House of Commons Home Affairs Committee Independent Police Complaints Commission

Eleventh Report of Session 2012–13

Volume II

Additional written evidence

Ordered by the House of Commons to be published on 10 July, 18 September, 23 October, 6 and 20 November, and 4 and 11 December 2012, and 8 and 29 January 2013

Published on 4 February 2013 by authority of the House of Commons London: The Stationery Office Limited Home Affairs Committee

The Home Affairs Committee is appointed by the House of Commons to examine the expenditure, administration, and policy of the Home Office and its associated public bodies.

Current membership

Rt Hon Keith Vaz MP (Labour, Leicester East) (Chair) Nicola Blackwood MP (Conservative, Oxford West and Abingdon) James Clappison MP (Conservative, Hertsmere) Michael Ellis MP (Conservative, Northampton North) Lorraine Fullbrook MP (Conservative, South Ribble) Dr Julian Huppert MP (Liberal Democrat, Cambridge) Steve McCabe MP (Labour, Birmingham Selly Oak) Bridget Phillipson MP (Labour, Houghton and Sunderland South) Mark Reckless MP (Conservative, Rochester and Strood) Karl Turner MP (Labour, Kingston upon Hull East) Mr David Winnick MP (Labour, Walsall North)

The following Member was also a member of the Committee during the Parliament.

Rt Hon Alun Michael MP (Labour & Co-operative, Cardiff South and Penarth)

Powers

The Committee is one of the departmental select committees, the powers of which are set out in House of Commons Standing Orders, principally in SO No 152. These are available on the Internet via www.parliament.uk.

Publication

The Reports and evidence of the Committee are published by The Stationery Office by Order of the House. All publications of the Committee (including press notices) are on the Internet at www.parliament.uk/homeaffairscom.

Committee staff

The current staff of the Committee are Tom Healey (Clerk), Richard Benwell (Second Clerk), Ruth Davis (Committee Specialist), Eleanor Scarnell (Committee Specialist), Andy Boyd (Senior Committee Assistant), Michelle Garratty (Committee Assistant), Iwona Hankin (Committee Support Officer) and Alex Paterson (Select Committee Media Officer).

Contacts

All correspondence should be addressed to the Clerk of the Home Affairs Committee, House of Commons, 7 Millbank, London SW1P 3JA. The telephone number for general enquiries is 020 7219 3276; the Committee’s email address is [email protected]

List of additional written evidence

Page 1 G4S Ev w1 2 Dr Rodger Patrick Ev w1 3 Women Against Rape Ev w7 4 E C Lucy Ev w8 5 Campaign4Justice Ev w8 6 Network for Police Monitoring (Netpol) Ev w13 7 Newham Monitoring Project Ev w14 8 Taherali Gulamhussein Ev w19 9 StopWatch Ev w20 10 Charles Kirk Ev w23 11 Sara Jane Loughran Ev w25 12 Celia Jeune Ev w29 13 Tony Wise Ev w30, Ev w33 14 Donna M Gardner Ev w38 15 David Mery Ev w43 16 Denise Hart Ev w44 17 Dr Rita Pal Ev w47 18 Family of Sharon McLaughlin Ev w47 19 Anton Venter Ev w51 20 National Policing Improvement Agency Ev w53 21 Liam Silcocks Ev w54 22 Keith Cornwall Ev w55 23 Satish Sekar Ev w57 24 Neil Coggins Ev w63 25 JusticeNow Ev w66 26 Richard Wildblood Ev w67 27 Ian Puddick Ev w68 28 Natasha Sivanandan Ev w68 29 Patrick Allfrey Ev w73 30 Patricia F Gallan Ev w75 31 Sir Jeremy Heywood Ev w76

cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [SO] Processed: [01-02-2013 12:48] Job: 025757 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/025757/025757_w032_michelle_IPCC 40 - Jeremy Heywood.xml

Home Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev w1

Written evidence

Written evidence submitted by G4S [IPCC 01] I am writing to you in relation to the Committee’s inquiry into the IPCC as G4S shares your view that the IPCC plays a vital role in ensuring fair play in policing and improve public confidence. We believe this is essential to uphold and improve confidence of the public accountability in policing. Private providers have supported police forces across the UK for over 20 years. G4S, for example, currently provides custody services and transport solutions in Lancashire, South Wales, Staffordshire and Lincolnshire forces, freeing up warranted police officers to focus on core policing tasks. To ensure that members of the public can expect the same, if not better, service, when a G4S colleague supports the police in their case, G4S informed the IPCC back in 2010 that our employees would be subject to the same scrutiny and sanctions from the IPCC applied to civilian police staff. In addition, and in the absence of statutory regulation, we have contractually included IPCC co-operation and compliance into our strategic partnership contract with Lincolnshire Police. However, as it currently stands other private providers are not required to follow our lead. G4S therefore supports the IPCC’s call for the power to investigate all civilian staff who support police duties in order to preserve public confidence in the service. Also, IPCC Statutory Guidance on the Handling of Complaints expressly excludes private sector Custody Detention Officers as the Secretary of State has not made regulation for the creation of a separate complaints system for such designated staff. However, we believe that private providers working with the police should follow our example, ensuring there Is no difference in the handling of complaints against civilian in-house police staff or staff working for private providers and fully cooperate with the relevant investigating organisation, whether it is the Police Professional Standards Department or the IPCC. This means there is currently no statutory requirement for contracted staff to co-operate with any investigation being conducted by the police or IPCC other than when asked to assist in a criminal investigation. This should be changed. John Shaw Managing Director G4S Policing Support Services June 2012

Written evidence submitted by Dr Rodger Patrick [IPCC 03]

Executive Summary The research into the impact of Performance Management on the Police Service indicated that “gaming” behaviours ie “cooking the books” or “fiddling the figures” was negating the potential benefits of the reform programme. The findings based on analysis of the performance data and official documents, some obtained under the provisions of the Freedom of Information Act, suggested the phenomenon was organisational in nature. It was also evident that the malpractice was managerially driven in a “top down” fashion and had spread as a result of ineffective regulation and governance. Establishing the evidence for this assertion involved the examination of a number of investigations carried out by the Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC) into incidents involving “gaming” type behaviours. It was clear from the review of these investigations that the IPCC were unable or unwilling to identify and address the organisational deficiencies’ or hold Chief Officers responsible for the outcomes.

1. Categories of Police“Gaming”Practices 1.1 This report is structured around the four distinct types of “gaming” behaviours identified during the research. Taken in their totality they constitute what can be referred to as the “perverse policing model”. The involvement of the IPCC will be itemised under each “gaming” category defined as follows: — Cuffing: The under-recording of reported crimes, the term being derived from the magician’s art of making objects disappear up the sleeve or cuff (Young 1991). — Nodding: This involves collusion between officers and suspects to confess to large numbers of offences, usually whilst in prison after sentence, in return for favours such as reduced sentences, access to partners, drugs or alcohol. The term is used to describe the act of a prisoner pointing out or “nodding” at locations where they claim to have committed offences. (Wilson et al 2001:63). — Skewing: This involves moving resources from areas of activity which are not subject to performance measures in order to improve performance in areas that are monitored for control purposes (Rogerson 1995). cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [01-02-2013 12:48] Job: 025757 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/025757/025757_w032_michelle_IPCC 40 - Jeremy Heywood.xml

Ev w2 Home Affairs Committee: Evidence

— Stitching: This includes a variety of malpractices designed to enhance the strength of evidence against a suspect in order to ensure the desired criminal justice outcome. Fabricating evidence or stitching someone up are forms of this behaviour.

2. Methodology

2.1 Examination of the trend data “before and after” known events or scandals involving “cuffing”; “nodding”; or “stitching” enabled consistent patterns to be established. This also provided an estimate of the scale of the problem and in turn could be used to identify the likely presence of the various “gaming” behaviours. The distorting effect of these three “gaming” practices made it difficult to use this method to quantify “skewing” and geographically mapping the deployment of police officers over time was one method used to overcome this obstacle. The other was the examination of IPCC reports into the investigation of serious cases, usually homicides, where police involvement was believed to be inadequate. In order to overcome researcher bias the findings and documents were commented upon by a group of retired officers with specialist experience of the areas of policing under study.

3.“Cuffing”

3.1 This form of “gaming” behaviour is relatively well documented in both the academic and practitioner literature. Her Majesty’s Inspector of Constabulary provided a detailed account in their thematic report on police integrity (HMIC 1999), so the IPCC should be alert to its presence and symptoms.

3.2 It may also be of interest to the committee to note that during the research the correlation between “cuffing” and complaints against the police was explored. However it appeared at least one large force was categorising some complaints as “quality of service issues” thus negating this approach. This in itself is a form of “cuffing” and the equivalent of the alternative crime registers uncovered in the West Midlands Police by HMIC (1999).

3.3 The Independent Police Complaint Commission (IPCC) investigated a number of offences where “cuffing” formed part of the incident under investigation. The most prominent were the failure to record and investigate rapes, part of the complaint following an undercover reporter’s disclosures on Leicestershire Police (www.ipcc.gov.uk 2008) and the death of Colette Lynch, where Warwickshire officers failed to record and investigate a domestic related crime (www.ipcc.gov.uk 2006).

3.4 In the Leicestershire case the undercover reporter had recorded an officer making an unguarded comment indicating that rapes reported by street sex workers were not being recorded or investigated correctly. The subsequent investigation appeared content to interview the officer who made the comment and was unable or unwilling to substantiate her claim. Rapes are particularly prone to under-recording and this perverse behaviour featured in the joint HMIC/HMcpsi thematic reports on the investigation of rapes (2007). These reports indicate that an audit of reported incidents of rape and indecent assault and those subsequently recorded as crimes is the basic method of investigating the organisational nature of such malpractice. The failure to record and investigate such crimes benefits offenders who go undetected (Patrick 2011a). This outcome was also highlighted in a recent book exposing “cuffing” in the New York Police Department (Eterno & Silverman 2012).

3.5 In the Colette Lynch case Warwickshire officers failed to record and investigate a report of criminal damage involving the victim’s estranged partner. In this case the IPCC did comment on the force’s crime recording procedures:

“A review should be undertaken of the extent to which those who are required to implement the policies on domestic violence, crime recording and call handling are aware of their responsibilities.” (IPCC 2006:5)

However no attempt appears to have been made to quantify the extent of the problem by instigating an audit comparing reported incidents with recorded crimes or to hold the Chief Officer responsible for any organisational failings identified. An examination of the data on recorded assaults without injury, an offence associated with domestic violence, for Warwickshire Police “before and after” this incident (Fig. 1), indicates an organisational dimension. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [01-02-2013 12:48] Job: 025757 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/025757/025757_w032_michelle_IPCC 40 - Jeremy Heywood.xml

Home Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev w3

Fig. 1 Warwickshire Police: Recorded Assaults Without Injury 2500

2000

1500

1000

500

0 2002/3 2003/4 2004/5 2005/6 2006/07 2007/8

4.“Nodding”

4.1 The IPCC has conducted at least three inquiries into allegations that police officers offered inducements to suspects to confess to crimes and have them “Taken Into Consideration”. These have involved officers from Merseyside, The Metropolitan Police and most recently South Wales. Again this type of “gaming” practice has a long pedigree and lay at the heart of a complaint made against the Chief Constable and Deputy Chief Constable of Nottinghamshire by one of their own Superintendents. This featured in the Channel 4 Dispatches programme (18 March 1999). However, the IPCC reported in the most recent case, that they had found no evidence of “wider systematic abuse” (BBC Law in Action 1 November 2011).

4.2 An examination of the performance data for South Wales Police on the number of Burglary of a Dwelling (Fig 2) and Theft from Motor Vehicle (Fig 3), offences particularly prone to “nodding”, suggest the contrary.

Fig. 2 South Wales Police 600 500 400 300 200 Burglary Dwellings Detected as TIC 100 0 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 /0 /0 /0 /0 /0 /0 /0 /1 /1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [01-02-2013 12:48] Job: 025757 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/025757/025757_w032_michelle_IPCC 40 - Jeremy Heywood.xml

Ev w4 Home Affairs Committee: Evidence

Fig. 3 South Wales Police 900 800 700 600 500 400 300 Theft from vehicle Offences Detetcted TIC 200 100 0

3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 /0 /0 /0 /0 /0 /0 /0 /1 /1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

4.3 This “before and after” pattern is consistent with that found in other forces where similar incidents have resulted in remedial action being taken (Patrick 2011b). These include the following: — Cleveland: Drugs and alcohol (The Observer 17 February 2002). — West Midlands Police: Drugs (Birmingham Post 7 March 2003). — reater Manchester Police, Salford Division: Alcohol (The Guardian 4 June 2004). — Bedfordshire Police: Sex (Metro News 16 May 2006). — Merseyside: Alcohol (BBC News 6 June 2007). 4.4 To accept the organisational nature of this type of “gaming” behaviour would require a major shift in the approach currently taken by the IPCC, encouraging them to examine any changes to the senior management teams when the rise in TICs first emerged. The theory on “gaming” (Legrand 2003, Bevan and Hood 2006) suggests that such practices are associated with, and therefore will follow, certain individuals with specific characteristics. Junior officers and their Police Federation representatives appear able to identify the individuals responsible for driving such behaviours and this was made clear during a presentation to a national forum of detectives (Patrick 2009). However they are in a “catch 22” situation as they could find themselves making difficult to prove allegations against senior officers who may be able to influence the punishment they subsequently receive. In any case the law works on the principle of individual responsibility, and evidence of pressure from superiors to do wrong only amounts to mitigation.

5.“Skewing” 5.1 Her Majesty’s Inspector of Constabulary reported on the dangers of “skewing” as early as 1999 and viewed the practice as unethical: “The drive for continuing improvements in detections should, however, be controlled to ensure high volume crimes are not unnecessarily pursued at the expense of proper investigation of more serious crime. There was evidence in one force that a divisional commander refused to allow his detectives to put more than minimal resources into a serious sexual crime investigation, preferring instead they concentrate their efforts on less serious crime such as car theft. This occurred because whether they solved a rape or the theft of a car radio, the division would only be credited with one detection.” (HMIC 1999:20) 5.2 The deaths of Police Constable Malcolm Walker in 2001 and Letisha Shakespeare and Charlene Ellis in 2003 exposed the vulnerability of the West Midlands Police to respond to the rise in gang related criminality. The force had been warned about “skewing” by HMIC in 2001 (HMIC/WMP 2001:2). Similar deployment trends were apparent from the reports on Nottinghamshire Police following the Chief Constable’s declaration that his force could not cope with a rise in murders (The Times newspaper 14 March 2005). 5.3 The rise in organised crime, particularly gang and gun related activity, resulted in HMIC undertaking a thematic study of this threat (O’Connor 2005). This report could only commend three forces, Avon and Somerset, Greater Manchester Police and the Metropolitan Police Service for their investment in measures to counter more serious crime. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [01-02-2013 12:48] Job: 025757 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/025757/025757_w032_michelle_IPCC 40 - Jeremy Heywood.xml

Home Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev w5

5.4 The IPCC had also investigated a number of cases where “skewing” appeared to have been a feature. A focus on easy to detect crimes was proffered as a factor in the lack of resources attached by Derbyshire Police to the investigation of the brutal beating and robbery of riding instructor Tania Moore (www.ipcc.gov.uk 2006). The report on the force’s handling of the case prompted the following media response: “A police force failed to investigate properly the violent robbery of a show jumper which led to her murder because its officers were busy inquiring into stolen chickens” (The Sunday Times 10 December 2006) 5.5 The IPCC investigation into the fatal shooting of Peter Woodhams in East London in 2006 also uncovered a poor level of response to an earlier stabbing by the same assailants. Whilst the standards of supervision was commented on, the lack of priority given to this type of crime was not identified as a major organisational issue, although operational officers in the Met were raising concerns about the lack of focus on the investigation of serious crime: “Every borough is playing the game; those that are not are seen as under-performing. Policing has completely lost its way. We only investigate crimes that matter in terms of performance data” (Police Federation Conference 2007) 5.6 Further investigations overseen by the IPCC also indicated a lack of priority and/or resources devoted to the investigation of more serious crimes. The investigation into the death of Craig Hodson-Walker, the postmaster’s son, in Bromsgrove found that evidence of involvement in armed robberies against some of those responsible had been available to West Mercia Police prior to the murder but this had not been pursued with due diligence (www.ipcc.gov.uk March 2010). The investigation into the way the Met dealt with the handling of the serial rapist Kirk Reid also indicated that other performance related priorities had hampered the case (www.ipcc.gov.uk: June 2010). As in earlier cases the IPCC refrained from criticising the leadership of the forces involved, being content to hold operational officers responsible for the failings: “There was pressure on the borough in relation to performance and the targets set by the centre, which at the time were robberies, street crime and burglary. Investigating sexual assaults was never a priority on the borough. But in my view none of these factors provides real mitigation for the actions of those senior supervisory officers” (www.ipcc.gov.uk June 2010:12) 5.7 It did appear that the IPCC was unwilling to consider the organisational nature of the failings they were uncovering despite the consistent pattern that was emerging. It was therefore thought beneficial to examine one of their investigations in more detail. The investigation into the contact West Midlands Police Officers had with the killer of Jordan McGann prior to her death (www.ipcc.gov.uk 2008) provided an opportunity to explore this tendency in more detail. 5.8 Jordan McGann was 16 months old when she was murdered on 6 August 2004 by her mother’s boyfriend. The case was referred to the IPCC in 2006 after publication of a serious case review revealed failings by a number of statutory agencies, including the police. Released from prison on licence for assaulting a mother and her child, he was not subject of the interagency monitoring arrangements normally associated with such offenders. Soon after release from prison he assaulted one woman and child. However, the child protection officers assigned to investigate this offence contacted him by phone to try and arrange for him to attend the police station for interview. He did not meet these appointments and the officers did not make vigorous efforts to track him down or circulate him as wanted. By this time he had moved in with Jordan’s mother. A few days prior to her death he was stopped by police and checked on the Police National Computer. Had his details been circulated as wanted he would have been arrested for the previous assault. The IPCC took up the case and indicated an intention to look more widely at the way the West Midlands Police dealt with child protection issues (BBC 12 January 2006). 5.9 This appeared a relatively straightforward investigation. The West Midlands Police had been criticised for under-resourcing child protection units by HMIC during their inspection of the force (HMIC/WMP 2006:48). This criticism was borne out by two internal reports; one examined staffing levels had found that in 22% of cases (122 out of a sample of 563) the level of investigation was unsatisfactory (WMP March 2004 unpublished) and the other included the following comment: “The results of the HMIC Thematic Audit would appear to indicate vulnerabilities in strategic direction, Force ownership, and a Force Training Strategy. To reinforce the above concerns we are now met with an increasing amount of Serious Case Management Reviews into the death and serious injuries of children where the Force is being found wanting” (West Midlands Police unpublished June 2004). 5.10 The officers interviewed by the investigating officer appointed by the IPCC cited high workloads for their deficiencies. However the IPCC concluded: “The actions taken and the resources committed by West Midlands Police demonstrates an open- minded approach to learning and improved working by a generally high-performing force, which is good news for the public of the West Midlands” (www.ipcc.gov.uk/020408) The wide disparity between the findings of the IPCC and the evidence cited confirms the validity of the concerns now being raised by the Home Affairs Committee. What is also concerning is the IPCC’s apparent lack of interest in the reasons behind the Freedom of Information requests on their investigation into this case. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [01-02-2013 12:48] Job: 025757 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/025757/025757_w032_michelle_IPCC 40 - Jeremy Heywood.xml

Ev w6 Home Affairs Committee: Evidence

It should also be noted that the Association of Chief Police Officers have suggested in their submission to the Justice Committee’s post legislative review of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 that documents relating to cases investigated by the IPCC should be exempt from FOI requests for disclosure. If this were to be adopted then the information brought to your attention in this submission would no longer be available.

6.“Stitching” Although “stitching” would encompass the planting of evidence and fabrication of confessions the research concentrated on the abuse of cautions and police “informal warnings” as a means of inflating the detection rate. Whilst the documentary evidence demonstrated that the Association of Chief Officers of Police, HMIC, the Home Office and the Information Commissioner were aware of the nature of this type of “gaming” behaviour I could not find any specific cases where the IPCC had investigated. However it does demonstrate that the lack of desire to hold Chief Officers to account for organisational failings is not restricted to the IPCC.

7. Conclusion The IPCC appears unwilling or unable to identify the organisational nature of certain types of behaviours that are referred to them for investigation. This enables senior officers, ultimately responsible for the standards their officers subscribe, to avoid being held to account. However this criticism can also be levelled at all the bodies entrusted with the regulation and governance of the Police suggesting that a wider ranging inquiry and more radical reform are required (Patrick 2011c).

8. Recommendations Closer external scrutiny of IPCC investigations is necessary and investigators need to be made aware of the organisational factors which manifest themselves in complaints ie they are symptoms. In such cases the introduction of Police Commissioners, with the power to hold Chief Officers to account, could provide a conduit for their findings. The appointment of a non-police Chief HMIC and closer collaboration with the IPCC could also make the skills required to investigate organisational failings more available to the IPCC. Legislative powers for investigating officers and sanctions penalising those who fail to disclose relevant information or obstruct investigations would reduce the reliance on the support of Chief Officers. Closer collaboration between the IPCC and the Police Federation of England and Wales could help in the early identification of concerning organisational trends. Better protection for “whistle blowers” should also be provided as part of this strategic approach. The ACPO proposal to restrict the provisions of the FOI Act should be rejected.

References Bevan G & C Hood (2006). What’s Measured is What Matters: Targets and Gaming in the English Public Health Care System. Public Administration Vol. 84, No 3, 2006 (517–538) Eterno John A & Eli B Silverman (2012). The Crime Numbers Game; Management by Manipulation. CRC Press Boca Raton Florida Her Majesty’s Inspector of Constabulary (HMIC) (1999). Police Integrity England Wales and Northern Ireland. Securing and maintaining public confidence. June 1999 Home Office Her Majesty’s Inspector of Constabulary (2001). Inspection of West Midlands Police. (www.hmic.gov.uk) Her Majesty’s Inspector of Constabulary (HMIC) & Her Majesty’s Crown Prosecution Service Inspectorate (HMcpsi) (2007) Without Consent: A report on the joint review of the investigation and prosecution of rape offences. HMIC January 2007 www.inspectorates.homeoffice.gov.uk/hmic LeGrand J (2003). Motivation, Agency and Public Policy: of knights and knaves, pawns and queens. Oxford University Press. Oxford. UK O’Connor D, HM Inspector of Constabulary (Sept. 2005). Closing the Gap; A Review of the “Fitness for Purpose” of the Current Structure of Policing in England & Wales. HMIC 13 September 2005. Patrick R (2009). “Oh What a Wicked Web We Weave When First We Practice to Deceive”. Seminar presented to the National Forum of Detectives. Police Federation for England and Wales. Patrick, R (2011a). “Reading Tea Leaves” an assessment of the reliability of police recorded crime statistics. The Police Journal, Volume 84 (No 1) pgs. 47–67. Patrick, R (2011b). “A Nod and a Wink”: Do “gaming practices” provide an insight into the organisational nature of police corruption? The Police Journal. Volume 84 (No 3) pgs. 199–221). Patrick, R (2011c). “Public Champions or Protectors of Professional Interests?” Observations on the performance of those bodies entrusted with the regulation of the Police Service during the era of New Public Management’ (The Police Journal. Volume 84 (No. 4) pgs. 344–371. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [01-02-2013 12:48] Job: 025757 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/025757/025757_w032_michelle_IPCC 40 - Jeremy Heywood.xml

Home Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev w7

Rogerson P (1995). Performance Measurement and Policing: Police Service or Law Enforcement Agency? Public Money & Management, October-December 1995. Wilson, D, J Ashton, & D Sharp (2001). What Everyone in Britain Should Know About the Police. Blackstone. Young, M (1991). An Inside Job. Policing and Police Culture in Britain. Oxford: Claredon Press Dr Rodger Patrick Ex Chief Inspector West Midlands Police. PhD based on the impact of Performance Management on Police Governance and completed at the Institute of Local Government Studies (INLOGOV), University of Birmingham in 2009. June 2012

Written evidence submitted by Women Against Rape [IPCC 04] We are submitting evidence to the Select Committee on the IPCC. We would like to give oral evidence about our findings since 2009 and our proposals for change.

Summary ofour Main Points We are told that complaints about rape investigations have increased, but the IPCC has not released figures about the numbers, nor details of the outcomes of IPCC investigations. The IPCC claims officers can refuse to be interviewed and they have no power to insist. Disciplinary measures are weak and ineffective. Complainants are tricked into giving consent to “local resolution”. In our experience, the IPCC is totally discredited and not independent of the police, and it mostly rubber- stamps what they have done.

BriefIntroduction to WAR WAR was founded in 1976. A multiracial organization, we have won many changes in the law, including the recognition of rape in marriage as a crime, set legal precedents and achieved compensation for many women. Our services are based on self-help and we provide support, legal information and advocacy. We campaign for justice and protection for all women and girls, including asylum seekers, who have suffered sexual, domestic and/or racist violence. Our legal skills and campaigning have helped get some prosecutions reinstated. We have also helped to bring and win the first ever private prosecution for rape in England and Wales after the CPS refused to prosecute a serial rapist—he was found guilty and sentenced to 11 years. Based on our first hand knowledge we are often asked to comment on legislative proposals, and the outcome of investigations and trials. We have wide experience of the ways in which the police discriminate against rape victims and how the IPCC allows them to get away with it.

Background—Why we are anInterestedParty In recent years, we have assisted thousands of women rape survivors; many have made complaints about police investigations and prosecutions discontinued by the CPS. We have accompanied dozens of women to meetings with the police and CPS. We have encouraged and helped many women to complain to the IPCC, but the results have generally been very disappointing. Most complaints are not upheld, reports are inaccurate, and the complainant is told her complaint is “unsubstantiated” wherever she has no independent witness. In 2009, at the same time as the Warboys and Reid cases came to light, we were supporting a mother whose under-age daughter was raped in 2005. Her rapist was acquitted, after police lost evidence—there is evidence that he has raped others. Because we sought publicity and the backing of the local MP, the complaints resulted in an unusually in-depth and damning IPCC report into the Southwark Sapphire Unit. It found the Unit had been run down to such a degree that it had no trained detectives, a PC with no experience and a ridiculous caseload of approx 35 rapes had been left to investigate this rape. The IPCC investigation found the Unit had moved its rape officers into car crime and street robbery. Effectively, car theft was prioritized over rape, and despite the protests of a woman detective internally, the unit did not improve. Three officers were eventually disciplined, but the head of the Unit, who was responsible for setting out priorities and depleting the rape unit, refused to be interviewed in person and retired. Despite a very strong IPCC report which vindicated the complainant, no sanction was recommended against him, yet he had the major responsibility for rapists getting away with it. The sanctions against the other officers were insufficient. That is no way to demand accountability and bring change. That this IPCC report is unusually thorough indicates that the IPCC only pays attention to the complainant if she is backed by an organisation, her MP and the media. That is totally unacceptable and very worrying. What scrutiny of police actions can we expect from such a body? What prospects do victims have of getting protection and justice? cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [01-02-2013 12:48] Job: 025757 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/025757/025757_w032_michelle_IPCC 40 - Jeremy Heywood.xml

Ev w8 Home Affairs Committee: Evidence

After these watershed cases, we asked to meet with the IPCC, as we were inundated with complaints from survivors. On 1 December 2009 we met with Amardeep Somal and Maneer Afzal at the IPCC, and we submit our correspondence with them as evidence for your Committee to consider.1 You will see the issues addressed cover the main areas you are looking into. We are particularly concerned that your Committee is made aware that the IPCC response to our letter is evasive and defensive, and that the main issues are not properly addressed. Since we have not been able to get the IPCC to deal with public complaints appropriately and to impose adequate sanctions on police who do negligent and biased investigations, falsify records, and break the law in other ways, we are having to challenge the police in a number of path-breaking legal actions. We would like to give oral evidence to this Committee. We would also like to know who has been invited to give evidence. Lisa Longstaff Women Against Rape June 2012

Written evidence submitted by E C Lucy [IPCC 05] Request the weekly input of officers of the IPCC who have a high rate of successfully convicting offenders, to create a SIG and to regularly brainstorm with a view to offering better training ideas for Police, to utilise freely available information such as the introduction of random psychometric testing de-rigueur across the spectrum of Policing (with a view to identify potential sociopath/PDs and remove to appropriate level) not excluding the importance of Emotional Intelligence training and implementation (“common sense”/impartiality) and to keep Police competitive in the behavioural problem-solving intelligence stakes? An introduction of healthy recreational interaction between Police and the IPCC could be employed with a view to Police generally, holding the IPCC in high esteem, to be seen as a desirable goal to work for and to promote the IPCC as a matter of natural course? E C Lucy aka Robillard June 2012

Written evidence submitted by Campaign4Justice [IPCC 07] We would like to extend our gratitude to the Home Affairs Committee for instigating this Inquiry into the much maligned Independent Police Complaints Committee. We hope some positive recommendation and change will be the result of your investigations. We at CAMPAIGN4JUSTICE are a community based, volunteer group, formed following our collective experiences at the hands of police corruption/misconduct. We have set our aims on campaigning for a fair and effective system of redress for victims of police corruption. In addition we offer support and advice on victims who approach our organisation. CAMPAIGN4JUSTICE organised the recent demonstration outside the London offices of the IPCC. We called upon linked sister organisations to join us, the turnout was strong and comprising of all sections of society, irrespective of colour or creed, age or infirmary we can and do get affected by police corruption. We are aware of many cases of the IPCC failing complainants and unless they have strong constitution and support, these isolate individuals find it impossible to win against the might of the police and IPCC combined. If the government is truly determined to give the people confidence in the IPCC it is clear to all that major change must be implemented to the structure and investigational process of the organisation. Both of which are compromised from the onset because of the “conflict of interest” in hiring mostly ex-police officers to represent them and failing to take statements from officers when a clear statement would go along way to appeasing the families concerns and getting to the facts of what may or may not have taken place. Having lost an uncle, namely Smiley Culture under suspicious circumstances last year and having to deal with the IPCC, I can say without hesitation that I found their efforts weak and impotent in regards to procuring any kind of truth on the events of that morning. With the evidence that we found from the autopsy we were sure there would be a robust investigation into what happened. We, along with many other families and individuals were wrong. In-fact from the very beginning of the investigation it was clear that the police had no intention of interviewing or even asking the police that were in the house at the time for a formal version of their events. 1 Not printed. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [01-02-2013 12:48] Job: 025757 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/025757/025757_w032_michelle_IPCC 40 - Jeremy Heywood.xml

Home Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev w9

Taking into account an alleged suicide had happened and they were the only ones present, why were they not made to make a statement if they had nothing to hide? Reasonable suspicion is a low threshold, these officers and the circumstances of my uncles death had certainly crossed this point. These officers should have been interviewed under criminal caution, just like any other member of the public would have if discovered in a similar scenario. But not police officers who seem to operate on a different tier of the criminal justice system. Of course we were told to have faith in the IPCC and their investigative procedure but like so many other families have been left feeling let down, abandoned and disillusioned not only in the police but also the legal system which quite clearly disproportionately protects them. The rule of law is essentially that we are all equal in the eyes of the law, this fundamental principle is undermined by the current apparent immunity enjoyed by our police. One must take into account that these cases are not issues of insurance fraud or pension/tax violations, these are real people that have lost their lives in police custody, mothers, fathers, uncles and friends. Real people who have had their lives and families destroyed by police corruption. The effect on society is clear, an erosion of confidence in the police which is all too evident on the streets of our towns and cities. When once the public would come to the aid of an officer in need, we are more likely to see citizens filming the police for the fear of them brutalising a member of the public. In the event that someone has died in police custody, as a British citizen one would feel that they would have the full support of their government and relevant legislation that could both support and protect the family, the reality however is quite the opposite. Of course that is precisely what we are entitled to in law, an effective system of police complaints supported by fair, impartial and robust investigations. One thing has become clear, the rules are very different for policemen when accused of wrong-doing, the question is why? Surely as individuals that have sworn to uphold the law if they are found to of transgressed from that straight path “the book should be thrown at them”. If on the evidence there is a case to answer, answer it they should. We know that the police have little to fear from the IPCC, unless their out of favour, as the organisation that investigates is full of ex-police officers anyway. This reality is unacceptable, so is the fact that not one officer has yet to be criminally charged with the manslaughter or murder of anybody even when there are hundreds of cases that bear witness to the fact that not all has been revealed and clearly evidence has been withheld or overlooked. Lost evidence goes unchallenged, missing CCTV, delayed and lengthy investigations all contribute to this unacceptable truth of a system and organisation that is failing justice and failing the public. The families are tired, fatigued and in need of support and real help from a government that refuses to accept that regardless of swearing to uphold the law, some officers have fallen short of that obligation. We are not on a witch hunt, we are not anti police, indeed we support and encourage the rule of law and accountability for all, irrespective of whether you wear a police uniform. We at CAM4JUSTICE will continue to fight for justice and equality for those who have gone before us and those who come after us until the spectre of deaths in police custody is resigned the pages of history. We hope the government and all those concerned will join us in this challenge. To provide a truly independent system of effective investigation will go some considerable way to achieving what should be granted in a democratic society. We say “GET THE POLICE OUT OF THE POLICE COMPLAINTS SYSTEM”. I would also welcome the opportunity to appear before the Committee to speak of my experience as both a campaigner for justice and first hand witness in relation to the IPCC and its woefully inadequate conduct.

Response to Terms of Reference Whether the Commission has improved the scrutiny of police practices? (1) Since its creation the IPCC has been tasked with the investigation of police misconduct and criminal conduct. Specifically to ensure public confidence in the police complaints system and deliver and effective and trusted method of resolving police complaints. It is the view of CAMPAIGN4JUSTICE that the IPCC has failed to deliver a professional or effective system of police complaints, it plainly fails the public and it’s legal duty. There is widespread distrust in the community with the IPCC and confidence with policing has deteriorated to all time lows, the two are clearly connected. (2) Investigations into public complaints are viewed by complainants with widespread dissatisfaction.2 It would appear from experience that the reasons for this are rooted in the repeated pattern of favouritism toward the police. (3) In the cases known to CAMPAIGN4JUSTICE there are clear cases of factors leading to failed investigations by the IPCC including: 2 IPCC survey figures detail 80% of complainants either unhappy or very unhappy with complaint outcomes cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [01-02-2013 12:48] Job: 025757 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/025757/025757_w032_michelle_IPCC 40 - Jeremy Heywood.xml

Ev w10 Home Affairs Committee: Evidence

— Long delays to investigate and respond to complainants3 [supervised investigations taking 324 days average to completion—IPCC annual statistics]. — Wilful blindness to evidence of police misconduct—[reported pattern of favouritism toward police]. — Failure to locate vital case evidence, accepting of police excuses such as evidence “missing”, “lost”. — Investigations not thorough, failure to follow the evidence.4 — Use of dispensations to avoid investigation of police criminal/misconduct matters. — Lack of IPCC investigatory rigour forcing complainants to become legal/police procedural experts. — No challenge to police practice of post event narratives which don’t match original contemporary records. — Meaningless outcomes to upheld police complaints such as “words of advice”. — Heavy reliance on procedural/system failures to explain away police conduct issues. — Use of Judicial Review and costs threat to dissuade complainants from challenging IPCC decisions.5 — Failure to challenge police evidence as fabricated.

