.

He was prepared quite cheerfully to insist on "federals government on the one hand, and demand local, municipal, non-responsible institutions on the other. Federation is but an extension of our political system, said the Globe, and it "is sustained by precisely the same reasoning as are municipal institutions".36 This was too much for the

Montreal True Witness. It gave a brief lesson to the

Globe on the subject of federation. Federal union, said the True Witness, "differs from a Legislative union, not in degree but in kind". There is a formal and an essen• tial difference between them.37 This was a lesson which

Canadians, certainly English Canadians, never learned.

To them federal union was but an extension in certain res• pects of legislative union. To George Brown, you hardly needed local institutions at all. To have a federal system it was not necessary to have two sets of govern• ments: all you needed was the proper division of representation in the central legislature. Brown thus saw Confederation as one government rather than two.

Confederation, said Brown, is nothing less than a bold scheme "to gather all these countries (of B.N.A.) into one - to organize them all under one government, with the protection of the British flag . • ."3Q (63)

Brown's project in local governments had the aim of being inexpensive, and only semi-responsible to the people. There would be a legislature elected for three years with an executive^, not responsible to the

legislatureybut in some way responsible to the elector• ate. This was suggested during the debate on Macdonald's bill for local governments. Macdonald interjected iron• ically, "Would you have a president too?" Brown stoutly denied being favourable to such a system. His conception of local government was, he said, not unlike the system of County Councils in Great Britain.°*

Brown's conception of federal government must therefore be acknowledged to be closely resembling leg• islative union. He would not have agreed perhaps with this statement; but there is little doubt that federal• ism as he conceived it did not in any sense include the idea of co-ordinate powers in a single state. Brown usually praised the elasticity of American federalism in allowing for sectional disagreement. But at the same time, federalism applied to Canada still meant an attempt to centralize. "It is unphilosophical," said the Globe in a moment of reflection, "that the part should be deemed greater than the whole • • .m41 Such statements suggest that Brown meant the Canadian federal state to be one; the provinces would not be co-ordinate parts, but would be sections of an integrated unity. 7 (64)

Other reformers were quite clear that the

Quebec resolutions did not suggest a federal state, "if we are notigoing to have a legislative union in name", said Col. Rankin, "we shall have something very closely 4,? resembling it".

It is perhaps difficult to justify Brown's conception of a federalism-with his demand for a nom• inative Upper House. Assuming that the Upper House is the principal instrument through which the nation was to be federalized, it is difficult to believe that Brown could have been prevented from advocating an elective

Upper House. Brown had, however, always opposed the elective Upper House, It seemed to him, inconsistent with the methods of the British .

When it came to confederation, Brown could not but feel the pull of long-held beliefs; at the Conference he agreed to a return to the nominated Legislative Council.

Macdonald said later, "I do not think there was a dissen- 43 ting voice on the nominative principle in the Upper House".

This was not true. The nominative principle aroused the opposition of Brown's Reform colleagues in the Cabinet, William McDougall and Oliver Mowat.

McDougall wrote in his personal copy of the Confederatiiuw

Debates» opposite Macdonald*s words: "... I moved and

Mr. Mowat seconded a motion for the elective principle.

About l/3rd the delegates voted for the proposition - (65)

Brown arguing and voting against it". McDougall hoped that some revision might be made at the London Conference when the fixed membership of the Upper House would almost certainly come up for revision.45 McDougall did not secure the introduction of the elective principle. With

Brown's help and that of New Brunswick he managed to get the fixed limit on the membership of the Upper House revised.

There is some doubt that Brown's policy on the nominative Upper House was the policy of the Reform party. McDougall claimed it was not. The truth of the matter is probably that McDougall was right. Reformers would probably have preferred an elective Upper House.46

But the lack of reform opposition on any large scale suggests they did not lose much sleep over the nomin• ative principle. Some conservatives considered it a retrograde measure, a step backwards in political evolution; most Reformers probably did not care. The

Upper House and its constitution was more the concern of Lower Canada who would look there for guarantees and protection against the English majority in the Lower

House•

Brown carried Reformers with him on almost every move right up until June 1867. He continued to support Confederation although out of the Cabinet, and the fact that McDougall and Howland47 were still in the 48 Cabinet guaranteed continued Reform support. In June Of (66)

1867, however, Brown's opposition finally broke through his long support of the ministry and its project. There had been carping criticism in the Globe for some months, although nothing fundamental. Brown felt the time had come, now that confederation was assured, to begin a new party platform in opposition to the present government.

He called a Reform convention for June 27, the basis of whioh was the cry, "No coalition."

It was a grievous tactical error. The Reform ranks split. Brown came off a weak second; the major part of the reform party continued in strong support of

McDougall and Howland; Brown was left holding the short end of the anti-ministerial group. Said the OBhawa :

Vindicator: "... the convention of 1859 fought for a principle, while that of 1867 fought for power ...»

*anti-coalition may be the decision of the convention,

49 but it v/as not the decision of the people". Brown thus projected the reform leadership to McDougall and

Howland. Since the latter were connected with the Con• servatives, it meant that the most of Reform party would continue with the coalition as long as McDougall and

Howland were satisfied with what MacDonald had to offer.

In August Brown ran for election as an anti- coalitionist in South Ontario constituency against the sitting member, Thomas Gibbs. Gibbs was a local reform• ist with Conservative sympathies, and who had aroused (67)

the opposition of the local reform paper in August, 1864, for such sympathies. But in August 1867 the

Yindioator swung behind Gibbs against Brown; Brown was defeated 1889 - 1£18. The incident shows the effect of

Brown's policy on Reform sympathies. Gibbs was undoubt• edly a strong local man, but he had once had strong local opposition. The Vindicator had supported Brown's project for inexpensive local governments; it had supported

Brown's policy rather than Gibbs since 1864. Brown was thus opposed by those who had usually supported him.

The Vindicator is but an example of what happened right across Canada West (Ontario) in the summer of 1867. In the Leader for the early days of July are pages of extracts from Reform journals who had broken away from Brown. In this context there is perhaps some justification for Morison's remark that "Brown had a difficult game to play, and he played it badly".50 In trying to form a strong opposition to Macdonald he moved too soon. He was too eager to bring the old vigour of the Reform party to bear against the Conservatives, and to displace them from power. On the cry of "no coalition" the Reform party went down to utter defeat in Ontario.51

As in his resignation from the ministry in December 1865,

Brown was too impulsive. One mistake need not have con• demned him to political oblivion; indeed it did not. But the second move, an attempt to throw Canada West against (68)

the ministry begun three days before Confederation was due to go into effect, was all but fatal. It resolved the question of "no coalition" quickly into "anti-union".

And "anti-union" was an extremely bad issue on which to appeal to Canada West in the summer of 1867.

In confederation, said Cartwright, Brown,

Cartier and Gait took all the risks and Macdonald got all the glory. Brown, who risked perhaps more than anyone, came crashing down with a suddenness equal to the risks he ran. Brown's failure was due as much to his own im• pulsiveness as to Macdonald's astuteness. It was tragic that Brown's great gesture of statesmanship in June 1864

should have ended so sadly in June 1867.52

As if to sound the final note of irony, Sand- field Macdonald was given the leadership of the union party in the local government of Ontario. Brown, who had led Canada West through so many vicissitudes, was eclipsed in his own section by a man whom he had long- disliked and often opposed; a man who was a Catholic and with the invidious record of having passed a Separate

School law in the teeth of an Upper Canadian majority, a man who, above all, had opposed confederation since it was first brought into active politics by the reform convention of 1859.

Sandfield Macdonald and his career illustrates (69)

the peculiar difficulty of the moderate Liberals of

Upper Canada. They were liberals rather than reformers; they had aimed at tolerance, at more equitable school laws; they had a tradition to trying to get along with

French moderates; they saw the present union as adequate for present needs and change only a cause of great dis• ruption; they were content with the status quo, and believed-that more generosity on everyone's part would prevent further constitutional difficulties. This generous policy met with considerable opposition, and

Sandfield Macdonald's career epitomizes the difficulty of the moderate caught between two extremes.

This difficulty was the more pressing because

Sandfield Macdonald*s principle of double majority, a mean between the two opposites, was never really tried.

The double majority principle may not have been capable of sustaining the pressure which it was oalled upon to bear. Indeed it failed on the first serious test.53

But Sandfield Macdonald did not resign when it did fail.

He stood condemned on his own ground.

The double majority system was an admission in practice what the Upper Canada liberals could not bring themselves to concede in principle. It was in effect a federalization of a sort, but without discrim• ination as to what could be a local question and what could not. It was not only difficult to apply, it was (70)

difficult to stick to«. Sandfield could not bring him• self to resign over its defeat in 1863.

The position of the Upper Canada liberals was unstable and uncertain. Most of them tended to be in opposition to confederation, largely on the ground of trying to make the existing union work. Sandfield

Macdonald and Holton, a Lower Canada Liberal, agreed that confederation was too drastic a step in Canada's constitutional evolution. However, Holton's consistency and vigour^ contrasts rather sharply with Sandfield

Macdonald*s expediency and shallowness of purpose.

Sandfield Macdonald*s opposition was weak and uncertain and he lost support from his followers who opposed con• federation more vigorously, and also from those who decided confederation was the answer to existing dif• ficulties.

The Liberals who opposed confederation did so on the ground that the Union oould still work given more tolerance and less virulence of party spirit. Their allegiance was to the Union which had accomplished so much in the past, and whioh they believed, had not yet outlived its usefulness. They looked in fact to the

Union at the time of Baldwin and La Fontaine and wished the return of what might be called (in the language of one Liberal's metaphor) Canada*s youth.54 They were aware of existing difficulties. Sandfield*s attempt (71)

to form a coalition in March 1864 was a recognition that

some solution was neoessary.55 But coalition was hardly an adequate solution, and nothing else seemed to be sug• gested* The double majority principle was moribund and

Sandfield really had no other solution.

Some Liberals and Liberal journals thought things through and decided that confederation was the only solution to Canada*s difficulties. The most noted was the London Free Press, whose editor had long been a friend of Sandfield Macdonald*s. The Free Press fol• lowed pretty generally the tone of the Liberal-Conserva• tive Press, especially the Toronto Leader, and offered considerable opposition to the government on its failure to appeal to the people. It agreed with the Leader that federation, not legislative union, was the only kind of union suitable for British North America.57

The main thread which united all Upper Canada

Liberals was the opposition to government failure to appeal to the country. This did arouse strong complaint of high-handed methods. The Ottawa Union quoted with obvious delight the strong line taken by the Hamilton

Times. If, said the Times, the people's "direct decision on the confederation question is unnecessary, we know of no question that has arisen in the past, we can imagine none in the future of sufficient importance to justify an appeal to them. The polling booths there- (72)

after may as well be turned into pig-pens, and the voters1 58 lists cut up into pipe-lighters". This homespun senti•

ment was characteristic of both Liberal and liberal-

Conservative views of government policy in the upper

section of the provinces of Canada. But on the question

of the nature of federal government the liberals seemed

to have no policy or principle worthy of the name.

Opposed to confederation or not, they seemed to lack the

honest approach to the problems of their time which

characterized much of liberal-Conservative thought on

confederation. They recognized that the union was in

difficulties; but that recognition only meant some sol•

ution within the simple bounds of the existing framework;

coalition or a double majority system. If Sandfield 59 Macdonald was heir to the Baldwin tradition, he was

conspicuously less progressive than Ms able predecessor.

The Liberal party in Canada West at the time of confed•

eration was by no means what it had been under Baldwin;

but it was hampered seriously by a leader who was unable

to rise to the occasion, and who, in the end, accepted a

premiership under the patronage of a man who was.

Sandfield Macdonald was a Catholic and might

have been expected to appeal to this large minority in

Upper Canada. The reason he failed to do so was perhaps

because of Ms personality, perhaps because of Ms policy. 60 The greater part of the Catholic minority were Irish (73)

who could not find in Macdonald's Highland Scotch Cathol•

icism the appeal that a man of their own race, such as

McGee, had. Especially interesting, however, is the

Catholic policy on federal government. Sandfield never made it clear just what his policy on federal government was; but the double majority principle would hardly con•

cur with Upper Canadian Catholic policy on federalism.61

The fact is that the Catholic minority in Upper Canada

saw eye to eye with the Protestant minority in Lower

Canada as far as federal government was concerned. Their policy was quite simple: they did not want federal government at all. Federal government gave power to the local section; this section, in the case of Upper Canada^ was strongly Protestant. Hence to the Catholic minority, federal government was bad, and the less decentralization the better. This is quite clearly enunciated by the

Toronto .Canadian Freeman. Confederation should, it said,

"approach as nearly as possible to the character of a legislative union". For two reasons: first, it is a more solid foundation for future greatness; second, because it is a "greater pledge and surer guaranty for an the rights of minorities".

It is hardly necessary to say that the Catholic group, especially the Irish Catholics, gave strong support to Macdonald and the Conservatives. Macdonald, a Scotch Protestant, they looked to as well as to McGee (74)

for the guarantee of their own rights in the new Canadian federal state. Macdonald*s strong statements on the pro• tection of minority rights hy the central government gave the Catholics of Canada West great encouragement.. Not unnaturally, therefore, they preferred legislative union, with its strong central government in the new Canadian constitution. McGee, speaking in London (C.W.) in Sept• ember 1866, must have warmed their hearts with his stirring words of the strong beneficient central power.

"The minorities east and west haVe really nothing to fear . • •; the strong arm and the long arm of the Confederate power will be extended over them all, and woe be to the wretch on whom that arm shall have to descend in anger ... localism must be taught to know 6 its proper place; sectionalism must be subordinate. ..." The Bishop-of Toronto echoed these words in his appeal to all Upper Canadian Catholics in July 1867. Although there are some reformers amongst us, he said, the "great major• ity are conservatives and have always supported the 64 Conservative government".

There is little to suggest that the local government of Ontario alone would have been any protec• tion for minority rights by Ontario Catholics. The view that was designed to protect minori• ties is open to grave mis-interpretation. It was only designed to protect one group: the French Canadians. (75)

Whether the French Canadians are a minority or not depends on the frame of reference used. In any case, none of the sectional minority groups regarded federal union as any• thing but a source of great danger to their rights and privileges. The Catholics of Canada West are the classic example. They had no commercial axe to grind as did the

English Protestants of Canada East; with the'Catholics of

Canada West it was a question of legislative union and protection or federal union and sectional intolerance»

And their choice was almost unanimous: conservatism, legislative union, protection, privileges, and largeness of vision; all these they saw in the policy of the

Canadian government on federalism.

On a broad -survey it can be said that there was no source of strong opposition in Canada West to

Confederation. This might be attributed to the fact that there was no real idea of just what kind of a measure Confederation was. This is not a likely inter• pretation. Political groups in Canada West not only knew what kind of a measure they were getting, but by and large were strongly in favour of it. There was little ignorance on what Confederation meant: any ignorance displayed was on what federalism meant. The two were often juxtaposed in Canada West. Confederation meant strength, union, and a great new nationality; federalism meant sectionalism, disunion, strife, and a (76)

splitting up into component groups.

The support of the Reform party was indispens• able to the success of confederation. The Reform party might have forced the government to concede a great deal more to localism had they so desired. But the Reform party was far from preaching such a doctrine. Although representation by population was the great sectional issue, its achievement projected a cessation of sectional strife, at least as far as Reformers were concerned. In other words, the Reformers were seeking to end sectional discord rather than perpetuate it. This was admittedly bound to work in their favour, and is indeed the reason why it so bitterly opposed by French Canada; but the fact remains that Reformers sought an end which was a con• comitant of legislative union, not of federal.

Representation by population is a basic tenet of any true national state.

In the nature of things, the Reformers were in this sense committed to a united government. But the end they sought could only be obtained by concessions to

French Canada. They had long realized this, and it lay at the basis of their demand for federal government.

Thus federal government was a means of securing what they so earnestly desired: an equitable distribution of representation.

This accounts for Brown's curious theory of (77)

federal government. He had agitated the subject for ten years: he might be presumed to have formed some theory about it. But this theory shows a strange weakness on the very point which is the most fundamental: the rela• tions between two co-ordinate powers, central and regional, and the division of powers between them. Brown's theory gave only the most rudimentary powers to local in• stitutions and gave them no plenary power whatsoever. On the other hand the central power was given strength and more strength, with even the abolishing of an elective principle in the regional representation of the Upper

House. Brown's theory of federal government was merely a system for perpetuating the union government; it would give to Upper Canada "rep. by pop.wwhile making enough concessions to French Canada to enable such an unpalatable measure to be accepted.

It cannot be denied that there were some root causes in Upper Canada which tended in the other direction.

There was a general desire to be in control of one's own affairs without interference or hindrance from French

Canada. But this desire did not necessarily breach the argument and favour of local institutions, since rep. by pop• would give Upper Canada legislative dominance over the French anyway. There was moreover little of the ar• gument for federal institutions which are a commonplace today. It seems natural enough at the present time to (78)

regard Ontario as ceasing at the Ottawa River, where a different culture and atmosphere in reality does begin.

But such an argument found little place in Canada West

1864-1867. The province of Canada was united by many ties, the St. Lawrence, the Grand Trunk, and intimate political and commercial relations of the past genera• tion. The introduction of modern communications had only drawn the Province more closely together.

The federal system was therefore not entirely compatible with Upper Canadian views of their political or commercial future. It was, on occasion, looked upon as a fair system, allowing for sectional rights and sectional privileges. There is even a remark in the

Oshawa Vindicator which suggests that the system of legislative union is after all, only applicable to Great

65 Britain. But such remarks as those of the Vindicator fift were few and far between. The remarkable thing is that the argument was resorted to so little. It can only suggest that federal government was not then regarded as necessarily applicable to North American countries, and perhaps not even desirable. Whether this is the case or not is a most interesting question. Modern Canada cer• tainly regards federalism as a national way of life.

But the fact is that it was not always so regarded, and especially was this true in Canada West at the time when federalism was under discussion. (79)

Opposition to Confederation existed in Canada

West but it was the kind of opposition which could not.

carry its policy very far. The Liberals and Conservatives

did consider the subject of federal government; they did

suggest that the central government was being given a

dangerous amount of power. But confederation was after

all a Conservative measure. Some of the Conservatives

of a more liberal trend of mind did critically examine

it; they joined with Liberals in strongly suggesting the

government make a constitutional appeal to the people.

But the nature of their opposition, though not fundamen•

tally benign, could not be carried very far in the face

of the extraordinary pressure of events below the border.

If the liberal-Conservatives were disposed to be critical,

they were not critical for long after the Fenian invasion.

The one minority group which could have made

trouble were the Catholics. Had they opposed Confedera•

tion for any reason, the French Bleus would, have found

it difficult to support Confederation. The whole project would indeed have been quite impossible. But the

Catholics and especially the Irish Catholics were fully

behind the policy of the government as long as it did not

concede too much to a sectionalism which might threaten

Catholic rights. In this respect the Irish Catholics and

the Protestant Reformers were unintentionally at one.

They both wanted a strong central government; the Irish (80)

because it would give them protection, the reformers because, with rep. by pop., it would give them more control of their own affairs. Both could have been right perhaps, though Brown changed his tune after July 1, 1867.

Brown's conversion to provincialism began under the aus• pices of his opposition to Macdonald in 1867 after Confed• eration had begun. The Catholics continued to look to the Central government for support.

The interplay of ideas and parties in Canada

West on the subject of Confederation reflects the per• petuation of the idea of legislative union. Federalism may have been a necessity, a convenience or a luxury; but Canada West understood federalism as but a convenience, a system not of principles or of co-ordinate powers, but of practical utility, a system to be added to existing institutions in order to lighten the heavy load of sectional differences they were obliged to carry. Fed• eralism was but a convenient means of giving to existing political institutions the elasticity necessary for them to function in the complex social and religious frame• work of the Province of Canada. /fa

Notes

1. Whitelaw, W.M. "reconstructing the Quebec Conference" CHR XIX. # 2 (June 1938) p. 133.

2. Cornell, P.G. "The alignment of political groups in the United Province of Canada, I85l*-l861*." CHR XXX. # 1. (March 191*9) p. 1*2.

3. See Appendices 1 and 2.

1*. Ottawa, The Union Tues. Nov. 29, 1861*, said that a vote for confederat• ion would be a vote against one's own city.

5. The population of Canada West by origins:(Census of 1861) Native(non-French) 869,592 " (French) 33, 287 Ireland 191,231 England 111*, 290 Scotland 98,792 Total population: 1,396,091. United States 50,758 Germany & Holland 22,906 Maritime Provinces 7,597

The population of Canada West by religious belief: Church of England 311,565 Free Church of Scotland 11*3,01*3] Estab.Church of Scotland 108,963> Presbyterians 303 , 381* United Presbyterians 51,3781 Wesleyan Methodists 218,1*27] Episcopalian Methodists 71,6l5J Methodists 290,01*2 Roman Catholic 258,11*1 Baptists 61,559

6. The Irisfii Catholics of Canada East vigourously opposed legislative union. See Chapter IV.

7. Leader, Thurs. Nov. 3, 1861*. In Canada West, said the Leader, the Free Church of Scotland is strongest in its political instincts, "...it is an undoubted fact that our most extreme politicians are to be found in that church." The Presbyterians are "almost exclusively Conservative". The Church of England "leans toward Conservatism", but its clergy exer• cise less political influence than that of any other denomination. McGee has an interesting analysis of public opinion, which he classifies into "Monarchical" or "Democratical". In the former he includ• es most French Canadians, Old Country men, Canadians of British origin, the Church of Rome and the Church of England, generally j the Auld Kirk; the Free Kirk is divided; the militia, the professions, and the "people of property". In the latter, McGee includes a minority of French Canad• ians—very small; a majority of/Americans living in Canada; the dissent• ing or elective Churches—and the London Times. See/McGee, T.D./ The crown and the confederation, a series of three letters addressed anony• mously to John A. Macdonald by "A Backwoodsman". Montreal', 107 611,1861*. p. 18. McGee proved to be a very erudite"backwoodsman" 1

8. After the coalition, M.C.. Cameron refused to give up his seat in North Ontario to Wm. McDougall, and in the by-election ran as opposition and was re-elected. McDougall was forced to run again in North Lanark. Cam- -ii-

8. (cont'd)eron was supported by the Leader on the ground that McDougall and Brown did not wanfe the union of British North America, but only H± the Province of Canada made federal. Like most of tie Conservatives, the Leader had little sympathy with the latter project. M.C. Cameron had originally been a Reformer, but he had deserted the Reform pa rty on the confederation issue on the ground that the federal system would weaken British North America rather than strengthen it. See the Leader, Friday, July 29, 1864.

9. St. Thomas Weekly Dispatch Thurs. Aug. 18, 1864. "...federation will tend to perpetuate, rather than to remove, the sectional differences which are said to be the cause of existing difficulties."

10. M.C. Cameron in the House, on seconding J.H. Cameron's motion for an appeal to the people on the confederation issue, Mon. March 13, 1865. Conf. Debates, p. 976.2

11. There was a curious little group formed in 1866, with J.H. Cameron as a kind of unacknowledged president. The group consisted of Cameron, Gait, Hoi ton, Cartwright, Abbott, Sandfield. Macdonald, Irvine, and MacPherson. These men dined regularly at the Rideau Club in Ottawa djtr- ing the session. Everything that was said was on the understanding that it was not to be repeated elsewhere. This agreement, says Cartwright, was "very honorably kept". It is testimony not only to J.H. Cameron's personal ascendancy, but also to a sharp drop in the asperity of party politics, that men such as Cameron, Cartwright, Holton, S.Macdonald, could sit around a dinner table amicably during parliamentary sessions for a period of ten years. (Until Cameron's death in I876) See Cart• wright, R.J. Reminiscences pp.30-31.

