1 Introduction

Notes

1 Introduction

1. According to the WTO agreements, non-market economies refer to economies “where the government has a complete or substantially complete monopoly of its trade and where all domestic prices are fixed by the state.” For more discussion on the NME rules, see “Background: Rise of Export Barriers,” in Chapter 5. 2. Legalization is indicated by three components: “the degree to which rules are obligatory, the precision of those rules, and the delegation of some functions of interpretation, monitoring, and implementation to a third party.” See Kenneth W. Abbott and Duncan Snidal, “The Concept of Legalization” in Judith L. Goldstein, Miles Kahler, Robert O. Keohane and Anne-Marie Slaughter, eds, Legalization and World Politics (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 2001: The MIT Press), pp. 37–72. 3. The WTO dispute settlement system is not an enforcement body. The members have to rely on self-enforcement in complying with WTO rulings. However, it has been proven that nations take them into account more frequently when enacting, implementing, and interpreting domestic laws and regulations. See Paul B. Stephen, “American Hegemony and Interna- tional Law: Sheriff or Prisoner? The United States and the World Trade Organization,” Chicago Journal of International Law 1 (2000, spring): 49–74. 4. Robert Hudec, “Transcending the Ostensible: Some Reflections on the Nature of Litigation between Governments,” Minnesota Law Review 72 (1987): 224. 5. Robert Hudec, “The New WTO Dispute Settlement Procedure: An Overview of the First Three Years,” Minnesota Journal of Foreign Trade 8, no. 1 (1999): 8. 6. Alan O. Sykes, “The Remedy for Breach of Obligations under the WTO Dis- pute Settlement Understanding: Damages or Specific Performance?” M. Bronckers and R. Quick, eds., New Directions in International Economic Law: Essays in Honour of John H. Jackson. The Hague: Kluwer Law International, p. 352. 7. Hudec, “The New WTO Dispute Settlement Procedure: An Overview of the First Three Years,” p. 1. 8. Wilfred J. Ethier, Punishments and Dispute Settlement in Trade Agreements, Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU) Discussion Paper No. 2001–14, Uni- versity of Copenhagen, 2001; Christina R. Sevilla, Explaining Patterns of GATT/WTO Trade Complaints, Working Paper 98/1, Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, 1998. Christina R. Sevilla, A Polit- ical Economy Model of GATT/WTO Trade Complaints, Jean Monnet Working Paper No. 5/97, New York University School of Law, 1997. Giovanni Maggi, “The Role of Multilateral Institutions in International Trade Co-operation,” American Economic Review 89, no. 1 (1999): 190–214. Kyle Bagwell and Robert W. Staiger, “An Economic Theory of GATT,” American Economic Review 89, no. 1 (1999): 215–248.

120 Notes 121

9. The World Trade Organization, Current Status of Disputes, http://www .wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_current_status_e.htm. Retrieved on 14 April 2013. 10. Keisuke Iida, “Is WTO Dispute Settlement Effective?” Global Governance 10 (2004), 207–25. 11. According to the DSU timeline, it takes up to 26 months for a diligent complainant from the time of requesting consultation to obtain the removal of measures inconsistent with the WTO. In reality, this timeline is often exceeded. A survey on DSB cases from 1995 to 2004 found that the median time from the request for consultations to implementation was 34 months. For more information, see William J. Davey, “The WTO Dispute Settlement System: The First Ten Years,” Journal of Internal Economic Law (March 2005) 8 (1): 17–50. 12. Marc L. Busch and Eric Reinhardt, “Testing International Trade Law: Empir- ical Studies of GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement,” in Daniel M. Kennedy and D. James Southwick eds., The Political Economy of International Trade Law: Essays in Honor of Robert Hudec (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002): 457–81. 13. Henrik Horn, Petros C. Mavroidis, and Håkan Nordstrom, “Is the Use of the WTO Dispute Settlement System Biased?” Economic Research and Analysis Division, WTO Centre for Economic Policy Research (1999); Joseph Francois, Henrik Horn, and Niklas Kaunitz, “Trading Proﬁles and Developing Country Participation in the WTO Dispute Settlement System,” IFN Working Paper No. 730, Research Institute of Industrial Economics (2008); Chad P. Bown, “Developing Countries as Plaintiffs and Defendants in GATT/WTO Trade Disputes,” The World Economy 27, no. 1 (2004): 59–80. 14. Chad P. Bown, “U.S.–China Trade Conﬂicts and the Future of the WTO,” The Fletcher Forum of World Trade 33, no. 1 (Winter/Spring 2009): 27–48; Mohammad Ali Taslim, “How the DSU Worked for Bangladesh: The First Least Developed Country to Bring a WTO Claim,” Gregory C. Shaffer and Ricardo Meléndez-Ortiz eds., Dispute Settlement at the WTO: The Developing Country Experience, Cambridge University Press (2012): 230–48. 15. Chad P. Bown, “The Economics of Trade Disputes, the GATT’s Article XXIII and the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding,” Economics and Pol- itics 14, no. 3 (2002): 283–23; James Smith, “Inequality in International Trade? Developing Countries and Institutional Change in WTO Dispute Settlement,” Review of International Political Economy 11, no. 3 (August 2004): 542–73; Marc L. Busch and Eric Reinhardt, “Developing Countries and GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement,” Journal of World Trade 37 (2003): 719–35. 16. Bruce A. Blonigen and Chad P. Bown, “Antidumping and Retaliation Threats,” Working Paper 8576, National Bureau of Economic Research (2001); Chad P. Bown, Self-Enforcing Trade: Developing Countries and WTO Dis- pute Settlement (Washington, DC: Brookings Institute, 2006). 17. Chad P. Bown, “Participation in WTO Dispute Settlement: Complainants, Interested Parties and Free Riders,” World Bank Economic Review 19, no. 2 (2005): 287–310. 18. Valentina Delich, “Developing Countries and the WTO Dispute Settle- ment System,” in Bernard Hoekman, Aaditya Matoo, and Philip English 122 Notes

eds., Development, Trade, and the WTO (Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2002): 71–80; Andrew Guzman and Beth Simmons, “To Settle or Empanel? An Empirical Analysis of Litigation and Settlement at the World Trade Organization,” Journal of Legal Studies 31 (2005): 205–35; Constantine Michalopoulos, Developing Countries in the WTO (New York: Palgrave, 2001); Marc L. Busch and Eric Reinhardt, “Testing International Trade Law: Empir- ical Studies of GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement,” in Daniel M. Kennedy and James D. Southwick eds., The Political Economy of International Trade Law: Essays in Honor of Robert Hudec (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002): 457–81. 19. Christina L. Davis, Why Adjudicate? Enforcing Trade Rules in the WTO (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010), p. 69. 20. Marc Busch, “Democracy, Consultation, and the Paneling of Disputes under GATT,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 44, no. 4 (2000): 425–46; Peter Rosendorff, “Stability and Rigidity: Politics and Design of the WTO’s Dis- pute Settlement Procedure,” American Political Science Review 99, no. 3 (2005): 389–400; Eric Reinhardt, “Aggressive Multilateralism: The Determinants of GATT/WTO Dispute Initiation, 1948–1998,” Manuscript, Emory University, 2000. 21. Davis, Why Adjudicate? Enforcing Trade Rules in the WTO. 22. Davis, Why Adjudicate? Enforcing Trade Rules in the WTO: p.12. 23. Thomas Sattler and Thomas Bernauer, “Dispute Initiation in the World Trade Organization,” paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Political Economy Society (Stanford University, Palo Alto, California, 2007). 24. Davis, Why Adjudicate? Enforcing Trade Rules in the WTO. 25. From 1995 to 1998, Japan filed six complaints against the United States, Brazil, Indonesia, and Canada on issues including unilateral sanction measures import duties. For the 15 years under the WTO (1995–2010), Japan filed 14 complaints against other countries whereas it only filed 12 over almost half a century under the GATT. 26. Miles Kahler, “Litigation as Strategy: The Asia-Pacific Case” and “Conclu- sion: The Causes and Consequences of Legalization,” in Goldstein, Kahler, Keohane and Slaughter, eds., Legalization and World Politics: pp. 277–300. 27. Saadia Pekkanen, Japan’s Aggressive Legalism: Law and Foreign Trade Politics Beyond the WTO (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2008): pp. 28–31. 28. Peter Evans, Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial Transformation. Princeton University Press, 1995. 29. See Chapter 6 for more discussion. 30. In this project, East Asia includes China, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and ASEAN states who are members of the WTO. 31. According to the WTO agreements, trade remedy measures include antidumping, countervailing, and safeguard measures. Antidumping measures are measures that can be undertaken whenever the importing country confirms that dumping and material injury resulting from the goods under investigation has occurred. Countervailing measures are measures that can be undertaken whenever an investigation, by the investigating authority of the importing country, has led to the determination that the imported goods are benefited from subsidies and that they also result in material injury. Safe- guard means actions taken to protect a specific industry that is seriously Notes 123

injured by an unexpected build-up of imports. All three measures often take the form of duties or the price undertakings by the exporting ﬁrms or the authorities of the exporting country (in the case of countervailing measures). For more details, see the World Trade Organization, Antidumping, http:// www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/adp_e/adp_e.htm. Retrieved on 1 April 2011. 32. Dumping takes place when goods are exported at a price charged below one’s domestic market or below the cost of production. 33. The disputes of this kind are in part caused by the current WTO rules grant substantial degree of discretion to the importing countries to judge the act of dumping. For more details, see Thomas J. Prusa, “Anti-dumping: A Growing Problem in International Trade,” The World Economy, Vol. 28(5) (May 2005): 683–700. 34. Thomas J. Prusa, “On the Spread and Impact of Antidumping,” Canadian Journal of Economics, 34, no. 3 (2001): 591–611; Thomas J. Prusa, “East Asia’s Anti-Dumping Problem,” The World Economy 29, no. 6 (June 2006): 743–761. 35. These numbers were in part related to the fact that since 2004 major trading countries started to use countervailing duties on countries of NME status like China and Vietnam. 36. Ordinary least squares (OLS) is used to test the multiple linear regression regarding the number of antidumping orders received by 80 WTO member states and the economic factors that were found to affect the chance of receiving antidumping orders. GDP, GDP per capita, the GDP share of exported goods and services, and the balance of trade of each country used in the regression are based on their average numbers between 1995 and 2010. 37. From 1995 to 2010, there were 419 WTO dispute settlement cases and 151 were ﬁled regarding the WTO chapters on antidumping, countervailing, and safeguard measures. See The World Trade Organization. Chronological list of disputes cases, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_status_e .htm. Retrieved on 5 June 2012. 38. The Philippines is not active at contesting antidumping measures as the number of trade remedy measures against it is the lowest in the region.

2 Developmental States Contesting Export Barriers in the WTO: An Analytical Framework

1. Chalmers A. Johnson, MITI and the Japanese Miracle (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 1982); Robert Wade, Governing the Market: Economic The- ory and the Role of Government in East Asian Industrialization (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990); Stephan Haggard, Pathways from the Periph- ery: The Politics of Growth in the Newly Industrializing Countries (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990); Alice Amsden, Asia’s Next Giant: South Korea and Late Industrialization (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992); Meredith Woo-Cumings, ed., The Developmental State (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999). 2. The phrase of “high performing East Asia” is coined by a World Bank policy research report. See the World Bank, The East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and Public Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993). 124 Notes

3. For more discussion, see Gary Hufbauer, Clyde Berliner, and Kimberly Elliott, Trade Protection in the United States: 31 Case Studies (Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 1986). 4. VER refers to a self-imposed limit on the amount of goods that one country can export to another to control export price and quantity. For more discussion on US export restrictions on East Asian exports, see Takatoshi Ito and Anne O. Krueger, eds., Trade and Protectionism: NBER-East Asia Seminar on Economics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993). 5. In the GATT time, administrative measures included antidumping, countervailing, safeguard, and measures against unfair competition caused by intellectual property rights. During this time, the US Congress amended several administrative rules to make trade remedy measures more accessible for business petitioners. For more information, see I. M. Destler, American Trade Politics (Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 1995): pp. 139–74. 6. Stephan Haggard, The Political Economy of the Asian Financial Crisis (Washington, DC: Institute of International Economics, 2000); Stephan Hag- gard and Jongryn Mo, “The Political Economy of the Korean Financial Crisis,” Review of International Political Economy 7(2) (2000): 197–218. 7. The best example that illustrates this bottom-up way is the US Trade Act of 1974. Sections 301–10 of the Trade Act of 1974 deﬁne responsibilities for both the executive and legislative branches in tackling foreign trade barriers related to trade in goods and services. Section 301 and its amendments in 1979, 1984, 1988, and 1994 also broaden the range of foreign trade barriers to cover investment, international property rights, competition law enforcement, and labor practices. The amendments not only authorize business petitioning but also specify the timeline for the USTR to handle petitions. Shaffer describes that The Trade Act of 1974 provides a foundation for business actors to play a proactive role in guiding the public authorities to solve market access problems. Gregory C. Shaffer, Defending Interests: Public-private Partnerships in WTO Litigation (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2003): pp. 19–64. 8. This point is made by several law professors who have provided legal consultation to South Korea’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade. Won-mog Choi (Professor of International Trade Law and Director of the WTO Law Center, Ewha Womans University School of Law), in discussion with the author, 29 March 2012; Duk-geun Ahn (Professor of Trade Law and Pol- icy, the Graduate School of International Studies (GSIS)/Law School, Seoul National University), in discussion with the author, 12 March 2013; Jae-min Lee (Professor of the Department of Law, Hanyang University), in discussion with the author, 21 March 2013. 9. For more discussion on the case of Japan, see Pekkanen, Japan’s Aggressive Legalism, pp. 9–13. 10. Other options to enhance such human resources include hiring outside legal counsel and expertise-speciﬁc training. For example, the Advisory Centre on WTO Law (ACWL) provides legal counsel services and civil-servant training in trade litigation and dispute settlement for WTO members of developing world. For more details, see the Advisory Centre on WTO Law, http://www .acwl.ch/e/index.html. Notes 125

