EFFïCIEIiJCY DEBATES IN THE HALIFAX REGIONAL

TERRI LEE EVANS

B.A., University of Manitoba, 1993

THESIS SUBMlTI'ED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF

THE REQUREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS

in the Department

of

Politicai Science

8 Tari Lee Evans 2000

SIMON FRASER UWERSlTY

Deamber2000

AU rights nserved This wodt may not be npcoduccd in wbok or in part. by photocopy or other means, without pecmission of the author. uisitions and Acquisitiane et '3Bi bgraphii Servicfts seMces bibhiraphiques

The author has granted a non- L'auteur a accordé une licence non exciusive licence aiiowing the exclusive permettant B la National Li'brary of Canerln to Biblioth6que nationale du Canada de reproduce, loan, distri'bute or seii reproduire, prêter, distribuer ou copies of this thesis in microfonn, vendre des copies de cette thése sous papa or electronic formats. la fonne de microfiche/film, de reprodaction suc papier ou sur fonnat électronique.

The author retains ownership of the L'auteur conserve la propriété du copyright in this thesis. Neither the droit d'auteur qui protège cette thése. thesis nor substautial extracts fiom it Ni la th& ni des extraits substantiels may be printed or otherwise de celle-ci ne doivent être imprimés reproduced without the author's ou autrement reproduits sans son permission. autorisation. Metroplitan reform, the mhaping of municipal govedng structures and geographic boundarks, has been a significant force in the Canadian urban landscape in the latter part of the 20Ih century. Refonns in the 1950s and 1960s lookcd at changing the structure of to address problems of planning coordination, infrastructure and service delivery, due to the burgeoning population growth after World War li, and the pressure of outward expansion beyond the city limits. In the 1990s, the basis of metroplitan reform has shiftcd away from the carlier focus on solving urban problems to a concentration on achieving efficiency in the govemance of regions.

Metroplitan reform has experienced a rebirth in the 1990s as provincial govemments have tinkered with the stmcture of metropolitan ngions as a solution to achieving pater fiscal efficiency within them. Consolidation of individual into one governing structure has been the mudel dominating recent reforms. Thosc who oppose the consolidationist trend, such as Andrew Sancton and Robert Bish, argue that there is no evidence that one larger rnetropolitan unit within a generates a greater cost savings than many separate municipalities within a region.

This thesis tested ihe prevailing view that metropolitan consolidation equates with greater efficiency and cost savings using a two region case study. A comparison of the Halifax Regional and Victoria's was chosen as case study sites because they represent an amalgamated versus non- amalgamateci fom of regional government, and are regions of similar size in terms of land base and population. An examination of municipal fiscal indicators was used to test the bypothesis that metropolitan consolidation equals a more efficient governing structure and captures cost savings.

iii To my parents, Eva and Terrance Evans, for showing'me the value of hard work and the ctward of king gcnemus OF spirit. 1would like to express sincere gratitude to my supervisor, Dr. Patrick J. Smith, for his resourcehilness, mentoring, and positive encouragement throughout my entire graduate program. Thank you for ihe advice, support, and friendship you have show in this rescarch project and other celatd endeavoun.

Special thanks also to Dn. Monroe Eagles and James Lightbody for being part of my cxamining cornmittee and for providing valuable feedback on the final draft.

My graduate expcrience would not have becn so thoroughly enjoyable without the friendship and support from the following grad students: Jasoda Kishun-Austin, Russell Williams, Greg Clarke, Jerutette Ashe, and Karen Lochead.

Thanks also to Dr. Andy Heard for showing, by example, the joys of teaching and research; and to Dr. Michael Howlett for contributing to the title of this thesis.

Financiai assistance to conduct research was generously provided by Dr. and Mrs. Joseph and Rosaiie Segal.

Acknowledgement is aiso given to the staff, Counciliors, and Mayor of the Halifax Regionai Municipality for indulging an inquisitive grad student during the latter stages of my research.

Spcciai thanks to my partner, Jonathan Fershau for keeping up with my frenzied pace over the past few years, for al1 your love, support, and humour-filled debates. Table Of Content8

.. APPROVAL ...... -11 ... ABSTRACI' ...... 111 DEDICATION ...... iv ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ...... v TABLE OF CONTENTS ...... vi .. LIST OF TABLES ...... vn LIST OF FIGORES ...... ix CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCHON ...... 1 Basis For Study ...... 4 Case Study Sites...... 10 Background...... 17 Structure ...... 21 CHAPTER TWO: VARIABLES ...... 23 CHAPTER THREE: METROPO~ANREFORM EXPERIENCES m CANADA, 1950s TO PRESENT ...... 28 klyRefom Era ...... 28 Recent Reform Era...... 46 CHAETER FOUR: THE HALlFAX REGIONAL MUNICIPALITY ...... 52 CHAP'ïER FIVE. THE CAPlTAL ...... 70 CHAPTER SIX. CASE STUDY COMPARISON ...... 80 CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUSION ...... 88 APPENDIX A ...... 97 BIBLIOGRAPHY ...... -99 1. Elected Representation in the Halifax Region. Pre Consolidation ...... 12 2. EIectcd Representation in the Halifax Regional Municipality ...... 12 3. Elected Reprwntation in the Capital Regional District ...... 16 4 . Per Capita Cost of General Govemment Services (HRM) ...... 57 5 . General Government Services as a Percentage of Total Operating Expenditures (HRM) ...... 59 6. Per Capita Cost of Fire Services (HM)...... 61 7. Fire Services as a Percentage of Total Operating Expenditures (HRM)...... 62 8 . Per Capita Cost of Protection (HRM) ...... 64 9. Municipal Tax Rates - Residential (HRM) ...... 65 10. Fer Capita Cost of Total Operating Expenditures (HM)...... 68 I 1 . Pcr Cupita Cost of Gcncril Govcrnmcnt Scrviceq (CRD) ...... 72 12. General .Govemment Services as a Percentage of Total Operating Expendituns (CRD) ...... 73 13. Per Capita Cost of Fire Services (CRD) ...... 74 14. Fire Services as a Percentage of Total Operating Expenditures (0)...... 75 15 . Per Capita Cost of Administration of Justice (Cm)...... 76 16. Administration of Justice as a Percentage of Total Operating Expendituns (CRD) ...... 76 17. Residential Tax Rates - Residential (CRD) ...... 77 18. Per Capita Cost of Total Operating Expendituns (Cm)...... 78 19. Per Capita Comparison of General Govemment Services...... BO 20 . General Government Services as a Percentage of Total Operating Expcndituns ...... 82 2 1. Per Capita Comparison of Fire Services ...... 83 22 . Fire Services as a Percentage of Total Operating Expenditures ...... 83

