Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration (DDR): a New DDR Approach for Iraq

Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration (DDR): A New DDR Approach for Iraq

A thesis presented to

the faculty of

the Center for International Studies of Ohio University

In partial fulfillment

of the requirements for the degree

Master of Arts

Amal Hussein Alwan Shimir

April 2021

This thesis titled

Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration (DDR): A New DDR Approach for Iraq

AMAL HUSSEIN ALWAN SHIMIR

has been approved for

the Center for International Studies by

Brandon Kendhammer

Associate Professor of Political Science

Patrick Barr-Melej

Interim Executive Director of the Center for International Studies 3

Abstract

SHIMIR, AMAL, M.A., April 2021, International Development Studies

Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration (DDR): A New DDR Approach for Iraq

Director of Thesis: Brandon Kendhammer

This thesis offers a theoretical review of the literature related to the practices of

Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR), a strategy for addressing the status of former armed fighters in post-conflict societies and proposes a new DDR approach— “fluid” DDR with reference to the case of Iraq. Fluid DDR is a more flexible approach to the practice of DDR than the traditional one and offers a new perspective for practitioners and scholars to consider within Iraq's context. In Iraq, the standard DDR approach has largely failed to address the country’s challenges related to civilian militias, largely due to challenges with correctly sequencing the steps in the absence of a stable peace. “Fluid” DDR addresses these concerns by providing the possibility of military disarmament alongside non-military demobilization and reintegration strategies. 4

Dedication

I would like to dedicate this thesis to my family, my mom, my sisters and my brothers who always supported me to cross oceans to follow my dreams. I cannot express my gratitude

of having this wonderful family by my side especially in these difficult times.

Acknowledgments

Special thanks to my thesis advisor, Dr. Brandon Kendhammer, who has read through many rough drafts. He encouraged me and pushed me to focus on my writing. I would also like to thank my committee members, Dr. Loren D. Lybarger and Dr. Nukhet

Sandal for their comments and feedbacks that were given to me.

Special thanks also to my mom, Kareema Salman who has always supported me and encouraged my independent choices. She is my role model.

Table of Contents

Page

Abstract ...... 3 Dedication ...... 4 Acknowledgments ...... 5 List of Tables ...... 8 List of Figures ...... 9 List of Acronyms ...... 10 Chapter 1: Introduction ...... 11 The Purpose of this Thesis ...... 12 An Overview of Iraq's Context after 2003 ...... 12 Why DDR? ...... 19 Obstacles of DDR ...... 20 The US's Role in the Invasion and Its Presence in Iraq since 2003 ...... 22 Chapter 2: The Challenges of DDR ...... 27 Typologies of DDR ...... 27 Where There Is No Peace ...... 28 Characteristics of Militias in Iraq ...... 31 DDR in Iraq ...... 34 Chapter 3: Fluid DDR and Prospects of Success in Iraq ...... 38 The Past Attempts of DDR in Iraq ...... 38 Pros vs Cons of Coercive DDR ...... 43 The Impact of the Militias in Iraq ...... 44 "Fluid" DDR ...... 45 Possibilities of a Successful Fluid DDR ...... 46 Chapter 4: The Role of Economic Development as a Tool for Reintegration of Ex- combatants ...... 49 The Economic Situation of Iraq ...... 50 Iraq's Living Standards ...... 50 Foreign Direct Investment, Net Inflows ...... 53 Iraq Imports and Exports ...... 56 Analysis of the Economic Situation in Iraq ...... 57 7

Chapter 5: Conclusion ...... 60 References ...... 62

List of Tables

Page

Table 1 Pros vs Cons of Coercive DDR...... 43-44

List of Figures

Page

Figure 1 Iraq GNI...... 50 Figure 2 Iraq's Foreign direct investment, net inflows ...... 53 Figure 3 Iraq's Export and Import ...... 56

List of Acronyms

DDR Disarming, demobilizing and reintegrating

PMF Popular Mobilization Forces

CSOs Civil society organizations

ICS Iraqi Civil Society

PGMs Pro-government militias

ISIS Islamic State of Iraq and Syria

NGOs Non-governmental Organizations

GNI Gross national income

FDI Foreign direct investment

Chapter 1: Introduction

Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) is a strategic program designed to address the place of non-state armed groups in post-conflict peacebuilding.

The three components each represent an important step in eliminating the threat of these groups. The first step, disarmament is the act of collecting, controlling and disposing weapons and ammunitions of the militias to deprive them from the violence tools to create a stable situation in a post-conflict setting (Dzinesa, 2007). In other words, it is a guide of how the combatants should live their lives without weapons and tools of violence. The second step, demobilization, is the aim to reduce the size of militias and armed groups by downsizing or complete disbanding them which would lead to their transition to civilian life (Dzinesa, 2007). The last one, reintegration, is a long-term process that ex-combatants resettle and become part of their communities in both social and economic levels, which open the doors of opportunities for them to be involved in the peace building process within their nation (Dzinesa, 2007). Also, it involves the need in changing attitudes and behavior in addition to given opportunities and benefits such as cash payments, foodstuffs, household utensils, school fees, vocational training, job placement, and healthcare support (Dzinesa, 2007). DDR is a development intervention program as it is "based on the clime to know how others should live, to know what the best for them is, and to know what they need" (Burns and Worsley, p3, 2016).

Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) programs are a "vital" part of policy efforts to stabilize post- conflict environments and help a community's

"transition from conflict to normality and development" (Rufer, 2005, p1). DDR 12 programs have been implemented in more than 60 countries since the 1990s; thus, "DDR can be described as something of a growth industry" (Muggah, 2010, p.2). Yet not all

DDR programs are the same. It is important for the development practitioners, governmental institutions and international organizations, to understand the challenges of and how to involve different institutions in DDR implementation.

The Purpose of this Thesis

DDR is a flexible strategy for thinking about how to deal with conflict environments where there are non-state actors. Thus, DDR is not a solution or peace arrangement, but it is a way of thinking fluidly about the back and forth between ending conflict and bringing about peace and reconciliation. This thesis explores the possibilities and challenges of introducing new DDR programs in Iraq, a country that, despite considerable international intervention since 2003, continues to suffer from violence and insecurity linked to the presence of civilian armed groups (“militias”) across the country.

It will focus in particular on the need to balance coercive efforts to demilitarize and demobilize religious militias with the need to also advance development and reintegration. This thesis will explore what that balance might look like and what actors are going to be necessary to make that balance happen.

An Overview of Iraq's Context after 2003

The issue of militias and armed groups in Iraq has been in the news since the U.S. invasion of Iraq in March 2003. Militias are defined here as civilian groups, often numbering in the thousands, and armed with basic firearms. Militias have fvarying degrees of organization and command/control, but generally operate—often in alliance 13 with political or formal military actors, with the intent of "maintaining local defense, upholding law and order, violating human rights and fostering insecurity, controlling security in weak states, and recruiting members from local communities" (Rached &

Bali, 2019, p. 227-228). These militias are responsible for violence in many Iraqi cities, which has cost many lives and created an unstable social and political environment.

These militias are some of the main causes of conflicts, sectarian wars, and corruption in the country. Iraq is a multi-ethnic and diverse nation, and most Iraqi militias represent a sectarian faction, particularly along the Sunni/Shi’a divide.

Many scholars believe that "the militias are embedded in mainstream society" because these militias are formed out of religious, ethnic and geographical divisions of

Iraq, which is roughly "60% Shi’i Arab south, a 20% Sunni Arab middle, and a 20%

Sunni Kurdish north" (Cigar, p. ix, 2015; Bunton, 2008, p. 631). Also, many of the militia leaders are either political or religious leaders who have emerged as powerbrokers in the country’s political system in their own right (Cigar, 2015). Furthermore, increasing competition among these militias and their leaders to control the local resources can result in ongoing conflict and this would put Iraq in unstable situation (Cigar, 2015, p.

65). According to Hunt (2020), the most recent source of tension between Shia and

Sunni groups began with the bombing of the Al-Askari – a scared shrine for Shias in

Samarra city—in February 2006.

However, after 2003, these divisions in the Iraqi society surfaced because of the history of both groups, where Saddam Hussein had discriminated against Shia in which the bombing of the shrine only escalated the situation. Hagan et. al., (2015) points out 14 that the violence peaked in Baghdad in 2006, which also became known as the "Battle for

Baghdad". The authors emphasize that due to widespread violence that resulted in systematic displacement in many neighborhoods, Baghdad’s social composition was changed from mixed areas to areas where the majority of the population were either

Sunnis or Shias (Hagan et. al., 2015). In this regard, Shia were being displaced from

Sunni majority areas to Shia majority areas, and Sunnis were being displaced from areas where they were the minority to Sunni-majority areas (Hunt, 2020). As such, these years long conflicting periods were considered the darkest days in the Baghdad's history, when many neighborhoods were “unmixed”. These changes made easy for militias to secure = ground for their operations.

