Fountain Valley School of Colorado

What’s Our Role?: Exploring the Civic Engagement of the Vietnamese Youth

Viet Dang

Global Scholars Candidate Thesis

May 2020

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Table of Contents

Introduction 3

A Short Guide 4

Baby Boomers Era 7

Political Structure 8

Youth Engagement 10

Gen X Era 15

Political Structure 15

Youth Engagement 18

Modern Era 20

Political Structure 20

Youth Engagement 22

Action Plan 23

What we know 24

Another Short Guide 24

DON'T: 25

DO: 25

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Introduction

“The Youth is the Spring of our Society”. Fifty one years after his death, ’s last words prove to be more significant today than ever before. In 1969, Ho Chi Minh passed away after years of fighting enemies on both sides: the malicious illness inside, and the colonial intrusions outside. During his time as the Prime of North and later its President, he continuously emphasized the importance of the role youth have in upholding the Vietnamese independent spirit and establishing our country as one of the great nations of the world. There are multiple reasons why the youth is the root of political and social development. First, as Uncle Ho said, the youth would grow up to be “future owners” of Vietnam; regardless of the contemporary narrative, we will have the ability to re-write it in our own words because as current generations become the past, we become the agents responsible for the growth of our nation (Nguyen).

Therefore, it is instrumental that the youth is educated about public issues and given the opportunity to propose solutions as a way to develop their awareness of the country’s social landscape. Secondly, the youth possesses the industriousness and energy necessary to induce change quickly. From

“bypassing” legislative institutions to negotiate ceasefire treaties to rebuilding war-torn towns, young citizens are both innocent enough to not dwell over the potential consequences of activism and proactive enough to put what they believe into action, which leads us to the last reason: ideas.

Especially in a “flat-earth” society where globalization is the norm and modernization a standard, the youth is the generation most receptive to different ideas, who is shaped not only by the traditional values of their people, but also by the process of enculturation accompanying the diffusion of borders in a digital age. Conservative systems, which categorize Vietnam, can only benefit from a “borderless” era if it is willing to incorporate ideas deviating from its strict history Dang 4 and yet essential in today’s world. As a result, the youth is the most suited generation to enact change in Vietnam, in modern times. To neglect this role would be to neglect one’s civic duty and risk both patriotism as well as the future success of the Vietnamese state. As young citizens, we have to place the cause of our country above the whims of our desire, contributing to the Nation’s progress with every tool we possess, every medium we procure, and every ounce of effort bestowed upon our body by a determined will and an unwavering faith. And yet what tools are accessible?

What medium is present? And even with the will and faith of a devoted Nationalist, how much change can we enforce? These are the questions which this paper aims to answer, culminating in an organized framework for the ambitious and educated youth to advance their Motherland.

The first step in examining the level and impact youth engagement has had on the development of Vietnam requires historically tracing youth political involvement, especially during defining periods of our nation’s history. This paper will begin in the Baby Boomers era that transpired between 1955 to 1975, at the same time as the infamous where nationalistic ideals were heightened to unprecedented levels. The second era between 1975 to 1986 is characterized by the Gen Xers and post-war ideological and social shifts that took place as Vietnam was healing from conflict. Lastly, the paper will address the Modern/Gen Z era from 2000 to 2019, oscillating between a journalistic, report-only approach and an analytical voice which aims to advocate for expanded youth involvement in politics.

A Short Guide

Recognizing that not all the readers of this paper are familiar with Vietnam, its history, or its people, below is a list of “concepts” that will aid the newcomer in grasping the context from which this paper was conceived. Dang 5

The Communist Party: The present-day Communist Party was founded in 1930 on the basis of absolute intra-stability and to become a “highly disciplined, all- powerful” organization (Normand 68). It claimed to represent the vanguard of the working class, and yet the “great majority of [Party members] come from the petty-bourgeoisie” (Normand 72).

This is an issue that had endured since the time of its predecessor, the Revolutionary Youth League, which was founded in 1925, survived for 5 years and then metamorphosed into the Communist

Party, and is continuing to define the politics of Vietnam. The Party, however, did embody the qualities expected of a developmental administration: traditionalistic, opposing colonial rule, and embracing as an interpretation of Marxist ideologies. Utilizing its unchallenged authority over the Vietnamese political scene, the Party infused these ideals into the public - which, conveniently, desired an unchallenged leader and unitary beliefs - galvanizing the people under one cause: to preserve independence at all costs (Ngo).