Whether the Commission has the right powers and resources to carry out its role effectively (4) The IPCC has the same powers at their disposal as general policing in the UK. The power to interview is available and used by the IPCC in appropriate cases. It is a concern of CAMPAIGN4JUSTICE that the IPCC’s recent call for more powers was a direct response to the mass community protest outside its London offices on 1 May 2012. It is a bluff, a smokescreen to distract public opinion away from its evidence failings. (5) It is felt that this call for more powers is simply a method of deflecting attention away from their core failures to investigate police crime/misconduct. In cases known to CAMPAIGN4JUSTICE, there is clear evidence of alleged police criminality, under present available powers the IPCC could of and should of have interviewed. Despite this the IPCC elected, without good cause not to interview. Giving the IPCC a power to interview without “reasonable suspicion” would erode legal protections for police officers, this would be a concern for CAMPAIGN4JUSTICE. It is clear that where there is reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct, the IPCC have abjectly failed to interview under criminal caution. (6) The IPCC budget is in the region of £43 million per annum and the vast majority of cases are investigated by the police. Currently IPCC workload involves around 6,000 appeal cases per year (involves IPCC reviewing police investigation), Managed and independent cases amount to approximately 200 per annum. (7) CAMPAIGN4JUSTICE, would hold that whilst organisations would always welcome extra financial resource, until such time as the resource they do have is used efficiently, pouring more public funds into the IPCC would be wasteful. With the abject failure of the IPCC to investigate police complaints effectively, the result to the taxpayer is costly Judicial reviews, lengthy and costly civil litigation claims, stress and suffering for victims of police misconduct. Getting it right first time at the IPCC requires professional case investigation, following all reasonable lines of enquiry and taking decisive action where required. (8) In the cases known to CAMPAIGN4JUSTICE there is repeated and abject failure to investigate serious cases of police corruption. One case which the IPCC claimed was not upheld is at significant cost, now rightly progressing through the criminal courts. In terms of cost, we must never forget the personal cost to families and individuals who find themselves on the wrong end of police corruption. This personal cost translates into a wider detrimental cost to society and the current evident erosion in confidence for our once highly respected police service. (9) One further resource issue which has always been of significant concern is the number of ex police employed at the IPCC. Campaign groups including CAMPAIGN4JUSTICE call for the police to be removed from the police complaints system. The IPCC claims that the skill set from the police is required to discharge their duties effectively. Upon viewing the standard of investigation, it would appear that the standard of investigation is poor. If there was a will, trained civilian investigators, with no former police ties, could properly manage IPCC workload. (10) Other commonwealth countries such as Canada have taken the requisite steps in the 1980’s to train civilian investigators to manage their police complaints system. If there was a will from the IPCC this could equally be achieved here in the UK. A step which would make a real difference (it must also be noted that it is not only the investigator population of the IPCC who are ex police, the legal dept, media dept and many directors are ex police). 3 IPCC Investigations research Paper 2010—only 20% of complainants felt response was timely. 4 IPCC Investigations research Paper 2010—60% of respondents dissatisfied with the quality of IPCC investigation 5 IPCC does not collect data on number of challenges to their reports by way of JR or cost to the public purse cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [01-02-2013 12:48] Job: 025757 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/025757/025757_w032_michelle_IPCC 40 - Jeremy Heywood.xml

Home Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev w11

Whether investigations lead to improvements in police practices (11) The poor quality of IPCC investigations can only lead to poor outcomes in terms of improvements in police practice. When allegations of criminal conduct, supported by cogent evidence are buried under a poorly reasoned IPCC narrative, the only outcome is widespread dissatisfaction from the complainants (levels of 80% of complainants unhappy with outcomes) amongst the general population and an erosion in confidence in policing in general. (12) Like a traffic control system without consequence, motorists would ignore the double and single lines. The current police system gives the police confidence that they will not be the subject of criminal proceedings, as a result corruption and misconduct grows much to the concern of decent lawful officers and the public. (13) There is the other side to this coin, whereby the IPCC is acting as control mechanism on officers who are perceived to have stepped out of line. Further it appears the disciplinary system is used to act out racist prejudice. Recent figures show that BME officers are five times more likely to face disciplinary allegations for corruption than their white counterparts.6 (14) CAMPAIGN4JUSTICE notes that in the Ali Dizaei case, on what can at best be described as “word against word” the IPCC plied every available resource to bring the matter before the criminal courts. Complainant experience of the IPCC would concur that the IPCC acted very much out of character with the Ali Dizaei case, considering the history of Ali Dizaei and previous witch hunts he’s endured, all the more concerning. From experience we know that even when the evidence is very strong against police officers there is only a remote chance they will ever face criminal trial, let alone misconduct sanction.

Whether improving police services should be formally included in the Commission’s remit (15) CAMPAIGN4JUSTICE believes that the current system of IPCC making recommendations (following investigation) without power of compulsion fails to address the need for Continuous improvement in policing. (16) It is agreed that the IPCC should offer recommendations to the police following the outcome of an effective investigation. There must be an element of compulsion to these recommendations. There also needs to be a feedback mechanism to ensure recommendations are actually implemented. (17) In addition, if the IPCC were applying the full range of sanctions following investigation, such as instigating criminal proceedings in the right circumstances, this would have an obvious controlling effect on police corruption. The lack of sanctions/disciplinary or criminal means that officers can and do act with impunity and disregard for both the law and their operating procedures such as Police and Criminal Evidence Act. (PACE)

The Commission’s role in scrutinising elected police commissioners (18) The new Policing Commissioners provides an excellent opportunity to effect positive change in policing. For once there will be democratically elected officials, responsible to their electorate, at the helm of our police forces. It would simply be untenable for the accountability for these posts to be handed over to an unaccountable and unelected body such at the IPCC. They have demonstrated and admitted that they are ineffective, it would be folly to extend their powers beyond their current jurisdiction. (19) CAMPAIGN4JUSTICE also has concern about the selection process for IPCC Commissioners and Directors. It seems that most Directors are from a police background and the appointments appear to be orchestrated on a nod and a wink from the likely suspects. A fair and open selection process, from beyond the police service would go some way to ensuring the organisational culture changes for the better.

The Commission’s role in scrutinising third parties commissioned to carry out policing duties (20) With the ever increasing (and likely to increase further following the Winsor report) “privatisation” of UK police duties, it is likely to be the case that members of the public will come into contact with these privately contracted parties. (21) Whilst at present, police civilian staff are included in the IPCC’s remit for investigation, private contractors are not. It would be recommended that private contractors, providing policing duties to the public should face an effective system of independent investigation. To that end, the IPCC or a body replacing the IPCC should be given power to scrutinise these private contractors delivering policing service.

The Commission’s role in considering complaints which may relate in part to other bodies involved in the justice system, such as the Crown Prosecution Service (22) Currently the IPCC is failing to deliver an effective system for complaints in relation to its current workload. It is failing the public and also the police, as a result contributing to the current erosion of confidence in our policing services in the eyes of the public. 6 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-18239960 cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [01-02-2013 12:49] Job: 025757 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/025757/025757_w032_michelle_IPCC 40 - Jeremy Heywood.xml

Ev w12 Home Affairs Committee: Evidence

(23) CAMPAIGN4JUSTICE would recommend issues related to the current IPCC failings are addressed before any consideration is given to widening their powers. (24) CAMPAIGN4JUSTICE would however recommend a specialist section of the CROWN PROSECUTION SERVICE is developed, specifically for the consideration and management of criminal prosecutions against the police. Traditionally the CPS and Police have close working relations, some distance by creating a specialist group would ensure not only that justice is done, but seen to be done (we appreciate that this CPS role is currently undertaken by the specialist crime directorate, but they are not insulated from extensive police contact).

Whether the right balance is achieved between independent, managed and supervised investigations (25) From a complainant point of view, the distinction between the mode of investigation is of little importance when the standard of investigation is of such a poor level. Complainants who are unable to navigate law/police procedure/complaint process are at the mercy of a system which demonstrates repeated favouritism toward the police. (26) CAMPAIGN4JUSTICE understands the distinct need for serious cases of police corruption to be independently investigated. The number of (ex) police investigators within the IPCC and their close ties with the police, calls into question the actual independence of these investigations. Further the outcomes, illustrate in statistical clarity the very limited number of these investigations which actually result in criminal charges and trial. (27) Of 154 Independent investigations into police misconduct, year to April 2011, just 16 of those cases were submitted to the CPS for a charging decision. Of those 16 only five resulted in charges. With an such a high attrition rate, there is real concern that with the aid of the IPCC the police are getting away with criminal conduct.7 (28) In terms of managed investigations and supervised investigations, it appears that the IPCC do little more than set terms of reference (required in a supervised investigation) and the police are at liberty to run the case without much in the way of management action from the IPCC.

How the work of the Commission could be effectively scrutinised (29) It is vital that the work of the IPCC is scrutinised on a regular basis, indeed there is provision within the IPCC guidance which caters for this, with exchange of case files between other government organisations for peer review. Indeed IPCC casework manuals state that peer review should take place on the conclusion of managed and Independent investigations. (30) There is no available data via the IPCC website on whether these reviews have taken place or what the results may have been returned. We invite the Home Affairs select committee to make further enquiries on this matter. (31) Scrutiny of the IPCC decisions are coming into stark focus in the decisions made by the IPCC and the low levels of police prosecution. We are aware of one case in which claims from the IPCC that false allegations were nothing more than a simple mistake are now progressing to criminal trial. The decision to take the case to trial in the criminal courts was made on exactly the same information in possession of the IPCC. The fact the IPCC failed to investigate such serious concerns brings into sharp focus the integrity of the organisation. (32) In terms of European involvement, a suggestion which could be explored for the future, in line with European harmonisation, would be to have peer reviews conducted by fellow European police complaint agencies. Recommendation 2001 (10) of the Committee of Ministers to Member states on the European Code of police ethics, adopted 19 September 20018 states: The aim of the Council of Europe is to achieve greater unity between its members: “also the purpose of the Council of Europe to promote the rule of law, which constitutes the basis of all genuine democracies”. The paper also confirms that the Member states: “the police organisation shall contain efficient measures to insure the integrity and proper performance of police staff, in particular to guarantee respect for individuals’ fundamental rights and freedoms as enshrined, notably, in the European Convention on Human rights”. And “Effective measures to prevent and combat police corruption shall be established in the police organisation at all levels”. 7 http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/police-escape-charges-in-70-per-cent-of-ipcc-cases-6953024.html 8 https://wcd.coe.int/com.instranet.InstraServlet?command=com.instranet.CmdBlobGet&InstranetImage=1277578&SecMode=1& DocId=212766&Usage=2 cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [01-02-2013 12:49] Job: 025757 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/025757/025757_w032_michelle_IPCC 40 - Jeremy Heywood.xml

Home Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev w13

(33) It is held that the current English system of police complaints fails to be effective and this self regulation has systematically failed the public. A system of European peer review would have the effect of drive up standards throughout Europe and lead to harmonisation of policing standards and levels of accountability. We would welcome the opportunity to attend the Committee when it sits to give representation from CAMPAIGN4JUSTICE and answer any queries that you may have. We appreciate this is not about individual case, but we believe that the only real evidence for IPCC malpractice, failure is found within the body of those individual cases. Merlin Emanuel Campaign4Justice

Written evidence submitted by the Network for Police Monitoring (Netpol) [IPCC 09] 1. The Network for Police Monitoring (Netpol) is a network of organisations with an interest in monitoring or observing policing. This includes organisations based within a set community, such as the Newham Monitoring Project, and those that work directly with protest, such as the Green and Black Cross, who train and support legal observers. Netpol acts as a focus for campaigns against certain aspects of policing that are viewed as excessive or oppressive. 2. This submission relates to the role of the IPCC in policing complaints emanating from protest and public order policing. The Newham Monitoring Project (NMP), who are a Netpol partner, have provided their own submission based on the client group NMP serves—people from Black, Asian, Minority Ethnic or Refugee (BAMER) backgrounds. Netpol would also adopt and support this submission. 3. The demographic of protest is remarkably varied. Over the last few years Netpol or its partners have provided observers and monitors to a large range of protest and public order policed events, including community based demonstrations and football matches. We therefore feel that the feedback we receive is indicative of the views of a significant section of society. 4. Throughout this demographic confidence in the police complaints system is very low. The perception that “there is no point” in making a complaint is commonly held. There is also significant anxiety that making a complaint will result in increased police attention, surveillance or harassment. 5. The great majority of complaints are dealt with, in the first instance, by the professional standards department of the relevant force. For most complainants, therefore, the overall experience is not one of interaction with an independent body. They must deal directly with the very force they are registering their complaint against. 6. Protesters who wish to make a complaint regarding police conduct are frequently obliged to do so without legal representation as the number of lawyers experienced in this area of law is very small and those able to provide legal aid even smaller. This is a particular problem outside London. Complainants are at a great disadvantage and some vulnerability given the disproportionate resources, knowledge and influence the police possess. The police are known to apply pressure on individuals not to pursue a complaint, or to pursue it through the local resolution process in circumstances which are inappropriate. The local resolution process cannot result in disciplinary action beyond “words of advice”. 7. Professional standards departments carrying out investigations commonly request complainants to participate in an interview, either in their homes or at a police station. Complainants may feel uncomfortable and intimidated by this process, and have reported being treated in a brusque, aggressive or accusative manner by investigating officers. This is obviously of greater concern when a complainant does not have legal representation. 8. The function of the IPCC in carrying out appeals is fundamentally flawed. The appeals system is complex and not easily understood by the general public. It is not widely known that the role of the IPCC is only to review the investigation in to the complaint and not to re-investigate the complaint. This ultimately means that the IPCC will often simply review whether the proper steps have been taken by the investigator in terms of gathering evidence and taking statements, and not whether the conclusions drawn are the logical outcome of the evidence. There is therefore an over-reliance on the original findings and insufficient probing of the factual or legal matters. This means that, especially in the case of those who do not have legal representation, the process becomes ineffective and difficult with an unsatisfactory outcome. The overall feeling is that it was not worth engaging with the process in the first place as the IPCC is not an independent mediator. 9. Further, the narrow remit of the IPCC means that there is little scope for making complaints about police behaviour at political protest. Most complaints relating to the misuse of police powers or the excessive use of force are classified as “direction and control complaints”, and thus fall outside of the remit of the IPCC. 10. There is insufficient clarity regarding procedures for making direction and control complaints. The IPCC simply advises complainants to make a complaint directly to the police force concerned; with recourse to the police commissioner or Chief Constable if that is unsatisfied with the outcome. Netpol’s experience of cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [01-02-2013 12:49] Job: 025757 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/025757/025757_w032_michelle_IPCC 40 - Jeremy Heywood.xml

Ev w14 Home Affairs Committee: Evidence

submitting direction and control complaints is not a happy one. Complaints made to the Metropolitan Police in February have not been responded to or even acknowledged.

11. It is not always easy for a member of the public to differentiate between a complaint within the remit of the IPCC, and a direction and control complaint, particularly in the context of a public order situation. This can lead to a feeling that a person is being “sent around the houses” when trying to raise issues of importance in the conduct of policing.

InResolution

12. There is a need to establish a single point of contact for all policing complaints, including direction and control complaints, and a transparent, easily understood structure for the resolution of all complaints. The distinction between a misconduct complaint and a direction and control complaint is not always easy to define, particularly for a member of the public. All complainants should have the right to know that their complaint will be taken seriously and properly investigated, and there should be absolute clarity in procedure.

13. The public is unlikely to have confidence in any complaints system which places so much emphasis on internal investigation by police officers. For confidence to increase there needs to be a body which is demonstrably independent from any police force, and which has sufficient powers, resources and will to robustly investigate police misconduct.

14. More should be done to provide independent support and advice to unrepresented complainants at all stages of the complaints procedure, and to redress the imbalance of power between police and complainant. The use of informal or local resolution systems should be independently monitored to ensure that it is not used inappropriately in relation to conduct that would justify criminal or disciplinary proceedings.

15. Consideration should be given as to whether the sanctions applied to police officers as a result of disciplinary hearings are appropriate and sufficient, and a review should be carried out to find the causes of the low level of successful misconduct proceedings.

Written evidence submitted by Newham Monitoring Project [IPCC 10]

“ONE RULE FOR THEM, AND ANOTHER RULE FOR US” SUBMISSION FROM A COMMUNITY-BASED PERSPECTIVE BY NEWHAM MONITORING PROJECT (NMP)

1. About Newham Monitoring Project

Newham Monitoring Project (NMP) is a grassroots community-based anti-racist organisation, founded in 1980 by local people to monitor both racist attacks and the response to them by statutory agencies, in order to effectively campaign around the resultant issues for justice and change. Our remit today encompasses work across six East London boroughs, strengthening communities to challenge racial discrimination and violence, police misconduct and civil injustice. We provide independent advice, support, advocacy and a 24-hour emergency helpline to people of Black, Asian, Minority Ethnic or Refugee backgrounds, supporting hundreds of people every year.

We also undertake community outreach and educational projects and campaign work around issues arising from our casework. NMP has worked alongside others in support of the Stephen Lawrence family and contributed to the many voices that called for replacement of the former Police Complaints Authority. In recent years, we have been involved in the public support and assistance of a number of well-known cases seeking to hold the police to account, including Mauro Demetrio, the families caught up on anti-terrorist raids in Forest Gate in 2006 and the relatives of Jean Charles de Menezes, Ian Tomlinson and Mark Duggan. NMP has also supported the many families campaigning tirelessly for justice following a death in custody as part of the United Families and Friends Campaign (UFFC).

2. Foreword

“One rule for them, another rule for us” is a phrase routinely used by our cases both before (referring to the police) and also during (referring to the police investigators) the process of making a police complaint. Our experience of working at a community level repeatedly demonstrates that the distinction between the police and those who hold them to account is viewed as imperceptible.

This submission focuses on the experience of the client group NMP predominantly serves—people from Black, Asian, Minority Ethnic or Refugee (BAMER) backgrounds—in relation to making complaints against the police. Using the evidence of our casework, we outline the difficulties and barriers faced by this group as a result of existing powers and processes and make recommendations for improvement. We also support a separate submission to this inquiry as part of the Network for Police Monitoring. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [01-02-2013 12:49] Job: 025757 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/025757/025757_w032_michelle_IPCC 40 - Jeremy Heywood.xml

Home Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev w15

3. ExplanatoryNote As an organisation working at a grassroots community level it is important to understand that the context of our client experience of the IPCC falls into two distinct categories: (i) Police complaint cases where the IPCC acts as an appeal-body only. (ii) Police complaint cases where the IPCC manages or supervises the investigation. Both are addressed in this submission and we make it clear, where relevant, which group we are referring to. To understand why the experiences of these two groups (and concurrently NMP’s experience) may be different, we give a “typical picture” of the clients in these two categories below: (i) Police complaint cases where the IPCC acts as an appeal-body only: — The complaint falls outside of the remit of those either managed or supervised by the IPCC and is therefore investigated by the Professional Services Department (PSD) also commonly known as (and referred to here as) the “DPS”. — The majority of the complainants are unable to access formal legal representation for their case, but lack the confidence or ability to make their complaint without support. — NMP therefore provides support and any representation (free of charge) and acts as the main contact for complaint correspondence. — The interaction these clients have with the IPCC is usually limited to the “appeals” stage, ie appealing an investigation outcome decision by the DPS, which, if successful, typically leads to an IPCC recommendation for the DPS to reinvestigate either the whole or aspects of the complaint. (ii) Police complaint cases where the IPCC manages or supervises the investigation: — These cases typically relate to deaths involving police contact or in police custody, allegations of police racism or cases involving the use of police firearms or taser. — The majority of these complainants are able to access legal representation. — NMP’s role therefore involves supporting clients throughout the legal process. However, with the exception of circumstances where information provided by the IPCC to the client or lawyer is subject to confidentiality, we are usually aware of and follow the progress of the IPCC in investigating the complaint.

4. Executive Summary—Key Findings This report responds to the scope of the inquiry: — The independence of the Commission; — The powers and responsibilities of the Commission; and — The effectiveness of Commission investigations. Under the following terms of reference: — Whether the Commission has improved the scrutiny of police practices. — Whether the Commission has the right powers and resources to carry out its role effectively. — Whether investigations lead to improvements in police practices. Our key findings are: — The creation of the IPCC has failed to impact at a grassroots level. — The IPCC has not resolved significant and obvious weaknesses in the process and procedure for making a complaint, resulting in a system that falls woefully short in its ability to be independent, accessible or effective, specifically: — The oversight of the police complaints system under the IPCC does not seem to have eradicated bias towards the police. — Complaints are often dismissed for being “out of time” despite mitigation being presented around the complainant’s mental health, awareness of how the complaint system operates or language-support needs, which are pertinent issues to BAMER communities in relation to police complaint matters. — The IPCC has failed to make an impact on apparent misuse of the local resolution system by the DPS. — The IPCC does not acknowledge poor handling of first stage complaints by the DPS allowing bad practice to continue. — The current police complaints system frequently disadvantages a layperson despite purportedly being accessible to them. — Deadlines in relation to complaints only apply to complainants, not to the IPCC (or DPS) putting the complainant at a disadvantage. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [01-02-2013 12:49] Job: 025757 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/025757/025757_w032_michelle_IPCC 40 - Jeremy Heywood.xml

Ev w16 Home Affairs Committee: Evidence

— The protection that the IPCC should offer is inaccessible to those involved in an ongoing police investigation. — The IPCC needs to be able to compel officers to be interviewed as witnesses. — The IPCC has failed to make any detectable impact on poor or discriminatory practice relating to the use of stop and search powers.

5. How theseFindings wereReached 1. In our experience the majority of complaints are undertaken by the DPS, not the IPCC, with the IPCC acting only as an appeal body. Frequently complaints are rejected outright by the DPS. The result is that the police are investigating themselves and this is reflected in the public perception reported to us that the police lack accountability. 2. The IPCC has not resolved significant and obvious weaknesses in the process and procedure for making a complaint, resulting in a system that falls woefully short in its ability to be independent, accessible or effective. Specifically, the oversight of police complaints system under the IPCC does not seem to have eradicated bias towards the police. The existence of the IPCC has done little to improve the process of everyday police complaints in terms of robust, impartial and independent handling of complaints or improved prospects of complaints being successfully upheld. When the IPCC become involved at the appeal body stage, their role as an effective review body or adjudicator has, in our experience, frequently already been undermined by the process that has gone before. 3. At the appeals stage the IPCC are presented with a minimum of three documents: (i) the original complaint; (ii) the initial investigation outcome response from the DPS; and (iii) the complainant’s appeal in response to the DPS’ investigation outcome. 4. The “format” for the DPS response is often problematic: it first summarises the substantive of the complainant’s grievance from the DPS’ viewpoint and then responds with what investigations it has carried out and the decision it has made in relation to each complaint point. 5. The fact that the DPS is allowed to summarise or reinterpret the complaint (without consulting the complainant in the process) and then proceed directly to investigating it on these terms presents the first and major barrier to the process. In our experience, the DPS summary/interpretation is often inaccurate and frequently biased in favour of the police. Information that has often been painstakingly presented to the DPS, identifying the precise alleged breach of police regulations, is reorganised “selectively” (with some parts removed completely) and then responded to in a manner that is at best confusing and often lacks any evidence of a thorough investigation having been carried out. 6. This can be further compounded at the stage that the IPCC becomes involved either as an appeals body or when overseeing or carrying out aspects of the investigation of the complaint themselves. The number of former police officers working within the IPCC and doubts over the impartiality of the lawyers based within the IPCC are a source of severe tension at a community level. In our experience, the IPCC is not seen as an independent body. 7. Complaints are often dismissed for being out of time despite mitigation being presented around the complainant’s mental health, awareness of how the complaint system operates or language-support needs which are pertinent issues to BAMER communities in relation to police complaint matters. If a complaint is lodged against the police beyond a year after the incident giving rise to the complaint, the DPS seek to dismiss it instantly. Complainants can provide mitigation to the IPCC in these circumstances. However, informally the IPCC have advised us in the past that the only grounds they will consider are those of the severity of “sexual abuse against a child”. 8. For many complainants from BAMER backgrounds, including young people, making the decision to complain against police is a difficult one that they fear may lead to further reprisals. Added to this, the vast majority of people are not aware of how the process works or where to seek support hence a delay in submitting a complaint. In a high number of our cases, complainants have mental health issues that are often intertwined with the misconduct or targeting they feel they have experienced from the police and wish to complain about. Furthermore, many police complaints arise from a situation that the complainant feels has compounded their mental health issues (heightened anxiety, depression, paranoia). 9. The system takes no account of this, leaving us in the difficult position of having to inform people redress is unlikely to occur. Consequently, many people are forced to accept suspected wrongdoing leaving them with an overt sense of being excluded despite being the most vulnerable. 10. The IPCC has failed to impact on apparent misuse of the local resolution system by the DPS. In our experience, clients who meet with the DPS to discuss a complaint and have a statement taken are almost by default advised to take the path of local resolution which can only result in “words of advice” being given to an officer rather than any heavier sanction that could result from a full investigation. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [01-02-2013 12:49] Job: 025757 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/025757/025757_w032_michelle_IPCC 40 - Jeremy Heywood.xml

Home Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev w17

11. The IPCC does not acknowledge poor handling of first stage complaints by the DPS allowing bad practice to continue. The current system appears to lack any mechanism to implement improvements or lessons learnt into the system. If an appeal is upheld by the IPCC, they simply refer it back to the DPS to reinvestigate—potentially to the same DPS investigator. The complainant has no assurance that any action will be taken to improve examples or patterns of poor investigation by the DPS. This does little to inspire confidence. 12. By way of example of the above, the following are instances of poor handling by the DPS which we have reported and that have received no scrutiny by the IPCC: — allowing irrelevant speculation on the victim’s character by police officers; — providing statements to the investigation to form part of the “evidence” to dismiss a complaint; — misinterpretation or lack of understanding of basic law; — failure to identify or interview witnesses or officers pinpointed by the complainant; and — no explanation of what attempts have been made to secure relevant evidence in a timely manner (when it has not been secured) and instead simply stating that it cannot be located or that an attempt has been made but has not been responded to. 13. The current police complaints system frequently disadvantages a layperson despite purportedly being accessible and accommodating to them. As outlined above, a complainant wishing to appeal to the IPCC is often presented with the onerous task of having to “unpick” the DPS investigation outcome, explaining how and why their complaint has been misinterpreted, challenging a lack of investigation, defending their character and arduously researching the law for themselves to explain how the DPS have misinterpreted it. The average layperson is at a disadvantage in this process because they are essentially “going up against” the work of a police investigator who has potentially greater experience of dealing with an evidence-based investigation within a legal framework. 14. Complainants often tell us that they feel the DPS have deliberately manipulated a complaint outcome into a confusing long-winded document leaving them with the impossible task of needing to appeal using detailed analysis which is far better suited to a trained eye. 15. Deadlines in relation to complaints only apply to complainants, not to the IPCC (or DPS) putting the complainant at a disadvantage. At the first stage of a complaint, the DPS rarely indicate how long it will take them to respond and are extremely reluctant to give updates on their investigation to reassure the complainant. This process can take many months. Where an update is given, it is often scant of detail and complainants have no avenue to direct any complaint over the length of this process. 16. When the Investigation Outcome is received from the DPS the complainant has to appeal within 28 days without exception. Once an appeal is submitted, an estimated timeframe that is very “generous” to the IPCC (several months), is given for response. Frequently this is not adhered to, with no explanation given—the onus is on the complainant to chase the IPCC. Effectively the complaint disappears into a system where the complainant has no control over the issue they raised and the IPCC appears to have no accountability for how it conducts its investigation. 17. If a complainant is unhappy about the length of time of the complaint process, there is no guidance on who to complain to or how. If the complainant is forced into the position of trying to complain, they are effectively complaining to the IPCC about the IPCC, having already predictably been through a process of complaining about the police to the police, giving rise to a sense of inequality. 18. Tight deadlines on one side whilst the other is given a prolonged and extendable period to respond tips the balance of favour away from the complainant who often has to submit their documents in a hurry. 19. If a complaint is wholly or partially successful, it is returned to the DPS to reinvestigate and the whole process starts all over again. Yet again the complainant can wait months for a DPS response and then if they wish to appeal, wait even longer for another appeal to occur. With the complaints process being so slow, it undermines both the chances of a fair outcome (as evidence is harder to secure over time) and potential benefits of lessons learnt or changes in practice that could result from an upheld police complaint. 20. The protection that the IPCC should offer is inaccessible to those involved in an ongoing police investigation. We receive a high volume of complaints at a community level from people unhappy with how the police are handling an investigation—either where they are a victim of crime, where they are being investigated themselves for a crime or in many cases where their complaint relates to the police’ failure to identify them as the victim, which is common in racial harassment cases. In this situation there seems little advantage in making a complaint as it will be dealt with so slowly. Potential complainants fear that making a complaint will result in victimisation, damage their case or have a negative impact on the ongoing criminal investigation process against them. 21. For example, a black client of NMP was unhappy at being investigated in a situation where they contended they had been the victim of an assault by another black person. They reported to us that police attending the scene of the assault had treated them in a racially discriminatory manner saying words to the effect of “You lot are all the same, always fighting amongst yourselves, you need to shake hands and sort it cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [01-02-2013 12:49] Job: 025757 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/025757/025757_w032_michelle_IPCC 40 - Jeremy Heywood.xml

Ev w18 Home Affairs Committee: Evidence

out”. This “advice” had been given to our client in the back of an ambulance during treatment for serious facial injuries. The police had then left and as the situation had not been dealt with appropriately the two parties had ended up crossing paths again later, resulting in the police being called and a subsequent investigation into our client. Due to the need to liaise with the police over the ongoing investigation and to make representations that the client was in fact a victim of crime, the client felt they had no choice but to let the initial matter drop for fear of antagonising the police and jeopardising her position. The matter was of course raised in dialogue with the police, when advocating for an improved ongoing investigation, but no redress was offered. 22. The IPCC needs to be able to compel officers to be interviewed as witnesses. The need for this has recently been highlighted by the death of Mark Duggan in Tottenham, where the 31 officers present have not been interviewed. We have come across similar issues in other cases and note that there appears to be a secondary practice where officers who are called to interview appear to use delaying tactics to allow the six-month mark to pass meaning they cannot be prosecuted for assault. The message this sends out to the public is that police officers are evading scrutiny over serious matters of public concern. 23. The IPCC has failed to make any detectable impact on poor or discriminatory practice relating to the use of stop and search powers. The feedback we receive at a community level is that the existence of the IPCC is not seen as a deterrent to discriminatory or poorly carried out stops. The IPCC identifies stop and search as one of its target areas, yet appears to have implemented no changes to address barriers faced by young people or people from BAMER backgrounds in relation to making complaints. Complaint rates around stop and search remain low. 24. In 2004, The 1990 Trust published “Stop & Search: The views and experiences of Black communities on complaining to the police—A study conducted for the Metropolitan Police Authority”. The report made a series of recommendations around improving the complaint process, including: — “Recommendation 7: It is recommended that the newly established Independent Police Complaints Commission develop specific information that clarifies: (i) How to make a complaint regarding Stop and Search, (ii) What the procedure will be, and (iii) Possible outcomes. This must be further supported by greater transparency in the investigation of complaints. Complainants should be kept regularly informed of the progress of investigations and the outcome of all criminal, disciplinary and administrative investigations into alleged violations.” 25. In 2012, the IPCC website contains no specific guidance on making complaints about Stop and Search, maintaining the same lengthy and arduous complaints process for complaints of this nature as for others. In an area of policing as contentious as this, with complainants having an increased likelihood to be vulnerable minors or from marginalised backgrounds facing discrimination, it is unfathomable how an independent body could have overlooked implementing any new measures in eight years.

6. Recommendations 1. In our view the current system needs radical restructuring longer term. The public is unlikely to have confidence in any complaints system that places so much emphasis on internal investigation by police officers. For confidence to increase there needs to be a body which is demonstrably independent from any police force, and which has sufficient powers, resources and will to robustly investigate police misconduct. 2. There is a need to establish a faster and fairer process for all police complaints. A single point of contact should be established and a transparent, easily understood structure for the resolution including clearer deadlines for response and avenues for information and redress when responses are late. All complainants should have the right to know that their complaint will be taken seriously and properly investigated, and there should be absolute clarity in procedure. 3. In the short term, there is a need for an urgent review of the practice of allowing the DPS to restructure a complaint without consulting a complainant and then proceeding straight to investigation, Instead, the resultant and commonplace pressure on a complainant to comprehensively complain about the police, the terms of the investigation, the process of investigation and investigation outcome should be alleviated. 4. Under the current system, the IPCC needs to develop a transparent process of sanction and accountability alongside a clearer “lessons learnt” approach to flaws in the manner the DPS carry out investigations. 5. There should be greater mitigation around late submissions of complaints, where the complainant has experienced barriers to access due to vulnerability or disadvantage, such as mental health issues or not having English as a first language. There is a need to take into account the broader interests of justice with the recognition that the exclusion of such cases may be contribute to abuses of power against a subsection of society falling under the radar. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [01-02-2013 12:49] Job: 025757 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/025757/025757_w032_michelle_IPCC 40 - Jeremy Heywood.xml

Home Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev w19

6. The use of informal or local resolution systems should be independently monitored to ensure that they are not used inappropriately in relation to conduct that would justify criminal or disciplinary proceedings. 7. There is an urgent need to develop a clear and independently supervised system to address complaints about ongoing investigation cases. 8. The IPCC need to be granted powers to compel officers to provide witness statements. 9. A specific approach tackling the difficulties of complaining about Stop and Search needs to be developed to encourage greater reporting, through consultation with young people and community organisations. All complaints regarding stop and search should be directly referred to the IPCC given the importance of this issue and the need to promote greater accountability. A specific section on the IPCC website needs to reflect this area of work. Newham Monitoring Project June 2012

Written evidence submitted by Taherali Gulamhussein [IPCC 11] 1. I am a law student and campaigner with a keen interest in ensuring the accountability of the police, with personal experience of the Independent Police Complaints Commission (the “Commission”). The views expressed herein are entirely my own and not of any organisation I have or am currently working or volunteering for. 2. The Commission has not improved the scrutiny of police practices to a level that commands sufficient public confidence. 3. There are two reasons that the Commission fails:

(1) The Commission has not used some of the powers it has been given effectively (a) The Commission has been given the power to employ ex-police officers as well as police officers. However the Commission has chosen to employ a large number of ex-police officers, which severely compromises the statutory requirement for the Commission to be Independent.

(2) The Commission does not have all the right powers and resources to carry out its role effectively 1. The Commission has not been given the responsibility by Parliament to make the following decisions. (a) Recording decisions (i) The responsibility for deciding whether or not to record a complaint rests with the police force subject to the complaint. (ii) It is unacceptable that the non-recording of legitimate complaints has been a persistent problem since the inception of the Commission and the accompanying new regulatory framework. (iii) For the period 2010–11 over 50% of valid appeals against the recording decisions of police forces in England and Wales were upheld.9 (iv) More importantly, the responsibility for deciding whether or not to record conduct matters or death or serious injury matters rests with the police force concerned. It is conceivable that some death or serious injury matters will not be recorded by the police at all and there is insufficient oversight by the IPCC to prevent this. (v) The Inquiry should propose statutory changes to transfer the responsibility for making recording decisions from the police (and other appropriate authorities) to the IPCC. (b) Mode of Investigation decisions (i) The responsibility for deciding the mode of investigation of a complaint rests with the police force subject to the complaint. (ii) The responsibility is important because the modes of investigation afford different consequences for the police officers subject to a complaint. One of the modes of investigation, local resolution, is not in fact a mode of investigation at all. It is not an investigation as Taherali Gulamhussein. (c) Decisions to take over formal police investigations when unacceptably lengthy (i) The law does not require the police to meet deadlines in completing investigations. (ii) On average a complainant will have to wait seven months for a conclusion to a complaint handled via a formal police investigation, which is unacceptably lengthy.10 9 Police complaint: statistics for England and Wales, 2010–11 page 4, IPCC, accessed on 28 June 2012 10 Ibid, page 7 cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [01-02-2013 12:49] Job: 025757 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/025757/025757_w032_michelle_IPCC 40 - Jeremy Heywood.xml

Ev w20 Home Affairs Committee: Evidence

(iii) The powers could be improved by legislative amendment. (iv) This is a workable proposal. The law imposes deadlines on the police in other arguably analogous circumstances for example the police (and all relevant bodies) are required to respond to requests under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 ordinarily within 20 working days. Taherali Gulamhussein June 2012

Written evidence submitted by StopWatch [IPCC 12] Introduction 1. StopWatch is an action group formed of leading organisations from civil society, the legal profession and academia. StopWatch aims to ensure the fair and effective use of stop and search powers to promote safety and positive police community relations. StopWatch is grateful for the opportunity to respond to the Home Affairs Committee inquiry into the Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC). In this submission, we provide a response to the following three areas: — The independence of the Commission; — The powers and responsibilities of the Commission; and — The effectiveness of Commission investigations. Please note, for the purpose of clarification that when referring to stop and search, we are including stop and account and stop and searches conducted under the variety of police powers.

