Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Uk...

The SMM observed ceasefire violations in Donetsk and regions. In Donetsk region, the SMM saw and heard the use of mortars. The SMM reached Kominternove several days in a row to follow up on reports about the presence of armed persons in the village and the situation of the residents, but its access was restricted*. The SMM encountered other restrictions to its freedom of movement and security incidents. The SMM reached parts of the international border in Luhansk region not controlled by the Government...

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DAILY REPORT Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to , based on information received as of 19:30hrs, 27 December 2015

This report is for media and the general public.

NOTE: This report covers the period since 19:30hrs on 23 December, the cut off time of the last daily report.

The SMM observed ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions. In Donetsk region, the SMM saw and heard the use of mortars. The SMM reached Kominternove several days in a row to follow up on reports about the presence of armed persons in the village and the situation of the residents, but its access was restricted*. The SMM encountered other restrictions to its freedom of movement and security incidents. The SMM reached parts of the international border in Luhansk region not controlled by the Government.

The SMM observed a number of ceasefire violations in Donetsk region. Positioned 6km north-west of Donetsk city-centre, during the reporting period, the SMM heard over 35 explosions, including seven assessed as caused by 82mm mortar on 24 December as well numerous bursts of small-arms and automatic-grenade-launcher (AGL) fire. Whilst in government-controlled Avdiivka (15km N of Donetsk) on 25 December, the SMM heard three impacts of what it assessed as 120mm mortars.

In Luhansk region, the SMM assessed that the majority of ceasefire violations it recorded were related to activities at known training grounds. However, on 25 December, the SMM was flying a medium-range unmanned-aerial vehicle (UAV) to observe the area between the government-controlled village of (69km west of Luhansk) and the contact line. Whilst the UAV was returning to its launching point, the SMM heard approximately 100 rounds of small arms fire. Once the UAV had landed, the SMM discovered that its wings had sustained four bullet impacts. At the time when the UAV ostensibly sustained small arms fire, the SMM estimated that it was at least two kilometres within government-controlled areas. Also on 25 December, the SMM was threatened at a “Lugansk People’s Republic” (“LPR”) position north of “LPR”-controlled Smile (32km north of Luhansk) in close proximity to the contact line. The SMM launched a mid-range UAV some 100-200 meters away from the position, while another two SMM monitors stayed in the vehicles. Five “LPR” armed men threatened the monitors who remained in the SMM vehicles by pointing their weapons at them and pretending to shoot. Once the other SMM monitors returned to the car, an additional three armed men threatened to assault

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the SMM patrol leader if the SMM would not delete a photo it supposedly took of their position. Another “LPR” member arrived at the scene and advised the SMM to leave the area.

In relation to the implementation of the Addendum to the Package of measures, the SMM revisited Ukrainian Armed Forces permanent weapons storage sites whose locations corresponded with the withdrawal lines and found that all weapons previously verified as withdrawn to the sites were present, with the exception of one site where one tank (T-64) was absent.

Beyond the withdrawal lines and outside storage sites, during the reporting period the SMM observed the following Addendum-regulated weapons: near Myrne training area one stationary tank (T-64) on a transport trailer; 12 tanks (unidentified) near a training area outside “LPR”- controlled Shymshynivka (27km south-west from Luhansk)

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of heavy weapons foreseen in the Minsk Package of measures. The SMM is yet to receive the full information requested in the 16 October notification (see SMM Daily Report 14 December 2015).

On 24 and 25 December the SMM revisited “LPR” heavy weapons permanent storage sites. All weapons previously verified as withdrawn to the sites were present.

The SMM revisited locations beyond the respective withdrawal lines known to the SMM as heavy weapons holding areas, even though they did not comply with the specific criteria set out in the 16 October notification.

In such Ukrainian Armed Forces areas, the SMM observed in total: 54 towed howitzers (18 2A65 Msta-B, 152mm, and 36 2A36 Giatsint-B, 152mm), 48 self-propelled howitzers (17 2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm, and 21 2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm), 40 anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira 100mm), 28 towed mortars (2B11 Sani, 120mm), 29 tanks (20 T64, 9 T72) and 32 multiple-launch rocket systems (MLRS, 24 BM21 Grad, 122mm, and eight MB27 Uragan, 220mm). Two areas were found abandoned, as they have been for over three months. In those areas the SMM had previously observed 11 MLRS (BM21 Grad, 122mm).

The SMM visited three locations at coordinates for temporary holding areas provided by “Donetsk People’s Republic” (“DPR”), but none of the locations were found to hold any heavy weapons.