12. Conf. Debates p. 963.L.

13. Ibid. p. 1020. The Legislative Council defeated a similar measure 31- 19. Ibid.p. 361.

Iii. The public was undoubtedly caught by surprise in June 1864. Dent uses the word "electrified". Cartwright says, "...I must admit that it was a leap in the dark, and we certainly had not popular mandate behind us." However he goes on to say that the people "acquiesced". "At any rate, two or three years elapsed in which they could have manifested their opposition, but there was no sign of dissent from any considerable sec• tion af in Ontario of Quebec." Reminiscences p. 38. There is some suggestion that public opinion had not caught up to government policy by the end of June 1864. However the public may have been surprised in June, but it came very quickly to grasp the general nature of the confederation project. There was hardly anything else, in the newspapers from July to November, 1864.

15. Montreal Gazette Wed. Nov. 2, 1864.

16. Globe Sat. Nov. 5, 1864.

17. Leader Wed. Nov. 16, 1864.

18. Leader Tues. Nov. 22, 1864. -iii-

19. Leader Sat. March 1*, 1865.

20. Leader Thurs. April 6, 1065.

21. Leader Mon. Feb. 27, 1865.

22. Montreal, L'Ordre lun. 12 dec, 1861*.

23. The Leader refers of course to the French. Wed. Aug. 3, 1861*.

21*. Leader Mon. Oct. 3, 1861*.

25. Leader Tues. Sept. 27, 1861*.

26. Leader Thurs. March 2, 1865.

27. Leader Mon. April 3, 1865.

28. Cf. however the statement of David Reesor, member of the Legislative Council for King's Division. '.'The country has heard only one side of the Question, (hear.) They had.the great daily newspapers, the chief organs of public opinion of both political prties, all on their side, and there.was only a small portion of the country press, and that not widely circulated that gave the opposite side of the question." Conf. Debates, p. 163.2. There is an implied contrast between city and rural papers on the confederation issue, which I have not been able to justify. Reesor doubtless meant that "there was only a small portion of the country press"opposed to confederation.

29. The newspaper circulation for dailies ran from about 800 for a pap• er such as the Kingston British Whig to about 1*000 or 5000 for a paper such as the Hamilton Times, or the London Free Press. The circulation of the Globe was claimed to be in the neighborhood of 26,000, the Leader about 22,000.

30. The Quebec BaxxpcMgggaagcDaily Mercury for August 17, 1861* comments on the peculiar nomenclature developing in Canada, and compares it with the United States. In Canada, "federation" meant usually the federation of the two Canadas. "Confederation" meant the federation of British North America. A "federalist" in Canada, says the Mercury, means ore who favours decentralized institutions. A "centralist" usually favours 1B gislative union.

31. Conf. Debates p. 87.1.

32. A remarkable tribute to Brown's speech appeared a few days later in the Rouge paper, L1Union Nationale, lun. 13 fev., 1865. This

speech was, said L'UHIon, thevbest of any of the ministers.^"Si nous etions haut-canadien, nous eleverions une statue de bronze a ce aie- doufeable politicien."

33. Notably Wm. McDougall. -iv-

34. Conf. Doc, p. 59

35. Conf. Debates p. 88.

36. Globe Sat. Oct 15, 1864.

37. Montreal, True Witness and Catholic Chronicle Fri. Oct 28, 1864.

38. Conf. Debates p. 86.1

39. Globe Fri. August 3, iH^. (Reporting debates of the House for August 2nd.) There were some reform dissentients on this point. The Newmarket Era, a reform paper which followed Brown right through his anti-coali- tion manoeuvres in 1867, said of this plan: "We need hardly tell you, readers, that we dislike the Government scheme for Upper Canada; and the more people examine it, the more strongly will become popular feel• ing against it....it looks like a huge County Council without even a responsible executive,—and purposes giving us a form of Local Govern• ment even more democratic than is enjoyed by the neighboring state of New York...." Brown's scheme not was a "Government scheme", and the Era's apprehension of a non-responsible executive was not justified. Newmarket Era Fri. July 5, 1866.

40. The Civil War in the United States, sgid the Globe, was "quite unconnec• ted with the federal character of its government." Globe Mon. Aug. 1, 1864. Brown was one of the few Canadians who did not adduce the Civil War to the final and utter breakdown of federalism.

41. Globe Mon. Aug. 1, 1864.

42. Conf. Debates p. 918.1. Rankin was a reformist, member for Essex.

43. Ibid. p. 35.2. Cf. however Tache's explanations, which give more details on why the eledtive principle was dropped at Quebec. He admits that seme were "anxious to retain the elective principle." Ibid. p. 240.2.

44. McDougall's copy of the Confederation Debates is in the Archives section of the University of Toronto Library.

45. MacDougall to Monck, Jan. 27, 1867. Bellemare Papers, Archives of Canada MacDougall notes the objection^he had always taken to the fixed limit of the number of members of the upper chamber. "Indeed," he writes, "I told the Conference at Quebec, and Mr. Brown and Muaratt concurred that believing the Imerial Parliament would never stultify itself by enact• ing so absurd a constitution. I yielded to the majority then reserving my right to object and discuss the point at every favorable oppurtunity af terwards.... It has been no secret to our colleagues that...we did not as indistiduals, nor as exponents of the Liberal /Reform/ party of Upper Canada believe that an Upper House appointed for life, and fixed as to number, would work satisfactorily." On this question, the London Conference nearly split, according to MacDougall. Upper Canada and New Brunswick were opposed to the fixed upper chamber, while Lower Canada and Nova Scotia(the latter by a bare majority of its delegates) voted for it. Both Nova Scotia and Lower Can• ada looked to a fixed upper chamber as a protection against being swam- -V-

45. (cont'd) ped by Upper Canada. The letter is written in MacDougall's appalling handwriting and is marked "Strictly confidential"-. It is signed "W.M."

46. Burwell, a reform member from East ElgjLn argued for an elective Upper House on the ground that it would be the closest approach to the House of Lords. Conf. Debates pp. 14.46-7.

47. Howland replaced Mowat who was appointed to the Bench in November, 1864. Cartwright comments that Brown could hardly afford to lose such an able colleague, and that the loss left Brown dangerously isold£ed. Reminscences p. 4l.

48. Brown at first had been more popular with the Conservatives than eitfar of his collagues. Montreal Gazette, Sat. June 25, 1864." " We have in him then a guarantee that in any oo nstitutional change s about to be worked out, British institutions will serve, wherever practicable, as the model. We shall have a minimum of American dem• ocracy infused: with Mr. Hoiton or Mr. Dorion or Mr. MacDougall we might have had more than we cared for." Brown however found it difficult to get along with Macfllonald, and MacDougall by contrast seemed to te able to. The positions of Brown and MacDougall were thus due to change as tine went on. Both MacDougall and Howland gradually lost their reform complexion under Macdonald, although they made no direct break with the Reform pxfcjc party.

49. Oshawa Vindicator Wed. July3, 1867. Even Brown's old friend, Eger- ton Ryerson disagreed with his course. See Ryerson, /A.E./ The new Canadian dominion; the dangers and duties of the people Toronto Lovell, 1867. :

50. Morison, J.L. "Parties and politics, 1864-1867" p.63.

51. Brown and th? anti-coalition reformers lost the election 67-II. (There were four independents elected as well.)

52. Brown was finally appointed to the Senate by the Mackenzie govern• ment, December, 1873.

53. R.W. Scott's amendment to the Upper Canada Separate Schools Act had been brought forward in I863, and it passed over the opposition of a great majority of the Upper Canadian members.

54. Joseph Rymal, member for South Wentworth, a Liberal. He saw Canada in 1850 as tge envy of all. "I would compare the^ position of Canada at that time—and I think I may without impropriety—to that of a young man of eighteen or twenty, handsome in figure, with a good constitution, of robust strength, and under the care of a tender and loving parent ( as I presume England is to Canada), and this parent has committed the health of this lovely child of his—this lovely youbh—to the care of a family physician, who, however, has trans• ferred him from time to time to the care of other physicians of dif• ferent schools. Some of them were allopaths, some were homoeopaths, some were hydropaths—but they all bled (laughter )p-they all blis- 51*. (cont'd) "tered—they all sweated. (Continued laughter).Under such treatment this lovely youth became pale and sickly." Rymal carries this amusing metaphor on for another column or so . Conf. Debates p.935.1.

55« See Supra, p.

56. Miss Helen McMann of Queen's University is doing her M.A. Thesis on Sandfield Macdonald, and I am indebted to her for Sandfield *s politic• al views, and for information of his attempts to form a coalition in March, 1861*. The Quebec Mercury was leased by Sandfield Macdonald, and many of his views are therein expressed, until the termination of the lease on April 6, 1861*. Sandfield Macdonald's friend, Josiah Blackburn, took leave of absence from the London Free Press in order to help Mac• donald on the Mercury, having left his brother in charge of the Free Press.

57. This stand of the London Free Press Mon. Oct. 17, 1861*, was perhaps in regard to its near neighbour, the St. Thomas Weekly Dispatch which was strongly for legislative union.

58. Ottawa, The Union Thurs. Nov. 21*, 1861*, quoting the Hamilton Times probably of Nov. 21st or Nov. 22nd. The Union was sympathetic to Sand• field Macdonald and opposed confederation on the ground that it was a costly expedient and one which provided no real remedy for existing dif• ficulties. The Hamilton Times was however a liberal-Conservative paper more along $he lines of the Toronto Leader.

59. The thesis of Miss Helen McMann.

60. Some 18$ of the sqag population of Canada West was Roman Catholic accor• ding to the census of 1861. Those of Irish origin in that section of the province numbered about 11* % of the total population. It seems like• ly that preponderant majority of the Irish belonged to the Catholic group. It is interesting to note that the city of Toronto had in 1861 a population of just under 1*5,000, of whom 12,000 were of Irish origin.

61. Toronto, Canadian Freeman, implied that Sandfield Macdonald did not have its whole-hearted support; they were however glad to have him as head of the Ontario government, since he was a Catholic. Thurs. July 18, 1867. But only a few weeks prior to this, the Canadian Freeman had objected that Sandfield Macdonald was not the type of man on whom to rely for relgious protection, presumably be cause of his liberal le atjings.

62. Canadian Freeman, Thurs. Dec. 15, 1861*.

63. Speech took place on Thurs. Sept. 20th, 1866, and was'reported in the Canadian Freeman for Thurs. Sept. 27, 1866.

61*. Joseph Lynch, Bishop of Toronto, to R.P. Jamot, dated from St. Cathar• ines July 8, I867. Re-translated from the French translation of Le Jour• nal de Quebec lundi, 15 juillet, I867.

65. "No system of Government could be fairer, or could be better calculated to give satisfaction to all parties interested, than the federal system. In speaking thus we do not wish to be understood as advocating the adop- -vii-

6$. (cont'd) "tidn of the details of federation as it has been carried out in the neighboring Union, for we believe that si. though the system in vogue in the United States does infinite credit to the men who first bro't it into being, yet time has shown wherein it may be improved upon ....But of the two systems of Government, the ^Legislative and the Federal, there is no doubt whatever in our mind as to which would be found to work satisfactorily, and which would tend to produce discord and discontent in, at least, some sections of the contemplated union. The legislative union works very well in. England, with Parliament ass• embled under the eye of Her Majesty, and representing so small a terr• itory. But with such diverse interests as would bs brought together in a British American union extending eventually over the whole of Brit• ish North America, a system of Government more like that under which the United States have grown to such vast proportions, is what is plain• ly required in order to do justice to the varied and widely separated interests involved." Oshawa Vindicator Wed., Aug. 31, 186U.

66. The above quotation is one that might have been expected from num• erous sources in the province of Canada. I have quoted it at length because it is the only example I have seen. There are probably others, but they must be remarkably few. It is significant that the . above argument, so obvious to present-day Canadians, was used so little 186U-1867. (81)

CHAPTER IV

FRENCH IDEAS IN CANADA EAST REGARDING FEDERALISM (82)

L'e'tranger volt d'un oeil d'envie Du Saint-Laurent le majestueux cours; A son aspect le Canadien s'eerie: 0 Canada! mon pays! mes amours.1

The deep and abiding patriotism of French

Canadians is the first and the primary consideration

in any analysis of their ideas. The love of their land,

and the close web of social and cultural institutions that such a love implied, was the very Ark of the

Covenant. The French Canadians saw every issue in the

golden light of their nationality; they could see it in no other fashion, and they would judge it only as they

saw it to be.

In French Canadian discussion of federal govern• ment there is, not unnaturally, a sense that the issue is important and vital. Nothing else can esplain the long and bitter opposition of the Rouges than their utter con• viction that here was a threat to French institutions to be opposed quite a* l'outrance. The vitality of the issue produced a critical and a sincere journalism, which is notably more vigorous than most of the journalism of

Upper Canada. This stems directly from the fact that as far as confederation was comcerned French Canadians were on the defensive. The result was the production of a virile and able literature directed at preserving what had already been secured, to surrendering as little as possible. (83)

The Tory Conservatives of Upper Canada were thus not the only ones in the province of Canada reluctant to

give up the Union. The French Gandians were just as re• luctant, if not more so. The kinship of the two groups in the Macdonald-Cartier and Macdonald-Tache governments was a natural combination of the elements of conservation: conservation of the Union. This applied not only to the general rightist tone of their political ideas, but to con- sevation of the Union as well. The great strength of the

Bleus lay in this double appeal: the appeal of a benefi• cent, rightist political regime; and the appeal of a party which sternly resisted any attempt to change the consti• tutional arrangements of the Union. The French had secured a good deal through the Union government; they were at least equal to the English in political power; they were untrammelled by any great interference from

English Canada. They were, in short, quite content with the status quo.

The English Conservatives were in a much weaker position. In Upper Canada they were weak for the very reasons which made the Bleu party strong: they were trying to maintain the status quo.

The election of 1863 had resulted in a notice• able tightening up of regional opinion, not only in

Canada West, but in Canada East as well. The Reformers (84)

won ten new seats; the Bleus won five. The trend was

obvious and dangerous: the polarizing of sectional opin•

ion. There is little doubt that this election provided

the stimulus which made all political parties look for g some new solution. Sandfield Macdonald in March 1864

had tried unsuccessfully. Brown, in a better strategic

position in June, tried and succeeded.

Clearly the initiative lay with Canada West.

The French stood united on the ground of the status quo:

only the utmost exigency would have moved them from it.

This exigency came with the defeat of the Conservative

government; even then it was Brown who approached

Cartier, not vice versa.

The policy of the Bleus on confederation must be considered in this light. They had everything to lose

and federalism to gain. They stood to lose equality with

Canada West in United Canada and gain only the dubious

status of a local government in an essentially English

confederation. They were venturing away from their com•

fortable home onto the strange, uncertain, windy groud

of "rep, by pop." They had to be very sure that the new home to be built there would be as safe and snug for their national family as the old one had been. They were on

the defensive, and their policy has all the earmarks of

such a condition. They had to ask for French support

on the ground that conditions not merely warranted, but (85)

necessitated change. They had to show that the changes

suggested were the best possible, and that they secured

for the French all the guarantees they could reasonably

expect. It was a very difficult position for the Bleus,

and they performed their task most ably. It is under•

standable, however, that-Bleu ministers might say one

thing speaking semi-privately, and yet say another through

the editorial pages of ministerial newspapers. Thus

Cartier knew pretty well what kind of a project of Con•

federation would be; but he explained it in La Minerve with a much greater emphasis on its decentralized

character than was warranted by his knowledge.

, The Rouges, on the face of it, had a very strong

position. French Canada wanted to keep the status quo.

Cartier and the Bleus had consented to change. The course

of the Rouges was easy. All they had to say was that the

changes were bad, and turn the Bleus quite neatly out of

office when they appealed to the people. They could then make excellent terms with George Brown.

There were some difficulties however in this

pleasant course of affairs for the Rouges. Cartier and

the Bleus avoided an appeal to the people. The govern• ment resisted this demand in the face of unusual pressure

from Upper Canada. The main ground for this resistance was the apprehension that the passions of a general

election might cause the French Canadian support of the (86)

Bleus to waver* The Rouges themselves were uncertain about an appeal to the people. The Church was at this point an unknown factor, but might conceivably follow

Cartier and the government* Moreover the past record of the Rouges was not such that they could appeal unblemished to the people.

The alliance of Brown and Cartier put the Rouges in an awkward position, and in some respects a most unfair one* They had been willing to make some concession to

Upper Canada's constitutional grievances* In 1858 Dorion had suggested that the Rouges were ready to consider some remedy for constitutional difficulties.3 Doubtless they saw this as a means to power if they could persuade their compatriots to accept concessions to Upper Canada. But

Brown, after the Short Administration of July 1858, moved away from Dorion and forced him to ally himself with

Sandfield Macdonald who had considerably less support from Upper Canada. - Mori son bitterly oondemns Brown for his policy after 1858, and for his coalition with

Cartier in 1864. "It is not too much to say that he

(BrownJ not only made common action between Upper Canadian and Lower Canadian radicalism impossible, but that he assisted to destroy Dorionfs power as a leader of the 4 French, . • ." Brown's self-sacrifice in 1864 hardly warrants such criticism, but it is undoubtedly true that his action made the course of the Rouges very difficult. (87)

After the coalition Dorion was placed in the peculiar pos• ition of being in opposition to something he had previously favoured; his only possible ally in Upper Canada was allied with Cartier. Rather pathetically Le Pays had said on June

16: "Nous ne sommes pas prets a. croire que M. Brown abondonne ses amis pour un areopage d'intriguants politlques 5 qu'il a toujours vaillament et si efficacement combattus...."

When it became painfully obvious that Brown had abandoned his friends, the Rouges nobly refrained from indulging in angry criticism of their former colleague..

There is some force in Skelton's contention that the French Canadians would accept a measure from Cartier and the Bleus that they would not have accepted from the a. Rouges. The Rouges were suspect because of their tradition of co-operation with Brown and the other Upper Canadians.

In that sense lies the weight of Morison's argument that 7 Brown helped to destroy French liberalism. It is clear at any rate that the Rouges were not in the strong position they might have appeared to be. Their opposition to con- federation was sincere and forthright; but their argument was to some extent vitiated by their past reoord.

It was still encumbent on the Bleus to show that constitutional changes were necessary and that they con• tained adequate safeguards for-French Canadian cultural autonomy. In this effort they were greatly aided by the menace of the United States. French Canadians realized (88)

that if constitutional changes were perhaps desirable be• cause of difficulties with Upper Canada, they were made necessary by a general truculence below the border. In

French Canada the issue of confederation or annexation 8 was given great prominence, and the Ministerial papers were certainly interested in maintaining and stimulating such an issue. La Revue Canadienne. a moderate indepen-v dent monthly magazine, saw the issue as many Upper

Canadian publications saw it, that the time had come when some great new step would have to be taken in Canadian political affairs. It is no use blinding ourselves, said

La Revue, changes are now necessary. We can no longer 9 remain in colonial obscurity.

The ideal of a great new country, an ideal which permeated all the province, was appealing in a peculiar way to French Canadians. It captured their imagination and made them forgive, as the English Canadians forgave, many apparent faults in the constitutional structure of the new country. The French differed from the English about a new nationality; naturally they wanted to keep their own; but the scope of the project caught their at• tention the more easily because it was a great measure of self-defence against "le gouffre et le neant de la republique voisine".

Despite the factors which influenced French

Canadians in favour of the ministerial project there (89)

remains the fundamental opposition of most French Canadians

to "rep. by pop." Rightly or wrongly, they saw'rep. by pop

as the aneantissement of their culture, and the fact that

George Brown was backing Upper Canadian agitation on the

issue did not help to allay their apprehensions. Brown was right when he said it must be a federal union, not a legislative one. If, said le Journal de Quebec, a legis• lative union had been possible, that is if it could be so

constructed as to provide all the protection necessary for

French institutions, there is no doubt that it would be preferable.10 But without such guarantees, no union was possible. Equal representation of the two sections was a matter of life and death, said Le Journal. We will be generous, tolerant, just, "mais nous serons!"11

This spirit was the basis of French Canadian interpretation of confederation. It is why they looked at confederation as a source of guarantees for their nationality. Necessarily they were driven to examine the powers given to .the local governments, for such powers represented the autonomy which the French could expect.

What was given to the local governments would in effect be what was given to French autonomy. Naturally the French were concerned with autonomy, but curiously they were - comparatively unconcerned about the division of powers.

Yet the division of powers lay at the heart of the French future in North America. Considering the importance of (90)

such a question it is not a little odd that the discussion 12 of this problem was so limited. But the French were con• cerned not with what they might have been given, but what they had been given. They were concerned with what the local powers meant, not what they should be. Their argu• ment was concerned with reflections on. a datum. Was confederation or was it not the proper safeguard for their autonomy? The ministerialists said it was, the

Rouges said it was not.

The divisions between the Bleus and the Rouges on Confederation were thus considerably sharper than divisions,in Upper Canada. The French middle party, between the Bleus and the Rouges, broke up in 1863, going mostly to the Bleus. This sharp distinction between par• ties tended to make dispute bitter, and the four years,

1864-7, contain some sharp accusations. The Rouges labelled Cartier and the Bleus "traitres"; Dorion et cie. were referred to comtemptuously by ministerial papers as

"annexionistes".

The Rouges themselves split in June 1867. The

Church had come out for Confederation and a segment could not agree with Rouge opposition to the Church. This opposition was carried by Dorion to the full limit of his powers - which were considerable. This split was contem• poraneous with that of the Reformers over coalition, and represented an even more vital issue. The moderate Rouges, (91)

had however, shown their position during the Fenian invas• ions, which had considerably reduced their opposition to

Confederation. Their breaking away from Dorion and the main body of Rouge opinion in June 1867 was not entirely unexpected.

The Church for a long time remained neutral on

Confederation, despite the efforts of both sides to draw her into the struggle. There is some suspicion that the parish clergy in the Montreal area and in some of the eastern counties were opposed to confederation, though by no means following the Rouges through all their liberal motions. However, the Bleus had strong Ghruch connections]- the Rouges were not in particularly good favour, and events forced the Rouges into an opposition such that there was no possibility of their securing church support. The Church's neutrality was thus perceptibly weakened in the face of

Rouge sentiments. It is not unlikely, too, that when

Cartier visited the Pope Pius IX in March 1867, he sug• gested that some stand by the Canadian bishops would be very desirable.

The regional opposition to confederation tended to be concentrated in the eastern counties with extensions into the Montreal area, and other extensions into one or 14 two counties north of the river. The concentration of opposition in the Eastern townships was probably due to the prevalence of Erench liberal sentiment among the more (92)

settled sections of Quebee-. The proximity to the United

States does not appear to have affected opinion a great deal one way or the other. It is curious, perhaps that the Rouges who were strong in the eastern counties, should have been on occasion annexationist in tone, but other counties equally close did not reflect this tone. More• over, Dorion was member for Hochelaga, part of Montreal

Island, and his brother, Eric Dorion, was member for 15 Drummond and Athabaska, a county in the north centre of the eastern townships. Brome, a county on the border, elected Dunkin who was of the Conservative opposition, rather"than a Rouge. The counties near the border of

Upper Canada were divided in their opposition, most of their representatives voting for Confederation. Thus, acquaintance and familiarity with the English does not seem to have affected attitudes to any noticeable extent.