1. The independence of the Commission 2. One of the key purposes of the IPCC is to have an independent and proactive role in building a police complaints system in which all sections of the community and the police service can have confidence.11 While we acknowledge that lessons have been learnt from the experiences of the Police Complaints Authority (PCA) and there appears to be increased independence of complaint investigations in some aspects, we cannot ignore that practices such as the recruitment of former police officers raises concerns around how truly independent the IPCC is. 3. The recruitment of former police officers as investigators raises concerns about independence and impartiality of the investigation of complaints. Concerning is the presumption that former officers will be able to conduct impartial and effective investigations into the conduct of current officers and police force practices. While we appreciate the reassurance from the IPCC that there are no circumstances in which an IPCC investigator, with a police background, can investigate a former colleague with whom they worked,12 in reality, it does little to counteract the public perception of life long camaraderie and solidarity between police officers. There is also little to reassure the public that a former police officer will not behave more sympathetically towards the investigated officer, due to his knowledge of the demanding role of that officer. 4. There is an inherent lack of diversity within the Commission at all levels, which among other factors can be linked to the recruitment process, further damaging the perception of a truly independent IPCC, fuelling lack of public confidence. There is no evidence to suggest that the IPCC has made proactive efforts to make their recruitment process more accessible to individuals of Black Minority Ethnic groups within its institution. It is crucial that a body which is policing various law enforcement institutions is a representation of the communities it represents to establish and maintain public confidence. Concerning are also the low complaints figures of Black and Asian individuals (10%) in comparison with those of White individuals (57%),13 which we do not believe to be attributable to greater satisfaction of policing amongst BME individuals. Notably, the IPCC states that: “people who are unhappy with stop and search encounters, in particular young people and those from black and minority ethnic backgrounds, have the least confidence both in the police and the police complaints system.”14 5. There is a need to raise awareness amongst the public of the function of the IPCC by communicating some of the positive outcomes through various media outlets, including social media. Prosecution outcomes, misconduct and recommendations should be more widely publicised in a format which is easy to understand and accessible to all. Transparency of the IPCC is vital for public confidence so that the police can be seen to be subject to rigorous, fair and open scrutiny. Materials should be targeted to different groups, using a variety of mediums. If citizens are to have confidence in the police service as a whole, they must feel that when they 11 http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/documents/comp-against-pol/complaints-against- police.pdf?view=Binary 12 http://www.official-documents.gov.uk/document/cm80/8056/8056.pdf (accessed 26 June 2012) 13 http://www.ipcc.gov.uk/en/Pages/stats.aspx (Police Complaint: Statistics for England and wales 2010–11) 14 IPCC position regarding police powers to stop and search cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [01-02-2013 12:49] Job: 025757 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/025757/025757_w032_michelle_IPCC 40 - Jeremy Heywood.xml

Home Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev w21

complain about individual instances of police misconduct their allegations will be investigated thoroughly and impartially. Independence and openness is required at every stage of investigations.15

2. The powers and responsibilities of the Commission 6. The Commission’s current powers provide the remit to investigate death, serious injury, corruption and other serious complaints against the police was to play a key role in ensuring that the British way of policing by consent works effectively. The regulations further stipulate that all incidents in specific categories are mandatory for referral to the IPCC so that it can decide on a case-by-case basis whether to investigate it itself or supervise a police investigation or neither. At present, stop and search complaints do not fall within this category and are usually handled at a local level. 7. Last year’s riots starkly brought stop and search back into the spotlight. In December 2011, the Riots, Communities and Victim’s Panel identified police “stop and search” practices as one of the factors behind last summer’s riots. In many of the areas the inquiry visited, stop and search was identified as a major source of discontent with the police. In some instances, these tensions were cited as a motivating factor in the riots and a reason for some of the attacks on the police. This finding was echoed by research conducted by the Guardian and the London School of Economics, Reading the Riots, which found that anger at the police was a major cause of the London riots, with 86% of rioters citing policing as an important, or very important, factor in causing the disorder.16 8. The 2009 Home Affairs Select Committee report on progress since the Lawrence Inquiry noted that minority ethnic people remain “over-policed and under-protected within our criminal justice system.”17 The Equalities and Human Rights Commission’s (EHRC) investigation into the use of stop and search powers in 2010 concluded that a number of police forces are using the powers in a manner that is disproportionate and possibly discriminatory.18 9. Stop and search is deeply contentious and profoundly shapes peoples’ attitudes towards the police. This is particularly true of young people, who often feel targeted, embarrassed, and humiliated by the experience of repeat stop and search encounters. Stop and search is grossly disproportionate, undermining public assessments of police fairness and as a result damaging public support and cooperation with the police. 10. Research shows that unsatisfactory contacts between the police and the public can have a negative impact on public confidence in the police, not only for the individual directly involved, but also for his or her family, friends, and associates.19 Many young men, particularly those from black and Asian communities, feel they are being stopped and/or searched simply because they fit a general stereotype, and this is fuelling anger and alienation amongst some communities and jeopardizing their support of the police and the use of their powers.20 Ethnic disproportionality fundamentally undermines public assessments of the fairness and legitimacy of the police and the wider criminal justice system.21 When members of the public are treated rudely and unfairly, trust and confidence in the police suffers. When members of the public are treated fairly and with respect, they are more supportive of the police and more respectful of the law.22 Ultimately, police officers rely on legitimacy, cooperation and compliance with the law to be able to undertake policing functions and uphold the law. When the police lose their legitimacy in the eyes of the policed they lose their claim to the monopoly of the use of force and disorder can arise, as was the case in August 2011.23 11. Given the severity effects of stop and search, as outlined above, it is crucial that complaints concerning stop and search are removed from the remit of the professional standards board and directly investigated by the IPCC. Given the importance of the issue and the damaging effect stop and search can have on communities, all complaints regarding stop and search should be directly referred to the IPCC. At present, only complaints about Schedule 7 of the Terrorism Act 2000 are automatically referred from local police forces to the IPCC. This is a welcome move towards ensuring that this power, being UK’s most wide ranging stop-and-search power, is more accountable and transparent particularly since it operates outside of the PACE framework. This should apply to all stop and search powers to ensure equal oversight. The IPCC must be given more powers to investigate complaints and claims of misconduct by community members in order to foster and rebuilt good relationships and trust within the complaints system. Especially, given that the changes to the Police and Criminal Evidence Act (PACE) Code of Practice A in March 2011 removing the mandatory national recording 15 http://www.liberty-human-rights.org.uk/policy/reports/an-independent-police-complaints-commission-april-2000.pdf 16 The Riots, Communities and Victim’s Panel (2011). Five Days in August, available at: http://www.5daysinaugust.co.uk 17 Home Affairs Select Committee (2009). The Macpherson Report—Ten Years On, session 2008–09 18 Equalities and Human Rights Commission (2010). Stop and Think: A Critical Review of the Use of Stop and Search Powers in England and Wales. London: EHRC. 19 Miller, J, Bland N, and Quinton P (2000), The Impact of Stops and Searches on Crime and the Community, Police Research Series Paper 127, London: Home Office. 20 Sharp, D, and Atherton, S (2007) “To Serve and Protect? The Experiences of Policing in the Community of Young People from Black and Other Ethnic Minority Groups”, British Journal of Criminology, 47(5): 746–763. 21 Sunshine, J and Tyler, T R (2003). “The Role of Procedural Justice and Legitimacy in Public Support for Policing”, Law and Society Review, 37(3): 513–548; Tyler, T R (2006). “Legitimacy and Legitimation”, Annual Review of Psychology, 57: 375–40. 22 Tyler, T R and Fagan, J (2008). “Legitimacy and cooperation: why do people help the police fight crime in their communities?” Ohio State Journal of Criminal Law, 6, 231–275; Hough, M, Jackson, J, Bradford, B, Myhill, A., and Quinton, P. (2010). “Procedural Justice, Trust and Institutional Legitimacy”, Policing: A Journal of Policy and Practice, 4: 203–2010. 23 Bradford, B and Jackson, Jonathan (2011). “When Trust is Lost: The British and their Police after the Tottenham Riots,” Books and Ideas.Net cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [01-02-2013 12:49] Job: 025757 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/025757/025757_w032_michelle_IPCC 40 - Jeremy Heywood.xml

Ev w22 Home Affairs Committee: Evidence

of stop and account, have created the danger of different levels of service to communities in different policing areas. The changes remove a vital form of redress for individuals who feel they are been unfairly or inappropriately stopped. The changes undermine the complaints systems. There will be no proof that stops took place thus denying those affected the chance to seek remedy through the complaints system and ultimately the courts. Thus all complaints related to stop and search should be directed to the IPCC for investigation to reinstate some form of redress.

3. The effectiveness of Commission investigations

12. It is difficult to assess the effectiveness of the IPCC investigations with the lack of public information available. The lack of transparency of the service is concerning, as it a vital component for public trust and confidence. It is important that data specifying referrals to the Crown Prosecution Service and consequent charging decisions are made public. The same applies to recommendations made to police services and other law enforcement agencies. This information should be readily available in order to assess the effectiveness of investigations and allow scrutiny.

13. We believe that there is a need for public involvement in the scrutiny of law enforcement services in areas, such as stop and search, to rebuild strained relationships between police services and communities adversely affected by the disproportionate use of that power. Focus needs to shift from policing communities to solving problems with local communities through effective communication and engagement. We would welcome consideration of various methods, which will actively involve community representatives in the investigation process of police complaints; specifically, where the complaint relates to stop and search. In this instance we would welcome pilots where investigations are conducted by a panel of investigators and local community members.

14. The current system for the implementation of recommendations following investigation does not confer sufficient powers to the IPCC to compel a law enforcement institution, including counter terrorism officers, to adopt recommendations. We recognize that a system must be in place to address recommendations; however, this does not require their implementation. The decision whether to implement remains that of the respective force.24 It is important that recommendations are enforced and the IPCC should be given these powers instead of relying on costly judicial review processes to ensure enforcement, which will restore public confidence in the services authority and effectiveness. Particularly, recommendations for stop and search policing need to be applied quickly to re-establish good community and police relations.

Conclusions andRecommendations

15. A truly independent, vocal and transparent IPCC is vital for public confidence and effective policing. To this end, StopWatch encourages considerations of the following points: — Former police officers acting as investigators affects public perception of the IPCC’s independence from police services. It is important to minimise the numbers of former police officers within the institution to increase public confidence and positive perception of independence. — The lack of diversity within the institution on all levels is concerning. We need a service which is a representation of the communities it represents. Recruitment needs to be tailored to insure diversity in all levels of the institution. — Transparency of the IPCC is vital for public confidence so that the police can be seen to be subject to rigorous, fair and open scrutiny. There needs to be greater emphasis on information and data sharing with the public. — It is crucial that complaints regarding stop and search are directly referred to the IPCC given the importance of the issue and the damaging effect this has on our communities. — The IPCC must monitor police complaints arising out of stops and stop and searches so that patterns of disproportionate use against people from black and minority ethnic backgrounds in certain boroughs, police stations and/or by certain police officers can be identified and addressed by the IPCC. — New investigation methods including local community members need to be explored and piloted, especially for those concerning stop and search complaints. — The IPCC must be given sufficient enforcement powers to ensure that polices forces, including counter terrorism commands, comply with the decisions of the IPCC rather than relying on lengthy and costly judicial reviews. — Young people should be engaged at all levels of the work of the IPCC, including on various high level or strategic committees, to ensure that their voices are heard. 24 http://statguidance.ipcc.gov.uk/Pages/learning.aspx#para593 cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [01-02-2013 12:49] Job: 025757 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/025757/025757_w032_michelle_IPCC 40 - Jeremy Heywood.xml

Home Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev w23

About StopWatch StopWatch is a coalition that seeks to work with communities, ministers, policy makers and senior police officers to ensure that reforms to the police service are fair and inclusive, and lead to better policing for all. StopWatch aims to ensure that the stop and search agenda progresses on fair grounds. Comprising leading figures from civil society, the legal professions and academia, StopWatch is committed to the following Core Aims: (1) Reintroduction of full recording and extension of measures to ensure police accountability and transparency in their use of stop-searches. (2) Substantial reductions in the use of stop-searches and elimination of ethnic disproportionality. (3) Challenge the use of stop-searches, which do not require “reasonable suspicion.” (4) Promote civil liberties, in particular those affected by extension of policing powers in arenas such as migration, identification (DNA, fingerprinting, biometrics etc) and transport. (5) Investigating and advocating alternatives to stop-searches, and supporting the police in implementing them. (6) Empowering all who are affected by stop-searches and help them to make their voices heard. Members of StopWatch include: Equanomics UK; Independent Academic Research Studies; Howard League for Penal Reform, Just for Kids Law, Mannheim Centre for Criminology, LSE; Muslim Safety Forum; NACRO; Newham Monitoring Group; Not Another Drop; Open Society Justice Initiative; Release; Runnymede Trust; School of Law, Kings College London; Second Wave and Turning Point. Stop Watch July 2012

Written evidence submitted by Charles Kirk [IPCC 13] 1. Reference the 96 hours bail issue: an illegal practice continuing for many years until a lowly clerk in a lesser court asked a question, result: emergency legislation. Equally the conduct of News International, MP’s and their expenses or the bankers, so eloquently illustrated this week with Barclays and LIBOR. I find it disconcerting for the Chancellor and so many MP’s to declare such “shock” and “surprise” at the current farrago, I am not in banking yet commented on the manipulation of LIBOR four years ago during the crisis, the evidence was quite obvious albeit circumstantial, circumstantial being more than adequate to settle many a criminal trial. “Wilful blindness” is an affliction not restricted to the upper echelons of News Int., and when it so pervades the institutions that are entrusted and obligated to protect us the harm is manifestly greater, what has been the cost of the riots of last summer? 2. In a similar vein, a culture of malpractice may have been in play for a number of years and not restricted to just one Police Force if comments made by certain officers are accurate. It’s extremely difficult to make a firmer assertion as those who are culpable are the very same people in control of any avenue of inquiry and are actively suppressing any chance of scrutiny (itself a common law offence). 3. I have evidence of the most egregious malpractice by both Police and the IPCC and collusion together, exploding the myth of “independence”. Malpractice that firmly sits in the realm of criminal law, not merely the all too frequent practices that can be judged as unlawful, unfair or unreasonable. 4. I recall a comment made by an observer of this case that “I’m of the considered opinion that the IPCC operates as an early warning system for the Police.”. Another from a member of PALG following a meeting with the IPCC where they admitted to “being completely shit”. A judicial source said the underlying case “stinks” of misconduct and “whitewash” when referring to the IPCC. What is the IPCC’s primary role exactly? Clearly there is little if any confidence in the integrity of the IPCC let alone the complaints system it has a statutory duty to improve or uphold.

SPECIFIC ISSUE to be explored: It requires an appreciation of the procedures mandated under the numerous statutes and guidances to grasp the issue. 5. When faced with a formal investigation under the PRA2002 (and CPIA 1996 Part II), what the Force actually carries out is a process known as Informal or Local Resolution and then passes it off as a formal “Investigation” by falsifying the paperwork to the IPCC (as when an Investigation is required for identified conduct matters, to include criminal allegations, it is not discretionary or optional to notify the IPCC). The fabrication barely utilizes sophisticated deception, as it appears the IPCC is “in on the scam”, so when a complete failure to follow any procedures mandated by law (PRA & CPIA; HOCR, NCRS & other policies or guidances), when names change on the paperwork (illegal sub-delegation or other), or any other impropriety is implied no questions are raised. In fact the opposite has become apparent, as the IPCC takes positive action to suppress the evidence/issues. How widespread is this malpractice? cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [01-02-2013 12:49] Job: 025757 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/025757/025757_w032_michelle_IPCC 40 - Jeremy Heywood.xml

Ev w24 Home Affairs Committee: Evidence

6. The IPCC collusion in covering up this malpractice is not a civil but criminal matter, evidenced by avoiding the many opportunities it had to rectify the situation (and to which statute mandates action).

As for a specific case:

7. On making indictable only criminal allegations against Police Officers, a statutory process is laid down to follow which dates back at least to PACE 1984, rolled up into the Police Act 1996 and subsequent Acts which created the IPCC from the PCA and PCB that preceded it. Preceding, parallel, at least still relevant to the process is the common law and Roman law governing such procedures that came before PACE as to the propriety in investigating misconduct of any kind in any organisation: impartiality, fairness, reason.

8. The issue is required to be recorded and referred to the IPCC, senior officers (the appropriate authority) need to be informed and herein lies a weakness—the trend away from the Chief Constable. Exacerbated by the ever watered-down Regulations and Codes of Conduct which have become little more than a bad joke since the 2008 revision, worse still with the latest 2011–12 revision. Where no-one is to be “blamed” for misconduct what is the obvious result—one merely has to look at the current Barclays scandal for the answer. The Police feel that they are “untouchable” and it is ever more becoming so, a topic discussed with Lord Dear a couple of months back as accountability is “failing”.

9. In this case, few if any, procedures were followed, no notification of the Chief Constable (or his delegated equivalent), no Regulation 9/15/Yellow Notice, none of the other basic requirements and safeguards, in fact the “investigation” did not even proceed until AFTER the alleged offender was liaised with and a story “fixed” before the victim was even interviewed, let alone gave a formal statement (MG11). How many rapists, robbers or burglars get to arrange their story before they have even been formally accused or interrogated? An initial statement guides the interrogation not the other way round.

10. This cannot be all too surprising when it turns out the “investigating officer” acting on behalf of the IPCC was in fact a direct colleague of the officers facing potential indictments, and therefore an “interested party” (re- PA1996, Conduct Regs 2004, 2008, etc). Who was in fact directly involved in the original case (un- beknownst to the victim) albeit to what degree is yet to be ascertained (as why would he investigate himself? re- Morris v Police Services Board). That this breaches every rule in the book hardly needs to be stated, nemo judex causa sua has been in existence long before the UK, the courts and the common law came into being. Leveson has highlighted the importance of impartiality and propriety in quasi-judicial decisions, the media, and Westminster, being filled with the topic ad nauseam these past months, thus the concept is hardly arcane or antiquated, but of the most contemporaneous currency. We need not trawl back to the travails of Lord Hoffman or further still to Lord Hewart. One hardly needs to elaborate on the myriad of additional misconduct and impropriety that flows from such a corrupted process, an endless stream of fabricated or dishonest official records and nefarious deeds. All of central interest of the IPCC, or would be if the IPCC were not actively involved in their commission! In so doing this is just another instance of institutionalised corrupt practice like “cuffing”, “laddering” or the phenomenon of interviewing away from a Police station to circumvent PACE, which has been highlighted recently by the Law Society, where Police are “wise” to the loophole that they exploit to circumvent Article 6 on a daily basis. By corrupting the “Investigation”, proceedings to follow are purposefully compromised.

11. That should suffice for now, perhaps a reformatted version could be produced in due course. Another specific case which must be looked into is the Duggan case. First the IPCC are caught relaying a false version of a DSI incident, simply “rubber stamping” the Police’s false version without cursory inquiry or scepticism, a matter of the utmost gravity by itself, given even greater import by the events the dishonest conduct precipitated at huge cost to the nation, exacerbated further still by the stiff custodial sentences handed down at tax-payers expense, all potentially avoidable had the IPCC acted with integrity. So one would think the IPCC would at least learn from this, considering the immediacy and the wider ramifications, but no it was business as usual when they broached the next phase, dealing with the grieving and innocent relatives. They were denounced as liars, treated with contempt and this continued for many months. I am not aware whether the precise circumstances of how the sudden u-turn occurred just two weeks before the publication of the IPCC’s report have been aired properly in public, but it is a topic that needs to be tackled by the Committee. It would be very useful to have sight of the original report that was to be published to compare it with the final version rushed out at the 11th hour. The latest version was bad enough—the MPS asserted that senior officers relied on the solitary word of a subordinate, with a vested interest. Then in turn, the IPCC merely reiterated this version without any real inquiry choosing to brand two women, two ordinary Brits with no agenda, as liars whilst they were vulnerable and grieving. Disgusting hardly does it justice to describe the IPCC’s conduct in this regard. As for confidence in, or improving the complaints system, what a sick joke. Likewise the Tomlinson case is in need of a proper inquiry, I trust Tuckers will likely make a submission to this Committee and I’ll leave it to them but it regards the IPCC and issues outside the current criminal case. Charles Kirk June 2012 cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [01-02-2013 12:49] Job: 025757 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/025757/025757_w032_michelle_IPCC 40 - Jeremy Heywood.xml

Home Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev w25

Written evidence submitted by Sara Jane Loughran [IPCC 14] Executive Summary 1. I am Sara Jane Loughran and I am 45 years of age. I am a staff nurse at Blackpool Teaching Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust. I am of exemplary character and until this case I had barely used the police and had not heard of the Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC). I stress that I am not raising this matter out of dissatisfaction with my personal case. I am raising my experience as a user who sensed an overarching attitude from the IPCC that suggested that as a non police complainant my evidence was irrelevant whatever I said or provided in support of my case. Overall my involvement with the IPCC made me feel that I was a liar, ignored, worthless and even going slightly mad such was the improper treatment of the evidence. This case has made me distrust the police when I have always respected them and encouraged my four children to do precisely the same. Our experience of the IPCC has caused me and my family to resolve never to use it again as long as we live. I am not the type of person to write in this way but I feel so strongly about this matter that I feel that I have to submit my account and evidence to the Home Affairs Committee (the Committee). I feel that I have a public duty to raise this matter precisely because it demonstrates how simplistic material is skewed and disregarded in favour of the police by the IPCC. I am a senior staff nurse who had never used the IPCC before. Why they did this to me personally is a mystery. I am of the view that the problem is systemic. In concluding I never want any other person to endure what I had to at the hands of the IPCC. Accordingly I am determined to try to ensure that it never happens again to any citizen who is forced to turn to the IPCC for help. 2. My presentation to the Committee is based on my single experience of the IPCC. I will try to show the Committee how cavalier the IPCC was in relation to the eyewitness and documentary evidence that I provided in support of my very simple case. My allegations involved serious allegations of dishonesty, misconduct and conspiracy from several named police officers and was powerfully evidenced. My main concern is that the IPCC disregarded truthful written eyewitness evidence from three non-police individuals who did attend the scene in favour of untruthful evidence from one police officer who didn’t attend the scene. The police also failed to interview a fourth eyewitness who corroborated my version who had provided his details to the officers at the scene. The documentary evidence that demonstrated my assertions is simplistic but powerful. I am sharing my case and evidence as a factual example of how the IPCC disregards eyewitness and documentary proof of police misconduct. 3. My view is that the behaviour from the IPCC was so flagrant that it may be indicative of a wider problem. Indeed the evidence and facts in my case was reviewed by David Knight, Director of Casework and Customer Service (attached dated 22 March 2011) and the erroneous decisions stood. This shows, in my view that evidential problems possibly go right to the top. My experience is that the IPCC disregard evidence of whatever standard if it points to police misconduct; no matter how serious it is. Their default fallback position appears to be to highlight perceived minor “systemic failures” with no personal “blame” attached. But I had made serious allegations of personal misconduct and provided the evidence to prove this. My expectation was that this evidence would be considered appropriately without fear of favour and that the guilty would be brought reasonably to account. To my regret this never occurred at any point. My view is that the IPCC deals with this type of routine case and evidence improperly regularly with the aim of exonerating police from misconduct in such cases no matter how serious the allegations. In my view the only time that the IPCC may divert from this approach is when there is wide publicity and press or national oversight. This could explain and account for the around 80% public dissatisfaction rate with the IPCC from almost all definitive reports on IPCC performance. No other public sector organisation would survive with such consistently huge dissatisfaction ratings from users. 4. My only encounter with the IPCC resulted in me having absolutely no faith in its fairness, independence and even its probity. Since 2009–10 I have read of many other citizens who have suffered the same fate and I have total empathy with them. The incident in which I was involved caused me serious back injuries from which I still suffer to date. But to my regret the police lied about the whole scenario from start to finish and the IPCC disregarded any and all evidence that proved this. Allegations of dishonesty and even conspiracy orchestrated on the scale of this case are tantamount to corruption and the IPCC ignored the facts and evidence of this. I place my case in the context of the two IPCC corruption reports of September 2011 and May 2012 and the HMIC report “Without Fear or Favour”. The police behaviour seriously hampered my recovery and made me feel dishonest, irrelevant and slightly insane. The subsequent behaviour of the IPCC made it all much worse. I had only approached the IPCC out of desperation but ended up bewildered, distraught and shocked by their performance and unreasonable approach to the facts and evidence. Quite simply the IPCC made it appear that I was a premeditated and wilful liar. 5. I also wish to raise material that worried me as to the independence of the IPCC that they considered during the course of my case. I received this material separately via the Data Protection Act and it was never volunteered to me by the IPCC. I was mortified that the police suggested in one “confidential” and unofficial document that I was in effect a fraudster acting in collusion with my fiancé who pulled all of my strings. They suggested that I was not injured in the accident and I was merely attempting to defraud the Council who had denied liability. In another document a superintendent suggested to the IPCC that my partner was mentally ill and a vulnerable complainant. An example headed “Confidential Information” is attached (undated) from “PS 2006 Young” the investigating officer. This document is a virtual fabrication from start to finish. However I was absent from work for two years due to the extent of my back injuries and had to have a major back cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [01-02-2013 12:49] Job: 025757 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/025757/025757_w032_michelle_IPCC 40 - Jeremy Heywood.xml

Ev w26 Home Affairs Committee: Evidence

operation in March 2011. My worry is that at no point did the IPCC inform me of the existence of these informal and slanderous documents whilst they were dealing with my case and I have no idea what weight (if any) the IPCC attributed to the untruthful slurs as contained in them. I could easily rebut all of the police claims if I had been informed. The police misled the IPCC in stating that the Council had denied liability because of police actions. However I could have immediately produced a letter to the IPCC from my solicitor of early August 2009 whereas the Council had admitted full liability. In my single experience of the IPCC I found them to be a body that disregarded all evidence in order to skew the facts in favour of the police. This included the IPCC possibly considering untruthful assertions and opinion from the police without any recourse back to me. In my experience it is virtually impossible to get a fair, independent, reasonable and even lawful outcome from the IPCC whatever the standard of evidence that is supplied to them.

Submission 6. Can I please make it clear that the police misled me throughout the entire passage of my complaint to them? All the examples are too numerous and I don’t want to over burden the Committee when it has more important matters than this to consider. However the IPCC allowed the police to escape at each and every stage whether it was via disregarding evidence or concocting bogus and unconvincing stories on behalf of the police. However one series of specific and premeditated lies percolated the whole affair throughout the 14 month passage of my complaint. That is that the police lied about attending the scene of the accident on foot throughout and had no equipment which is why they never breathalysed anyone involved. This single series of lies on one matter was simplistic, wilful, long term and conspiratorial. This one matter showed the attitude of the police and IPCC to police misconduct throughout. The IPCC acted improperly even in the face of powerful eyewitness and documentary evidence that proved that my allegations had substance. Documents (i) to (iv) prove that between 6 November 2009 and 22 January 2010 the police repeatedly recorded falsehoods in formal documents at a time when they knew or reasonably should have known they were false. The police later lied to the IPCC about these matters as proven by the IPCC case note dated 27 July 2010 at such time as the IPCC knew that they were lying. The complaint that I made to the IPCC dated 5 November 2009 proves that both the police and IPCC knew the full truth as early as 5 November 2009. 7. I was badly injured in an RTC with a Council lawnmower on 30 June 2009. The RTC was entirely the fault of the mower driver and the Council admitted full liability within weeks. Within seconds a marked police Vauxhall Astra (PO56 HXH) had appeared at the scene. Two male uniformed officers were in the car which parked only yards from me. They dealt with the incident and seemed like they didn’t want to be there. They immediately seemed to me to take advantage of my shock and the fact that I was alone. I had no idea why and I still don’t know why they did this. The officers promised to come to my home address in the next days to log injuries that I stressed that I had; principally to my back. At no point did they mention an ambulance, offer any medical assistance or arrange to get me home. I wasn’t happy with their attitude and conduct at the scene. I had to be almost carried home from the scene by my partner; another matter that the police lied about. However they never came to my home as promised even though we rang many times. The police claimed they lost all of the records with no explanation. Ten weeks later in September I was advised to complain to the police. On 15 October 2009 a PS Young came to my home to finalise the complaint having already investigated. He was unconvincing and only supported his officers. He was reluctant to discuss the calls that were ignored and that my injuries were never formally recorded. But when I asked for an explanation as to why nobody at the scene was breathalysed things escalated. He told me that his two officers had assured him that they had not breathalysed anyone because they were on foot patrol and hence didn’t have access to the necessary equipment which is always in a vehicle. He told me that he had investigated this matter and that is what his officers had told him and he had based his formal report on that information. I was mortified at the blatant lies that both officers had related to PS Young and the cavalier way that he initially accepted these. Even in this light his first formal report weeks later (dated 6 November 2009) contained the same lies that he then knew to be lies. My daughter Abbi also wrote a statement in regard to this meeting for the purposes of the IPCC dated 8 March 2010 as attached. 8. Naively on 15 October 2009 I was relatively unconcerned as I expected PS Young to deal with the matter because of the compelling eyewitness and other evidence against his officers. PS Young was also aware that Abbi had witnessed the latter events of the meeting on 15 October 2009. However three weeks later I had heard nothing more from PS Young or the force. Therefore I raised the matter with the IPCC on 5 November 2009 (attached). The complaint made a quite simplistic series of facts very clear. I also made it known to the police in no uncertain terms that the IPCC had been contacted. Indeed the IPCC itself sent my complaint dated 5 November 2009 to the force as proven by the IPCC letter dated 13 November 2009. Even though the IPCC were well aware of my concerns and the police knew this it did not alter the police approach in any way. This factor truly concerned me even in the months before I wrote my subsequent appeal on 12 March 2010. It appeared to me that the police knew that the IPCC were “reliable” and “compliant” which, to my cost, turned out to be the case. 9. The police were rigid about the false version of events in that the officers had been on foot patrol when they attended the scene. My fiancé made a Freedom of Information request requesting details of vehicles that had attended road traffic incidents in the Hatfield Avenue area on 30 June 2009. To our disbelief the force replied on 7 January 2010 (attached) and confirmed that a vehicle and two officers had attended the scene and supplied the vehicle registration. Two months previously I had supplied a summary of the same facts to PS cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [01-02-2013 12:49] Job: 025757 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/025757/025757_w032_michelle_IPCC 40 - Jeremy Heywood.xml

Home Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev w27

Young on 15 October 2009 and to the IPCC on 5 November 2009. I also provided the police and IPCC with a witness statement from Mr Thompson dated 16 October 2009 as attached. But in the teeth of the evidence the force reported formally on 22 January 2010 (precisely as they did on 6 November 2009) that the officers had attended the scene on foot. It was impossible for this to be a mistake bearing in mind the volume of the contemporaneous evidence that I had supplied since the meeting on 15 October 2009. Not surprisingly at this point I thought that I was going slightly insane and, quite frankly, could not believe what I had witnessed from the police who I had always respected. I was really hurt by this (and the attitude of the IPCC later) because if the version of events from the police was true the only reasonable conclusion was that I was an unashamed and serial liar. This aspect was never addressed by the IPCC and I am not a liar as shown by the proven fact that I told the truth throughout. 10. Bearing in mind that I had informed the IPCC of the true version of events on 5 November 2009 and that the force was well aware of this I appealed to the IPCC on 12 March 2010. I was very confident that the police couldn’t escape account for such serial dishonesty such was the strength of the evidence in rebuttal of their version. My confidence was increased by the existence of at least six eyewitnesses and that the IPCC was independent. For my appeal I made an eyewitness statement as did my fiancé. I also requested that Mr Thompson confirm his eyewitness statement of 16 October 2009 which he did on 1 March 2010 (attached). All of the quite simplistic and contemporaneous evidence was supplied to the IPCC. The IPCC responded to my appeal on 29 July 2010 and concluded that the officers had come across the scene of the RTC whilst on foot patrol and had no equipment which is why no breathalyser was used. This was totally and utterly untrue and both the police and IPCC knew this beyond any doubt at that time. The IPCC also exonerated the police as regards every other lie that they had relayed about me. The truth of this matter is that the IPCC constructed a series of elaborate and false versions of events purely to exonerate the police from allegations of serious misconduct and wrong doing. Two examples are outlined at 11. below from their appeal response of March 2011. 11. It appears that the IPCC determined the entirely untruthful conclusion at 10. as a result of a phone conversation with PS Young on 27 July 2010. At no point did the IPCC call me or any of the other eyewitnesses who attended the scene to corroborate or contradict the police version of events from an officer who was not at the scene. The IPCC also disregarded all of the other clear and compelling evidence that confirmed that PS Young was lying. As evidence of this I have attached the IPCC case notes in 2009/020597 dated 27 July 2010. In that conversation PS Young quite simply lied to the IPCC at the same time as he (and the IPCC) knew or reasonably should have known that he was lying. Simplistic lies such as this from the police percolated the whole process from start to finish and the IPCC allowed it all to be enacted with impunity. The IPCC “explained” this orchestrated dishonesty at two points of the second appeal response. The actual explanations asserted by the IPCC were an elaborately concocted false version of events. “Having read the clarified statements of PC Plant and PC Hadwick, and the account of PS Young, I believe that PS Young made an incorrect assumption about the reasons why a breath test was not administered. What is more, that assumption persisted, so that he also told our casework manager, when he challenged this point during the first appeal, that the officers were on foot”. AND: “He (Sergeant Young) would have been better advised either to probe further, or to stick to the exact facts he was given, rather than elaborate to provide a reason why the breath test was not carried out (lack of equipment because on foot), which was never given by the officers themselves. In particular, Ms Loughran states that she informed him at the meeting on 15 October 2009 that he was mistaken in this matter, yet he does not appear to have sought further clarification before completing his report on 6 November 2009. In stating the above the IPCC disregarded all of the eyewitness and documentary evidence that I provided that contradicted this in particulari to iv and my IPCC complaint of 5 November 2009. This complaint proved that I had informed the IPCC that the officers had lied to PS Young at our meeting and that in turn I had informed PS young of this fact. And even more critically the IPCC also disregarded the contemporaneous eyewitness evidence that also contradicted the police. The two officers also altered their statements in September 2010 after having seen all of my documentary evidence. Prior to that moment both had quite simply lied to PS Young which was recorded formally in several police reports. To my disgust the IPCC allowed the two officers to rewrite history when their dishonesty and misconduct was publicly exposed. 12. Each item of evidence that I had sent to the IPCC was disregarded. This includes the eyewitness evidence, the complaint dated 5 November 2009 sent to the police on 13 November 2009 and the correct version of events that we had supplied verbally to Sergeant Young on 15 October 2009. The fact is that the police told proven lies in the investigation report dated 22 January 2010 (and 6 November 2009) which was disregarded by the IPCC. However the case note of 27 July 2010 proves beyond any doubt that the IPCC was minded to believe lies from a senior officer at such time as they knew or should have known that he was lying. In my view the unfair, unreasonable and flagrant breaches of natural justice that the facts indicate against the IPCC can be summarised as: — The IPCC disregarded the truthful eyewitness evidence of three non-police individuals who had attended the scene in favour of one police officer’s untruthful evidence who didn’t attend at the scene. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [01-02-2013 12:49] Job: 025757 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/025757/025757_w032_michelle_IPCC 40 - Jeremy Heywood.xml

Ev w28 Home Affairs Committee: Evidence

— The IPCC disregarded numerous items of powerful and contemporaneous documentary evidence that I supplied in favour of unsupported and unconvincing bare assertions from the police. — The IPCC disregarded the entirely factual information from the complaint that I sent to them at an early stage dated 5 November 2009. — The IPCC disregarded the force’s formal and entirely accurate FOI response dated 7 January 2010 and Abbi’s formal statement dated 8 March 2010. — The IPCC received and maybe considered unofficial and informal police annexes, sometimes marked confidential, that contained serious and untruthful slurs in regard to our conduct. These were never referred to me by the IPCC at the time of receipt or during the consideration of my case. — The IPCC was well aware of all of the above at the time of my first appeal of 12 March 2010 and basically colluded with the police to conceal the truth throughout reporting finally in March 2011. This was all done when the IPCC knew or reasonably should have known that the police were being dishonest throughout via incontrovertible evidence. 13. In the light of my experience I fear for any decent citizen who approaches the IPCC for help in the absence of a greater strength of eyewitness and documentary evidence that I supplied. Indeed when I showed Mr Thompson the decisions of the IPCC of 29 July 2010 he was mortified. He volunteered a third statement dated 5 August 2010 which is self explanatory (attached). This was sent to the IPCC and, once again, disregarded for the purposes of the second appeal. Even though it was clear Mr Thompson, an entirely independent eyewitness, was deeply offended by the behaviour of the IPCC they never contacted him as requested. 14. The force finally admitted that they had attended in a marked Vauxhall Astra on 26 November 2010 and that it was all a misunderstanding. The force conceded that I had been correct all along and that the officers had attended the scene in a vehicle. Their conclusions, however, disregarded that the force had been in possession of the proof of this for over a year and the fact that documents originating at the police had contained blatant lies. The second police report was published 13 months after PS Young was told the full truth at the meeting on 15 October 2009 and over a year after the IPCC was told the truth on 5 November 2009. On 22 March 2011 after a further appeal the IPCC concluded, inter alia, that at no point had any police officer or member of police staff lied in my case and it had all been a misunderstanding (impossible on the evidence). They also concluded that there had been no misconduct or any conspiracy involving any officer or member of police staff. The simplistic extrapolation of that was that I and the eyewitnesses were liars and the police were not. At that point it had taken me 18 months to see a series of conclusions that were shamelessly based on lies from the police that the IPCC knew or reasonably should have known were lies. I was totally distraught at how I had been treated. During this period I was trying to recover from my injuries and was suffering from quite serious depression. The strain of everything also caused me to have a seizure in December 2009. The subsequent behaviour of the IPCC seriously held back my recovery and rehabilitation. 15. The evidential anomalies had worsened at this point in the case. My view is that the IPCC were unconcerned about whatever lie the force relayed to them. The evidence presented in writing by PS Young to the second investigation again contained serious and quite simplistic lies. In his statement dated 28 September 2010 (attached) PS Young made it clear that he learned that the officers did attend the scene in a vehicle as a result of my appeal. This appeal was dated 12 March 2010 as outlined above at 10. In his statement PS Young categorically stated that, “Since then I have been made aware that they did have a vehicle with them at the time”. He had clearly stated that he became aware of the truth via my appeal dated 12 March 2010. The IPCC had that statement in full. Furthermore by 5 November 2009 the IPCC knew or reasonably should have known that the first time PS Young knew about the vehicle being present was at the meeting on 15 October 2009. Still this did not stop PS Young lying to the IPCC over four months after 12 March 2010 on 27 July 2010 or force the IPCC to bring him to account for this dishonesty. Instead the IPCC concocted a false version of events to explain it all away in March 2011 as outlined at 11. above. It was also proven at that time that PS Young had seen Mr Thompson’s statement dated 1 March 2010 via the police document dated 7 April 2010 (attached) signed by Kathleen Forshaw. This document refers to PS Young raising an irrelevant “mistake” from Paul’s statement in relation to “shirt colours”. However the same statement made it totally clear that Mr Thompson was an independent eyewitness at the scene, that the two officers were in a marked Astra and that they were, quite simply, not telling the truth. The IPCC disregarded the fact that PS Young admitted that he had seen Mr Thompson’s 1 March 2010 eyewitness statement sometime prior to 7 April 2010 but still allowed him to lie to them on 27 July 2010. Overall the police conspired to concoct a litany of lies and the IPCC effectively colluded in this by ignoring the facts that proved it. 16. The evidence available shows that for over a year the police conspired to fabricate and concoct all manner of lies about their actions and my conduct. But even though these lies were proven via a clear audit trail of eyewitness and written evidence that the IPCC possessed they still found totally for the police as regards this premeditated dishonesty. In light of the weight of evidence I am of the view that thousands of routine or normal complainants have no chance of achieving proper or fair redress against the police from the cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [01-02-2013 12:49] Job: 025757 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/025757/025757_w032_michelle_IPCC 40 - Jeremy Heywood.xml

Home Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev w29

IPCC. It may be different as regards high profile cases with wider press or national scrutiny. But routine complainants without this type of press or other oversight, in my view, have no chance whatsoever against the police via the IPCC. This is my certain view of the IPCC based on the experience of my case. In consequence I firmly believe that it is my public duty to raise their real-time conduct with the Committee via indisputable evidence.