Sunni and Shia groups now compete for power, which has led to "opportunistic violence" with the objective being that these militias expand their ruling boundaries and territories over people by spreading fear within the society (Hagan et. al. 2015, p. 678;

Ucko, 2008). This pattern of opportunistic violence has given these militias platform to gain more power in Iraq as they have expanded their rule over people and territory by using threats, harassment, extortion, and kidnapping inside Iraq (Hagan et. al. 2015, p.

678; Ucko, 2008).

The United States (US) and its allies invaded Iraq in 2003 and appointed a diplomatic mission to act as the head of the Provisional Government for one year. During this period, a few critical decisions were taken, one of which was the dismantling of the

Iraqi Army and put a stop on any future activities from the Baath Party, a prominent party that was controlling everything during the Saddam Hussein era (Pfiffner, 2010). Thus, 15 after the army was completely annihilated, the unemployed soldiers all came out to streets and took up guns, starting to form their own militia groups, which were mostly regional, and religion based. These uncontrolled and freed former Iraqi soldiers were well-trained to use different weapons, thus they started to train other militias that joined their groups. As a result, the situation of force displacement in Iraq after 2003 started with these two major events – US invasion of the country and the formation of religious and regional-based militia groups.

Iraq has moved in a violent direction after the invasion, but there are also important historical and political factors that preceded the invasion that have contributed to tension between Sunnis and Shias groups. These tensions started in the 1950s when

Iraq " often characterized as being Pan-Arab and Sunni centered and aimed at maintaining the political hegemony of Iraq's Sunni Arab elites and stifling Shi ci and

Kurdish protests" (Bashkin, 2011, p. 294). Also in Iraq's case, it seems hard to establish

"a broad and appropriate social consensus," which was evident when the majority of the

Sunni after 2003 refused to be part of the political process (Rached & Bali, 2019, p.223).

This refusal led to Sunnis' resistance against the Iraqi state, which ultimately led to the emergence of Sunni insurgents, which was seen as "the most difficult internal threat against the Iraqi state" (Rached & Bali, 2019, p.223).

Also, many of the militia leaders are either political or religious leaders who have emerged as powerbrokers in the country’s political system in their own right (Cigar,

2015). For example, the Badr Brigade that is headed by Hadir al-Amiri who is a Member of Parliament, and Saraya Al Salam that is headed by Muqtada al-Sadr who is a very 16 prominent Shia cleric (Aljazeera Net, 2017). Many political and religious leaders thought that they should mobilize civilians’ militias and convinced them to sustain coordinated attacks against the US army (Tatar, 2005). Furthermore, the increasing competition among these militias and their leaders to control the local resources has resulted in ongoing conflict and this would put Iraq in unstable situation (Cigar, 2015, p. 65). The enigma of militia groups in Iraq is a controversial issue because they are mostly ethnic and religious based which installs fear and increase the chances of the country going into further violence and a possible civil war. Adding to the enigma of the uncontrolled militias, the rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in 2014, put Iraq into another hotspot and challenged the country to face a new tragedy which added to Iraq's long history of internal turmoil, conflicts, and wars.

The above situation is reflected in different scholarly literatures. Shadid (2005) refers to this dynamic as the "logic of violence" driven by the uncertain future and fear of the Iraqis with regard to the country being fallen into the "devastating violence conflicts"

(p. 357; p. 22) Shadid documents how ordinary Iraqi citizens were worried about their country's future security situation, especially when the government is weak and accessing weapons is very easy. Furthermore, the majority of Iraqis were worried about the fact that their country was invaded by a foreign army that completely challenged the system of controlling power and authority in the country (Shadid, 2005). Thus, they were worried about the increasing power competition among different armed forces, which would disrupt the socio-political and economic situations of the country in the long run. Most militias were formed after 2003 in Iraq, each of which has played a crucial role in 17 increasing chaos in the county. Sunni and Shia groups have been competing for power, which led militias to expand their ruling boundaries and territories over people by insulating fear within the society. Many people blamed the government for not stepping in to stop these militias; yet some citizen of Iraq believe that they were mostly part of the

Iraqi government as the country was ruled by corrupted leaders and politicians (Hagan et. al., 2015). As a results Iraq's stability for growth and prosperity has been undermined by these militias since their establishment.

The lack of stability in the country on the political and security level have created an environment for these divisions to become feasible, which led each sectors and religions to create their own armed groups to protect themselves against any attack from others. It started as small protection groups; however, these groups were eventually mobilized into bigger groups under political and religious leaders. This has resulted in violence and more attacks in urban areas like assassinations and suicide operations in which considered as all standard non-state armed group methods (Shultz et al., 2004).

Another event from 2005 to 2011 that led to the creation of more militias and armed groups was that "Sunnis chose to support the rebel groups against the coalition forces and the Iraqi government" (Rached & Bali, 2019, p. 218). In 2014, ISIS emerged in Sunni cities, which resulted in the defeat of the Iraqi army who lost its capacity and ability to fight. This followed, the Iraqi government’s decision to ask Shia cleric Ali

Sistani to call for young Shias from all cities in Iraq to go and fight ISIS under the authority of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) (Rached & Bali, 2019). The fact that 18 the Iraqi army was not ready yet to fight ISIS, led the government to announce the formation of the PMF in June 2014 (Martin, 2018, p. 103).

The PMF "is an umbrella organization consisting of sixteen major and dozens of lesser militia groups, totaling approximately 110,000 armed men", which are the Badr

Organ¬ization, Asaib Ahl al¬Haqq (League of the Righteous), Saraya al¬Salam (Peace

Brigades), Kataib Hezbollah (Hez¬ bollah Brigades), and Kitaib al¬Imam Ali (Imam Ali

Brigades) (Martin, p. 103-104, 2018). This came as a call for saving Iraq from ISIS because the threat was real, and ISIS was marching to Baghdad. The PMF was supposed to operate under the Iraqi forces; however, some of them were fighting under different agenda from outside funds. These PMFs should report to the Iraqi Prime Minister, who was also Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces; however, many believed that "they actually [took] their orders from Tehran", which has had a great influence and power in

Iraq’s struggles during the past 15 years (Martin, 2018, p. 103; Cigar, 2015, p. 15). Iraqis have shown their fear over the influence of Iran because they believe that Iran is trying to drag Iraq to a reginal conflict as well as international with the US.

Some groups in PMFs were not obeying by the Iraqi laws or the army practices.

According to Hisham al-Hashimi (2020) an Iraqi historian and researcher in security and strategic affairs who was assassinated, he stated that some of PMFs groups were unwilling to disconnected itself from political and foreign affiliation (Alarabiya.net,

2020). He further added that groups like Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq and the Badr Organization, which they are also do not want to be reintegrated in the Iraqi Army (2020). Many people including Hisham al-Hashimi have flagged this as a threat to the sovereignty of the Iraqi 19 government. Moreover, these groups were equipped with military equipment because of the war against ISIS, which made them more powerful and armed. In 2020, the emerging tension between the US and Iran due to the assassination of Iran's military commander,

Gen Qasem Soleimaniin in Iraq (BBC NEWS, 2020). Iran has threatened the US with the use of pro-Iranian militias against these American diplomatic missions and forces

(Finer, 2019). The influence of Iran on some of these armed groups can play a major role in turning Iraq to a proxy war zone (Finer, 2019).

In Iraq, right now, there are many drivers of violence and many different domestic and international actors who contribute to this dynamic. My goal in the next section is to think about what kind of contribution DDR might be able to make to addressing these problems

Why DDR?

In post-conflict environment, DDR's major goal is "to contribute to security and stability" of any country because it is very crucial for the recovery and development to be established (Knight, 2009). The DDR approach to post-conflict peacebuilding has been executed in many countries; yet, it has not been equally successful everywhere. In Iraq, crafting an effective DDR strategy is challenging due to different agendas and objectives as well as the influence of external and internal actors and their funding of these militias

Policymakers working on Iraq's DDR program must acknowledge the challenges before the implantation and how the behavior of militias in Iraq can impact the success of the program. The security environment in Iraq is complicated and challenging due to 20 different sources of violence that is led by "ethnic, sectarian, and tribal armed non-state actors with large numbers of combatants" (Özerdem, 2010, p. 41).

DDR as kind of proposed in its standard model has a mixed track record of success. Critics of DDR have emphasized that it often looks like a one size fits all model that doesn't sufficiently grapple with the need for local knowledge and local buy in like

Afghanistan and Haiti. Mostly, many policymakers support the DDR implementation in post-conflict environments to stabilize the security situation, stability, improve the economy, and rebuild the country, while maintaining the peace. DDR is one of the key factors in peacebuilding processes because former combatants can be a major player in destabilizing a post-conflict state. This would lead to increase of the risk of hostilities to start again since the militia groups believe that they are not being reintegrated and involved in the peace process (Banholzer 2014). In the eyes of many, DDR programs are being designed to give combatants the chance for a peaceful transition from professional fighters to civilians. Therefore, experts believe that this step would decrease the risk of new conflicts to reappear as it would reduce their incentives to produce more violence

(Banholzer 2014).