Such influences are in the nature of things intangible, and it is difficult to find them reflected in anything like a regional analysis. All three constituencies of the city of Montreal and most of the counties near Upper

Canada supported Confederation, while some of the eastern counties did not. In short, it-is difficult to make much out of the regional opposition to Confederation beyond the salient fact that it was centred in the more settled counties of the south and east. Doubtless liberal French opinion found some kind of sympathy in those areas, where (93)

the Church might he losing the dominance it had in fron• tier counties.

The Leader's observation that Lower Canada would form the "states-rights" party in confederation is sub- IS stantially correct. French-Canadians saw confederation as a step in the dark. To concede "rep. by pop." meant for them enormous sacrifice, and such a sacrifice must be met by a yiid pro quo in local autonomy. Sir Etienne

Tache' reveals something of this feeling in a letter early in July, 1864. Is a plan of confederation, he asked, possible without sacrificing Lower Canada? "C'est ce qu' fait voir; pour moi, c'est une grande affaire et tenant la clef de la boutique, je pourrai toujours la fermer si je m'aperc.ois qu'on ne peut y rien faire de bon • . ."17 There is hesitancy here, and uncertainty, attributable in part to not knowing what confederation would be, to a sense venturing into unknown territory, where every footstep must be measured, every precaution taken if disaster is to be prevented.

The ministerial papers, in this state of un• certainty leaned strongly to federalism. Prior to the

Quebec Conference, they took a strong line of de-central• ism. Not quite knowing the measure that would be brought from the Conference, they tended generally in the direc• tion of strong local government.. Confederation, said

La Minerve. means a league of independent states in order (94)

to discuss and regulate in a kind of congress, certain points of general interest* Lower Canada will thus have its own government with powers extending over all objects which come in the normal run of things, that is life, liberty and the prosperity of its oitizens. Lower Canada will be master in its own house in every respect of social, civil and religious life* Confederation would, in fact, be not unlike the United States Constitution, with the singular difference that would have monarchical institutions, while they have republican*

This line taken by La Minerve was undoubtedly that intended by Cartier for reasons not wholly derived from French-Canadian uncertainty. Cartier may have had some uncertainties, but he must have had a general idea of what kind of measure would come from the Quebec Con• ference. Where he and Taehe were uncertain was as to how French Canada would take such a measure. In the interval between June and October, the French minister• ial papers were forced to take a wider line on federal• ism than they actually believed possible of attainment.

They were.forced to reassure their compatriots that there was no danger of their conceding "rep. by pop." without commensurate guarantees. To argue in_favour of a decentralized federalism was an excellent way of reassuring the French public* The French ministers were forced to argue thus for another reason: they must not (95)

allow English, opinion to develop too far the idea of leg•

islative union. They must place the issue before the

Canadian public so that there would be no possibility of

the English denying adequate concessions to French auton•

omy. They must educate opinion to expect guarantees;

thus Macdonald and Gait would be forced to concede

adequate safeguards in order to carry French Canada with them, Cartier had had to force his views on a reluctant

Macdonald, to say nothing of Gait and Brown; that it was a federal system at all was undoubtedly due to Cartier*s pressure. The appeal to decentralized institutions by

La Minerve was patently additional security in the face

of possible Cabinet recalcitrance on federal government.

La Minerve was, moreover, forced to take action by the Montreal Gazette and other English minis• terial papers which took the legislative union line. The

Gazette quoted the Toronto Globe*s prediction that the forthcoming conference at Charlottetown would result in a legislative union. This, said the Gazette, is the opinion not only of leading men in the Maritimes, but is also the decided tendency of public opinion in Canada,

An absolute complete legislative union is perhaps impos• sible; but if we reap the instruction from our neighbours to the south, Canadians and Maritimes alike "will infuse as little of the federal principle into their union • , . as will suffice to meet the absolute necessities of the (96)

case." Such a line was calculated to appeal to English

opinion in Lower Canada; hut it was not liable to do any•

thing to soothe French opinion, and was quite likely to

arouse fear and desperation on their part about their fate

in confederation. La Minerve replied a few days later that

the Gazette was certainly wrong if it thought public

opinion in Lower Canada was favourable to legislative union. French Canadians will always oppose such a measure to the bitter end, for they see in legislative union the obliteration of their nationality. What we want,

said La Minerve, is "une confederation dans laquelle le

principe federal serait applique dans toute son e'tendue. •

• which will leave only general questions to the

central legislature. The central power will be sovereign, undoubtedly, but it will have jurisdiction only on certain

general question "bien determinee" by the constitution.

The local legislatures will, on the other hand, be indepen•

dent of each other and have control over all their own

OA particular interests. La Minerve went to some pains, not long afterward, to point out that the Gazette did not

represent ministerial policy, and in fact was precisely p-i |i contrary to it. But Minerve was exaggerating. The

Gazettef s conception of the new constitution was very

close to ministerial policy - the policy of the English-

Canadian ministers. The policy of La Minerve was farther

off the track than that of the Gazette. Doubtless Cartier (97)

knew it. But it served a useful purpose.

, By the middle of October La Minerve was begin• ning to introduce the qualifications to its earlier stand.

In a federal constitution, it said, there are two dangers, not one. There is admittedly the danger of too much power in the central government! but there is also however the danger of too little power. Too much power leads to the sacrificing of minority interests; too little power leads to anarchy. The English Canadians want the first; the French Canadians want the second. What will be nec• essary, said La Minerve, will be a compromise.22 It was a clever argument, and helped to bring La Minerve back from the extreme federal position. Confederation would thus be a compromise. A compromise could be a federal constitution, but it was more likely to be a legislative union with local guarantees.

When the constitution was finally made known this is precisely what the opposition maintained.

Dorion wrote angrily, MCe n'est done pas une confeder• ation qui nous est proposed, mais tout simplement une

Union Legislative deguise'e sous le nom de confederation .

. . 1,23 La Minerve replied simply that such ideas were very strange coming from a man who had advocated confed• eration himself in 1858.

The change in tone in the ministerial French press continued. La Minerve had argued in October that (98)

United States institutions were based on the sovereign rights of the individual state against the central power.

It suggested in January 1865 that any appeal to this PA. theory was fallacious. * It discussed French Canadian rights not on the basis of local governments but on that of their power in the central legislature under the sys• tem of responsible government.25 As the final point it raised for the first time the argument of confederation or annexation. These changes in argument are the natural result of an earlier policy of concessions to ideas on decentralized government. There^retrenchment from the earlier position. Confederation was now a compromise between English and French views. Under responsible gov• ernment there would be guarantees for the French in the central as well as the local legislature; Confederation was now the only alternative to annexation. These argu• ments indicate that the Bleus had shifted their ground toward legislative union.

The reason for their shift was simple: the

Quebec Conference. They could hardly maintain their arguments of August and September in the face of the 72 resolutions. The Bleu press admitted that Confederation was not the best possible constitution, but the best that could be had. Confederation as adopted at Quebec was not,

said Le Courrier du Canada, "la meilleure des choses possibles dans le meilleur des mondes possibles; mais, (99)

dans notre opinion, la moins mauvaise des choses dans un

fort mauvais monde."26 This frankness on the part of the

French ministers was in part dictated by necessity. The

resolutions were there for anyone to read. Their theory

of federalism had to be in fair accord with project of

Confederation as it stood.

There was a further reason for ministerial

frankness on Confederation. They could afford to be

frank. The period of uncertainty was over; the Rouges had not secured any strong support in their opposition 27 to confederation. For the moment, at least, French majority opinion still followed the traditional Bleu

lead. One contemporary suggested that a good means by which to judge the advantages of confederation was to

take a good look at the men who opposed it. Can anyone

hesitate between Mr. Dorion and Mr. Cartier, between the

Rouges and the Conservatives? All "honnetes gens" of whatever party will vote for Mr. Cartier.

The direct examination of the Quebec Resolu•

tions and what they meant was made by one of the leading ministerial papers in December 1865 and January 1865. A

series of twenty-one articles entitled "La Confederation"

began in Le Courrier du Canada Monday, December 5, 1864,

and continued until Wednesday, January 25, 1865. This

series was probably written by Sir Etienne Tache, and

represents one of the very few satisfactory comtemporary (100)

attempts to analyse the nature of the government suggested

in the Quebec Resolutions. The general tone of the arti•

cles follows closely the more realistic attitude on the

part of the Bleus after October 1864. "La Confederation"

recognized that the constitution was not perfect. It was

a compromise between French and English, between federal union and legislative union. That the constitution

appeared to be weighted more in the direction of the

English preference for legislative union was not due to

any lack of strength on the part of the French ministers;

it was due to the pressure of events. In the face of

pressure from below the border, w legislative union was

naturally looked to for defence and internal strength.

The constitution was a compromise between the strength of

a legislative union and the protection for sectional inter•

ests found in a federal union. Thus it bears the mark of

a mixture between English and American institutions. In

Confederation we have, said Le Courrier. a mixture of

responsible government and the federal system. x Charac•

teristically, Le Courrier was at pains to show that

Confederation did not copy the errors in the American

constitution in this mixture. In fact, it said, the dif•

ference between our constitution and the American really

is quite considerable. Confederation rests on constitu•

tional government, with its three branches, the ,

the senate and the House of Commons. In these bodies (101)

resides, "sans restriction, le principe de souverainete .

• ." The American constitution on the other hand is based on a republican regime, on a congress whose powers are defined by a written constitution, and on a judiciary to interpret those powers.

The comparison is suggestive of what lay in the mind of the Canadian Fathers of Confederation. Confed• eration was not considered by Le Courrier to be fundamen• tally based on a written constitution. The difference - between Confederation and the American constitution in one respect at least lay in the fact that the latter had a written constitution. The implication is clear. Le

Courrier considered that Confederation was based princi• pally on the unwritten constitution, or the British traditions and methods of responsible government. That there would be written guarantees at all, was due to the nature of the imported doctrine of federalism.

The federal system is revealed by Le Courrier as an essential concession to French-Canadian participa• tion in Confederation. It is not possible to argue behind the fundamental fact that guarantees were necessary for

French-Canadian support, and that French Canadians saw in the federal system the only means of securing those guarantees. None the less, Le Courrier is unique in its analysis, for it emphasized, as no one had yet done in

Canada, the point at the heart of the federal system: (102)

"Le point le plus important, nous pourrions dire le seul important du projet de constitution est sans contredit eelui qui touche a. la definition des attributionsrespec- tives du gouvernement federal et des gouvernements locaux. > 32 C'est la la clef, la base de la constitution". This statement is virtually unique in Canadian writing on con• federation. Le Courrier is emphasizing the fact that

French Canada will be better off because the things that matter to her will be outside the legislative competence of the central government, i.e. in the local legislature.

This point is implicit in French recognition and support of a federal system. But it ,is curious why it was so little emphasized. The Rouges argued that French Canada was not given enough protection for her local institutions:; that the word "federal" was but an excuse for an essential• ly centralized system. Undoubtedly they recognized a strong central government when they saw one. But they were not really concerned with the question of a federal system.

They were concerned with French-Canadian autonomy, and with opposing the new system as a threat to that autonomy.

Rightly or wrongly they preferred to continue with the old system rather than venture into the new one. The assump• tion is that they saw more protection for French Canada in a modified version of legislative union than in the federal system proposed by the Quebec resolutions. If

Confederation represented new and greater concessions to (103)

French. Canadian autonomy, the Rouges should not have

opposed it. The probability is that the Rouges feared

the strength of the new central government. The fact

that Confederation purported to be a federal system did not prevent them from wishing to remain in the framework

of the old Union. It was difficult for the Rouges, and

all Canadians, to realize the separateness of a local

legislature in a federal system. Canadians continually

failed to grasp the fact that the local powers given to

local governments were outside the control of the central

government. If French Canadians wanted the federal sys•

tem as a protection for their cultural autonomy, they did not wholly understand what it was they wanted. And their understanding was not made any easier by the fact that

the Canadian cabinet did not want to concede too much to

a federal system.

The net restult was to prevent the development

of French Canadian ideas on federal government. The

Courrier*s statement that the division of powers is the key to the constitution is unique in the discussion of

Confederation. The Rouges were probably right when they

said the system proposed was not intended to be a fed•

eral system; but their analysis does not 3how them to be wholly aware of the division of powers that had been

secured•

The point is that a federal system was not in- (104)

tended at Quebec, and French Canadian discussion as a whole reflects the limitation of such a frame of mind.

This does not mean that they would not have preferred more guarantees. They were afraid that they had not been given adequate enough guarantees. But they did not con• nect these directly with the division of powers. They wanted more local autonomy, but they did not know the institutions through which more autonomy might be secured.

The obvious place was the division of powers. To French-

Canadians it was often a question of sovereignty. Should the central government be sovereign? Reluctantly the majority admitted that it should. If the central govern• ment was sovereign could the local governments be sover• eign? Apparently not. Dorion suggested that the role of a state in the United States might be preferable to that of a province in Confederation. The reason was simple. A state was sovereign, while in Canada the I'll. Atoolul*""* J[

central government was sovereign.A This apparent dicho• tomy, in federalism, and the concomitant of federalism, the division of powers, was not understood. In short, federalism and the division of powers were understood in French Canada as a system of guarantees conceded by a central power to local rights: no less, and certainly little more. The resolution between the central and the local in Canada, said Le Courrier, was to leave the "gouvernements locaux des garanties suffisantes pour les (105)

*proteger contra touts tentative impietement de la part du

gouvernement central, et elle donne au gouvernement

central une somme de pouvoirs suffisante pour lui per-

mettre de travailler, sans etre gene, au bienetre

materiel et l'agrandissement des differents etats de la

confederation pris colleetivement et separement". °

Le Courrier however was unique in Canada for

its consideration of the principal problem in federal

government. There were indeed glimmerings of a concep•

tion of co-ordinate authority. Le Courrier pointed out

that the role of the central government is like that of

an intendant Hde grande maison" whose authority over the

chief general questions is undoubted and unquestioned,

but who has no authority over the life of the individual

family. The idea that local governments were wholly

independent in their own sphere is clearly implied. Le

Courrier did not pursue the matter further and the idea

reamined only in germ in fundi thought until the growth

of the provincial rights theory after 1873, and judicial 34 interpretation beginning with Hodge v. the Queen.

Le Journal de Quebec followed the example of

Le Courrier and printed a series called "le projet de

constitution de la convention de Quebec". These articles

did not display the grasp of political theory which was 35 so unusual in Le Courrier; it is a pity that Cauchon's

work was reprinted and that Tache's work was not. (106)

Cauchon was concerned principally with justifying his opposition to confederation in 1858.36 Cauchon got into a curious argument with Le Pays and its editor, A. A.

Dorion. Dorion had advocated some concession to Upper

Canada's demands in 1858, whereas Cauchon had opposed any change from the legislative union. In 1864 the tables were turned. Cauchon was arguing for confedera• tion and Dorion wished to keep the present union.

Cauchon definitely had the advantage in strategic position and made the most of it .JU Journal and^Pays

37 paired off for the purpose and spent a good part of three years arguing with each other on the subject of confederation. UPays referred to Cauchon contemptuously as a "converti", and Cauchon replied that he was proud of the name.38 Cauchon was himself a rather unusual character, and was famous in the House for his bird calls. 39 The bird, it is said, chirped merrily all through the late sittings of the House, and proved to be most enter• taining to the Gallery. The confederation debates closed with the notes of the famous bird accompanying the final recalcitrant speeches of some of the French members between four and five in the morning. Le Journal de Quebec. Cauchon1s paper, was typical of a considerable section of French bleu opinion in respect of a general sympathy for the British con• nection. They saw the British connection as the (106)

guarantee of French rights in the past; in the future the British connection would be as counsellor and a guide until the new nation was ready to take her place among 40 the nations. Such remarks were symptomatic of a gen• uine desire to revere what had been, in the long run since 1774, a generous policy. Brown, in a rare moment of enthusiasm for the French people under British rule, said that confederation was formed to remedy evils "complained of - by the vanquished? No, sir - but com• plained of by the conquerors'! (Cheers by the French 41 Canadians.)" Brown praised British generosity warmly and was just as warmly supported by his French colleagues.

Coupled with this regard for what British mod• eration had done for French Canada, was an understanding of the nature and responsibilities of constitutional government. Le Journal criticized some of the opposition to confederation on the ground that such opposition followed ideas too rigidly. This, said Le Journal, was too reminiscent of old Franoe.. In Canada under consti• tutional government, ideas and principles must on occasion be sacrificed to practical means and practical measures. Under constitutional government one cannot carry one's ideas too far. The French, especially the

French Conservatives, had absorbed some things of British traditions and methods of political practice; they had come gradually to the British view that in constitutional (107)

government expediency itself may become a political principle.

, The Journal raised the question in criticising the resignation of two of the editors of Le Courrier de St. Hyacinths. The two collaborators, Honore Mercier and Paul de Cazes, had withdrawn from the paper, in opposition to the government, on an issue known in Lower Canada as "l'arbitrage imperial". The issue was concerned with the pressure brought by the imperial government on the maritimes. Such pressure aroused fear in Lower Canada that in London the Quebec resolutions would be changed to suit the wishes of possibly the British government, Upper Canada, or the Maritimes. In other words., the French were afraid of changes which could compromise their pos• ition. The Journal answered that there was -no such danger, but if? its sanguine attitude was in a sense justified by subsequent events, it was no answer to a worried section of conservative opinion.

The letter which Mercier and De Cazes published is distinguished for its moderate tone. The authors state they still wish to remain conservatives; but they feel their party leaders have allowed themselves to be drawn too far into intrigue, both by the Canadian and the Imperial government. They have forgotten their

AO duties as chiefs and members of their own nationality. Such opposition was undoubtedly dangerous and (108)

had it gone very far might have seriously threatened

confederation. Had it joined the liberal-conservative opposition to government policy in Upper Canada it

might have had grave consequences. As it was it became clear to Cartier that he could not allow any revision of the Quebec resolutions in London. Le Canadien of Quebec, an old, established

Bleu paper, resolutely opposed the government on the

issue "^arbitrage imperial". In 1865 it had condemned

the Rouges for their factions opposition to Confedera- 43 tion; a year later Le Canadien itself was in

opposition, if not to Confederation, at least to the methods used to secure its adoption. It was afraid that

changes in the Quebec resolutions would be made to allow

them to be carried in the Maritimes. It was especially

incensed because the Canadian Government had insisted on

carrying the Quebec Resolutions without amendment.44 It

could see great danger in the London Convention, which would be directly under the influence of the colonial

office and deciding questions without any kind of appeal

from those decisions.45 Finally, after a change in editorship in 46 September, Le Canadien came out against confederation

itself. Like Mercier and De Cazes, Francois Evanturel,

proprietor of Le Canadien. still remained essentially

conservative. Opposition to confederation was, he said, (109)

not really a question of parties at all, but "une lutte

4.7 exclusivement nationale". Le Canadian did not oppose the principle of confederation; it opposed the particular 48 project of Quebec Resolutions. In doing so it repudia• ted its earlier support. Le Canadian's opposition to the methods by which Confederation was carried was finally translated into opposition to the project itself.

In the end, such Bleu opposition flagged and failed before Church support of Confederation. The

Church proved to be the deciding factor. All five

Catholic bishops issued pastoral letters in June and

July, 1867 which advocated support of the established authority. The Bishops of Rimouski, Trois-Rivier*%

Quebec and St. Hyacinthe were warm in their approval of

Confederation.49 The letter of the Bishop of Montreal,

Ignace Bourget, was a model of gentle resignation worthy of Marcus Aurelius.50

The support of the Church was of great impor• tance. Cartier's visit to the Pope is probably a good indication of Cartier*s feeling on the matter. The

Confederation Resolutions were passed in 1865 by a majority of 31-22 among the French Canadian members, but since that time there had been increased opposition.

Some of the Bleus who had previously voted for the measure now opposed it. Yet confederation was carried in the fall elections of 1867, 65-12. The explanation (no)

lies to a considerable extent in the tremendous weight of Church support thrown into the scales, just a month or two before the crucial elections. Undoubtedly the truculent attitude of the United States crystallized the issue of confederation or annexation; but Church support was also of extreme importance. The two were connected of course. The threatening gestures from south of the border made the Church uneasy, and certainly predisposed it to bear with the strong policy of the Canadian gov• ernment. The Roman Catholic Church had already contri• buted conspicuous services to the Bleu cause. Cartier had not been ungrateful and the alliance was indeed well cemented by 1864. But in its firm stand on Confederation, 51 - coming when it did, the Church rendered its greatest service to the cause of the French Bleus.

Though the Bleu cause was in a sense weak strategically, the Rouges helped to make their path somewhat easier. The Rouge position is in some ways a tragic one* The movements as a whole might have suc• ceeded in establishing French-Canadian liberalism on a sound foundation. But the Rouges were cheated out of an alliance in 1864 which might have been the road to power and perhaps prestige. They had been cheated out of a chance to run the country in 1858. And in the confederation issue, they carried their long bitter opposition to the Bleus to an equally bitter end. The (Ill)

quarrel with Bishop Bourget in 1869 began the last act of the tragedy. The tragedy of the Rouges opened in 1858 with the failure of the short administration; it ended on a rainy November day in 1875 with Guiford's burial in a cemetery at Cote des flfeiges.

The Rouges were divided into two sections by events. There were the moderates who were in continuous touch with the Church, and refused to disobey the mande- ments of June 1867. There were the Rouges themselves, not necessarily extreme, but committed to the full limit of their liberal ideas. They would offer opposition to the Church if the Church should oppose a course they considered correct. The great proportion of the Rouges were committed to the full-blooded policy often charac• teristic of French liberalism. It was not only over the question of the Church that the Rouges differed. A moderate Rouge paper, such as L'Ordre. was significantly affected by Fenian invasions; Le Pays, the paper of A. A. Dorion, was not especially affected.

The Rouges up to June of 1866 remained almost as one in their policy on confederation. They opposed it bitterly. Their bitterness was perhaps not quite in keeping with their earlier willingness for concessions to Upper Canada. Skelton suggests they were forced into taking a stronger stand against confederation than they really felt.53 This may be true, but the opposition of (112)

the Rouges was not especially stringent in the early months of the coalition. But it developed rapidly, and it did so in ways which suggest that Dorion could not have been any• thing but sincere in his opposition. It is hardly likely he would have carried the Rouges into bitter opposition against the Church in August and September 1867 without just cause. Dorion was not the type of man to attempt a display of something he did not feel. Whatever his faults, he was rarely guilty of a fault characteristic of more than one Canadian politician: expediency. Expediency may be a virtue; in politicians it is often liable to be a fault. In fact he clung to his principles after it was clear that consistency was very dangerous to himself and to his party. And, the main body of the Rouges followed their leader. Those that did not were moderates who could not oppose the Church.

The attitude of the Rouges on confederation was mainly that it was premature. They were prepared to con• sider some measure for the alleviation of sectional difficulties in the province of Canada. Their collabora• tion with Brown in 1858 had sought (and may have reached) an agreement on this matter. But confederation they saw as an attempt to have the sectional issue swallowed up in the grand plan for a union of British North America. By this means French Canada and her particular problems would be given second place to considerations of overall (113)

importance. Such a method was replete with dangers for French Canada, and Dorion was not convinced that Cartier was wholly aware of the danger. Cartier*s known pre• disposition to the strong paternal hand in government blinded him to certain grave dangers to French Canada in such a system. Cartier undoubtedly insisted on guarantees for French Canada; but he failed to see the possible sources of danger in a strong government. Dorion realized that such a government would be a strong central govern• ment. Cartier's blind eye prevented him from seeing clearly the necessary connection between a strong govern• ment and a strong centralism.