11. For more details, see Office of the United States Trade Representative, https:// ustr.gov/ 12. Evans, Embedded Autonomy; Robert Wade, Governing the Market: Economic Theory and the Role of Government in East Asian Industrialization (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990); Atul Kohli, State-Directed Development (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004). 13. Wade, Governing the Market. 14. The workload required to carry WTO litigation is enormous; such as Korea’s first WTO complaint against the United States, the paperwork prepared by both the government and the involved firm, Samsung electronics, reportedly could have filled five eight-ton trucks. For more discussion, see Junsok Yang, “Learning by Doing: the Impact of a Trade Remedy Case in Korea,” in Peter Gallagher, Patrick Low and Andrew L. Stole, eds., Managing the Challenges of WTO Participation (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005): p. 307. 15. Shaffer uses the term of “Public-private partnership” or “public-private networks” to describe a form of governance that relies on public and private actors together to address discrete policy issues. For more information, see Shaffer, Defending Interests. 16. Peter B. Evans, “The Eclipse of the State? Reflections on Stateness in an Era of Globalization,” World Politics 50(1) (1997): 86. 17. Evans, “The Eclipse of the State?” 18. Michelle Ratton-Sanchez, Gregory G. Shaffer, G. and Barbara Rosenberg, “Brazil’s Response to the Judicialized WTO Regime: Strengthening the State through Diffusing Expertise,” Paper Presented at the Annual Meeting of the Law and Society Association, Berlin, Germany, 25 July 2007; Gregory C. Shaffer and Ricardo Meléndez-Ortiz, eds., Dispute Settlement at the WTO: The Developing Country Experience, 1st ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010). 19. Saadia M. Pekkanen, “International Law, Industry, and the State: Explain- ing Japan’s Complainant Activities at the WTO,” Pacific Review 16(3) (2003): 285–306. 20. Richard Posner, “The Behavior of Administrative Agencies,” The Journal of Legal Studies 1(2) (1972): 305–47. 21. For more information about the WTO rules on safeguards, see the World Trade Organization, Safeguard, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/safeg _e/safeg_e.htm. Retrieved on 1 April 2011. 22. Robert E. Baldwin, The Political Economy of U.S. Import Policy (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1985); Judith Goldstein and Stefanie Lenway, “Interests or Insti- tutions: An Inquiry into Congressional-ITC Relations,” International Studies Quarterly 33 (1989): 303–27; Wendy L. Hansen, “The International Trade Commission and the Politics of Protectionism,” American Political Science Review 84(1) (1990): 21–46; Wendy L. Hansen and Thomas J. Prusa, “The Eco- nomics and Politics of Trade Policy: An Empirical Analysis of ITC Decision Making,” Review of International Economics 5 (1997): 230–45. 23. Marc Galanter, “Afterword: Explaining Litigation,” Law and Society Review 9(2) (1975): 347–68. 24. Kenneth J. Arrow, Social Choice and Individual Values, 2nd ed. (New York: Wiley, 1963); Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1965); 126 Notes

William H. Riker, The Theory of Political Coalitions (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962); James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, The Cal- culus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1962). 25. Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965). 26. Sam Peltzman, “The Gains and Losses from Industrial Concentration,” Jour- nal of Law and Economics 20 (1977): 229–63; Yale Brozen, Concentration, Mergers, and Public Policy (New York: Macmillan, 1982); Harold Demsetz, “Industry Structure, Market Rivalry, and Public Policy,” Journal of Law and Economics 16(1) (1973): 1–9; Joseph E. Stiglitz and G. Frank Mathewson, eds., New Developments in the Analysis of Market Structure (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1986); Gary S. Becker, “A Theory of Competition among Pressure Groups for Political Inﬂuence,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 98 (1983): 371–400. 27. Richard E. Wagner, “Pressure Groups and Political Entrepreneurs: A Review Article,” Public Choices 1(1) (1966): 161–70; Daniel G. Arce M., “Leadership and the Aggregation of International Collective Action,” Oxford Economic Paper 53(1) (January 2001): 114–37. 28. Messerlin notes that these features are more distinct in the metals and chemicals sectors while the other sectors require a closer look with disaggregation. For more discussion, read Patrick A. Messerlin, “Economic Effects of China’s Accession to the World Trade Organization,” The World Bank Economic Review 18(1): (2004): 105–30. 29. In addition to contesting trade remedy measures, exporters may adjust their business strategies through, for example, moving manufacturing site to a third country to circumvent the measures, selling their products to other markets that do not impose such measures, or manufacturing new products that are not affected by such measures. 30. Gavin Reid, Small Business Enterprise: An Economic Analysis (New York, Routledge, 1995): pp. 135–56. 31. Reid, Small Business Enterprise. 32. Shaffer, Defending Interests.

3 The Developmental State Goes Litigious: Korea’s Pursuit of WTO Litigation

1. Financial Times, “South Korea Keen to Stake Its Trade Claim,” 24 July 1985; Financial Times, “South Korea Urged to Liberalise Trade Policies,” 10 July 1992. 2. Chong-Hyun Nam, “Protectionist U.S. Trade Policy and Korean Exports,” in Takatoshi Ito and Anne O. Krueger, eds., Trade and Protectionism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993): pp. 183–222; Taeho Bark, Antidumping Restrictions against Korean Exports: Major Focus on Consumer Electronic Prod- ucts (Seoul: Korea Institute for International Economic Policy, 1991). 3. Dukgeun Ahn, “Korea in the GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement System: Legal Battle for Economic Development,” Journal of International Economic Law 6(3) (2003): 607. Notes 127

4. Yun-han Chu, “State Structure and Economic Adjustment of the East Asian Newly Industrializing Countries,” International Organization 43(4) (1989): 647–72; Jung-En Woo, Race to the Swift: State and Finance in Korean Industri- alization (New York: Columbia University Press: 1991); Kohli, State-Directed Development, pp. 27–126. 5. About chaeb˘ol firms’ development, see Stephan Haggard, Pathways from the Periphery: the Politics of Growth in the Newly Industrializing Countries (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990); Bruce Cumings, “The Origins and Devel- opment of Northeast Asian Political Economy: Industrial Sectors, Product Cycles, and Political Consequence,” in Frederick Deyo, ed., The Political Economy of the New Asian Industrialism (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987): pp. 44–83; Woo, Race to the Swift; Kohli, State-Directed Development, pp. 27–126. 6. Gerardo R. Ungson, Korean Enterprise: The Quest for Globalization (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1997). 7. Paul W. Kuznets, “Trade, Policy, and Korea-United States Relations,” Jour- nal of Northeast Asian Studies 8(4) (Winter 1989): 24–42; Stephan Haggard, Pathways from the Periphery: The Politics of Growth in the Newly Industrializ- ing Countries (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990): pp. 126–60; C. Fred Bergsten and Il-Sa Kong, The Korea-United States Economic Relationship (Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 1997). 8. GoldStar was changed as LG Electronics and LG Cable in 1995 after merging with the competitor Lucky. 9. Sang-young Rhyu, “The Political Economy of POSCO’s Growth: Government- Business Relations, Continuity Debate, and Rent-Seeking Behavior,” Korean Journal of Political Science 35(2) (2001): 67–87; William Hogan, POSCO Strat- egy: A Blueprint for World Steel’s Future (Lanham, MA: Lexington Books, 2001). 10. Eun-mee Kim, “Globalization of South Korean Chaebol,” in Samuel S. Kim, ed., Korea’s Globalization (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 102–25. 11. Lucy Williamson, “South Korea’s Small Businesses Fight for Survival,” BBC News, 17 August 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news. Retrieved on 10 August 2012. 12. Yonhap News Agency, “South Korea’s Ratio of Exports to GDP Hits New Record Last Year,” 8 January 2013, http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/. Retrieved on 13 September 2013. 13. Chung Soo Kim, ed., Effects of Neo-Protectionism of the Korean Exports (Seoul: Korea Institute for Economy and Technology, 1986). 14. Duol Kim, Export Diversification: Lessons from Korean Experience, Working Paper (Seoul: Korea Development Institute, 2012). 15. Dumping is defined as selling goods abroad at a price charged below one’s domestic market or below the cost of production. Therefore, calculation of dumping margin and the duties charged uses exporter’s domestic price as a baseline. For the effect of domestic market structure on the antidumping duties on Korean exporters, see Bark, Antidumping Restrictions against Korean Exports; Tae-ho Bark, The Korean Consumer Electronic Industry: Reactions to Antidumping Actions, Working Paper 781 (Washington, DC: the World Bank, 1991). 128 Notes

16. Bark, The Korean Consumer Electronic Industry,p.4. 17. Financial Times, “Survey of South Korea.” 18. Linsu Kim and Jeffrey B. Nugent, The Republic of Korea’s Small and Medium- Size Enterprises and Their Support Systems (Washington: The World Bank, 1999); Jeffrey B. Nugent and Seung-Jae Yhee, Small and Medium Enterprises in Korea: Achievements, Constraints and Policy Issues (Washington: The World Bank, 2001). 19. Kim and Nugent, The Republic of Korea’s Small and Medium-Size Enterprises and Their Support Systems. 20. Williamson, “South Korea’s Small Businesses Fight for Survival.” 21. Moon-kyu Park, “Interest Representation in South Korea: The Limits of Corporatist Control,” Asian Survey 27(8) (August 1987): 904–19; Mark Clifford, Troubled Tiger (Armonk, NY: ME Sharpe, 1994): pp. 60–6. 22. Yun-han Chu, “State Structure and Economic Adjustment of the East Asian Newly Industrialized Countries.”; Clifford, Troubled Tiger; Yun-han Chu, “The State and the Development of Automobile Industry in South Korea and Taiwan,” in Joel D. Aberbach, David Dollar, and Kenneth L. Sokoloff, eds., The Role of the State in Taiwan’s Development (Armonk, NY: ME Sharpe, 1994): p. 141; Carter J. Eckert, Korea Old and New: A History (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990). 23. Bruce Cumings, “The Origins and Development of Northeast Asian Political Economy: Industrial Sectors, Product Cycles, and Political Consequence,” in Frederick Deyo, ed., The Political Economy of the New Asian Industrialism (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987): p. 44–83. 24. Yun-Tae Kim, “Neoliberalism and the Decline of the Developmental State,” Journal of Contemporary Asia 29(4) (1999): 441–61; Clifford, Troubled Tiger (Armonk: ME Sharpe, 1994): pp. 39–40; D. Michael Shafer, Winners and Losers: How Sectors Shape the Developmental Prospects of States (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1994). 25. Jongryn Mo, “A View from Abroad: The Korean Experience in Develop- ing Public Policy Research,” in Toru Hashimoto, Stefan Hell, and Sang-Woo Nam, eds., Public Policy and Research Training in Viet Nam (Hanoi: Asian Development Bank Institute, 2005): pp. 172–213. 26. It included FKI-afﬁliated institutes, the Korean Economic Institute, the Korean International Economic Institute and International Management Institute, and KITA-afﬁliated Institute for International Trade. 27. Park, Interest Representation in South Korea; Kim, “Neoliberalism and the Decline of the Developmental State”; Christopher M. Dent, The Foreign Economic Policies of Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan (Gloucestershire: Edward Elgar, 2003): pp. 183–86. Cited the 1991 FKI annual report, Dent wrote, by 1995 business representatives had sat on 78 advisory, consulta- tive, and decision-making committees of the Korean cabinet. 28. Federation of Korean Industry, Jeongug Gyeongjein Yeonhabhoe Yeogsa Ui 30 Nyeon [The 30 Years of History of the FKI] (Seoul: Federation of Korean Industry, 1991). 29. Kim, “Neoliberalism and the Decline of the Developmental State,” 454–56. 30. It included FKI, KTA, Electronics Industries Association of Korea, Korea Steel and Iron Association (KOSA), and the Korean Federation of Textile Notes 129