17. In conclusion I can see no way apart from radical reform that will improve the IPCC. Though this case has caused me distress and pain it is nowhere near as serious or distressing as some encountered by other individuals. But the way the IPCC dealt with the evidence in my case is applicable to all cases. If that happened in reality in other cases it is totally unfair to every citizen who uses the IPCC and disastrous for the more distressing examples. In my case the evidence of the wilful deceit from the police was simplistic and powerful. This made no difference and it appeared to me that the IPCC was determined to exonerate the police from misconduct no matter what the evidence. This cannot be proper, appropriate, reasonable or lawful in any case. There can be no effective quality control or proper governance in existence at the IPCC even in circumstances that are so important to individual citizens. The IPCC in my experience totally fail in their most important statutory purpose to increase public confidence in the police complaints system. In fact by their actions they achieve the precise opposite.

I make this submission to the best of my knowledge and belief. Sara Jane Loughran June 2012

[Committee Note: The papers attached to this submission and mentioned throughout are not being printed.]

Written evidence submitted Celia Jeune [IPCC 15]

I enclose a brief overview of a saga of incompetence/bad practice/corruption by the South Wales Police which has not been addressed by the South Wales IPCC. It is my belief that it is because those who originally perpetrated the “crimes” or were very close to the source of the mal-practice are not keen to expose it or consult with those who are protecting the perpetrators.

This saga, concerning my brother, illustrates that Police cannot investigate Police with an open mind and fair heart.

Welsh IPCC Lack of Action

1. In February 2012 Police Inspectors Holder and King from the Professional Standards Department, South Wales Police, Bridgend visited a remand inmate at Cardiff Prison and took a statement of complaint. They did not allow him to see the final statement nor to sign it as correct. On investigation of the progress of these complaints against the Police it appears nothing has been done beyond acknowledgement that these complaints are in the system.

2. The inmate was informed in April that the IPCC upheld two issues: (a) the suggestion that the machine gun had been “altered” to influence the jury; and (b) the confusion over the sex of the undercover agent known as “Foxy” who made several telephone calls to the remand prisoner’s home as opposed to the person who gave the evidence in court.

3. No action has been taken by the IPPC on these issues to date. The case relates to an arrest on 22 June 2009 with subsequent remand to a trial which took place in January to February 2010. The defendant, who represented himself, was unable to get bail as a doctor of psychiatry suggested to one bail judge that he had a “a possible brain tumour” and had “significant brain damage”.

4. He was acquitted of the charges.

5. To date the applicant has been trying to get a copy of the erroneous medical report used in court to prevent his bail. June 2012 cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [01-02-2013 12:49] Job: 025757 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/025757/025757_w032_michelle_IPCC 40 - Jeremy Heywood.xml

Ev w30 Home Affairs Committee: Evidence

Written evidence submitted by Tony Wise [IPCC 16] 1. The single overarching point that I refer to the Committee in regard to the Independent Police Complaints Committee (IPCC) is a simple one; it is about consistency. I have tried to be brief and straight to the point in order not to overburden the Committee. It is vitally important that a public body such as the IPCC is seen to operate consistently at all times in relation to serious matters involving the public interest. I have provided a resume of comments, sections of reports and published announcements from the IPCC.25 For the purpose of the Committee I have dated the resume 21 June 2012. The resume outlines even very recent public comments from the IPCC in relation to corruption involving the police. In particular I refer the Committee to corruption allegations against ACPO rank officers and the claimed vital public interest in independently investigating such serious allegations. I place that resume into the context of this case that involves well evidenced allegations of corruption and collusion against Steve Finnigan, Mike Cunningham and Dave Whatton who respectively are the Chief Constables of Lancashire, Staffordshire and Cheshire. Also involved in the allegations is Miranda Carruthers-Watt the Chief Executive Officer of the Lancashire Police Authority (LPA). 2. In this case the IPCC to date appears to have ignored every single item as produced in the attached resume and is seemingly refusing to independently investigate serious corruption allegations against three currently serving Chief Constables. I only quite simply want the IPCC to live up to its promises and indeed its aspirations in relation to corruption allegations especially against the most senior officers and involve itself independently in the serious allegations. The IPCC has already failed to live up to its own promises in relation to the original investigation into Chief Constables Finnigan and Cunningham when it allowed the original investigation to be conducted totally by Dave Whatton the Chief Constable of Cheshire. Hence contradicting itself and allowing the police to investigate the police in a case involving corruption allegations against two other Chief Constables with absolutely no IPCC oversight. Indeed immediately after the investigation by Dave Whatton began Commissioner Long placed the following into the public domain on 10 May 2011 in relation to the Chief Constable of North Yorkshire and his deputy. Mr. Long is one of the Commissioners with oversight of this case in the North. The Chief Constable and his Deputy are the two most senior officers in the force and are supposed to lead by example and set the standards for others to follow. “The IPCC would have been failing in its duty if it had not investigated these matters after they were brought to our attention. The allegations could not pass without appropriate investigation”. “We conducted a thorough, timely and proportionate investigation and I am proud of the work undertaken by the IPCC investigation team, lead by Senior Investigator Mike Grant”. None of the above was applied in this case which raises a serious example of inconsistency. In any event in my view it was absolutely inevitable that the investigation by Chief Constable Whatton into his fellow Chief Constables would be flawed and unacceptable. Furthermore I was of the opinion that the IPCC was of the same view that this type of thing may happen which is why it stated on all of the occasions that it did publicly as outlined in the resume that it would independently investigate such matters. The investigation by Dave Whatton was flawed in very simplistic evidential circumstances which is why I appealed to the IPCC. But still the IPCC does not seem minded to intervene independently or otherwise in contradiction of all that it says. 3. My overarching public interest worry in this case is that the current case is unique as far as I can see as it involves no less than three currently serving Chief Constables being the subject of well evidenced corruption allegations. It also involves substantially evidenced alleged collusion involving the Chief Executive Officer of the LPA. The evidence in support of the allegations is compelling and powerful and I only wanted such serious allegations and the evidence to be considered by the IPCC fairly, without fear or favour and in the public interest. I also place my concerns into the context of the two IPCC reports into police corruption of September 2011 and 24 May 2012 and the HMIC report entitled “Without Fear or Favour”. The evidence in support of this case includes contemporaneous internal email evidence, publicly listed minutes from the LPA and an Internal Audit report that cost almost £30,000 of taxpayers’ money to produce. The evidence has never been challenged by the three Chief Constables involved and, indeed, Lancashire Constabulary included much of the same evidence into the bundle for a recent Tribunal. Therefore the force itself supports the efficacy of some of the evidence against its Chief Constable. I also have to apolgise that I wrote to Mr. Vaz on 6 February 2012 (enclosed26) raising my concerns then about the IPCC and I understand fully that the Committee cannot involve itself in individual cases. I never intended that to happen and I merely wanted to raise concerns about the IPCC with Mr. Vaz as an upstanding and thoroughly ethical Member of Parliament and Chairman of the Committee. In no way do I want the Committee to look at any factual aspect of this case during this inquiry. But the contradictions and inconsistencies raised as regards the IPCC approach to these corruption allegations involving the most senior of police officers is on the record and should be scrutinised. 4. In this case the IPCC has seemingly refused to get involved and independently investigate the serious corruption allegations in contradiction of all its public pronouncements. As far as I have researched there has never been a case before involving three currently serving Chief Constables at the same time in corruption allegations which is another factor that should reasonably militate in the direction of some kind of independent scrutiny of the allegations. The IPCC will not account for these apparent contradictions and has substantially 25 Annex. 26 Not printed. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [01-02-2013 12:49] Job: 025757 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/025757/025757_w032_michelle_IPCC 40 - Jeremy Heywood.xml

Home Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev w31

ignored my reasonable correspondence requesting an explanation. These are attached as documents dated 24 May 2012 and 12 June 2012 (documents A, B, 1 and 2). I have no idea why the IPCC is refusing to respond properly to my correspondence when I am only asking reasonable public interest questions involving their apparent inconsistencies and contradictions. This type of reaction is not public facing and creates the impression of secrecy and lack of transparency from a vitally important public authority. I consequently have no idea how, why or when the IPCC is making its decisions in this case bearing in mind the resume as attached. I also have no idea when the IPCC will respond to my appeal as they have not contacted me once since the IPCC accepted my appeal over four months ago. I am certain, however, that they will have contacted the persons involved or their forces. In the context of the serious allegations and compelling evidence against three serving Chief Constables this is not acceptable, reasonable or amenable to the public interest.

5. The two summary points that I make to the Committee are why does the IPCC not apply their public commentary from the resume in this apparently unique case and why will they not respond properly to documents A, B, 1 and 2? Their present conduct contradicts each and every one of their public pronouncements and even the recent public comments of their new Chair Dame Anne Owers made in the press release accompanying the corruption report of 24 May 2012. The IPCC constantly espouses the vital public interest in investigating corruption allegations against the police and particularly against ACPO rank officers. However in this case the IPCC has been in possession of an appeal involving well evidenced corruption allegations against three serving Chief Constables and has done nothing to date apart from ignoring my requests for a reasonable explanation of this occurrence. At the outset I only wanted a reasonable investigation that considered the available evidence in an independent, objective and fair way. I have never got this via the “police investigating the police” and I feel that the IPCC has a public interest obligation to involve itself in this case purely based on what it has regularly stated publicly. Seemingly it will nor or does not intend to live up to its public promises in this case.

6. In relation to all of the above I fear that the IPCC actually assists in making the complaints system against Chief Officers demonstrably less fair. The police complaints system is not a level playing field as regards public complaints against the police especially in relation to the most senior officers. In my experience it is virtually impossible to require the IPCC to independently investigate even serious and well evidenced allegations against ACPO rank officers whatever the standard of evidence in support. The higher the rank of the officer the bigger the gradient becomes. It is not possible in my experience to get the police to investigate these types of case appropriately or fairly whatever the evidence. Then when a citizen approaches the IPCC for some independent oversight it blatantly ignores its own pronouncements from the attached resume whilst at the same time ignoring correspondence requesting a reasonable explanation of this.

7. In summary the IPCC is to date substantially ignoring my reasonable requests asking them to account for the departure in this case from its own numerous public pronouncements. The case involves corruption allegations against three currently serving Chief Constables and the available contemporaneous and other evidence is strong. For the last four months I have heard not one word from the IPCC and have no idea what is happening with the appeal, my complaints or most vitally the powerful evidence in support of this case. Of course this also involves the IPCC ignoring reasonable requests for information related to perceived contradictions. I hope that the Committee will consider these serious anomalies and the contradictions from the IPCC that I raise in this case. If this is how the IPCC really operates in relation to vital public interest cases it is very worrying to me personally. I can only produce one of the relevant paragraphs from the recent IPCC police corruption report of 24 May 2012 in support. “The public expects serious corruption to be investigated by an organisation independent of the police. The IPCC stands ready to take on more corruption cases if additional resources could be made available. Within existing resources, the IPCC will continue to conduct a small but increased number of independent investigations into corruption cases, prioritising those involving senior officers, serious criminal allegations and gross abuse of police powers”.

I am of the view that the quote as above is what I can only have reasonably expected all along from the IPCC. Now the IPCC will not even give me the common courtesy of an explanation in response to correspondence requesting an explanation for the departure from the quote as outlined above in this case. The IPCC ignored the quote above in terms of the original investigation that was passed wholly to Chief Constable Whatton. Now the IPCC is seemingly refusing to involve itself in the more serious and very well evidenced corruption allegations as brought to their attention via the appeal.

Annex

Second IPCCPoliceCorruptionReport May 2012

PAGE 5. Nevertheless, the IPCC needs to be able to investigate cases of serious corruption—particularly those involving senior officers, serious criminal allegations and gross abuse of powers.

PAGE 8. The focus groups provided further insights. Factors that defined seriousness included: the seniority of the officer. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [01-02-2013 12:49] Job: 025757 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/025757/025757_w032_michelle_IPCC 40 - Jeremy Heywood.xml

Ev w32 Home Affairs Committee: Evidence

PAGE 10. The need for a more effective national system for handling allegations against very senior officers ie those of ACPO rank. The IPCC will work with HMIC, the National Crime Agency (NCA) and the CPS to establish a more formalised and robust system for escalating such complaints. PAGE 10. The public expects serious corruption to be investigated by an organisation independent of the police. The IPCC stands ready to take on more corruption cases if additional resources could be made available. Within existing resources, the IPCC will continue to conduct a small but increased number of independent investigations into corruption cases, prioritising those involving senior officers, serious criminal allegations and gross abuse of police powers. PAGE 19.Seniority: the more senior the rank, the more serious the public considered the act to be. PAGE 19. The resulting recommendations included the need for senior officers to review corporate governance arrangements to ensure that these support the values of the force, and that they themselves promote the values of the organisation through their behaviour. PAGE 46. We therefore plan to report annually on corruption cases from 2011–12 onwards. We anticipate that such information will be vital to the Police and Crime Commissioners due to be elected during 2012 and we will want to ensure that they are able to draw on our data to inform their priorities in holding their Chief Constable to account on behalf of the public.

First IPCCPoliceCorruptionReport September 2011 PAGE 6. During its lifetime, the Commission has received corruption referrals from a number of police forces. These have included both overt and covert referrals, further details of which are provided in the Referrals and Case Study sections of this report. More recently some of these referrals have been particularly high profile as the allegations have involved senior officers including those of the highest rank, ie Chief Constables and their deputies. Such cases are rightly viewed with considerable public concern and have tested public confidence in the police service.

PublicViews onPoliceCorruption. Research by Solutions Research IPCCPaper 23 (May 2012) PAGE 4. All however, would be regarded as more serious and more likely to be seen as corruption if they are found to be regular, of significant value and involving senior officers or involving several officers. PAGE 5. Few are aware of the IPCC, but welcome its involvement, particularly for serious cases of corruption and other cases that would be inappropriate to deal with at a local level, for example if a senior officer was involved. PAGE 9. Most expressed the opinion that serious corruption would be found “at the top” and among more senior officers, rather than the “bobby on the beat”, as there was an assumption that a degree of power is necessary for more serious corruption to occur. PAGE 22. The seniority of the individual involved; the more senior, the more serious the public considered the act to be.

10 May 2011. Comments from Nicholas Long: Northern Commissioner IPCC Commissioner Nicholas Long said: “The Chief Constable and his Deputy are the two most senior officers in the force and are supposed to lead by example and set the standards for others to follow. “The IPCC would have been failing in its duty if it had not investigated these matters after they were brought to our attention. The allegations could not pass without appropriate investigation”. “We conducted a thorough, timely and proportionate investigation and I am proud of the work undertaken by the IPCC investigation team, lead by Senior Investigator Mike Grant”.

16 August 2011. Further comments from Nicholas Long The IPCC is already independently investigating an allegation that Mr Price used undue influence to have an individual appointed to a position within the police force. This investigation remains ongoing. IPCC Commissioner Nicholas Long said: “I have been kept informed throughout about the ongoing investigation led by Mr Bristow into allegations of criminality and was notified at an early stage about the arrests of the Chief Constable, Deputy Chief Constable and the member of police staff. Allegations of corruption within a police force have a significant impact on public confidence and must be investigated thoroughly. I am confident Mr Bristow and his team are being thorough in their approach”. “While I believe it important that the IPCC becomes involved to provide wholly independent oversight, I also believe it important that we do not do anything that might undermine the ongoing investigation. It is for this reason that I have decided it appropriate for one of our Senior Investigators to work alongside Mr Bristow with a specific focus on allegations of potential misconduct or gross misconduct.” cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [01-02-2013 12:49] Job: 025757 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/025757/025757_w032_michelle_IPCC 40 - Jeremy Heywood.xml

Home Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev w33

Statement to Leveson enquiry: Chief Constable Mike Cunningham 13 February 2012

(23) What is your view of the recommendations contained in the HMIC’s recent report “Without Fear or Favour” insofar as they concern relations between the media and the police? If you disagree with any of the findings, please explain why you disagree with the same.

Leadership has always been an important part of tackling police corruption and the service has worked hard to identify threats and put preventive measures in place. All our relationships must meet the highest standards of integrity and this review highlights the need to continue to develop safeguards and to keep pace with new developments in information technology which expand the potential for vulnerability to corruptors. Any member of staff, regardless of rank or role, who brings the service into disrepute does huge damage to staff who strive, every day, to deliver a police service with commitment and integrity. June 2012

Supplementary written evidence submitted by Tony Wise [IPCC 16a]

Email sent9 August 2012

On 24 July 2012 the IPCC responded to my corruption complaint against the three named Chief Constables. The IPCC took on absolutely no independent oversight of the corruption concerns against ACPO ranks as they promise publicly they will whenever they can. They exonerated the three Chief Constables in detail based purely on very unsafe and unreliable findings from the police only with no independent oversight as continually promised. Indeed I attached a resume of quotes from the IPCC along with my submission that I knew that in practice the IPCC would ignore. In ignoring their own numerous public pronouncements the IPCC also ignored relevant evidence and accepted contradictory statements and differing versions of events from the police that they knew or should have known were untrue. In this case the IPCC is actually assisting three ACPO rank officers and other public officials in covering up malpractice and corruption via wilful ignorance or worse of relevant evidence.

The fact is that within one week of Dame Anne Owers appearing before the Committee the IPCC had actually contradicted what she said to the Committee in relation to corruption from ACPO rank officers or any officer. The most worrying aspect of this matter, and I knew that the IPCC would do this, is that they have ignored their public surveys and focus groups which found that the public required corruption allegations, especially against the most senior officers, to be investigated independently of the police. In reality the IPCC doesn’t care about public opinion or the public interest and this case proves it in detail which is the type of concern shared with thousands of people who have actually experienced the IPCC. There is always a major disparity in what the IPCC says publicly and what it actually does in reality. These disparities always fall on the side of the police in my experience. The worrying aspect that the IPCC appears to have wilfully ignored is that ACPO rank officers could only allegedly collude with the LPA in the way that they did because of their very senior ranks which was the single reason that they had the ear of and regularly met with the LPA CEO who controlled the ACPO complaint investigations. In reality it is staggering how the IPCC can directly contradict the following finding and public opinion in relation to corruption and collusion allegations against three currently serving Chief Constables.

Page 47 of “Corruption in the Police Service 2nd IPCC report May 2012”. “A clear finding in this report is that the general public expects an independent body like the IPCC to be investigating cases of serious police corruption. This is supported by previous research, which placed investigating police corruption as a higher priority for the IPCC than investigating deaths following police contact (Inglis and Shepherd, 2007). It is evident, from the figures provided in this report, that in the great majority of these cases, IPCC investigations are able to substantiate the need for misconduct proceedings, and in nearly half of those cases, to uncover evidence that justifies a referral to the CPS.”

I predicted precisely what would happen in this case when I wrote to Mr Vaz in February 2012. I alluded to precisely what would happen in my submission to the Committee. It all came true on 24 July 2012. The IPCC actually assists even the most senior officers in covering up allegations of serious corruption and in doing so ignores its own findings in relation to public opinion and the public interest. For the record I have attached another series of relevant public pronouncements and findings from the IPCC that have also been ignored in this case.27 In the absence of a definitive and reliable investigation from an appropriately independent body I can only conclude that the IPCC is actually wilfully assisting the police in covering up serious corruption from ACPO rank officers in this case. Their own very numerous and regular public pronouncements preclude the IPCC from having no independent oversight of this serious case. Worryingly the IPCC has been so brazen in this case that they have done this when they are aware of my totally reliable, truthful and evidence based submission to the Committee. It’s as if the IPCC are afraid of what they may uncover in this case if the facts and evidence are looked at properly, decently and objectively. 27 Not printed. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [01-02-2013 12:49] Job: 025757 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/025757/025757_w032_michelle_IPCC 40 - Jeremy Heywood.xml

Ev w34 Home Affairs Committee: Evidence

In conclusion I now have some very strong evidence of a conspiracy involving collusion and dishonesty between the ACPO ranked officers and the CEO of the LPA in this case. I also have evidence that proves that the IPCC has ignored its own promises and significant corroborative evidence in this case in order to keep the lid on the alleged corruption. But as a member of the public I cannot complain to the police about the IPCC or the IPCC about the police because the ranks would quickly close. Can I respectfully suggest that as a very relevant source of a thought for this Committee because in this case and probably others there is nowhere for the public to go whatever the evidence and whatever the extent of any potential criminality? The difficult fact is that it is absolutely pointless relying on rectitude or integrity from either body.

Email sent 21 August 2012 Further to my last email of 09 August 2012 whereas I informed the Committee that the IPCC had disregarded all of their public and Parliamentary promises via the appeal assessment dated 24 July 2012. In train with my rights I requested an explanation as to the significant anomalies surrounding the appeal assessment via the IPCC comeback procedures on 27 July 2012. The IPCC has ignored this request as of the date of this correspondence which worries me in the context of the current inquiry. Consequently my concerns related to the IPCC in this case are now amplified. I have and always have had serious reservations about the IPCC’s conduct in this matter which is why I wrote to Mr Vaz in February 2012 and made a submission to the inquiry. However my overarching concern is that the two IPCC anti-corruption reports and the IPCC Annual Report 2011/2012 (all attached28) were laid before Parliament and all of the vitally important promises and undertakings made were disregarded immediately by the IPCC in this case. I have to bring this matter to the attention of the Committee because all along I knew that this would happen such is my experience of the IPCC. The two anti-corruption reports and the Annual Report raised serious issues about police corruption and indicated precisely what the IPCC would do about this serious matter based on public surveys and focus groups. Indeed the list that I supplied with my original submission contained definitive comments from both the first and second anti-corruption reports. None of the promises from the IPCC related to police corruption that were actually laid before Parliament have been honoured in this case. This raises a serious issue as to what the IPCC is up to and why has the IPCC made definitive promises to our Parliament and not honoured them on the very first occasion that it could? The compelling evidence and allegations in this case involved the most senior rank in the police service; that of Chief Constable. One of those involved is also the ACPO lead for Professional Standards, Chief Constable Mike Cunningham. Therefore it should be an imperative priority of the IPCC to see that everything is totally above board in relation to these very senior officers. Further the corruption allegations and evidence provided compelling information in relation to dishonesty, corruption and collusion in the police complaints system from senior officers. Bearing in mind that the IPCC’s main statutory role is to increase public confidence in the system surely the IPCC was duty bound to investigate these matters independently as regards both fronts. However the IPCC chose not to do this and in doing so broke solemn and transparent promises made to Parliament and the public as a whole that are not arguable.

First anti-corruption report (September 2011). Page 15. There is very little empirical research which explores the public’s view or perceptions of police corruption. Much of what exists comes from outside the UK and reports on countries with very different experiences of policing and, arguably, more extensive problems of corruption. However, in 2007 as part of a wider public survey, the IPCC asked a representative sample of adults across England and Wales about who should deal with cases of serious corruption. The findings showed that the vast majority of respondents (87%) believed that this should be dealt with by the IPCC.

Second anti-corruption report (May 2012). Page 10. The public expects serious corruption to be investigated by an organisation independent of the police. The IPCC stands ready to take on more corruption cases if additional resources could be made available. Within existing resources, the IPCC will continue to conduct a small but increased number of independent investigations into corruption cases, prioritising those involving senior officers, serious criminal allegations and gross abuse of police powers. I presented a further six definitive quotes from this report to the Committee via my original submission.

IPCC Annual Report 2011/2012 (July 2012). Page 8. In the wake of the concerns that emerged in the summer of 2011 about police handling of phone hacking allegations, the Home Secretary used her powers in the Police Reform Act to request that the IPCC provide a report on its experience of police corruption. In addition to analysing previously published data on corruption complaints from the public and referrals from the police, we took the opportunity to consult the public on their understanding and perception of police corruption. The report was produced in two parts. It has been laid before the Houses of Parliament and made public and is informing our work for the future. Public confidence in and co-operation with the police is crucially affected by whether we believe they act in 28 Not printed. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [01-02-2013 12:49] Job: 025757 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/025757/025757_w032_michelle_IPCC 40 - Jeremy Heywood.xml

Home Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev w35

the public interest and allegations of corruption are deeply damaging to this perception. The Commission is clear that it wishes to play a significant role in investigating serious allegations of corruption, particularly when it involves very senior officers. Our report sets out the actions we intend to take and implementation is well in hand. The list of solemn and definitive promises made to Parliament and the public by the IPCC in relation to police corruption, particularly involving senior officers goes on and on. All of these promises to Parliament have been presented as being the aspiration and intent of the IPCC in the last 10 months. But in this case for example, within weeks of the clear promise as above from Jane Furniss IPCC CEO in the Annual Report, the IPCC had disregarded each and every promise made to Parliament and ignored the evidence and allegations against three currently serving Chief Constables. Indeed it appears that Jane Furniss made a very dubious statement in the Annual report when she stated “our report sets out the actions we intend to take and implementation is well in hand”. That statement as presented to Parliament is just not true as the facts and evidence in this case prove beyond any doubt. The IPCC also effectively disregarded some of Dame Anne Owers’ evidence re: police corruption to the Committee made on 17 July 2012 within seven days of her appearance. The IPCC has also ignored a formal comeback application under its formal procedures requesting reasonable explanations as regards serious anomalies in their appeal assessment. The appeal assessment purely relied on the input of the police in gross contradiction of everything that the IPCC promised Parliament. It is clear that something very untoward is ongoing at the IPCC in this case and the overarching inconsistencies and major contradictions need to be looked at objectively and fairly in the public interest. I only say in the public interest because the IPCC makes it totally clear precisely what the public wants in relation to corruption from the police and particularly from senior officers in the three reports outlined in this correspondence. But as well as ignoring what it has said to Parliament the IPCC has also ignored what it definitively knows to be the overwhelming public opinion and interest in this case. To mislead both Parliament and the public so outrageously as the IPCC has done in this case is a serious constitutional worry to me as a bona fide complainant and citizen of the UK. Can this matter and evidence please be presented to the Committee because the three reports as raised were all presented to Parliament and were all disregarded at the very first opportunity the IPCC had to prove that it means what it says re: senior officer corruption? The IPCC also similarly ignored overarching public opinion and public interest in this case. Clearly the IPCC is present for the benefit of the public and not for the benefit of senior officers with corruption allegations levelled against them. All of this gives me a serious worry as to the very probity of the IPCC to me as a complainant and citizen. The evidence against the IPCC in this regard is just not arguable and effectively the IPCC has misled Parliament and the public as a whole via no less than three formal reports. If the Committee could just put four reasonable questions to the IPCC it should shed some light on these matters if they are answered honestly. 1. Why did the IPCC make clear and solemn promises to Parliament re: senior officer corruption and ignore each and every promise within months at the first opportunity that it had to honour them? 2. Why has the IPCC allowed the hard evidence to prove that it does not prioritise and independently investigate serious corruption allegations against ACPO rank officers as it consistently states publicly that it does even in the context of this inquiry? 3. Why has the IPCC ignored what it knows beyond doubt is clear public opinion and the public interest re: senior officer corruption in this case as proven by its public research and surveys? 4. Why has the IPCC seemingly misled Parliament and the public as a whole via its overarching promises re: senior officer corruption?

Email sent 23 August 2012 This is the most important communication in this case that I have sent to the Committee. I have no more submissions to make after this date unless requested. Quite simply and succinctly the IPCC has finally demonstrated how and the methodology by which it operates against the public and public interest on an absolute basis. I truly hope that the Committee can get to the bottom of this and try to effect change at the IPCC and in the system for the good of all and in the public interest. In this case, for whatever reason, the IPCC does not care about what it has repeatedly stated publicly even when corruption allegations against ACPO rank officers are involved. It ignored even an acknowledgement of the comeback application for a month and then outrageously ignored the reasonable points of dissatisfaction and requests for clarification that were made. I had a right of an explanation and clarification as the IPCC procedure demonstrates but this has been inappropriately refused. The IPCC defines a comeback as: A comeback is a challenge to an IPCC operational decision or an expressed dissatisfaction or request for clarification on an IPCC. One of the points that makes the IPCC so exasperating is the fact that no matter what it says it never sticks to it in reality. I am of the view that if it did or was required to the whole house of cards would collapse immediately. What I did get via the comeback was another series of blatant untruths primarily in relation to “it is clear that all evidence has been considered carefully”. Most worryingly the IPCC has not even mentioned in the letter from a senior casework manager my overarching point in that the IPCC has ignored promises to cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [01-02-2013 12:49] Job: 025757 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/025757/025757_w032_michelle_IPCC 40 - Jeremy Heywood.xml

Ev w36 Home Affairs Committee: Evidence

Parliament and the public via disregarding the clear undertakings from the two anti corruption reports and the IPCC annual report. The IPCC cannot reasonably be allowed to disregard solemn and repeated promises made to Parliament and the public re: ACPO rank corruption only weeks after they were made. But this is what always happens at the IPCC no matter what was said or who said it. Whatever the upper echelons of the IPCC state publicly or publish the lower levels carry on regardless and ignore it all. Then when it is brought to their attention the higher echelons take no action to alter the clear cultural and systemic issues that operate against the public interest at the lower levels. It all then carries on regardless with more and more dissatisfied and exasperated members of the public the inevitable result. This has clearly occurred here even though the issues and contemporaneous evidence in this case are not arguable from the point of view of the IPCC. The attached letter dated 20 August 2012 is entirely indicative of what everyone gets from the IPCC no matter how important the matters of concern.29 It has flatly refused to answer each individual point in my comeback application because it cannot. It has merely distorted and avoided the vital points that I raised. The central and most vital evidential appeal issue was that of ignoring the hard evidence of initial intent to collude that was very contemporaneous with my complaints being recorded. This included a six page email string shared between the CEO of the LPA and the Staff Officer of the Chief Constable (attached30). All of the actual collusion, dishonesty and conspiracy was enacted after the 09–10 September 2008 section of the string. Meetings occurred that initially were denied and discussions occurred the nature of which have been altered repeatedly. All of what the string demonstrated was improper at the outset with documents shared, meetings held and dialogue/discussions enacted without the knowledge of the complainant; which in itself is unlawful in the IPCC statutory guidance. Since the Dave Whatton investigation further stories have also been altered based on that string and other evidence fabricated based on that evidence. And the IPCC will take no part independently in looking at the allegations and evidence as they promised to Parliament and every member of the public. The worry is that the misconduct in this case is entirely simplistic and to be ignored outright by a police force and then the IPCC can only be deliberate such is the nature of the failings. Any reasonable person has only one quite obvious question. Why? The fact is, in my view, that none of the other undisputed (merely ignored) evidence was considered because of what it actually proved. This is precisely how the IPCC operates and it is the antithesis of the public interest. Whatever the IPCC says it always bases its whole opinion on the input of the police and then reports purely upon it with the complainant’s evidence being disregarded or at best secondary. It then resists challenge from the public whatever the evidence and circumstances and firmly puts up the drawbridge in flatly refusing to depart from the police version. Some recent high profile cases have demonstrated precisely the same but at the bottom the IPCC resolutely and relentlessly remains the same. Worryingly the Dave Whatton investigation had an overarching criminal aspect to it and the disregard of material evidence and other evidential anomalies could constitute attempts to pervert the course of justice. I have raised this with the IPCC at a senior level and even such serious criminal allegations have been entirely disregarded. This raises yet another disgraceful anomaly in the police complaints system. In this context a member of the public has absolutely no place to go. He or she cannot complain to the police about the IPCC and cannot complaint to the IPCC about the police because the drawbridge is up at both. Please, please can the Committee consider this aspect which has to be a source of absolute antagonism and disbelief from most IPCC users? Lastly the IPCC then uses its favourite dodge and dares the citizen to find about £30,000 and challenge it through the courts at the same time as it uses public money to defend itself against the public and the public interest. That is even if the member of the public can even find a solicitor to deal with the matter in the first place because of constraints on public funding and a lack of suitable expertise. Indeed most of the expertise is London based and as I am finding at this time it is very, very difficult to engage a solicitor to deal with these cases. This aspect is the ultimate kick in the teeth to the palpably offended members of the public because their own money is used against them by the IPCC itself.

Email sent 16 October 2012 Can you please present the IPCC’s attached Freedom of Information response to the Committee.

Letter from the Independent Police Complaints Commission to Tony Wise, 1 October 2012 Your Request for Information Thank you for your email received in this office on 24 August 2012 regarding your request for information. I would like to apologise for the delay in responding to your request. I can confirm that I am now in a position to formally respond to you. I note that you have requested the below details: 1. How many corruption allegations have been made against ACPO rank officers in 2010, 2011 and 2012 that have not been independently investigated by the IPCC? Please provide reasons if they weren’t. I don’t want any personal data. 29 Not printed. 30 Not printed. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [01-02-2013 12:49] Job: 025757 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/025757/025757_w032_michelle_IPCC 40 - Jeremy Heywood.xml

Home Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev w37

Response There were three cases in 2010, 10 cases in 2011 and 10 cases in 2012. (One of the cases in 2010 was redetermined to Independent). Each referral was assessed on its own merits and these were deemed appropriate for managed, supervised or local investigation. 2. Please provide the forces involved at 2. I don’t want any personal data.

Response The Forces involved were North Yorkshire, Dyfed Powys, Metropolitan, Cleveland, Northamptonshire, Staffordshire, West Midlands, Wiltshire, British Transport, Leicestershire and South Wales. 3. Please supply the full criteria adopted by the IPCC as to how corruption allegations re: ACPO rank officers are assessed for independent investigation.

Response Paragraph 240 at Page 7 of the IPCC Statutory Guidance refers to Independent Investigations. “IPCC staff conduct independent investigations into incidents that cause the greatest level of public concern, have the greatest potential to impact on communities or have serious implications for the reputation of the police service”. Whilst each referral is assessed on its own merits, it is likely that an allegation of corruption involving a Chief Officer will meet the criteria for an Independent Investigation. For a trial period only, the Commission agreed that all cases involving senior police officers should be reported to the Deputy Chair and that, depending on the rank, the nature of the issue and any other issues that might go to perceived bias, the Deputy Chair would agree with the relevant Commissioner whether the case should be dealt with by the Force Commissioner or elsewhere. Such cases should also be doublehanded. 4. Re 3: or does the IPCC always investigate corruption allegations against ACPO officers in concord with the undertakings and promises made to Parliament and the public as outlined above.

Response The response to this question is outlined in Response 3. 5. Does the IPCC take seriously promises and undertakings made to Parliament and the public as a whole?

Response The IPCC’s primary statutory function is to secure and maintain public confidence in the police complaints system in England and Wales. Information about our work towards achieving this is already in the public domain and is contained within our annual reports to Parliament which have been produced each financial year since the IPCC’s inception. These are available on our website. 6. In summary what are the IPCC’s findings from public surveys and focus groups re: corruption allegations against ACPO rank officers?