Not unnaturally, the Rouges took the realistic view that Confederation, as it stood in the Quebec resol• utions, was nothing much more than the bitter medicine of legislative union disguised by the honey of guarantees for local rights. "I am opposed to the scheme of Confed- 54 eration", said J*. B. E. Dorion in the House, "because 55 the first resolution is nonsense and repugnant to truth;

it is not a Federal union which is offered to us, but a

Legislative union in disguise. Federalism is completely

eliminated- from this scheme, which centers everything in

the General Government". This introduced the Rouge

definition of what a Federal state should be, and patently what confederation was not. "Federalism means", continued

J". B. E. Dorion, "the union of certain states in everything (114)

that immediately concerns them, but submitting to the

General Government questions of peace, of war, of foreign relations, foreign trade, customs and postal service. Is that what is proposed to us? Not at all. In the scheme we are now examining all is strength and power in the

Federal (central) Government; all is weakness, insignif• icance, annihilation in the Local Government I"56 The

Rouge definition was very close to the powers conceded by the United States constitution to the central govern• ment of the United States. And from this conception of what the federal state should be, stems Rouge support of that horreur-11annexion.

Rouge advocacy of annexation may have stemmed from their democratic ideas. Certainly J. B. E. Dorion and the history of L'Avenir indicated the two were virtually connected.57 But L'Avenir had failed and its place was taken by Le Defrioheur which was much less pro-American. In the opposition to confederation, how• ever, Rouge sympathy with American ideas flared up again, this time on the issue of federalism. We do not hesitate to say, L'Ordre suggested, that from any point of view, our institutions, language and laws will be better protected in the American system than in the projected system of Confederation.58 In Canada control would be lost of French laws and institutions; in the United

s 59 States French Canada would be "un etat soWverain". (115)

L1Ordre1 a argument was simply that in the United States the individual states were sovereign: in Canada the dominance of the central government was such that no sovereign powers of any kind could he conceived to belong to the local governments.

The annexation argument was not strongly urged by the Rouges. There were numerous references to it, but it was urged with a touch of diffidence, or as a gesture of last resort. Dorion's paper Le Pays was not too strongly convinced that such a claim was practicable or useful.60 But their general conception of federalism was based on the principle of a sovereign province with a devolutionary central government. The nature of this argument was more concerned with interpretating the balance of French power in the proposed central govern• ment, than in discussing the division of powers, or suggesting powers for the local government. British experience crept into the Rouge point of view. They were unable to really comprehend the devolutionary nature of the federal state. Their advocacy of a federalism sim• ilar to the United States was the result of a search for argument rather than a conscientious approval of a system of federal government. The Rouges were looking for guarantees for French Canada, not necessarily for federal government•

This explains the Rouge preference for contin- (116)

uanoe of the Union rather than advocacy of a more devo- lutionary federal state. They suggested both; but federalism was urged as argument rather than as a possible solution. To retain the legislative union was the general aim of the Rouges, and they urged it as the obvious alter• native to confederation. Nearly all the public meetings fin which the Rouges stirred up over the issue included a resolution stating the great desirability of preserving the Union. Sectional difficulties they said were only the pretext for organic changes. There was really no need for change; the difficulties between Upper and

Lower Canada were "susceptible dfcne solution equitable", without resorting to a means as extreme and as dangerous as Confederation. Dorion maintained that the system of double majority could still be worked by giving guarantees 63 to Upper Canada or perhaps one or two more members for good measure.

It seems likely that many French-Canadians when brought face to face with constitutional changes wished heartily they had conceded something to Upper Canada's demands before the movement had gone to the lengths it had. Such concessions might have been possible; they might have worked, and they might not; but many French

Canadians were not particularly happy with the prospect before them in the winter of 1864-65. The amenability of several public meetings.to concessions to Upper (117)

Canada's demands suggests French dislike of the vast changes which were now unrolled before their eyes.

But the attempt to keep the Union failed, and the Rouges could only see Confederation as an evil with unimagined consequences for the French nationality. It is difficult to imagine the bitterness of the Rouge press; they saw "la langue francaise noye'e, la religion persecuted, la nationalite submergee, la race franco- canadienne befoulee et maltraitee, ses droits ravis, ses libertes foule'es aux pieds . , ,«64

The impact of the Fenian invasions on this state of mind was curious. At first the Rouges suspected that the Fenian alarms were little more than ministerial exaggeration for the purpose of gaining support for con• federation.65 After Ridgeway the split in the Rouges became evident. L'Ordre apologized for having suspected the ministry of exploiting French Canadian fears;

America Act was given royal assent at the end of Maroh

1867, L'Ordre was quite philosophical; the task of the (118)

opposition was now over; having nobly fulfilled its duty, it was now necessary to accept'n le fait accompli".67 When Dorion and Le Pays, L'Union Nationale continued their opposition to confederation, when they denounced the clergy for exerting undue influence on the elec• tions, L'Ordre sternly disowned such action. It could only see great danger in such a course, and added that unless Le Pays repudiated its stand, the Rouge party would split between moderates and extremists.68 At the same time L'Union Nationale spoke of the "trahison

AQ de L'ordre" and Dorion continued to issue bitter editorials in Le Pays.70

The result of Dorion*s opposition to the

Church was to strengthen the hand of the Bleus, as it had never been strengthened before. It is not too much to say that without the threats from the United States, without the bitter opposition of unrepentant liberals like the Rouges, without the support of the Church which resulted from both factors, the Bleus would never have carried confederation. To the issue of confedera• tion itself was added a number of objectionable features in government policy. Both aroused considerable oppos• ition among French-Canadians. But with the extremism of Dorion, French-Canadians were given very little real choice. There was no longer any middle ground. There were disgruntled Bleus, such as Francois Evanturel, (119)

editor of Le Canadien; there were moderate Rouges such as indicated by their paper, L'Ordre, but these could not really amalgamate and certainly formed no centre party in opposition to Confederation. French Canadians did not therefore withdraw from their traditional allegiance to the Bleus, although they may have had some considerable provocation for doing so.

French-Canadian ideas about federalism, when sifted through the vicissitudes of sharp party struggle, were limited by the same organic defects as the ideas of

Canada West. They knew responsible government and the methods of British political practice. They were used to legislative union. The result was to limit their ideas about federal government.

They had exceeding good reasons for wanting the federal system. It was the sine qua non of a North

American union. But the federal system was only a means of securing guarantees for their cultural autonomy.

They did not want the federal system as such; they wanted the federal system as a guarantee of their national sur• vival in an English-speaking North American union. This explains the negligible discussion of the division of powers. They were concerned not especially with what the division was; they were concerned with what it meant in terms of guarantees. "Rep. by pop." was such a threat that nothing but a federal system was capable of allaying (120)

their fears. The fact that this federal system was very close to a legislative union alarmed many French-Canad• ians. But the word "federal" had a touch of magic in it, while French confidence in Cartier and the support of the Church* soothed the fears of the majority, and Con• federation passed.

, The Rouges saw what Confederation was and fought bitterly against it. There is little doubt that they were sincere in their opposition. They saw Confed• eration as a disguised legislative union which Cartier had accepted in his blindness to the evils of strong government. If there were guarantees, they were not, in the opinion of the Rouges, sufficient to prevent them from being overruled by the central government.

In the last analysis French-Canadian ideas on federalism conditioned by the same factors that had conditioned Upper Canadian ideas. They had every reason to be vitally interested in federal government; but with one significant exception they failed to penetrate beyond the circumscription caused by their traditions of government in Canada. Federal government was something the French had yet to learn. French ideas on federalism came after Confederation, rather than before it. Notes

1. Part of the first stanza of Cartier's "0 Canada, Mon Pays, Mes Amours" written in^l837. In Discours de Sir Georges Car- tier edited by J. Tasse. Montreal, Senecal, 1893. (intro• duction) The full text of this poem is in Boyd, J. Car- tier pp. 383-4. In the latter, however, there is an exclama• tion point after "amours" at the end of every stanza. The citation in the Pi scour s uses the full stop.

2. Cornell, P'.'G" "Political parties in Cara-da" p. 41

3. The question of alleviation of the sectional difficulties between Canada East and West should be considered, Dorion said in 1858. "Le gouvernement s'etait engage a la resoud- re d'une maniere acceptable aux deux sections de la prov• ince." Montreal. Le Pays mardi 19 juillet, 1864. Dorion's willingness to makeconcessions in 1858 was based on the idea that if "rep. by pop." was not considered tan, it wouE come later/on, and then without guarantees fir Lower , Canada.

4. Morison, J.L. "Parties and politics, 1840-1867" p. 83.

5. Le Pays samedi 16 juin, 1864.

6. Skelton, 0. D. a,Gait p. 364

7. There were other factors which were perhaps stronger than Brown's played the role of the Pied Piper. Rouge an;ti-cler- icalism and sympathy with the United States in the end weak• ened their case fatally. To be anti-clerical and democratic AJrtlrjb same time tended to put the Rouges into the limbo of

unconstitutionalism as far as many French-Canadians were v concerned.

6. 011 awa. aLe Can a da samedi 22 dec., 1866. (Quoting its ov.n issue of 21 dec, 1865 which was unavailable): "Deux idles sont en guerre permanente au milieu de nous, l'idee demo- cratique avancee ou republicamne et l'idee liberale-conser- vatrice ou monarehique-constitutionelle. La premiere nous mene a 1'annexion, c'est-a-dire a 1'aneantissement national par Ie nivellement de nos ire tutions autonomiques; 1'autre va nous donner la Confederation, sauvegarde de notre auton• omic locale et rempart contre 1'envahissement dire republi- camtme."

9* La revue canadienne, Janvier, 1865. "Les Evenements du mois" p. 53. "II ne faut pas aveugler: des changements constitu- ioneils^sont necessaires aujourd'hui....II est inutile de songer a revenir au fonctionnement pur et simple de 1'Union .... II ^ Ibid, fevrier, 1865. "Considerations sur le s nouveaux changements constitutionally de l'amerique britannique du nord." par Joseph Royale. pp.116-117. "Sans confederation les provinces deviendront, lors qu'aura sonne pour l'heure -ii-

9. (cont'd) de 1'independance, autant des petites souverainetes sujettes a. toutes inconvejLents et a. toutes les vicissitudes physiques et morales des petits peuples....le moment grave, decisif, et solennel est arrive pour elles /les Provinces/ de'savoir si, heureuses et satisfaites de leur obscurite coloniale, elles n'aspirent vaguement a 1'independance que pour s'en aller disparaitre plus surement...avec leur histoire et leurs traditions dans le gouffre et le neant de la prepublique voisine ou bien si elles vont se lever fierement et jeter dans le monde la prem• iere et eclatante declaration de leur vitalite et de leur avenir."

10. Le Journal de Quebec jeudi 22 dec, 1864. "Si 1'Union une avait ete pos- sible, c 'est-a-dire si nous y eussions trouve toute la protection que nous demdandons pour nos institutions, et si soutes les autres provinces .. .y avaient consentir, nous avouons, sans hesiter, que nous eussions jgqan penche de preference Brers cette forme nstitutionelle, car plus un peuple a de coahesion, plus ses elements s'harmonisent et s'unifent, plus il est sur de vivre, de prosperer et de grandir."

11. Cauchon, J. L'Union des provinces de l'Ame'rique britannique du nord (Ex- trait du Journal de Quebec") Quebec, Cote, 1865. P« 7.

12. The significant exception to these general remarks was a series of ar• ticles in Le Courrier du Canada in Decemeber, 1864 and January, 1865, entitled "La Conf^deration" This series is perhaps the xxwgtw exception that could be made to the generalization-that Canadians did not really understand federalism as such, but only understood it as a political convenience within the existing system of legislative union. The articles of Le Courrier du Canada form a significant contribution to Canadian li&erature on the subject of federal government.

13. Not the least of these ties was the fact that Hector Langevin's brother was the Bishmp of Rimouski.

14. See appendices 1 and 2.

15. Jean-Baptiste Eric Dorion was also editor of Le Defricheur. He died in 1866, and was succeeded in that capacity by Wilfird Laurier, then a mod• erate Rouge, although somewhat more moderate than J.B.E. Dorion. Laurier was elected member for Drummond and Arthabarska in 1871, which seat J.B.E. Dorion had held at the time of his death.

16. Leader, Wed. Aug. 31, 1864.

17. Tache to Quesnel, 9 juillet, 1864. Cited in Tache, L. "Sir. E P. Tache et la confe'deration canadienne" Revue de l'Universite d1 Ottawa $me anne'e 1935. P. 244 n. :

18. Montreal, La Minerve samedi 16 juillet, 1864.

19. Montreal Gazette Wed. Aug. 24, 1864.

20. La Minerve mardi 30 aout, 1864. La Minerve believed that the American Civil War was caused by too much, power in the central government rather than too little. -iii-

21. La Minerve mardi 6 sept., 1861;.

22. La Minerve samedi 15 Oct., 1861;.

23. Public letter of A.A. Dorion to the electors of the county of Hochelaga

dated Nov. 75 1861;. Reprinted in %a Minerve ven. 11 nov., 1861;.

2h. La Minerve sam. Ik Jan., 1865.

25. Ibid.

26. Quebec, Le Courrier du Canada ven. 2k mars, 1865.

27. Groulx', L. La confederation canadienne p. 198.

28. B , Alphonse Contre Poison Montreal, Senecal, 1867. p. 1*9. Though this work was published 2-g- years after 186U, it does reflect Bleu op• inion contemporaneous with the winter of 186U-1865.

29. I have not been able to established Tache's authorship of these artic• les 00nclusively. Le Courrier du Canada was said to be "l'organe du chef du cabinet, M. Tache' et l'organe du clerge", according to Le Defri- cheur 21 juillet, 1861;. Le Courrier said that it was not especially either of these points of view, although it added that it supported their principles, (lundi 25 juillet, 1861;.) Tache''however resided in Quebec and Le Courrier represented generally his point of view. The author of the articles was ill during thecourse of their publication, and Tache at the time was not well. A further point is that the author of these articles was almost certainly at the Quebec Conference. However, Hector Langevin was it the Conference, and also resided in Quebec city, and was furthermore an able writer. The possibility ex• ists that Langevin did write the articles or that he might have collab• orated with Tache on them.

30. The St. Albans raid in September 1861; resulted in a wave of anti-Canad• ian feeling in the United States, led vociferously by the New York Her• ald. This feeling was greatly aggravated when the Confederate prisoners were discharged on technical grounds by Coursol, a judge of magistrate's court in Montreal.

31. Le Courrier du Canada mer. lU dec, 1861;. ("La Confederation)

32. Le Courrier du Canada lun. 26 dec, 1861;. ("La Conf^deration)

#3. Ibid.

31;. See Chapter VI.

35. Joseph Edward Cauchon was editor of Le Journal de Quebec Also M.P.P. for the county of Mont^morency. Mayor of Quebec City, 1865-1867. J.C. Dent notes that Cauchon's work was very influential in securing or helping to secure Frenh-Canadian support of GOnfederatLon. Dent, J.C. The last forty years Toronto, Virtue, 1881. (2 Vols.) ii.l;i;8n. -iv-

36. Cauchon, J.E. Etude sur 1'union projetee des provinces brittanmques Quebec, Cote, 1^58. Cauchon was opposed to a plan of federation in 1858 on the ground that French Canada would only have one voice in six in such a union, whereas in the existing union of the Canadas she had one voice in two. Moreover, "C'est 1'unite seul, l'initiative et la resis• tance seules dans 1'unite, qui nous sauverait dans l'avenir des griffes de 1 'aigle...." p.9.

37. This was characteristic of a number of French and English papers in Lower Canada. La Minerve usually opposed 1'Qrdre. Le Canadien (independent con• servative was opposed to 1'Union Nationale, an extreme rouge paper. The Gazette often fought the Herald(liberal) and sometimes the Witness (pro- testant independent) Ee Courrier du Canada did not choose any paper es• pecially but took occasional jabs at the Montreal True Witness, an Irish Catholic paper strongly opposed to confederation.

38. Le Journal de Quebec jeudi 27 juillet, 1865.

39. Oshawa Vindicator Wed. March 15, 1865. hO. Le Journal de Quebec lundi 22 mai, 1865. Tache on one occasion, in a burst of after dinner ebuillition, said that Canada was "indebted to Lord Durham for the liberties we now enjoy...." Reported by the Toronto Globe Mon. Oct. 17, 186L;, from a dime r by the Quebec Board of Trade, Saturday Oct. 15, I86I4. Tache was probably referring to the grant of responsible government rather than to French liberties which Durham might be thought to have conceded.

Ul. Conf. Debates p. 85.2. Le Canadien was probably referring to these sympa- thetic words of Brown when it said: "II /Brown^ a parle en homme d'Etat, qui relegue dans 1'ombre tous les souvenirs irritants du passe', pour ne songer qu'a l'avenir de la conf e'deration canadienne... .En l'e'coutant, il etait impossible de ne pas se laisser entraxner a EHixcroii^avec lui a ces perspectives grandioses." ven. 10 fev., 1865.

U2. Public letter of Paul de Cazes and Honore'' Mercier, reprinted in Le Journal de Quebec, mardi 29 mai, 1866. "Les chefs du parti conservateur ont trop compte, dans ces derniers temps, sur leur propre forige, et pas assez sur leurs devoirs comme chefs et comme membres d'une nataonalite qu'il importe de ne pas laisser perir; pour faire triompher un projet qui est devenu leur reve habituel, ils paraissent disposes a. tout sacrificier. 1'ambition plutot que le patriotisme nous semble devenue le guide au moyen duquel ils voudraient traverser les ±M. dLfficultes du moment." This letter was just a few days before the Niagara invasion by the Fen• ians. This invasion was therefore not inoppurtune in mitigating the Effec• tiveness of such conservative opposition. Mercier later moved farther left, andfhis leaving Le Courrier de St. Hyacinthe may have been partly due to a change in political belief, besides simply opposition to the Bleu policy.

1*3. Quebec, Le Canadien ven.28 avril, 1865. "Certes le jugement de l'histoire devra etre sevre sur le compte de ces ambitieux /les Rouges/ qui n'ont pas he site' a tout entreprendre pour renverse fltn gouvernement national qui pro- mettrait de fermer l'ere de nos discords, pour ce seul motif, qu'ils n'en fesaient pas partie." 44. Le Canadien ven. 4 mai, 1866.

US- Le Canadien ven. 18 mai, 1866."Au debut de cette discussion, nous dis- ions que le gouvernement canadien etait le principal auteur de la poli• tique que l'on s'efforcait de faire pre'valoir dans ]e s provinces mari- tine s en y exercant une pression extraordinaire, ejs qui avait pour but 1'arbitrage imperial. Nous accusions nos ministres de nous trahir et de vouloir mettre les droits du Bas-Canada a la merci d'une convention sie- gant a Londres, delibeant sous 1'influence du bureau coloniale et decid- ant sans appel." The imperfect tense is used because Le Canadien is giv• ing a resume of its position to date.

46. Hector Fabre had been the editor, with Francois Evanturel, conservative member for Quebec county, as proprietor. After Fabre relinquished his post in Sept. 1866, the editorship was taken over by Evanturel. Le Can• adien lundi 3 sept., 1866.

47. Le Canadien ven. 26 dec, 1866.

48. Le Canadien ven. 2° mars, 1867•

49. A good example is the pastoral letter of Mgr. l'Bveque des Trois Riv• ieres, Thomas /Cook/, dated 8 juin, I867. The letters were expected to be read on two successive Sundays from the pu$f»its within the diocese. The text of this letter is printed in full in l'Echo du cabinet de lec• ture paroissial Neuvieme Annee, 1867, and occupies 6 pages of close print. Only an extract can be quoted. "Vous n'ignorez pas, N.T .C .F./Notre Tres Chers Freres/ quelle fut la vivacite des debats sur ce projet /confe'de'ration/ dans la Chambre d'As- semble'e. La grande majorite' des deputes le regardait comme laseule planche de salut que la Providence offrait a notre nationalite, tandis que la mi^orite' le repoussait de toutes ses forces, sans avoir toute- fois de plan bien arrete a mettre a la placem, pour arracher le pays de 1'impasse ou il se trouvait. Un certain nombre de membres de cette min- orite laissaient entrevoir assez clairement que 1'annexion du Canada aux Etats-Unis etait bien la condition indispensable au saMt de notre nation. Quelques-uns auraient prefere laisser les choses comme elles etaient, ou amener tout ou plus quelques modifications a la constitu• tion, qui n'auraient fait que re'culer pour quelques temps la crise en 1'aggravant. Pour toute homme tarit soit peu observateur, il etait e'vid- ent qu'a. peu pres tous reconnassaient la necessite d'un changement de constitution, et que le luttie veritable etait entre confederation et 1'annexion, c'esi^-a-dire, qu'il agissait de decider si 3e Canada allai t se preparer a dev/iir un grand Etat prospere et Libre...JOU bien si re- noncant a la vie de peuple libre e£ maitre chez lui, il allait pour tou- jours enchainer son avenir au sort d'une republique qui* n'a encore vecu qu'a peu pres l'age d'un homme. ... "Mais c'est avec peine que nous avons vu la violence avec laquelle quelques-uns de nos compatriotes se sont elewes contre le projet de confe'de'ration; nonjqu'il ne fut permis de le discuter dans le temps; mais il est toujours reprehensible de manquer de moderation....Nous avons surtout regrette' les efforts qui oni/e'te faits pour jeter 1 'alarme^parmi vous, lorsque l'on a cherche' a. vous fiaire croire que ce projet n'etait rien moins qu'une trahison.... "Oh I comme nous serions hettfteux, N.T.C.F., si dans cette circonstance qui s'y prete si bien, nous voyions les hommes de tous les partis se rallier sincerement et marcher comme un seul homme sous le meme drapeau -vi-

1*9. (cont'd) pour travailler avec la me me ardeur a promouvoir la prosper- ite et assurer le bonheur de notre commune patrie."

50. Pastoral letter from l'Eve'que de Montre'al, Ignace /Bourget/ printed in l'Ordre lundi 29 juillet, 1867. "...Votez pour celui qui, dans votre ame et conscience, vous parait qualified pour soutenir les intergfes de la Religion et de la Patrie. ... "L'Eglise s 'y soumit / Union of 181*0/ et precha a ses enfants 1 • obe- issance a 11 autorite* ^constituee. Aujourd'hui, elle accepte sans replique le Gouvernement federal parce que qu'il e'mane de la meme autorite."

51. The Church maintained a non-committal attitude toward confederation un• til June, 1867. There is some doubt whether their opinion would have been more effective made known in 1865 or in I867. Coming in June and July, I867, however, such opinion could hardly halp but affect the elec• tions in August considerably.

52. Represented by 1 'Ordre; "L 'Ordre a pour but de re'concilier le liberalisme avec le catholicisme, et de demonstrer que 1'alliance de ces deux Ele• ments est non-seulement possible, mais qu'elle existe reellement en Canada." Le Pays, jeudi, 30 nov., 1865.

53. Skelton, O.D. Gait p. 368.

51*. J .B.E.Dorion was the brother of A.A. (Antoine Aime ) Dorion, was affec• tionately known as "L'enfant terrible". See Conf. Debates p. 858.

55. The first resolution of the Quebec resolutions states: "The best interests and present and future prosperity of British North America will be prom• oted by a Federal Union under the Crown of Great Britain, provided such

union can be effected on principles just to the several Provinces."