In areas beyond the withdrawal lines and outside storage sites on 24 December the SMM observed a mobile convoy of two transporter-loaders (9T452, support vehicles for MB27 Uragan, 220mm), near government- controlled Shevchenko (88km north-west of Luhansk).

On 24 December the SMM was able to reach Kominternove (23km north-east of Mariupol, 88km south of Donetsk) and follow up on reports about the presence of armed “DPR” members in the village (see SMM Spot Report 24 December 2015)*. On 25 December, the SMM spoke to Kominternove residents who claimed that “DPR” soldiers had asked to stay in residents’ homes. The residents also said that “DPR” soldiers were in fact staying in some of the houses in the village. The SMM did not see “DPR” members in the village. Residents also said that since “DPR” members had arrived three days prior, residents and other civilians were not allowed to enter and exit the village. The armed “DPR” member escorting the SMM confirmed this, but claimed it had only been a temporary restriction and had already been lifted. The SMM spoke with a 50 year-old man who was leaving the village to relocate with his family to Mariupol. He stated that he had heard the sound of BMP/tanks moving across the village at night, and that he had seen around 20 “DPR” members, though he was not able to provide any further detail. Whilst in Kominternove, the SMM heard several explosions, more than 5km to the south-west of its position, assessed as related to demining activity in government-controlled areas. The SMM,

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however, was still unable to proceed to the village beyond the last Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint at the western outskirts of Kominternove as explosive devices (including anti-tank mines) remained placed on the only road leading to the village from the west (see SMM Spot Report 24 December 2015).

On 26 December, the SMM followed-up on allegations of shelling in Kominternove. The site of the alleged impacts was in a field, and whilst approaching this location, the SMM was informed that the Ukrainian Armed Forces would not provide security guarantees if it were escorted by “DPR” members. The SMM was thus unable to proceed and conduct crater analysis. On 27 December, the SMM was able to reach the site on foot and while examining three impact craters came under small arms fire (see SMM Spot Report 27 December 2015) and left the area before being able to conduct crater analysis.

The SMM also followed up on complaints of Kominternove residents that emergency medical services were being refused to them. In Mariupol, the SMM met with the head of the medical emergency office who explained that according to the current administrative regulations, the office is not allowed to provide services in Kominternove and other villages on the contact line. In emergency situations, he said, the Ukrainian Armed Forces were in charge of providing first aid and bringing patients to the villages of Vinohradne, Talakivka or Sartana (11km east, 17km north-east and 14km north-east of Mariupol, respectively), from where the emergency office could transport them to the hospital in Mariupol.

On 27 December, the SMM followed up on reports of a woman allegedly killed in Zaitseve (50km north of Donetsk) on 26 December. At the only hospital in Dzerzhynsk (government-controlled, 43km north of Donetsk) hospital staff told the SMM that military personnel had delivered to them the body of a woman, approximately 65 years old, late on 26 December. They said the woman was as yet unidentified and had died of wounds sustained in shelling. According to the hospital staff, the paramedic who had brought the body had said that the woman had been killed when her house was shelled. A military physician at the hospital additionally told the SMM about two other casualties of 26 December. Namely, that one Ukrainian Armed Forces service member had been brought to the hospital also from Zaitseve, with non-life threatening shrapnel wounds. He added also from Zaitseve another service member had been transported to the hospital with severe injuries caused by shrapnel from a fragmentation mortar shell. He had been transferred to Artemivsk hospital (government-controlled, 40km north of Donetsk) later that night and had died of his wounds.

On 27 December, the SMM observed clearly posted hazard signs reading “Mines” in Cyrillic placed every 500 metres for approximately 15 kilometres along the west side of the highway between Krasny Partyzan (“DPR”- controlled, 25km north-east of Donetsk) and the junction at Kruta Balka (“DPR”-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk). The SMM also observed improvised signs (wooden boards, reading “Mines” in Cyrillic) in a field north-west of Novoselivka (government-controlled, 29km north-east of Donetsk), in the direction of Novobakhmutivka (government-controlled, 26km north of Donetsk).