Obstacles of DDR

DDR is more effective in some places than others depending on kind of conflicts and places. DDR has a track record of successes and failures. According to Muggah

(2004), "poor inter-institutional communication and cooperation" among the Republic of

Congo (RoC) government and international organization limited the effectiveness of

DDR on the national level (p.27). However, DDR is a beneficial strategy with the right 21 consideration of “external parties” at the national level who were active in contributing to war and/or peace process (Muggah, 2004, p. 29). For example, the success that DDR has achieved in countries like El Salvador, Mozambique, and Namibia due the understanding of the context of the conflict (Doolan, 2008, p. 1). For example, in Mozambique, armed groups were given timeline and flexibility in the disarming process where the government and international organization made efforts to gradual confidence-building (Edloe, 2007, p. 10). Thus, understanding the context of the country and involving all parties in the peace process are major keys in designing and implementing a successful DDR program.

Another good example of why DDR programs fail is the experience of

Afghanistan. Giustozzi (2016) talks about Afghanistan’s DDR program in the 2000s

(post- U.S. invasion) as having been based on "little Afghan input”. Again, the "template approach" or "the one-size fits all” policy have been the challenge of many DDR programs where nonstate actors design and the government implements without understanding the scope or the weight of these programs (Giustozzi, 2016).). Another challenge is the poor implementation by the government due to lack of strong institutions, existence of ethnic, religious, and regional biases, and corruption (Giustozzi, 2016).

Selber (2018) focuses on how DDR failed to make impactful results in Afghanistan. He discusses the cultural aspects of the country and how its "reconciliation" process played a major role in ending disputes among different ethnicities, while such an important aspect was totally ignored during Afghanistan’s DRR planning. It seems that Afghanistan has been a laboratory for testing DDR programs for decades now, where most of these tests have failed (Selber, 2018). Likewise, the lack of understanding of these programs 22 and the lack of governmental control have been a challenge for these programs to succeed. Özerdem's (2010) article suggests that DDR can be successful if it goes along with the security sector reconstruction (SSR), which is essential in the peacebuilding process. It shows that DDR is especially hard when the security sector is weak and divided. There are ongoing efforts to do DDR in Iraq have been impaired by the continued sectarianism of the security state apparatus.

The US's Role in the Invasion and Its Presence in Iraq since 2003

International actors are often very involved in DDR, and in Iraq the US has been the key international actor that has at various times tried to do DDR that had some short- term successes, but much of it is has been a long-term failure. The US government also believes that militias are “an inseparable element of Iraq’s [socio-political] fabric”; hence they are the main challenge for the Iraqi’s DDR program (Cigar, 2015). This is due to the fact that Iraq has experienced a descent number of challenges that led the country into civil war characterized by insurgent violence, militia rule, crime, and insecurity (Ucko,

2008). Another reason for this perception is the Iraqi government and its security forces’ inability or unwillingness to take action against the growing anarchy, "which reinforced the scope for vigilante violence and tit-for-tat retaliations among rival militias" (Ucko,

2008, p. 342). With these challenges, the U.S.-backed solution has primarily been to support a to-down DDR approach, even as the Iraqi government has been unable to carry it out. In particular, the U.S. has ignored and neglected the local level of civil society while they were working to strengthen the democracy in Iraq (Isakhan, 2015). 23

Moreover, Ucko (2008) talks about different DDR approaches that were implemented by the US government in Iraq. One of them was the process of integrating militias to be part of the political system, and how this strategy, the "surge" failed to achieve its goal. Ucko (2008) believes that it is important to evaluate the political landscape of a country and deem it as one of the key factors in the reintegration militias.

The author concludes that it is curial for Iraq's DDR program to examine the cultural factors of its militias to understand whether they are pro or antigovernment, since the ethnic rivalries in Iraq have contributed toward these militias in being mostly affiliated with their own ethnic groups (Ucko, 2008). This affiliation is a strong tie among members of the militias because they share the same beliefs and norms. These members think that they are being part of groups that are protecting their own ethnic group.

However, to demilitarize these militias, many historical, political, economic, factors need to be considered and reinforced such as peace agreement, understand the root of the conflict, providing details of DDR program, upholding to the terms of the peace agreement, development and involving local, reginal, international actors and international organization (Edloe, 2007; Molloy, 2017). Other important factors, such as identity politics, are among the most important to do lists for the regional and international civil society organizations to make sure that Iraqi institutions understand that a top-down approach of implementing its DDR programs are impossible (Alden, et, al., 2011). Furthermore, in fact the increase of rivalry among these militias has already compromised security codes and has hampered military efforts in stabling the situation in

Iraq (O’Driscoll & van Zoonen, 2017). Therefore, the need for security sector reform 24

(SSR) is crucial, which should be generally in conjunction with DDR, and it should also be considered to have a comprehensive security and justice development program in Iraq

(O’Driscoll & van Zoonen, 2017).

Demilitarizing militia's is only effective in the long run if you also establish trust and engaging multi-faceted development. It is not about sequence and doing these things together, which is the need for all of the parts of DDR to happen kind of at the same time but it's not such a strict first we do D and then the D and R talk about how DDR is hard because we have to do all of these things together even as we're maybe not done with every step right, I want to see you say that directly

In addition to that "a wider program of reform, including anticorruption, the rule of law and multifaceted development initiatives" must be taken seriously with DDR

(O’Driscoll & van Zoonen, 2017). These reforms will establish trust among all parties and will show how the government is determined to end the existence of these militias in a peaceful process. Last but not least, one of the biggest challenges that yet remains to be solved is the fact that most pro-government militias (PGMs) are heavily influenced by

Tehran, since "Iran has emerged as a regional superpower, enjoying the status of hegemon in Baghdad" (Martin, 2018; Cigar, 2015).

Although, in 2016, the Parliament has passed a law to legitimize the PMF; however, this does not change the fact that "forces within the PMF have rival nationalisms that go against Iraqi unity and threaten the territorial integrity of the state"

(O’Driscoll & van Zoonen, 2017, p. 36; BBC NEWS Arabic, 2016). This challenge is related to Iraqi nationalism that is a complex phenomenon, which is optimized by 25 particular ethno-sectarian groups rather than the sense of governing a united “nation", that "is maneuvering into a position of power/dominance over the others" (O’Driscoll & van Zoonen, 2017, p.35). Therefore, the support of militias is essential for those in government to maintaining power, while creating division among the population which are mostly led by the same militias is key to controlling the government resources

(O’Driscoll & van Zoonen, 2017). Thus, having rival ethnosectarian nationalisms backed by militias is a real concern because these "rival nationalisms can use their militias to oppose the state or act against rival groups", which would give a "rise to internal security threats and instability, weakening the central government" (O’Driscoll & van Zoonen,

2017, p. 36). The government of Iraq has failed many times to show its strength, and this has been taking as a sign of the government losing control over these militias.

Moreover, the final challenge for the Iraqi government would be the lack of a political agreement, which is the scope for cross-community reconciliation, and a neutral arbiter to be able to provide security guarantees that bodes well for (DDR) in the future

(O’Driscoll & van Zoonen, 2017). Militias would never come to an agreement with the government if such an agreement does not serve their will. What is important for militias is to have guarantees from the government that would them impunity and not falling into obsolesce for their crimes against citizens. While such an approach seems hard to believe and get implemented, it will nonetheless ease the process of disarming and demobilizing them.

Given the challenges of adopting and adapting of DDR, this thesis will explore they need to balance a possible use of coercion and force measures with the need to also 26 implement plans that facilitate disarmament and reintegration. It is a way to think about the challenges of doing this all at once rather than in a clear sequence. I am going to say that in Iraq is never going to have full disarmament before starting to do the mobilization and reintegration. Thus, I’m going to talk about what DDR might look like to be involved in disarming militias while also bringing the other parts. The idea of balancing coercion measure with mobilization and reintegration is important to fluid and flexible DDR.

Chapter 2: The Challenges of DDR

Typologies of DDR

Many DDR programs have been implemented in many countries. Some of them are considered to be successful and common like cooperative DDR, others like coercive and integrative are less common and may not have the same record of successes:

Cooperative DDR is militias voluntarily ending the hostilities and give up their arms. This is one of three approaches, which is proven to be successful due to the having a mutual peace agreement, where international community acts as a neutral party to fulfil the peace agreement requires for all parties.