56. Conf. Debates p. 858.1. 57. Ibid.

58. L'Ordre ven. 9 juin, 1865.

59. L'Ordre lundi, 12 juin, 1865. 60. Cf. Conf. Debates pp 870-1. J.B.E. Dorion argued that the French in Louisiana were better off than Lower Canada in Confederation; that ann• exation would be really better for Lower Canada; but, at the same time, insisting that he was not advocating annexation to the United States, nor do the people desire it.

61. Le Pays mardi 27 dec, 1861* cites report of a meeting of the electors of the county of St. Jean, at the city hall in St. Jean (on the Richi- laeeu River), on Dec. 20th, at which the following resolutions were pas• sed.* . "Resolu: Que la confederation projetee des provinces britannques h'est ni neces- saire^ni desirable Que le nouveau projet de confederation est d'autant plus alarmant qu'on semble valoir l'emporter d'assaut et sans.un appel au peuple, et -vii-

61. (cont'd) "sans qu'il soit pourvu a ce que la majorite' de chaque pro• vince puisse se prononcer separement au lieui de la majorite' collective des deux provinces du Canada.X - Que les gouvernements locaux...ne seraient que siraulacres de gouverne- ments incapables de prote'ger leur autonomie, leurs institutO ions nationales et religieuses.... Que nous devons etre, au reste, prets a accorder au Haut-Canada toutes les reclamations legitimes qu'il espere

62. L'Anion Nationale lundi 6 fev. i860, reported a meeting of l'Institut Canadien on January 30, 1865. "Resolu: Qu'un semblable projet, s'11 etait adopte n'aurait d'autre resul- tat que d'affaiblir les liens qui attachent le Bas-Canada a la Grande-Bretagne en cre*ant dans 1'esprit de ses habitants de juste alarmes sur le conservation de tout ce qui est cher a un peuple loyal et capable d'appre'cier les droits d'un sujet anglais.... Que les difficultes sectionelles qui on servi de pretexte a des changements organiques dans les institutions pol- itiques du Haut et du Bas-Canada, sont suscept- ibles d'une solution equitable, sans qu'il soit necessaire d'avoir recours d un moyen dispendieux et aussi extreme que celui d'une conf e*cieration....

63. Le Pays mardi 27 dec, 1861*.

61;. Le Pays jeudi 3 aout, 1865.

65. Le Pays samedti 2k mars, 1866. Cartier, said Le Pays, is deliberately exaggerating the Fenian danger. "Son interet exige que la peur redouble que 1'on mette tout espoir dans la confederation comme dans une barque de salut."

66. L'Ordre mere 6 juin, 1866. "Les e'venements qui fondent sur notre pauvre Canada depuis quelquesJours, sont loin d'etre rassurants; 1'en• terprise Fenienne a laquelle on croyait ne pas devoir attacher d'abord Sxune/grande importance menace de grossir. Deja plusiers milles hommes ont envahi nos immenses fronti^res...." This was followed by a poem writtenxfaffiaia for the occasion entit• led, "Aux militairs de la campagne", of which three stanzas follow: -viii-

66. (cont'd) "Mais aujourd'hui les crisde 'sang I' de'guerre I' Ont retenti sous la voute des cieux. A votre pere, a votre tendre mere, A vos amis faites done vos adieux....

JLassez et fleurs et jardins et chaumieres; Au bout du champ 1'instrument des labours Sera tranquilleI ...Ecoutez...Aux frontieres De tous cotes on vous crie: 'Au secours'.'

En avant, coureageux soldats, Volez au triomphe, a la gloire '. Dans tous vos chaleureux combats Remportez une eclatante victoire '.'. "

Shippee's interpretation of the Rouge reaction to the Fenians is rath• er different than the one maintained here. He suggests the thesis ad• vanced by the Gazette on March Ik, 1866, that the Rouges were sympa• thetic to Fenianism although pretending to detest it. From the Gaz• ette 's statement, Shippee draws the conclusion that "the Rouge fac- tion in Lower Canada, long discontented with existing conditions, harbored designs lookidg^toward co-operation with the Fenians." If 1'Ordre represents Rouge opinion, as Mr. Shippee says it does, I would seriously question his whole argument as far as the moderate Rouges are concerned. In respect of A.A. Dorion and Le Pays, the matter is not quite so clear. But Dorion was less annexationist than 1 'Ordre; and, being French-Canadian, he could hardly see in the Fenians much comfort for French-Canadian nati. onaliiy. I believe Mr. Shippee has accepted the conservative interpretat• ion of the Gazette at its face value, since he cites no other author• ity for his argument. See Shippee, L.B. Canadian-American relations, 18I|.9-187U New Haven, Yale University Press, 1939. (relations of Canada and the Uni• ted States) p.221 and p.x221n.

67. 1'Ordre mere. 27mars, 1867.

68. 1'Ordre lundi lo-sept., I867

69. 1'Union Nationale jeudi 3 Oct., I867.

70. Le Pays sam. 21 sept., I867. Le Pays distinguishes the rights of the clergy as citizens and as officers of the church. It has no quarrel with the action of the clergy in their former capacity; but it strong• ly objects to the clergy using their position in the church for essen• tially temporal matters. "Au moment ou allait s'engager la lutte electoralea, aux dates success- ives du 8, du 12, du 13, du 18 juin, les Eveques de Trois Rivftires, de Quebec, de Rimouski, et de St. Hyacinths, publiaient chacun une lettre pastorale a. propos des elections qui allait bientot commencer. Exprimee en terms differentes, l'ide'e dominante dans ces quatre documents, est la meme_. On y vante l'acte de la co nfe'deration, comme une ouevre a. peu pres parfaite et necessitee par les circonstances, on y exalte le pat- riotisme, les vues elevees de ses auteurs, on les recommande avec leurs partisans aux electeurs, comme les seuls dignes de leurs suff- -ix-

70. (cont'd)"rages;—ceux qui n'acceptent de bonne grace le renversement de nos institutions ne peuvent conduire qu'a l'anarchie, a la trahis- on, a la xrevolte et a. tous les maux qui en sont la suite. "Et tout cela, pour quelle raison ? Parce que c 'est une LOI, adopt• ee par les autorites constituees '. 1" Le Pays jeudi 26 sept., 18*$?. "...om abuse de la chaire et du confes- sional pour faire croire au peuple qu'il etait tenu, de par ses devoirs religieux, d'accepter, de sanctionner la tyrannie et 1'oppression...." See note h9 for the pastoral letter of the Bishop of Three Rivers, Dorion does not nention the pastoral letter of the Bishop of Montreal which came out in July, probably because Bishop Bourget did not suggest directly the for which to vote, leaving the decision up to the consciences of the individuals concerned.(See note $o). Bourget's diocese also included the county for which Dorion was a member—Hoche- laga. (121)

CHAPTER V

ENGLISH IDEAS IN CANADA EAST REGARDING FEDERALISM (122)

Joseph Cau^on once said that a French-Canadian editor spent the best part of his time translating.

That was the reason, he added, why so many French papers only appeared twice or three times a week. A French editor translates- "peniblement et longuement", and has little time left ot devote to the immense work of a daily.

It is an interesting comment on the English dominance of the Province.

Nowhere perhaps was this dominance cherished more than in the hearts of the English of Lower Canada.

They had been the commercial and financial leaders of the

Province almost since the conquest. They were at the centre of the Province geographically and economically.

And they did not wish to see the Province split by a federal union. They wished to see British North America united in a legislative union, with themselves, the dominant commercial group, at the centre. Montreal had been the centre of the Canada Land Co., which had exten•

sive holdings west of Hamilton to Lake Huron, and had

acquired scattered holdings in Crown Reserves in just about every county in Upper Canada.2 Montreal had been the centre for the operations of Gzowski and Co., who had been the contractors for the Toronto-Sarnia section of the Grand Trunk. Montreal had been the focus of the whole Canadian canal system. These "had beens" in 1864

still left Montreal with great commercial and financial (123)

interests in Canada West. The influence of commercial

interests on confederation was considerable. The princi•

pal significance in the present context was that they

affected the ideas of the English in Lower Canada on .

federal government. The commercial class of Lower Canada

strongly favoured legislative union.3

The English in Lower Canada were more fervent

in their desire for legislative union than merely com• mercial connections with the Western section would imply.

The vigour of the English belief in legislative union

came from a variety of sources not specifically connected with their commercial interests. Most important of all perhaps was the plain fact that they would be a minority

in a French-speaking province. Not only would they be a

linguistic minority, but even more decidedly a religious minority. The French-speaking population outnumbered

English-speaking by over three to one. But Catholics

outnumbered the Protestants by over six to one.4 Not unnaturally the English commercial class, largely Protes•

tants, looked with considerable anxiety at a project which might have the result of putting them in a very

serious minority in the religious sense as well as

threatening their commercial dominance. The effect of

religious belief on ideas about federal government was

considerable. In this respect, religious belief was of (124)

more vital importance than language. English-speaking

Catholics were at one with the French in opposing leg• islative union. In Lower Canada the issue on Confedera• tion was drawn between Catholic and Protestant, rather than between English and French.

Thus ideas about federalism among the English- speaking of Lower Canada break sharply into two sections.

The Protestants formed about two-thirds this group; the

Catholics one-third. The great weight of commercial and financial strength lay with the English Protestants.

They gave the tone to what is usually known as the

English minority. They were mostly of English or Scot• tish origin and had acquired a dominant control in the business life of the Province. They desired legislative union largely because they were Protestants in a

Catholic world. Federal government was anathema to them.

It meant French political dominance on their home ground.

It meant that they would be at the mercy of an alien religion and an alien language.

Federal government also meant the introduction of American ideas, the decentralised system of govern• ment, the pandering to popular influence, even perhaps universal suffrage. The Lower Canadian English-speaking

Protestants wanted legislative union, British traditions of political practice, conservatism. Faced with the realities of 1864 they were prepared to make certain (125)

concessions to the federal principle; but no more than was absolutely required by French Canada, and perhaps less if it could be managed by political pressure.

The other section of English-speaking opinion was the Catholic group. This group took a; line on federal government very close to that of the French-Canadians.

They were in closer touch with English opinion in both sections of the Province however than the French, and it led them to fear that guarantees for the Catholics in

Lower Canada would be all too few. They were in close sympathy with the French, and tried to interpret English opinion on occasion for them. Nominally they were repre• sented in the Cabinet by McGee, but they disagreed with him over federal government, and found him on occasion much too monarchist for their taste. McGee did secure concessions for the Catholics, but they were more often of value for the Catholic minority in Upper Canada.

Hence, though McGee was elected for Montreal West, he really represented Upper Canadian Irish opinion rather than lower. He secured his Lower Canadian support through sheer personal attractiveness and on his past record, rather than through his policy on confederation.

Beside the two main divisions of English- speaking opinion there were a number of curious elements which combined to form the Liberals of Lower Canada. Led by Luther Holton, they represented all shades of religious (126)

views, and carried their Liberal principles into practice by associating closely with the Rouges. Dorion and Holton were politically inseparable. Like Dorion the Liberals maintained that confederation was premature; but they did not stress the aspect which Dorion stressed: that confed• eration was little more than legislative union in disguise

Some of the liberals, together with Christopher Dunkin, an independent Conservative, ware prepared to give Upper

Canada "rep. by pop II if Confederation were dropped.5

It is difficult to penetrate the point of view of the Lower Canada Liberals. They seem to have been more concerned with offering opposition to the government in office than in advocating any particular issue or point of view. Holton had been associated with Gait when

Gait was in opposition in the 'fifties. Unlike Gait, he did not change political colour with maturity, or on the invitation of John A. Macdonald. He was a friend of several of the leading conservatives. The Liberals prob• ably opposed Confederation on the grounds simply that it was hasty government measure, and one designed to give the

Conservatives a new lease on life.

But to most English-speaking residents of

Lower Canada confederation was a step dictated by events.

It was a project in which they were: not unwilling to share provided that it could be effected with a minimum of con• cession to the odious system in operation below the border (127)

nConfederationl" said the Morning Chronicle; "Have we not

seen enough of federations with their cumbrous machinery

of government, well enough in fair weather but breaking up

with the least strain, • • ? Shall we not draw wisdom from

the errors of others? Must we steer our bark on that rock

on which the neighbouring ... union has split ? • • •

Never was there such an opportunity as now for the birth

of a nation. The main problems of government have been

solved for us. The problem of a Federal Union has been worked out - a failure. The problem of a Legislative

union has been worked out - a success."7

The success to which the Chronicle was referring was not the Union of the Canadas, but the union of England

and Scotland. This was an analogy which had considerable

currency in Lower Canada, especially among those with

preferences for a legislative union. They pointed out, as

did the Chronicle, that Scotland still had her own religion,

and many of her own laws. If she had had her own language,

said the Chronicle, she would still have had that too.

The analogy in Canada implied a principle not unlike

Sandfield Macdonald's system of a double majority, applied

to the Lower Canada French alone, in a legislative union

of British North America. This system would be of universe

advantage over a federation - it would avoid all the

cumbrous machinery of "clerks and petty place-men" nec•

essary to federation. (1E8)

The Gazette, more judiciously, took a similar line on the desirability of legislative union. It ad• mitted that such talk had already excited some alarm among the French papers, but reasserted its position that if there was to be a union at all, it must be strong and one likely to last. There can be no mean between forces: either they are centripetal tending to consoli• dation, or they are centrifugal tending to separation.

We all know, continued the Gazette, that history teems with the conflict of powers in federations. Let us not have a repetition of that conflict in the new union.

Like many a newspaper in the good land of Canada, the

Gazette, could not believe that there was any mean between power at the centre and power at the circumference. When the wheel starts to move the power has to go somewhere.

Either it tends to fly off - to be restrained only by the weak and tenuous bonds of the federal system; or it tends to the weight at the centre - local power holding itself only far enough aloof to keep its identity. Put in this way the Canadian solution is almost self-evident: keep the weight of power in the centre. If one adds the influence of British traditions and methods, the influence of a Civil War which had been raging almost four years, the Canadian solution seems not only self-evident but

justified by circumstances. To Canadians it seemed, as the Chronicle suggested, that their political problems (129)

had been solved for them. It is too much to expect that

in the course of three weeks anything but the practical

political line of compromise and least resistance was

followed.

However, the Gazette was quite prepared to admit

limited guarantees for French Canada. It even suggested

certain very limited "plenary" powers for local govern•

ments. This daring suggestion was somewhat qualified by

the admission that the central government should have some

right to interfere - though purely in the case of local

disputes. But the Gazette like most other ministerial

papers in English was clearly not interested in federal

government or anything resembling it. The French would

have guarantees of course; that need was unanimously

recognized; but no more than were sufficient to meet the

circumstances of the case.10 What we want, said the

Gazette, is either a legislative union with a recognition

of federal rights, or if that is not possible, a federal union with the powers of local legislation very distinctly

defined and very strictly limited.11

The Gazette, in keeping with the practical line

taken by the ministry in the formation of a constitution,

followed the old English method of arguing on practical

-grounds rather than floating off into the stern and lofty

realm of principle. It was quite ready to believe that

Confederation was the best scheme possible under the (130)

circumstances: the Gazette considered that the highest

recommendation. Those who opposed it on a priori grounds were simply being unrealistic. "If the new constitution

only proves to be a practical success" said the Gazette,

"we shall easily forgive it for being a theoretical 12 failure". Whatever may be said of the constitution as a success or failure, at least the Gazette got pretty well what it wanted in the Quebec resolutions and the British North America Act. But it continued to maintain that the one thing which any federal system had to dread 13 was the predominance of sectional over national feeling.

The pronounced opinion of the Conservative

Protestant press in Lower Canada could be compared only with the equally pronounced opinion of the Toronto Globe.

Both wanted strong central government; both wanted a very

limited and a very strictly defined local system of

power. The Globe and the Gazette usually saw eye to eye

on the subject of federal government. As the Globe was

criticized by the Leader, so was the Gazette by La Minerve.

The Gazette and the Chronicle took exception on occasion

to the Leader * s point of view;14 both were inclined to

be more careful dealing with La Minerve.

The Gazette's general tone was often quite

close to that of Thomas D'Arcy McGee, McGee usually pub•

lished letters to the public through the pages of the

Gazette, and its strong conservatism doubtless appealed

to him. The Gazette was in addition ably written - (131)

perhaps the best outside of the Toronto Leader. McGee could have used the pages of a local Catholic journal,

The True Witness,15 But he was poles apart from the

True Witness on federalism; he was closer to the Toronto

Canadian Freeman, the Upper Canadian Irish counterpart of the True Witness,

McGee is a fascinating figure, but an elusive one. His words and ideas were like a golden aureole about the solid features of the Quebec resolutions, il• luminating them and reflecting upon them the gracious light of a new nationality. What McGee really thought and believed is hidden beneath his oratory. The leading ideas are fairly clear. He was a convinced monarchist.

He believed in the aristocracy of talent and wealth, he believed in liberty without believing in democracy. He was close to De Tocqueville in some respects, but with a greater flair for feeling and with a less keen analytical sense as a result. McGee on federal government is a curious combination. He knew what federal government was, but he faced the difficulty of having to disassociate it from Republicanism and from democracy. It is not true historically, he said, that Republicanism is the comple• ment of Federalism. Federalism is "a-political co• partnership" which has been formed by many different groups in various periods of human history.16 At the same time, McGee took care to point out the virtues of the (132)

monarchical and the responsible form of government and

cited John Adams in support of his argument. McGee never

really resolved the problem of monarchy and federalism; philosophical resolutions were not his forte.

Federation he defined as "a political co• partnership". This is a good definition on the face of

it. But he applied the federal idea in a number of curious instances. The principle of Federation, he said

in the debates on Confederation, is a generous principle; it gives men local duties, yet with "a healthy sense of responsibility and comprehension". It is a principle favourable to liberty. It gives local affairs to local bodies, and general matters to a central government. It is this wise system which is applied in varying degrees in almost every country. Spain is a confederation. So is the British Isles.17

McGee had come from a "political co-partner•

ship" to a unitary state, in three easy political lessons.

The fact remains that he understood the nature of federal government; but he found it much easier to take it as the leaven in the lump of legislative union, than to carry on the analogy of the co-partnership. McGee was in fact following the line that nearly all other Canadians took: federalism as a function of legislative union. He did not make clear how a political co-partnership would (133)

function in a monarchical system. He did not conceive of

the Crown distributing its sovereign power through two

sets of institutions, one national and the other provin•

cial.18 The reason he did not was perhaps the fact that

the theory was not easy to grasp. The theory of a

federal system under a monarchy was evolved after rather

than before such a system had been established. McGee

thus followed the line of least resistance. He adapted his perfectly good theory of federalism to fit the

Canadian system, and just about argued federalism out of

existence. At least, he argued it on such a ground as

to leave grave doubts as to whether he really did believe

Canada had a federal system. He states nowhere his belief that Canada had such a system. One can only sus• pect that McGeefs natural desire for order, civil

obedience and monarchy, got the better of his theory

about federalism. In other words he was caught up in

the same state of mind as most other Canadians, and

found himself very quickly for legislative union with

local guarantees.

In Lower Canada Gait as much as McGee epito• mized the general set of English opinion. Gait was not unlike McGee in some respects. He was a man of vision;

like McGee he had taken up Federation long before

Macdonald and the Conservatives had seen fit to grasp

the nettle. Gait combined his vision with a shrewd and (134)

able knowledge of practical possibilities. His plan of federal union of 1858 foreshadowed, with unusual prescienc the resolutions at Quebec six years later.

So closely did the Quebec resolutions follow

Gait's plan that it is impossible not to suspect that in the Cabinet meetings between June and October 1864, the

Canadian ministers took up Gait's plan in detail, making only such adjustments as were suggested or made necessary by the experience of six years. The six years were

crowded; with the difficult domestic problem in Canada, the recurrent crises between Britain and the United States the Civil War to the south, it was likely that changes would be made in Gait's scheme of 1858. The changes were made: principally a nominative Upper House, instead of

Gait's elective one; and the assigning the residual power to the central government which Gait had left an open

question in 1858. Gait himself said in 1858 that he hoped the suggested plan would combine the strength of legis• lative union with the benefits of local government of

19 matters of local interest. If that was true in 1858,

it was certainly all the more so in the resolutions of

1864. He had not defined the local powers in 1858, nor had he attempted to suggest any control by the central

government over local legislation through the veto power.

These were ramifications worked out in 1864, probably by

Macdonald. (135)

The Canadian delegation'went to Charlottetown and Quebec with a definite plan already in mind. The successive introduction of resolutions by Brown, Mac• donald, Mowat and Gait, shows the Canadian delegation to have come to general conclusions about the nature of union before it ever came to the Conference table. By and large the conclusions to which they had come were those of Gait's proposal of 1858. The plan of subsidies to local governments was specifically that of Gait. He had conceived it with the idea of making the.local leg• islatures dependent on the preservation of central authority. It was not unlikely that this motive actuated acceptance of the plan in 1864.20 GalVs great signifi• cance in this context was that he was just about the only political figure in Canada who had given any consid• eration to the precise nature of a union government for

British North America, prior to 1864; and the proposal which came from Quebec in the closing weeks of October of that year show strongly the commanding influence of the thought he had given the subject of confederation.

Gait, the representative of a considerable section of English Protestant opinion in Canada East, was the leading theorist behind the formation of the Canadian constitution. If McGee gave the constitution its aura of poetry and history, Gait fastened it firmly to the ground of political reality. His position was perhaps comparable (136)

with that of Alexander Hamiltoneach was a financier,

each was concerned with keeping a strong central govern• ment in control of affairs. However, Gait dominated the

form of the Canadian constitution more than Hamilton did

the American. Gait had few rivals: Hamilton had several.

, The conclusion is that the Canadian constitution

represented the thought of the leading figure among the

English Protestants of Lower Canada. Doubtless it con•

ceded more to local institutions than the Montreal Gazette would have preferred. Gait himself showed an awareness

of the local problem which was perhaps unusual among his

fellow English. But behind him stood the general opinion

of English Lower Canada; if he was prepared to be more

liberal than most of his supporters on the question of

local government, he could hardly oppose the general trend po of opinion.fc His thought on the constitution is unusually significant; but it is not surprising that the Constitution emphasized the central power, knowing the inclinations of the men who supported its leading theorist. The English minority in Lower Canada of Protestant faith generally welcomed the text and tenor of the new constitution. If anything they would have pre• ferred less concession to local institutions but as a whole they were satisfied. J. H. Pope reported to his constituents in December 1864 that having local legislatures 23 at all was the real weakness of the Confederation proposals. (137)

At any rate they assumed, as did the Toronto?Globe, that in any conflict between local and central authority, the central authority would have the upper hand through un• questioned use of the veto power.24

The attitude of the Lower Canadian Protestants was very much the same as that of the Upper Canadian

Catholic. Both saw in tne central government a protector and a guarantor of their rights and privileges; both saw in the local government a possible source of tyranny and injustice. In Upper Canada the Catholics feared-George

Brown and the Orange Order. In Lower Canada the Protes- 25 tants feared the French. Both minorities looked to a strong central government as the source of their cultural and religious autonomy, and eschewed any notion of strong power in local hands.

However, the Lower Canada Catholic position was just the reverse. Like the French, the English- speaking Catholics wanted strong local control of affairs

The contrast in attitude between the Irish of Toronto and the Irish of Montreal is both amusing and instructive

They were completely juxtaposed• Where the Irish of

Toronto praised and supported Macdonald and his whole point of view on the strong central government, the Irish of Montreal abhored the ministerial project.

, The policy of the Montreal True Witness on fed• eralism was what the French policy might have been and (138)

was not. The True Witness did not look so much to guar• antees as to the project itself. It argued that confed• eration was not a federation at all; in its very nature it could not he a federation. And it therefore opposed the measure root and branch.