The Communist Party? Risk-taking time. While the paragraph above portrays the

Communist Party to be an ultra-stable, dissent-free, exclusive institution, it is important to note that there is potential bias in the official account. During an interview with two American academics, high-level Vietnamese government officials laid out the characteristics which they considered to be indicative of the country’s bureaucracy. Although the study is also prone to bias due to the dividing sentiments over the War at the time it was conducted, the answers it harvested were illuminating in their own rights. From lack of honesty to unwillingness to assume responsibility, the Vietnamese government, through the description of the interviewees, appeared less grandiose and more

“human”. And although it was hard to determine whether or not the Party was worthy of praises, it was apparent that propaganda played an instrumental role in establishing its indisputable influence over the . Dang 6

The Vietnam War: After the Geneva Accords of 1954, Vietnam was temporarily divided into two military zones at latitude 17oN, or the 17th parallel. forces stayed in the North, while French and Associated State of Vietnam troops remained in the South. During this time, the northern government, with its capital in , embarked on an ambitious program of socialist industrialization, as exemplified by an effort to collectivize agriculture in the 1950s. The southern government also engaged in widespread efforts to stabilize the anticommunist regime in Saigon, headed by its prime minister, Ngo Dinh Diem. Diem was ruthless in his attempt to consolidate power. He eliminated pro-French elements, massacred Buddhists, and founded an “elitist underground organization to spy on officials, army officers, and prominent local citizens”

(Buttinger, Neil). Despite these disparate actions, as part of the Accords, Vietnam was to hold democratic elections in July 1956. The North was predicted to win by a landslide. Diem refused to participate and cited the age-old Domino Effect. The King of Democracy stepped in. War followed

(Buttinger, Neil).

The Vietnam War! It was during the War that the insurgent movement called National

Liberation Front, or more commonly known as Viet Cong, rose to national prominence. Their goal was to undermine the illegitimate government of Saigon and unite the nation by “[working] as hard as two in order to compensate for [the brothers] in the South” (Normand 71). The movement was organized in late 1960 and within four years had achieved a tremendous number of followers, growing from “30,000 men in 1963 to about 150,000 in 1965” (Buttinger, Neil). To couple with this growth of manpower, the United States increased its number of advisers from 700 to 17,000 by the end of 1963, hoping to halt the advance of the Viet Cong. Remember what I said about extreme nationalism and steadfast loyalty to the cause of independence? America’s response only fueled

Vietnam’s burning spirit with events such as the bombings of in 1965 under Lyndon

B. Johnson, and the attacks on the Ho Chi Minh Trail in 1971 to prevent supplies from being sent Dang 7 to the Viet Cong. Though minor scars, they resulted in a major upheaval. By late 1974, Hanoi decided that “victory could be achieved only through armed struggle”, and a major offensive against the South was waged on April 30, 1975, marking the end of the Vietnam War (Buttinger, Neil).

The Youth: Aside from easy women and free beer, the War also brought another undeniable benefit: widespread youth engagement. From risking their lives delivering important military messages to rebuilding towns and cities, the youth were able to “withstand unbelievable pain” to perpetuate the “political-ideological complex” of Marxism-Leninism coupled with a

“oneness of mind” mentality (Ngo). Given the proliferation of youth activity in the constructs of the nation during this time, the Vietnam War period, from 1955 to 1975, seems to be an optimal choice for the paper’s starting point of examination. The times before that are either inundated with unverifiable information or overly concealed that any attempt to perform a social surgery on them is beyond my risk appetite.

As Thomas Sowell greatly puts it, “When you want to help people, you tell them the truth.

When you want to help yourself, you tell them what they want to hear.” Therefore, to be patriotic in essence and not just in appearance, honesty is paramount. Throughout this paper, there will be information presented that might cause one to question the merit of the facts, but hopefully, the untamed desire therein to elevate the Vietnamese people will not cast a doubt. There will be arguments in favor of the government’s decisions, and inevitably, there will also be statements that would put the speaker in a dangerous position had they not been in an academic setting and encased with a positive purpose. Ultimately, the paper will produce an extensive guideline for youth participation in today’s political landscape of Vietnam, combining the history of civic engagement during the Vietnam War as well as the post-war, nation-building period. It is paramount to realize that to engage does not lie on the same vein as to comply; it will be more proactive, more non- conforming, and in the end, more positive for the country we all love. Dang 8

Baby Boomers Era

Political Structure

After the Geneva Agreement of 1954, North Vietnam, contemporarily called the

Democratic of Vietnam (DRV), was a fully committed Communist regime who delegated all power to maintain “political and administrative hegemony”, as well as social monitoring and economic planning to the all-powerful Dang Lao Dong, or the Vietnam Workers’ Party (VWP). The original name of the Party when it was first conceived in 1930 was The Communist Party; in 1951, the name “Workers’ Party” was adopted, presumably to signal a change in national strategy: from establishing Marxism-Leninism as the principal political ideology of the country to encouraging people to labor for the causes of socialism and national unity. In one of Ho Chi Minh’s speeches to the youth during the Vietnam War, he asked them to love five things, “Love the country, love the people, love labor, love science, and love public goods” (Nguyen). Among these five concepts, two stood out to be evident products of Communist propaganda - the love of labor and public goods - which reinforce the aforementioned statement about the purpose of the name change.