The SMM continued to facilitate and monitor adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs of critical infrastructure. On 24 and 25 December, the SMM facilitated repairs of water pipelines and pumps near “LPR”- controlled Slovianoserbsk (28km north-west of Luhansk) by repairmen of the Luhansk Water Company. On 26 December, the SMM monitored repairs of the power line conducted by workers of the energy company DTEK near government-controlled Krasnohorivka (21km west of Donetsk). Whilst at the repair site, the SMM heard a single undetermined explosion 2-3km north-west of its position, but repair works continued. On 27 December, local residents told the SMM that power supply to the village had been restored on 26 December. On 27 December, the SMM monitored the continuing gas pipeline repair works conducted by the workers of Krasnoarmiisk public gas company on the eastern side of the road between Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk) and Krasnohorivka. On 26 December, the SMM facilitated the access of two

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engineers affiliated with an international non-governmental organisation to the “LPR”-controlled part of the bridge (16km north-east of Luhansk). The engineers assessed the safety of the improvised wooden ramps that allow civilians to cross the destroyed portion of the bridge and told the SMM that pedestrians could use the ramps safely. The bridge is used on a daily basis and is the only official pedestrian crossing point between government-controlled and “LPR”-controlled areas in Luhansk region. While on the bridge, the SMM observed a queue of around 200 people at the government-controlled side of the bridge, waiting to cross the government checkpoint.

The SMM surveyed railway lines and stations in areas of Luhansk region not controlled by the Government. On 25 December, the SMM found that four lines were not in use: near Samsonivka (“LPR”-controlled, 31km south-east of Luhansk) the railway line leading to government-controlled Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk); the railway station in (“LPR”-controlled, 43km south-east of Luhansk); Uralo-Kavkaz (“LPR”-controlled, 45km south-east of Luhansk) the railway line leading toward the “Izvaryne” border crossing point. The SMM also visited the railway station in “LPR”-controlled Leninske (57km south-east of Luhansk). An employee of the railway station (woman, 40 years old) told the SMM that there were two passenger trains every morning and evening between “LPR”-controlled Fashchivka (69km south of Luhansk) and “LPR”-controlled (69km south-east of Luhansk), which carried workers to their jobs, and there were only ten passengers using Leninske station. The woman also said that there were ten trains passing through the station daily, which carried coal, but she did not provide information about the route and destination of the freight trains. On 27 December, the SMM visited the railway station in “LPR”-controlled (40km south-west of Luhansk) and spoke with the rail dispatcher (woman, approximately 40 years old). She said that the station facilitated transit of some four passenger trains daily destined for Luhansk city and Donetsk city. The SMM observed several passengers waiting at the platform.

On 27 December, the SMM visited the pedestrian border crossing points number 1 and 2 near “LPR”- controlled Krasnodarskyi (57km south-east of Luhansk). At both locations, the SMM observed that only the Russian Federation checkpoints were staffed. On 31 October the SMM had observed one “LPR” member at checkpoint number 1 (see SMM Daily Report 2 November 2015). The SMM saw a small number of civilians crossing in both directions.

On 25 December, the SMM attended a “popular assembly” in the town of Kalanchak (67km south-east of Kherson) organized by the local branch of the Ukrainian Union of Afghan War Veterans. The SMM observed some 700 people participating, including local government representatives, several parliamentary staff members and law-enforcement officials. The event was covered by crews from five national TV channels. The meeting focused on criticism of what was described as “the arbitrary actions and offences”, which – according to the veterans, many of them local entrepreneurs – had recently been committed by some Crimea blockade activists and Aidar battalion members stationed in the village of Chervonyi Chaban (90km south-east of Kherson), near the administrative boundary line between Kherson and Crimea. The SMM saw a motorcade of seven civilian vehicles filled with people from the village of Chonhar (161km south-east of Kherson) joining the assembly. The SMM heard a woman from Chonhar stating that her community had been experiencing problems with the blockade activists. The SMM spoke to several local farmers who said that some blockade activists who presented themselves as Aidar battalion members had committed kidnappings, violent assaults, extortions, armed robberies, and confiscation of vehicles, livestock and other property in the district. At the conclusion of the event, the organizers announced that a special local self-defence force consisting of 100 members would be created. The SMM saw about 50 participants approaching the organizers ostensibly to sign up for the unit. The SMM later spoke to the Crimea blockade leader who admitted that two activists from Aidar battalion stationed in Chervonyi Chaban had “misbehaved” by allegedly “harassing one farmer”.

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On 27 December, the SMM followed-up on media reports of an explosion in a residential area in Kyiv on 26 December in which a 42 year-old man was killed. The SMM spoke to a 50 year-old woman who introduced herself as a neighbour. The woman told the SMM that the man had been walking through the narrow paved corridor around the building to reach his car when the wheel of the baby carriage he had been pushing left the paved area and activated a buried explosive device. The SMM observed a pool of blood next to a hole in the ground likely caused by the explosive device. Mud stains and shrapnel marks ostensibly caused by the explosion were visible on the building façade, and the window of the ground floor adjacent to the explosion site was broken. Shrapnel marks were also noted on the façade of another building 25 meters away. The site of the explosion is a few hundred meters from Children Clinic № 3 and Secondary school № 69. The police described the device as an “unidentified explosive device” and have initiated criminal proceedings under “Article 115, clause 2, point 5 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine: murder, committed by a method dangerous to the lives of many people”.