Industries. This working group was led by the External Economy Policy Committee chaired by the vice Prime Minister, with members from relevant line ministries. The studies and policy recommendations accomplished by this working group were compiled into a book. See Kim, Effects of Neo-Protectionism on the Korean Exports. 31. Kim, Effects of Neo-Protectionism on the Korean Exports. 32. Financial Times, “South Korea Keen To Stake Its Trade Claim.” 33. These reforms were also a part of Korea’s neoliberal movement since the Kim Young-sam administration. For more details, see Samuel S. Kim, “Korea and Globalization (Segyehwa): A Framework for Analysis,” in Samuel S. Kim, ed., Korea’s Globalization (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2000): pp. 1–28; Barry K. Gills, “Economic Liberalization and Reform in South Korea in the 1990s: A Coming of Age or a Case of Graduation Blues?” Third World Quarterly 17(4) (1996): 667–88. 34. In 1984, the Ministry of Commerce and Industry became the Ministry of Trade and Industry in order to strengthen the ministry’s capacity in handling GATT and bilateral trade negotiations. Since 1995, the Ministry of Trade and Industry expanded to absorb the Ministry of Energy and became the MOCIE. On the other hand, the Korea Institute for Inter- national Economic Policy (KIEP) was created in 1989 for advising the government on all major international economic policy issues and served as an information powerhouse on Korea’s international economic policies. KIEP worked closely with MOCIE as well as MOFAT after the GOK’s ministerial reorganization in 1997. 35. For more discussion on President Roh’s initiative of FTA diplomacy, see Min-Gyo Koo, “Embracing Free Trade Agreements, Korean Style: From Developmental Mercantilism to Developmental Liberalism,” Korean Journal of Policy Studies, 25(3) (2010): 101–23. 36. Dent, The Foreign Economic Policies of Singapore, pp. 187–90; Min-gyo Koo, “South Korea’s FTAs: Moving from an Emulative to a Competitive Strategy,” in Mireya Solis, Barbara Stallings, and Saori N. Katada, eds., Competitive Regionalism: FTA Diffusion in the Paciﬁc Rim (New York: Palgrave Macmillan 2009): pp. 181–97. 37. Chi-wook Kim, “Toward a Multistakeholder Model of Foreign Policy Mak- ing in Korea? Big Business and Korea-US Relations,” Asian Perspective 35 (2011): 471–95. 38. Tae-sik Lee (former Director-General of Trade in the Foreign Ministry of Republic of Korea), in discussion with the author, 1 May 2012. 39. Tae-sik Lee, 1 May 2012. 40. According to Yong-wook Lee, a profession in Korea University and external consultant to the MOFAT, the culture of credentials has been in the Korean administration. This trend since the late 1990s has accelerated as academic degrees became a prerequisite of promotion. Yong-wook Lee, in discussion with the author, 24 April 2012. 41. MOFAT Ofﬁcial, in discussion with the author, 16 March 2012. 42. Won-mog Choi (Professor of International Trade Law and Director of the WTO Law Center, Ewha Womans University School of Law), in discussion with the author, 29 March 2012. 130 Notes

43. The Foreign Trade Act of 1986 is accompanied by the Enforcement Decree and an Ordinance to specify the Act’s delegations and enforcement. Article 4, Foreign Trade Act of 1986, Republic of Korea. 44. Article 8, Foreign Trade Act of 1996, Republic of Korea. While the Act autho- rizes the MOCIE with this responsibility, the MOFAT, after taking over the duty of foreign trade affairs, became the main administer. 45. Article 9(1)-(2), Foreign Trade Act of 1996. 46. Eun-sup Lee, “Foreign Trade Regulation of Korea in the WTO World,” Journal of Transnational Law and Policy 231 (Spring 1999): 246–47. 47. However, the treaties, such as FTAs, which fall under Article 60 of the Con- stitution of the Republic of Korea, must win the consent of the National Assembly after the signing of the treaties and before their ratification by the President. Therefore, the GOK (administration body) normally seeks to involve the National Assembly during the process of its FTA negotiations by providing relevant information to its members to facilitate the consent procedure at a later stage. 48. The output of the three companies accounted for 93.5 percent of Korea’s consumer electronics market in the 1980s. Bark, Antidumping Restrictions against Korean Exports, pp. 28–9. 49. These included washing machines, refrigerators, color television sets, video cassette recorders, and microwave ovens. While small electronic products, such as calculators, audio recorders, and watches, were produced by small firms, they were not Korea’s major exports. Bark, The Korean Consumer Electronic Industry, pp. 2–3. 50. There were 15 antidumping initiations against Korean electronic products from 1973 to 1989. The United States was responsible for two with color television sets and color picture tubes; Canada placed one order on microwave ovens; and the European Community ordered four antidumping orders on videotapes, video recorders, personal computers, and small-sized color television sets while Australia restricted lamps and audiotapes. 51. For more about this point, see Bark, Antidumping Restrictions against Korean Exports. 52. Goldstar, Samsung, and Daewoo received 20.08, 52.5, and 25.09 percent of dumping margins respectively in the preliminary ruling, which were reduced to 7.47, 12.23, and 14.88 percent in the final ruling. For more information, see 49 Federal Register 18336, 30 April 1984. 53. Most of US chipmakers were closed down in the mid-1980s due to competition from Japanese chipmakers. As a result, Micron Technology became the single largest US DRAM memory chipmaker while other three companies – Texas Instruments, Motorola, and International Business Machines Corp – produced chips primarily for their own consumption. In 1986, The US–Japan Semiconductor Trade Agreement was signed to set floor prices for memory chips imported from Japan to the US market. The Agreement turned US buyers to Korean chipmakers, which become the major foreign competitors for Micron. For more information, see Douglas A. Irwin, “The U.S.-Japan Semiconductor Trade Conflict,” in Anne O. Krueger, ed., The Political Economy of Trade Protection (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996): pp. 5–14. Notes 131

54. In the preliminary investigation, Samsung, Goldstar, and Hyundai received dumping margins of 87 percent, 52 percent, and 7.2 percent respectively. See San Jose Mercury News, “U.S. Rules South Korea Dumped Chips but Temporary Import Duties, which Ran as High as 87 percent, where Lowered to 7.2 percent or Less,” 17 March 1993. In May 1993, DOC issued an antidumping duty order for DRAMS from Korea and found an antidumping margin of 0.82 percent for Samsung, 4.97 percent for GoldStar, 11.16 percent for Hyundai, and 3.83 percent for all others. 55. The US CIT remanded the case to DOC to correct certain errors. In August 1995, DOC revised dumping margins to 0.22 percent (de minimis) for Samsung, 4.28 for LG, 5.15 for Hyundai, and 4.55 for all others from Korea. Thus, Samsung was exempted from future reviews. In the administrative reviews, DOC found LG and Hyundai did not dumping during the period of review for three consecutive years. However, DOC denied the request of revoking the antidumping duties as it considered they remained “likely” to dump in the near future. The US CIT also rejected LG and Hyundai’s request of revocation, claiming that this move was beyond its jurisdiction. 56. Crista Hardie, “Two Korean Memory-Makers Challenge Anti-Dump Order,” Electronic News, 26 May 1997. 57. Financial Times, “South Korean Shipyards Pay Price for Success,” 25 June 1982. 58. The traditional antidumping and countervailing procedures were not applicable to the shipbuilding industry given the nature of large-sized com- modity. The principle agreements on this issue area were governed by the OECD including General Guidelines for Government Policies in the Shipbuilding Industry (ﬁrst negotiated in 1969), General Guidelines for Government Policies in the Shipbuilding Industry (1972), and General Guidelines for Government Policies in the Shipbuilding Industry (1976). The Guidelines set tariff rates for different countries and provides provisions of import restrictions of ships, parts, and components thereof in response to “dumping” actions of foreign shipbuilders. However, their effectiveness was limited because of their non-binding nature. The dispute was mostly between the European and Japanese shipbuilders as Japan was the world’s top shipbuilding country at the time. Korean shipbuilders, while not bound by the Guidelines, were also involved in the dispute as Japan accused Korea’s sudden rise in the industry contributing a part to the overcapacity problem. See more in David John Blair, Trade Negotiations in the OECD: Structures, Institutions, and States (London: Kegan Paul International, 1993): pp. 216–37. 59. The negotiations resulted in the Agreement Respecting Normal Compet- itive Conditions in the Commercial Shipbuilding and Repair Industry. However, its enforcement failed due to opposition from the major US mil- itary shipyards. Kwang-seo Park and Seung-hyuk Roh, “A Study on the Background and Negotiations Around a Trade Dispute Regarding the Shipbuilding Industry of Korea and the EU,” Journal of Korea Trade Research 27(2) (2002): 405–26. 60. Sung-woo Kim (Director General, The Korea Iron and Steel Association), in discussion with the author, 26 April 2012. 61. Kim, 26 April 2012. 132 Notes

62. Policy communication and coordination was done under the collaboration between the OMT and the Bureau of Basic Metal under the MOCIE. As to dual price system, it refers to a practice since the 1970s where POSCO supplied its products to Korean steel exporters at prices lower than those quoted to foreign customers or Korean companies who just serve the domestic market. Such practice, many criticized, gave Korean steel exporters price advantage. The system was phased out in 1999. The Korea Herald, “POSCO to Abolish Local Price System to Evade Trade Dispute,” 9 March 1999. 63. The Korea Herald, “Steel Industry Concerned about Antidumping Moves Abroad,” 26 September 1998; The Korea Herald, “Business News Briefs: U.S. Exempts Korea from Steel-Dumper List,” 2 October 1998. 64. Yonhap News Agency, “Group Report on Foreign Trade Barriers on ROK Goods,” 9 January 1985. 65. Legal consultant to MOFAT, discussion with the author, 12 March 2013. 66. The US antidumping order on Samsung’s color television receivers might pose a threat to the potential export of Samsung’s upcoming high- definition televisions. Likewise, Hyundai and Goldstar in the early 1990s were prepared for capacity expansion. 67. Junsok Yang (Associate Professor, Catholic University of Korea), in discussion with the author, 26 March 2012. For more information about Samsung’s case, see Junsok Yang, “Learning by Doing: the Impact of a Trade Remedy Case in Korea.” 68. These banks include Korean Development Bank (KDB), Korea Exchange Bank, and Woori Bank. 69. A campaign led by US Senators Larry Craig and Mike Crapo, and Congress- men Mike Simpson and C.L. Otter intended to introduce a legislation to prevent Hynix bailout through high tariff. The deputy US Trade Represen- tative, Jon Huntsman, and the US Secretary of Commerce Donald L. Evans expressed their concern about the Hynix bailout plan. Evans sent a letter to Korea’s Commerce Minister Chang Che-sik stating, “Extending additional, extraordinary financial assistance to Hynix Semiconductor (calls) into ques- tion Korea’s commitment to genuine structural market reform and to its obligations under the World Trade Organization.” See The Asian Wall Street Journal, “Hynix Sells Part Of LCD Unit To Consortium – Semiconductor Focus Spurs Deal With Cando-Led Group,” 7 September 2001. 70. The Cho Sun Ilbo, “Hynix Bailout Plan Angers Micron,” 31 December 2002. 71. Yonhap News Agency, “South Korea Calls US Decision to Levy High Tariffs on Semiconductors Unfair,” 2 April 2003. 72. eWEEK International News, “Koreans Hit U.S. Hynix Decision,” 8 April 2003, http://www.eweek.com/c/a/Finance-IT/Koreans-Hit-US-Hynix-Decision/. Retrieved on 11 October 2012. 73. KITA Symposium Discuss Hynix Subsidy Conflict, 28 May 2003, http:// global.kita.net/news/02/1188134_1687.jsp. Retrieved on 25 September 2012. 74. Deseret News, “Hynix Lobbying in Trade Dispute,” 16 April 2003, http:// www.deseretnews.com/article/977212/Hynix-lobbying-in-trade-dispute .html?pg=all. Retrieved on 12 October 2012. Notes 133