Although the purpose of the Party varies throughout history, hence the adoption of different names and strategies, one factor appears to transcend time and continue to play a decisive role in prolonging the Party’s unchallenged leadership over Vietnam, and that is the stability of intra-party politics (Normand 69). With respect to stability, many of Ho’s top lieutenants in the revolutionary turmoil of the 30’s and 40’s remain in the same leadership positions during the Vietnam War, a consequence of the “highly centralized in form” and “rigid in discipline” infrastructure of the Party

(Normand 71). For instance, Truong Chinh, Pham Van Dong, and Vo Nguyen Giap had been at Ho

Chi Minh’s side since 1941. Le Duan, the Party’s First Secretary, had been a member of the Central

Committee, the political body that made major decisions and formulated policies by which the DRV Dang 9 would be governed, since at least 1939 (Phan 772). With Ho being the Supreme Leader of the VWP, it could be assumed that he would keep all members of the elite “in harness together”, uniting them under 3 main guiding objectives. They were “the building of socialism in the north, liberation of the south and reunification of the fatherland” (Phan 773). According to the current Vietnamese Minister of Defense, it was the “oneness of mind” shared by the Party and the public that propelled the

Vietnamese nation to triumph over the French and later the Americans during the Vietnam War; the steadfast belief in a socialist society and the universal malice of colonialism allowed Vietnamese people to “withstand unbelievable pain” and “sacrifice themselves for the liberation of their brothers” (Ngo). Coincidentally, Ho Chi Minh, in March 1964, resonated the same message by calling on “every person to work as hard as two in order to compensate for our brethren in the

South” (Normand 71). This continuity of political narrative over a 50-year span illustratively exemplifies the endurance of Party unity throughout time. However, the “rather stable” record of the leadership of the VWP inevitably begs the question of whether or not it was an inherent characteristic of the Party, which was supported by official documents, or only a facade that it wore to unite the Nation under its command.

As of March 1972, it was still the Le Duan-Truong Chinh-Pham Van Dong triumvirate that controlled the party and the state, a “remarkable achievement” in terms of leadership stability at the highest level (Phan 774). The War waged by the U.S. against the DRV, instead of weakening the of the Party, actually strengthened it and added an aura of legitimacy to the struggle for national salvation. In addition, it also made the gravest drawback of the Party less apparent: its inability to “function as a broadly-based mass party” (Normand 72). Before the War, it was admitted that it was precisely at the grass-roots level that party organization was weakest; in

Truong Chinh’s own words, the great majority of cadres and Party members “[came] from the petty- bourgeoisie” (Normand 72). His statement did not align with the Party’s public exhortation of being Dang 10 the “vanguard of the working class”, which was the first sign of external-internal discrepancies of the Party (Normand 72). As a result of the bombings of North Vietnam, the Party was forced to decentralize, which gave the middle- and lower-echelon cadres a “heightened sense of broad-base participation”, who in turn galvanized the population to boost production while defending the fatherland and reinfused patriotism into a war-weary people (Phan 774). This delegation of responsibility served as the basis for youth engagement during the conflict, especially at lower levels of the Party. Despite creating some “heroic units”, the Party’s requirement to increase more output under greater difficulties also led to breaches against socialist law and order. It was during this period that laws on “counter-revolutionary activities” were enacted. And with them, the disentanglement of ideological coherence between the ruling Party and the obedient Public began. Since the War,

Vietnamese have struggled with comprehending the cost of absolute national unity and the advantages of a “heightened nationalism” not coupled with “ideological purity” (Phan 775).

According to Phan Thien Chau, the “stability” which the Party prided itself on was utilized as a tool to incite patriotism, not Communist leanings; the internal body of the organization, although withstood no major purges, was divided into factions, with the most notorious being the leadership rivalry between Truong Chinh and Le Duan, the two most powerful theoreticians of the Party.

Nevertheless, the decentralization of the Party that constantly announced that its authority “[rested] upon the principle of collective leadership” actually benefited the youth: it allowed them to participate in politics at a level previously unseen (Phan 775).

Youth Engagement

In , an extensive study was conducted by Guy H. Fox, a political science professor at Michigan State University, and Charles A. Joiner, an associate professor at Temple

University, to determine what high-level Vietnamese civil servants regarded as the “outstanding attitudes, behavior, and practices” of their public administration system (Fox, Joiner 448). The Dang 11 interviews were held during the summer of 1962 with forty-nine career officials in Class A, the highest level of the Vietnamese civil service, who held posts such as director-general, secretary- general, and director of the . The opinions of public officials could provide valuable information about the contemporary level of youth engagement. First, they serve as primary sources about the workings of government at the time, which, given Vietnam’s history with counter- revolutionary regulations, determines how much youth was allowed to contribute to public affairs.