A coercive DDR approach is based on force; through coercive DDR militias and armed groups would be forced to disarm, demobilize and reintegrate by either a local or an intervening armed force (Doolan, 2008, p. 7). In coercive DDR approach, forcible measures are a must due to the lack of a mutual agreement among the militias and the government to put an end to the ongoing violence and the control of militias in the society (Doolan, 2008, p. 7). One of the most valuable actors in coercive DDR approach would be military forces, who will be using force that it is required to "capture combatants or get them to turn over their weapons" (Doolan, 2008, p. 7). Coercive DDR has shown good results in Mozambique, South Africa, Angola, Namibia, Guatemala, and

El Salvador; however, it failed due to "the high level of crime and violence committed by ex-combatants" (Doolan, 2008, p. 8) Integrative DDR is based on collaboration where it synchronizes the efforts of many agencies both international and local and to ensure that the goals of DDR are met. However, it failed because it "prevent ex-combatants from 28 turning to destabilizing crime and violence" (Doolan, 2008, p. 9). Also, the integrated approach neglects addressing the disadvantages of the coercive approaches; for example, the forcing of peace agreement by external force (Doolan, 2008, p. 9). Doolan (2008) states that "the integrated approach assumes that any micro-level insecurity will come from former combatants who are not successfully reintegrated back into society," which may not be the cases in many countries like Haiti (p. 9).

Where There Is No Peace

One of the biggest challenges of engaging in DDR is when there are still violent of non-state actors. One school of thought states that if there are still violent by non-state actors, a country is not ready for DDR; yet another school of thought believes that in this case, coercive DDR should be implemented. It suggests that a state can use military forces, or state security forces to force them to disarm while also pursuing peaceful demobilization and reintegration. In Iraq, this would require the military to play an important and leading in DDR.

DDR should be a voluntary process, but in conflict environments there's often fluidity between when sort of conflict is happening and the need to work with the mobilizing and reintegrating fighters. It is rarely the case in complex conflicts that the conflict simply ends where DDR can be implemented with peace agreement. However, the literature on DDR is to think about how a state manages to balance DDR with the fact that sometimes violence is still happening where coercive DDR should be considered.

However, I am going to talk about how this should be balanced in cases where there still 29 kind of ongoing violence in the militaries involved in fighting militias with the fact that at the same time trying to implement the demobilization and the reintegration of militias.

Scholars and practitioners have not focused on coercive DDR because they believe that "DDR is a voluntary process," which all parties should be willing to participate with a free well (Molloy, 2017). Thus, for them, the use of force will lead to the failure of the program and also undermine the legitimacy of the program (Molloy,

2017). However, in case of Iraq, coercive DDR and modifying the sequence of it should be considered for future development program otherwise Iraq will be a place and example for how militias can be powerful in taking over the government and also will be threaten the stability of the region and potentially, the world.

The complexity of the Iraqi society has made Iraq a fertile environment for conflict like sectarian war and resistance movement against US Army after 2003-2011,

Al-Qaeda, and ISIS. The tribal system in Iraq allows carrying weapons and engaging in violence, which paves the way to emergence of militias. Furthermore, the beliefs that militias are “an inseparable element of Iraq’s [socio-political] fabric”, normalized the existence of these militias in the society and challenges the implementation of DDR program (Cigar, 2015). therefore, Iraq can be easily transformed to a failed state due to the presence of the militias that are going to hander the stability of the political environment and the economic development. Iraq ranks 17th out of 178 countries with

95.99 score on the Fragility in the world report, which means that Iraq is likely to fill back in the index if the militias continued to challenge the legitimacy of the government

(Fragile States Index, 2021). According to Thurber (2014)," Militias also push weak 30 states along the process toward becoming failed states, creating greater regional and global instability" (p. 901).

Iraq has faced so many challenges where DDR is necessity necessarily. This approach is going to be an ongoing in fluid process rather than something that you start do for a while and then just finish. The goal is to figure out how to balance starting DDR with the need to continue military operations and use of coercive measures. The new approach will help Iraq to ensure the democratic process, reduce violence, reduce corruption, enhance the performance of Iraqi forces, and contribute to the regional stability in terms of security and politics.

I argue that it is in the interests of the US and International community to help

Iraqi government to implement the new approach because these militias are not only endangering the stability of Iraq, but they have also attacked the US embassy and the coalition forces and the humanitarian missions in the country. There were many attacks from 2019 to 2021 in multiple cities in Iraq like Irbil, Baghdad, Kirkuk and Anbar targeting military base. It is reported that "21 rockets hit inside the heavily fortified Green

Zone—where the embassy and a base hosting troops from the U.S.-led coalition are located" (Gordon & Lubold, 2020). These attacks became usual for Iraqis as many of these rockets have threatened civilians’ houses and lives. In is also reported that "militias have claimed responsibility for dozens of attacks on Iraqi convoys transporting equipment for the U.S.-led coalition" (Gordon & Lubold, 2020). In other words, many

Iraqi forces were also injured and died in these attacks; thus, these militias represent a real threat to the Iraqi forces as well. 31

Characteristics of Militias in Iraq

In DDR some militia groups may give their arms if they feel that there are some incentives that can be given during negotiation. Unlike, militia groups who will be unwilling to be bought in with incentives. Thus, the need to show what kind of militias are in Iraq is explained in this section. Iraq's militias fit the description that is given by

Shultz, Farah, and Lochard who tried to define a militia, which is meant to distinguish militias from other irregular forces. Specifically:

• Most militias in Iraq represent specific ethnic, religious, tribal, clan, or other

communal groups.

• Most Religious and political figures have militias under their command

• Some militias’ members were part of the army forces at some point

• Many of these militias are pro-government militias, "they service of the state,

either directly or indirectly".

• Many militias' members have no formal military training because the recruitment

was/is based on their ethnicity or ideology (Thurber 2014, p. 902).

Also, that fact that Iraq has many political parties and religious figures who have their own militias that created PGMs in Iraq's society, which have been inflicting violence against protesters and activities for the benefit of the government. It is important define PGMs to understand their characteristics. They are “a group that (1) is identified as pro-government or sponsored by the government (national or subnational),

(2) is identified as not being part of the regular security forces, (3) is armed, and (4) has some level of organization” (Clayton & Thomson, 2016, p. 502). Also, there are two 32 types of PGMs in relation to their link with the state, which are either “informal” or

“semi-official” (Clayton & Thomson, 2016, p. 500). Mitchell et al. (2014) believes that

PGMs are more likely to produce opportunistic violence, which "governments may take advantage of these informal armed groups in order to shift responsibility for the violence they commit" (p. 814). This shows how it is difficult to control these militias as they are backed by the government itself. Also, most militias are led either by political parties, religious figures or politicians.

According to Ahram (2016) PGMs have the ability and the means to continue their violent activities even after the conflict, which would make it difficult for the government to maintain peace and obtain the trust of the citizens. Thus, the government would not be able to uphold the rule of law and would be seen as a weak government.

Also, PGMs collaborate with the government to keep the order in some cities; however, they do not have a legitimate status as the armed forces; thus, modern PGMs are characterized as a "form of state organized crime" (Ahram, 2016, p. 2). Therefore, some of these PGMs serve on behalf of the government to eliminate some opponents and threats by using violence and because they do not obey the law, they can be efficient and effective (Ahram, 2016; Mitchell et al., 2014). Hence, the government can always blame these militias for the violence and deny any involvement with them (Ahram, 2016; Carey

& Mitchell, 2016). Therefore, it is not hard to understand how PGMs can be beneficial for the government and not so beneficial for the DDR programs, since they can skip the implementation of these programs. Moreover, PGMs are a profitable business from many groups, and they will be "active regardless of regime type, the degree of regime 33 institutionalization and longevity, and the duration of individual rulers" because they serve a purpose, which is keeping some leaders in power (Ahram, 2016, p.2). Therefore, this needs to be taken into consideration when it comes to designing DDR to ensure the accountability of the government’s officials.

Furthermore, PGMs benefit the government by offering cheap human capital, keeping rural communities in line, and fight on behalf of the armed forces, which reduces their casualties; and in return, these militias tend to get privileges that is given by the government (Steinert et al., 2019; Carey et al., 2012). Yet, PGMs are a risk factor that can start an internal conflict, a civil war, and harm civilians as well as the infrastructure of a state, since the accumulation of wealth may shift the PGMs primary focus from political goals and ideologies to fight for their own benefits (Carey et al., 2013; Steinert et al., 2019). Thus, it is a challenge for the Iraqi's policymakers to address this issue as many officials within the government may oppose the implementation of DDR.

According to Beehner (2006), "growing number of small, homegrown, paramilitary-style brigades", which are "formed by local tribes, religious leaders, and political parties" to fight with the government against insurgents’ groups like Al-Qaeda.

Likewise, most larger and powerful militias like the Badr Brigade and the peshmerga, which are tied to the political system as they are known to be military wings for the leading political parties (Beehner, 2006). Paramilitaries can provide a cost-effective way to rapidly expand the manpower engaged in a counterinsurgency campaign. But perhaps more importantly, paramilitaries offer regimes an opportunity to engage in brutal repression while shedding accountability for human rights abuses. (Thurber 2014, p. 34

903). Another reasons that militias' leaders won’t to agree to sign a peace agreement is that fact that some of them have a strong linkage to Iran such as such as Kata’ib

Hezbollah and Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq (Thurber 2014, p. 906; Boot, 2020). In addition, there is the tension among militias leaders and members, which would make it difficult to bring them on one table to negotiate disarming and reintegration of their militias. Thurber

(2014) talks about the tension between the Sadr and Hakim families that has been there for decades. This shows that it is the age of militias rivalry over economic and political benefits in Iraq. Thus, the existing DDR program won’t be to overcome this challenge.