75. 68 Federal Register 47607, 11 August 2003; 102 the Official Journal, 24 April 2003. 76. The WTO panel report favored Korea in several key points regarding the definition of a state-owned body and whether state-owned banks have been “entrusted” or “directed” in their decisions to extend commercial loans. The United States appealed to the Appellate Body which overturned the panel decision. For more information, see the World Trade Organization, WT/DS296/AB/R, 2005. 77. Korea Net, “EU to Repeal Countervailing Duties on Hynix DRAMs,” 8 April 2008, http://www.korea.net/NewsFocus/Policies/view?articleId= 72609 Retrieved on 11 October 2012. 78. For more detail about the history of the rivalry between the Korean and European shipbuilding industries, see Tae-woe Lee, “Restructuring of the Economy and Its Impacts on the Korean Maritime Industry,” Maritime Policy & Management 4 (1999): 311–25. 79. Third Report to the Council on the Situation in the World, COM(2000)730 final, Commission of the European Communities, 2000, Brussels, http://eur-lex .europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2000:0730:FIN:en:PDF Retrieved on 1 October 2011. 80. Daewoo Shipbuilding and Samho Heavy Industries (managed by Hyundai Heavy Industry) were the focal point of the EC investigation. 81. Position Paper on Korean/EU Shipbuilding Talks, Korea Shipbuilders Associa- tion, Seoul (November 2000). 82. For more details, see Heiner Heseler, The Shipbuilding Dispute between the EU and Korea, December 2000, http://www.maritim.uni-bremen.de/yards/ korea/korea-e.pdf Retrieved on 30 August 2012. 83. In June 2002, the EU issued a temporary subsidy order to the affected shipbuilders, which was prolonged by a new resolution until March 2005. Later in September, the EU requested a WTO panel against Korea’s export subsidies in the form of advance payment guarantees and loans provided by the state-owned bank. Amid the stalemate in negotiations, the GOK launched a WTO complaint in 2003 against the EU temporary subsidy order. 84. However, the WTO Panel upheld the part of the EU’s claims in export subsidies and preferential tax code. The GOK responded that the WTO simply confirmed what they already knew, and the prohibited export subsidies and tax breaks were to expire anyway. Jonathan Fowler, “EU, South Korea Face Off at World Trade Organization Over Shipbuilding Aid,” AP World Stream, 11 April 2005, http://www.nsnet.com/archive-1-2005-04.html Retrieved on 30 August 2012. 85. The Korea Herald, “Korea Eyeing 40 percent Global Shipbuilding Share by 2010,” 18 June 2002. 86. Ahn, 12 March 2013. 87. David Greising, “South Korea Steelmaker Could Export Lessons,” Chicago Tribune, 30 October 2002. 88. At the preliminary ruling determinations of the “plate” and “sheet” cases, the dumping margins imposed were 2.77 and 3.92 percent respectively. POSCO officials argued that the sharp increase was a result of Washington having excluded November and December prices from their calculation, 134 Notes

although the US officials said their investigation included the whole of 1997. For more information about the errors of these methods, see the World Trade Organization, WT/DS179/R, 2000. 89. Senior KOSA official, in discussion with the author, 26 April 2012. 90. The complaint over the DOC review investigation was centered with the “zeroing” rule in review investigation. In addition to POSCO’s antidumping duties, the complaint also contested two other antidumping orders on diamond saw blades and on parts from cutting tool manufactures that faced the same issue. Among them, POSCO was the most prominent actor complaining about the issue. 91. Hidetaka Yoshimatsu, “U.S.-East Asian Trade Friction: Exit and Voice in the Steel Trade Regime,” Asian Affairs 30(3) (Fall 2003): 200–17. 92. Zeroing refers to the practice of replacing the actual amount of dumping when it yields negative dumping margins with a value of zero prior to the final calculation of a weighted average margin of dumping for the product under investigation with respect to the exporters under investigation. Zero- ing drops transactions that have negative margins and hence increases the overall dumping margins and the resulting size of the applied antidumping duty. Zeroing has been banned by the WTO with a few exceptions including the case of “target dumping.” For more information, see Chad P. Bown and Alan O. Sykes, “The Zeroing Issue: A Critical Analysis of Softwood V,” World Trade Review 7(1) (2008): 121–42; Dan Ikenson, “Zeroing in: Antidumping’s Flawed Methodology under Fire,” Cato Free Trade Bulletin 11 (27 April 2004): 1–3; Thomas J. Prusa and Edwin Vermulst, “A One-Two Punch on Zeroing: U.S. – Zeroing (EC) and U.S. – Zeroing (Japan),” World Trade Review 8(1) (2009): 187–41. 93. For more information about the case, see 76 Federal Register (FR) 23281, 26 April 2011; 76 Federal Register 23298 and 23281, 26 April 2011; 77 Federal Register 4007, 26 January 2012; and 77 Federal Register 4279,27Jan- uary 2012. 94. Given its small market share in the United States, Daewoo decided not to participate in the collaboration. Legal consultant to MOFAT, discussion with the author, 12 March 2013. 95. MOFAT Official, in discussion with the author, 16 March 2012. 96. MOFAT legal consultant, discussion with the author, 12 March 2013. 97. The ITC determined antidumping duties on South Korean and Mexican- made washing machines by Samsung (9.29 percent) and LG (13.02 percent), along with a countervailing duty of 1.85 percent against Samsung. Daewoo Electronics, reportedly left the US market entirely, was also subjected to an antidumping duty of 154.71 percent. See Jeoug-hun Lee, “Seoul mulling complaint to WTO over anti-dumping duties,” The Hankyoreh, 9 August 2013, http://www.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_international/598969 .html, Retrieved on 1 November 2013. For the appeals, see United States Court of International Trade, L.G. Electronics Inc. v. United States International Trade Commission, Consol. Court No. 13-00100, 2013; United States Court of International Trade, Samsung Electronics Inc. v. United States International Trade Commission, Consol. Court No. 13-0098/13-0099, 2013. 98. United States Court of International Trade, Consol. Court No. 13-00100. Similar with Samsung’s CIT appeal, the GOK contended that the tax credit Notes 135

that Samsung received is similar to the financial benefits American companies get from tax credits. The GOK also supported LG which, in its appeal to US CIT, stated the DOC investigation found no evidence of targeted dumping but “merely reflected the normal commercial practice of promotional pricing during certain time periods during the course of a year.” 99. Yonhap News, “South Korea Requests WTO Settlement of U.S. Duties Against South Korean Washers,” 29 August 2013, http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/ 100. In 2012, Korea was the sixth largest trade partner to the Philippines whereas the Philippines ranked 20th in Korea’s major trade partner. See Embassy of the Philippines to Korea, Philippine Trade and Investment Center, http:// www.philembassy-seoul.com/ptic.asp. Retrieved 20 August 2013. 101. The affected firms included Daelim Corp., Hanwah Corp., Kolon Interna- tional Corp., Hyundai Corp., SK Global Co., Jinwon Trading, LT Interna- tional, Sekitoku, Sewon Corp., and Hyosung Co. See The Philippine Star, “DTI Lifts Anti-dumping Duty on Korean Resins,” 21 November 2001, http://www.philstar.com/. Retrieved on 2 August 2012. 102. A former MOFAT official, in discussion with the author, 29 March 2012. 103. See The Philippine Star, “DTI Lifts Anti-dumping Duty on Korean Resins.” As a response to the GOK’s request, the Philippines Permanent Mission in Geneva found that there was no significant increase in the volume of dumped imports, both in absolute terms and relative to domestic consumption. The Philippines Tariff Commission later confirmed the findings and lifted the measures. 104. A former MOFAT official, 29 March 2012. 105. Dent, The Foreign Economic Policies of Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan, 85. 106. Legal consultant to MOFAT, in discussion with the author, 12 March 2013.

4 Taiwan: The Developmental State Trying to Be Litigious

1. Studies show that a country is less active in using the WTO dispute settlement system if alternative forums are available. See Christina Davis, “Overlapping Institutions in Trade Policy,” Perspectives & Politics 7(1) (March 2009): 25–31. 2. According to the Taiwanese official data in 1989, these restrictions include quotas of textiles, footwear, canned mushrooms, and the VER of steel products. Bureau of Foreign Trade, Ministry of Economic Affairs, the Republic of China, 1989 Nian Geguo Dui Hua Maoyi Zhangai Huibian [Foreign Trade Barri- ers against the Republic of China] (Taipei: Bureau of Foreign Trade, Ministry of Economic Affairs,1989). 3. Taiwan was ranked behind China, the United States, South Korea and Japan. For the statistics, see Thomas Prusa, “East Asia’s Anti-dumping Problem,” The World Economy 29(6) (2006): 743–61. 4. Prusa, “East Asia’s Anti-dumping Problem.” According to Prusa, from 1980 to 2002, the United States imposed 56 antidumping orders on goods from Taiwan. 5. To use the US record as an example, antidumping orders against Taiwan included polyvinyl chloride sheet and film; polyethylene terephthalate film, 136 Notes

sheet, and strip; acrylic sheets; polyvinyl alcohol; carbon steel plate; stainless steel bars; hot-rolled and cold-rolled carbon steel flat products; and many other stainless steel products. 6. Chinese National Federation of Industries, Guonei Qiye Chukou Shichang Maoyi Zhangai Diaocha Baogao, 2003–2011 [Reports on Foreign Trade Bar- riers to the Domestic Enterprises, 2003–2011], 2003–2011, http://wto.cnfi .org.tw/all-module12.php?module_class=2 Retrieved on 20 January 2013. 7. Inflation and land reform were the top priorities to the Kuomintang government after the retreat from Mainland. To tackle these issues, it adopted conservative monetary and financial rules to control credit flows and wealth aggregation. For more information, see Joel D. Aberbach, David Dollar, and Kenneth L. Sokoloff, eds., The Role of the State in Taiwan’s Development (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1994); Thomas B. Gold, State and Society in the Taiwan Miracle (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 1986); Tun-Jen Cheng and Yun-hen Chu, “State-Business Relationship in Taiwan: A Political Economic Perspec- tive,” in Peter C.Y. Chow, ed., Taiwan’s Modernization in Global Perspective (Newport, CT: Praeger, 2002): pp. 195–214. 8. Gereffi, Global Production Systems and Third World Development. 9. Hsin-Huang Michael Hsiao, “Jiedu Taiwan Zhongxiao Qiye Jia Yu Da Qiye Jia De Chuangye Guocheng,” [The Entrepreneurial Process of Taiwan’s Small- Medium and Big Businessmen] Zhongguo Shehui Xue Kan [Chinese Journal of Sociology] 16 (1993): 139–67; Marco Orru, “The Institutional Logic of Small- Firm Economies in Italy and Taiwan,” Studies In Comparative International Development 26(1) (Spring 1991): 3–28; Gary Gereffi, “Global Production Systems and Third World Development,” in Barbara Stallings, ed., Global Change, Regional Response: The New International Context of Development (New York, Cambridge University Press: 1995): pp. 100–42. 10. For more discussion on Taiwan’s technology industries, see Peter C.Y. Chow, Taiwan in the Global Economy: From an Agrarian Economy to an Exporter of High- tech Products (Newport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2002); Zhaocheng Mai and Jiansheng Shi, Taiwan’s Economic Success Since 1980 (Cheltenhem: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2001); and Suzanne Berger and Richard K. Lester, eds., Global Taiwan: Building Competitive Strengths in a New International Economy (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2005). 11. Hua-yuan Xue, Taiwan Maoyi Shi [Taiwan Trade History] (Taipei: Taiwan External Trade Development Council, 2008): pp. 348–57. 12. Xue, Taiwan Maoyi Shi [Taiwan Trade History], p. 352. 13. In 2002, TSMC ranked ninth in the world’s top 20 semiconductor sales lead- ers (including foundries). It moved to third in 2012 while UMC moved up to 19th. IC Insights, “Research Bulletin,” 7 November 2012, http://www .icinsights.com/data/articles/documents/466.pdf. Retrieved on 2 April 2013. 14. Robert C. Feenstra, Tzu-Han Yang, and Gary G. Hamilton, “Business Groups and Product Variety in Trade: Evidence from South Korea, Taiwan and Japan,” Journal of International Economics 48 (1999): 71–100. 15. The six largest chaeb˘ol firms contributed to 70 percent of Korea’s overall exports. Williamson, “South Korea’s Small Businesses Fight for Survival”. 16. For the data on export restrictions on Taiwan, see Chu-Wei Tseng, Woguo zao qingxiao kongsu qijian gean chanpin zhi xingwei fenxi-yi meiguo 1992–1998 nian anjian wei li [The Effect of Antidumping Suits on Taiwan’s Exports: Study Notes 137