Secondly, contrary to one’s initial impression that the officials would reinforce the Party’s narrative, their answers actually offer a more accurate view of how the general public felt about their political leadership, and as an extension of those thoughts, decided to take action.

It is important to note that the South Vietnamese government officials were questioned, and not members of the VWP. At the time of the interview, the two governments had taken drastic steps towards different directions, one adopting a full-fledged Communist regime and the other an experimental Democratic structure, which would greatly affect how their members respond to the questions. While Communist officials were asked to maintain coherence of ideology and unity of purpose, their Southern counterparts enjoyed more freedom to express their opinions. Nevertheless, the questions centered around the “Vietnamese bureaucracy”, which blanketed the political structure of the whole nation. When asked “What do you consider to be the outstanding characteristics, good and bad, of the Vietnamese bureaucracy?”, 88% of the civil servants responded stating that there was an “unwillingness of civil servants to assume responsibility” which illuminated a potential space in which the Vietnamese youth could offer support. “Lack of dedication”, “Basic honesty”,

“Authoritarian behavior”, and “Centralization of authority” were all mentioned as part of the answer to the same question. Additionally, civil servants were expected to follow rigid, established procedures and offered “unquestioning obedience” at every level (Fox, Joiner 451). If even the ones within the government were forced to comply with the system, how could the youth expect to enact Dang 12 any progressive change? They could not. The attempts of the progressive elements to “exercise initiative” and to “change the existing system” had usually been “squelched” (Fox, Joiner 451).

While young officials learned that men got ahead by being “quiet” and “orthodox”, the youth recognized that in order to participate in the political affairs of their country, they had to act in accordance with the government parameters by reinforcing their message instead of challenging it.

The rebuilding of District 8 in South Vietnam illustrates how the path was cleared for youth to participate in affairs that bolstered the position of the government. When a group of youth leaders asked Premier Ky, who took control of South Vietnam from 1965 to 1967 after a military junta, to restore an entire province, he declined. Instead, he handed them District 8, a three-square- mile, 300,000-resident zone to rebuild. And what is the first thing the youth did to thank him for his gesture of confidence? Replace all the district officials with their 1,000 student friends (The Boy-

State). Averaging nineteen to twenty years of age, the project leaders were surprisingly adept to take on such a challenge. They organized residents to dredge “30 acres of dumps and swamps”, carved out three miles of street, built new homes for 600 families, and constructed a hospital and seventeen health centers. With only $85,000 of funding from the government, the youth ended up generating

$255,000 worth of construction, an increase of $170,000 in asset value made possible by their industriousness and the absence of the district officials. Premier Ky then gave the young reformers the go-ahead to take over two adjoining districts, increasing the number of inhabitants they could help to a staggering 600,000 people. They had successfully engaged in their country’s public efforts: by cleaning up after the government.

In addition to the nobility of their incentives, the youth also left a tremendous impact on the social and economic development of the District 8 community. By leading more than 200 projects that ranged from communal housing to environmental cleaning, they served as a catalyst for the

District to be able to get back on its feet and become a productive agent for the country. However, Dang 13 their effort was not an example of activism. Yes, they participated. Yes, they helped. But the process was so effortless that Fox and Joiner might wake up and use pseudonyms to salvage their credibility; a system characterized by “authoritarian behavior” and “centralization of authority” untangled its systemic knots so that the youth could get involved in the reconstruction efforts. Why? Aside from the apparent economic and social alleviation, the ultimate achievement of the youth was that “Viet

Cong infiltration to and from the capital through District 8” has been “virtually wiped out” (The

Boy-State). Had their actions not resulted in this outstanding political feat for the government, the thirty acres of dumps and swamps might still remain today.

On November 29th, 1970, a group of college students from the University of Indiana left for Hanoi; they were negotiating the first part of a peace treaty with North Vietnamese student representatives. They bypassed President Nixon, essentially calling his plan a “fraud”, and threatened to bring Washington to a standstill in May unless the President announced a total American troop withdrawal (Ingram 646). While the Americans’ actions were deemed as bold and radical, they promptly fell under the right of freedom of expression enjoyed by citizens of democratic systems.