- The True Witness was an able exponent of its point of view. It was perhaps the most significant oppos• ition paper in the Province as far an analysis of federal government was concerned. The basis of its argument was its conception of the relation of Lower to Upper Canada.

The two Ganadas stand to each as the South to the North.

The differences between the two lay deep in their aspir• ations and outlook. Canada East wanted her institutions and her religion. Canada West wanted Anglo-Saxon and

Protestant ascendancy.26 Between these views there was no real compatibility. There was no system which could provide the elasticity for such divergences of outlook.

Federal government in the United States, under auspices certainly more favourable than in Canada, had failed to preserve its union. How, therefore, could Canada preserve a union with such internal divergences evident already?

The Cessation of sectional differences from a federal union? asked the True Witness "Are men mad or do they believe their listeners to be fools that they assail our ears with such trash."27 We are secessionists at heart, continued the True Witness; not that we do not detest (139)

slavery, but we are opposed heart and soul to the princ• iple of centralisation, and believe-that "States-rights" holds the only security for us.

Through the summer of 1864 the True Witness continued its examination of the problem. On the assump• tion that union between the Canadas was no longer possible it pressed not for federation so much as repeal of the

union altogether. It proposed that Lower Canada revert to a single colony under the great federation of Empire. In this attitude it may have been influenced by . It is more likely that it was the natural conclus• ion of its line of thought.

From this position, the True Witness went on to show the status of a new government between the colony and the Mother Country would be ridiculous and intolerable. It would mean that any colonial confederation would draw powers from those now belonging to the Imperial government, and from powers belonging to the existing colonies. There was in fact nothing for a colonial federal government to do. All the functions of a legitimate federal government are now handled by Great Britain. If such a government

were established it would be bound to "encroach upon the j legitimate functions either of the Imperial or of the 28 Provincial Government". The question arises, what was a federal govern• ment? This is the kernfll of the problem. A federal (140)

colonial government was impossible, tne True Witness said, for obvious functional reasons. But it was also impossi• ble from the nature of the federal idea. A federal union derives its power from an agglomeration of several states or provinces. Power devolves upward. Thus in a federal system, reasoned the True Witness, all power remains in• herent in the local government. The power of the central government is derived or delegated. What is being prepared for us by the Ministry is certainly nothing of

PQ the sort. It is "Unification not Federationnav that will be brought before the Canadian legislature.

Not unnaturally the True Witness objected when the Globe -Suggested that federation was but a municipal extension within the existing political system. The

Globe's suggestion was the most natural one in the world and the reason why the True Witness insisted on dissolu• tion of the Union first, then federation. The True

Witness insisted the Province of Lower Canada must be restored to its original status. Then and only then could a federation be formed. Then and only then would a federal government for British North America be a genuine• ly delegated government.

This suggests the significance of the existing

Union government. The extension of the Union government after 1867 was not a provincial government but in reality a national one. In effect the existing legislative (141)

union was continued and broadened with increased compe• tence for the rest of British North America, The old provinces of Upper and Lower Canada were re-formed, so to speak, beneath this government. The True Witness argued that unless the union government were first dissolved, no true federation could be formed. The True Witness was undoubtedly right. Had the union government been dissolved and Upper and Lower Canada left to bargain with the Maritimes, the resultant union would likely have been considerably different. Each province of the Canadas would then have felt the full strength of a plentitude of power, which they would have been reluctant to surrender.

The result would have been not unlike the Confederation of the United States in 1777 or perhaps analogous to the

American Constitution. John A. Macdonald and the Cabinet were probably not unaware of this problem. The project for local constitutions for the Canadas was given no ministerial consideration until after it was apparent that Confederation was acceptable to the Maritimes government. No local constitutions were considered until it was reasonably certain that Confederation was likely to come into effect.

It was the Union government which suggested and lead the project for confederation. It was in effect to the Union government to which the new power of a confed- (142)

eration of British North America was given. Macdonald and the Canadian cabinet were simply given Maritime mem• bers, enlarged functions and a great new scope for their political talents. Such is not a legal interpretation of Confederation. But it is what happened, even though the theory behind events was considerably different.

Like Le Courrier du Canada on the nature of federal government, the True Witness on colonial federal• ism represents an isolated study. In the case of the

True Witness, it was based on ramifications of a minority dissentient position, and brought out as a result of consideration of a minority problem. That it was astute and penetrating cannot be denied. But it was isolated; and it is significant both in its isolation and bjr its isolation.

A few months after the Quebec conference reso• lutions had been reported the True Witness changed its tune. On April 14, 1865, it asserted that it had not pronounced on the issue of Confederation itself-but had- opposed the particular details of the'Union.30 This was quite wrong. The change of heart can perhaps be explained.

Lee had surrendered but five days before; the True Witness had believed that the only safe future for Canada lay in a balance of power between a Northern Union and a Southern confederacy. Now the future lay darkened with the heavy cloud of a grimly victorious North; and the True Witness (143)

turned almost instinctively to Union of British North

America. Where it had once opposed the whole idea on

principle, it now opposed it on the details alone. This may not he the whole explanation, hut it is a likely sur• mise. Once again the impact of events below the border

seems to have had the effect of weakening and stultifying

opposition in Canada.

The position of the True Witness in dealing with the inconsistencies and the problems of a colonial

federation, closely resembles the long, careful, critical

speech of Christopher Dunkin. Dunkin was an independent

Conservative, member for Brome county, near the United

States border. He sided with the Lower Canada Liberals

on confederation, but went far beyond their rather feeble

opposition. On Monday night, February 27, 1865, and the

following Tuesday night, he delivered a criticism of the

Quebec resolutions which dwarfs any other in the debates

for sheer ability and penetration. It was comprehensive,

it was exhaustive; and it showed Confederation to be

apparently a shambling mass of compromise and of rule-of-

thumb methods. Dunkin did not believe that in seventeen

days "thirty-three gentlemen" could produce a Constitution

which was a happy and judicious combination of the best in

the British system and the best in the United States 32

system. In fact he maintained that legislative union

and federalism were quite different and quite imcompatible. (144)

Moreover, far from talcing the best in each, he maintained the worst had been taken from each, and these together with concessions to Lower Canada and compromises to other sections, produced an* indescribable jumble.33

His speech was principally concerned in point• ing out just what these compromises and inconsistencies were. In doing so, he prophesied, with considerable prescience, problems of the Canadian constitution which 34 have arisen since 1867. The point was that he could not believe the haste with which confederation had been sug• gested, negotiated, brought before the House, was in the slightest justified either by the project itself or by 35 the circumstances at the time. Nothing good could come from such haste, and much indeed that was anything but good.

Beneath this great body of criticism was Dunkin's own belief and policy. He was not greatly interested in a federal government at all. The English system of responsi• ble government was to him the best system, and he held to a maintenance of the existing union on that ground. But, at the same time he knew the American constitution and its background more thoroughly perhaps than any other of his contemporaries, and he was not in the least disposed to disparage the work of 1787. By and large it was by com• parison with the American constitution that he made his most telling points against Canadian confederation. He chose his comparison well. The harmony and balance of (145)

the American system contrasted sharply with the Quebec resolutions, and showed the Quebec resolutions in a most awkward and bumbling light. It was in a sense an unfair comparison; the Quebec resolutions assumed the British system of government at least as much as they overtly mentioned the federal system.

Confederation was a British system of govern• ment, engrafted with federal institutions for the sake of perpetuating the inheritance of a significant minority.

It was a compromise. It was a compromise largely for the sake of French Canada. Dunkin wanted no such compromise.

He wanted a closer union of the Canadas, not a more atten• uated one. Had he been less clear an analyst, he might have been led to believe his object was accomplished.

There was certainly a good deal in the Quebec resolutions which suggested that a closer union was desired. But

Dunkin saw instead the direction of the new system. He saw that local institutions, once created, would quite conceivably extend the system beyond what was intended at Quebec. Provincial governments would naturally tend to amplify rather than diminish their power. In such cir• cumstances he considered the compromises, the looseness, the careless wording of some of the resolutions, the speed of their formulation, to be dangerous for the future, when the strain and stress of political battle and contentious issues would threaten to wreck the loosely-framed consti- (146)

tution. Dunkin was too sharp an analyst to have much con• fidence in the force of centralising tendecies which studded the resolutions. He could not believe as some others did that the local institutions would gradually tend to wither away, leaving a legislative union. Thus, though he wished a closer union of the Canadas, he did not see Confederation, for all its centralisation, as the means to such a union.

Confederation was a compromise, and it did not take Dunkin long to show up many of its incongruities.

He followed the despatch of Cardwell to Monck36 in crit• icising the fixed limit of the legislative council; he 31 followed the criticism of the London. Times and the

Edinburgh Review38 injrespect of the wording of the res• olutions of the division of powers. He criticized the power of disallowance. It was, he said, suggestive of the only uniformity in the whole system: the complete lack of local autonomy. But to his mind, things should be what they are stated to be. If Canada was to have a federal system, it should be a federal system, not a mere display of words to cover another intent. Dunkin's criticism caused Cartier to remark that the power of disallowance would presumably only be exercised in case of "unjust or unwise legislation". Dunking promptly replied: "If the law presumes anything of the sort, 39 the law's a fool - a natural fool!" This reply ended (147)

Mr, Cartier*s interruptions for the reminder of the evening.

Dunkin*s speech was praised generously by sev• eral Upper Canadian papers for at least its candour and its clarity. The St. Thomas Weekly Dispatch considered it the ablest of all the speeches delivered during the 40 41 debate; the Oshawa Vindicator said the same. The

Montreal Gazette however criticized the speech with re• gard to several heresies which Dunkin had delivered against the British constitution. It is an amusing reflection on the Gazette's pro-British attitude that it accounted it a heresy to rank the .United States Senate as the best deliverative body in the world. Heresy or not, Dunkin*s speech was probably the most powerful attack the new constitution sustained during the period of its incubation, 1864-1867. After it was over, the remainder of the speeches seemed to contemporaries anti- climatic. Comments began to appear not long afterward suggesting the Debate had just about talked itself out. °

Dunkin's attack was conspicuous among a number of rather weak opposition speeches. No other opposition speaker had the grasp and the insight into constitutional problems and background of Dunkin. The Liberals, Holton and

Huntingdon, did little more than suggest there was too much haste. But none of the opposition, Dunkin included, seemed to have much to suggest as a substitute. Most of (148)

the opposition wanted a continuance of the status quo.

Yet Brown had noted that a return to the old state of things before coalition was quite impossible. The Reform party had come too far on the way to "rep. by pop."., for there to be any turning back. The opposition which

Dunkin offered was therefore merely criticism. He had nothing to substitute for the measure he so ably ridiculed.

Thus his work was mainly that of pointing out to the government the problems which forced them, and to perhaps render them less sanguine of the perfection of the reso• lutions which they had framed at Quebec.

English-speaking opinion in Canada East was thus split neatly into two sections; for and against

Confederation. The English Protestants gave a rather uncritical allegiance to the project. They wanted a leg• islative union if possible, but realized that there might have to be some concessions to French Canada. The

English Catholics; together with some Protestant liberals and independents were entirely opposed to confederation.

The English Protestants were supporters not just of

Gait's 1858 plan of federation, but for all the central• ising tendencies which Macdonald or Gait wanted to add to the plan in 1864. The Catholics wanted the status quo, if possible; but if there was to be a new constitution, they insisted that it be rooted in the sovereignty of the individual province. The federal government in their eyes (149)

must be a delegated government.

In the end, opposition failed. It failed because it had nothing practical to substitute for the plan of confederation but a return to the status quo.

Such a return would have provoked a near revolution in

Upper Canada. The opposition failed because it had no constructive plan; it had only criticism. It failed because it could garner no solid support for an essen• tially negative policy in a difficult and troubled time.

The Catholic opposition in Lower Canada was weakened by such circumstances, and its policy rendered much less tolerable by the Irish invasion of Canada from the United

States. When the Church gave its orders in June 1867, the English-speaking Catholic opposition of Canada East quietly bowed its head to the inevitable.

Confederation as a whole shows the impress of the ideas of the Protestants of Lower Canada. Powerful economically they tended also to be powerful politically.

They had the satisfaction of seeing the plan of their

Cabinet representative adopted at Quebec with surprising• ly little change. A strategic group politically, they made the most of their position. A conservative group, they made the most of the tactical errors of Brown.

They wanted legislative union but knew that it would not satisfy the French; they got a union which did satisfy the French, and one which might almost have been called (150)

a legislative union. They were satisfied in 1867; they had preserved strong central government, and Cartier 44 had not been unprepared to make concessions. While Gait had not been able to secure them all the minority guarantees of education which they might have liked, they felt fairly secure, confident that the strong arm of the central power would be ready to rescue them in any local difficulty. Notes

1. Le Journal de Quebec samedi 30 avril, 1861;, on announcing its change from a tri-weekly to a daily.

2. See map in Skelton, O.D. Gait opp. p. 16.

3. Creighton, D.G. "British North America at confederation" in Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial relations Appendix 2, p. 53~T i|. Population of Lower Canada by origins: (1861 census) Native French 81f7,320 " non-Frencbll67,578 Ireland 50,192 United States 13,61;! (English speaking: 267,000 app.) Scotland 13,160 (French speaking: 81;8,000 app.) England 13,139 Population of Lower Canada by religious belief:(l86l census) Church of Rome 9k 2, 7 21; Church of England 63,322 Est.Church of Scotl'd 23,688 Free Church of " 11;, 770 United Presbyterians 5*11*9 (Protestant 150,000 app.) Wesleyan Methodists 25,879 (Roman Catholic 9^3,000 app.) Other Methodists 2,537 Baptists 7,751 Congregationalists U,927 2nd Adventists 2,305

5. Reported in the Globe Tues. Nov. 29, 1861;, without confirmation. It is quite probablg, however, in view of Dunkin's well-known desire to keep the legislative union.

6. Macdonald to Gait, Nov. 2, -J.867. Dated from Toronto. . "...You call yourself a Rouge. There may have been at one time a reddish tinge about you, but I could observe it becoming by degrees fainter. In fact you are like Byron's Dying Dolphin, exhibiting a series of colours— 'the last still loveliest'—and that last is 'true blue', being the col• our I affect. "Seriously you would make a decent Conservative, if you gave your own judgement a fair chance and cut loose from Holton and Dorion and those other beggars. So pray do become true blue at once: it is a good standing colour and bears washing." in Skelton, O.D. op.cit. p.229-230. This is an interesting example of Macdonald's methods.

7. Quebec, Morning Chronicle Mon. Oct. 17, 1861;. Quoting a "recent writer" who I have been unable to trace.

8. Note the reaction of La Minerve. See Chapter IV.

9. Morning Chronicle Mon. Oct. 17, I86J4.

10. Gazette Thurs. Sept. 8, 1861;. The Gazette was concerned over the differ- ence of opinion in two professedly ministerial papers, one English, and the other French.(La Minerve) The Gazette said that we "are willing that on certain reserved questions, the local governments should have plenary power, subject only to the right of the federal governnent, recognized by -ii-

10. (cont'd) "La Minerve, to intervene in our local contests when they trouble public peace.

11. Gazette Fri. Sept. 9, 186U. The following editorial provides a good ex• ample of a mature Canadian judgment of the Civil War. "The Southerners claim with good show of reason that the separate States being sovereign and independant they have a right to secede. After a careful study of the history of their constitution, we agree with them in opinion. But while we agree with them in opinion, we also believe that it was a great mistake in the founders of the constitution—an in• herent weakness in that instrument, that the States retained any such power. The greatest men,-such as Hamilton, sarcforesaw the danger, and protested eloquently against it in the Federalist—but as a matter of fact, their warnings were not sufficiently heeded^ and either through the acceptance of a form of words in two different senses by different States, or by some shuffling evasion or mental reservation, a constitu• tion was adopted which fairly admitted of two interpretations. The Vir• ginia and Kentucky resolutions show meaning that the South entertained of the proper constitutional powers of a federal government. The trouble has arisen now out of this—that the federal government and congress have claimed an exercise of power, not over the states or their intern• al government, but over the territories held in common, and over the commerce of the whole country, which the South? restates believed to be opposed to their interests, and such an infringement of their rights as to justify their secession....Therefore we desire to limit the powers of the local and separate provincial legislatures, if they are to be established, very strictly and explicitly. Therefore we advocate so. earnestly either a legislative union with a constitutional recognition of a federal principle, if possible; or, if not, federal union with the powers of local legislation very distinctly defined and very strict• ly limited. Between these two forms of government there would be but little difference—except this, that the latter would be somewhat more expensive and involve a larger measure of direct taxation than the former. See also the statements of John Rose, member for Montreal Centre, Conf. Debates, p. 1*01*.2.

12. Gazette Yfed. May 1, 1867.

13. Gazette Fri. June 7, 1867.

Iii. The Conservatives of Canada East found it very difficult to sympathize with the critical and detached opinion opinion of the liberal-Conserv• atives of Canada West. In the Conservative line in Canada East there is much that resembles the attitude of the Globe . The Morning Chronicle objected to the fact that the Toronto Leader had not buried the hatchet along with everyone else. "Our,contemporary may not find the new combin• ation to his taste..../but/ If we are never to le£ 'byegore s be bye- gone s' when are we to have peace ? ...Enough of personality—enough of recriminations—let us away with theme, and in place of narrow-minded partisanship, of vituperation and scurrility, find a nobler exercise of our energies and our intelligence in a broad and common patriotism. The country needs peace and honest efforts. Why may it not have them ?" .Morning Chronicle Mon. June 27, l86lu -iii-

15. The actual name of this journal is the True Witness and Catholic Chron• icle . Not to be confused with the Montreal Witness, a Protestant inde- perdent journal.

16. Speech at Cookshire, Compton Co., Canada East, Dec. 22, I86I4. Given at a dinner in honour of the member for Compton, J. H. Pope. In Speeches and Addresses, chiefly on the subject of British-American union. London Chapman, 1665. P» 128.Also reported in the Globe Dec. 29, 1864, which had quoted the report of the Richmond guardian.

17. Conf. Debates p. 145.2.

18. Cartier, Ross and Gait to Bulwer-Lytton, Oct. 25, 1858. (Confidential) See Chapter I, n. 36.

19. Ibid.

20. Cartwright suggests this. See Chapter II, n. 24.

21. John A. Macdonald has been compared with Hamilton; but I might venture to suggest that if any comparisons are to be made, the comparison of Gait with Hamilton closer.Macdonald lacked the vision of Gait, and lacked Gait's political courage in putting such visions into concrete terms before they had been taken up publicly. Macdonald was a conserv• ative and an able leader. He might in some respects be compared with Washington.

22. Gait's speech to his constituents is reported in full in the Glcb e Mon. Nov. 28, 1864. It took twelve columns of small print to reprod• uce the speech. Gait said that though the term "federation" was used, it must not be supposed that the present union was "intended to imit• ate the Federal Union which we had seen existing in.the United States." Gait said that the Conference had considered what type of government would be adopted, but there were no differences of opinion on the re• solve to follow British principles. "They all preferred that system which' they had enjoyed for the last eighteen years....They were unan• imously of the opinion that this system was more likely to operate for the benefit of the people than any attempt to introduce the fjtmer- ican system of government." As to the form of the general government, Gait said "that form was copied almost literally from the system exist• ing in the several Provinces." Gait's speech took place on Wed. Nov. 23, 1864.

23. Pope was speaking at the same dinner as McGee on Dec. 22, 1864. See note 16.

24. Globe Sat. Dec. 31, 1864.

25. James O'Balloran, member for Mississquoi:"The reason why so large a por• tion of the people of Lower Canada of French origin will not consent to a legislative union is the very reason that makes it desirable to the English speaking population of Lower Canada. We are in favor <£ a leg• islative union. We desire that Canada should be a united people, ignor• ing sectionalism, and basing our institutions upon one broad principle of Canadian nationality, which shall blend all races, and in tins oblit- -iv-

25. (cont'd) "erate all accidental distinctions of language, religion, or origin." Conf. Debates p. 793.2. O'Halloran, despite his name, did not represent Irish opinion, but rather English Protestant.

26. Montreal, True Witness Friday June 24, 1864. This "whole scheme /of con- federation/ is humbug, and is merely the gilding with which it is pro• posed to cover the bitter pill of Representation by population...." The best so lution, thought the True Witness, would be simply to repeal the legislative union. "This solution would inflict no wrong, no in• justice upon either; it would leave both free and independent, but it would not satisfy the Protestant Reform party of which the real object is the Anglo-Saxon and Protestant ascendancy."

27. True Witness Fri. July 1, 1864. "In short, to dispose of the whole question as to the efficacy of Federal Union to promote concord, we have but to ask ourselves—what are the Southerners fighting for ? ... We reply—to throw off a yoke which long years of bitter experience has proved to be too grievous to be borne; a yoke, alas 1 which some amongst us it seems are intent on imposing on Canada. We are, and we are not ashamed to own it, Secessionists at heart, sympathizers with the South; not because we do not detest slavery—but because heart and soul we uphold the principle of S&ate-Rights agaisnst Federal Sovereign• ty, or in other words, Centralisation." v

28. True Witness Fri. Sept. 23, 1864.

29. True Witness Fri. Aug. 19, 1864.

30. True Witness Fri. April 14, 1865.

31. True Witness Fri. March 3, 1865. The position of the §outte rn States, said the True Witness, enlists the sympathies of all Canadians. Not only is the cause of true liberty being fought, but more important, Canadians' own "welfare is involved in the struggle;...the future of Canada is being determined not on the floor of the Provincial Parlia• ment, but in Virginia and the Carolinas...." The True Witness went on to argue that only by a southern Victory could a North American balance of power beaachieved in which Canada could feel secure.

32. Conf. Debates p. 489.2. Dent states that Dunkin's speech occupied two days and two nights. Dent, J.C. The last forty years ii.449- This is in• correct according to the Journals. Journal s, 1865, ~PP. 157 and 161.

33. Conf. Debates p. 501.2.

34. Notably his warning of the great difficulties in forming a cabinet for the new government. He argued that the Legislative Council cuuld hardly be considered a true federalizing agent, and that perforce the Cabinet would have to do such work. See Conf. Debates pp.497.2- 500.1.

35. This statement provoked the remark from McGee: "If 'twere done, 'twere well 'rctwere done quickly." McGee must have realized as soon as.he said this that the allusion was unfortunate. Dunkin replied that McGee was too good a scholar not to know that the allusion was to sone thing very bad. "The hon. gentleman is welcome to all he can make out of his quo- -V-

35- (cont'd) "tation...." Ibid. p. U86. T1E words of McGee are slightly mis• quoted from Act. I. Scene VII of Macbeth.

36. See Chapter II, note 33.

37. London Times Tues. Dec. 13, 186U. "It is exceedingly difficult to con• strue these provisions. First, general powers of legislation are given in the widest terms to the General Parliament; then a power is given especially to make laws on thirty-seven subjects, one of those being all matters of a general character not exclusively reserved to the local legislatures. /Resolution 29, subsection 37./ Nothing is exdusively reserved to the local legislatures....In the same way, what are matters of a private and local nature not assigned to the Gneral Parliament ? /Resolution U3, subsection 1$./ Dunkin quotes some interesting passages from the same issue, Conf. Debates p. 506.2.

38. Edinburgh Review (Jan. 1865) CXXI. # 21*7. "The British American Feder• ation" Dunkin refers especially to criticism of the looseness of the wording of some of the clauses, which criticism was contained in a footnote on p. 187 of the January issue.