Response The IPCC’s reports (parts one and two) do not contain any breakdown on allegations of corruption by ACPO rank. Instead, Chapter 2 of the part two report Corruption in the Police Service in England and Wales: a report based on the IPCC’s experience from 2008 to 2011, focuses on survey questions and focus groups responses from the general public. There is a section in the report in chapter five which looks at the outcome of corruption cases investigated by the IPCC. Here a number of case studies are discussed and reference is made to the seniority of officers who had been involved in corruption (see below***). Neither of the two studies a) the public survey; or b) the focus groups, asked the public any questions relating specifically to ACPO rank officers. However both did explore public perceptions and whether they were able to distinguish between less serious and more serious forms of corruption based on a range of different scenarios. Any findings which relate to senior officers have been highlighted and appear below in the bullet points.

Details of research studies The survey questions about police corruption were placed in a face-to-face omnibus survey and put to a representative sample of 1777 adults across England and Wales. The qualitative research involved six focus groups and nine in-depth interviews being conducted. Public views on police corruption: A qualitative research study (the following points were taken directly from the qualitative research report i.e. focus groups). cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [01-02-2013 12:49] Job: 025757 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/025757/025757_w032_michelle_IPCC 40 - Jeremy Heywood.xml

Ev w38 Home Affairs Committee: Evidence

— “Most expressed the opinion that serious corruption would be found “at the top” and among more senior officers, rather than the “bobby on the beat” as there was an assumption that a degree of power is necessary for more serious corruption to occur” (page 9). — In response to a question asking what they thought corruption is, an in-depth interview said “things like bribery, evidence going missing, cover ups, senior officers turning a blind eye—that sort of thing ...” (page 11). — In relation to levels of seriousness “six scenarios were picked out to demonstrate how the general public perceive seriousness”—“the seniority of the individual involved; the more senior, the more serious the public considered the act to be” (page 21–22). — In relation to question on factors that impact on approach for how corruption is best managed, a summary stated that “in making a decision about the ideal management approach, respondents identified a range of factors that could affect the decision. In many ways these shared much in common with the factors they identified as being important in weighing up the seriousness of the corruption and misconduct. A range of key factors to consider included—the seniority of the officer and their position within the force” (page 24). — Therefore, falsifying figures could vary in seriousness—the degree of seniority in order to falsity these pointed to a more external approach, however as not all viewed this as serious, for others internal management felt more appropriate (page 25). *** Corruption in the Police Service in England and Wales: a report based on the IPCC’s experience from 2008 to 2011—(the following is an extract from chapter five on the outcomes of independent investigations in part two of the corruption report). The below is in reference to organisational vulnerabilities relating to management and leadership. — Management and Leadership was “an additional theme to emerge from the IPCC’s cases concerning the actions of ACPO rank officers, a number of which feature in the case studies in the report. They specifically raise questions about whether these senior officers saw themselves as being ‘above the rules’ that they expected their junior officers and staff to follow” (page 43). 7. Does the IPCC always operate in the public interest? Please produce any policy, procedure or promise that confirms that the IPCC always and is required to work in the public interest.

Response The IPCC’s primary statutory function is to secure and maintain public confidence in the police complaints system in England and Wales. Information about our work towards achieving this is already in the public domain and is contained within our annual reports to Parliament which have been produced each financial year since the IPCC’s inception. These are available on our website. If you are not satisfied with this response you may request an independent internal review by our FOI appeals officer, who has had no involvement in dealing with your request. If you wish to complain about any aspect of this decision, please contact: [Name redacted by Committee] Director of Business Services Independent Police Complaints Commission Yours sincerely S&Q Support Officer On behalf of the Independent Police Complaints Commission Tony Wise October 2012

Written evidence submitted by Donna M Gardner [IPCC 17] Executive Summary 1. My complaint was about the conduct of staff (making false statements) and poor medical record keeping. It was raised in 2009. The complaint was diverted by the Chief Constable away from the Professional Standards Department and to the very department complained about. This department then instigated a distorted report that covered up the wrong doing by failing to disclose correctly to the investigator, a doctor commissioned to carry out the enquiry. Ultimately this distorted report was presented as evidence to a court. 2. In May 2010 it had become clear that the initial complaint was not being handled correctly at all. No recording decision had been given in relation to the initial complaint, and the investigation was not really a complaints investigation (under the terms of the Police Reform Act). 3. The problem has been the ineffectiveness of the IPCC and its procedures, and a lack of common sense. The complaint, having been so clearly abused in the first instance, has been recycled by the IPCC back to the original people who abused the system in the first place. The result had been an increasing complexity in the cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [01-02-2013 12:49] Job: 025757 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/025757/025757_w032_michelle_IPCC 40 - Jeremy Heywood.xml

Home Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev w39

case, resulting in the complaint escalating from a “administrative” complaint about internal processes (which might attract internal sanction) to a criminal offence of pervert the course of justice and perjury, which could attract custodial sentences. 4. The complaint is ongoing and unresolved.

Background 5. The complaint made March 2009 to the Chief Constable (This was the first opportunity to investigate). 6. My initial complaint against the Force 2009 was diverted away from their Professional Standards Department to Corporate services, by the then Chief Constable and was limited in scope by an ACC. 7. The complaint was not recorded. This denied me the right to an appeal. 8. I raised this failure to record the complaint in July 2009 with the Chief Constable. I received no response to this. 9. An internal process took place throughout 2009, limiting an investigation to medical matters only. The managerial matters complained of were not investigated. The investigator, a doctor from the Metropolitan Police Service, was not given all the documents he needed to see to provide a full unbiased investigation. 10. In October 2009, I received a copy of the skewed report. 11. In November 2009 requested that the Chief Constable refer the complaint to the IPCC. I pointed out that complaints about senior officers had not been reported to the Police Authority. 12. I did not understand the system at this point and was relying on the Force to handle the complaint correctly and with integrity. 13. It took until 27 May 2010 for the Force to inform me that the complaint had not been recorded. 14. I appealed to the IPCC in June 2010 about the failure to record the complaint. 15. My appeal to the IPCC was upheld in 14 July 2010, and it was held that the force had not recorded the complaint. 16. The IPCC then referred the complaint back to the Force for “local investigation”. 17. This was the second opportunity for the Force to record and investigate the complaint. 18. A Detective Inspector and Detective Sergeant from PSD visited my home once only in August 2010 to “scope” the complaint. 19. During 2010–11 I received a series of letters from the DI, telling me that the investigation was “ongoing”. I sent several letters asking what complaints had been recorded, but never received a response. 20. I never gave a statement, no witnesses were interviewed. No evidence was gathered. No investigation took place. 21. In October 2010 I asked the Chief Constable for a recording decision, and copied it to the IPCC. I raised a further complaint against the DI for failure to record a complaint. 22. The staff officer to the ACC informed me by letter that the matter was passed to the head of PSD and was assured of a detailed response. 23. I received a response from the IPCC case work manager in October 2010 stating they were not going to get involved at that stage and reminded me of the right to appeal at the end of the investigations. 24. I received no contact from the head of PSD. 25. In October 2010 I received a letter from DCI in PSD attempting to limit the complaint, but it still was not clear which complaints had been recorded and against whom. He assured me that the DI was still investigating. 26. In November 2010 the report, resulting from the 2009 flawed investigation, was presented as evidence to a court in 2010. It was presented in the full knowledge of the Force that it was factually incorrect. The Force documentation documents show this to be the case. The Chief Constable, and the force legal team, a solicitor, a barrister and other senior staff member were involved in this attempt to mislead a court. 27. In April 2011 the DI wrote to me stating that the investigation would not proceed as civil court proceedings were ongoing in relation to a different issue. 28. In May 2011 I asked for an explanation and highlighted that this is not a reason under Statutory Guidelines for delaying an investigation into a complaint. I copied the IPCC into this correspondence. 29. The IPCC Casework Manger explained again that they were not going to get involved and copied my correspondence the Force. 30. The IPCC should have intervened at this point. It by now was clear that the Force had: cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [01-02-2013 12:49] Job: 025757 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/025757/025757_w032_michelle_IPCC 40 - Jeremy Heywood.xml

Ev w40 Home Affairs Committee: Evidence

(a) Not recorded the complaint. (b) Were delaying the investigation because of a tribunal. 31. This was a flagrant breach of guidelines (S146 Statutory Guidance) which should have attracted sanction 32. On 28 May 2011 I wrote to the IPCC and asked for them to intervene: (a) The complaint was not being investigated. (b) The complaint now involved a Relevant Offence—Attempt to Pervert the Course of Justice (the false report being presented to a court in November 2010). 33. In June 2011 I wrote to the Chief Constable (copy IPCC) complaining that none of my letters were being answered in relation to recording and investigating the complaints, and the head of PSD had not been in touch, as the Chief Constable had said. 34. In June 2011 an IPCC casework manager responded, repeating that the IPCC had no involvement until the Force provided a final response and copied my letter to the Force. 35. Essentially what was happening now was the Force was resisting the investigation by failing to provide a response, leaving the IPCC (rightly or wrongly) claiming to be unable to intervene. This left the Force free to continue with their conduct, which had by now escalated to criminal conduct. 36. On 13 June 2010 I wrote to the IPCC asking if the complaint against the Chief Constable had been recorded. 37. In the same letter to the IPCC I asked that this complaint be a “Called in Matter”. 38. I received a reply from the IPCC on 21 June 2011 which did not address the question of the complaint against the Chief Constable, and referred the matter back to the Force. 39. On 15 June the Force wrote to my MP and advised that they were suspending the complaint investigation until civil proceedings were concluded (into an unrelated matter). By now the Force conduct had already resulted in a criminal offence occurring in the civil proceedings which would have been avoided had the Force investigated properly, or the IPCC taken over. 40. On 15 June 2011 I appealed to the IPCC that “Power to Suspend “ was being abused and this was a refusal to investigate. 41. The IPCC advised they had no power to intervene, I had no right of appeal, but they contacted the Force. 42. On 18 July 2011 PSD DS contacted my MP and advised the investigation was going to resume. 43. On 18 July 2011 (the same day he wrote to my MP), I received a letter signed by the same DS to say the investigation was now complete. In doing this he had effectively delayed any investigation until after civil proceedings were complete, as he knew that I would have to make an appeal, which would put me back to the beginning-the beginning of the IPCC flowchart. The Force had been able to resist the investigation again. 44. I appealed on 3 August 2011 to the IPCC. It was a seven-page letter detailing in full the sequence of events, listing the complaints and the people involved. I stated it would be perverse to allow the Force a third opportunity to investigate as they had clearly demonstrated there was no intention to investigate. I also pointed out that the conduct being demonstrated was a continuation and escalation (to criminal) of the original conduct complained of. 45. The appeal was upheld on 15 September 2011. 46. The matter was again returned to the WMP for local investigation, now the third opportunity to investigate. 47. The case was allocated to the same sergeant, now an acting DI, the same officer who had failed to investigate throughout 2010–11, the same officer who had resumed and closed the investigation on the same day. He apologised for this but to date has offered no explanation, so at this point he is now supposedly investigating his own failure. 48. On 4 October 2011 the DS undertook to draw up a written course of action (not seen to date). 49. The DS states that he wrote to the IPCC on 2 December 2011 strongly recommending that an IPCC investigator meet with me and review the paperwork. The DS asked for the IPCC to independently assess the case. 50. On 5 December 2011 (three days later) the IPCC wrote stating they had reviewed the complaint and again referred it for local investigation. 51. Having received no response from either the Force or the IPCC about a recording decision regarding the complaint about the Chief Constable, made in 2009, I wrote to the Police Authority on 18 January 2012 to make the complaint again. 52. On 30 January 2012 the Authority responded with a list of questions which I answered. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [01-02-2013 12:49] Job: 025757 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/025757/025757_w032_michelle_IPCC 40 - Jeremy Heywood.xml

Home Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev w41

53. On 2 February 2012 the Authority asked even more questions. 54. I answered 8 February 2012. 55. By 28 February 2012 I had heard nothing so I appealed to the IPCC about a failure to record a complaint by the Authority. 56. On 6 March 2012 the Authority confirmed they were not recording the complaint. 57. On 13 March 2012 the IPCC part-upheld my appeal. To date this has gone nowhere. 58. On 27 March 2012 I wrote to the IPCC, after an extended telephone conversation with a senior manager in the IPCC, as by now it was clear: (a) that the investigating officer considered that he not the most suited to investigate and had said so, and (b) that the investigators had been talking to the same legal team about the complaint that had used the false report in November 2010, and who were now themselves subject of a criminal complaint. 59. I complained that the investigation was compromised. 60. The IPCC still will not get involved and still refer the matter locally, and will not answer how many times it is acceptable for the investigation to be re-cycled around this loop. 61. My complaints remain unrecorded to my knowledge. 62. All my correspondence has been forwarded to the police. Nothing that the Force has written to the IPCC has been forwarded to me. 63. I made a subject access request 23 April 2012. I received no response by the beginning of June and made a complaint to the Information Commissioner to which I await the outcome.

Current Problems with the Present Investigation 64. The Force allocated an officer to carry out the investigation who is himself implicated in failing to investigate what is now an attempt to mislead a court. 65. The investigating sergeant and his civilian partner are discussing the case with the force legal team, who are supposedly under investigation for a serious offence that, if found, would attract a custodial sentence. 66. The investigating officers seized files as evidence but then allowed them to be sifted by the very people complained about, and allowed documents to be removed by staf. 67. Seized files are not held securely in detained property but in the investigator’s office in an open bag (continuity and integrity of evidence is compromised). 68. Despite four day-long visits to my home and a detailed written summary of the allegations, the investigating officers have not given a clear decision as to which allegations and against whom complaints have been recorded, despite being specifically directed to do this by the IPCC. 69. Complaints against the Chief Constable were supposed to have been recorded by the Authority. I have not yet received a complaint number and no action has been taken. 70. Complaints against other senior officers have yet to be recorded, despite repeated requests made to the Force and the IPCC since 2009. 71. The investigating sergeant tells me that he wrote to the IPCC on 2 December 2011, detailing his reasons why he believed that the complaints should be investigated externally. Even he thinks he is the wrong person to investigate.

IPCC Failings 72. The IPCC do not seem to be either capable or willing to ensure that complaints by members of the public are dealt with effectively or efficiently, as their website claims. 73. I have appealed to the IPCC three times and three times the appeals have been upheld. 74. Their sole purpose seems to be to provide a complainant with a “right of appeal”, as though that were an end in itself. What I really need is resolution—recording and investigation, and sanction for wrong doers and/or changes in practice. 75. Each time I write to the IPCC, a different caseworker responds. 76. I now have several reference numbers, which suggests that there may be several IPCC files, with no overall view of the complaints. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [01-02-2013 12:49] Job: 025757 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/025757/025757_w032_michelle_IPCC 40 - Jeremy Heywood.xml

Ev w42 Home Affairs Committee: Evidence

77. Each time, following an appeal, the complaint was sent back to the West Midlands Police. This beggars belief in this case. 78. The IPCC advise the Force have a legal duty to comply with their directions and Statutory guidelines, but there appears to be absolutely no enforcement, or enforcement mechanism. 79. It is clear in my case that the Force knows this and is exploiting the system. 80. The IPCC takes the Force at their word and does not copy the complainant into correspondence. I regret to say that the Force have misled many processes and have escalated to a criminal matter (Attempt to Pervert). 81. The IPCC refuse to answer how many times this process of failure to record, failure to investigate, appeal and return for local investigation to the Force will be repeated. The flow chart on the IPCC website shows this clearly. It has the potential to be a never-ending process, where the complaint is simply returned to the police. 82. The IPCC has no sanction against forces that choose to act in this way. 83. As I understand it once an investigation is completed, if an appeal is not upheld, the only way to challenge an IPCC decision is at judicial review. This is not an option that is open to the majority of complainants due to the high costs. 84. It worries me greatly that I have not been able to see these complaints investigated despite my dogged efforts. I am an articulate woman, able to understand most processes, able to advocate for myself, yet I have been thwarted at every turn. 85. I do not see how a young teenager with minimal education and lacking in self belief could ever get a complaint investigated. 86. At a time when government is concerned with an “underclass”, people who do not seem to have a stake in our society and its laws and guiding principles, the way the Police is held accountable is of the utmost importance. 87. We are failing to do this. The Public have every right to believe that the Police are unaccountable, a law unto themselves. 88. I would go as far as to say that this unaccountability contributed to some people’s feelings of powerlessness that may have had a bearing on the riots last summer.

Improvements 89. Complaints should never be sent to the police force being complained of if they involve more than one or two members of staff. 90. Officers should not be allowed to collude before producing statements after an incident. 91. There should be a strict time limit for forces to make a recording decision and this time limit should be communicated in written form to the complainant at the time of complaint. 92. A booklet detailing the complaint process should be produced including timelines and time limits. 93. There should be a standard proforma for responding to a complainant that includes a recording decision, who the complaint has been recorded against and what the complaint is about and who will be investigating. 94. There should be a clearly defined process for investigating a complaint. 95. There should be sanctions if the process and timelines are not followed. 96. Inference should be drawn in Court and sanctions imposed when evidence goes “missing”. 97. The IPCC should not send complaints back to a force when an appeal is upheld. If the force has had an opportunity to investigate once and have not done so then it should be passed externally to the force. 98. The IPCC need to understand that upholding their right to appeal is not what the Public are looking for when they make a complaint. The right of appeal is not the outcome people are seeking. Upholding a complainant’s appeal merely puts them back in the starting blocks. 99. A complainant should be given one reference number and one caseworker at the IPCC, so that there is some overall scrutiny and continuity of complaints. The IPCC say that they use different caseworkers each time to maintain independence at the right of appeal. I cannot see how one equals the other. 100. Perhaps there needs to be a bit of naming and shaming about how long investigations take, how many appeals are upheld etc. It should not be in the interests of a police force to delay or fail to thoroughly investigate. 101. Sanctions need to be in place and used when guidelines are not followed. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [01-02-2013 12:49] Job: 025757 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/025757/025757_w032_michelle_IPCC 40 - Jeremy Heywood.xml

Home Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev w43

102. An ombudsman service could be introduced to deal with complaints against the IPCC. The public cannot use Judicial Review, and are denied access to justice as a result. June 2012

Written evidence submitted by David Mery [IPCC 18] 1. Based on the experience of having had an IPCC supervised investigation following my unlawful arrest by the Metropolitan Police Service I recommend that the IPCC considers the outcome the complainant is looking for (and not just the terms of reference), that the IPCC gets the power to demand actions from the police, that the IPCC gets the power to make decisions in the public interest and that the IPCC be more careful in fulfilling subject access requests from complainants. 2. I submit this evidence as an individual. I have been residing in London since 1993.

FactualBackground 3. On 28 July 2005 I was stopped and searched and then unlawfully arrested at Southwark tube station. As the arrest has eventually been found to be unlawful, the subsequent taking of my fingerprints, palm prints, DNA samples and photographs were an assault on my person, the overnight detention was false imprisonment and the search of my flat was illegal. When I surrendered to bail on 31 August 2005, I was informed that No Further Action would be taken.31 4. I complained to the IPCC about my arrest on 19 April 2006. On 20 June 2006, the IPCC decided to supervise an investigation to be run by the Metropolitan Police Service’s Directorate of Professional Standards (DPS). The key outcomes I was looking for were: an apology for the actions of the police (the unnecessary and possibly unlawful stop and search, arrest, search of my flat, seizure of property, etc), the destruction of all the personal data the police had collected since my arrest (in particular my DNA sample and profiles, fingerprints and palm prints, PNC record and photographs), and ensuring that lessons were learnt so the same would not happen to others.32 5. The DPS completed its investigation report on 23 January 2007. The report found there was no lesson to be learnt and that the actions of the police were lawful, however the cover letter accompanying the report includes the following comments by the Inspector managing this case at the Misconduct Office: “I agree that the stop and search were lawful under that Act but I believe the arrest was unlawful. I agree with all the other conclusions in this report. […] I agree that this search was unlawful.”33 6. As none of my expected outcomes were achieved and that I had also since discovered a breach of the Data Protection Act as my PNC record had information implying a conviction had been achieved, on 9 February 2007 I appealed the outcome. On 11 May 2007, the IPCC decided not to uphold my appeal. In the accompanying letter, I am informed: “Despite the decision made, we have however requested that the Metropolitan Police Service reconsider your request for your records and samples to be physically destroyed and electronically deleted, and for the summary information in the Police National Computer to be expunged. We have also informed the service that a copy of the Stop and Search form 5090 should be provided to you. You should now expect the Metropolitan Police Service to contact you regarding the actions that I have asked them to take.”34 7. On 19 May 2007, I contacted a solicitor to start a civil action against the Metropolitan Police Service. My DNA sample were destroyed, and fingerprints, palm prints and PNC record deleted on 14 September 2007.35 8. Eventually on 23 September 2009, the Metropolitan Police Service settled and the Borough Commander for Southwark wrote: “I would like to apologise on behalf of the Metropolitan Police Service for the circumstances that arose on 28 July 2005 including your unlawful arrest, detention and search of your home. I appreciate this has had a deep and traumatic impact on your lives and I hope that the settlement in this case can bring some closure to this. I shall ensure that the officers concerned are made aware of the impact of the events of that day and also the details of the settlement in this case.” And the photographs taken when arrested and during the flat search were returned.36

31 Suspicious behaviour on the tube, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2005/sep/22/terrorism.july7 32 Innocent in London—“Suspicious behaviour on the tube”, http://gizmonaut.net/bits/suspect.html#D20060620 33 Innocent in London—“Suspicious behaviour on the tube”, http://gizmonaut.net/bits/suspect.html#D20070123 34 Innocent in London—“Suspicious behaviour on the tube”, http://gizmonaut.net/bits/suspect.html#D20070511 35 Innocent in London—“Suspicious behaviour on the tube”, http://gizmonaut.net/bits/suspect.html#D20070914 36 Metropolitan Police Service apologises for unlawful arrest, http://gizmonaut.net/blog/uk/2009/09/mps_apologises.html cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [01-02-2013 12:49] Job: 025757 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/025757/025757_w032_michelle_IPCC 40 - Jeremy Heywood.xml

Ev w44 Home Affairs Committee: Evidence

Recommendations 9. (A) That the IPCC considers the outcome the complainant is looking for (and not just the terms of reference) 10. My written statement of witness37 used by the DPS to start its IPCC-supervised enquiry concluded with a list of desired outcomes. These were ignored by the IPCC, which focused on the terms of reference drawn by the DPS. 11. With hindsight I would have ensured that all my desired outcomes were included in the terms of reference. The DPS attempted to pressure me to go for local resolution instead of a full investigation and to shorten my written statement of witness. I resisted this pressure. The definition of the terms of reference to be narrower than my statement of witness achieved a similar outcome for the police without being as obvious. 12. If the current system continues, it must be made clear to the complainants that the terms of reference are the only scope for any outcome they may be expecting in approaching the IPCC.

13. (B) That the IPCC gets the power to demand actions from the police 14. The IPCC “requested” that the Metropolitan Police Service reconsider my request for personal data to be expunged and “informed” the service that a copy of a compulsory form “should” be provided to me. The IPCC should have the power not just to make polite requests, but also to make effective demands.

15. (C) That the IPCC gets the power to make decisions in the public interest 16. Even if the IPCC does not obtain the power to direct the police to consider the outcome requested by the complainant, it should still be empowered to direct the police to consider lessons to be learnt to ensure that no one else will have to go through the same ordeal.

17. (D) That the IPCC be more careful in fulfilling subject access requests from complainants 18. After the case was over, I requested the personal data the IPCC had retained.38 On several occasions it was clear that pages were missing in the information sent by the IPCC. It took me several attempts to obtain a set of documents that appear to be complete.39 June 2012

Written evidence submitted by Denise Hart [IPCC 19] Executive Summary 1. Resolving the complaints issue 2. Firstly, the Police need to be held responsible for their actions: 3. I believe there should be a system in place where the Senior Officer in charge of the relevant Police Officer, station or section should, initially have to handle the complaint, as they would have done in the 1950’s and 1960’s. 4. They need to be held accountable for staff working for them. The Police Station with the Officer responsible for that complaint should NOT be allowed to handle the Police Investigation (which happened in my complaint about Devon Police). This is the only way to really improve Police Practices and avoid a “whitewash”. 5. Another station in that area should undertake the Police Investigation within a few months of the incident occurring (not the 14 months that Lincolnshire’s Police took for their investigation). 6. In this way, a central log or register of “offending” Police stations could be easily (and economically) collated and dealt with as a matter separate from individual complaints. The Senior Officer there would have to be held responsible for his offending officers. 7. Police should be held responsible for their own actions. The Senior Officer would have to be totally aware of all improper conduct of any Officers reporting to him. 8. If, after the Police Investigation (a copy of the report should, obviously, be sent to the Senior Officer at the “offending” Police Station or section), the matter is not resolved effectively or to the satisfaction of the individual complainant, the Senior Police Officer should refer it to an independent body for further investigation. After all, taxpayers are paying for the service they receive from the Police. 37 Statement of witness, http://gizmonaut.net/bits/articles/200607_Statement_of_witness.html 38 IPCC Subject Access Request, http://gizmonaut.net/bits/suspect.html#D20100210 39 IPCC Subject Access Request, missing pages, http://gizmonaut.net/bits/suspect.html#D20100702 cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [01-02-2013 12:49] Job: 025757 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/025757/025757_w032_michelle_IPCC 40 - Jeremy Heywood.xml

Home Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev w45

9. Personally, I would change the name of the IPCC, as it demonstrated very clearly in the Press that it was not at all “independent” during the riots last year. 10. The IPCC needs to be able to investigate complaints further. 11. If, for example, there has been dishonesty by the Officer during the Police Investigation, evident to the complainant, or a failure to provide accurate witness evidence, the IPCC really does need to be provided with this information BEFORE drawing a conclusion regarding that complaint. If new evidence comes to light, the IPCC should be able to review a previous decision, at that time. Anything else really is a waste of time and money for everyone involved. 12. The PSD department should not work to defend the Officer. The Officer should be interviewed by the person conducting the Police Investigation in the same way that anyone else accused of breaking the law would be, and not be provided with information or correspondence from the complainant without their written authority (as MPC Adams in Devon was), so that they can fabricate their own story around that evidence. 13. Witness statements provided to a Police Investigation should be signed and dated as a legal “Statement of Truth” by the Officer, who, if later found guilty of perjury, would be able to be prosecuted, as would be the case for civilians committing perjury in a witness statement. I doubt that this is currently the case. 14. The individual complainant should be allowed to request copies of the Officer’s witness statement and pass comment on them to the IPCC, and vice versa. These comments should be taken into account by the IPCC when dealing with the complaint. The review would then be objective and account for both sides of events. 15. Currently, as matters stand, if Police are dishonest with the Police Investigation, (and therefore the IPCC do not uphold the complaint) the complainant has no redress other than Judicial Review which is expensive and time-consuming for all involved. As it stands currently then, this is unlikely to lead to any improvement in Police Standards or Practices as the Officer’s main priority is to have the complaint against him dismissed. This is true also, it seems for the PSD department, who currently provide the IPCC with reasons NOT to uphold the complaint. 16. For the IPCC to be truly “independent”, they need to have greater powers. Currently, it seems that as any Police Investigation cannot be questioned further, it is taken on face value, as being 100% honest. In my experience, this is rarely the case. The balance, then, is distinctly in the Police’s favour. The scrutiny of Police Practice is, therefore, currently marginal. 17. The Home Office should be able to ask the IPCC to review complaints, when necessary, without the complainant having to undertake a judicial review. 18. The Scottish Police Force seems to deal with complaints in a far more effective manner and each Officer takes complaints far more seriously than seems the case with English Police Officers. 19. The IPCC also needs brighter people working there. A girl dealing with one of my complaints did not seem to be able to grasp many of the issues involved, and from her replies to my emails, didn’t even seem to have read through all of my correspondence properly. Some of the comments on the internet about her were less than flattering!

Background 20. Over the last few years, I have had reason to make complaints against the Police due to three separate events. 21. Briefly, in 2008, I was driving alone through Lincolnshire on my way to Scotland, and had an unmarked Police Car with a plain-clothes Police Officer tailgate me for some miles. When I pulled into a service station (the first opportunity I had to pull over), his car also pulled in. A marked patrol car, which had been close in a layby also pulled in. The Inspector (now Chief Inspector) and Sergeant in that vehicle were witness to the unnecessary and unprovoked aggression that I received from that Officer, PC Goodwill. I had no idea he was a Police Officer until he started to caution me regarding my own driving! He was eventually sent away by the uniformed Officers and the Inspector listed around six breaches of the Police Code of Conduct that he had witnessed. 22. The Police Investigation took around 14 months to be published. In it, there is absolutely no mention of Inspector Pache’s acknowledgement of PC Goodwill’s breaches of the Police Code of Conduct. It was a whitewash. I can only think that they waited for over a year imagining that I would lose interest in the complaint and go away. I didn’t. 23. I complained to the IPCC. They did not uphold my complaint. I appealed to the IPCC with the information that (now Chief) Inspector Pache had not provided the Police Investigation with material evidence. They did not uphold my appeal. 24. Ms Foster (Lincoln PSD) states “the Complaints concerning Chief Inspector Pache, Sergeant Farmer and Inspector Bennett should have formed part of your appeal against the initial complaint investigation, even though this would not have ever been possible, as the evidence was sent to me in Chief Inspector Pache’s letter, cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [01-02-2013 12:49] Job: 025757 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/025757/025757_w032_michelle_IPCC 40 - Jeremy Heywood.xml

Ev w46 Home Affairs Committee: Evidence

dated 30 June 2010. It seems that CI Pache and Sgt Farmer both failed to inform the Police Investigation that CI Pache had verbally listed approximately six points of the Police Code of Conduct that PC Goodwill had breached. They therefore failed to provide true and accurate witness statements to the Police Investigation and therefore to the IPCC. As the IPCC can only base a decision on the information provided, they failed to uphold my complaint.

25. I was told that the only avenue for redress open to me is Judicial Review. I doubt that many people chose this option as it is expensive and time-consuming.

26. I never found out whether it was because a Chief Inspector was involved that Lincolnshire’s PSD applied for and were granted a dispensation. If Chief Inspector Pache had provided honest evidence to the Police Investigation (and therefore the IPCC), my complaint about PC Goodwill would have been upheld. He would have been made to take responsibility for his actions and punished accordingly. I would not have felt that I wasted months of my time.

27. As he failed to provide honest evidence to the Police Investigation, my complaint and appeal to the IPCC and all of my many emails and phone calls attempting to get hold of a copy of the Police Investigation Report, were all a waste of time, effort (and taxpayer’s money).

28. Briefly, in 2010, I was charged with dangerous driving by a Police Officer driving an unmarked Police car in Devon. I was not driving dangerously or carelessly. MPC Adams was not entirely honest either with the Police Investigation or in his written witness statement or when giving verbal evidence in Court. He failed to question another driver who had been driving poorly. He told me that if I left the country that I would be arrested on my return. He failed to interview me regarding this matter, probably because my written witness statement would have ensured that this case never went to Court. His verbal evidence in Court differed from his written statement. A male witness fabricated evidence which differed dramatically from his written statement. His wife admitted that she had been “led” by the Police to write a particular comment in her written evidence. The final “witness” admitted they had not seen much at all. I was convicted of careless driving, fined and given nine points on my previously clean driving license. The points were reduced to eight points when I appealed, defending myself.

29. The IPCC refused to uphold my complaint, even though I had informed them that the case was subjudice and I could therefore not provide all information required until a later date.

30. Peter Hunt, Casework Manager dealt with both complaints and failed to uphold either of them.

31. Due to that mentioned above, when I was burgled in 2011 (reported originally as an “attempted” burglary) and the Detective Constable based in Launceston, Cornwall, failed to interview me for ten days, I only made a complaint via the local resolution process. I did not have the time to waste to do anything more. Even that complaint was not upheld. It was proof to me that, currently, there really is no point in making a complaint against any Police Officer for any reason, because no-one in the Police force really seems to care about Police Standards.

In Summation

32. The issues addressed by any Review should go further than just reviewing the role of the IPCC.

33. If the question is whether the IPCC really is effective at upholding Police Standards, then what really needs to be considered is the number of complaints and appeals that the IPCC does uphold and the way in which those Officers are dealt with. Even though this matter is very newsworthy currently, very few Officers seem to be held accountable for their actions and prosecuted in a Court of Law.

34. The Police complaints procedure is ineffective at EVERY level and the General Public has no faith that “justice will prevail” when complaining about any Police Officer. It seems that, legally, there is still one rule for the General Public and another for the Police, who have lawyers paid for with taxpayer’s money defending them. Jo Public has to pay for his own defence lawyers and/or subject themselves to the Legal Aid process, which is far less likely to result in a fair outcome.

35. I am happy to provide any further correspondence relating to these matters, if required. I do appreciate the fact that the Review concerns the IPCC’s performance, rather than that of the Police, but I have provided relevant background information regarding both cases, for information. It may be that the individual MPs for these areas would be interested in the conduct of their Police Officers.

36. The General Public also needs to be protected from poor Policing and dishonest Officers who abuse their position of authority. 40 Not printed. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [01-02-2013 12:49] Job: 025757 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/025757/025757_w032_michelle_IPCC 40 - Jeremy Heywood.xml

Home Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev w47

37. Attached to this email are a number of files relating to the cases noted above. They may not be required for the overall Review, but may be useful for background information.41 June 2012

Written evidence submitted by Dr Rita Pal [IPCC 20] My concerns about the IPCC are well known to them and detailed in their documentation. My comments are these: 1. There is a strategic failure by its staff to assess each complaint using the standards or ACPO standards set down for the police. 2. There is no review procedure or avenue to manage mistakes and errors made by their administrative staff leading to wrong decision making. The GMC for instance has the procedure of a Presidential Review. The IPCC has nothing. Their staff is broadly obstructive, unable to communicate effectively, unable to assess the public interest dimension of complaints etc. 3. A few months ago, I made a Data Protection Act request. This request was nearly send to a third party I did not know. I spotted the wrong address and advised them to ensure that no errors were made in the future. Errors were subsequently made. In fact, personal data plus sensitive data concerning our family was leaked to a third party. The third party threatened to go to the media with the material. The IPCC sought to obtain a injunction against this gentleman but effectively failed to retrieve the sensitive documents. The leaked documents contained material concerning child protection, confidential documents related to me issued by the police and much more. There was a internal IPCC inquiry. We have not had the results. The ICO was informed but we have not heard from them either. The Home Office was informed but again we have not heard from them. This is a catastrophic disaster in data protection. The IPCC remain unapologetic and offer no remedy. Their actions have distressed our entire family. At present, we are in a situation where confidential data is with a third party and there is nothing anyone appears to be able to do about it. In conclusion, I believe the IPCC to be unfit to regulate the police force. June 2012

Written evidence submitted by the family of Sharon McLaughlin [IPCC 21] INQUIRY INTO THE INDEPENDENT POLICE COMPLAINTS COMMISSION—SUBMISSION MADE ON BEHALF OF THE FAMILY OF SHARON MCLAUGHLIN Christian Khan Solicitors write on behalf of the family of Sharon McLaughlin to provide submissions to the Inquiry into the Independent Police Complaints Commission (“IPCC”).

Background Facts Sharon McLaughlin was 32 years old when she died in Worthing Custody Centre in West Sussex on 16 May 2010 as a result of cardiac arrhythmic failure. At the time of her death Worthing Custody Centre was manned by both officers under the direction and control of the Chief Constable of Sussex Police, and custody staff employed by Reliance Secure Task Management (“Reliance”). By way of background, police forces may enter into contracts with third parties for the provision of police services. In those circumstances, police forces at present have a choice as to whether or not to “designate” employees of the contractors. Section 39 of the Police Reform Act 2002 (“PRA 2002”) sets out that, where a police authority has entered into a contract with a person (including a legal person such as a limited company) for the provision of services relating to the detention or escort of persons who have been arrested or are otherwise in custody, it may designate an employee of that contractor to be a detention officer or an escort officer. Significantly, Section 39(4) PRA 2002 states that: “A chief officer of police shall not designate a person under this section unless he is satisfied that that person: (a) is a suitable person to carry out the functions for the purposes of which he is designated; (b) is capable of effectively carrying out those functions; and (c) has received adequate training in the carrying out of those functions and in the exercise and performance of the powers and duties to be conferred on him by virtue of the designation.” [our emphasis] 41 Not printed. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [01-02-2013 12:49] Job: 025757 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/025757/025757_w032_michelle_IPCC 40 - Jeremy Heywood.xml

Ev w48 Home Affairs Committee: Evidence

Further, Section 39(5) PRA 2002 states that: “A chief officer of police shall not designate a person under this section unless he is satisfied that the contractor is a fit and proper person to supervise the carrying out of the functions for the purposes of which that person is designated.” [our emphasis]

For reasons that have never been explained to the family, the Chief Constable of Sussex did not designate Reliance staff. As set out below, this has had very serious repercussions in terms of investigating the cause and circumstances of Ms McLaughlin’s tragic death.