DDR in Iraq

DDR has been discussed extensively in the focus since the end of the Cold War.

Many DDR programs have been implemented throughout the years in post-conflict as well as during violent conflict around the world. Most of these programs have been under international lead organization like the UN peacekeeping (PKO) and peace support operation (PSO) in addition to the financial support from "World Bank, the United

Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the International Labour Organisation (ILO) and numerous other national development agencies and non-governmental organisations

(NGOs) active in the area of development co-operation and peace consolidation" (Rufer,

2005, p. 20). This shows how important DDR programs are, not only for the countries who are suffering from militias, but also for the international community. Moreover,

DDR is considered to be part of peace processes because is constitutes an "essential confidence-building measure" (Gleichmann et al., 2004, p. 17). The planning of DDR starts the moment where all parties are willing to start peace negotiations because it is 35 essential for these parties to be motivated to continue the peace process (Gleichmann et al., 2004, p. 17). This means that all parties should be willingly committed to the implementation of DDR.

As classically understood, DDR is meant to start after there is a piece arrangement agreement treaty, but conflict that exists in Iraq is often quite fluid, and violence is rarely ever just fully over because new conflict emerges. Thus, one of the biggest challenges in making DDR work is the fact that there is often not a finished piece to be capped as you have demobilized demilitarized old groups sometimes new groups to merge, or they shift.

In the case of Iraq, most these militia leaders have a powerful influence over the government as well as having tense relationship over power and resources. One of the main prerequisites of standard DDR is peace agreement, which is not applicable in Iraq's case. Another factor that is not applicable is the willingness to corporate militias in DDR program since militias in Iraq can be described as regimes or/and foreign proxies. Also, the fear of growing number of militias within different factions that competing for power within Iraqi government.

Standard DDR emphasizes reforming the security sector and re-building the army; however, the Iraqi army and police have shown operational capacity in the war against

ISIS, which resulted in the full liberation of all occupied cities in Iraq on 10 July 2017

(Levenson & Karadsheh, 2017). The victory against ISIS has rebooted the confident of the Iraqi Army due to training and equipment that were provided by the US military and the coalition. In 2021, Global Firepower reported that Iraq ranks 57 out of 140 in its annual review. According to Aziz and Van Veen (2019), the Iraqi Army and Counter 36

Terrorism Service are the traditional armed forces in addition to the federal policy. The

Iraqi Army has "300,000 soldiers and approximately $17.3 billion in 2019" and "the

Counter Terrorism Service is only a division-sized military unit, but it is highly competent, it is considered closely aligned with U.S. interests, and it performed well in the fight against the Islamic State" (Aziz &Van Veen, 2019). It has 10,000–12,000 personnel and $800 million budget (2018–2019) (Aziz & Van Veen, 2019). However, the multiple militias that are trying to take over the responsibilities of Iraqi Army in terms of internal security may impose threat within the authority of the military forces in Iraq.

Iraq's PMFs was established in 2014 due to ISIS occupying about a third of Iraq and the collapsed of Iraqi army in facing this threat at the time (Haddad, 2018). Grand

Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani who is the most widely emulated Shi’a cleric, "issued a fatwa calling upon Iraqis to join the Iraqi security forces to help repel the IS threat," which they are highly motivated to defend Iraq (Aziz & Van Veen, 2019; Haddad, 2018). However, the PMF should have been under the control and the structure of Iraq traditional military; yet some divisions within the PMF “brigades” "contains an array of independent groups and “formations,” which vary in their origin, orientation, power, ideological leanings, and proximity to Iran" (Day, et. al, 2020, p32; Aziz & Van Veen, 2019).

The final element of the standard DDR is ownership and community involvement.

According to standard DDR, "local NGOs and civil society should participate to the maximum extent possible in DDR exercises, particularly in the reconciliation and peacebuilding process" (Rufer, 2005, p. 119). However, assessment of the Iraqi Civil Society

(ICS), the National Democratic Institute (2011) published that they are "are hesitant to 37 criticize certain public officials or the government’s policy on certain issues". Moreover, militias have been targeting the Iraqi civil society organizations (CSOs); militias have been violently responding to their protests because they criticized the government, which eventually threaten civic engagement (Halawa, 2020). In short, CSOs in Iraq are under attack and this has impacted their willingness to be a part of in policymaking or decision- making.

In terms of national and local governments should pave the way to the Iraqi military forces to implement the forcible measures that is needed in disarming militias in

Iraq within the fluid DDR. In this regard, "military actors play a key role in disarmament and demobilization, both sensitive issues with regard to the balance of power and security, while reintegration programmers are often organized by civilian sub- organizations of the United Nations" (Rufer, 2005, p. 119). Thus, the responsibilities for the implementation should be mainly under the Iraqi military forces with full support from the national and local government. Iraqi military has the advantage of having the support of Iraqis and the recent victories against ISIS.

In conclusion, standard DDR approach is not going to work in case of Iraq due the absence of most prerequisites for a successful standard DDR approach. This leaves policymakers and Iraq officials in the government with fluid DDR approach because it is more flexible.

Chapter 3: Fluid DDR and Prospects of Success in Iraq

Challenges in Iraq’s history since the 2003 invasion and various times where there were already kind of a history of attempting to do DDR while also fighting other groups.

DDR efforts have been implemented in Iraq in different times with different groups; however, the results were not effective in both these efforts. DDR efforts were not given the attention and the careful planning that it needed. These below examples of DDR in

Iraq were not completed; thus, it failed to stabilize the country; on the contrary, it escalated the violence in Iraq.

The Past Attempts of DDR in Iraq

The demobilization of Iraq Army in 2003, when the United States (US) invaded

Iraq and appointed a diplomatic mission head as the head of the provisional government for one year, the decrees that this short-term government ordered dismantled of the Iraqi

Army and put a stop on any future activities from the Baath Party, a prominent party that was controlling everything during the Saddam Hussein era (Pfiffner, 2010). The

Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) headed by Lwwis Paul Bremer who ordered to start the De-Baathification process, which dissolved the whole army systema as well as dismissed all Iraqi soldiers (Isakhan, 2015). Thus, after the army was completely annihilated, the jobless soldiers all came out to streets and took guns, starting to form their own militia resistant groups, which were mostly regional and religious based. These uncontrolled and freed former Iraqi army men were well trained to use different weapons, thus they started to train other militias that joined their groups. "In Iraq, according to most military experts, the early demobilization of the Iraqi Army led to the current 39 violent insurgency" (Doolan, 2008, p.7). This shows that coercive measures were taking to demobilized Iraqi Army that was considered Baathists without going forward with the disarming and reintegration of these personals. This is a lesson learnt of IQ and other organizations to keep in mind while implementing coercive DDR.

Disarming and demobilization of the Mahdi Army in 2007, the operation that was known as the Surge started in 2007 where Iraqi Army and American-led coalition

(Krohley, 2005). the Mahdi Army was a Shia majority militia group (Jaysh al-Mehdi in

Arabic) led by a Shia cleric, Muqtada al-Sadr, which was highly active in “participating in sectarian violence” (Hunt, 2020). The Mahdi Army controlled all the resources of

Iraq's ports in the Persian Gulf (Krohley, 2005). In this regard, Iraqi Army and American- led coalition targeted prominent militants who were captured killed or forced to flee, which left the Mahdi Army without its commanders (Krohley, 2005). This resulted in weaking the militia who dominated much of Baghdad and southern cities in Iraq

(Krohley, 2005). Also, the fact that American soldiers were fighting side by side with

Iraqi military that made this operation successful in a very short term. The operation ended with ceasefire which helped improve Iraq’s security environment, was positively perceived by different political parties and the public, including the Sunnis residing in

Baghdad (Hunt, 2020). This shows how important to collaborate with different entities to ensure successful results. In the same year of 2008, Muqtada al-Sadr announced the dissolution of the Mahdi Army.

These two examples of DDR were imposed and implemented by the US and there was little input from the national and local government. According to Isakhan (2015), de- 40

Baathification filed to address sectarian divides in Iraqi history, marginalized Sunni, forced thousands of Iraqi military personals into unemployment and poverty, which ended up in upsurging in violence (p. 23). Therefore, Sunnis chose to support the rebel groups against the coalition forces and the Iraqi government" (Rached & Bali, 2019, p.

218). In the case of the surge, this strategy was to reduce violence for a short-term, which neglected the long-term sustainable peace (Simon, 2008). Also, the surge created more combatants when they established Concerned Local Citizen (CLC) groups, which they were more than 77,000 Iraqis mostly Sunnis to solve Al-Qaeda issue and to give them the right to defend themselves in their areas, which they kept the weapons (Biddle, 2008).

Moreover, after the ceasefires that was agreed on, Mahdi Army militia was demobilized; however, these ex-combatants were left without financial support (Biddle, 2008). Thus, these two cases should be taken in consideration when we apply fluid DDR as the surge was a successful in the short run in using coercive measures in disarming and demobilization; however, it did not acknowledge the importance of reintegration.