on the United States Antidumping Cases, 1992–1998] (Taipei: Trade Inves- tigation Committee, Ministry of Economic Affairs, 2000). Tseng’s study was based on the period 1980–1989 but the data did not include the trade remedy measures from Australia. 17. Timothy J. Stergeon and Ji-Ren Lee, “Industry Co-Evolution: A Compari- son of Taiwan and North American Electronics Contract Manufacturers,” in Suzanne Berger and Richard Keith Lester, eds., Global Taiwan: Building Com- petitive Strengths in a New International Economy (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2005): pp. 33–75. 18. TSMC is the largest wafer foundry manufacturer in the world, whose annual production is worth of US$14.6 billion in 2012. However, the production scale of wafer foundry is still much smaller than that of regular integrated circuit (IC). For example, the production of Intel and Samsung, two largest IC producers in the world, is US$49.7 billion and US$32.7 billion in 2012 respectively. IC Insights, “Research Bulletin,” 7 November 2012. 19. Gwo-shyong Shieh, “Boss” Island: The Subcontracting Network and Micro- entrepreneurship in Taiwan’s Development (New York: Peter Lang Publication Co., 1993). 20. Yun-han Chu, “State Structures and Economic Adjustment in the East Asian Newly Industrializing Countries,” International Organization 43(4) (August 1989): 647–72; Tun-Ren Cheng, The Politics of Industrial Transformation: The Case of the East Asian NICs, PhD Thesis (Berkeley: University of California, Berkeley, 1987). 21. Tun-jen Cheng, “Political Regimes and Development Strategies: South Korea and Taiwan,” in Gary Gerefﬁ and Donald Wyman, eds., Manufactured Mir- acles: Patterns of Development in Latin America and East Asia (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991): pp. 153–17; Karl Fields, “Strong States and Business Organization in Korea and Taiwan,” in Sylvia Maxﬁeld and Ben Ross Schneider, eds., Business and the State in Developing Countries (Ithaca: Cornell University Press): pp. 149–51. 22. These state-owned think tanks included Academia Sinica (also known as Central Research Academy), the Industrial Technology Research Institute, built in 1974 to conduct research and development for important industrial technologies, and Chung-Hua Institution for Economic Research, built in 1980 to specialize macroeconomic and global economy. For more information, see Robert Wade, Governing the Market, p. 275; Fields, Strong States and Business Organization in Korea and Taiwan, pp. 149–50. 23. For example, Taiwan Textile Federation was involved in negotiating textile quota with the European Community. Taiwanese Electric Appliance Manu- facturer’s Association (now “Taiwan Electrical and Electronic Manufacturers’ Association,” TEEMA) worked with the government in transferring integrated circuit technology to the private sector. For more discussion, see Yun-han Chu, “State Structures and Economic Adjustment in the East Asian Newly Industrializing Countries,” International Organization 43(4) (August 1989): 647–72. Karl J. Fields, “Trading Companies in South Korea and Taiwan: Two Policy Approaches,” Asian Survey 29(11) (November 1989): 1073–89. 24. Peter Evans, “The State as Problem and Solution: Predation, Embed- ded Autonomy, and Structural Change,” in Stephan Haggard and Robert 138 Notes

R. Kaufman, eds., The Politics of Economic Adjustment (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), 158–63. 25. Chao-Chi Wang, Taiwan Gongye Tuanti De Zhuanxing Yu Fazhan [The Transfor- mation and Development of Industry Associations in Taiwan] (Taipei: Ding-Mao Publishing Co., 2001). 26. Hung-Min Tsai, Keji jingji luntan-Xin Shidai Zhongxiao Qiye Xilie: Jing Fa Hui Hulue De Jingji Fazhan Zhongda Yiti-(3) Ruhe Xiezhu Zhongxiao Qiye Zouchu Kunjing Zuotan Hui Shilu [Technology and Economy Forum–New Genera- tion SME Series: The Issues the Economic Development Advisory Committee Neglected and How to Assist SMEs during Hard Time], 6 September 2011, hosted by National Policy Foundation and the Economic Developmen- tal Council of the Taiwanese Government, Taipei, http://old.npf.org.tw/ monograph/series/series057-TE.PDF. Retrieved on 20 July 2012. 27. Gongshang Shibao [Commercial Times], 24 April 1995, Taipei, p. 10. 28. Taiwan Institute of Economic Research was created in 1976 by Chen-fu Koo, the founder of the NCAIC. The Institute specialized at researches on domestic market and industry policy recommendations. It was only until the 1990s that other private think tank, such as the Institute for National Policy Research, was created for similar functions. 29. See Lien-sheng Tsai and Xi Zhu, Woguo Suo Mianlin Shijie Ge Zhuyao Guojia Zhi Maoyi Zhangai [Trade Barriers against the Republic of China from Advanced Countries] (Taipei: The Bureau of Foreign Trade, the Ministry of Economic Affairs, 1986). 30. For more information about the fund, see Central News Agency, “BOFT Seeks Defense Fund to Fight ‘Protectionist’ Lawsuits,” 17 October 1984. 31. The International Trade Commission, Maoyi Jiuji Fanghuoqiang De Shiwu Yu Gainian [The Practice and Concept of the Firewall System of Trade Reme- dies] (Taipei: The Ministry of Economic Affairs, 1999). The project was in two-year term and was designed for the industry associations to take responsibility of its operation after the completion of the project. By 2005, this program helped eight industry associations set up the early warning system, including Taiwan Steel & Iron Industry Association, Petrochemical Industry Association of Taiwan, Taiwan Paper Industry Association, Taiwan Electronic and Electrical Manufacturers Association, Taiwan Semiconductor Industry Association, Taiwan Association of Mechanical Industry, Taiwan Cement Association, and Taiwan Plastic Association. 32. Senior ofﬁcial at the National Federation of Industry, in discussion with the author, 11 August 2011. 33. Wayne Lee (Director General, Kaohsiung Chamber of Industry), in discussion with the author, 20 August 2011. 34. The survey was conducted among members of Importers and Exporters Asso- ciation of Taipei, the largest association of trading ﬁrms in Taiwan. Meng-Jia Tsai, “Taiwan Maoyi yè De Weiji Yu Zhuanji,” [Crisis and Turning Point for Taiwan’s Trading Sector] Maoyi Zazhi [Trade Magazine] 181 (July 2006), Taipei: 15–23. 35. The concept of the OTN was started in 2004 by the Committee of External Economic Strategy chaired by the Deputy Prime Minister with the mission of coordinating Taiwan’s post-WTO entry foreign economic policy. Disagreements on the OTN’s position within the cabinet pended the process. Notes 139

36. MOEA legal consultant, in discussion with the author, 20 August 2011. 37. Section 6.6 describes the government’s responsibility to assist businesses to handle export barriers and commercial disputes. The Trade Law of 1993. 38. Section 15, Rules on Implementing the Trade Law of 1993. 39. Kristy Tsun-tzu Hsu (Associate Researcher, Taiwan WTO & RTA Center, Chung-Hua Institution for Economic Research), in discussion with the author, 12 August 2011. 40. Section 19–26, Chapter 4, Measures of Trade Promotion and Assistance, Republic of China, 2002. 41. Wan-wen Chu, Jingji Chengzhang De Jizhi—Yi Taiwan Shihua Ye Yu Zixingche Ye Wei Li [Economic Growth Mechanism: Studies of Taiwan’s Petrochemical and Bicycle Sectors] (Taipei: Taiwan Social Science Studies, 2002): pp. 199–224. 42. Chu, Jingji Chengzhang De Jizhi—Yi Taiwan Shihua Ye Yu Zixingche Ye Wei Li [Economic Growth Mechanism: Studies of Taiwan’s Petrochemical and Bicycle Sectors]. 43. The dumping margins for four foreign-invested or affiliated firms (AOC, Hitachi, Orion, and RCA) ranged from 0 to 3.5 percent. Among the local TV-makers, Sampo and Fulet received the highest duties (23.77 percent), followed by Tatung of 8.18 percent and all others of 5.45 percent. Federal Register,Vol.49,No.42, 1 March 1984. 44. There were 75 antidumping investigations against Taiwanese exports during this period from the United States, the EU, Canada, Australia and South Korea. Tseng reviewed 31 out of the 75 cases and found that the affirmative determination of the investigations by the Canadian trade authority was as high as 100 percent, followed by 55.6 percent by the American trade authority. Tseng, The Effect of Antidumping Suits on Taiwan’s Exports. 45. Thomas J. Prusa, “The Trade Effects of U.S. Antidumping Actions,” in Robert C. Feenstra, ed., Effects of U.S. Trade Protection and Promotion Policies (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997): pp. 191–213. 46. Lin reviewed 22 sunset reviews from 1995 to May 2005 and found 14 cases led to an affirmative determination of continuous antidumping order. Fong Lin, Meiguo Fanqingxiao Luori Fucha Sunhai Jiantao Yaodian Shiwu Qianxi [Appraisal on the US Antidumping Sunset Reviews and Their Impact], The Federation of Industry of Taiwan, November 2005, http://www.cnfi.org.tw/ wto/admin/upload/23/4-5.pdf Retrieved on 28 December 2012. 47. Sui-yu Wu (Attorney, Wu & Partners, Attorneys at Law), in discussion with the author, 15 August 2011. 48. Senior CNFI official, in discussion with the author, 11 August 2011. 49. In addition to the bike case, these investigations also included, to name a few, the 1985–1986 US antidumping/countervailing investigations on Taiwan-made porcelain and steel cooking ware and on stovetop stainless steel cooking ware, the 1984 Canadian antidumping investigation on Taiwan-made ladies’ handbags, and the 1985 Canadian investigation on Taiwan-made fasteners. 50. Central News Agency, “ROC Should Strengthen Washington Lobby U.S. Official Says,” 16 April 1987. 51. For example, due to its direct involvement in the 1986 US countervailing investigation on stovetop stainless steel cooking ware, the GOT assembled an 140 Notes

inter-ministerial taskforce that ensured the involved exporters cooperate in the investigations. The GOT covered the litigation and accounting expense of the case. 52. Chinese Television News, “Prime Minister criticized Micron’s charge as protectionist,” 13 August 1998. 53. This is the first case in which the Taiwanese exporters succeeded at both the appeal to the US CIT and the appeal after the applicant complained about the determination of the US ITC. 54. Gongshang Shibao [Commercial Times], Zhengfu Yi Shenshen Yunyong Fanqingxiao Cuoshi [The government should be cautious about antidumping orders], 31 May 1999, Taipei. 55. The result was issued as the 24th pubic announcement on 28 April 2004 by the Ministry of Commerce, People’s Republic of China. See Chinese National Federation of Industries, “Zhongguo Dalu Gonggao Zhongzhi Dui Wo Nilong Si Ji Nilong Jiagong Si Chanpin Zhi Fanqingxiao Diaocha [China Closed Antidumping Investigation on Nylon Imports],” 28 April 2004, http://www.cnfi.org.tw/wto/all-news.php?id=1682&t_type=s Retrieved on 14 October 2012. 56. In 2002, China started its first antidumping investigation on Taiwanese steel- makers, including China steel, Yieh Long, Kao Hsing Chang, Sheng Yu, and others. 57. A year later, China’s affirmative dumping determination was suspended after the TSIIA settled an agreement with its Chinese competitors regarding the marketing and pricing rules. 58. Ching-chang Yen (former Ambassador to the WTO, the Republic of China, Taiwan), in discussion with the author, 26 August 2011. 59. John Chen-Chung Deng (former director of the Office of Trade Negotiation, Ministry of Economic Affairs, the Republic of China, Taiwan), in discussion with the author, 29 August 2011. 60. Chun-fang Hsu (former Deputy Director General, Bureau of Foreign Trade, Ministry of Foreign Affairs. the Republic of China, Taiwan), in discussion with the author, 16 August 2011; Cheng-Chi Chen, (Negotiator for WTO dispute settlement, the Office of Trade Negotiation, the Ministry of Economic Affairs, the Republic of China, Taiwan), in discussion with the author, 8 August 2011. 61. Chen, 8 August 2011. 62. The Ministerial Declaration on Trade in Information Technology Products (ITA) was concluded by 29 participants at the Singapore Ministerial Con- ference in December 1996. The number of participants has grown to 70, representing about 97 percent of world trade in information technology products. The ITA provides for participants to completely eliminate duties on IT products covered by the Agreement. Developing country participants have been granted extended periods for some products. For more information, see the World Trade Organization, Information Technology Agree- ment, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/inftec_e/inftec_e.htm. Retrieved on 20 September 2011. 63. Deng, 29 August 2011. 64. The Office of Trade Negotiations, the Ministry of Economic Affairs, the Republic of China, “Wo Yu Mei, Ri Gongtong Xiang WTO Yaoqiu Notes 141

Chengli Zhengduan Jiejue Xiaozu Shenyi Oumeng Dui San Xiang Zixun Keji Chanpin Ke Zheng Guanshui An [Taiwan, the US and Japan filed WTO complaint against EU tariff on certain information technology products],” 29 August 2008, http://iknow.stpi.org.tw/Post/Read.aspx?PostID= 608. Retrieved on 21 November 2011. 65. The Office of Trade Negotiations, “Wo Yu Mei, Ri Gongtong Xiang WTO Yaoqiu Chengli Zhengduan Jiejue Xiaozu Shenyi Oumeng Dui San Xiang Zixun Keji Chanpin Ke Zheng Guanshui An.” 66. Wei-chun Liao (Assistant to the Negotiator of WTO Dispute Settlement, the Office of Trade Negotiation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Republic of China, Taiwan), in discussion with the author, 8 August 2011. 67. MOEA legal consultant, 20 August 2011. 68. Ya-yu Chen, Prosecutor, Ministry of Justice, Republic of China, in discussion with the author, 8 August 2011. 69. This multiple-party complaint was led by the EU and Japan and followed by South Korea, China, Norway, Switzerland, New Zealand, and Brazil. 70. By the end of 2001, the United States and Australia cut a deal regarding duties on steel products, which effectively exempted Australia from the 2002 safeguard order. The United States was forced to make separate bilateral agreements with Brazil, South Korea, and New Zealand after they further pursued the WTO panel proceedings over the 2002 safeguard order. Taiwan was the only WTO member that did not participate in the panel proceedings but made a bilateral settlement with the United States regarding the steel exports to the US market. 71. In the 1990s and prior, around 19 percent of Taiwan’s steel export went to the United States. After the US steel recession in the late 1990s, Taiwan’s steel exports to the United States dropped by over half in 2001 and continued to shrink since then. In 2010, the US steel market represented only 4 percent of Taiwan’s steel exports. 72. Taiwanese economic official, in discussion with the author, 8 August 2011. 73. Wu, 15 August 2011; Hsu, 12 August 2011. 74. Wu, 15 August 2011. 75. Taiwanese economic official, 8 August 2011.

