STUDY Despite gloomy headlines, NATO serves its members’ core security interests and is here to stay. Beyond this agreement, however, expert communities in member states strongly disagree on NATO’s future direction. PEACE AND SECURITY Contested are NATO’s future focus, priorities and strategies THREE VISIONS towards Russia, China and its Southern neighbourhood, as well as the ways in which its internal architecture should FOR NATO be reformed. Mapping National Debates on the Future of the Atlantic Alliance Three different visions of NATO’s future are on the table: (i) a »NATO classic plus« would fo- cus on collective defence and Russia, with a few extras, such Matthias Dembinski and Caroline Fehl (eds.) as cyber. (ii) a »NATO with a June 2021 global outlook« would set its sights on China and widen its partnerships. (iii) a »NATO Gen- eration Z« would widen its scope even further and address such risks as climate change and democratic backsliding. PEACE AND SECURITY THREE VISIONS FOR NATO Mapping National Debates on the Future of the Atlantic Alliance Contents FOREWORD 3 Eva Ellereit and Marius Müller-Hennig EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 4 Matthias Dembinski and Caroline Fehl INTRODUCTION 6 Matthias Dembinski and Caroline Fehl ON THE ROAD TO NATO 2030: HOW THE ORGANIZATION VIEWS THE FUTURE OF NATO 8 Matthias Dembinski and Caroline Fehl COUNTRY CASES NATO MEMBER STATES THE UNITED STATES DEBATES THE FUTURE OF NATO 16 Caroline Fehl THE CANADIAN DISCOURSE ON NATO’S FUTURE 29 Dirk Peters THE FRENCH DEBATE ON THE FUTURE OF NATO 36 Janna Chalmovsky GERMANY’S VIEW OF THE FUTURE OF NATO: NECESSARY BUT IN NEED OF REPAIR 43 Matthias Dembinski ITALY DEBATES THE FUTURE OF NATO 49 Matthias Dembinski THE NETHERLANDS AND THE FUTURE OF NATO 54 Matthias Dembinski POLAND: STRENGTHENING THE EASTERN FLANK 59 Hans-Joachim Spanger THE ROMANIAN DEBATE ON THE FUTURE OF NATO 64 Matthias Dembinski SPAIN AND THE FUTURE OF NATO 68 Matthias Dembinski TURKEY DISCUSSES ITS COMPLEX RELATIONSHIP WITH NATO 72 Sezer İdil Göğüş THE UK DISCOURSE ON NATO’S FUTURE 80 Dirk Peters FRIEDRICH-EBERT-STIFTUNG – THREE VISIONS FOR NATO COUNTRY CASES NON-NATO STATES RUSSIA AND THE DIVISIVE DISCOURSE ON NATO 87 Hans-Joachim Spanger UKRAINE DEBATES THE FUTURE OF NATO 93 Mikhail Polianskii COMPARISON OF COUNTRY CASES AND CONCLUSION THROUGH THE KALEIDOSCOPE: COMPARING VISIONS OF NATO 99 Matthias Dembinski and Caroline Fehl List of Figures and Tables ............................................................................................................... 107 List of Interviewees and Acknowledgements .................................................................................. 108 About the Authors ........................................................................................................................ 109 Foreword FOREWORD Eva Ellereit and Marius Müller-Hennig The future of NATO is once more under discussion. Political- this, a number of other serious issues have emerged, above ly, the Alliance and relations between the allies have been all NATO’s relations with China, how to tackle hybrid characterized by multiple tensions and heated controversy threats and the balance in the Alliance between values and in recent years. But the Alliance has been under massive interests. pressure to change militarily, too. The evolving nature of the Afghanistan mission and the return to the core task of Given the heightened complexity the present study is in- collective defence in the wake of Russia’s annexation of tended to provide solid orientation for participation in the Crimea and the war in Eastern Ukraine were perhaps the political debate on the future of the Alliance. It sheds light most prominent challenges, but by no means the only ones. on national expert discussions on the future of NATO in a To be sure, NATO responded to the new challenges, but it series of key member states and non-member states, sys- was a long time before there was a comprehensive strate- tematizes them and, finally, takes a comparative perspec- gic discussion in and between the member states on a stra- tive. In all this there is a deliberate focus on the debates in tegic reorientation of the Alliance. The most recent Strate- the expert community. gic Concept dates from 2010. In this way, this study is supposed to contribute to a better But the most recent experts’ report to NATO’s Secretary mutual understanding of national discussion dynamics. It is General on the political dimension of the Alliance made it directed both at those interested in foreign and security clear that it was high time to renew the Strategic Concept. policy and at experts and decision-makers. It is intended to It looks likely that the requisite mandate will be issued at involve and provide orientation in a debate that is other- the NATO summit in Brussels on 14 June 2021. But whatev- wise conducted mainly in a very exclusive »epistemic com- er the precise process of working out a new Strategic Con- munity« of NATO experts. This is because it is particularly cept, it is essential and will shape the security policy