On the other hand, for the Vietnamese youth to represent the government and speak on behalf of their leaders, they had to circulate the strictly centralized political structure at the time. Whereas the

American students appeared to be saying, in effect, “We can negotiate an acceptable peace, why can’t you, [Mr. President]?” (Ingram 647), the Vietnamese students were asking themselves, “Wait, we can negotiate?” Again, in accordance with the previous example, the youth was given full autonomy and responsibility to carry out their civic duties because their actions align with the Party’s objectives--a “standard” that continues to exist today. A second delegation was to go to South

Vietnam to conclude a similar agreement with heads of the Saigon Student Union; however,

“difficulties in obtaining visas have plagued this phase of the trip”. The South Vietnamese Embassy in Washington said that “under no circumstances” would they be granted a visa (Ingram 646). Why Dang 14 not? Because the leadership of the Union “has been at odds with the South Vietnamese government” since the war began to spread in 1965 (Ingram 648).

After all, youth participation in Vietnam during the Baby Boomers era did not depend on geographic regions - as exemplified by both the North and the South only allowing certain methods of engagement - or leadership, since the Communist regime and its Democratic counterpart were strikingly similar in how they facilitated public involvement, but on their purpose. When the youth asked to rebuild war-torn Districts, the government went out of their way to support the initiative as if they, themselves, despised the violence of conflict; and yet the same government denied their constantly-at-odds Student Union the ability to negotiate a peace treaty. And although the North was notorious for its counter-revolutionary measures and anti-colonialism sentiments, they embraced

American students with open arms. Both parts of Vietnam, albeit being divided physically and ideologically, shared the same rigid requirements for youth participation: speak not to raise a counterpoint, but only to amplify the already established message.

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Gen X Era

Political Structure

After the military victory against the United States, Vietnam’s socialist model began to collapse. The country, although prevailed in war, faced formidable problems in peace. The most significant vacuum that the leadership had to fill was the economy. In the South alone, millions of people had been made homeless by the war, and more than “one-seventh of the population had been killed or wounded”; the costs in the North were at least as extreme (Buttinger, Neil). The tremendous loss of life was coupled with a destruction of valuable infrastructure: roads, rail lines, bridges, and canals were “devastated by [U.S.] bombing” (Davies). Vietnam was completely unequipped to tackle the task of uplifting the economy, especially when its potential workforce was made up of “10 million refugees”, “1 million war widows”, and “362,000 war invalids” (Davies). By the time Liberation Day arrived, which was April 30th, 1975, inflation was running at up to 900%, and the country known for its paddy fields had to import rice. The government, being “poorly trained” to deal with the problems of peacetime recovery, instituted new programs in hopes of rescuing the free-falling economy (Buttinger, Neil). Firstly, they adopted a crude Soviet policy that forced peasant farmers to hand over their crops in exchange for ration cards. With no incentive to produce, output crashed. Secondly, they assigned residents from both sides of the nation to “new economic zones” - primitive areas in the countryside used to relocate and provide work for millions of people displaced by the War - which resulted in major resistance (Bittinger, Neil). With no intent from the people to cooperate with the government’s initiative, the “economic zones” remained

“new” and unlabored. Lastly, in an attempt to integrate the two economies of the North and South, in March 1978, the government “nationalized the commercial sector in the South” (CIA). The action, which struck heavily at Vietnam’s 1.5 million ethnic Chinese, was intended to “eliminate the freewheeling private market” in the South and brought the distribution of scarce commodities fully Dang 16 within the government’s orbit; the centralization approach, although successful in politics, constrained the country’s economic growth rather than hastening it (CIA). After three strikes,

Vietnam’s economy was out. With 70% of the people living below the official poverty line, it was hard to imagine which economic model could have survived the “hostile” environment in Vietnam

(Davies).

Vietnam desperately needed the world to offer aid in order to turn its economy around; the world made sure that it got none. In 1973, 2 years before the War ended, the U.S. agreed to pay $3.5 billion in reconstruction aid to remedy the damage dealt to Vietnam’s infrastructure. Not a cent was received. Instead, Uncle Sam stared down the war-wrecked country and drafted others that bowed to American pressure to not only impose a trade embargo on Vietnam, but also demand that the communist government “repay millions of dollars borrowed by its enemy”, the Saigon regime

(Davies). The IMF, the World Bank, and UNESCO all denied Vietnam aid due to American influence. The U.S., however, did pay $2 billion for people exposed to Agent Orange--but only to its own veterans. More than 2 million Vietnamese victims “got nothing” (Davies). Being isolated from the world, as well as having to fight wars on two fronts - against the Khmer Rouge in the West and the Chinese in the North - the government decided that it was time for reform: Vietnam would become a “market economy with socialist orientation” (Davies). Nguyen Van Linh, the General

Secretary of the Communist Party from 1986 to 1991, was a revolutionary politician and launched a program of “sweeping economic and institutional renovation” called doi moi, or change. The program would forever alter the socialist spirit of the country, and with its dissipation came widespread corruption and the rise of elitism.