5 The Legacy of a Developmental State: China’s Reservation in Using the WTO Dispute Settlement System

1. Gary Clyde Hufbauer and Jared C. Woollacott, Trade Disputes between China and the United States: Growing Pains So Far, Worse Ahead? Working Paper, Washington, DC: Peterson Institute for International Economics, December 2010. 2. Some countries offered Chinese exports, particularly agricultural, textile, and handicraft products, reasonable access to their markets either through voluntary MFN treatment or sometimes even preferential treatment through programs such as the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP). Nonetheless, the voluntary MFN treatment and the GSP, offered unilaterally, were subject to occasional scrutiny. For example, the US Congress voted on a year-to-year 142 Notes

basis during the 1990s, after floor debates over a number of issues, including China’s humanitarian record, on whether to continue granting China MFN status. 3. Li-Zhi Tan and Jen-Zhong Tan, “Waiguo dui hua fanqingxiao toushi ji qishi,” [Insights and Implication of Foreign Antidumping Orders against China] Waimao Jingji Guoji Maoyi [International Trade] 10 (2002): 54–8. 4. For the statistics, see The World Trade Organization, Antidumping statistics, http://www.wto.org/ Retrieved on 2 November 2011. 5. For example, Bown, examining the US antidumping measures against China during the 1995–2001 period, finds that Chinese exporters received an average antidumping margin of 131.77 percent—almost twice as high as the average facing all exporters. See Chad P. Bown, “China’s WTO Entry: Antidumping, Safeguards, and Dispute Settlement,” in Robert C. Feenstra and Shang-Jin Wei, eds., China’s Growing Role in World Trade (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010): pp. 281–337. 6. In antidumping investigations, the dumping margin, and thereby the maxi- mal possible duty, is derived from a comparison between the price at which the product is sold to importers in the importing country (the export price) and the product’s “normal value.” Under regular circumstances, the normal value corresponds to the price at which a like product is sold in the exporting country’s home market. However, in countries which are deemed to have no real market, establishing a home market price may be impos- sible in the sense that the prices there are not determined by supply and demand under a high degree of state interference. This situation, in trade law jargon, is called a “non-market economy” (NME). In the absence of a reliable home market price, the investigation of an NME country often uses the surrogate method, that is, the use of price or production data from third countries to evaluate the normal value of the product. However, unclear rules on how to select a third country often allow the investigators to arbi- trarily choose a representative country, which leads to positive rulings or exceedingly high dumping margins. Studies also show that NME exporters are more often found to be “conducting dumping” and thus face more severe antidumping duties than others. For more discussion, see Dukgeun Ahn and Jieun Lee, “Countervailing Duty Against China: Opening a Pandora’s Box in the WTO System?” Journal of International Economic Law 14(2) (2011): 329–68. 7. The precedence of exempting NME countries from countervailing duties comes from the landmark case Georgetown Steel Corp v. the United States made in 1983. In this case, the USCIT ruled that countervailing duties are not applicable to NMEs due to difficulties in calculation. For more detail, please see 49 Federal Register (7 May 1984): 19370–75. 8. WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Article 14. 9. The World Trade Organization, China’s WTO Accession Protocol, Section 15(b). 10. Article 16, China’s WTO Accession Protocol. According to the article, WTO members can use transitional product-specific safeguards against China’s exports until 2014. Many believe that the characteristics of this “China safeguard” are at odds with core WTO principles as it requires weak- ened evidentiary criterion. For more discussion about the impact of China safeguard, see Chad P. Bown and Meredith A. Crowley, “China’s Export Notes 143

Growth and the China Safeguard: Threats to the World Trading System?” Canadian Journal of Economics 43(4) (November 2010): 1353–88. 11. Prior to 2004, Chinese textile and garment exports were restricted by the WTO Agreement on Textiles and Clothing, which contained its own transitional safeguard provision during the phase-out of the Multi-Fiber Arrange- ment. In addition, China’s WTO Accession Protocol provided a transitional textile and apparel product safeguard policy instrument that can be used until 2008. 12. Zhongguo Haiguan Zazhi [China Customs Magazine], “2011 Nian Zhongguo Waimao 200 Qiang,” [Top 200 Chinese Exporters in 2011], May 2012. 13. “FIEs” hereby includes exclusive foreign-invested enterprises, joint- venture enterprises with foreign investment, and enterprises with foreign shareholders. 14. China 2012 Statistical Yearbook, National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2012. 15. Tianbiao Zhu, “Building Institutional Capacity for China’s New Economic Opening,” in Linda Weiss, ed., State in the Global Economy: Bring the Domes- tic Institutions Back In (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003): pp. 142–60; Seung-Wook Baek, “Does China Follow ‘the East Asian Develop- ment Model’?” Journal of Contemporary Asia 35(4) (2005): 485–98; Keun Lee, Donghoon Hahn, and Justin Lin, “Is China Following the East Asian Model? A ‘Comparative Institutional Analysis’ Perspective,’ ” The China Review 2(1) (Spring 2002): 85–120. 16. Tianshu Chu and Thomas J. Prusa, “The Reasons for and the Impact of Antidumping Protection: The Case of People’s Republic of China,” Economics Study Area Working Papers 69, East-West Center (April 2004): 19–20. 17. Barry R. Weingast, Qian Yingyi, and Montinola Gabriella, “Federalism, Chinese Style: The Political Basis for Economic Success in China,” World Politics 48(1) (1995): 50–81. 18. Ministry of Commerce of People’s Republic of China, “Zhongguo waimao shi nian she moca 736 yi meiyuan tongbi zengzhang 22.2 baifen” [China’s Trade Conflict in Last Decade Valued $73.6billion, 22.2 percent Increase From Last Year] 10 April 2013, http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/article/ Retrieved on 15 June 2013. 19. Chu and Prusa, “The Reasons for and the Impact of Antidumping Protec- tion,” pp. 17–19. 20. The World Trade Organization, Country Profile-China, September 2012, http://stat.wto.org/Home/WSDBHome.aspx?Language=E Retrieved on 10 December 2012. 21. They included the Self-Employed Laborers Association, representing small and medium private enterprises; the All-China Federation of Industry and Commerce, representing large private enterprises; the China Enterprise Confederation-China Enterprise Directors Association, representing large state-owned enterprises; the China Association for Enterprises with For- eign Investment, representing foreign invested firms; and nationality-based chambers of commerce. 22. For example, the Ministry of Light Industry and the Ministry of Textiles were transformed into the Light Industry Association and the Textile Industry Association respectively. 144 Notes

23. Hui Yu, “WTO tizhi xi a hanye xiehui de yingdui celue- yi fanqingxiao weili,” [Strategies for Business Associations under the WTO Framework: An Example from Antidumping] Zhong-Guo Gongye Jingji [China Industrial Economy] 3 (March 2002), Beijing: pp. 39–46. 24. Hui Yu, “Hangye xiehui ji qi zai zhongguo zhuanxing qi de fazhan,” [Indus- try Associations and Their Development in Transitioning China] Zhidu Jingji Xue Yanjiu [Institutional Economics Studies], 2003: p. 91. 25. For example, a survey on 49 industry associations in Shanghai suggested a third of their members failed to pay membership fees. See Yu, “WTO tizhi xia hanye xiehui de yingdui celue- yi fanqingxiao weili,” p. 40. 26. Yu, “WTO tizhi xia hanye xiehui de yingdui celue- yi fanqingxiao weili,” p. 44. 27. Yu, “Hangye xiehui ji qi zai zhongguo zhuanxing qi de fazhan,” pp. 75–124. 28. In addition to the seven national Chambers of Commerce of Exporters and Importers, chambers of commerce established based on the nationality of foreign investors, such as American Chamber of Commerce, also had foreign trade licenses. 29. Yu, “Hangye xiehui ji qi zai zhongguo zhuanxing qi de fazhan”. 30. Kellee S. Tsai, Back-Alley Banking: Private Entrepreneurs in China (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002); Scott Kennedy, “Transnational Political Alliances: An Exploration with Evidence from China,” Business & Society 46, no. 2 (June 2007): 174–200; Scott Kennedy, The Business of Lobbying in China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008). 31. Kennedy, “Transnational Political Alliances: An Exploration with Evidence from China.” 32. Kennedy, “Transnational Political Alliances: An Exploration with Evidence from China.” 33. Yu, “WTO tizhi xia hanye xiehui de yingdui celue- yi fanqingxiao weili.” 34. Shi-chun Wang, the former Director of the Bureau of Fair Trade for Imports and Exports, Ministry of Commerce, People’s Republic of China, interviewed by 21st Business Herald, 13 September 2004, http://finance.sina.com.cn/roll/ 20040914/13001022180.shtml Retrieved on 27 October 2011. 35. Legal scholar from a State Council-affiliated research organization, in discussion with the author, 18 July 2011. 36. Legal scholar from a State Council-affiliated research organization, 18 July 2011. 37. Legal scholar from a State Council-affiliated research organization, 18 July 2011. 38. The Regulations for Registration and Management of Social Organisations, Peoples Republic of China State Council Order No. 250, issued 25 October 1998. 39. Article 4, The Regulations for Registration and Management of Social Organisations. 40. These orders include People’s Republic of China State Economic and Trade Commission Order No. 139 (1997), Measures on Testing Industry Asso- ciations in the Selected Cities; Order No. 1016 (1999), Suggestions for Developing Industry and Commerce Associations; and Order No. 278 (2002), Tasks for Strengthening the Management and Development of Industry and Commerce Associations. Industry associations have started to develop more dynamically at the regional level. In Wenzhou, the most active industry Notes 145

associations are created by enterprises instead of the city government. In Shanghai, the government accepted FIE membership in some local industry associations so as to enhance the collaboration within industries in which FIEs play an essential part. 41. Rules of the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation on Response to Anti-Dumping Charges Raised by Foreign Countries against Chinese Export Commodities, Decree [1994] No. 1, Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation, People’s Republic of China, 12 April 1994. 42. The Provisions on Responding to Actions of Antidumping of Export Products, Decree [2001] No. 5, Minister of the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation, People’s Republic of China, 11 October 2001; The Provisions were revised under the same name, Decree [2006] No. 12, 14 August 2006. In addition, State Economic and Trade Commission Order No. 128 (2001) authorized industry associations to handle trade remedy measures related to both import and export. 43. Foreign Trade Barrier Investigation Rules, Decree [2005] No.4, The Ministry of Commerce, People’s Republic of China, 21 January 2005. 44. Henry S. Gao, “Taking Justice into Your Own Hand: The TBI Mechanism in China,” Journal of World Trade 44 (2010): 633–59. 45. Scott Kennedy, “Transnational Political Alliances: An Exploration with Evi- dence from China,” Business & Society 46(2) (June 2007): 174–200. 46. Yu, “WTO tizhi xia hanye xiehui de yingdui celue- yi fanqingxiao weili,” This count included participants throughout the preliminary to ﬁnal investigations. 47. Bin Jiang and Alexandra E. Ellinger, “Challenges for China-the World’s Largest Antidumping Target,” Business Horizons 46(3) (2003): 25–30; Messerlin, “Economic Effects of China’s Accession to the World Trade Organization.” 48. Richard S. Eckaus, “China’s Exports, Subsidies to State Owned Enterprises and the WTO,” China Economic Review 17 (2006): 1–13; Robert Cull and Lixin Colin Xu, “Who Gets the Credit? The Behavior of Bureaucrats and State Banks in Allocating Credit to Chinese State-Owned Enterprises,” Journal of Economic Development 71 (2003): 553–59. 49. Chinese trade lawyer, in discussion with the author, 6 July 2011. 50. The charge was against color televisions with screens under 14 inches. The two Japanese joint ventures were Hitachi-Fujian and Hua-Qiang Sanyo, and the three SOEs were China Great Wall Manufacturing Co. (Shanghai Branch), China National Export and Import Co. of Electronic Appliances, and China National Export and Import Co. of Light Industry (Tianjin Branch). 51. China National Export and Import Co. of Electronic Appliances, whose overseas sales were mostly to developing countries, was not willing to share the cost of litigation proposed by the other two SOEs. They eventually failed to establish a mutual fund for handling antidumping charges. 52. Charles Tiefer, “Sino 301: How Congress Can Effectively Review Relations with China after WTO Accession,” Cornell International Law Journal 34(1) (2001): 55, 78. 53. Nadeem M. Firoz and Ahmed S. Maghrabi, “Antidumping War against China and the Effects of WTO Membership,” Journal of American Academy of Business 3 (September 2003): 311–18. 146 Notes