discus- important at the present time, when the Alliance’s funda- sion over the coming years. mental orientation and future are under debate that, be- yond the circle of designated NATO experts, also deci- In his analysis of NATO’s current Strategic Concept for the sion-makers from political executives and legislatures, the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung in January 2011 Christos Katsioulis media, but also the critical public should be called upon to came to the conclusion that »the Strategic Concept glosses play an active part in the discussion. over the sometimes fragile consensus between the member states and avoids definite positions on disputed points«.1 A We would like to thank the team of authors at the Leibniz new Strategic Concept worthy of the name needs to confer Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (PRIF) for their compre- clarity on the key contentious issues in order to provide ori- hensive expertise and outstanding cooperation, especially entation, both internally and externally. the two project leaders Dr Caroline Fehl and Dr Matthias Dembinski. The study will continue to shape our own polit- In the 2010 Concept it was above all »the role of nuclear ical advisory, dialogue and educational work as a reference weapons in the Alliance, crisis management in relation to point, and should help us, the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, to other actors, relations with Russia … and the question of contribute to this vital strategic process. defence funding in a period of financial and economic cri- sis«2 that fell short of expectations. The present study Berlin, June 2021 shows that these issues remain on the agenda for the next Strategic Concept, albeit sometimes under completely dif- ferent circumstances. This study also shows that, on top of 1 Katsioulis, Christos (2011): »The new NATO strategy. A temporary com- promise«, available at: https://library.fes.de/pdf-files/id/ipa/07796.pdf 2 Ibid. 3 FRIEDRICH-EBERT-STIFTUNG – THREE VISIONS FOR NATO EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Matthias Dembinski and Caroline Fehl NATO is at a crossroads – yet again. After years of internal and the encroachment of extra-regional powers? And what turmoil and self-doubt, the Alliance is in the process of re- does the withdrawal from the very costly and rather unsuc- forming and re-inventing itself. At the London summit com- cessful 20 year long security assistance mission in Afghani- memorating NATO’s 70th anniversary, the Heads of States stan imply for the future of military interventions? and Governments asked NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg to initiate a forward-looking reform process. At NATO’s response to these threats is also contested. Should the summit in June 2021, NATO members will take stock of NATO focus on Russia and its traditional core task of collec- the state of this NATO 2030 process and authorize work on tive defence? Should it rather respond to China by expand- a new strategic concept. NATO’s current strategic concept ing its geographical scope and its partnerships in the In- dates back to 2010 and was drafted in a completely differ- do-Pacific region? Or should it expand its functional scope ent geopolitical environment. Adaptation is thus inevitable. and focus, for example, on critical infrastructure, or on sta- But because this always bears the risk of maladaptation, it is bilization and societal resilience more generally? imperative to accompany this reform process with critical analyses and discussions that engage not just a small expert Adding to this list of external challenges are increasing inter- community, but also policymakers in governments and par- nal divisions and uncertainties. Will the United States shift liaments, as well as the general public across NATO’s mem- its attention and capabilities away from Europe as the con- ber states. flict with China intensifies? If so, should European member states start to compensate the relocation both politically With this edited volume, we aim to provide the basis for and militarily? And how should NATO react to authoritarian such an informed discussion. By summarizing and compar- tendencies in some member states and to the growing het- ing expert discourses on key questions regarding NATO’s fu- erogeneity of interests and outlooks? ture across a broad spectrum of key member (and selected non-member) states, we seek to promote both a deeper un- This edited volume maps and compares expert discourses derstanding of the issues at stake and a better mutual un- on these questions within NATO, as well as in selected mem- derstanding of diverging geographical, historical and politi- ber states, and in Russian and Ukraine. cal perspectives on these issues. At the same time, by map- ping and juxtaposing national visions of NATO, we delineate Summarizing the key findings, given recent debates about a a space of political possibilities, giving rise to different »fu- crisis of the liberal order and a decay of its institutions, a first tures« that could result from the ongoing reform process.