39. Conf. Debates p. 502.1. Slightly misquoting Dickens' Mr. Bumble, in Chapter VI of Oliver Twist.The actual words are, "The law is a ass, an idiot...." hp* St. Thomas Weekly Dispatch Thurs. May 18, 1865.

1+1. Oshawa Vindicator Wed. March 8th, 1865.

1*2. See Skelton's remarks on this speech in his Gait p. 375. Also Gray, J.H. Confederation Toronto,Copp, 1872. pp. £8X270-272. ii3» Quebec, Morning Chronicle Mon. March 6th, 1865. There is an interest• ing comment on the last few days of the confederation debate. "The Confederation discussion is growing wofully /sic/ stale; not a new idea js to be coined and hononable gentlemen are doomed to talk to the clock and empty benches of the Legislative Chambers.... In truth the question of Union of the Provinces, upon the grounds upon which it has been discussed is worn threadbare, and no one cares to listen to ffain repetitions, worse and worse, presented as each fresh speaker brings the dead carcase of a worn-out argument to fill up the leaden periods he is endeavoring to make acceptable to ah unwilling and wearied audience." hh* There were several references in the contemporaryE press suggesting that Cartier wanted a two-chamber local legislature for Lower Canada because of the English minority. The assumption was that there would be some amel• ioration of French dominance in the local legislature by± concessions to an English minority representation in the upper chamber of the local legislature. Cartier's contemporaries were unwilling to accept his ex• planation that the two-chamber local government was simply because of tradition. (151)

CHAPTER YI

CONCLUSION (15S)

The central question of federalism is the re• lation between the central and the regional governments.

In a federal state, this relation should be essentially that of equality; if there is any other relation a fed• eral state cannot really be said to exist. The Central and regional governments are simply equals, of which the central government is but the primus inter pares. The question of the residual powers, while of considerable interest, does not affect fundamentally this relationship of equal to equal. Let the residual powers be where they may, the fundamental criterion of federalism should be simply that the central and the regional governments be equal, that is equal in the sense of being sovereign in their own sphere.

In a federal state, there should never be subordination of one government to another. The question of whether the central or the regional governments are subordinate does not exist. They are both sovereign, ergo, neither is subordinate.

The word "federalism" thus defined is reason• ably precise. It can in essence mean only one thing.

Federalism may take a variety of forms; the emphasis given to the regional governments in one country may vary from the emphasis given to them in another; but the inner relation between the central and regional will be the same. (153)

There may exist forms of government in which the powers of the central government are delegated and subordinate. There may exist forms of government in which the powers of the regional governments are delega• ted and subordinate. But these forms of government are not federal as the term has been' defined. They may be called "federal", or one of the variations of the word, but they are not truly federal states.

The question therefore arises, is Canada a federal state? The answer must be that it undoubtedly is. But what Canada is, and what it was intended to be, are not the same thing. Quite simply the Quebec Resol• utions were not intended to give Canada a federal constitution. The purpose of the resolutions was to make local governments essentially subordinate to the central power. Canadian federalism is the result of an historical process of interpretation. The British North

America Act did not of itself C.M*X\. a federal system.

This is what K. C. Whease meant when he said that:

"Canada has not a federal constitution, it has a federal government."1 It was not a federal system that the Can• adian leaders had in mind. George Brown had used the word "federal" in all sincerity to mean a "federal" system in the central legislature alone. Macdonald had an idea of what it meant, but saw the word "federal" a convenient disguise for legislative union. Cartier saw (154)

it simply as guarantees for French Canada. Gait saw it as the inevitable compromise between French and English

Canada,2 and was not above wanting to preserve English control at the centre if possible. It could be said that since the Canadian leaders did not know what feder• alism was, they could hardly be expected to institute a federal system. This of course is precisely the point.

They did not really understand federalism. Judging from the Civil War in the United States they did not see any- virtue in federalism. Its elasticity might be useful - but only as part of a strong system of central government.

They sought to continue the existing system as far as possible, making such concessions as were necessary to local government.

Many and varied have been the misinterpreta• tions that have followed from the use of the word

"federalw by the Canadian cabinet to describe the consti• tution of 1867. "The object of the act," said Lord

Watson in 1892," was neither to weld the provinces into one, nor to subordinate provincial governments to a central authority, but to create a federal government in which they should all be represented, entrusted with the exclusive administration of affairs in which they had a common interest, each province retaining its in• dependence and autonomy".3 The deviation from the conception of federalism in Canada 1864-1867 is obvious. (155)

JLs far as Canadians were concerned the object of the Act was to weld the provinces into one nation, by subordina•

ting the local governments to central authority. Had the

Privy Council admitted the Quebec Resolutions as evidence of the intentions of the Fathers,4 they might have seen this more clearly. In the Quebec Resolutions the provin•

cial legislatures are not given an "exclusive" power.

They were not even "provincial legislatures", they were

"local". Indeed the municipal analogy runs right through 5

Canadian ideas on federal government. Doubtless the

Quebec Resolutions cannot sustain close analysis; they were indeed loosely framed. But if the wording cannot be relied upon for legal argument, it may at least be

taken as some evidence of intention. Yet the Privy

Council took its own line on what the intentions of the

Fathers were. There is some suspicion that the word

"federal" was accepted by the Privy Council as meaning

essentially what ifc meant in political theory, quite without regard for the Canadians1 conception of the meaning of the word.

The misinterpretation of Canadian federalism by the Privy Council and by others was rendered the more plausible by the growth of a provincial rights movement

after 1867, especially in the 1880's. This movement was

evidence that, despite intention, Canada was becoming a

federal state. The introduction of local governments in (156)

1867 only began the development of a full-fledged theory of federal government, Christopher Dunkin had suggested that this would happen. He believed that if a federal system were to be inaugurated it should be given much more serious consideration; once local governments were formed the growth of federalism was almost inevitable; then the confused relations between central and local governments which he saw in the Quebec Resolutions would become impossible. The Canadian ministry, in Dunkin's eyes, were simply deceiving themselves if they believed that they had overcome sectional interests. Local gov• ernments would be the nuclei around which sectional interests would crystalize, Dunkin's point was that sooner or later federal government would come, and when it did the system formed at Quebec would not be able to take the strain.

This analysis is sound. Dunkin simply argued that there was no point in trying to get two things at once. You could not have legislative union and federal union at the same time - at least not in Canada, with sectional interests lying half dormant, simply waiting to be fostered. The argument of Dunkin's was not heeded, because perhaps the constitution formed in 1867 had to be what it was. It was a compromise, a compromise between the English desire for legislative union, and the French desire for federal union. A federal system (157)

could not have passed even if it had been proposed; nor was a legislative union possible. The natural result was to keep as much of the old system of legislative union as possible, and to introduce only as much of the new system of federalism as would satisfy the French.

The Rowell- Sirois Commission left the question of the intentions of the Fathers an open one. It sug• gested there were arguments on both sides, that no final historical interpretation was perhaps possible. Yet it is difficult to believe that the intentions of the

Fathers can be in doubt. Certainly the intentions of the Canadian cabinet can hardly remain an open question.

Their intentions are reflected in the public press which supported them and supported their arguments. What the

Canadian cabinet thought about federal government is reflected in the pages of the Toronto Globe, Montreal

La Minerve and the Montreal Gazette. What the Canadian people thought, for and against the issue of confedera• tion is reflected in other journals, English and French.

The final historical interpretation of the intentions of the framers of the Quebec Resolutions cannot be established conclusively from an analysis of contemporary opinion in the province of Canada alone.

It is a larger historical problem than just the idea re• garding federalism in the Province of Canada, 1864-1867.

But it is not too' much to suggest that the intentions of (158)

the Canadian cabinet dominated the Quebec Conference and

the resolutions that the Conference produced.

What the intentions of the Canadian cabinet

were in respect of federal government, and what the

Canadian people thought of those intentions, has been

the subject of this thesis. Their intention was to

preserve the strength of legislative union while con•

ceding to local governments those elements which caused

sectional conflict. The local governments were intended

to be local governments. The intention of the resolu•

tions was clear to both sides on the confederation

question. The intention to form a strong central gov•

ernment with local guarantees may have been applauded

or opposed; but the intention itself was not seriously

questioned. Confederation was"recognized for what it was. Canadians knew at least the general significance

of the Quebec Resolutions, whether they supported them

or not. Colonel Rankin, in supporting the Resolutions,

said that if Confederation was not a legislative union

in name, it was at least something very closely re- 1

sembling it. Eric Dorion in opposing the measure said

that confederation was simply a legislative union in o

disguise, and to call it a federal union was nonsense.

The significance of these remarks lies not only in the

respective attitudes of the groups Rankin and Dorion

represented; it lies in the general recognition by both (159)

men that'Confederation was little more than a modified

legislative union, conveniently labelled "federal".

This recognition pervaded Canadian ideas on the subject

of confederation, and it was indeed an accurate

reflection of the attitude and purpose of the Canadian

Government.

Finally, for Canadians it was a question of

experience. Like the Conservatives of the American

Revolution,^ they wanted the continuation of the central

authority of the British system, with any local govern• ment subservient to the central. The words of Lord

Bryce, applied to the Fathers of the American constitution,

fit equally well the Fathers of the Canadian. "They preferred to walk in old paths, to follow the methods (A which experience had tested". The old path for Canadians was the Union of 1840, the methods tested by experience were those of responsible government. Beneath the sense

of a new nationality lay this central influence of past

experience in British institutions. It was not the

North American environment, it was not ideas of American

federalism that affected fundamentally the Canadian

conception of Confederation; it was Canadian experience,

Canadian ideals, and the long and hallowed history of

the British connection. Notes

1. Wheare, K.G. Federal Government p. 21.

2. Gait maintained that "property and civil rights" was only given to the local legislatures as a guarantee for French cultural autonomy. See Creighton, D.G. "British North America at confederation "p. 58. Lower notes that "property and civil rights" wass used in the old French meaning of personal property and individual and fanily rights connec• ted with such property. Lower, A.R.M. Colony to Nation Toronto, Long• mans, 1947. P« 331. See also Report of Royal Commission on Dominion- Provincial Relations pp.34-35* (Vol. %.)

3. Lord Watson in "Liquidators of the Maritime Bank of Canada v. Receiver- General of New Brunswick" /1892/ A.C. 437. p..4l8 of the judgment. Cam• eron, E.R. The Canadian constitution as interpreted by the Judicial Com• mittee of the Privy Council...Winnipeg, Butterworth, 1915. P 442. ii. Lord Sankey in "Henrietta Muir Edwards v. Attorney-General for Canada and others" /1930/ A.C. 12i|..p. 25 of the judgment. Plaxton, CP. Canad• ian constitutional decisions of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council 1930-1939 Ottawa, King's Printer, 1939". P« 136. Lord Sankey was sympathetic to the large view of the powers <£ the central govern• ment, but implied that the duty of the .Privy ^Council was to interpret what was said, not what was intended. Presumably the Quebec Resolutions are therefore inadmissable as evidence of i^ention.

5. Creighton refers to the analogy of the old Colonial system as that which lay behind the idea of confederation. This is a suggestive line of thought. But the continued use of municipal terms by Canadians writing and speaking of Confederation suggests that they thought of it in terra of local government rather than of the Colonial system. Local govern• ments were more apt to be compared to local county or municipal instit• utions than with the colonial status of Canada in relation to Great Brit• ain. Canadians viewed the relation of the union government of the prov• ince of Canada to local county and municipal institutions as reasonably analagous to the relation of the new Federal governne nt to the new local legislatures. The old Colonial system was a little too far in the past for Canadians tos look readily to it for ideas on confederation. It was freely admitted in the confederation debates that Canada had become vir• tually self-governing in her internal affairs. See however Creighton, D.G. Dominion of the Horth Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1944. pp.304-311.

6. Report on Dominion-Provincial relations i. p. 36.

7. Conf. Debates p. 918.1. 8. Ibid. p. 858.1. 8. "In a general way the Conservatives knew what kind of a governne nt they wanted. They wanie d a centralized government that would take the place of the British government....mere local authority should be subservient to the supreme decision of Congress." Jensen, M. "The articles of con• federation: a re-interpretation." Pacific Historical Review Vx. # 2 (June 1937) P. 130. - 10. Bryce, J. The American Commonwealth New York, MacMillan, 19l5.(5th Ed.) 2 Vols, i, 34. APPENDIX 1.

Regional opposition to Confederation,

Legislative Assembly. OPPOSITION TO CONFEDERATION IN CANADA WEST, MARCH, 1665.1 Baaed on the division on MacDonald'a main motion, Conrad. Debates p. 962.2. LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY

VtftMxto M

hi

'Nil

Conservative opposition, usually meaning opposition to the federal system.

Liberal or Reform opposition. Liberal op- osition was usually that the scheme of gonfederation was premature, Reform op• A* position that Confederation was too ex• 1 1 lA M OPPOSITION TO CONFEDERATION IN CANADA EAST, MARCH, 1665.(Basec^^the division ofi Macdonai^j-Jtlain motion, Confed. Debates v^T^zTzT

LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY

Conservative opposition to the federal sys tem: usually English Conservatives wanting legislative union. Bleu opposition to strong central governmc-

Rouge opposition or English liberal oppos- it ion.

W. c I- APPENDIX 2.

Regional opposition to confederation,

Legislative Council OPPOSITION TO CON FEDERATION IN CANADA WEST, FEBRUARY, 1865.(Based on the dlvisionon Tache's main motion, ConfecU, Debates p. 346.2.

Legislative Council. Elected Members

Conservative opposition

Reform opposition

Conservative opposition of a Life •ft Member of the„Legislative Council, place of residence indicated.

Reform opposition of a Life Mshax Member of the Legislative Council place of residence indicated. OPPOSITION TO CONFEDERATION IN CANADA EAST, FEBRUARY, 1865.(Based on the division on Tache's main motion, Confed. Debates p. 346.2. LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, ELECTED rvIEMBERS

Conservative opposition ". . Rouge or Liberal opposition

Conservative opposition of life member L C> Rouge opposition of life member.

WtUlR/6To tvi

Iff / APPENDIX 3-

Serial and Newspaper Bibliography. I

American newspapers 1821-1936 New York, Wilson, 1937. Ed. W. Gregory

The Canada directory for 1857-1858 (Corrected to Nov. 1857.) Montreal Lovell, 1857.

Les journe'es de presse francaise a Quebec Quebec, Le Soleil, 1935.

Locke, G. H. & Wallace, W. S. A joint catalogue of the periodicals and seriaiits in the libraries of the city of Toronto Toronto, King's Printer, 193U. Mitchell's Canadian gazeteer and business directory for 186U-5 Toronto, Chewett, 186k.

Pettengill's newpaper directory and advertiser's handbook for 1877 New York, Pettengill, 1877.

Tetu, H. Historique des journaax de Quebec Quebec, Brousseau, 1873

"Les journaux publies dans le Bas-Canada 176i;-l81j.O" Bulletin des recher- ches historiques XXXVIII. # 8. (Aug..1932.) pp.U72-Q.

Miller, H. 0. "The history of the newspaper press in London, 1830-1875" Ontario Historical Society, Papers and Recordd XXXII.1937* pp.llk-139.

Talman, J.J. "The newspaper press of Canada West, 1850-1860" Transactions Royal Society of Canada (RSC) Section 2. Vol. XXXIII. Series 3. (May 1939) PP. 11*9-171;. This is by far the best article on the newspaper press, and it is a pity that there is nothing comparable for the news• paper press of xCanada East.

Tod, D. D. & Cordingly, A. # "A bibliography of Canadian literary period• icals, 1789-1900" Transactions RSC. Section 2. Vol. XXVI. Series 3. (1932) pp. 87-96.

Wallace, W.S. "The perdiodical literature of Upper Canada" CHR XII. # 1. (March 1931). pp.U-22. This covers the period prior to l8hl, but is useful for background. Newspapers in the Province of Canada

1857 1864 1877(Ont. & P.Q.) Daily 20 19 32 Tri-weekly 20 10 Bi-weekly 13 6 Weekly 153 264

Total 206 198 312

Atuthority for 1857: The Canada directory for 1857-1858 (corrected to Nov. 1857) Montreal, Lovell, 1857-

Authority for 1864: Mitchell's Canadian Gazeteer and business direct• ory for 1864-5 Toronto, Chewett, 1864.

Atuthority for 1877: Pettengill's newspaper directory and advertiser's handbook for 1877 New York, Pettengill, 1877- Political lessee, Town & name of Journal. .Pol.^party . Owner or publisher • Files available at . 1864-1867.

Barrie Examiner Weekxly Conservative Archives of Ontario > Scattered copie - i (More than 10)

•- Barrie, northern Advajic e M Reform it J Few copies (Less than 10.)

Gait Reporter II Independent Jaffray Bros. W June-Dee.,1$67.

Kingston,Daily Hews 2-weekly lib-conserv. J. Rowlands Queens University Library Complete

London Free Press Daily Liberal J.& S.Blackburn U. of Western Ont.Library ti

Montreal, Gazette n Conservative Lo«$we & Chamber- 11 lin

Montreal Herald II Liberal E.G. Penny tt H

Montreal,La Minerve tt Bleu Cartier it tt

Montreal, L'Ordre 3-weekly Mod.Rouge Linguet & LaPlant e " II

Montreal, Le Pays n Rouge A. A. Dorion it H

Montreal,True Witness Weekly Liberal- J. Gillies Archives of Ontario II Rouge

Montreal,L'Union Nat• Daily Rouge M.Lanetot Library of Parliament tl ionale

5t 3 Political lessee, Town & name of Journal. ,, Pol. party ,•owne r or publisher . Files available at 1864-1867.

Montreal Witness 2-weekly Independent John Dougall Queens Univ. Library Complete liberal

Newmarket Era Weekly Reform Archives of Ontario it

Niagara Mail n II it Scattered copies.

II Oshawa Vindicator II Times Publishing,Osh• Complete awa , Ont.

Ottawa, Le Canada 3-weekly Bleu Duversna£ Freres Library of Parliament ScattBBed Copies.

Ottawa Times Daily Conservative R. Davis n Complete from Jan. 1866.

Ottawa,The Union Daily Independent II Issued July,1864 reform to Oot.,1865.

Quebec, Le Canadien 3-weekly Independent F. Evaaturel n Complete bleu

Quebec,Morning Chron• Daily Conservative J.J. Foot n it icle

Quebec, Le Journal Daily Bleu J.E. Cauchon il n de Quebec

Quebec Daily Mercury ti Liberal S. MacDonaId it n

St. Catharines Const• Weekly Reform Archives of Ontario Scattered copies. itutional

c Political lessee, Town & name of Journal. .Pol, party .owner or publisher. Files available at . 1864.-1867 St. Catharines Journal Daily Lib.conserv. Archives of Ontario Few copies

St. Thomas, Weekly Dis• Weekly Conservative Univ. of Western Ont Complete patch Library

Sarnia Observer it Reform Archives of Ontario Few copies

Toronto, British Con• 11 Independent (Orange Order) it 11 stitution reform 18b4-J> Scatt.copies Toronto, Canadian Free• 11 Conservative (Irish Catholic) ti 1866-7 Complete man

Toronto, Globe Daily Reform G. Brown Legislative library,, Complete Ontario

Toronto, Leader 11 Lib.conserv. J. Beaty 11 11

London, England it Times n (Read only in part; Nov. and Dec, 1864 and Sept . 1865.) Name .Purpose . Issued(read 1863-7 only) . Where available

British American "devoted to literature, Monthly. May 1863-April 1864. University of Toronto Lib. Magazine science and art" Montreal (?)

Canadian quarter• "national politics and li• Quart. Jan. 1864-April 1866 Toronto Ref. Library ly review terature" Hamilton

L'Echo de la Republishes extracts from Montreal France French periodicals in Europe Month. Dee.l865-Dec. 186?. 11

4f Montreal L'Eoho du cabinet Aimed to appeal to French Month. Jan.l85?-Dee. 1873 University of Toronto Lib. de lecture ... catholic families.

Le foyer canadien Stories & articles but littl e Month. Jan.1863-Dec.1866 n comment on events.

New dominion Literary magazine. Rather Month. 1867-187? Legislative library, Ontario juvenile writing Montreal

La Feuilleton Publication of French Month. Oct.1865-Sept.1867 Toronto Ref. Library stories Montreal

La revue canad• Of Bleu sympathies, but with Monxth.Jan.l864-.Deo.l?22 Legislative library, Ontario ienne analyses of a fairly object• Montreal ive tone.The best of the ser ials.

La Semaine Offers news comment on sig• Month. Jan.l864-.Dec. 1864 Toronto Ref. Library nificant religious events.

Saturday reader Weekly family magazine. Lit• Weekly.Sept.1865-Aug.186?. Legislative library, Ontario tle or not comment on events

Les soirees can• "recueil de litterature nat- Month. Jan.1861-Deif.1865. University of Toronto Lib. adienne s ionale"

5 Significant newspapers not included in research

Brantford Expositor Daily Reform Files no longer extant

Guelph Mercury Weekly ? "

Hamilton Spectator Daily Reform "

Hamilton Times Daily Lib.-Cons. "

Kingston, British Whig Daily iWmgfcReform "

Montreal/?/, Le Defricheur ? Rouge "

Le Courrier de St. Hyacinthe ? Bleu Files available at the Legis• lative Library, Province of Quebec.

Le Journal de St. Hyacinthe ? Rouge Files no longer extant. APPENDIX h.

Bibliography Bibliography

I. Primary Sources (a) Manuscripts (b) Printed sources Collections of documents Official Unofficial

II. Secondary Sources (a) Books (b) Articles

III. Bibliographical aids. I. Primary Sources

(a) Manuscripts.

Canada, Province of. Governor General. Desptaches received from the for the Col• onies .

G.l. Vol. 1^9. January-May, lQ6k 160. June-December, 186U 161. January-May, 1865 162. June-December, 1865 163. January-May, 1866. 16U. June-August, 1866 165. September-December, 1866 166. January-April, 1867 167. May-August, 1867.

Canada, Province of. Governor General. Letterbooks of despatches to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.

G. 12. Vol.69. 106U-1865 70. I866-I867 71. Confidential despatches.

Canada. Archives. Macdonald papers V0I.I46. Quebec conference ii7« London conference k8. B.N .A. Act drafts U9. " 50. Despatches. Minutes of Council

51. Correspondance, 1863-187U5 received 52. Miscellaneous printed material 55. Constitutional questions, 1860-1873-

(b) Printed sources. Collections of documents.

Keith, A.B. (ed.) Selected speeches and documents on British colonial policy 1763-1917. London, Oxford University Press, 19U8. (World's Classics) (b) Printed sources. Collections of documents (cont'd).

Kennedy, W.P.M. (ed.) Statutes, treatises and documents of the Canad• ian constitution, 1713-1929. Toronto, Oxford Univer• sity Press, 1930.

Pope, Sir J. Confederation; being a series of hitherto unpublished documents bearing on the British North America Act. Toronto, Carswell, 1895.

Pope, Sir J. Correspondance of Sir John Macdonald. Toronto, Oxford University Press, 1921.

Tasse', J. (ed.) Discours /de Sir G.E. Cartier/ Montreal, Senecal,l893«

(b) Printed sources. Official.

Canada, Province of. Bureau of Agriculture and Statistics. Census of the Canadas, 1860-1861. Quebec, Foote, 1863. (2 Vols.)

.Legislative Council. Journals. 1864-1866 inc.

•Legislative Assembly. Journals. 1864-1866 inc.