Ms McLaughlin was arrested and taken to Worthing Custody Centre on 15 May 2010 on suspicion of shoplifting. On arrival, she informed the custody sergeant that she was dependent on heroin. When searched, she was found to be in the possession of over 50 needles as well as drug paraphernalia and some Class A drugs. During the search, Ms McLaughlin had asked the officer if the needles could be returned to her on her release so that she can re-inject any residual drugs. It was therefore clear that Ms McLaughlin suffered from an established heroin addiction. In addition, she informed the custody sergeant that she had previously self-harmed.

The care of vulnerable detainees was, at the time of Ms McLaughlin’s death, subject to guidance both in Code C of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (“PACE Code C”) and the 2006 Home Office/Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) “Guidance on the Safer Detention and Handling of Persons in Police Custody” (“the Guidance”).

Paragraph 9 of PACE Code C sets out the care and treatment of detained persons. Paragraph 9.5 of Code C sets out the circumstances in which a custody officer must make sure a detainee receives appropriate clinical attention as soon as reasonably practicable. Paragraph 9.5B sets out that: “The custody officer must also consider the need of clinical attention as set out in note for guidance in 9C relation to those suffering the effects of alcohol or drugs.”

Practice Note 9C sets out in turn that: “A detainee who appears drunk or behaves abnormally may be suffering from illness, the effects of drugs or may have sustained injury, particularly a head injury which is not apparent. A detainee needing or dependent on certain drugs, including alcohol, may experience harmful effects within a short time of being deprived of their supply. In these circumstances, when there is any doubt, police should always act urgently to call an appropriate healthcare professional or an ambulance...”

Ms McLaughlin received no medical attention despite the fact that the custody officer was, or should have been, aware of the fact that she suffered from a drug addiction.

Whilst in the police cell, Ms McLaughlin displayed signs of being unwell. She was cold and asked for a blanket and vomited on at least two occasions. Ms McLaughlin refused food over a lengthy period.

The custody support officers employed by Reliance were heard on the custody suite CCTV sitting in front of their computers discussing the fact that Ms McLaughlin had vomited. Neither was willing to clean it up and one was jokingly asking whether she was “still alive”. Ms McLaughlin was left in her own vomit for a number of hours.

However, of even greater concern is the fact that, upon becoming aware of the fact that Ms McLaughlin had vomited, no police officer or custody assistant visited Ms McLaughlin in her cell to speak to her and/or assess her. Incredibly, Ms McLaughlin was never seen or examined by a nurse, despite the fact that she was highly dependent on intravenous heroin, had not eaten for a considerable period and had vomited.

Twenty-two and a half hours after Ms McLaughlin’s arrest, she was visited in her cell by a police officer to release her. She was found unconscious and pronounced dead at approximately 2pm on 16 May 2012.

The IPCC Investigation

Prior to the Inquest, the IPCC carried out an investigation into Ms McLaughlin’s death. They found a number of serious breaches of the Standard Operating Procedures on behalf of police officers in the employment of Sussex Police. A copy of the full report is attached for your information.42

However, because Reliance staff were not designated, the IPCC lacked jurisdiction to question, interview and investigate the actions of custody staff in the employment of Reliance. Reliance were therefore left to speak to their staff and carry out an internal investigation, which (in evidence at the Inquest) Reliance’s Operations Manager Claire Boffee accepted lacked any independent input.

Reliance staff were not interviewed (on tape or otherwise) and the report failed to touch on key factual and legal issues. 42 Not printed. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [01-02-2013 12:49] Job: 025757 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/025757/025757_w032_michelle_IPCC 40 - Jeremy Heywood.xml

Home Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev w49

The Inquest As is frequently the case, the Inquest into Ms McLaughlin’s death did not occur until some considerable time after her death, in this particular case some 18 months. HM Coroner Mr Burgess commenced the two week inquest on 14 November 2011. At the inquest, evidence was heard from three pathologists and a doctor as to the cause of Ms McLaughlin’s death, as well as a large number of witnesses of fact. In light of the medical evidence, the following possible causes of death were explored: — SADs abnormal heart—there may have been a heart abnormality that was not obvious/detected during the autopsy. — SADs with a normal heart. — SADs with Chronic Drugs Use. — Chronic Drug Use and Arrhythmic Failure. — Undetermined/unascertained. However, because no independent body had investigated or recorded the accounts of staff in the employment of Reliance crucial factual evidence was lost. Reliance staff were repeatedly able to rely on a lack of recollection due to the passage of time in the course of their evidence. The only record of their account was the internal report carried out by Reliance, which lacked both detail and independence. In addition, one of the key staff members of Reliance who had been responsible for Ms McLaughlin during her time in custody (and who was subject of some of the most severe criticism) had been released from the employment of Reliance at the time that the Inquest took place. He failed to attend the Inquest (despite having been summoned) having previously endeavoured to instruct independent legal representatives following concerns that his evidence could potentially lead to criminal charges being brought against him. It subsequently transpired that he was not able to obtain public funding for his representation and as such he was not able to afford legal representation at the Inquest. At short notice, a doctor’s note was produced stating that he was unable to attend. As a result of these issues, flowing ultimately from the lacuna in the IPCC’s jurisdiction, were therefore significant gaps in the factual evidence before the Jury, Coroner and medical experts and crucial information was lost. The family argued that, without knowing the precise circumstances surrounding or cause of death, it could not conclusively be said that a nurse or medically qualified person would not have identified symptoms related to a cardiac failure (whether by a vital signs observation, eliciting responses by questioning or otherwise). Consequently, the possibility of further medical treatment having been capable of preventing her death could not be excluded. The jury ultimately returned a verdict of natural causes, but the evidence at the inquest, which revealed failings by those responsible for her in the care and treatment she received, caused the Coroner to write to the Home Secretary and Chief Constable with a report under Rule 43 of the Coroners Rules 1984 (as amended). In summary, he wrote as follows: 1. This case has found that all custody officers and Reliance custody staff involved in Ms McLaughlin’s detention had a lack of awareness of the Home Office Guidance on the Safer Detention and Handling of Persons in Police Custody. 2. There were similar failings identified in the IPCC investigation into the death of Garry Reynolds in March 2008. There was also a lack of appreciation of the importance of Sussex Police Policy and Home Office Guidance, amongst custody officers and Reliance staff. 3. The Coroner recommended that Sussex Police reviews its custody officer training to ensure that it is fit for purpose and complies, with the Home Office, guidance. Furthermore, that Sussex Police reviews whether any of the officers involved in this incident need to re-attend custody officer training to ensure they fully understand the requirements of to continue in the role. 4. Although no link has been established between Ms McLaughlin’s death and the time she spent in custody, it is clear from the evidence that having vomited, no-one treated her with the consideration, professionalism and dignity which she should have been able to expect as a detainee in custody. 5. Whilst it is probable that no medical treatment could have prevented the death in this instance, not only was it suggested (and accepted by Sussex Police) that her previous medical history should have resulted in an examination by a “health care professional” but her sickness in the morning (between 5:00 and 6:00 hrs) went unremarked and unrecorded. 6. It is also clear from the evidence that none of the custody sergeants were fully conversant with the Home Office Guidance on the Safer Detention of Persons in Custody, nor did their conduct comply fully with the guidance. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [01-02-2013 12:49] Job: 025757 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/025757/025757_w032_michelle_IPCC 40 - Jeremy Heywood.xml

Ev w50 Home Affairs Committee: Evidence

7. There were also problems with the way in which the detention records were kept and the various periodic observations recorded. 8. The Coroner recommended that Sussex Police, and the specific custody staff and officers involved in this incident, need to reflect on this incident in order to learn from it and develop improved custody practices which comply with the guidance laid down by the Home Office. Furthermore, the inquest revealed a number of “structural problems”: 1. The differences in wording between the 2006 Home Office/ACPO “Guidance on the Safer Detention and Handling of Persons in Police Custody” and the 2008 “Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE)—Code C (Code of Practice for the detention, treatment and questioning of persons by police officers)” resulting in differences of approach and potential conflicts in interpretation and practice. 2. There were also difficulties for the IPCC in that as the Custody Assistants and Detention Supervisors employed by Reliance were not “designated” by the Sussex Police, the IPCC could not interview and investigate their actions/failures to the same extent as they could individual police officers. We enclose copies of the HM Coroner’s letter under Rule 43 of the Coroners Rules, as well as the responses from the Secretary of State for Home Department (undated) and the Chief Constable of Sussex Police Martin Richards dated 4 January 2012.43

Broader Legal Framework andSubmissions You will no doubt be aware of the State’s obligations under Article 2 of the European Convention of Human Rights, actionable under the Human Rights Act 1998, which enshrines the right to life. It is a well established principle that Article 2 includes a positive obligation on the State to prevent the loss of life, which in turn gives rise to an investigative duty where an individual dies in police or prison custody. This duty is often discharged through the IPCC investigation and inquest. Ms McLaughlin’s case is a tragic example of the State’s failure to secure a full and effective investigation into her death, in part as a result of the IPCC’s impotency in investigating the role of staff employed by non- State actors in the context of a death in custody. It is wholly unacceptable in this context that State agents such as the Chief Constable of Sussex Police are allowed to abdicate responsibility for detainees’ wellbeing by contracting out responsibility to private companies and are able to avoid accountability by deciding not to designate staff. In addition, the family are concerned that Ms McLaughlin’s case demonstrates a lack of transparency in the course of the IPCC investigation in terms of their communications with the police. Although a number of recommendations were made, Sussex Police were given an opportunity to comment on the investigation report without such comments being disclosed to the family. Further, the family’s experience was that there was insufficient communication and transparency in terms of the police force’s subsequent decisions as to whether or not to act on such recommendations. Therefore, additional measures to ensure better transparency should be put in place and a framework should be developed which requires public responses to concerns raised by the IPCC. The problems faced in holding private companies to account in the context of Ms McLaughlin’s death was not an isolated incident. We enclose a print-out of an article in the Independent Newspaper regarding Ms McLaughlin’s death highlighting the broad-scale concerns that this case exemplifies.

Ms McLaughlin’s Family Ms McLaughlin left behind a young daughter, and her four siblings, Graeme Lloyd, Emma Lloyd, Carol McLaughlin and Amanda Taylor, as well has her father Philip McLaughlin. The family are devastated by her loss, which they believe could have been prevented by better care by both Sussex Police and Reliance staff. The medical circumstances around Ms McLaughlin’s death were complex and the Inquest was unable to conclude that if medical assistance had been provided earlier her death would have been avoidable. However CCTV footage undoubtedly demonstrates that Ms McLaughlin was treated with a lack of respect and that her final hours were spent in an undignified and inhumane state. This is echoed by HM Coroner in his letter to the Secretary of State and Chief constable. Ms McLaughlin’s family have, throughout the course of the investigation and subsequent Inquest, conducted themselves with the utmost dignity, as recognised by HM Coroner at the conclusion of the Inquest. Their sole desire is to see improvements in accountability and transparency of investigations into deaths in State custody, including where public functions are contracted out to private companies. 43 Not printed. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [01-02-2013 12:49] Job: 025757 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/025757/025757_w032_michelle_IPCC 40 - Jeremy Heywood.xml

Home Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev w51

It is hoped that the Home Affairs Select Committee inquiry will review these submissions favourably and improve the IPCC’s ability to ensure that lessons are learnt from such tragic deaths so that they can be prevented in the future. Christian Khan Solicitors on behalf of the family of Sharon McLaughlin June 2012

Written evidence submitted by Anton Venter [IPCC 22] I submit that I was a victim of crime committed by a senior police officer. The IPCC investigated this matter, but refused to submit the evidence to the Crown Prosecution Services despite very strong evidence which may secure a safe conviction. Correspondence is still ongoing after six and a half years. I do appreciate that this committee does not wish to investigate individual cases, but my submission will allow the committee to form a general assessment of the IPCC. I now submit the following under the guidelines set by the Committee:

Whether the Commission has improved the scrutiny of police practices The IPCC needs scrutinising itself before it can scrutinise anybody else. The 85% percentile of public don’t trust the IPCC at all, due to wide publicity of unfair and prejudice finding on public complaints. The other internal investigations initiated by police forces for disciplinary matter and the police officers for grievances are not attracting media attention and a public perception is drawn on what is on in the news about the IPCC. My personal contact with the IPCC suggests that for the past six years nothing has changed and both the police and IPCC are racist toward anybody not a white british born national; and a lot of corruption occur. The COL Police have become so confident of “obtaining” dispensations from the IPCC that complainants are informed by the concerned force that their complaint wouldn’t even be considered by the IPCC. The Police Force instead of the IPCC makes this decision on behalf of the IPCC. It has also become clear that “outcomes” of investigations are still strongly based on the race or nationality of the complainant and “if” sanctions are instigated against officers in extraordinary cases, the officer will escape severe sanctions, if the complainant was an immigrant. Recent Media Reports suggesting not only did scrutiny not improve, but IPCC officials made false statements about police incidents to discredit the victims. (Ian Tomlinson case and the latest the case of Mark Duggan, where the IPCC initially reported that the victim fired shots at the Police, which was certainly untrue). These are only cases which were highlighted in the media, all cases are not reported in the media and there may be many more instances of cover ups and attempts to do so by dishonest and influence IPCC officials. I’m prepared to give oral evidence and provide copies of correspondence from Management level of the IPCC, attempting to pervert the course of justice to aid failures of a particular police force.

Whether the Commission has the right powers and resources to carry out its role rffectively We should firstly consider whether the Commission’s existence is justified in its current form before addressing this point. The UK has a qualified judicial system with Courts and Tribunals in place, why is the IPCC needed? 1. Crimes committed by Police Officers are no different to crimes committed by other member of the public and should be addressed in the same way. Having a different body to buffer Police Officers from facing the general legal system constitutes a breach of equality and human rights legislation. 2. Employment Tribunals are in place for disputes between employers and employees about codes of conduct and disciplinary procedures. Police officers are employees. Again, why should there be a different body to deal with these matters? 3. Civil courts including small claims courts are able to deal with claims and complaints from the public, if it can’t be resolved between the Police Force and the complainant, this avenue is available for use, why have a separate publicly funded independent commission, which has many a time now proven to have been not as independent as it should be? If this body is to be retained to relief the work load of current courts and tribunals, this IPCC could be transformed into a “Police Affairs Tribunal”, which would allow proper hearings by legally qualified personnel to do so. That would be a much more fair, transparent and efficient service than the current administrative system conducted and performed by mostly unqualified and ineffective and sometimes very dishonest personnel. This will also bring along a lot of savings on administration of so called “investigations” as cases would have to “investigated”, researched and prepared by the parties wishing to bring and defend the actions. Because cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [01-02-2013 12:49] Job: 025757 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/025757/025757_w032_michelle_IPCC 40 - Jeremy Heywood.xml

Ev w52 Home Affairs Committee: Evidence

tribunals and courts makes binding and enforceable decisions, there is no need for further referrals and duplication of the process. In its current form, the IPCC lacks the skills and experience of qualified lawyers and prosecutors to deal with cases effectively which leads to disputes lasting for years, costing a fortune.

Whether investigations lead to improvements in police practices Whilst the police do wrong and the IPCC seeks justification for the wrong doing instead of addressing the defaults, there can never be improvement! The IPCC can’t be trusted themselves, how can they be expected to... and be trusted to improve and rectify police malpractice? I can by giving evidence and providing copies of management correspondence prove that top management staff members of the IPCC are dishonest and aiding police crimes, what can you expect of those led by these dishonest managers and directors? I would like to call Mr. David Knight Mr. David Ford a Director and a senior manager to testify about directed by the internal legal team to ignore legislation and case law when making decisions. I wish to call a receptionist Mrs. Sophie Lawrence of the IPCC to give evidence about the facts that reception had instructions to in no circumstance connect any calls to management if there are complaints about IPCC staff not acting according to expected service standards.

Whether improving police services should be formally included in the Commission’s remit Whilst my personal believe is that the QUALITY of Police Services should be improved, I believe that the Commission; if retained in its current form; should first improve its own profile, service delivery and public image before taking on this task. I don’t think there should be any improvement in police services, but there should be improvement in the way that existing services are delivered.

The Commission’s role in scrutinising elected police commissioners The Police Commissioner’s should be scrutinized by the community leadership and not the IPCC.

The Commission’s role in scrutinising third parties commissioned to carry out policing duties No comment, as I don’t think that third parties should be doing police work to start off with. These parties will be difficult to hold to account for abuse and wrong doing. Lessons should have been learned from Parking Services, where the objective of road safety has been traded for boosting profits. The same will happen with the police as contractors will only deal with money generating jobs.

The Commission’s role in considering complaints which may relate in part to other bodies involved in the justice system, such as the Crown Prosecution Service The Police and IPCC should account to the Judicial system and not the other way round. The IPCC should sort out itself firstly and get its own house in order. In a case which concerns both the IPCC and the CPS, an independent Investigator should be appointed by the relevant MP for Justice.

Whether the right balance is achieved between independent, managed and supervised investigations 1. There can be no right balance unless IPCC staff are fully trained into primary the relevant legislation in respect of the act and its regulations. 2. IPCC staff are fully trained in investigation skills. 3. Unless staff are encouraged to be honest and without prejudice during investigations. 4. Serious sanction are taken publicly against IPCC officials not complying with the law when taking decisions. There had been a notable review of previously prejudice decisions after media intervention.

How the work of the Commission could be effectively scrutinised 1. The commission should have an component of floating board of directors which rotate monthly rather than appointed for longer periods. 2. There should be a significant number of directors from a qualified legal back ground sitting on the board as well as rotated local business leaders. The board should take note of all decisions taken. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [01-02-2013 12:49] Job: 025757 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/025757/025757_w032_michelle_IPCC 40 - Jeremy Heywood.xml

Home Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev w53

3. Detailed return of all complaint dealt with should be made available to the Local Borough Council of the complainant’s residence and the Borough where the Police Station is located. Personal details can be anonymised and should be published. This is for public to determine trends in police and their residents’ behaviour. June 2012

Written evidence submitted by the National Policing Improvement Agency [IPCC 24] The National Policing Improvement Agency (NPIA) welcomes the opportunity to contribute to the Home Affairs Committee Inquiry on the future of the Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC), as the NPIA and the IPCC are close working partners, particularly in the development and sharing of evidence-based practice and priorities and influencing standards across the police service. 1. With reference to the inquiry’s Terms of Reference, the Agency’s interests fits mainly within the consideration of: “whether investigation leads to improvement in police practice”. 2. This evidence refers both to current relationships between the IPCC and the NPIA and the potential relationships between the IPCC and the new professional body that will receive many relevant functions from the NPIA. 3. The NPIA is a member of the IPCC’s multi-agency Learning the Lessons Committee that disseminates and promotes learning across the police service. The Committee has fostered closer and more effective relationships between IPCC (investigators), policy makers and practitioners with: — lessons from investigations being fed back into police practice, systems and processes; — a more evidence-based approach being taken to the creation of police practice; and — better policing outcomes and interactions with the public. 4. A good recent example of joint working is the IPCC’s contribution to the new “Detention and Custody Authorised Professional Practice”, developed by the Agency, with ACPO. This has been informed by recommendations arising from IPCC investigations and appeals and its “Study of Deaths in or following police custody”. 5. Authorised Professional Practice (APP) is the body of consolidated guidance for policing which will be available to forces from Summer 2012. APP will reduce significantly the amount of national guidance in circulation, encourage the use of professional discretion and bring consistency to all authorised police practice. The first release of APP will take place in July 2012 and will include all of the “Core Practice” or cross-cutting areas and ten Specific Practice areas, where additional standards and/or practice are needed for reasons of high risk, interoperability and partnership working and particularly those areas included in the Strategic Policing Requirement (SPR). 6. ACPO is responsible for overseeing the APP Programme in partnership with the NPIA. The Programme is governed by a Professional Practice Steering Group (chaired by the Chief Constable of Thames Valley Police and ACPO Vice President, Sara Thornton). The IPCC is represented on this Group by their Deputy Chair. 7. The future creation/revision of APP will be dependent on an evidence-based approach to “what works” and what practitioners need and that will require the continuing input of the IPCC as APP transfers to the new police professional body. 8. At the same time, the Agency looks to the IPCC to make the best use of the policing evidence base, practice and research in reaching its findings and developing recommendations, without prejudicing its independence. Again, this aim will transfer to the new body. 9. The IPCC could make a major contribution to policing practice by coding common contributory factors to adverse police events, to highlight national priorities for improvement. There is ongoing work in the police service in this area, specifically focused on Violence and Public Protection, of which IPCC is aware. The approach is in line with that proposed by Professor Eileen Munro, a year on from her landmark review of Child Protection: http://www.education.gov.uk/childrenandyoungpeople/healthandwellbeing/safeguardingchildren/ a00209245/munro-progress 10. Taking a “human factors” approach suggests that the focus of investigation should be on where in a system the causal factors seem to lie, rather than on the actions of specific individuals. In general terms, problem-solving approaches have been found to be successful in addressing crime reduction and also in organisational change. Similar approaches are equally appropriate to performance or structural issues in terms of identifying factors which lead to adverse police events. 11. It is important that, in the new policing landscape, following the close-down of the NPIA, the work of the Learning the Lessons Committee continues and a constructive relationship is built between the IPCC and the new policing professional body that will be responsible for setting standards across policing as well as developing the evidence-base and professional practice. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [01-02-2013 12:49] Job: 025757 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/025757/025757_w032_michelle_IPCC 40 - Jeremy Heywood.xml

Ev w54 Home Affairs Committee: Evidence

12. There is nothing in the evidence that is confidential and I am content for it to be published on the HAC website. Nick Gargan Chief Constable Chief Executive, The National Policing Improvement Agency July 2012

Written evidence submitted by Liam Silcocks [IPCC 29]

I understand that you are currently looking at Police investigations & the function/effectiveness of the IPCC.

I am a PCC candidate for the Wiltshire Police Force area. Prior to becoming a candidate I did some considerable research around the force and its senior management.

Historically, I campaigned for a truly independent Police complaints framework and the abolition of the former PCA (Police Complaints Authority). My campaign stopped in 2004 when the IPCC was born.

I was alarmed to discover that the Chief Constable of the Wiltshire Police Force was linked to a murder case that multiple institutions, including the courts & media, labelled rotten and corrupt. This is an old case from 1989 that has fallen through every net possible and remains unsolved with many Police officers and witnesses never being pursued for perverting the course of justice or perjury. The court of appeal overturned an original murder conviction of two men because it was simply unsafe—no real or thorough investigation has ever been undertaken. Allegations remain uninvestigated as to the Police investigation and indeed if the death or murder was as result of Police brutality.

Hensley Wiltshire, the murdered black male’s, case is more fundamentally disturbing than the Stephen Lawrence case.

I have discussed this case with the IPCC, HMIC, CPS and indeed have contacted my MP and the Home Secretary. It would appear that nobody has the stomach to open this can of worms, with the Home Office simply advising me of the upcoming PCC elections and the fact that the IPCC existed. Somewhat ludicrous given my PCC candidature and my former work around Police Complaints. I await a response from my own MP, Dr Andrew Murrison.

I do not believe that Parliament ever intended to create an independent framework for complaints (i.e. IPCC) where that commission simply refuses to progress your inquiry or concerns beyond its first line of call handlers. It simply is not working.

As a PCC candidate I have met numerous people who have had issues and concerns but whom have chosen not to make a complaints after getting advice from the IPCC. The overwhelming feedback I have received is that the IPCC front line call handlers are poorly trained and have poor knowledge around the complaints framework. I am also hearing the same complaints I did 20 years ago—the Police initiating investigations against themselves—it’s still being abused.

As a PCC candidate, I have committed to set up a review of former complaints against Wiltshire Police to establish if they have been handled correctly or abused. I have no doubt this will highlight failings by both the former PCA and the current IPCC.

I have also published an intention to remove the function of recording and handling complaints out of the Police force and into the voluntary sector, e.g. Citizens Advice Bureau.

I will also have to consider if the people of Wiltshire require a more thorough appeals process and, under public consultation, will consider the need to circumvent the IPCC with a local fully independent body to truly handle complaints—where the IPCC appears to fall short.

I cannot expect the HASC to take on individual cases—however given the frustrations of the people I have met, and my own frustration around this disturbing case, I believe this must be a national issue.

It is quite feasible that if elected and if the above is implemented, that other PCC’s will consider a similar route as each Police Force area will have a point of contact and will no doubt be inundated with similar issues. Liam Silcocks November 2012 cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [01-02-2013 12:49] Job: 025757 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/025757/025757_w032_michelle_IPCC 40 - Jeremy Heywood.xml

Home Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev w55

Written evidence submitted by Keith Cornwall [IPCC 30] Injustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere. We are caught in an in an inescapable network of mutuality tied in a single garment of destiny. Whatever affects one directly affects all indirectly: Luther King 1963. I recently wrote to you via email with an attachment of my latest letter to the police Borough Commander, David Chinchen. I am not sure if it reached you. I will write to you again detailing how a subservient culture to the police exists within the IPCC, and that culture is in some part engaged in serious illegal activities. Before my case was heard at the IPCC I was already making complaints about certain officials there, so it is not out of bitterness that I seek to highlight the wrongs—and I have absolute evidence that a crime of perverting the course of justice took place. This is merely the prelude to the prelude and you haven’t seen the prelude yet. There was enough evidence of a police smear campaign against me and the doctoring of evidence in a file sent to the IPCC from Wandsworth police. Senior officials of the IPCC decided to suppress important documental evidence instead of doing their legal and civic duty of forwarding the evidence of serious corrupt practices to the Met Commissioner or an outside force for further examination. Their actions or non actions afforded police officers more time and opportunities to continue inserting material into records held on file about me they knew to be incorrect—and we’ve barely scratched the surface. I have key witnesses that can substantiate my evidence; the Local Government Ombudsman, the Borough Commander, the Information Commissioner and others. Long before I received further written evidence from the IPCC under a data request, which I made because of my concerns for the integrity of police files, I wrote to the aforementioned to highlight my concerns. I spoke with them at length about a ferocious smear campaign against me that certain police officers were engaged in; trying to portray me as a Walter Mitty character. The IPCC knew of my concerns and ignored them. Even with the evidence before them, the senior Caseworker and the Director of Casework main obligation was to protect these police officers. They chose to yield to the racial stereotypes—and I believe aided and abetted serious crimes. It is a crime to pervert the course of justice. It is a crime to suppress evidence. The IPCC had evidence in its domain of serious police evidence tampering and covered up that evidence. A senior casework manager had ample opportunity to forward my case to the Commissioners for consideration for a proper investigation. Instead he and the Director of Casework attempted and temporarily closed down my case to help the police. I can put these allegations in writing because I have the evidence and witnesses to prove my case and to bring officers and those willing to protect them to justice. Now that I have put my allegations in writing, if the people named believe there is no evidence against them, I would’ve committed what I am accusing the police of doing, and I would be a prime target for libel action. I listened to Dame Anne give evidence at a previous session. Her key reason for taking up the post is laudable, but I still cannot work out why a woman of her quality would want to be any where in close proximity to an organization with such a bad reputation. At some stage there should be an end to the appeals process, but there should also be a mechanism within the structure to challenge appeal decisions at least once. We have a perfect example of a properly structured independent organization—the IRS—soon to be wound up in the government’s drive to cut public spending. Pauline Adey is the manager of that organization, built in the same fashion as Dame Anne—and it is to this structure that we should look to for a perfect example of how a future independent police complaints body should be. There is no future for the IPCC in its currents form. The public do not trust it—and Jane Furniss is certainly not the person to instill any level of confidence. In my opinion she is the George Entwhistle of an extremely flawed concept. The IPCC is more supporting of the police than the PCA it replaced—and it is the public belief that it is the police investigating the police again. Pauline Adey is a person with the right qualities and temperament to have a major role in the formulation of the new body. She is dedicated, trustworthy and reliable. I am convinced that she would bring a level of public confidence in a new complaints system working with Dame Anne. She keeps a keen ear to the ground and is concerned about the reputation of the body she is responsible for. Equality and public confidence are her priorities—and what sets her apart from any manager at that level is her willingness to take the occasional telephone call from members of the public to hear firsthand their concerns. She will listen to constructive criticism with the aim to improve her services. I personally would want such a person in the new body. I have spoken with her on two or three occasions. You simply cannot ignore what she represents. I will be writing to the relevant ministers to consider her in any future reforms of the police complaints system. Given the fact that People-of-colour are disproportionately represented in the criminal justice system, there is simply no recognition within the structures of the IPCC of that fact—and that a significant number of cases/ appeals brought to it are innocent black victims of the unspeakable horrors of a new police brutality. Law-abiding people-of-colour, businessmen and woman, community workers with no criminal past, are finding themselves victims of police harassment and illegal activities in their late thirties and forties—and I have become a victim twice in the past eight years to such police conduct. The IPCC holds no fear for the police. There is a network of police officers in the Met that is completely out of control and the IPCC is subservient to the type of conduct that the Hillsborough report highlighted—and we’ve barely scratched the cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [01-02-2013 12:49] Job: 025757 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/025757/025757_w032_michelle_IPCC 40 - Jeremy Heywood.xml

Ev w56 Home Affairs Committee: Evidence

surface. The structure of the IPCC is made up of people who have spent their adult working life wedded to such institutions. Many of them would starve themselves to protect what they hold dear. Jane Furniss is so distant from the realities of complainant appeals that she is failing the public in producing an independent body that we can have any level of confidence in. In comparison there is Dame Anne, recently appointed Chair—a person of great quality, and with the ability that one can have faith in to change the workings of the IPCC. Within weeks of her being in her new role she was prepared to give evidence at the Committee. Tough and courageous decisions need to be made now about the creation of a new and properly structured body that is truly independent of the police. Such a structure must be absolutely free of former police officers and people who have close association with the police—people who once worked in Customs and Excise. This ridiculous notion that there should be police officers in an independent complaints body for it to function with some knowledge of police procedure is the problem that is driving the problem. With the right training and dedication we can have an authority that can function without any police influence. It is time to have a grown- up complaints system that the public can have confidence in. I have four brothers. Having them serve on a panel I am making representations to would serve to effect conflict of interest claims, and they would temporarily be removed from those proceedings. There is simply no curiosity in Jane Furniss to want to find out or address what is happening with the regular theme of appeals—and this is tantamount to a gross dereliction of duty. There have been a number of complaints about increasing police racism, the racism reemerging from the eighties—and if she isn’t forced to respond, little is said. The police, the DPS and the IPCC are deeply involved in this type of conduct, perpetuating eighties stereotypes of people-of-colour; encouraged and influenced by smear campaigns by illegal police officers. Even when presented with irrefutable evidence of corrupt practices within the police and protection given by senior police officers of the DPS, the IPCC still refuses to take racism and racial profiling seriously—simply choosing to believe what is written in police reports against the evidence which proves document tampering. The IPCC is a failure because it was a deeply flawed concept from the naissance—and it attracts a certain mentality that is institutionalized and subservient to the police. With that comes a personal fear within the IPCC. As an individual caseworker it would not be wise to rule against the police because they may one day need the help of the police in a personal situation; and it is well known within the Met that these people would be blacklisted should officers be deeply criticized in their reports. As much as I like and respect Dame Anne, I believe the IPCC must now be wound up and a new structure of real independence be put in place to start the rebuilding of public confidence. Dame Anne and Pauline Adey must be paid small fortunes to head the new body. This is merely a sample of what the new structure must consist of. A more extensive version will follow: — A certain number of lay people with wide and long experience of the police and relating organizations should sit in on cases with the purpose of identifying trends in complaints and to offer practical guidance where necessary. — A mechanism should exist within its structure to challenge appeal decisions at least once, and this would avoid shoddy and laughable assessments that leads to miscarriages of justice—and which would indeed stop lazy caseworkers using judicial review as an escape route or a get out clause of their inadequate decisions. The familiar refrain, ‘if you don’t like the decision go to judicial review’, must be curtailed. — The assessment process of police investigations should consist of the opening up to the appellant of all police files forwarded, accept in cases of national security and where revealing such information would be of detriment to third parties. It is for a judge within the body and strictly for the body that an appellant can appeal to release information. The judges’ decision is final. — Currently the appellant must appeal within 28 days of a recorded decision. This should be extended to two months of that decision to give the appellant ample time to prepare a case. Given the fact that the police do not adhere to deadlines where data requests are concerned, there should be extended deadlines for an appellant to forward evidence.—and it should be extended twice by periods of two months if the police continually refuses to cooperate with such requests. After six months of non- compliance with data request, the Chief Inspector and then ultimately the Borough Commander of the region should be held to account/liable to face legal action if the information required by the appellant is not forthcoming within another period set by the body. Getting crime reports and custody records is crucial in most cases to prove that the police have followed the process of arrest and detention to the letter. We have seen too many cases where the appellant faces time restrictions within the IPCC without the means to challenge the police tactic of stalling and the doctoring of evidence. The case is then heard by the IPCC without the appellant knowing what is written in police reports, which is a disadvantage and against the concept of openness. It is then too late for the appellant to challenge the authenticity of the records and is left with the stark option of judicial review, which is way beyond most of us—financially and physically. So that escape cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [01-02-2013 12:49] Job: 025757 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/025757/025757_w032_michelle_IPCC 40 - Jeremy Heywood.xml

Home Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev w57

route so readily deployed after insufficient assessments must be closed as a matter of urgency. This must be the key element in the structure of the new body. — There should be no serving or former police officers in the new IPCC. There should be no one connected with Custom & Excise serving on this body. There should be a dedicated team of trained professionals for each region of the country; twelve good men and women trained in every aspect of policing and judicial matters. This team is directly answerable to the Chair, and ultimately to the Home Secretary. That training should start immediately so by 2015 the new structure can be up and running. — Twice a year the Chief Executive, the Chair, the Casework Directors of all the regions should attend evidence sessions in parliament to give progress reports on performance and to answer questions on general themes of complaints. — The illegal actions of some police officers are ruining the lives of law-abiding citizens; people-of- colour in particular. Their illegal actions are ruining businesses and potential careers of people who find themselves victims of this conduct. The IPCC in its current state is more concerned about allegations hanging over the police officer than the immeasurable distress police actions are having on the health and financial wellbeing of the appellant. If there are racial elements to any complaint, and it is proven that police actions against the appellant are racially motivated in any arrest and detention, the new body must have the authority to levy fines of up 10,000 and a minimum award to the appellant of 2,000 and a maximum of 10,000 according to the severity of discrimination. This will address the entry levels of racism within the Met and give the Borough and Area Commanders a sharper focus on tackling the increasing problem. There must also be stringent sanctions against any appellant who chooses to make false allegations of racial misconduct against serving police officers. If there are more than ten proven cases of serious racism within a year, a 100,000 fine should be leveled against the borough. The only sanction that will reduce the scourge of racist attitudes and conduct is the fear of financial penalties. That is the reality we should own. — The new body will have the power to compel police officers to give evidence in person within a set period. This will be a legal requirement except in cases of national security. Where the lives of third parties may be put at risk, this exemption will only apply if there are future court cases to be heard. — Every government body, legal structures, public authorities, police and independent structures are bound by the Human Rights Convention, Disability Discrimination legislation, civil rights protection, and most importantly, English Common Law. The IPCC in its current form think it is exempt from these duties when it is making potentially life-changing decisions. Every investigation and assessment carried out must come with full explanation as to whether appellant rights were breached under any or all of the aforementioned acts. This will give some guidance to the appellant when considering future actions. — If the police admit to certain procedural failures, and in cases where the detained persons’ rights to have someone informed of his/hers detention is not adhered to, it must state in the caseworker’s finding what rights under the aforementioned acts were breached and what remedies can be sought. This must be a legal requirement. In my next letter to you I will produce tape recordings and evidence of serious police and council corruption and cover-ups by the IPCC and the DPS. This will be a signed affidavit. Keith Cornwall November 2012

Written evidence submitted by Satish Sekar [IPCC 31] My name is Satish Sekar. I wish to bring to your attention serious flaws relating to the IPCC. I made a serious complaint against a police force which is unlawfully retaining my property (I am a journalist, whose work—papers, letters, photos and taped interviews gathered over 20 years of research) and using it for its own purposes against my wishes—consent for the original purpose, which ended last December, ended then was emphatically refused for the new purpose. The case that I am referring to is the Lynette White Inquiry Police Corruption trial, as it has come to be known. I voluntarily cooperated with the Phase III investigation, which ended ignominiously on December 8th 2011. As per the agreement for me to allow them to use my property, they were obliged to return it at the end of the trial. I demanded its return at a meeting with ACC Matt Jukes and DCS Tim Jones. They have never disputed that it is my property, nor that I am entitled to it. They simply ignore my wishes to abuse it for their own purposes—purposes that I expressly refused to authorise it for. Despite this refusal of consent, which has been repeated both by myself and my solicitor, Darren White, the police refuse to return my property. This has gone on for almost eleven months since the end of the trial ended the original purpose that had my consent. Since the end of that trial the police have unlawfully kept my cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [01-02-2013 12:49] Job: 025757 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/025757/025757_w032_michelle_IPCC 40 - Jeremy Heywood.xml

Ev w58 Home Affairs Committee: Evidence

property, preventing me from using my own material. They have lost that willingness to assist now as a result of their conduct. The Professional Standards Department of that force wrongly classed the complaint against this conduct a control and direction issue after two months, forcing that decision to be appealed to the IPCC and thereby continuing the unlawful retention on my property, which they still unlawfully hold on to. I have been forced to sue them to get my property back. This is a waste of public resources and it will have serious consequences. If journalists who help the police are treated like this, cooperation will end and the police will only have themselves to blame. Last week the IPCC upheld my complaint obliging the PSD to record my complaint, but the PSD still refuse to talk to me. The behaviour of that department has been nothing short of a complete disgrace. Despite this the IPCC say procedures dictate that I must trust this investigation to a force that has acted dishonestly throughout and still unlawfully retains my property, knowing it has caused me serious damage and is against the law. I do not trust that force at all any longer and see no reason why they, especially that department, should be allowed to investigate a matter that they caused. In these circumstances the IPCC should take this matter away from that force and that department which I see no reason to cooperate with after their behaviour. If it does not have the powers to do this, then this is a serious flaw in its provisions. It says that I have to let the PSD investigate this matter. This is absurd. There is now an irrevocable breakdown of trust between me and the PSD which has condoned a criminal act by colleagues—the effective theft of my property. Even after the decision ordering them to record it as a complaint they won’t talk to me and I have had enough of this terminally flawed process. It cannot have been the intent of Parliament for the complaints process to be abused like this. If it is to be competent, it must have transparency and public support. This has neither. A police force should not be allowed to flout the law and manipulate the complaints procedures to get away with criminal conduct, but that is exactly what is happening and the IPCC say I have no choice but to allow them to continue to get away with this. Furthermore, it should be pointed out that the IPCC has its own investigation relating to that trial. I have made it clear that I do not support or cooperate with it because I believe that process to be unfit for the needs of that case. I specifically emphasised that I do not consent for my material to be used by the IPCC investigation or the CPS or South Wales Police, yet I am being forced to cooperate by the effective theft of my property. How in these circumstances can my concerns be investigated in a plainly transparent process? Who is the IPCC accountable to in these circumstances?