DDR has been modified many times to fit the context of a country to ensure best results. Innovation became crucial for DDR; many scholars have written books and journal articles analyzing the results of DDR programs and coming up with changes that would work in the future. According to Rufer (2005), "post conflict DDR in the peace process is very much determined by the context" (p. 42). Also, Burke (2015) talks about the "context sensitivity", which he believes that it is important in terms of implementing and designing DDR programs (p.19). He further adds that "stereotyped plans that are not customized to each DDR situation will yield sub-optimal results" (p. 19). DDR planners 41 should understand the complicity of the country and studying previous DDR programs attempts to understand what kind of approach works the best in this country. The world is changing especially when it comes to violence and militias; thus, DDR programs required revisions given the "fundamental changes in the dynamics of organized violence in

Africa, Asia, and the Middle East" (Muggah & O'Donnell, 2015). Therefore, policy makers and practitioners should be updating practices and "how to adapt DDR programs to these new realities" (Muggah & O'Donnell, 2015).

This indication showed that DDR should evolve and adapted "the new realities"

(Muggah & O'Donnell, 2015). In Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Somalia,

DDR was "coincided with a more forceful military intervention revealed a new ‘stick then carrot’ approach to addressing non-state armed groups that continued to engage in violence" (Muggah & O'Donnell. This was encountered when policy makers and practitioners had to deal with the 2004 crisis in Haiti (Muggah & O'Donnell, 2015). The government of these countries had to use coercive measure "after ten years of being offered an option to voluntarily join a DDR program", which was met by refusal; thus, the coercive DDR approach was implemented as solution to end the violence in these countries (Muggah & O'Donnell 2015). ‘Stick then carrot’ approach or coercive DDR approach has been used in many countries even in the international relations and foreign policy.

In similar circumstances, other states have implemented coercive DDR in efforts to disarming their militias. For example, Albanian's case is considered to be "an example of a successful implementation of coercive disarmament" (Doolan, 2008, p.15). In Feb 42

1998, the Albanian government asked the international community to be involved in helping them implement the coercive disarmament of civilians in Albania where civilians armed themselves and fought against the government (Doolan, 2008, p.15). "The fear of a possible civil war in an unstable region led the international community in April 1997 to launch “Operation Alba,” a multinational force led by Italy and supported by the UN

Security Council," which led to disarming civilians that was ended in August 1999

(Doolan, 2008, p.50).

DDR program was implemented in Haiti from 2004 to 2009; however, the standard DDR was not that effective because it was not context based (Molloy, 2017).

There was no peace agreement and most of the violence was committed by gangs and criminals in the country where most of the gang leaders were in a strong relation with powerful elites in Haiti (Molloy, 2017). Violent groups like gangs and criminals impose a threat to the state and the citizens, which DDR or the responses "must be reactive, not preventive", which "DDR implemented must be able to convince violent gangs into discontinuing their profitable, illegal, and violent activities (Doolan, 2008, p. 68).

Violence and criminal activities like killing and kidnaping were increasing that in 2006,

Haiti's president, Preval stated in public that "gang members should join the DDR process, or the state would kill them" (Molloy, 2017, p. 70-72). This led to many of the gang members to join DDR forcibly by the government. Another example is Somalia where coercive measures were used in implementing DDR program. Somalian government choose ‘stick then carrot’ DDR approach that applied forcible measures 43 against Al Shabaab using the military to re-gain territorial control of the capital

Mogadishu in 2011 (Muggah & O'Donnell, 2015).

Pros vs Cons of Coercive DDR

Coercive DDR approach has its advantage and disadvantage, which I will be addressing; however, fluid DDR is a flexible approach that is based on the context and the situation of a country like Iraq. Also, these disadvantages are important to take in consideration for fluid DDR approach when it is time to be implemented in Iraq.

Table 1

Pros and Cons of Coercive DDR

Pros Cons

It gives you short-term stability in It does not break the linkage of the

Iraq and Haiti (Simon, 2008; gang members with their leaders or

Doolan, 2008) other gang members (Molloy, 2017)

Force policymakers to acknowledge Changing its "strategy and tactics the complexity of the context of from conventional military countries and the nature of the engagements to almost exclusively conflict (Burns and Worsley 2015, p. asymmetric warfare" like in Somalia

18). (Muggah & O'Donnell, 2015).

Lead to more violence in some Working despite the lack of peace situations (Doolan, 2008) agreement (Doolan, 2008)

The Impact of the Militias in Iraq

In Iraq, the aim of creating these groups was to protect Iraqi civilians; however, some of them were fighting against Iraq interest. These groups were not following the

Iraqi laws or the military practices. Many people flagged that these militias are imposing a threat to the sovereignty of the Iraqi government and impacting the stability of the country as they are engaging in violence activities. This issue has become under the spotlight because these militias have started attacking civilians, suppressing civil society, attacking foreign diplomatic missions and investors, illegally detaining civilians (Knights

& Mello, 2019).

The issue of armed groups and militias is a public problem because it threatens the security, stability, and development of the country. The Iraqi government is accountable and responsible for a stable Iraqi society as well as building strong confidence in citizens (Brinkerhoff & Johnson, 2009). In other words, the citizens are looking to the government to act accordingly because the Iraqi government has the resource the power to intervene. As it was mentioned above, these militias are attacking civilians and play the role of the government and undermine the responsibilities of the government as well. Also, "Iran’s Iraq policy apparently moved from a hard strategy of mainly clandestine military support of various Shi‘a militias to a soft strategy of influence, largely aimed at exerting control over Iraq’s economic and political life" 45

(Rahimi, 2012, p. 27). This means that some of these militias and armed groups are serving the interest of Iran not the Iraqi people. This would weaken the Iraqi authority and threaten the sovereignty of Iraq. Iraq needs to be strengthened to discourage other countries in the region from meddling in its internal affairs, which would result in the unraveling of regional order; its stability is key to restoring a balance of power (Sky,

2017).

It was mentioned before that "the militias are embedded in mainstream society" because these militias are formed out of religious, ethnic and geographical divisions of

Iraq (Cigar, 2015, p. ix). Thus, these militias have been given legitimacy in Iraq. British

Army Maj. Gen. Kevin Copsey said that Iraq is facing four threats and," “the fourth one is the militia groups,” which he believes is very crucial (Williams, 2021). Many Iraqis agree with him as they see what these militias are doing and how they use violence against civilians like Saifuddin Ali, journalist and blogger said that " The methods of suppressing freedom have varied and differed such as kidnapping, killing, arresting and beating continue" (Alhurra, 2020). However, most importantly, they believe that they are loyal to Iran and its benefits in Iraq. Iran has “turn Iraq into a proxy state of Iran,” by using the militia groups that take orders from Tehran (Williams, 2021).

"Fluid" DDR

Fluid DDR is a flexible approach that is mixed approach of the three approaches, cooperative, coercive and integrated approaches. Implementing coercive measures in terms of disarming and demobilizing where militias would be forced to sign a peace agreement like what happened in Iraq during the surge. Also, militia leaders would come 46 to negotiate the peace treaty with the government and other international and local organizations. Reintegrating ex-combatants back into the community is very important because it would prevent the conflict from relapsing. The fluid approach should be carefully planned with the emphasizes that the government would not hesitate in using force when it comes to disarmament and demobilize militias; however, development and reintegration process would be a key to a successful implementation of fluid DDR approach. Therefore, fluid DDR can be implemented in Iraq and it could result in a successful implementation if the government invested in the planning and the implementation with the support of international community. Iraqi military is capable of carrying out balanced coercive measures in disarming with focus on the demobilization and reintegration process if it gained the social and political support.

Possibilities of a Successful Fluid DDR

The legal framework is important because this is what justified coercive measures in DDR applanation. In this regard, the constitution of Iraq does not allow any form of armed groups or militias. It states clearly in the Iraqi constitution in Article 9, "B. The formation of military militias outside the framework of the armed forces is prohibited"

(Constitutions Project Organization, 2020, p. 6). Also, in Article 78 in the constitution, which positions the leadership of the army forces, " The Prime Minister is the direct executive authority responsible for the general policy of the State and the commander-in- chief of the armed forces" (Constitutions Project Organization, 2020, p. 27).

To have a successful coercive DDR approach in terms of Iraqi context, Iraq would need to collaborate with multiple international organizations and international community 47 like the United States and UN peacekeeping (Doolan, 2008, p.7). This would empower

Iraq in its efforts to disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of militias in Iraq and push Iraqi government to take actions to bring these militias to sign a peace treaty. The

US has been "assisting the training of Iraqi security forces, helping to advise Iraqi leaders, and providing crucial assistance in areas such as intelligence, targeting, and logistics" (Boot, 2020).