54. “San da hangye jianli fanqingxiao yujingji zhi [Three Major Sectors Estab- lished Early Warning System against Antidumping Suits],” The People’s Daily, 12 September 2002, http://www1.peopledaily.com.cn/BIG5/jinji/31/ 179/20020912/820913.html. Retrieved on 21 December 2011. 55. “Sheng: Maoyi baohu shi zhongguo kuoda chukou de zhongyao zhangai,” [Trade Protectionism is the Major Barrier for China’s Export Expansion, said Shi] The People’s Daily, 4 June 2002, http://www.people.com.cn/BIG5/jinji/ 31/179/20020604/744059.html. Retrieved on 11 December 2011. 56. In 2007, the Chinese National Development and Reform Commission set a renewable energy plan target of reaching 1,800 megawatts of installed solar capacity by 2020. “CORRECTED-China solar set to be five times 2020 target- researcher,” Reuters, 5 May 2009, http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/05/ 05. Retrieved on 11 January 2012. 57. “Quanqiu Dui Hua Qing Gong hangye Maoyi Jiuji Anjian De Tedian Yu Qushi,” [Characters and Trend of World Trade Remedy Measures on Light Industries] International Business Daily, 11 May 2012, http://cafiec.mofcom .gov.cn/article/tongjipeixun/ Retrieved on 8 April 2013. It reported the metal industry overall had a 60-percent response rate to all foreign trade remedy charges and 85 percent to the charges issued by developed countries. 58. Legal scholar from a State-Council-affiliated research organization, in discussion with the author, 9 July 2011; legal scholar from a State-Council- affiliated research organization, in discussion with the author, 19 July 2011; researcher affiliated with MOFCOM, in discussion with the author, 21 August 2011. 59. Chinese trade lawyer, 6 July 2011. 60. In these two sectors, only Zibo Aifudi Plastic Packaging Co. completed the entire investigation and received antidumping duty of 64.28 percent and countervailing duty of 29.54 percent. 73 Federal Register 45405, 5 August 2008 and 73 Federal Register 45941, 7 August 2008. 61. Zhe Shang Network, Gangtie Qiye Wunai Kangbian Shuang Fan Tuxian Duilei Ying Shang Beijing [Steel Sector Contested Double Measures in Despair], 26 June 2008, http://biz.zjol.com.cn/05biz/system/2008/06/26/009666050 .shtml. Retrieved on 10 December 2012. 62. However, as many have observed, this decision is, unlike most WTO dispute cases, more a result of “bandwagoning.” See Henry S. Gao, “Aggressive Legalism: The East Asian Experience and Lessons for China,” in Henry S. Gao and Donald Lewis, eds., China’s Participation in the WTO (London: Cameron May, 2005), 315–51. 63. This case is the first and only one so far where the GOC initiated a lawsuit at the national court of another country or jurisdiction. In principle, the GOC holds that it enjoys the jurisdictional immunities of a state from the jurisdiction of another state’s court under international law. In practice, the GOC has never responded to cases in the court of another state so far. For a brief study of China’s past practice and position in relation to state immunity, please see Dahai Qi, “State Immunity, China and Its Shifting Position,” Chinese Journal of International Law 7(2) (June 2008): 307–37. 64. For more information about the US CIT refusal, see United States Court of International Trade, Government of the People’s Republic of China v. United States, Slip Op. 07–50, Court No. 07-00010, 2007. Notes 147

65. The panel report disfavored most of China’s claims but the Appellate Body ruling reversed several key points in favor of China. See The World Trade Organization, WT/DS379/AB/R, 3 November 2011. 66. Application of Tariff Act of 1930 to Nonmarket Economy Countries,PublicLaw, No. 112–99, 126 States 265 (March 2012). 67. Also see “German, Chinese Ministers Condemn Protectionism,” Peo- ple’s Daily, 26 February 2009, http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90776/ 90883/6601169.html Retrieved on 11 January 2013; “China: Protectionism Is No Cure to Crisis,” Xinhua News, 10 February 2011. Retrieved on 11 January 2013. 68. United States Court of International Trade, GPX International Tire Corporation v. United States, No. 08–00285, 1 October 2010. 69. First, China explained that DOC inflated duties on the same goods by cal- culating antidumping and countervailing duties with rates for an NME, in other words, “double counting.” Second, China asserted that the United States generalized the inputs of SOE suppliers at the upstream industries and the loans from state-owned commercial banks as “financial contribu- tions from public bodies” without sufficiently proving that the business operations of these entities are influenced or controlled by the government. Finally, China opposed the general practice of using surrogate price to calculate the “real market price” and the subsidy margins derived from public bodies through, for example, interest rates and granted land-use rights. For more information, see The World Trade Organization, G/ADP/D74/1, G/L/854, G/SCM/D78/1, WT/DS379/1, 2008. 70. Elliot J. Feldman, “Unless It’s All Politics, China And The United States Should Tone It Down,” 25 April 2011, http://www.chinaustradelawblog.com Retrieved on 12 November 2011. However, other lawyers argue that this litigation strategy choice is rational in WTO dispute settlements since the government has to fight over issues of “principle” instead of the particular measures that affect the private sector. Chinese trade lawyer, 6 July 2011. 71. This measure was not properly addressed until 2012 when the GOC filed another WTO complaint (DS437). However, the WTO Panel Report for DS437 did not uphold China’s contestation. For more information, see The World Trade Organization, WT/DS437/R. 2014. 72. Geoff Dyer and Tom Braithwaite, “US Tyre Duties Spark China Clash,” Financial Times, 13 September 2009; Gordon G. Chang, “The Coming Trade War With China,” in Forbes, 3 July 2009; and The Economists,“When Partners Attack: China Will Test the WTO’s Dispute-settlement System,” 11 February 2011. 73. Compared to other industry associations in China, the CRIA tire branch has exceptionally high coverage of the industry: its membership covers 90 percent of China’s tire production. For more information, see The Tire Branch of China Rubber Industry Association, http://www.tyrefh.org/ Retrieved on 15 January 2012. 74. Researcher affiliated with MOFCOM, 21 August 2011. 75. Before the tires case, ten WTO members initiated a total of 31 special safeguard investigations against China: the United States (6), India (6), Turkey (6), Columbia (4), Ecuador (4), the EU (1), Peru (1), Canada (1), Taiwan (under the name Chinese Taipei) (1), and the Dominican Republic (1). Out of 148 Notes

these investigations, three led to activation of safeguard orders: Turkey (float glass), India (aluminum flat rolled products and aluminum foil), and Taiwan (towels). 76. The complaint was filed after the WTO appellate body ruled against Canada’s measures relating to domestic content requirements which affected imported renewable energy generation facilities (DS412). China’s complaint was against similar measures in the EU. 77. This refers to Council Regulation (EC) No. 384/96, Article 9(5) (the Basic Anti- Dumping Regulation). 78. For more detail about the issues contested by the GOC, see The World Trade Organization, WT/DS397/1, G/L/891, G/ADP/D79/1, 2009. 79. In 2006, the EU imposed antidumping duties of 16.5 percent on footwear with leather uppers from China. Due to disagreement within the EU on this issue, the term of the order was cut from five to two years. In 2008, the EU Council, a political organ, instead of the EC, reviewed the antidumping order and determined to extend the order for another 15 months. 80. Legal scholar from a State-Council-affiliated research organization, 19 July 2011; Researcher affiliated with MOFCOM, 21 August 2011. 81. In this case, hundreds of footwear-makers responded to the preliminary investigation and less than 30 completed until the final investigation. For the ruling result, see Official Journal of the European Union, L275, 6 October 2006, 1. 82. Official Journal of the European Union, L 29, 31 January 2009, p. 1. 83. Court of Justice of the European Union, Ningbo Yonghong Fasteners v. Coun- cil, Case T-150/09, 2009; Shanghai Biaowu High-Tensile Fastener and Shanghai Prime Machinery v. Council, Case T-170/09, 2009. 84. Court of Justice of the European Union, Zhejiang Aokang Shoes v. Council, Case C-247/10P, 2010. 85. “China Shoemakers Call for Appeal against EU’S Extension of Anti- Dumping Duties,” Xinhua News Agency, 27 December 2009, http://news. xinhuanet.com/english/2009-12/27/content_12708125.htm. Retrieved on 14 January 2013. 86. Ji Wenhua, a legal consultant at the DTL made a similar point about the chance of winning as one of the key considerations when filing WTO complaints. See Cui Huang, “China’s Path to the Center Stage of WTO Dispute Settlement: Challenges and Responses,” Global Trade and Customs Journal 5, 9 (2010): 365–77. 87. Chad P. Bown, “U.S.-China Trade Conflicts and the Future of the WTO,” Fletcher Forum of World Affairs 33 (2009): 44.

6Conclusion

1. To compare the size of top Korean and Taiwanese exporters, see Table 3.4 in Chapter 3 and Table 4.8 in Chapter 4. 2. For more discussion on this point, see Messerlin, “Economic Effects of China’s Accession to the World Trade Organization.” 3. For more discussion on how business environment and product turnover affect ﬁrm’s preference of using WTO litigation, see Christina L. Davis Notes 149

and Yuki Shirato, “Firms, Governments, and WTO Adjudication: Japan’s Selection of WTO Disputes,” World Politics 59(2) (January 2007): 274–313. 4. Saadia Pekkanen, Japan’s Aggressive Legalism: Law and Foreign Trade Politics Beyond the WTO (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2008), 9–30. 5. Susan Strange, The Retreat of the State: The Diffusion of Power in the World Econ- omy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Robert Cox, “Democ- racy in Hard Times: Economic Globalization and the Limits to Liberal Democracy,” in Anthony McGrew, ed., The Transformation of Democracy? Globalization and Territorial Democracy (Malden: Polity Press, 1997), 49–72; Thomas L. Friedman, The Lexus and the Olive Tree: Understanding Globalization (New York: Anchor Books, 1999). 6. About the debates, see Linda Weiss, “Developmental States in Transition: Adapting, Dismantling, Innovating, Not ‘Normalizing,’ ” The Pacific Review 13(1) (2000): 21–55; Robert Wade, “What Strategies are Viable for Develop- ing Countries Today? The World Trade Organization and the Shrinking of ‘Development Space,’ ” Review of International Political Economy 10(4) (2003): 621–44; Tom Ginsburg, “Dismantling the ‘ Developmental State’? Admin- istrative Procedure Reform in Japan and Korea,” The American Journal of Comparative Law 49(4) (Autumn, 2001): 585–625; Eun-mee Kim, “Contradic- tions and Limits of a Developmental State: With Illustrations from the South Korean Case,” Social Problems 40(2) (May 1993): 228–49; Chang Kyung-Sup, Ben Fine, and Linda Weiss, Developmental Politics in Transition: The Neoliberal Era and Beyond (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012). 7. Joseph Wong, “Adaptive Developmental States,” Journal of East Asian Stud- ies 4(3) (2004): 345–62; Elizabeth Thurbon, “The Developmental Logic of Financial Liberalisation in Taiwan,” in William Redvers Garside, ed., Institu- tions and Market Economies: The Political Economy of Growth and Development (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007): p. 87–106; Sung-Young Kim, “The Rise of East Asia’s Global Companies,” Global Policy 4(2) (2013): 184–93; Sung- Young Kim and Elizabeth Thurbon, “Developmental Environmentalism: Explaining South Korea’s Ambitious Pursuit of Green Growth,” Politics & Societies 43(2) (2015): 213–40. 8. Peter Evans, “The Eclipse of the State?” 86. 9. Linda Weiss, “Is the State Being ‘Transformed’ by Globalization?” in Linda Weiss, ed., States in the Global Economy (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge Univer- sity Press, 2003): p. 308. 10. For more discussion on the origin of East Asia’s FTA movement, see Paul Bowles, “Regionalism and Development After (?) The Global Finan- cial Crises,” New Political Economy 5(3) (November 2000): 433–55; Mireya Solis, Barbara Stallings, and Saori N. Katada, eds., Competitive Regionalism: FTA Diffusion in the Pacific Rim (New York: Palgrave Macmillan 2009); Vinod K. Aggarwal and Shujiro Urata, eds. Bilateral Trade Agreements in the Asia-Pacific: Origins, Evolution, and Implications (New York: Routledge, 2006). Bibliography