Submission on the IPCC Executive Summary — The IPCC is not a complaints system, let alone an independent one. — It is totally inappropriate that complainants are forced to make their complaints to the very organisation they are forced to complain about, because self-regulation does not work in any form. — The police cannot be involved in any form in an independent police complaints mechanism. — The IPCC is over-reliant on former police officers as its independent investigators. — The IPCC fails to exercise the degree of control that the public expected and this includes its failure to investigate complaints on issues of public importance, or supervise them. — An independent police complaints system should not allow the police to frustrate complaints by refusing to categorise them properly. — The IPCC allows the police to delay resolution of complaints by cynical manipulation of the system forcing complainants to appeal at every stage. — An independent system cannot and must not tolerate such abuse. — The IPCC has no independent mechanism to deal with conflicts of interest that render it inappropriate to consider complaints. — The IPCC appears to be accountable to nobody. It must be held accountable to an Ombudsman and to Parliament. — The IPCC claims that the Police Reform Act 2002 obliges complainants to go to the force they are complaining about, yet its discredited predecessor had the power to supervise investigations in death in custody cases, which were automatically referred to it. — The IPCC’s failures suggest that it is a deeply flawed organisation, lacking the tools to be an effective safeguard for the public from police excesses. — The IPCC should be abolished and replaced with a genuinely independent body that is also accountable to an Ombudsman and to Parliament through clearly defined structures. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [01-02-2013 12:49] Job: 025757 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/025757/025757_w032_michelle_IPCC 40 - Jeremy Heywood.xml

Home Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev w59

Background I am a freelance journalist, author and consultant on criminal justice issues. I am also the CEO of The Fitted- In Project (FIP), which is a not for profit organisation that specialises in legal issues, especially regarding miscarriages of justice. I researched a case that became one of Britain’s most notorious miscarriages of justice— a task that took over twenty years and still has not ended. The Lynette White Inquiry remains a unique miscarriage of justice. I have written two books on the case—Fitted In: The Cardiff 3 and the Lynette White Inquiry and The Cardiff Five: Innocent Beyond Any Doubt. I am the undisputed expert on this case and its ramifications and this has resulted in my having worked with police officers and the IPCC among others on it. My work on this case helped to persuade the authorities to reopen it twice and eventually to make history, becoming the first vindication case in the DNA age in Britain. Vindication is a concept coined by me to describe miscarriage of justice cases where there is no doubt about innocence because the real perpetrator has been brought to justice or if deceased whose guilt has been acknowledged by the authorities. FIP recognises that vindication applies to several other offences, but we have chosen to limit our work in Britain to homicides. In 1999 the Lynette White Inquiry was reopened for the second time. I cooperated voluntarily in both reopened investigations—the first occurred in 1995. The first investigation 1995–98 failed to identify the real killer and it soon became clear that the police’s attitude was that I should cooperate with them while they froze me out and made idiotic decisions that I was supposed to respect even though I was subsequently proved right and had expert opinion backing me up. That investigation was headed by the then head of South Wales Police’s CID. He would later be disgraced and jailed for corruption in 2010. Despite this experience I was prepared to give other officers and the new processes a fair chance. Nevertheless, the cooperation would once again prove to be a one way process. I gave them assistance for twelve years, sacrificing my own interests in the process. However, this was not enough for their colleagues. In July 2003 Phase II—the search for Lynette’s killer ended and Phase III began. The latter investigation searched for criminal conduct during the original Lynette White Inquiry. I was interviewed as a witness during it and agreed to some of my property—work—being exhibited. It was made very clear that it was my property, that I had to receive working copies and that the originals and copies had to be returned to me when the Phase III trials ended. I had made it very clear that my cooperation only lasted until the end of the Phase III Lynette White Inquiry trial of the police officers and witnesses. That was the agreed basis of my cooperation, which South Wales Police do not dispute. However, after the trial ended in farcical circumstances, they simply moved the goal-posts to force me to cooperate with processes they know I do not support. I am the only journalist whose work on this case has been so abused. The Phase III process ended on 8 December 2011 with the ordered acquittals of the remaining four former police officers facing trial—eight former police officers and two witnesses had been acquitted a week earlier. I then demanded the return of my property, as I was entitled to do at a meeting with an Assistant Chief Constable and the Head of the Professional Standards Department (PSD) of South Wales Police. Please note that I do not and did not request the return of my property, I made it clear that I demand it back in accordance with the agreed terms of it being provided to them in the first place. That department is responsible for rooting out corruption in the force, but it has chosen to use dubious practices to keep my material and use it for processes other than the one investigation that I agreed to cooperate with. They have not even provided any assurances of whether or even if they would ever return it. This is theft under any other name. I do not accept that they ever had an honest intention to keep their word and that my property has therefore been obtained by deception whether that was the original intention or not. It cannot have been the intention of Parliament when drafting the theft laws and in any subsequent amendment that denying an intention to permanently deprive the victim of their property becomes a complete defence to theft. When does depriving someone of their property for an unspecified amount of time breaching the terms of it being provided in the process after they have demanded it back become a deliberate intention to obtain property under false pretences and retain it illegally—effectively theft. They are keeping my property and work against my wishes and depriving me of the right to choose how my work is used and by whom. They have even prevented me from using my own work while they illegally do as they please with it. They now claim that lawyers for the Chief Constable of South Wales say the law entitles them to do what they have done. Really? If this is correct they should have no problem detailing the law and provisions that allow them to do this. Despite requests from my solicitor and me to do this they have not done so. We are entitled to know why not. I maintain that they have no legal right to do what they have done and that if there been the slightest suggestion that they could or would try to do this, they would never have secured my cooperation in the first place. They must have known that I would never have given my consent to allow such use of my work, so it was never sought. As such if they now try to seize such rights this has to be seen as obtaining my property and work under false pretences at the very least. They have refused to identify the law that allegedly entitles them to do this despite having been asked to do so by both me and my solicitor. If such a law exists which I doubt then Parliament is gravely at fault. It would mean that professionals such as journalists, investigators and others who agree to assist one police investigation find themselves assisting an unspecified number of processes for that force, other forces and even other cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [01-02-2013 12:49] Job: 025757 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/025757/025757_w032_michelle_IPCC 40 - Jeremy Heywood.xml

Ev w60 Home Affairs Committee: Evidence

organisations without their agreement being needed for an unspecified duration that can even be for ever. Imagine the outcry if this had occurred in a jurisdiction that we do not approve of. Parliament cannot have intended to give such sweeping powers to police forces that would have been condemned as a police state in other jurisdictions. Such conduct, if allowed, means there is no limit on the seizure of cooperation for any process and that the agreement to return my property at the end of the trial was utterly worthless. To further their aims of breaking the terms of my cooperation they have subsequently used and abused the police complaints mechanisms. It was never explained to me in advance that if they felt like it they could steal my cooperation for processes that I do not support or respect. Had they explained that the agreement was in their eyes worthless and that they would seize my cooperation against my will once they had my property and work, preventing me from using it and reneging on other promises of cooperation too, they know full well that I would have chosen not to cooperate. Either the terms of it being provided are binding on them or it has been obtained under false pretences and is now being used unlawfully. They also know that I am offended by the behaviour of both the IPCC (Independent Police Complaints Commission) and CPS (Crown Prosecution Service) throughout the course of Phase III and beyond, so rather than risk my refusal to cooperate with their decision to cooperate with those organisations; they have stolen my cooperation for their processes and others. Their conduct is utterly despicable and undermines the core of democratic principles and policing by consent. I did not consent, so they take my cooperation against my wishes and effectively steal my property. This steals my copyright, my intellectual property and work. If anyone else had done this, it would be called theft. They made no attempt to convince me to cooperate. They were told they had to regain my trust. Instead of attempting to do that, they kept asking me to agree to let them keep it. When I said no they said they were keeping it anyway. This is outrageous. I had broken no laws. Their colleagues had agreed to the basis of my cooperation before getting access to my work and they simply ignore it. That is at the very least obtaining property under false pretences. They do not disagree that it is my property, but they claim I requested it back. I did not request it, I demanded it. It is mine not theirs. I have the right to decide what happens to it, not them. I do not have to request it back from them. They are obliged to return it and promptly after being told it has to be returned. If not the agreement for me to cooperate by allowing them to use it was a complete sham. What they are doing is stealing my property and work. I did not give it to them to use as they saw fit for as long as they wanted. The terms of use were clear and defined. They have breached them and various laws too. They have recently said they are using it for different processes—none of which were agreed to by me. What were they afraid of? Could it be that they thought they would not be able to convince me to cooperate with these processes, so they decided to take my cooperation effectively by stealing it? I have been reasonable and fair to that force—far more so than they had any right to expect from me. Instead of respecting that, they fear I will not cooperate any more so rather than risk my making that decision, which is almost certainly what will happen now, but because of their behaviour, they chose to unlawfully force my cooperation by breaking the terms of the agreement—effectively robbing me of my property and free choice indefinitely. If the law and police complaints mechanism tolerate this, then we are living in a police state. There can be no doubt that South Wales Police have broken the terms of the agreement that resulted in my cooperation for one process alone—the police corruption trial. They have stolen my work and property and cooperation, abusing my copyright and done so by obtaining it under false pretences. They have robbed me of my right to choose whether or not to cooperate with their further processes. This has been done by the very people who should be stamping out such conduct in that force and goes right to the very top of that department. In order to prevent or at least unreasonably delay the return of my property, they forced me to complain about their refusal to return my property, having made it clear that neither they nor the IPCC should be involved as both are beneficiaries of their effective theft of my property. They spent two months deciding to refuse to categorise it as a complaint against their conduct. It plainly was that and more and they then tried to force me to cooperate with their decision. I refused, so they refused to talk to me, insisting that I had to appeal against their decision to the IPCC if I disagreed. Again they are trying to force me to legitimise their scandalous conduct by forcing me to cooperate. This outrageous delaying tactic served their intention of stealing access to my property for their purposes. Without consulting me and knowing that both the IPCC and CPS had been informed by both me and my solicitor that this was my property and I had not consented to it being sent to them, South Wales Police’s Professional Standards Department outrageously sent my material or copies to these organisations. Either I have the right to choose whether or not I want to cooperate or not, or my cooperation can be compelled without having committed or being suspected of any offence. It cannot have been the intent of Parliament that police forces can behave in such a fashion. In October 2012, five months after the complaint was lodged, the IPCC upheld my appeal that my complaint had to be recorded. Despite this, the Professional Standards Department still refused to talk to me. The force refuses to discuss the return of my property and its switchboard forces me to talk to the PSD, which insists that I talk to the IPCC. They had plainly decided to steal my cooperation, breach the previous agreement and use and abuse the IPCC to achieve their ends. They have consistently delayed consideration of the substantive issue, only responding to the IPCC’s decision near the end of the three weeks. The response makes it clear that they have no intention of investigating this complaint and never had. They have decided to steal my copyright and work. If this had been done by a civilian—a journalist for example—they would be arrested and rightly cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [01-02-2013 12:49] Job: 025757 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/025757/025757_w032_michelle_IPCC 40 - Jeremy Heywood.xml

Home Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev w61

so. It is clear that serious and important issues are at stake—ones that the IPCC should have to deal with and promptly if is to be considered part of the solution. For reasons that will be made clear below I have come to the conclusion that the IPCC itself is irredeemably flawed and must be replaced.

Inadequate Powers Eight years ago the IPCC was established. The public was assured that it was independent and that it had greater powers than its predecessor the Police Complaints Authority (PCA). Just before it became operational in 2004 I was among those assured by its then Deputy Chairman John Wadham that it would prove itself to be different from its discredited predecessors and that people like myself would not let it be a PCA Mark Two. The IPCC was given significant new powers, which included the power to utilise investigators of complaints who were not police officers, but pertinent questions remain on what the IPCC is, how independent a complaints system it is and whether it is an effective system to deal with complaints against the police? In fact there are doubts as to whether it is a complaints system at all. Recently the current Chair of the IPCC gave evidence to this Committee. The IPCC’s representatives pointed out that it was in reality an appeals system rather than one that deals with complaints, suggesting that a change of name would be welcome. Perhaps, but such tinkering at the edges will not suffice. Far too many former police officers are employed by it as independent investigators. It says it wants investigators from a non-police background. I would like to think that my experience and competence as an investigator of such issues would mean I would be the type of person that it would be seeking to recruit. However, for reasons that I will make clear below it is something I would not consider. Complainants are forced to bring their concerns to the very force that they are complaining about. Their concerns about the obvious partiality and potential for bias in this process are brushed aside. I was told that the IPCC had no power to agree to my request that they personally take over the complaint even though it must have been glaringly obvious that there was the perception and very real possibility of a biased approach at the start of the process. Before long that perception had turned to proof by their refusal to investigate the complaint fairly. The perception of bias had turned into reality. The IPCC insists that complaints must in the first instance be directed to the Professional Standards Department of the force complained about. So what is their response when informed that the officers you want to complain about work for that very department? In my case I was informed that I still had no choice, but to complain to the PSD. Even telling them that the person in charge of that department was one of the people involved in the conduct complained of and that I intended further complaints made little difference. I was told to take the matter up with a superior officer, but this involves an Assistant Chief Constable and an officer of that rank was involved as well. This alone should oblige an effective complaints system to take the whole complaint away from the force complained about. If the IPCC is to have any credibility, it must investigate such complaints itself. It cannot claim to be independent of the police if it does not do that. In addition to this the IPCC is in this case a beneficiary of the conduct complained of. They were informed that I did not want to cooperate with their Commissioner Sarah Green’s investigation unless they acknowledged my status and interest in the case. Instead they wanted me alone to submit to an insulting and demeaning process where I have to set out a case to be treated as an interested party. Not even the police tried that. I find it grossly insulting and refused to do so. I also made it clear that I refused them cooperation and that they were not to receive my property (work) for their investigation. They have never acknowledged that communication or one from my solicitor on that issue. They have compounded this by allowing themselves to be used and abused the PSD of South Wales Police to continue their outrageous abuse of my previous cooperation for another and clearly defined purpose. Usually complaints are investigated by the police force complained of, although there are limited circumstances where the IPCC will themselves conduct an initial investigation or supervise the police investigation. So what are these exceptions and why were they not applied in the circumstances of my complaint where very serious issues had been raised? In any country that claims to be governed by the rule of law and to value the civil and political and human rights of its citizens the right to decide how to use one’s work and property must belong to the owner of that work. In my case I agreed to the loan of my work for a specific purpose and only for that purpose and it was for a limited period. The duration was the length of the police corruption trial as it came to be called. I had not consented to its use for any other purpose or for longer than that trial lasted. Those were the terms of the property and work being made available to the police officers. Neither the original officers which took those items, nor the PSD have never disputed that those were the terms and that they were agreed to before the police were allowed to take possession of that property. Consequently, reneging on that agreement means the property was obtained under false pretences. Unfortunately, they have serially breached those terms and refuse to return it. It cannot under any circumstances be acceptable that the so-called police complaints process allows them to allegedly investigate themselves and abuse the process by delaying the only acceptable resolution of this matter—the immediate and unconditional return of my property and fully independent investigation of their outrageous conduct. The fact that the IPCC has allowed this to happen without seeking to take over the complaint and that it is a beneficiary of this conduct suggest that it is not suitable for purpose. The public want and expect an independent police complaints system. We still do not have that. I am not convinced that the IPCC can ever be that body. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [01-02-2013 12:49] Job: 025757 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/025757/025757_w032_michelle_IPCC 40 - Jeremy Heywood.xml

Ev w62 Home Affairs Committee: Evidence

An Egregious Abuse of Procedures—My Case My property, which consisted of work that I had conducted over 20 years, was the result of cooperation and trust that I had built up over that period. There were papers, transcripts of interviews, the tapes of the interviews, photographs and letters. I was deprived of them by the police, despite assurances that I would be given working copies during the Phase III investigation. That did not happen. This ensured that I could not use my own material for my latest book, The Cardiff Five: Innocent Beyond Any Doubt. Their subsequent refusal to return my property robbed me of the opportunity to use my own putative evidence for that trial in my book as well and quite possibly any subsequent articles or books as they have provided that material without even informing me in advance to another police force for an unrelated murder inquiry and for other processes, including for civil actions brought by others presumably against them. I never consented to assist them in that manner and they have not even had the courtesy to ask for my cooperation in those matters—they have simply taken it. Their cavalier disregard for my rights and the law are truly disturbing. Despite being told to return the property or say what law entitled them to keep it against the conditions of use and my wishes, they have refused to comply or even answer my solicitor’s letter demanding an explanation of what law entitled them to steal my cooperation by refusing to return my property. In the course of the Phase III investigation I became a witness. Statements were taken from me by officers and interviews with me were tape-recorded. That is their property, even though I would like copies of them, but the property that was given to them by me was loaned to them only until the end of the trial. The conditions of use agreed before they were allowed access to my property let alone use of it was that it was mine and had to be returned at the end of the trial. It was for that purpose alone. They did not suggest that they would seize the right to make up rules afterwards. They did not say that they would be allowed to retain it against my wishes for processes that had not even been agreed then and that they would decide when or even if the property would be returned. They did not say that they would use it for civil actions. Had they even suggested such a thing South Wales Police would never have been allowed anywhere near my property and work. They were obviously aware of that, so they never mentioned such a possibility. They have therefore obtained my work and continue to deprive me of it under false pretences. Offering me copies now does not in any way redress the unlawful use and retention of my work. The IPCC has had almost a decade to prove itself. Unfortunately, the evidence—admittedly from personal experience—establishes that it is unfit for purpose. In the first place it admits that it is not even a complaints body. It does not investigate complaints against the police. My case is actually a matter of public importance. The very department that is there to root out corruption and deal with complaints is the department that is behaving outrageously. I was forced to make a complaint as it became clear that the force had no intention of dealing with me honestly. They suggested a so-called compromise. They wanted me to let them keep my property and use it as they wished, while giving me copies. I refused. It is my property, my work and my right to choose whether to cooperate with additional processes or not. When they failed to get my agreement, they simply ignored that and me. After five months they made it clear that they would take my cooperation against my will as I would not agree to their outrageous demands voluntarily. I made a complaint, making it clear that I did not trust South Wales Police to investigate it. The PSD took two months to refuse to record it as a complaint against them. They continued to steal my cooperation and I now know they sent my work to others without my consent. In the first instance complaints are left to the police to categorise. They can choose whether to do that or not. This is completely outrageous. By miscategorising the nature of a complaint, they can frustrate and obstruct and delay the consideration of the merit of the complaint. In my case they achieved a result desired by the force being complained about—namely to deliberately delay the consideration of the substantive of the complaint, which would enable them to keep my property and use it for their purposes without my knowledge or consent. South Wales Police’s attempt to put right what they got wrong in the Lynette White case ended in failure. They immediately announced that they would cooperate with investigations to be conducted by the IPCC and the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP). I chose not to because the terms of reference of those inquiries were far too limited and because of experiences I had had with both those organisations. The CPS (Keir Starmer, the Director of Public Prosecutions is the head of the CPS) and IPCC were informed by both me and my solicitor that I was not cooperating with their investigations and did not consent to them being supplied with my property for those investigations by the police and that legal proceedings would be considered if they accepted my work from them. Despite that I have subsequently found out that the PSD ignored my wishes and provided them with my property and that neither organisation informed me or my solicitor that they had received them. The IPCC are therefore beneficiaries of the conduct complained about in this case. It quickly became obvious that the PSD had no intention of returning my property to me and had decided that it would seize my cooperation and use and abuse the complaints procedures to facilitate their intention to use my work for other purposes that I had not agreed to. Their refusal to categorise my complaint as a complaint against their conduct was designed to waste time and it achieved that end. The force’s switchboard was told not to allow me to talk to anyone but the PSD and the PSD staff refused to talk to me, insisting I talk to the IPCC. Even when the IPCC upheld my complaint, almost eleven months after the police refused to return my property, the PSD still refused to talk to me. I have them recorded refusing to talk to me even after the IPCC ordered them to record the complaint. They did this knowing that I was recording them. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [01-02-2013 12:49] Job: 025757 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/025757/025757_w032_michelle_IPCC 40 - Jeremy Heywood.xml

Home Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev w63

I informed the IPCC that the very department that was refusing to cooperate with me was the department they insisted I take my complaint to and they insisted that I had to do that. They claimed that Parliament gave them no choice. I find it impossible to believe that Parliament could have intended a police complaints system where the supposedly independent body does not investigate complaints—even ones that have such serious ramifications for democratic principles and individual rights as this. It must surely be my right in a supposedly democratic country governed by the rule of law to choose whether or not to cooperate with these processes. I have broken no laws. My property and work was not the subject of confiscation orders. It was not the proceeds of drug-dealing or aiding and abetting terrorism. It was not the subject of a court order compelling me to cooperate. The police simply abused the complaints procedures to achieve their ends—forcing my cooperation by stealing it and flagrantly breaching the agreed terms of use.

I informed the IPCC that the head of PSD was involved in the conduct complained of. He was at the meeting where I demanded the return of my property. I do not request it as that term concedes that they have an implied right to decide what happens to my property. I did not and do not concede that. It is my case that they must observe the terms of use of my property that had been agreed with the Phase III officers. This is not negotiable. It is my right alone to decide what happens to my property and work. Despite the IPCC’s caseworker upholding my appeal that it was a complaint about police conduct the Head of PSD responded by ignoring the decision, insisting that it was really a control and direction issue and usurping my rights. His response makes it clear that there has been no investigation of the complaint at all. They have not tried to talk to me or my solicitor. They have simply said they had legal advice that says they can keep my property against my wishes and use it as they see fit. They have again refused to say what law this is and who gave such advice. I am attaching the response of the Head of PSD and the IPCC’s decision to uphold my appeal as evidence of the intransigent attitude of PSD. It is plain that I cannot and will not get any reasonable redress from them or fair consideration on my complaint. A complaints system that allows the person and people complained of to make a decision on the merits of a complaint against them is utterly outrageous. The IPCC tolerates and even encourages this and is a beneficiary of said conduct. The PSD even uses my work to help the force defend civil actions against it without my consent. That is completely outrageous. In this case they and the IPCC are the problem and cannot be any part of the solution.

Conclusion

For the reasons outlined above I have come to the following conclusions. The IPCC is not a complaints system at all let alone an independent one. It is either wilfully flouting the intent of Parliament or it was a deeply flawed institution when it was established. The public does not and cannot have faith in a complaints system that is in reality a very limited appeals system that does not intervene even when the officers complained of work for the very department the IPCC insists must be trusted to investigate. That is hardly independent or impartial. The IPCC has powers to supervise or even investigate, but does not use them sufficiently to justify its existence.

If those powers (possibly too limited) are not used even in a complaint against the head of the PSD—the department that investigates complaints—there can be no hope for it. I therefore conclude that the IPCC is a fatally flawed organisation and that only a fully independent body with independent investigators and powers to investigate any complaint it chooses to can enjoy public confidence. The IPCC is not and in my opinion cannot become that organisation and this is not simply a question of resources, personnel and powers—it is a question of attitude. Has it even asked for the powers to investigate a complaint like mine independently of the police? If it has not demanded those powers, we are entitled to demand to know why not? Satish Sekar November 2012

Written evidence submitted by Neil Coggins [IPCC 32]

HMRC and the IPCC—is the IPCCEffective inOversight of HMRC?

Summary

1. Ms Lin Homer (HMRC Commissioner and Chief Executive) became aware that I had made a complaint alleging breaches of UK tax legislation and also fraud by false representation (as defined in the Fraud Act 2006 s2) on 9 July 2012.

2. On (or possibly before) 13 August 2012, Ms Homer became aware that HMRC Internal Governance Civil Investigations had independently established that legislation had been breached, and that there was consequently a real risk of fraud having taken place.

3. Regulation 28(1)(b)(v) of the Revenue and Customs (Complaints and Misconduct) Regulations 2010 (henceforth referred to as “the Regulations”) requires that a complaint be referred to the IPCC if that complaint alleges “a relevant offence”. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [01-02-2013 12:49] Job: 025757 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/025757/025757_w032_michelle_IPCC 40 - Jeremy Heywood.xml

Ev w64 Home Affairs Committee: Evidence

4. Regulation 12 makes it the duty of the HMRC Commissioners to ensure that they are kept informed of any obligation to act that arises under the Regulations that has not been complied with, or has been contravened, by HMRC. 5. Regulation 28(3) bestows personally upon the Chief Executive an obligation to refer a complaint of a relevant offence if satisfied that the complaint contains an indication that either a criminal offence may have been committed or that if the allegation was proved would result in disciplinary proceedings against the person about whom the complaint was made. 6. Given that HMRC’s own investigation established that legislation had been broken, and that if the allegation of fraud was proven it would result in dismissal of the person about whom the complaint was made (since they would have a criminal record for fraud and a potentially lengthy custodial sentence to accompany it), the Chief Executive (having been appraised of this fact, irrespective of her statutory duty to be kept informed of the matter) had an obligation to refer the matter to the IPCC. 7. Ms Homer failed to refer the matter to the IPCC within the deadline required by Regulation 28(6). 8. The HMRC Commissioners only “decided” to refer the matter to the IPCC upon threat of judicial review, some 3 months after the statutory deadline had elapsed. 9. The IPCC Commissioner Sarah Green was asked to decide whether to “call in” the complaint (i.e. to utilise the IPCC powers conveyed by the Regulations under Regulation 28(1)(d)). 10. Despite having before her evidence that the complaint was required to be referred to the IPCC under Regulation 28(1)(b)(v), Ms Green elected not to require the complaint to be referred to the IPCC. 11. The reason cited by Ms Green was that HMRC had already performed a detailed investigation. 12. Regulation 22 expressly prohibits HMRC from being allowed to handle the complaint internally because of the already-established applicability of Regulation 28. 13. Therefore IPCC Commissioner Sarah Green was herself operating in direct contravention of the Regulations by intentionally allowing HMRC to not refer the complaint and allowing a breach of the Regulations to go unchallenged. 14. Based upon these facts, I submit to the Committee that immediate steps should be taken to instruct the IPCC to put in place more rigorous mechanisms to detect and call in complaints that are supposed to be reported to them, and to impose sanctions (including disciplinary and/or criminal proceedings) against HMRC IGCI staff who fail to adhere to the legislation, given the sensitive nature of the role they are entrusted with. 15. I further submit that HMRC CEO Lin Homer utterly failed to adhere to the Regulations despite having ample opportunity to do so, and that the Committee should seek to ascertain the continued suitability of Ms Homer for the position she demonstrably is failing to meet the demands of. 16. I further submit that IPCC Commissioner Sarah Green should be the subject of an investigation into this breach of the Regulations, and be called to explain why, when faced with evidence that HMRC are failing to adhere to the Regulations, she chooses not to involve the IPCC or take any steps to ensure the rule of law and fulfil the ultimate duties of her position.

Supporting Information 17. On 15 May 2012, I made a complaint to HMRC IGCI that an HMRC tax officer had failed to adhere to both HMRC guidance44 and enacted tax legislation.45 I further alleged that the tax officer had consequently committed an act of Fraud by False Representation, as defined in the Fraud Act 2006 s2. 18. The crime of Fraud by False Representation carries a maximum custodial sentence of 10 years, and is both a “serious arrestable offence” and a “relevant offence”. 19. The requirement of legislation and IPCC statutory guidance is that any police force or police authority must, upon receipt of an allegation of a “serious arrestable offence” or “relevant offence”, report the matter to the IPCC no later than the end of the working day following the receipt of the allegation. 20. On 5 July 2012, HMRC IGCI attempted to close the investigation down, stating that “no evidence had been found or provided by [me] to support the allegation of fraud”. Upon telephoning the Senior Investigations Officer that wrote the letter, he confirmed verbally that “Civil Investigations lacks the requisite expertise to determine whether or not the law was broken”, and also “no contact had been made with other parties who had the necessary expertise to assess the merit of my case”. 21. At this time, my allegation of fraud had not been reported to the IPCC. 22. I emailed the SIO, Cc’ing my MP Lindsay Hoyle and the CEO of HMRC Lin Homer, restating his comments. His response was to initiate contact with relevant experts within HMRC to assess the merit of my complaint. 44 Capital Gains Manual—CG68050. 45 Income Tax (Trading and Other Income) Act 2005, s194. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [01-02-2013 12:49] Job: 025757 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/025757/025757_w032_michelle_IPCC 40 - Jeremy Heywood.xml

Home Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev w65

23. On 13 August 2012, the SIO wrote to me again, confirming that both HMRC guidance and tax legislation had indeed been breached. He also stated, however, that there was no evidence of “deliberateness” on the part of the HMRC tax officer, and consequently there would be no action (either disciplinary or criminal) taken against the tax officer. 24. At this time, my allegation of fraud had not been reported to the IPCC, despite HMRC now having established that the law had indeed been broken in at least one respect. 25. I submitted a complaint to the IPCC, asking them to “call in” the complaint, and making them aware of the fact that it pertained to a “relevant offence” as defined in both the IPCC Statutory Guidance 2010 and the Regulations. 26. The IPCC Casework Manager submitted a recommendation to not call in the complaint on the basis that she hadn’t found sufficient evidence to warrant the IPCC’s involvement. However, it was made entirely clear that the IPCC Casework Manager had trusted implicitly statements provided to her by HMRC that were at best misleading and at worst materially false. Furthermore, she had failed to acknowledge that HMRC had failed to report a relevant offence in the first place. Finally, she had also made numerous mistakes that may have unduly influenced the Commissioner’s decision to not call in the complaint. 27. The Regulations are very clear that allegations of a “relevant offence” must be referred to the IPCC if there is “an indication” that a criminal offence “may” have been committed or if the behaviour alleged (“if it had taken place”) would justify the bringing of disciplinary proceedings likely to lead to termination of the person’s employment. There is no burden of proof required by the Regulations in order for the referral of “relevant offences” to be mandatory. 28. Since the referral was required by the Regulations, the actions of the IPCC staff involved in the decision to not call in the complaint are complicit in the HMRC’s breach of the Regulations by not referring the complaint. That includes the IPCC Casework Manager, the IPCC Head of Casework, and the IPCC Commissioner. 29. Upon my commencement of pre-action protocol for judicial review of HMRC’s decision not to refer the matter to the IPCC, the HMRC Commissioners have now agreed to refer the matter to the IPCC for consideration, on the basis that I have made an allegation of a “relevant offence”, provided that I do not pursue with judicial review. 30. The referral of my complaint to the IPCC was made on 14 November 2012.

Recommendations for action 31. Since HMRC IGCI are failing to act responsibly and in accordance with legislation, the task of “internal” governance of HMRC be given to an independent organisation that can be entrusted to act responsibly and impartially and in accordance with legislation and published guidance. 32. Since the IPCC are failing to enforce lawful behaviour upon HMRC in respect of internal governance, sanctions should be imposed upon the IPCC to compel them (both as accountable individuals and as an organisation) to act responsibly and impartially and in accordance with legislation and their own guidance.

Further evidence Email from Neil Coggins to the Committee, 19 November 2012 Further to my previous submissions, I can advise the Committee that I have now identified and read the “Revenue and Customs (Complaints and Misconduct) Regulations 2010” (henceforth “the Regulations”). 1. I can—confirm—that HMRC Internal Governance Civil Investigations staff BREACHED the Regulations by failing to refer my complaint to the IPCC (something that the HMRC Commissioners finally overruled when faced with judicial review proceedings). 2. I can—confirm—that IPCC Commissioner Sarah Green WAS aware of the breach of the Regulations by HMRC, but still declined to “call in” my complaint, thereby allowing a demonstrable breach of the Regulations (which she is personally charged with upholding) to stand I submit to the Committee that an IPCC Commissioner who -officially- permits the breach of legislation by an organisation she is personally expected to provide oversight of is not fit for the post or duties she is entrusted with. I will shortly be filing a complaint with the IPCC Internal Investigations Unit in respect of this matter, and urge the Committee to ask the IPCC leaders it has before it currently to identify whether such behaviour is IPCC policy, and whether Ms Green’s actions are condoned by the IPCC as an organisation. The IPCC will now be making a Mode of Investigation decision in respect of my complaint as referred by HMRC. I remain hopeful that justice will finally see the light of day, but if the IPCC choose to ignore the law and side with HMRC instead, I will commence proceedings to drag them before the High Court just as swiftly as I did HMRC. To date, HMRC have failed to adhere to legislation on at least four occasions, and there is enough evidence to support at least two criminal prosecutions. With the IPCC apparently following suit, one wonders where it will all end... cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [01-02-2013 12:49] Job: 025757 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/025757/025757_w032_michelle_IPCC 40 - Jeremy Heywood.xml

Ev w66 Home Affairs Committee: Evidence

Email from Neil Coggins to the Committee, 20 November 2012 Further to my previous correspondence, I have now obtained evidence that I believe proves: 1. HMRC Internal Governance Civil Investigations officers have breached the Revenue and Customs (Complaints and Misconduct) Regulations 2010 (henceforth “the Regulations”), and 2. HMRC Chief Executive Lin Homer has personally breached the Regulations, and 3. IPCC Commissioner Sarah Green personally allowed this breach to go unchallenged, thereby creating a third breach of the Regulations Please find attached a submission of written evidence in respect of my complaint. In light of the severity of this matter I trust that, whilst the Committee cannot investigate individual cases, it will use its discretionary powers (to call for papers and persons) to determine if such matters as brought to light in my complaint are in fact endemic in the IPCC. To that end, I would welcome a direct communication from the Chair to confirm what actions, if any, the Committee intends to take. Neil Coggins November 2012

Written evidence submitted by JusticeNow [IPCC 33] IPCC managed investigation 2009/009815 IPCC managed investigation 2009/009815 looked at two aspects of the contact with Mr Doherty following his reporting to the Police suspected paedophile contact with his 13 year old child. The first aspect was the entry to Mr Doherty’s home on the morning of the 4 September 2008, the second aspect being the false allegations made against Mr Doherty by a member of police staff, for which Mr Doherty stood trial and was acquitted with a not guilty verdict.

False allegations of harassment Despite the evidence presented to the IPCC being judged to demonstrate serious concerns about the conduct of police staff in giving false allegations, there was NO CRIMINAL investigation conducted under the direction of Commissioner Deborah Glass. The IPCC investigation decided that the police member was “at the most simply mistaken” in giving false evidence in her statement, complaining of harassment. Mr Doherty instigated a criminal prosecution of this individual and the trial judge, on the same evidence stated that the matter “ought properly to go to trial”, demonstrated “completely false” allegations against Mr Doherty and case evidence was “compelling”. The question must be asked how could the IPCC fail to refer such a matter to the CPS for prosecution, why they failed to interview under criminal caution when the evidence is of such a compelling nature?