It is evident that Iraqi government has a “very little” control over the militias

(Williams, 2021). Thus, the Iraqi government should acknowledge the fact that this is affecting its image and legitimacy in the eyes of its citizens and the international community. It is not good reputation to be seen as the puppet of Iran. Thus, Iraqi government "should openly acknowledge that working toward a monopoly of the traditional army and police on the domestic use of force (Aziz & Van Veen, 2019).

Therefore, Iraqi government should take advantage of fluid DDR approach to reestablish itself as the only legitimate authority in using violence. Therefore, Iraqi government should start it’s a conversation with regional actors like Iran as many of these militias have shown that they are heavily influenced by it, which will give Iraq a leverage over these militias.

Finally, Iraqi government should apply the "threat perceptions: people are more likely to perceive a threat from a group if they hold negative stereotypes," which Iraqi government can use the threat strategy in showing how militias are harming Iraq

(Kaufman, 2014, p.7-8). This would reduce their popularity. Also, threat is a powerful tool that should be used in the fluid DDR approach that shows that militias as outgroup, 48 which would lead to the rejection of these militias (Kaufman, 2014, p.7-8). According to

Kaufman (2014), “social threats are significant in affecting attitudes toward outgroups," which would give Iraqi government an advantage over these militias (p.7-8).

In conclusion, fluid DDR program is a new flexible approach that balances between coercive measures of disarmament and importance of demobilization and reintegration. In Iraq, conflicts have empowered militias, and the fact that the Iraqi government has been influenced heavily by the leaders of these militias and armed groups, has made it difficult to control these militias. These militias are a real hazard for

Iraq’s political stability and security. The implementation of DDR has been changing with the context of many countries where scholars and international organization have invested a lot of money and efforts to understand the context and analyze the situation to get successful results. The existing DDR playbook is not going to work in Iraq; thus, fluid DDR can be a possible solution for Iraq.

Chapter 4: The Role of Economic Development as a Tool for Reintegration of Ex-

combatants

It is equally necessary to invest in economic development that will make reintegration easy as it is to invest in demobilization and disarmament, which will increase the chances for DDR to be more successful. I see economic development as a key part of DDR right now you're like DDR will make economic development and rehabilitation because economic rehabilitation and reintegration is part of DDR, and it is one of the most essential due to the impact that can have on the ex- combatants that would make important difference in the whole process. According to Rufer (2005), DDR is a fundamental part of development approach where DDR is seen as part of peacekeeping package that can reduce the possibility of resuming violence as well as

"facilitating a society's transition from conflict to normality and development" (Rufer,

2005, p. 12).

Iraq has experienced many conflicts and wars in the last few decades, which have left the country with many issues and poor infostructure. Iraq needs to start developing its economy and society and to do that it should eliminate any threats that are imposed on the development of Iraq. The militias are endangering the stability of the economy in Iraq because they have been using the resources of Iraq for their own benefit. This chapter examines how coercive DDR will be triggering the prosperity of Iraq's economy.

Development is another prerequisite for a successful standard DDR, which is mentioned in many scholar articles. According to Gleichmann et al. (2004) "well-planned development cooperation can provide a sound basis for making DDR programmer 50 successful" (p. 26). However, in Iraq's case, cooperation is hard to achieve due to the control of the militias over investment and development projects. According to Hisham al-Hashimi, an Iraqi scholar, militia “have wrested pervasive control over much of the

Iraqi economy" where they are controlling "airport customs, construction projects, oilfields, sewage, water, highways, colleges, public and private property, tourism sites, presidential palaces; and the extortion of restaurants, cafes, cargo trucks, fishermen, farmers,” (Boot, 2020)

The Economic Situation of Iraq

Iraq's Living Standards

Figure 1: Iraq GNI (World Development Indicators)

Iraq's GNI Per Capita, 1980-2019 $8 $7 $6 $5 $4 $3 $2 $1 $0 GNI Per Capital in US in $ (Thousands) GNI Capital Per 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 Years of Collected GNI Data

Iraq has a complicated history due to ethnically fragmented society by ongoing

Shia and Sunni rivalry, military coup against kingship, fought in first Arab-Israeli War,

Iraq-Iran War (1980-88), invasion of Kuwait and precipitating in the Gulf War of early

1991, international sanctions, the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, civil war (2007-2011), and fought against ISIS in 2014 to 2017 (Library of Congress, 2006). These events have made it difficult for Iraq's economy to flourish because it lacks the basic element, which is stability. Iraq is highly depending on oil revenue and most of the jobs are in government.

There are also poor service, poor government and corruption (The World Bank, 2020).

Thus, when oil prices drop, Iraq tends to face a fiscal crisis.

Analysis of Iraq's GNI. Iraq has started reporting data to the to the World Bank in 1980; however, the imposition of sanctions in 1991 made Iraq to stop sending data to the WB. The sanctions progressively worsened the living standards of Iraqis; therefore, in

1997, the UN's program Oil-for-Food was established, but this program did not help

Iraqis and the crisis continued (Library of Congress, 2006). As the graph shows, Iraq’s economy has seen a gradual decline from 1980 to 1988 due to the Iraq-Iran war, and significant growth after the war in 1990. However, in 1991, Iraq GNI declined rapidly because of the international sanctions that was imposed by the US. Thus, Iraq stopped reporting data to the World Bank untill 2006 when a national election happened, and new permanent government elected (Library of Congress, 2006). From 2006 till 2013, the

GNI of Iraq was on a steady increase despite with security issues; however, in 2014, ISI invaded large many cities in Iraq, which had weakened the economy of Iraq until 2017 52 when Iraq declared that all cities were retaken and the war against ISIS was over (BBC,

2018). Thus, the GNI of Iraq is gradually increasing as it is shown in the graph above.

According to the WB, Iraq is considered one of the economies with upper middle income (Shafaq News, 2020). However, the poverty in Iraq is relatively high at 22.9% with a poverty gap of 4.5% which means "7 million Iraqis (23% of the total population) live in poverty" who are spending less than 2.2 US$ per person per day (Rawaf et al.,

2014; United Nations Iraq, n.d.). A huge portion, 11 percent of the county still suffers from high unemployment rate while 65 percent of Iraq’s GDP comes from the oil sector, it only employs 1 percent of the total labor (United Nations Iraq, n.d.). the Gross National

Income (GNI) of Iraq is $5,740, a 13.44 precent increase from 2018 (Macrotrends, 2020).

Meanwhile 71 precent of Iraqis live in urban areas, which they live in "slum-like conditions" (United Nations Iraq, n.d.). Iraq's GDP growth is accelerated to 6.2 percent from 2019 which is sustained by higher oil production (The World Bank, 2018).

Iraq's GNI has been impacted badly with COVID-19, as the economy is depending on oil predication and prices in the market. Iraq’s economic prosperity relays on the oil prices and this puts Iraq at a risky situation; therefore, Iraq needs to diversify its revenue and start developing other sectors like agriculture, building factories, encouraging small enterprises and improve its infostructures for global investment.

Foreign Direct Investment, Net Inflows

Figure 2: Iraq's Foreign direct investment, net inflows (World Development Indicators)

Iraq's Foreign direct investment, net inflows (1971- 6.00 2019)

4.00 Billions

2.00

0.00 1971 1975 1979 1983 1987 1991 1995 1999 2003 2007 2011 2015 2019 -2.00

-4.00

-6.00

-8.00

-10.00 Foreign direct investment, net… -12.00

Iraq's economy has been growing gradually after 2017 after the defeat of ISIS, and there are high expectations that Iraqi government will attract foreign investment.

However, according to The World Bank (2017), "A country’s investment competitiveness goes beyond attracting FDI. It is determined by the country’s ability to bring in, retain, and leverage private investment for inclusive and sustainable economic growth". These characteristics are yet to be developed in Iraq despite the fact that Iraq has offered many, and foreign companies showed interest increasing their endeavor in 54 exploring non-oil trade with and investment in Iraq (U.S. Department of State, 2020).

The question is whether they will put their money in an insecure and politically unstable country.

Analysis of Iraq's FDI. The analysis of the above graph of Iraq’s FDI, from

1971-2019, shows the average value for Iraq for these years "was -0.26 percent with a minimum of -4.34 percent in 2014 and a maximum of 1.56 percent in 2012. The latest value from 2019 is -1.29 percent. For comparison, the world average in 2019 based on 97 countries is 4.17 percent" (The Global Economy, 2020). Thus, Iraq's foreign direct investment, net inflows (% of GDP) fluctuated significantly in recent years; it decreased through 1987-2019 that was ended at -1.29 % in 2019, but it was better than 2018 where it was -4,885 million US dollars (Knoema, 2020). The graph shows how from 2003 the

FDI started to increase in which more foreign firms were coming to Iraq; yet the graph shows some ups and downs until to 2012 where it falls badly due to ISIS occupation and the war against. UNCTAD's 2020 World Investment Report states that FDI latest stock data in 2018 fell to 10.1 billion US dollar, accounting for nearly 5.3% of GDP of the country (Nordea, 2020). Since 2013 FDI has recorded negative inflow, which shows how

Iraq has had challenges in attracting foreign firms due to its lack of security, fragile institutions and corrupt government (Nordea, 2020).