In a nutshell, doi moi legalized free market activities that the government had previously tried to inhibit or suppress. The government was compelled to “slash spending, court foreign investment, and liberalize trade” (Buttinger, Neil). Initially, Hanoi “failed to garner any commitments” from Dang 17

Western firms; although it successfully signed oil exploration agreements with Germany, Canada, and Italy, it “preferred U.S. technology and expertise” (CIA). Therefore, behind the scenes, the government was sending signals of compromise to Washington. It stopped asking for the $3.5 billion reconstruction aid, agreed to repay the Saigon regime’s debt of $146 million, and helped

America locate missing soldiers during the War. The U.S., satisfied that its image was somewhat repaired, lifted the trade embargo in 1994 and established diplomatic relations with Hanoi in 1995.

Fueled by international momentum, Vietnam went on to de-collectivized agriculture, ended fixed prices and subsidies, as well as significantly reducing the number of state-owned enterprises.

Everyone was surprised with the favorable results, including the politicians--especially the politicians.

Job creation in the private sector and trade relations with non-Communist partners, such as Hong

Kong and Japan, constituted the 8% growth in GDP throughout the 1990s.

With success, the leaders of Vietnam began to fear a “weakening of commitment” to further change and preserve Vietnam’s socialist orientation (Buttinger, Neil). A society where “men would not exploit other men” were starting to crumble under the weight of systemic corruption, heightened by the recent privatization of the country’s enormous state-owned companies (Davies).

It provided politicians and officials to appoint themselves and their families as executives.

Consequently, as the economy was on the rise, so was the wealth gap between people with influence and people without. While “life was tough for ordinary people”, the ones “who had connections” got richer (Davies). The new market economy was filled with “inequality and materialism”, which undermined Vietnam’s ability to further liberalize the country, culminating in the failed attempt to sign a trade agreement with the United States that would have also secured a membership in the

World Trade Organization (WTO), in 1999. Amid relentless globalization, the country was in a state of paralysis caused by the reluctance to reform its own political institutions. The “authoritarian ” and the “unfettered ideology” of allowed for a tiny elite to fill its pockets Dang 18 behind the rhetoric of revolution (Davies). Even though the government successfully curbed poverty and alleviated a feeble economy, their efforts also put into question the very foundation upon which the country was built, and ultimately galvanized the youth, who possessed little impression of the glory of socialism, to construct a new one.

Youth Engagement

Since there is extremely little information on Youth Engagement in the post-war period, the following paragraph would try to portray a coherent image of the youth’s role in rebuilding the nation with limited resources at its disposal. It is reasonable to speculate that propaganda was more profusely utilized at this time, since the country needed to heal its internal wounds while fighting off external forces aiming at breaking it apart, thus prioritizing uniting the people under one cause, which has been the purpose of state-controlled propaganda. Presumably, the restriction of third- party documentation of the government’s actions resulted in the miraculous survival of official accounts and the lack of non-official ones.

As a new generation of youth formed, the Ho Chi Minh Communist Youth Union (HCYU), which had been the pioneering symbol of youth engagement in political and social affairs, conformed to meet the new standard set by the Party: from loyal soldiers of the repressed to idealist builders of the elites. In wartime, the HCYU held an instrumental role in the country’s triumph over seemingly undefeatable enemies by providing both physical manpower - up to eight million members participated in the conflicts against the French and the Americans - and mental unity, as the youth were willing to “die so that the country could live at all costs” (Lac Hong). Although the post-war period did not incite nationalism as feverishly as the times of conflict, the youth’s ideological adherence to the goals of the country, and as an extension, the policies of the Party, Dang 19 remained and thrived. During this time, millions of young volunteers led the efforts in building the

North-South railroad line - a symbol of national unification - 35 “New Economic Zones”, and upwards of 80,000 constructions. To relate these modern works with the country’s glorious past, the

Party and the Union decided to call them “Marching behind Uncle Ho” (Lac Hong). The movement was then broken down to smaller goals that combined the Party’s propaganda messages with the country’s revised policies; for instance, as the government encouraged the economy to morph into a market-influenced one, the goals provided to the HCYU became “Starting one’s business” and

“Achieve business success”, all under the umbrella of constructing a “civilized and equal society”

(Lac Hong). The Union’s 7th Annual Conference emphasized the youth’s new role in Vietnam’s development, and it was to “fight vigorously” and “be creative” in pursuing industrialization and modernization--again, for some reason, our slogans read like they were taken out of a retired general’s speech to a cliché group of teenagers (Lac Hong). Regardless of the direction that the country was heading, the HCYU never imposed judgement and served as an obedient organization who was willing to drop and take on new objectives so that the stability-above-all doctrine of the

Party was preserved.