•Legislature. Parliamentary debates on the sub• ject of the confederation of the British North American provinces. Quebec, Hunter Rose, 1865.

•Legislature. Sessional Papers. 1864-1866 inc.

.Governor General. Despatches from Her Majesty's Secretary for the Colonies and other documents relating to the Union of the British North Amer• ican colonies... King's Printer, 1859.

Great Britain. Colonial Office. Question of federation of the British provinces in America. Colonial Office, November, TSFS: ~

. Colonial Office. Correspondance relative to a meeting at Quebec of delegates appointed to discuss the proposed union... London, HMSO, 1865.

. Colonial Office. British North American provinces. Cor• respondance respecting the proposed union... Lon- don, HMSO, 1«67.

•Parliament. Debates on the Confederation bill... /Lon• don, HMSO, 1867/ (b) Printed sources. Unofficial.

B , Alphonse. Contre Poison; la confederation c'est la salut du Bas- Canada. Montreal, Senecal, 1867. (Archives of Canada # 3923.) This short pamphlet is anti-Rouge, and is designed to rally the French to the side of the Bleus, and away from Rouge anti-clericalism.

/Blachford, F.R./ Letters of Frederic, Lord Blachford, under-secretary of state for the colonies, 1860-1871. London, Murray, 1896. Blachford refers in 186k to confederation, tak• ing the view that it was necessary to balance the nec• essity for strong central governnent with the necess• ity of protection for French-Canadian rights.

Cartwright, Sir R.J. Reminiscences. Toronto Briggs, 1912. A fascinating and useful work. Cartwright's reflections an men and issues at the time of confederation throws the de• lightful light of personal familiarity upon the scene.

Cauchon, J.E. Etude sur 1'union projetee des provinces brittaniques. Quebec, Cote, 1858. This work condemns confederation and supports continuance of the legislative union.

Cauchon, J./E./ L'Union des provinces de l'amerique brittanique du nord This work was claimed by Dent to be very influential in affecting French-Canadian opinion favourably to• ward confederation. It is partly concerned, of course, in justifying Cauchon's change of heart from his op• position to confederation in lf58.0au«W f - s Cherrier, C.S., Laberge, C. & Clerk, G.E. Discours sur la confederation Montreal, Lanctot, 1865. (Archives of Canada # 322U) Representative of the views of the Rouges of L'Union Nationale. The work was printed by the 1'Union Nat• ionale pTess.

/Durham/ Lord Durham's report on the affairs of British North America C. P» Lucas (ed.) 3 Vols. Vol. i. Introduction. Vol. ii. The report. Vol.iii.Appendices. Oxford, Clar• endon Press, 1912.

Gooch, J. Manual or explanatory development of the act for the union of Canada, Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick, in one domin• ion under the name of Canada. Ottawa, Desbarats, 1867- Annoitated comment on the B.N .A. Act.

Gray, J. H. Confederatlon; or the political and parliamentary history of Canada from the Conference at Quebec in October* Itibh to the admission of British Columbia in July, 10YX. Toronto, Coppm, 1«72. (b) Printed sources. Unofficial(cont'd).

Hamilton, P.S. Union of the colonies of British North America Montreal, Lovell, 1864. Reprint of 3 papers on the subject publish• ed between 1854 and 1861, in which the author argues for legislative union and advocates an hereditary viceroy.

/Macdonald, A .A.//Notes on the Quebec Conference, 1864/ CHR, Vol. I. # 1 (March 1920) pp. 26-47. A.G. Doughty, Ed. Macdonald was a Reform delegate to the conference from P.E.I.

/MacDougall, Wm/ /Notes/ in his copy of the Confederation Debates. In the Archives section of the University of Toronto Lib• rary.

/McGee, T.D./ The Crown and the confederation; Three letters to the Hon. John Alexander Macdonald by "A Backwoodsman" Mon• treal, Lovell, 1864. '

,McGee, T.D. The Irish position in British and republican North Amer• ica. Montreal, Longmoore, 1866. McGee shows the Canad- ian Irish in bitter opposition to the Fenians.

McGee, T.D. The mental outfit of the raw Dominion, n.p., n.p., n.d. (Reprinted from the Montreal Gazette, Nov. 5, 1867.)

McGee, T.D. Notes on federal governments, past and present; Montreal, Dawson, l865.

McGee, T.D. The present American revolution; the internal co ndition of the American democracy considered in a letter... (To Charles Gavan Duffy) London, Hardwicke, 186U.

McGee, T .D. Speeches and addresses, chiefly on the subject of British American union. London, Chapman, lB^T.

Morris, A. Nova Britannia Montreal, Lovell, 1858. Originally an add• ress before the Mercantile Library Association of Mon• treal. Gives the history and the industrial and economic potentialities of N.S., Nfld., N.B., Canada, Rupert's Land, and Vancouver's Island.

Ryerson, A.E. The new Canadian dominion; the dqagers and duties of the people in regard to their government. Toronto, Lovell, 1867. A plea for an abolition of party spirit in the new Canada.

/Smith, Goldwin/ The proposed constitution for British North America London, MacMillan, 1865. Reprinted from MacMillan's Magazine, March, 1865. pp.406-4l6.

Thompson, T.P. The future St. Catharines, Leav• enworth, 1864. An argument for a republican legislative union of British North America, mn opposition to McGee's monarchical union. (b) Printed sources.Unofficial(cont'd).

/Tickle, P. I./ The future of British America Toronto, Backas, 1865. (Archives of Canada, # 3225) Opposition to the weakness of a federation. Suggests "consolidation" rather than federation. Anything less than "consolidation" means an• nexation to the United States.

Todd, A. Brief suggestions in regard to the formation of local govern- ments for Upper and Lower Canada...Ottawa, Desbarats, 1866 Advocates a system not unlike that suggested by George Brown, based on the British Municipal Corporations Act of 1835- Todd was parliamentary librarian, was a noted authQ ority on constitutional matters and on parliamentary pro - cedure.

Watkin, Sir. E. W. Canada and the United Stages. Recollections 1851- 1886. London, Ward, /1687/

Whelan, Edward. The union of the British provinces. Charlottetown, Haz- ard, 1865. An account of the conferences and reports of the delegates.

-iHHHS- Edinburgh Review. "Report of the resolutions adopted at a conference of delegates..." Short title, "The British American federation" CXXI. # 2l*7. (Jan. 1865.) pp.181- 199. II. Secondary Sources

(a) Books.

Angus, H. F. (ed.) Canada and bar great neighbour (Introduction by R. M. Maclver) Toronto, Ryerson, 1938. (Relations of Canada and the United States) Useful as a modern account of a long process of Canadian reactions to the United States. The analysis of Canaian opinion helps in suggesting possibilities prior to 1867.

Bagehot, W. The English con&itution (1867) London, Oxford University Press, 19k9» (World's Classics)

Biggar, C.Rjj. A biographical sketch of Sir Oliver Mowat TorontonWar- . wick, 1905. ( 2 Vols.)

Bourinot, J.G. Federal government in Canada Baltimore, Murray, 1889. (John Hopkins University studies in Historical and Polit• ical Science) Bourinot's work is a descriptive treatise an early forerunnar of Dawson's Government of Canada. How• ever it shows the early trends of interpretation of the Canadian system. Bourinot introduces comftrisons with the United States showing"the strong resemblances" . It is possible that this kind of interpretation intrdduced the long history of comparable studies of the Canadian and American constitutions.

Boyd, J. Sir Georges Etinne Cartier, Bart. Toronto,MacMillan, 19lU.

Bracq, J.C. The evolution of French Canada New York, MacMillan, 192U. Useful for the connected background picture it gives of French Canada. In particular, Cartier is regarded as the logical successor of La Fontaine.

Brady, A. Democracy.in the dominions University of Toronto Press, 19U7.

Brady, A. Thomas D'Arcy Magee Toronto, MacMillan, 1925.

Bryce, James The American commonwealth New York, MacMillan, 1915. (5th Edition) (2 Vols.)

Bryce, James Modern Democracies New York, MacMillan, 1921. (2 Vols.)

Cameron, E. R. The Canadian constitution as interpreted by the Judic• ial Committee of the Privy Council... Vol. i.,Winni- peg, Butterworth, 1915. Vol. ii, Toronto, Carswell, 1930.

Canada. Parliament. Senate. Report...relating to the enactment of the British North America Act, 1867, any lack of consonance between its terms and judicial construction of them... /O'Connor Report/ Ottawa, King's Printer, 1939. (a) Books .(cont'd)

Colquhoun, A.H.U. The fathers of confederation, a chronicle of the birth of the dominion Toronto, Glasgow Brook, 1916. A survey, with interesting excursions into newspaper opinion. It is not fundamentally biographical, however, as the title might imply.

David, L.O. L'Union des deux Cafaadas l8Itl-l867 Montreal, Senecal, 1898. David was one of the editors of L'Union Nationale (186U- 1867) which should make this work.of some interest. But David's writing of I898 is much softened from the asper• ity of the issues of I86U-I867.

Dent, J. C. The last forty years; Canada since the union of 181+1. Tor- onto, Virtue, /1881/ ( 2 Vols.) The best history of the union of the Canadas, 18U1-1867. It is well-written and preserves a nice balance between detail and perspective.

DeTocqueville, A. Democracy in America (l83i>-l8UO) Ed. H.S. Commager. Translated by H. Reeve. London, Oxford University Pres§, 19U6. (World's Classics).

Egerton, H .E. Federations and unions within the British Empire Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1911.

Gould, E.C. United States and Canadian confederation. Essay submitted for the All Souls Historical Essay Prize, 1934. The thesis of this work is that confederation was largely a product of events outside British North America.

Groulx, L. La confecle'ration canadienne, ses origines Montreal, Devoir, " 1918. Groulx has a good survey of the early ideas of confederation. Also suggests that the Westminster conf• erence was highly dangerous for French-Canadians, and that Cartier had to threaten withdrawal in order to bring Macdonald to agree to a federal union.

Hamilton, A., Jay, J., Madison, J. The federalist (1787-1788) London, Dent, 19U8. (Everyman's Library)

Hammond, M.O. Confederation and its leaders Toronto McClelland, 1917. Contains information which is exceedingly difficult to procure anywhere else. Notably, information about Dor• ion and Dunkin, including a picture of the latter. .

Keith, A.B. Responsible government in the dominions Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1928. 2nd Ed. ( 2 Vols.) Keith seems to agree with Lord Watson that the British North America Act was intend• ed to be the charter of a true federal state.

Kennedy, W.P.M. The 153U-1937 London, Oxford Uni- versity Press, /1938/ .2nd Ed. . (a) Books(cont'd).

Laski, H.J. Studies in the problem of sovereignty New Haven, Yale Univ• ersity Press, 1917. Especially Appendix A,"Sovereignty and federalism"pp.267- 276.

Lefroy, A.H. F. Canada's federal system; being a treatise on Canadian cons titutional law. •. Toronto,Car swell, 1913.

Lewis, J. George Brown London, Oxford, 1926. (Makers of Canada series, W.L. Grant, Ed.) A sympthetic and earnest account of Brown's life in Canada, especially dealing with his rela• tion to party life.

Mackenzie, A. The life and speeches of Hon. George Brown Toronto, Globe Printing, ItiV'd'. This work is fckrgely the speeches of George Brown. Its value therefore tends to be proportionate only to the dis• tance one is from the files of the Globe.

MacPherson, J. P. Life of the right hon. Sir John A. Macdonald Saint John, Earle, 1091. (2 Vols.) Useful for long extracts of speeches and of documents, but seems to consist of little else, barring a few connective sentences.

Martin, C.B. British polidsy in Canadian confederation n.p, n.p., 1932. Reprinted from CHR, March, 1932.

/Mill, J.S./ "On Liberty" and "Considerations on representative govern• ment. R.B.MacCallum (ed.) Oxford, Blackwell, 19U7.

Munro, W.B. American influences on Canadian government Toronto, Mac- Millan, 1929.(The Marfleet lectures, 1929) This carries to the nth degree the comparison of the Canad• ian and American constitutions. Alexander Hamilton is re• ferred to as the "grandfather of the Canadian constitution" Creighton, in "Sir John Macdonald and Canadian historians", reacts violently to Munro's interpretation of confederation.

Plaxton, C.P. Canadian constitutional decisions of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council 1930-1939. Ottawa, King's Printer, 1939.

Poley, A.P. The federal systems of the United States and the British Empire, their origin, nature and development. London, Pitman, 1913. A rather factual survey, not too strong in its comparative treatment of federal systems, and is clearly surpassed by Brady's Democracy in the dominions.

Pope, Sir J. Memoirs of Sir John Alexander Macdon• ald K. C. B. (1»9U) Toronto, Musson, /19hk?/ ( 1 Vol.) (a) Books (cont'd)

Royal Commission of Dominion-Provincial relations. Report. Book.I. Canada, 1867-1939. Book IJ. Recommendations. Ottawa,/King's Printer ?/ ±22£xl9U0.

Royale, J. Histoire du Canada; 18^1 a 1867. Montreal, Beauchemin, 1909.

Sellar, R. George Brown and confedetation Toronto, Britnell, 1917. A pamphlet, with an anti-catholic, anti-conservative inter• pretation. Brown left the Cabinet in Dec. 1865 because of the"jobbery"of Langevin and Cartier, which Macdonald appar• ently would not rectify. L B Shippee,/Canadian-American relations l8U9-l87lt. New Haven, Yale Univ- ersity Press, 1939. (Relations of Canada and the United States) A factual account, very helpful for the details and attitudes in Canadian-American difficulties I86O-I867. See however note 66, Chapter IV, of this thesis. Skelton, Isabel The life of Thomas D'Arcy McGee Gatfdenvale, Garden City Press, 1925. This is the most comprehensive work on McGee, but like so many similar biographies, it is often content with an extract from a speech, when a short sentence would be to more advantage. This has, however, made the book a good source for material on McGee.

Skelton, O.D. Life and letters of Sir New York, Century, 1922. ( 2 Vols.) Vol. 1. for Laurier's relation with the Roufejes and l'liistitut Canadien, and for his connection with Eric Dorion and le Defricheur.

Skelton, O.D. The life and times of Sir Alexander Tilloch Gait Toronto, Oxford University Press, 1920. A fine biography, and of considerable value as a general survey of the period.

Smith, H.A. Federalism in North America, a comparative study of instit• utions in the United States and Canada. Boston, Chipman, 1923.

Trotter, R. G. Canadian federation Toronto, Dent, 192k• Written partly under the influence of W..B. Munro, and overestimates, I bel• ieve, the influence of American ideas on confederation. The book is a fine study of the financial and railway background of confederation, and in this respect it stands almost alone.

ffiucker, G.N. The Canadian commercial revolution 18U5-1851 New Haven, Yale University Press, 1936.

/Tupper, C./ Political reminscences London, Constable, 19lh- Ed. W*A. Harkin.

Turcotte, L.-P. Le Canada sous 1'union 18U1-1867 Quebec, Canadien,1871. This is the best French history of the union. Dent also praises the work highly, see his Vol.ii.559. (a) Books (cont'd).

Wheare, K. C. Federal government New York, Oxford University Press, 19U7• The best comparative study of federal government,*!***, which this writer found/very helpful.

Whitelaw, WM. The Maritimes and Canada before confederation Toronto, Ryerson, 193U- Detailed treatment of the Quebec confer• ence, the most detailed, in fact, of any work on confeder• ation. Very helpful confirming Maritime acquiescence in the Canadian policy of a strong central government.

Wrong, G. M. et al The federation of Canada Toronto, Oxford University Press, 1917.

Young, James. Public men and public life in Canada; being recolfe ctiofts of Parliament and the press. Toronto Briggs, 1902.

'(b) Articles,

Bailey, A,G."Railways and the confederation issue in New Brunswick, .1863-1865." CHR Vol. XXI. # U.(Dec. 19U0) pp.367-383- "western extension"was the most potent factor in defeat• ing confederation in New Brunswick in 1865; that is, it was preferred to the Intercolonial.

Blegen, T.C. "A plan for the union of British North America and the United States, 1866" Mississippi Valley Historical Re- view, IV. # h. (March 1918) pp. U70-U83.

Borden. R. L. "Constitutional development from cession to confederation" in Canadian constitutional studies, pp. 11-51+. University of Toronto Press, 1921. (Marfleet lectures)

Brown, G. ¥f."The Grit party and the great Reform convention of 1859." . CHR XVI. # 3. (Sept. 1935) pp. 21+5-265.

Burpee, L. J. "Joseph Howe and the anti-confederation league" in Transactions, RSC. Series J>. Vol. X. (1917) Sect.ii. pp. 1+09-1+73. Very useful bibliography pp. 1+16-1+22.

Careless, J.M.S."The Toronto Globe and agrarian radicalism, 1850-1867" CHR.XXIX. # 1. (March I9I+8) pp. 11+-39. Criticizes the usual radtcal-agrarian interpretation of the Globe, showing that its policy was rather that of the English liberalism of Cobden, Bright and others. One should be careful however to distinguish the Globe's policy from its manner of presentation. (b) Articles (cont'd).

Caron, A. "Notre constitution natiibnale" Partie documentaire in Revue de l'Universite d'Ottawa £me annee (1935) pp.2?5-27oT A treatise on the political theory of federalism in Can• ada, with emphasis on the power at the centre-.

Cooper, J. I. "The political ideas of George Etienne Cartier" CHR XXIII. # 3. (March, 191*2) pp.286-291*.

Cornell, P. G. "The alignment of political groups in the united prov• ince of Canada, I851*-l86k." CHR XXX. # 1. (March, 191*9) pp. 22-U6.

Criffighton, D. G."British North America at confederation" in Royal Com• mission on Dominion-Provincial relations. Appendix 2. Creighton surveys the economic and social background of confederation and concludes that Canadians wanted and needed strong central government.

Creighton, D. G. "Economic nationalism and confederation" Canadian His- torical Association Annual Report (CHAAR) 191*2. pp. Uh~ 5_

Creighton, D. G. "Sir John Macdonald and Canadian historians" CHR. XXIX. # 1 (March 19U8) pp.1-13. Creighton gets into a vehement digression against the soOcalled American influences in Canadian history of the nineteenth cen• tury.

Gray, V.E. "The O'Connor report on the British North America Act" in Canadian Bar Review XVII JT.p. 309CWo^ . tT3l) The difficulties of historical interpretation of the Quebec Conference.

Jensen, M. "The articles of confederation: a re-interpretation" Pacific Historical Review .VI. # 2. (June 1937) PP.120-1H2I An attempt to show the articles of confederation as the triumph of the more radical forces in the American Revolution, as opposed to the Conservatives, who wanted a more centralized form of government.

Kennedy, W.P.M. "The nature of Canadian federalism" CHR II. # 2. (June 1921) pp. 106-125. Kennedy does not examine particularly the intention of confederation. He concludes that the "true federal idea" is"clearly manifest in Canadian government'.' Note however he uses the word"government" not "constitution."

Landon, F. "The American civil war and Canadian confederation" in Tran• sactions, RSC. Series 3. Vol. XXI. Section 2. pp.55- 62. (1927) Landon says that the great silent majority of Canadians hoped that the North would win. (b)Articles(cont'd).

Landon, F. "Canadian opinion of southern secession, 1860-61" CHR. I. # 3.(sept. 1920) pp.255-266. Illustrating the general Northern slant of Canadian opin• ion, 1860-1865.

McArthur, D. "Confederation, an economic movement" Journal of the Canad• ian Banker's Association, 1927.

MacDermot, T.W.L. "The political ideas of John A. Macdonald" CHR .XIV # 3 (Sept. 1933) PP. 2U7-26U.

MacDermott, T.W.L. "John A. Macdonald—his biographies and biographers" CHAAR .(1931) PP. 77-8U.

Mclnnis, E. "Two North American federations: a comparison" in Essays in Canadian history presented to George Mackinnon Wrong, R. Flenley (ed) Toronto, 1939. pp. 9k- 118.

Perrault, J.-E. "La confederation canadienne, est-elle nee viable ?" Revue Universite d'Ottawa 5me annee.(1935) pp.8-25. , A plea for a more tolerant attitude in Canada, between provinces.

Rogers, N. McL. "Federal influences on the Canadian cabin?t" Canadian Bar Review XI. # 2. (Feb. 1933) pp. 103-121.

Rogers, N. McL. "The political principles of federalism" In Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science I. # 3. (Aug. 1935) PP. 337-3U7. Emphasizes the necessity of determining the true nature of federalism in order that the true nature of its econ• omic duties may be clarified.

Sauve, A. "La confederation caradienrB " Revue Universite d'Ottawa 2me annee (1932) pp. 11-21. About the same general view as Perrault's article above.

Scott, F .R. "The development of Canadian federalism" Canadian Political _ Science Association Annual Meeting Ottawa, 1931 PP.231- wr. Scott, F.R. "Political nationalism and confederation" Canadian Journal - of Economics and Political Science VIII. # 3. (Aug. 19U2) PP. 386-U15. ;

Smith, J. P. "American republican leadership and the movement for the annexation of Canada in the ei&hteen-sixties" CHAAR (1935) PP. 67-75.

Stacey, C.P. "British military policy in Canada in the era of confed- .eration" CHAAR(193U) pp.20-29. (b) Articles(cont'd)

Stacey, C.P."Fenianism and the rise of national feeling in Canada at the time of confederation" CHR. XII. # 3. (Sept. 1931.)

Tache, L. "Sir JE.-P. Tache et la confederation canadienne" Revue Univer- 8ite" d'Ottawa 5me annee, (1935) PP. 231-255.

Talman, J .J. "A Canadian view of parties and issues on the eve of the civil war" Journal of Southern History V. # 2. (May,1939) pp. 21+5-253.

Trotter, R.G. "Some American influences upon the Canadian federation movement" CHR. V. # 3. (Sept. 1921+) pp. 213-227. Trotter suggests .a number of influences only one of which was in any sense positive, i.e. the United States, being a federal system in a large country provided an obvious example.

Underhill, F.H. "Canada's relations with the Empire as seen by the Toronto Globe 1857-1867" CHR. X. # 2. (June 1929) pp. 106- 128. An account of the active interest taken by the Globe in English affairs and of the English attitudes to Canadian affairs.

Whitelaw, W. M. "American influence on British federal systems" in The Constitution Re-considered ed. Conyers Read. New York, Columbia University Press, 1938. pp. 297-311+. Whitelaw takes the view that the chief American influence on the formation of Canadian confederation was a negative one, i.e. that Canadians reacted against American ideas. Notes that the Australians vrhen forumlating their constit• ution did not consider that Canada had a federal system at all.

Whitelaw, W.M. "Reconstructing the Quebec Conference" CHR XlX. # 2. (June 1938) pp. 123-2137. III. Bibliographical aids

Canada. Archives. Catalogue des brochures aux archives publiques du Canada, 1U93-1877. Ottawa, King's Printer, 1931.

Canada. Archives. A guide to the documents in the manuscript room at the Public Archives of Canada. D.W.Parker, Ed. Ottawa, Government Printing Office, 191U.

Haight, W. R. Canadian catalogue of books. Toronto, Haight, I896.

Higgins, M. V. A bibliography of Canadian bibliographies Montreal, n.p., 1930.

Ontario. Legislative Library. Catalogue of books. Toronto, King's Printer, 1913.

Queens University. Douglas Library. Canadiana 1698-1900 Kingston, n.p., 1932.

Staton, F.M. & Tremaine, M. (Toronto Public Library) A bibliography of Canadiana Toronto, Public Library, /c 1935/

Trotter, R. G. The bibliography of Canadian constitutional history n.p., n.p., 1928.