The SMM continued to monitor the situation in Lviv, Odessa, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnepropetrovsk and Chernivtsi.

*Restrictions to SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to the fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM is restrained in fulfilling its monitoring functions by restrictions imposed by the parties and security considerations, including mine threats, damaged infrastructure, and the unpredictability of the situation in Donbas. “LPR” members continue to prevent the SMM from monitoring many areas alongside the border in parts of Luhansk region not controlled by the Government.

Denial of access:

On 24 December at the junction between the main road and the road to “LPR”-controlled Prokhladne (54km south-east of Luhansk), armed men stopped the SMM at a temporary checkpoint. Due to restrictions previously faced in “LPR”-controlled Komsomolskyi and Sverdlovsk (see SMM Daily Report 24 December 2015), the SMM had planned an alternative route avoiding known checkpoints, but noted that the checkpoint had now moved forward, to the junction. On 26 December, armed men prevented the SMM from proceeding through a checkpoint near Olenivka (“DPR”-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk). The armed men asked the SMM for “accreditation” from “DPR authorities”. On 26 December an “LPR” member again denied the SMM access to the site of the recently damaged television broadcast tower in “LPR”-controlled (55km south of Luhansk), where the SMM intended to confirm alleged damage by explosions (see SMM Daily Report 18 December 2015). On 26 December the SMM attempted to visit government-controlled Novooleksandrivka (68km west of Luhansk), near government-controlled (69km west of Luhansk), but was unable to access the village via any of the three roads leading to it, as large cement roadblocks had been installed by the Ukrainian Armed Forces. A local interlocutor told the SMM that access was only possible on foot. Security concerns related to the continued presence of explosive devices on the road prevented the SMM from reaching Kominternove from the government-controlled side of the village.

Delay:

On 24 December, armed men delayed the SMM for 45 minutes at the checkpoint at the southern entrance to “DPR”-controlled Olenivka (23km south-west of Donetsk). On 25 December, at a “DPR”-controlled checkpoint 5.7km north-east of Kominternove (23km north-east

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of Mariupol) armed men made the SMM wait for 25 minutes at the side of the road. The SMM was then allowed to proceed, but was instructed to “stay on the main street, and not to proceed further west than the town square due to the danger of snipers in the area.” On 26 December, armed men delayed the SMM’s passage through a temporary checkpoint near “LPR”- controlled Prokhladne (54km south-east of Luhansk) for 38 minutes. On 27 December, Ukrainian Armed Forces soldiers delayed the SMM for 25 minutes at a checkpoint in the north-eastern part of government-controlled (59km west of Luhansk), so-called “Zolote 1”. The Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel requested the SMM to show the national passports. The SMM did not comply. This was the first time that the SMM was allowed to pass through this checkpoint. On 27 December, two armed men delayed the SMM for 50 minutes at a checkpoint near Vlasivka (53km south-east of Luhansk). The armed “LPR” member demanded to check the patrol plan. The SMM was allowed to proceed after the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination intervened and the armed men received instructions from their superiors. On 27 December, the SMM was delayed for ten minutes by a mobile patrol of “LPR” “border guards” while traveling between “LPR”-controlled Vlasivka (53km south-east of Luhansk) and “LPR”-controlled Krasnodarskyi (57km south-east of Luhansk). The mobile patrol demanded to check the SMM’s patrol plan and then allowed it to proceed.

Conditional access:

On 25 December, at the entrance to Kominternove (23km north-east of Mariupol) a “DPR” soldier on foot, identified himself as the SMM escort officer and remained nearby the SMM in Kominternove. On 26 December, two armed men stopped the SMM in “LPR”-controlled Shakhtarske (60km south of Luhansk). They demanded to see the SMM patrol plan and thereafter -to escort the SMM through Sverdlovsk (61km south-east of Luhansk). On 26 December, at a temporary checkpoint, armed men only allowed the SMM to proceed to Prokhladne – after a 38-minute delay– under escort by “LPR” armed members.

Other impediments:

On 25 December, the SMM mid-range UAV sustained small-arms fire damage near government- controlled Troitske (69km west of Luhansk).

For a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table.

For PDF attachments or links to sources of further information, please visit: http://www.osce.org/ukraine- smm/212951

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