Dang 20

Modern Era

Political Structure

From 2000, the rate of change accelerated, and the political balance shifted. After the War,

70% of the people lived below the poverty line; by 2000, that number shrunk to 32%. Evidently, the

Party’s plans to salvage the economy was working, which also brought unprecedented capitalist influences on a country that had been fighting their presence. At first, during the late 1990s, when the World Bank offered hundreds of millions of dollars of loans for Vietnam to sell its state-owned companies and cut its trade tariffs, the country said No. This was when the socialist faction still exerted control over the “new capitalist vehicle”; however, increasing pressure from international donors and foreign investors eventually triumphed, and Vietnam began approving the sale of its money-making government properties in early 2000s (Davies). After being admitted to the

Association of Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 1995, which symbolized “Vietnam’s full acceptance into the family of nations”, Vietnam formed a bilateral trade agreement with the U.S. in

2001, and the country was given membership of the WTO in 2006--a token of economic integration and growth (Bittinger, Neil).

Despite Vietnam’s track record of economic success, not every citizen enjoyed the same increase in wealth. Between 2004 and 2010, the poorest 10% of the population saw their income fell by a fifth, while the richest 5% were taking nearly a quarter of the national income (Davies). Rural areas experienced the worst effects. In the early 1990s, nearly all rural households, around 91.8%, were landowners; by 2010, nearly a quarter of them were landless, driven off their property to make way for factories and roads. Poor peasants then joined forces with “hundreds of thousands” of workers, people who became redundant as state-owned companies went through the efficient- above-all privatization process, to form a new sector in society - wasn’t socialism supposed to have no separation of class? - the “informal sector” (Davies). They were hidden away in sweatshops and forced Dang 21 to sit trading on the pavements of new industrial parks or export-processing zones; in other words, they were the outcasts of the very system which their fathers sacrificed for, the system that promised them “independence and equality” yet gave them “no protection at all” (Davies). Foreign capital had completely shifted Vietnam’s social landscape: minimum wage was covering only 50% of essential costs, labor code was being watered down, and healthcare as well as schooling were no longer free.

Although Vietnam’s decision to implement sweeping changes to elevate the economy was timely and praiseworthy, its effects on the most vulnerable groups of people were unexpected and signaled the contrary, especially when most city workers were “physically wasted away” in their “cheap, shabby rooms” (Davies).

As Vietnam launches itself into the modern era, the Communist Party aims to monopolize power through the government, controlling all major political and social organizations while thwarting any effort that could undermine its sacred intra-stability. Freedom of expression, association, and public assembly are not encouraged if they result in “protests that criticize the government” (Human Rights Watch). It is common for dissidents who unreasonably question government policies and projects to face “daily harassment, intrusive surveillance, house arrest, travel bans, arbitrary detention, and interrogation” (Human Rights Watch). “Stability” continues to be the most important concern for the Party, regardless of the shifting social and economic landscape of the country. For that reason, it controls both the police and the courts, issuing instructions on how to treat individuals deemed detrimental to national security, as well as how to rule in certain cases so that further attempts at discrediting the government are quelled. After all, there are only two things that have transcended time to characterize the Communist Party of

Vietnam: the deification of stability, which forms the backbone of the development of Vietnam, and the crucifixion of unbelievers.

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Youth Engagement

A wide variety of government-backed organizations is providing opportunities for the youth to participate in civic and social programs; they share the same purpose, which is to alleviate less fortunate citizens, and the same mode of conduct, which is to act as the Party’s implementation engine. The ministry charged with youth-related policy in Vietnam is the National Committee on

Youth of Vietnam, which “shapes and monitors youth-related policies, their implementation, and executes cross-sector youth programs” (Banez). In 1981, 6 years after securing independence from

America, the Committee passed the Law on Youth of Vietnam for people aged 15 to 35, essentially recognizing and supporting youth volunteering on a national scale. Limited information is available regarding the details of this policy. Moving forward in time, in 2005, the revised Youth Law was promulgated by the National Assembly - the highest legislative body in the country - and the Ministry of Home Affairs in coordination of the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) disseminated the complicated legal jargon into an actionable booklet for the public, laying out the Youth

Development Strategies for the 2011 - 2020 decade and illuminating how the youth could continue to play a role in shaping the nation. The overall goal of the Party is to create a generation of

Vietnamese youth who are “highly patriotic”, “in possession of a revolutionary morality”, aware of socialism ideology and adept in technological skills (Home Affairs 16). After almost seventy years, the nurturing of a person to become a loyal and relentless fighter of the state remains Vietnam’s principal advantage over other countries. The government aims to equip at least 80% of young people with knowledge about “gender equality”, “reproductive health”, and “domestic violence control” (Home Affairs 17). For a country that often utilizes anti-revolutionary measures to maintain ideological unity, these goals are particularly ambitious in separating Vietnam from its Communist counterparts--they are evidence that Vietnam is adopting, albeit selectively, liberal elements of the