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antidumping measures China China, 2, 80–2, 84, 86, 88–99, countervailing measures, 80–1, 101–4, 108–10 94–9, 101–2, 104 export barriers, 32 The Department of Treaty and Law Korea, 32–5, 38, 42–50, 54–6 (DTL), 88, 114 from 1995 to 2011, 1, 11 export barriers, 79, 80–2, 98 pre-WTO age, 11 export sector’s structure, 82–6 Taiwan, 58–60, 62, 66, 68–73, foreign antidumping charges, 91–5 76–8 government–business relation, 86–9 United States, 26 high aggression litigation, 98–104 WTO rules, 24–5 Appellate Body Report (China), legal status, trade law, 89–90 99–100 safeguard measures, 80–2, 94–6, Asian financial crisis (1997-98), 18, 33, 100–1, 104, 116 56, 111 state-owned enterprises (SOEs), 83–4, 86–8, 91–3 Bureau of International Trade (BIT), WTO DSB cases, 95–8 76 see also China’s WTO litigation; business actors Government of China (GOC) Chinese, 82–3, 88–90, 105–6 China Chamber of Commerce for dispute settlement procedures, 23 Importers and Exporters of executive branch, 9 Metals, Minerals and Chemicals government capacity and, 118–19 (CCCMC), 88, 94–5 information sharing, 21 China Iron and Steel Industry Korean, 111 Association (CISA), 88, 94 legislative branch, 117 China’s WTO litigation Taiwanese, 107 Accession Protocol, 80–1 transnational, 118 after 2008, 114 WTO litigation, 7, 10, 15 antidumping investigations, 95, 98 Department of Treaty and Law, 88 chaeb˘ol firms foreign-invested enterprises (FIEs), economies of scale, 38–9, 106–7 83–6, 93, 95, 110 elite-like groups, 39 NME status, 93 export market, 36, 47 global expansion, 35 since 1980s, 104 GOK collaboration, 43, 50, 53–4, state influence, 116 57 with US, 79, 98–101 MOFAT, 56 Chinese National Federation of oligopoly, 35, 56 Commerce (CNFC, Taiwan), 64 OMT’s role, 41 Chinese National Federation of policy promotions, 40 Industry (CNFI, Taiwan), 64–6 subcontractors, 38–9 Committee of Bike-makers (Taiwan), top selling products, 38 68

168 Index 169 countervailing measures Korea, 32–5 China, 80–1, 94–9, 101–2, 104 Taiwan, 58–61 from 1995 to 2011, 1 government subsidies, 21 Federation of Korean Industry (FKI), Hynix case, 115–16 39–40, 51 importing country, 24 Firewall of Trade Remedies project Korea, 32–5, 45–6, 49, 51–2, (Firewall project), 66 54–5, 57 Free trade agreements (FTA), 57, 119 Taiwan, 59–60, 66, 68 foreign-invested enterprises (FIEs), US, 115 83–6, 93, 95, 110 WTO litigation, 10–11 CRIA Tire Branch (China), 100 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) Daewoo, 36–7, 42, 44, 54 antidumping measures, 33 Dispute Settlement Body of the World Government of Korea (GOK), 40 Trade Organization (DSB) provisional agreement, 4 adjudication power, 3 Taiwan, 58 China, 72, 98, 105 total complaints, 11 East Asia’s reservation, 12–13 Uruguay Round, 9 Free trade agreements (FTA), 119 Generalized System of Preference Government of Korea (GOK), 43, (GSP), 58 47, 54 Globalization, 16, 18–9, 117–20 rulings, 4–7 Goldstar, 35, 42–4, 48, 50, 111 see also dispute settlement Government of China (GOC) mechanism the EU’s action, 102 dispute settlement mechanism export barriers, 79, 98 East Asia’s trade disputes, 10–14 institutional infrastructure, 86 executive branch–business NME status, 93–4, 105 coalition, 8–10 policymaking network, 88–9 introduction, 1–3 regional separation, 86, 92–3 litigation and adjudication, 3–8 subsidy, 84, 91–3 overview, 15–16 WTO complaint ﬁling, 98–101, 104, process, 5 114 Dispute Settlement Understanding of see also LG Electronics the World Trade Organization Government of Korea (GOK) (DSU), 4, 7, 79 conglomerate collaboration, 32 DOC/ITC investigations (China), 99 corporatist system, 64 Doha round negotiations, 119 dynamic random access memory Dynamic random-access memory chips (DRAMs), export, 43–4 chips (DRAMs), 43, 48, 113 ﬁnancial crisis 1997–1998, 34 FTA diplomacy, 57 embedded autonomous states, 20 IMF funds, 52 European Commission (EC), 33, 51–2, Korea Iron and Steel Association 58, 92, 105 (KOSA), 45 export barriers LG’s appeal to US CIT, 55 background, 17–19 oligopoly, 36 China, 80–2 Pohang Iron and Steel Corporation Government–business (POSCO), 54 collaboration, 19–24 ship building industry, 44, 51 170 Index

Government of Korea (GOK) – Japan continued antidumping issues, 2 small and medium enterprises chipmakers, 43–4; see also Dynamic (SMEs), 39 random-access memory chips trade laws, 42 (DRAMs) US antidumping charges, 46 countervailing duties, 11 WTO entry, 115 economic miracle, 18 see also chaeb˘ol ﬁrms executive branch, 21 Government of Taiwan (GOT) import quotas, 58 antidumping charges (Canada), 68 international trade laws, 10, 20 corporatist system, 64 joint ventures, 92 export-oriented associations, 66, 68 Korean exports, 33 ITA case, 74 Ministry of Economy, Trade and SMEs, 61 Industry (METI), 8 Taiwan Electrical Appliance OEM subsidiaries, 69, 74 Manufacturers Association oligopolies, 107 (TEAMA), 69 OTN mediation, 116 top-down approach, 70 trade remedy measures, 13, 19 trade disputes, 58 WTO litigation, 1, 8–9, 22, 73 WTO entry, 71–3, 77–8 government–business collaboration Kim Dae-jung, 53, 115–16 business actor’s role, 15 Korea China, 16 countervailing measures, 32–5, developmental states, 19–24, 45–6, 49, 51–2, 54–5, 57 117–18 export barriers, 32–5 effects of export structure, export sector’s structure, 35–9 26–9 foreign antidumping charges, state capacity, 19–24 electronic industry, 42–7 Foreign Trade Act of 1996, 42 Taiwan, 16, 74 FTA diplomacy, 57 trade disputes, 2, 17 government–business relation, WTO litigation, 15, 117 39–41 GPX law, 99 high aggression litigation, 50–5 legal status, trade law, 42 Hynix, 36–7, 49, 51–3, 57, 111, low aggression litigation, 55–6 115 major exporters, 37 Hyundai, 36–7, 44, 48, 50–1, private sector-based trade policy, 111 42 safeguard measures, 32, 48, 53–4 International Monetary Fund (IMF), top-ten exporting goods, 50–3, 115–16 1990–2010, 38 International Technology Agreement Trade Act of 1986, 42 (ITA), 74 WTO DSB cases, 47–50 international trade (WTO) see also Government of Korea government–business collaboration, (GOK) 15 Korea International Trade Association investigating authorities, 24 (KITA), 39–40, 51–2 litigation, 1, 3, 9, 20, 57 Korea Iron and Steel Association provisional agreement, 4 (KOSA), 45, 54 Index 171

Korea-US Free Trade Agreement Pohang Iron and Steel Corporation (KORUS), 54–5, 119 (POSCO), 36–7, 44–6, 48–9, 53–4, Korean Shipbuilders Association 111 (KOSHIPA), 39, 44, 53 policymaking networks Kuomintang (KMT), 64 China, 86–8 effect on government-business LG Electronics, 37, 42, 49–51, 54–5, collaboration, 26–9 57, 111, 115 Korea, 39–41 liquid crystal display (LCD), 62–3, 74, Taiwan, 64–7 109 Protocol on the Accession of the People’s Republic of China , 80–1, Minister of Foreign Trade and 103 Economic Cooperation (MOFTEC, public–private partnership, 16, 21, China), 93–4 113, 118–19 see also Ministry of Foreign Commerce ((MOFCOM, China) regional governments (China), 87–8, Ministry of Commerce, Industry and 91, 93, 105, 110, 114 Energy (MOCIE, Korea), 42, 52 research and development (R&D), 21 Ministry of Economic Affairs (MOEA, Taiwan), 67, 75 safeguard measures Ministry of Finance (MOF, Taiwan), China, 80–2, 94–6, 100–1, 104, 116 74–5 investigation, 24 Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade Japan, 9 (MOFAT, Korea), 41–2, 53, 54–6 Korea, 32, 48, 53–4 Ministry of Foreign Commerce POSCO’s venture, 45, 111 ((MOFCOM, China), 85, 88, 93–4, Taiwan, 60, 72–3, 75–6 101, 103–4 US, 14 most-favored-nation (MFN), 80 WTO litigation, 10 Samsung Electronics, 35–7, 42–4, National Association of Industry and 48–50, 54–5, 57, 111, 115 Commerce (Taiwan), 64–5 Small and medium enterprise (SME), neoliberalism, 18, 57, 117–18 3, 16, 39, 56, 61, 66, 69–70, 109 newly industrial economies (NIEs), Solar Energy Promotion Alliance 18 (SEPA, China), 102 non-market economic (NME) status, state capacity 3, 80–1, 92–4, 98–9, 102–3, 105, developmental states, 19–24, 114 117–18 non-tariff barriers (NTB), 32–3 executive branch–business coalition, 8–10 Ofﬁce of Minister of Trade (OMT, Government–business Korea), 40–1, 53, 55–7 collaboration, 19–24 Ofﬁce of Trade Negotiation (OTN, Korea, 117–18 Taiwan), 67, 72, 74–5, 116 industry organizations, 29 Organisation for Economic state embeddedness, 10–11, 20–1 Co-operation and Development WTO dispute settlement system, (OECD), 41, 44 106, 111–15 Original equipment manufacturer Static random-access memory (SRAM), (OEM), 62–3, 69, 72, 74 71 172 Index

Taiwan Understanding on Rules and countervailing measures, 59–60, 66, Procedures Governing the 68 Settlement of Disputes, see export barriers, 58–61 Dispute Settlement export sector’s structure, 61–4 Understanding of the World Trade foreign antidumping charges, 68–72 Organization (DSU) government–business collaboration, United Microelectronics Corporation 64–7 (UMC, Taiwan), 62 LED manufacturers, 108, 110, 112, United States Court of International 116 Trade (US CIT), 24, 44, 50, 55 legal status trade law, 67–8 United States Department of low aggression litigation, 75–7 Commerce (US DOC), 24, 94 United States Federal Trade Ministry of Finance (MOF), 74 Commission (US FTC), 23 safeguard measures, 60, 72–3, United States International Trade 75–6 Commission (US ITC), 24 WTO DSB cases, 72–5 United States Trade Representative see also Government of Taiwan (USTR), 28, 100 (GOT) United Steelworkers (USW), 100 Taiwan Electrical Appliance US special safeguard measure, 100, 116 Manufacturers’ Association US Trade Act of 1974, 4, 42, 67 (TEAMA), 69 Taiwan Electrical and Electronic voluntary export restraints (VERs), 10, Manufacturers’ Association 18, 32–3, 43, 58 (TEEMA), 137 n 23 Taiwan Iron and Steel Industries Whirlpool, 54–5 Association (TISIA), 66 World Trade Organization (WTO) Taiwan Semiconductor Industry Chinese litigation, 79, 95 Association (TSIA), 66, 71 dispute settlement mechanism, 1–5, Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing 106, 108–11, 113–18 Company (TSMC), 62 export barriers, 17, 21–3, 30–2 Taiwan Steel & Iron Industries Korean litigation, 47 Association (TSIIA), 72 litigation approach, 1–3, 6–10, target dumping, 54 13–16 Tire Branch of China Rubber Industry members, 3 Association (CRIA), 100 Taiwanese litigation, 72 top-down approach, 19, 22, 29, 66, trade remedies, 1, 29, 33–4, 53, 66, 68, 70, 76, 94, 101, 104, 113, 87, 111, 114 116 see also speciﬁc DSB cases; WTO Trans Paciﬁc Partnership, 54, 119 litigation