Violent entry to the home of Mr Doherty—4/9/08 There has been significant recent developments in this area which demonstrate serious concerns about both the IPCC and the Metropolitan police professional standards dept. In simple terms they have concealed material evidence from the investigation. In this aspect of the IPCC investigation, it was directed that the officers would be interviewed under criminal caution. These interviews occurred in November 2009. One officer’s interview, Gareth Blackburn, was then suppressed from the IPCC and Mr Doherty (despite many requests) for the next three years. It has been confirmed that the IPCC, Deborah Glass, signed off an investigation report exonerating the officers involved without sight of the key evidence they had requested being disclosed. [see email attached below] The interview of officer Gareth Blackburn was in direct opposition to the final report findings that the IPCC used to exonerate the officers involved. Once again, two officers exonerated by the IPCC are on criminal trial by way of private criminal prosecution at Southwark Crown court. The judge issuing the summons confirming there is a case to answer. This is a stark example of the utter abject failures of the IPCC . Dear Mr Doherty, Further to your e-mail of Monday 15 October asking the following question: Can you confirm either way whether you had sight of the interview transcript of Sergeant Gareth Blackburn in the course of your managed investigation 009815/2009? I can confirm that we do not hold this information. This would mean that in all probability we did not see it. I hope this answers your question. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [01-02-2013 12:49] Job: 025757 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/025757/025757_w032_michelle_IPCC 40 - Jeremy Heywood.xml

Home Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev w67

Many thanks,

Maneer Afsar Head of Casework and Customer Services Independent Police Complaints Commission

Press Links to the case of Michael Doherty

1. http://ruvr.co.uk/2012_10_26/92563915/[Voice of Russia Radio interview]

2. http://poultonblog.dailymail.co.uk/2012/09/public-confidence-in-our-police-force-is-at-an-all-time-low-how- will-faith-be-restored.html

3. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/9477981/Police-officers-in-court-as-man-brings-private-prosecution.html

4. http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2188837/Two-Met-Police-officers-smas hed-way-aircraft-engineers-home-battering-ram-kidnapped-him.html#ixzz23oc0tK3Q

5. http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2012/jul/15/police-accused-kidnap-private-prosecution

6.http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/apr/12/police-truth-blair-peach-tomlinson

7. http://twitpic.com/3so1cx/full

8. http://rt.com/news/yard-police-secretary-doherty/

9. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pOmUDXZ77Qw&feature=share

10. http://www.uxbridgegazette.co.uk/west-london-news/local-uxbridge-news/2012/08/17/two-police-officers- in-court-113046–31642144/ JusticeNow November 2012

Written evidence submitted by Richard Wildblood [IPCC 35]

Without going into great detail, I made a complaint to the Independent Police Complaints Commission after ten months of silence from Essex Police following a complaint to that police force. The IPCC made an initial investigation and as a result instructed Essex Police to make a new and more detailed investigation into my complaints. Essex Police promptly declared that they were unable to comply with the directive from the IPCC as they had “lost” all the evidence.

The IPCC did not seem to find this declaration in the least surprising and closed the case with no new investigation by Essex Police, making the comment that it was “unfortunate” that the evidence had become “lost”. It did not seem suspicious to the IPCC that a police force could conveniently “lose” evidence. I held copies of the evidence and offered to make it available to the IPCC. However they stated that the case was now closed and could not be re-opened. Essex Police now hide behind the Hill Principle—that a police force cannot be sued for negligence and blithely declare that they were negligent in “losing” all the evidence in the case. The IPCC can only be viewed as a toothless bulldog—the title of the article I wrote and which was published concerning this matter.

My case is now at the European Court of Human Rights and it is disappointing that I have to take my case outside of this country’s jurisdiction to seek some form of justice. The IPCC should have been more rigorous and more inquisitive as to how a police force could conveniently “lose” evidence when confronted with difficult questions. I lost over a million pounds as a result of unlawful actions that Essex Police refused to investigate and the IPCC were impotent to enforce their instructions to that police force. I hold evidence showing substantial wrongdoings by Essex Police but the IPCC refuse to consider any further submissions. The IPCC is substantially staffed by ex-police officers and this cannot be the right way to ensure the organisation’s Independence. My experience of the IPCC is that it is anything but independent, merely acting as a “get out of jail free card” for errant police forces. Richard Wildblood November 2012 cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [01-02-2013 12:49] Job: 025757 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/025757/025757_w032_michelle_IPCC 40 - Jeremy Heywood.xml

Ev w68 Home Affairs Committee: Evidence

Written evidence submitted by Ian Puddick [IPCC 36] Richard kindly informed me that I could still add additional information pertaining to lack of Police and IPCC accountability to the Committee. Please see my website which now includes a short film which provides the narrative of my case, and highlights the lack of IPCC accountability—www.policeexpenses.co.uk. I note from speaking to many MPs about this subject and they all suggest the simple answer appears to be tougher regulation and improved systems and controls, whilst I believe this is true, the bigger problem is the cultures within the Police services, these cultures are always created by the leaders at the top. These cultures will not change overnight and will take many many years to address—this is the real cause of Police Corruption, aided by a compliant IPCC. A few Public Police Failures which highlight lack of accountability: — Leveson Inquiry—we only have this situation because Police inc two Asst Commissioners (& other top brass) knew about hacking and failed to uphold the law as their relationship was not only questionable but far too close to News International. Result—Resignations on full pension & no charges. — Operation Weeting—Journalists regularly arrested for bribing Police officers (these are generally senior officers and not the Park Police), much is publicised about the hacks being prosecuted, virtually nothing about the Police Officers who accepted the bribes. — Hillsborough—We all know this one, it’s sickening. Result—Sir Norman Bettison who named in the Report then resigns of full pension. I am not anti-police. I often hear Police moan about bankers etc, however Police hold a unique place in Society as they swear an oath to uphold the law without fear or favour. Every time an officer lies or fails to uphold the law, the oath of office is rendered meaningless. This is what has happened slowly over the years. In world war 1, deserters were shot not for cowardice but rather for not honouring the oath they swore to uphold. I do not advocate shooting anyone, not even traffic cops. I appreciate there is a distinct lack of funds these days, however the public must have faith in our Police Service to uphold the law, it’s is essential to protect our democracy.

Potential Solutions Barrister lead inquiries into police conduct. A police officer should be arrested and cautioned for an arrestable offence (just the same as it would apply to you & I). New Systems and procedures—I would be happy to consult independently on these issues, my time would be FREE. The Police Cultures have developed over many years, there is no simple quick fix—again I would be delighted to consult on such matters. Ian Puddick November 2012

Written evidence submitted by Natasha Sivanandan [IPCC 37] My background and qualifications 1. My name is Natasha Sivanandan and my contact details are given in my cover email. I am an Asian woman. I worked for 10 years as a teacher and then for four years as a Race Equality Advisor in the (former) Inner London Education Authority and Brent Council. I worked for many years as co-ordinator of a small race equality organisation in Hackney and was a member and then Chair of the Multi-Agency Racial Incidents Panel. 2. In 2004 I re-trained and became a barrister, working in London as a defence barrister in the area of criminal law before leaving to work in a law centre as a discrimination and human rights caseworker. My area of expertise is in discrimination law. 3. When I lived and taught in Hackney, I came across high levels of police harassment of black (African- Caribbean and Asian) school students and sometimes had to assist students in dealing with unlawful stop and searches and harassment from police from Stoke Newington and Hackney police stations, which at that time had an appalling reputation within the black and minority ethnic (BME) communities. 4. I am currently a resident of Haringey and previously resided in Hackney for 25 years. Both these London boroughs have seen high public concern about police misconduct including persistent racial discrimination in cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [01-02-2013 12:49] Job: 025757 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/025757/025757_w032_michelle_IPCC 40 - Jeremy Heywood.xml

Home Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev w69

relation to stop and search, miscarriage of justice cases, deaths in custody and more recently the shooting of Mark Duggan.

Executive Summary 5. My submissions and suggestions for change are largely about the more serious complaints that come to the attention of the IPCC but do deal with other points. They are based on knowledge and experience of the Metropolitan Police Service only. 6. I understand that the Home Affairs Select Committee is currently investigating: — The independence of the Commission. — The effectiveness of Commission investigations. — The powers and responsibilities of the Commission. 7. The role of the IPCC is to secure and maintain public confidence in the police complaints system. In my view, the best way to do this is by changing or improving the following: — Competency. Demonstrating actual competency in its activities so that police shootings, deaths in custody and other complaints are properly investigated and potential prosecutions of, or disciplinary charges against, police officers are not compromised or undermined by second rate or shoddy investigations. (See paragraphs 10 and 11 below.) — Independence. Showing that the IPCC is really independent or (to put it another way) is not seen as too close to the police by, amongst other matters, having fewer former police officers leading investigations; by IPCC commissioners having greater relevant analytical and forensic skills such as a background in criminal defence work; supervising cases more closely, (this may require more resources); by greater knowledge about and the ability to see equality implications in complaints, whether raised by the complainant or not. — Recruitment. Radically reforming the appointments system so that IPCC Commissioners and investigators/staff come from a far wider and more diverse background. A close examination of the past appointments and the recent appointments show that those appointed as Commissioners come from a particular background, are essentially middle class and from “the great and the good”, or, to put it another way, largely “establishment” figures. The IPCC realises the need to be seen to be more independent of the police and yet the recent Commissioner appointments show the appointment of the same kind people who do not reflect the backgrounds and diversity of the public they are supposed to serve. The IPCC will have to be far more radical in its appointments system if it is ever to achieve greater public confidence. — Relevant skills and backgrounds. Demonstrating that Commissioners and investigators/staff have the necessary and relevant experience, understanding, knowledge and skills to undertake the tasks required, particularly in relation to the investigation of serious complaints involving death or injury of members of the public and in relation to the clearly continuing problem in London of racially discriminatory stop and search practices. For example, how does a background in financial services regulation equip one to be Deputy Chair of the IPCC and the Commissioner in charge of operational matters and key national policy issues such as police use of firearms, counter-terrorism and corruption? How can this appointment be seen to inspire public confidence? (See also paragraphs 10 and 11 below.) — Equality. Putting into practice—through measurable indicators—and fulfilling the IPCC’s equality duties as a public body under sections 1 and 149 of the Equality Act 2010, and in particular its race equality duties. A good example would be reducing the disproportionate number of BME young men being stopped and searched. — Access to justice. Ensuring access to justice via the complaints procedure, by amongst other matters, assisting in obtaining successful disciplinary proceedings against or successful prosecutions of police officers and more widely publicising the role of the IPCC. For example, when I was practising as a criminal defence barrister all my clients who had good cause to complain about police misconduct saw no point in making complaints against the police (despite my advice to do so) because they had no confidence in the police or the IPCC. — Co-operation with other relevant agencies. Ensuring that the IPCC co-operates fully with disclosure and other requests from Coroners: if this requires a change in legislation this should be done speedily. See, for example, the Mark Duggan case. — Changing Operating Procedures in relation to Firearms Officers. Change and improve police procedures and practices especially in relation to firearms officers.

GeneralSubmissions as toPublicLack of Confidence 8. In my view, in London, the public do not have confidence in the independence or the competence of the IPCC and this is a view widespread amongst working class and BME communities in London. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [01-02-2013 12:49] Job: 025757 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/025757/025757_w032_michelle_IPCC 40 - Jeremy Heywood.xml

Ev w70 Home Affairs Committee: Evidence

9. Two recent cases are excellent examples of why there are legitimate concerns about the IPCC and the whole criminal justice system. The first is the collapse of the trial of police officers and others involved in the Cardiff Three case: this has led to a widespread belief that nothing has changed and that the police can get away with major crimes with impunity. 10. The second is the IPCC’s conduct in the Mark Duggan case: there is grave disquiet about the Deputy Chair of the IPCC following her handling of the Mark Duggan case and many people have no or little confidence in her or the IPCC. For example, how is it possible that the car was towed away then returned to the scene of the shooting, objects within the car were not examined properly and statements made by the Deputy Chair of the IPCC to the press and others were misleading, and yet no disciplinary action has been taken against her and the IPCC investigators involved? 11. There is also public loss of confidence in the IPCC following the Deputy Chair’s recent decision to not investigate the referrals relating to the conduct of Sir Paul Stephenson, Andy Hayman and Peter Clarke in relation to the initial police phone hacking investigation, see paragraph 42 and Appendix 3 of Ms Glass’ witness evidence to the Leveson Inquiry.

The issue of Equality and the IPCC’s statutory duties 12. There is real concern about racism in the police and the IPCC and the Mark Duggan case is just one example of this. While the IPCC’s published policy statements pursuant to its duties under section 149 of the Equality Act 2010 are to be welcomed, many in the BME believe that these are paper policies and in practice the issue of racism is either disregarded and/or not accepted or marginalised in practice. 13. A July 2009 report by the Home Affairs Select Committee indicated that racism within the police force is still a problem a decade after the Macpherson Inquiry report which found that the police were institutionally racist. In my view this situation has not improved since 2009. 14. Every investigation by the IPCC involving a BME complainant or person should have input from a knowledgeable, legally trained and experienced race equality advisor because of the problem of race discrimination in the police forces, the CPS and the judiciary. This is because a disproportionate number of serious complaints/events that are investigated by the IPCC involve alleged police misconduct towards BME members of the public and because there is evidence showing that issues of “institutional racism” affect all aspects of the criminal justice system. 15. All those who sit on Employment Tribunals and deal with discrimination cases are required to undergo specialist training. All Commissioners and investigators/staff should receive high quality training in discrimination law and the drawing inferences from all the relevant surrounding circumstances: a skill that those who successfully practice discrimination law in tribunals and courts are familiar with. Applying non- discriminatory practices is crucial as a disproportionate number of the cases that cause the most serious public concern—including concern not only about the police but also about the conduct of IPCC—frequently involve the BME community and an element of race discrimination. All Commissioners and investigators/staff should have high quality training in sex and age equality for dealing with complaints involving cases of domestic violence, grooming, child abuse and so on.

Wider powers and more resources and funding for the IPCC 16. The Police (Complaints and Conduct) Bill 2012–13 while it is welcome and helpful in the short term is not a well thought-out response to inadequacies in the system in the long term. I agree that the IPCC should have wider powers to compel witnesses to attend and give evidence, including third party witnesses. If the power is extended to police officers and they refuse to attend and give evidence, they should be subject to internal disciplinary proceedings for gross misconduct. This is relatively easy to implement by amending existing contracts of employment. Further, there is nothing to stop the IPCC drawing adverse inferences against any police officer who refuses to attend IPCC interviews or who gives a no comment interview: the drawing of adverse inferences is not limited to criminal cases—it is common practice in internal disciplinary procedures and in the civil law such as in discrimination claims in the Employment Tribunal Service. 17. There should also be a mechanism to issue witness summonses and order retired police officers to give evidence and failure to co-operate should entitle investigators to draw adverse inferences from that failure. 18. In the future, one way to achieve the co-operation of retired officers is to amend existing police officers’ contracts to include a clause that requires them to have a continuing duty, even after retirement, to assist in any police or IPCC or other investigation since evidence of police misconduct can often surface years after a police officer has retired. 19. The IPCC takes far too long to investigate complaints and it appears to me that there are too few Commissioners to have effective oversight of serious complaints. Rectifying this may require more funding and more resources. 20. The IPCC should have powers to investigate private contractors providing police-like functions because such contractors carry out functions of a public nature for the purposes of the Human Rights Act 1998 and the cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [01-02-2013 12:49] Job: 025757 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/025757/025757_w032_michelle_IPCC 40 - Jeremy Heywood.xml

Home Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev w71

Equality Act 2010. An example of this would be a private company running a prison on behalf of the government or private companies carrying out public duties on behalf of the police.

Who investigates and models of investigation 21. There are some who argue that it does not matter if a police officer investigates a complaint because it is supervised by an IPCC commissioner who is not a police officer. This is a naive oversimplification and rather misleading. As most criminal defence barristers know well, the way an investigation is led, the focus of evidence gathering and interviews and all aspects of an investigation, (including what evidence you gather and what you ignore), can be highly biased, whether by conscious or by unconscious prejudgments or unconscious racist attitudes and so on. These prejudices and prejudgments are not confined to police officers or former police officers and include IPCC Commissioners whose backgrounds are socially uniform and lack any real diversity. IPCC expertise in investigation methods needs to be developed so that former police officers are not so relied open. The idea that only police officers have investigative skills, however, is ludicrous. One only has to consider how investigative journalists have often done better jobs of uncovering miscarriage of justice cases than police officers to know the truth of this. 22. Nick Hardwick is right in saying in evidence to the Select Committee that the IPCC follows a police investigation model but these are not the only available investigative models. 23. It appears to me that the IPCC focus on police investigation models and principles taken from the criminal justice system, but when it comes to IPCC investigations, an useful or alternative model is that followed in discrimination claims in Employment Tribunals. Here, (as with investigations into complaints against the police), it often involves one person’s word, (the complainant or claimant’s) against a number of others, many of whom collude in supporting each other. Direct evidence of discrimination is never or rarely available and must be inferred from all the surrounding relevant and background evidence and a wealth of highly illuminating case law exists as to how these inferences can be drawn. Indeed, the skills used by a successful claimants in discrimination claims are skills that some of our police and crown prosecutors could learn a lot from.

Fear of making complaints 24. In my experience many potential complainants are afraid to raise the issue of racism by the police for fear that they may be unjustly accused of “using the race card”—a defensive and generally unjust accusation made by those complained against. To make matters worse, such stereotyped responses are widely supported by the tabloid press. A good example of this is the harassment and demonisation of Duwayne Brooks who, despite all the harassment he suffered following the murder of Stephen Lawrence, had the courage to take a race discrimination claim in the county court against the Metropolitan Police. 25. There is also widespread fear amongst BME communities that to complain about the police will lead to two adverse consequences: (a) there will be no effective investigation or resolution and no real justice and (b) it will leave the complainant open to victimisation by the police for having complained. This is particularly true of BME individuals who have criminal convictions and who feel that that fact, combined with their race, would lead to an apparent lack of credibility on their part. However, history has taught us that some of the most high profile miscarriage of justice/police corruption cases involved people who had previous criminal convictions but were in fact innocent because they make easier targets for police misconduct.

The press and leaks to the press 26. There must be greater and speedier scrutiny of the way that the tabloid press appear to have information/ misinformation from police officers about those who complain against the police: some complainants are vilified by the tabloid press following statements from un-named police officers. Good examples of this are Duwayne Brooks and fans at Hillsborough. Such leaks should be scrutinised more systematically and speedily and officers prosecuted and/or disciplined more rigorously.

Responses to IPCC Recommendations 27. There should be a statutory requirement on either the police and/or crime commissioners or on the chief constable to give a formal response to the IPCC’s recommendations and to provide reasons if they refuse to implement them.

Police officer shootings 28. The evidence given by Nick Hardwicke to the Select Committee implied that the test in police shooting cases is currently a different test than for other unlawful killing: I am unsure if he is correct on that. Assuming that Mr Hardwicke is right, then the law on self-defence should apply to police officers just as it applies to others. However, in my view this is unlikely to make the conviction of police officers more likely. It may be more productive to develop polices and practices aimed at prevention. 29. In a case like the Mark Duggan case, it may be more productive to consider what action the police can and should have taken prior to the point of confrontation on the road so as to avoid the chance or likelihood cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [01-02-2013 12:49] Job: 025757 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/025757/025757_w032_michelle_IPCC 40 - Jeremy Heywood.xml

Ev w72 Home Affairs Committee: Evidence

of a death: the police must surely have guidelines and operating procedures on this and if not, should have them. These are issues that arose many years ago in the Gibraltar shooting of IRA activists by the SAS. Though an Inquest held that it was a lawful killing, the ECtHR found against the UK, see McCann and others v the United Kingdom, date of Judgment 27 September 1995.

30. The failure to learn lessons from previous incidents leads many members of the public to feel a lack of confidence in the IPCC and the police: why are the lessons of earlier police shootings not learnt and new guidelines and laws not developed?

31. Many members of the public and particularly those from BME communities continue to feel that police officers “get away with it” after shooting unarmed people, or following deaths in custody even when an Inquest has returned a verdict of unlawful killing.

32. My experience as a criminal defence barrister leads me believe that the quality of prosecution in cases involving police needs to be improved: there appears to be no real willingness to obtain convictions of police officers except in respect of more minor offences.

33. Just as the tape recording of interviews of suspects in police stations dramatically reduced the number of fabricated confessions that the police produced as purported evidence, the law and/or police procedures need to change in relation to firearms officers.

34. A number of policies and procedures can be introduced, for example: (a) Firearms officers should be required by law to videotape all chases or pursuits of suspects. (b) There should be full discussion and documentation, (which will then be open to discovery in any later proceedings or investigation including by the IPCC or the CPS), as to the operational objectives including plans to minimise the risk to life during the arrest of a suspect who is believed to have a firearm. (c) This does not require a change in the law but can be incorporated into police Operating Procedures. This would protect the police from false allegations and reassure the public about what actually happened and why a shooting was deemed to be necessary and/or justified and/or was clearly self defence.

WhyJustice must beDone and beSeen to beDone

35. The Cardiff Three case is a prime example of how numerous agencies including the IPCC failed innocent men. Surprisingly, the issue of police racism that underlined the whole case is rarely ever discussed. It would be helpful to know whether the police officers are to be retried and if not, why not? If papers were lost—as reported in the Panorama documentary this year—have the people involved in losing court or file papers been identified and disciplined? If not, what’s the point of repeatedly saying yes mistakes have been made but we’ve learnt from them? The public and particularly the BME communities are tired of hearing this mantra because it appears that in practice nothing has been learned because nothing has changed in practice—the same mistakes keep being repeated.

36. I believe that Metropolitan Police claims that crime numbers are falling cleverly obscures the fact that a significant number of Londoners do not bother to report crimes because they have no confidence that some crimes will be solved or that some reports will even be logged as crimes. A recent example comes from a friend who suffered criminal damage to her home by a gang of local youths known to the police: the damage was such that she could repair it herself. She reported it but the local police did not even give her a crime reference number. She just laughed at my suggestion that she should pursue a complaint.

37. There is a real risk that the failure to have an effective, independent and non-discriminatory IPCC could be a factor leading to civil disorder in the future.

38. I have tried to accurately reflect widespread lack of confidence in the IPCC amongst my friends and in my local community and in light of my teaching and legal experience and training. I hope my positive suggestions and observations are helpful. Natasha Sivanandan November 2012 cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [01-02-2013 12:49] Job: 025757 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/025757/025757_w032_michelle_IPCC 40 - Jeremy Heywood.xml

Home Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev w73

Written evidence submitted by Patrick Allfrey [IPCC 38] I understand that your home affairs committee is taking evidence into the way the IPCC meets the expectations of the community in respect of the duties entrusted to it by Parliament. I am sorry to report that I am sadly disappointed by the way the Commission failed me in respect of a complaint that I submitted to the Commission. Powers granted to the Commission gave them, the authority and the right to require the police to conduct a proper investigation into any complaint submitted in respect of a police officer’s conduct. However the Commission are in some instances, allowing the police to continue as they did under the previous system. Should the police be allowed to pick and choose whether to interview witnesses or not. In my case they refused to interview the relevant witnesses as it would possibly weaken their case. And then the Commission say why not? The witness might not have provided sufficient evidence. Matter closed. When the criteria for judging the merit of a complaint is: Was the complaint substantiated or unsubstantiated, the result is always going to be the same if no evidence is taken. I am enclosing an attachment giving additional details of my specific case in the hope that you might feel the matter would merit the interest of your committee.

Memorandum I can and do understand that the Commission are only authorised to conduct investigations themselves in certain specified circumstances. However the Commission accept that they are the authority responsible for ensuring that police investigations are conducted correctly. In respect of my complaint the Commission have consistently maintained that they have no remit in the matter and refuse to accept that they have the right to insist that the police actually interview witnesses identified in connection with complaints. I have been told that I could make a fresh complaint in respect of the conduct of the Police Inspector who took the decision to avoid investigating my complaint but there is little sense in adopting this approach if the Commission will not accept their ability to ensure that a complaint is actually investigated. The Professional Standards Department to whom my complaint was referred; decided to only interview the two officers complained off since they considered that in all probability I had arranged for witness to support me rather than tell the truth. My solicitor made a complaint on my behalf to the Chief Constable (copy enclosed {10.08.06.}) as nothing happened, I submitted my complaint direct to the IPCC. This complaint was in connection of the perceived perjury of two police officers and the false accusation that I had altered the construction and material condition of the trailer that was the subject of my initial prosecution in the Magistrates Court. The Commission, determined that the complaint should be investigated by the Professional Standards Department of the force involved. The Professional Standards Department decided that a proportionate investigation should be conducted. I was interviewed and asked to make a witness statement with the specific request to include names and addresses of others known to have knowledge in relation to the matter. As proscribed at the conclusion of such an investigation the senior officer in charge, makes a decision as to whether the complaint is substantiated or unsubstantiated. With respect to my complaint it is now acknowledged that the investigation did not take any evidence from any one of those witnesses or as far as is known from anyone other than those two police officers. In these circumstances it was hardly surprising that the finding was that the complaint was not substantiated. My appeal to the IPCC against the decision of the West Mercia Constabulary was upheld and a recommendation made that the officers themselves, be given management advice. My concern was and remains that no effort had been made to investigate my complaint. The case summary confirms that a number of witnesses had been identified and says: Mr Allfrey had a number of persons who he says would have supported his assertions regarding the trailer bed and there is no doubt that each would say that at some stage they have seen an aluminium bed of some description on Mr Allfrey’s trailer. The Case summary was almost entirely related to the officers evidence that they had given to the Magistrates and did not indicate that any serious attempt had been made to look into or address the complaint itself or the condition of the car or the trailer. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [01-02-2013 12:49] Job: 025757 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/025757/025757_w032_michelle_IPCC 40 - Jeremy Heywood.xml

Ev w74 Home Affairs Committee: Evidence

In my case the Commission took the view that it was perfectly proper for the police to decline to interview witnesses as they might not be able to provide sufficient evidence. The terms used by the Commissioner were: “The decision made on the case indicated that the additional witnesses Mr Allfrey identified may not have provided sufficient evidence to support his allegations.” These were the same witnesses referred to in the enclosed letter of the 10 August 2006 to the Chief Constable of the West Mercia Constabulary. In recent months I have been led to believe that the Statutory responsibility of the IPCC is to increase public confidence in the police complaints system. This is a long way off, the unambiguous claim, “IPCC stands for Independent Police Complaints Commission. We are responsible for the way complaints about the police are handled.” It poses the question do the IPCC have a duty to ensure that complaints are fairly dealt with? The officers I complained about gave untruthful evidence in court and I was found guilty of a traffic offence. For the purposes of my appeal against this conviction an expert witness was appointed to examine and provide a report on the condition of the trailer, the use of which gave rise to the alleged offence for which I had been convicted. This report was correctly served on the CPS, who passed it onto the police. The report was unambiguous and as a result of its content the officers involved then alleged that I had altered the condition and structure of the trailer in order to obtain an acquittal. For unspecified reasons the CPS failed to consider the report themselves and when it came to trial they applied for an adjournment. The judge refused to grant an adjournment where upon the CPS withdrew. As a result the Judge allowed my appeal, so the fine and conviction were set aside. Leaving the allegation that I had altered the evidence in order to pervert the course of justice unresolved. In the light of the recent The Report of the Hillsborough Independent Panel it would appear that some police officers can be persuaded to alter evidence. The IPPC have in existence procedures or standards for determining their judgement in relation to appeals that are made to them. With respect to a case where the Police Force found a complaint to be unsubstantiated. These are set out in the IPCC’s Casework Manual. Where at 6.1 it says: “If the IPPC finds that the local resolution process has not been properly followed, it can give directions as to how the complaint should be handled in the future.” In an extreme case the IPCC can insist that the complaint is investigated. In my case the IPCC simply claimed to have no remit and have maintained this consistently to this day. As I have said the Commissioner determined that the witnesses might not provide sufficient evidence to support an allegation. To my knowledge, there was never any evidence to support the allegation that I had made changes to evidence, in an endeavour to pervert the course of Justice. Or that I had conspired with others to have them give false evidence in support of my case. How any complaint can be substantiated if the investigating authority is going to refuse to look at evidence is a mystery to me. And as to how the IPCC can claim to for-fill its remit to give the public confidence in the impartiality of the police complaints system is a total mystery. It had never occurred to me that the practice of giving false evidence was so common within the force that my complaint did not merit a proper investigation; or that it was such a trivial matter that the IPCC would consider there was no need to take evidence. I was quite clearly misled into believing that the Commission, replacing the Police Complaints Authority was appointed to make complaints investigation more open, timely, proportionate and fair. You and your committee are I believe in a position to establish if the Police Reform Act of 2002 was intended to protect the public from the accepted bias in the complaints process, condoned and supported by the PCA. Or if it was intended by those that drafted it, and members of the house that voted it through, to simply be a sticking plaster, to in-still in the majority of the populace a sense that they could trust the police complaints system. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [01-02-2013 12:49] Job: 025757 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/025757/025757_w032_michelle_IPCC 40 - Jeremy Heywood.xml

Home Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev w75

I would be extremely grateful if you could let me know if your committee consider that the Commission has a duty of care to those that rely on it to act fairly and impartially in relation to dealing with appeals submitted to the Commission. I can and will willingly supply any supporting documentation in my possession if it would be helpful to the committee. December 2012

Written evidence submitted by Patricia F Gallan QPM, Deputy Assistant Commissioner, Metropolitan Police [IPCC 39] Thank you for your letter of 9 January 2013. I appreciate the concerns of the Home Affairs Committee and I would, of course, upon completion of the investigation and at a time that will not prejudice any possible judicial proceedings, be happy to come and give evidence to the Committee. I can confirm that the investigation is progressing expeditiously and that I am in regular and personal contact with Deborah Glass, Deputy Chair of the IPCC and I have also recently apprised the CPS of the investigation. I will address the points raised in your letter in turn: (a) To date the estimated cost of Operation Alice is £82,500. This is solely the cost for staffing the operation since the case was reopened on 15 December 2012. (b) The investigation is progressing as expected. An advice file will be submitted to the Crown Prosecution Service by the end of January asking them to consider whether there should be relevant and appropriate charges arising from the investigation. (c) The original team engaged in the leak investigation in September 2012 consisted of officers. (d) Since the case was reopened in December 2012 the team has increased in size and a Detective Superintendent has been appointed as the SIO. The original four officers form part of the larger team. There are no known conflicts of interest and there has been no reason to remove any officer from the team. (e) The team are made up from officers from the Department of Professional Standards. (f) I have included the Terms of Reference agreed with the IPCC. Deborah Glass has strategic oversight for the IPCC and I am in regular contact with Deborah updating her personally. In addition to this high level oversight the IPCC have appointed a Senior Investigator, Steve Reynolds, to monitor the investigation and liaise regularly with the Senior Investigating Officer. As part of the supervision by the IPCC, Steve Reynolds has a meeting scheduled on Monday 14 January with the SIO to review the investigation to date. January 2013

Annex OPERATION ALICE BACKGROUND DPG officers spoke with Mr Mitchell on the evening of 19 September 2012 as he was leaving Downing Street, requesting that he used the side pedestrian entrance to leave the street rather than via the main vehicle gate. Mr Mitchell took exception to this as he had his pedal cycle. DPG officers reported the content of the verbal exchange to their line management via email. The content of this email subsequently appeared in both The Sun and The Telegraph newspapers. On Thursday 13 December 2012, the MPS received fresh information that resulted in the re-opening of the investigation into the alleged unauthorised disclosure of information on Saturday 15 December 2012. The information handed to Police included a DVD containing CCTV footage of Downing Street on the said 19 September, at the time of Mr Mitchell leaving Downing Street and a bundle of e mails pertaining to the incident. The Deputy Chief Whip had received an e mail from a constituent stating that he witnessed, with his nephew, the events of 19 September 2012 at Downing Street between the Police Officers and Mr Mitchell.

Revised Terms of Reference 1. To investigate the circumstances surrounding the Police Officer’s claim to have witnessed the incident in Downing Street. 2. To establish if there is any evidence of a conspiracy between this officer and any other person. 3. To investigate the allegations made by the Rt. Hon Andrew Mitchell in his statement that police lied in the police log dated 19 September 2012. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [01-02-2013 12:49] Job: 025757 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/025757/025757_w032_michelle_IPCC 40 - Jeremy Heywood.xml

Ev w76 Home Affairs Committee: Evidence

4. Establish what, if any criminal or misconduct offences are apparent. 5. To progress the supervised investigation to wherever the evidence takes it. 6. Establish if there is any organisational learning as a result of this investigation.

Written evidence submitted by Sir Jeremy Heywood KCB, Secretary of the Cabinet [IPCC 40] Thank you for your letter dated 9 January. As you will be aware, I gave evidence to the Public Administration Select Committee yesterday. In advance of the evidence session, I provided the Committee with details of my involvement in the events relating to Andrew Mitchell, and I enclose a copy of my letter for your ease of reference. You have asked whether I passed to the Metropolitan Police the email from John Randall’s constituent and the CCTV footage of the incident, and if so, when this took place and why I did so. Following a discussion I had with the Metropolitan Commissioner on 27 November, I provided him with copies of two emails from Mr Randall’s constituent and the unredacted CCTV footage on 12 December. I thought it right to make available to the Metropolitan Police any material we held which could potentially be relevant to any future inquiries as well as their on-going leak investigation. In doing so, I was conscious that Andrew Mitchell had requested his own copy of the footage and had indicated that he might wish to make this public at some stage. January 2013

Annex LETTER FROM SIR JEREMY HEYWOOD KCB, SECRETARY OF THE CABINET, TO BERNARD JENKIN MP, PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION SELECT COMMITTEE, 24 DECEMBER 2012 RE: ORAL EVIDENCE Thank you for your letter of 20 December. I am grateful for the opportunity to offer views before the Committee meets on 8 January. There has been significant coverage of this matter in the last two weeks, and in particular in relation to CCTV images taken on 19 September 2012, and subsequent emails purporting to be from a witness to events that took place on that date. It is my role as Cabinet Secretary to consider and provide advice to the Prime Minister including on matters relating to Ministerial conduct. As you will know, following the incident in Downing Street on 19 September, Andrew Mitchell apologised to the police for his inappropriate behaviour and the police decided to take no further action. The Prime Minister regarded the matter as closed, and Andrew Mitchell remained in post as Chief Whip. I first became substantively involved when the Shadow Home Secretary, Yvette Cooper, wrote to me about the episode on Sunday 23 September. I replied setting out the Prime Minister’s position on 24 September. I enclose a copy here. I became aware during the course of 24 September that the Deputy Chief Whip, John Randall, had copied to No10 a private email he had received from a constituent. The next day, following receipt of a second email and confirmation from John Randall that he had established through direct contact that this was indeed a genuine constituent, the Prime Minister asked me to look into whether this MPs constituency correspondence changed his original assessment of the then Chief Whip’s conduct. He did not ask me to investigate the veracity of the police logs or any other aspect of this incident. I do not have the powers to conduct a criminal investigation. Nor is it the Cabinet Secretary’s role to investigate the conduct of the police. To meet the Prime Minister’s request I reviewed the content of the two e-mails against the CCTV footage held by Downing Street and the Foreign Office and oral evidence provided to me by Andrew Mitchell. The Deputy Chief Whip’s constituent refused to speak to either me or my staff, arguing I believe, that his e-mails were private communications to his local MP and had not been intended for wider dissemination. I therefore asked the Deputy Chief Whip to talk to his constituent. He did so and questioned him specifically on whether he had any links to the police or the media which he denied. I concluded on the basis of my short review that the e-mails did not provide conclusive or reliable evidence and that there was no reason for the Prime Minister to change his conclusion that the Chief Whip should remain in post. The Prime Minister agreed with this conclusion and decided that no further action was warranted. This judgement was shared with the then Chief Whip. As you know Andrew Mitchell then remained in his post as Chief Whip until 19 October. cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [01-02-2013 12:49] Job: 025757 Unit: PG01 Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/025757/025757_w032_michelle_IPCC 40 - Jeremy Heywood.xml

Home Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev w77

I recognise the Committee’s desire to seek clarity on this case. Clearly significant questions remain to be answered about the episode, how the Downing Street police log-books ended up in the public domain and how the e-mailer knew about the incident prior to its becoming public. It is imperative that these questions are answered as soon as possible and the Government has therefore welcomed Scotland Yard’s commitment to a comprehensive, rigorous and urgent investigation. I have spoken to the Metropolitan Police Commissioner on a number of occasions to stress the importance that the Prime Minister attaches to this. In light of the on-going police investigation and having consulted the Treasury Solicitor and the Metropolitan Police, I do not believe I can provide a more detailed public account of my own internal review without the risk of prejudice to potential future criminal proceedings. I hope the Committee will understand the overriding importance of this consideration. December 2012

The Stationery Office Limited 02/2013 025757 19585