West. This also widens the parameters in which the youth could participate in from domestic issues Dang 23 to international concerns. In addition, the government also states that they would increase

“articulation of the Party’s resolutions and Government’s policies” to the youth, which signifies a drastic step towards greater transparency and accountability (Home Affairs 18). The youth in the modern era possess more ingredients for fruitful participation than any other generations in the past, such as more volunteering territory, higher education, and greater awareness of governmental actions as well as their effects. With these unforeseen benefits, the modern youth also has a larger responsibility to contribute and advance the country. The government has also made it their priority to attract “talented young people” to “return and make a contribution to the home country”. When the leadership has decided to change their approach from inviting only the elite petty-bourgeois to accepting all capable, patriotic individuals, we do not have any more excuses for not participating, do we?

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Action Plan

What we know

Throughout the tumultuous , the intra-stability of the Party and the oneness of mind it inspires are the main factors for the country’s independence and success.

Although Communist theories did not permeate lower levels of society as the leadership had hoped, its revolutionary spirit galvanized the entire nation to adopt absolute patriotism - a willingness to

“die at all costs so that the country could live”. Vietnamese patriotism is less a product of state- directed propaganda than a precursor of the Party’s monopoly of power. The people’s need to be united under one cause precluded the introduction of , which in turn amplified their needs, which in turn lent more credit to the revolution. The result of this? A nation where certain needs are prioritized over others, and the people’s obligation is to foster them as if they were their own. This is not necessarily a negative thing; when individuals are treated as a single structure with singular goals, internal dissent is minimized, and stability becomes the inevitable by-product.

Stability. The sacred doctrine of the Party. Its eternal indulgence; a blessing. From the Baby

Boomers era to the Modern age, the determination of our leaders to preserve stability has not waned; on the other hand, it has been further emphasized as the indisputable backbone of the might of Vietnam. Without stability, we would have no forests left to organize guerilla warfare. Without stability, we would have no ports left to import rice. And without stability, our borders would be integrated, our spirit diminished, and our country lost to the forces of imperialism. Therefore, if there is one thing which we have to keep in mind, it would be this: undermining stability is sacrilege.

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Another Short Guide

DON'T:

1. Undermine the supremacy of the Party. The Communist Party of Vietnam is established to

be the overarching power that unites the people under a unitary calling, or in other words, to

act as the stabilizer of the country. If a message demonstrates an intent to overthrow the

Party, it will not be received, regardless of the content.

2. Facilitate violent protests. Protests are an integral tool for civilized people to communicate

their concerns and advocate for change. However, within a conservative system, this tactic

has to be utilized sparingly and intelligently. Engage only in peaceful demonstrations, which

should not involve lambasting the government or disrupting outsiders, and maintain an

“informing” attitude, not a “criticizing” one.

3. Craft “unpatriotic” messages. An example would be the most efficient medium to explain

this. The government asks residents to move to a different location to use the land and build

a school. If one disagrees with the decision, one should not respond, “The government has

no right to steal our home!”, but instead, “Although the government’s decision to build a

school is right, it should give us more time to consider our options so that both parties are in

a win-win situation.”

DO:

1. Always demonstrate that your intention is to advance the country while maintaining stability.

As demonstrated in the rebuilding of District 8 and the signing of the peace treaty during the

Vietnam War, a youth initiative is only facilitated if it lies within the parameters of the Party’s

objectives. Therefore, clearly communicating your intention to exemplify the government’s

guideline is instrumental in having your actions recognized. This is the most important

strategy to keep in mind; although radical activists may view this method as cowardly and Dang 26

ineffective, writing slanderous blogs about high-ranking officials is guaranteed to fail.

Righteous acts only take form when the right intention is received.

2. Join youth organizations. The only way to bring about drastic changes, or eliminate insidious

traditions, is from within. The North did not win over the South by bombarding it from

outside, it utilized the Viet Cong to infiltrate internal networks. Doi moi was not pitched to

the post-war government by a political counsel, it was conceived by the Party leaders

themselves. Therefore, to persuade the leadership to realign their focus, one has to also

actively participate in the process. There are thousands of youth organizations in Vietnam,

public and private, but there are two that stand out as the most optimal destinations. The

Vietnam Youth Federation (VYF) is the largest youth organization in Vietnam, with over 8

million members. Its main tasks are to organize members to participate in industrialization

and modernization as well as activities beneficial to the people. The second front-runner is

the HCYU, which has become a symbol of youth participation and their pioneering spirit.

Join them, and advocate for change using the aforementioned tactics. After all, a seemingly

far-fetched idea could be made more relatable with a convincing intention; but an utterly

realistic request would never be fulfilled if it begs not authorization, but admission of guilt.