Iraq is the fourth largest proven oil reserves in the world; however, the oil sector needs major reconstruction efforts and infrastructure development (Nordea, 2020). Thus, even the foreign investors are finding hard to invest in the oil sector due to these challenges. Yet, it is the major sector that draws in foreign companies, and the majority 55 of FDI goes to the oil industry (Nordea, 2020). Adding to the oil industry, "the production of cement and the construction & public works sector offer interesting opportunities for investment", which shows that Iraq has the potential to attract more investors (Nordea, 2020). The top investors in Iraq are the United States and the

European Union, which are leading the inflow of money to Iraq's economy (Nordea,

2020).

Iraq changed many laws and made them in favor of the foreign investors like "a foreign investor is entitled to make investments in Iraq on terms no less favorable than those applicable to an Iraqi investor, and the amount of foreign participation is not limited" (U.S. Department of State, 2020). Also, Iraqi government passed an amended

National Investment Law (NIL) that enhances investment terms for foreign investors, which "allows them to purchase land in Iraq for certain projects and speeds up the investment license process" as well as joining the International Convention on the

Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nations of Other States (ICSID)

(U.S. Department of State, 2020).

Iraq Imports and Exports

Figure 3: Iraq Export and Import (World Development Indicators)

Iraq's Export and Import 1970-2019 Data

$120.00

$100.00

$80.00

$60.00

$40.00

$20.00

$0.00 Export and Import in US $ (Billions ) 1971 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017 2019

Years of Collected Data Exports of goods and services (current US$) Imports of goods and services (current US$)

Iraq is the second in the world in terms of oil reserves, which makes it one of the largest oil-exporting countries (Britannica, 2020). "Petroleum is Iraq’s most valuable mineral"; its production makes up the largest portion of GDP and represents most of

Iraq’s foreign exchange (Britannica, 2020). Therefore, Iraq has not invested in other minerals' production despite the fact that Iraq has a rich soil that contains many underground minerals.

Analysis of Iraq's Exports and Imports. In the chart above, the divergence between the imports and exports were minimal until 1978 where Iraq was exporting more 57 than importing; however, starting from 1981, the gap became bigger as Iraq was in war with Iran, which lasted for 8 years. This war has impacted both the import and the export of the country. From 1991 to 2003, Iraq stopped reporting its data to the World Bank; however, from 2004 to 2019, Iraq has increased its exports and imports after the fall of

Saddam's regime. In terms of facts and figures, Iraq in 2018 was "the number 48 economy in the world in terms of GDP (current US$), the number 40 in total exports in, the number 56 in total imports" (OCE, 2020). Thus, Iraq in 2018 exported $87.4B and imported $43.1B, which resulted in a positive trade balance of $44.2B; therefore, Iraq has been recording trade surpluses since 2005 due to a rise in the shipments of oil (99 percent of total exports) (Trading Economics, 2020; OCE, 2020).

Iraq has few trade barriers, which makes it an open market to foreign trade, and that represents almost 80% of the country's GDP; therefore, Iraq's trade policy aims to integrate its economy into regional and international markets (Nordea, 2020). Most imports get a tariff waiver and are taxed at 5 percent (USTR, 2020 and Import-Export

Solutions, 2020). Iraq needs to step up and works hard to catch up with the rest of the world in terms of the ports efficient game. These challenges have shown that Iraq is far behind in terms.

Analysis of the Economic Situation in Iraq

Additionally, Iraq's debt report stated that a 15 billion Iraqi dinar internal debt and

$5 billion external debt have been agreed on recently (MECRA, 2021). Thus, Iraq would be having a low credibility among international in terms of debt (MECRA, 2021). This resulted in Iraq 's shortage of 71 billion IQD due to "Iraq has multiple border crossings 58 which are not under Iraqi government control rather, they are controlled by militias"

(MECRA, 2021). This a huge concern for Iraqi people especially following what is happening to Lebanon’s financial system. Lebanon’s context is very much similar to Iraq; thus, this will show where Iraq may be heading towards if the economy of Iraq kept under the control of the militias. For example, due to the rising influence of Iran through

Hezbollah, armed Lebanese Shi’ite group that has political power, Gulf countries that are

Sunni Muslim left the country with their investment and money (Blair, 2020). Another example, the sectarian parties, or militias that "are looking after their own interests" are another factor in the economic crisis that is facing Lebanon (BBC News, 2020). This is the same scenario for Iraq where these militias "sole ethic is self-enrichment" (Worth,

2020); thus, it is important for to balance coercive measures when applying DDR approach. It is a prerequisite to Iraq's development. Adding to the that, Iraq's unemployment rate for 2019 was 12.82%, which is a 0.04% decline from 2018

(Macrotrends, 2021). In most cases, men who have secure jobs are less likely to be involved in violence, which means that they will not be joining militias or armed groups out of grievances (Berman et al., 2011).

Through reintegration, the issues of corruption will be reduced, and this would lead to the improve of Iraq economy. Militias in Iraq are controlling much of the economy. One of the militias, Kataib Hezbollah is controlling Baghdad airport with another Iranian-backed militia, Asaib Ahl al-Haq (Worth, 2020). Baghdad airport is important for Iraq's economy because it is the major airport for Iraq's revenue. These militias have created their own companies in order to control most of the development 59 and investment contracts in Iraq. For example, one of Kataib Hezbollah companies

"received a 12-year contract at the Baghdad and Basra airports, worth tens of millions of dollars a year, even though the firm — the blandly named Gulf corporation — was only two months old" (Worth, 2020). This shows how millions of dollars are being stolen by militias through corruption. These actions are discouraging local and international companies from working and investing in Iraq. Also, reports show that the militias have controlled "much of the trade through Iraq’s southern seaports" where they embezzle

Iraq's money through economic committees and their people (Worth, 2020). They also do money laundering, and they are smuggling dollars to Iran through the borders (Worth,

2020).

In conclusion, supporting fluid DDR will create a stable environment for a long- term development and economic prosperity in Iraq. “I think there's two major threats to the country of Iraq right now," the first one is the militias and the second one is the economy, said Lt. Gen. Paul Calvert, the commander of the U.S.-led mission (Williams,

2021). The fluid DDR approach is a key to address these two major threats. "DDR is a window of opportunity for development cooperation" (Rufer, 2005, p.52), which would encourage many countries to come and invest in Iraq. This would result in creating more jobs, diversifying the economy and building economic infostructures, which would be stretching the economy on the long run.

Chapter 5: Conclusion

DDR programs differ from one country to another as well as the typology of the group; thus, it is important for the development practitioners, governmental institutions, and international organizations to understand the challenges. Iraq has many different militia groups like PGMs and foreign proxy militias. Fluid DDR approach should be considered for policymakers because these militias have the ability and the means to continue their violent activities; therefore, it would make it difficult for the government to maintain peace. Thus, DDR approach program should be more flexible in terms of Iraq and should be balanced with a coercion measures that would contribute to the stability of

Iraq if it implemented carefully.

Through an examination of the situation of Iraq after 2003 and the complexity of the society have made Iraq a fertile environment for sectarian war, resistance movements against US Army and Iraqi government after 2003-2011, Al-Qaeda, and ISIS. The militia groups in Iraq are a controversial issue because they are mostly ethnicity and religion based, which installed fear and increase the chances of the country going into further violence and a possible civil war. In the previous chapters, I analyze how standard DDR will not work in cases of Iraq, and previous attempts of DDR in Iraq. The lack of peace agreement between militias and Iraqi government would make difficult for standard

DDR; thus, fluid DDR approach is one of possible solutions for Iraq overcome the issue of militias.

Therefore, DDR in Iraq must be unconventional otherwise it would be another failed attempt to stabilize the country. The classic DDR is not going to work for the 61 militias in Iraq unless the Iraqi government address some underlying issues that is giving these militias the opportunity to grow their power in the Iraqi society.

In sum, DDR programs have been changing and adopting new contexts in the world. As new threats to states and global security that these militias have impose, DDR practitioners should be addressing different approach including coercive approach as in many cases may be the right one. DDR has contributed to the peace building process and will counite to do so by facing the following the new trend where these militias are not willing to drop the arms and the power that they have gain by inflecting violence.

This thesis talks about importance of balancing all of the aspects of DDR, which shows clearly that it must invest in disarmament, which might involve coercion measures, but also have to invest in the reintegration part. Also, it acknowledges that local context matters so much in that in Iraq efforts to do DDR have not often taken seriously. The fact that violence is still happening and that the ethnic militias are still so important into politics as well as international actors have a stake in Iraq. and Thus, I am arguing a fluid or more holistic DDR that takes all of these things into account and is very flexible about sequence and about how it engages all the components in DDR approach. DDR program needs to be rethinking standard DDR approach and exploring solutions to the ongoing conflict in Iraq, which is to imagine what that balance between over demilitarization and disarmament and peacebuilding looks like through the lens of DDR

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