vii 23 . Per Capita Cornparison of Police Services ...... 84 24 . Police Services as a Pcrcentage of Total Operating Expenditures ...... 84 25 . Cornparison of Residential Tax Rates ...... 85 26 . Pct Capita Compatison of Total Opecating Expenditures ...... 86 27 . Population Variation Betwccn Statscan and B.C. Stats ...... 91

viii 1. Halifax Regional Municipality ...... Il 2. Comparison of Elected Representation in the Halifax Region. Pte and Post Amalgamation...... 13 3 . Capital Regional District ...... 15 4. Cornparison of Municipal Tax Rates in the Halifax Region ...... 67 5 . Per Capita Cost of Total Operating Expenditures (HRM) ...... 68 6. Pet Capita Cost of Total Operating Expenditures (CRD) ...... 79 7. Per Capita Cornparison of General Govemment Services...... 81 This thesis tests the prevailing view on urban govemance that metropolitan consolidation equates with greater e€ficiencyl and cost savings; while the accepted wisdom maintains that there is no measurable increase in efficiency and cost savings and that such amalgamation/consolidation efforts may have accountability/ accessibility costs. Specifically, two questions are central to this research: i) does metropolitan consolidation actualfy increase efficiency?; ii) are daims of cost savings borne out by those promoting "las govemment"? A third question is related to the consolidation experience; iii) does consolidation impact positively or negatively on accountability and accessibility to govemment at the local level? While question three is interesting and imponmt, the primary focus of this thesis will be on metropolitan consolidation as a municipal ceform option whose goal is to create a more efficientkost effective goveming structure. A case study analysis has ken used to test whether cost savings and efficiencies are achieved when municipal units undergo consolidating structural and functional change to a consolidated metropolitan form.

' The term efficiency can imply the eümination of overlap and duplication, the reduction in the nurnber of municipal goveniments, the achievement of economies of scale, and provision of the most service to the taxpayer at the least amount of cos See Sancton, Andrew "Reducingcosts by consolidating rnunicipalicies: New Brunswick, and ûntario". Canadian Public Adminismrion, 1996, vol 39 (3). A comparative case study approach bas been selected between Halifax and

Victoria The cases were selected specifically because they represent an amalgarnated versus non-amalgamated region at a time when consolidation was the approach king favoured by many provincial governrnents, especially in and Nova Scotia.

Instead of following the consolidationalist path of other provincial govemments, the govemment of British Columbia has chosen instead to address regionai pressures through a growth management approach.

Provinciai governments in Canada, traditionally, have played significant roles in formulating metropolitan options, particularly in the pst World War Ti period.

The metropolitan reforms in the 1990~~especially in Ontario, Nova Scotia, New

Brunswick and Prince Edward Island have an added dimension, premised on a belief by their respective provincial govemments that consolidation of many municipalities within one region would bring about cost savings and increased efficiency2. Andrew

Sancton notes that the fixed preoccupation of provincial governments on metropolitan reform and specificaily with consolidation as the preferred option, is summatized best by the following ciichd: 'the status quo is not an optiony?This represented a shift from the metropoiitan reform era of the 1950s and 1960s in which structurai reform at

William Hayward, for example, projected a savings of $9.8 million pet year ftom consolidating four municipal units in the Greaier MaxArea. Nova Scoiia, lnterim Report of the Municipal Refonn Commissioner. Halifax: Depament of Municipal Anairs, 1993, i. Similady, in teference to KPMG's Fresh Start report, Al Leach, Minister of Municipal Mairs for Ontario noted that ihe Tomnto megacity would yield an initial savings of $865 million, with subsequent annual swings pmjected at $300 million. See Ontario, Legislaune, Hansard, January 14,1997. htm:/lwww.ontlaon.calhallSardn6 patllsessionll houseM197n144-2.hm the municipal level more often resembled federated models and was developed by to address problems of planning coordination and service delivery. Those who oppose the new 1990s focus of metropoiitan consolidation, such as Andrew sancton4 and Robert ~ish,' suggcst that there is no evidence that one lvger metroplitan unit is more efficient and generates a greater cost savings than many separate municipalities within a given region? Such commentators also question the iinkage between efficiency and accountability when govemmental structures undergo structural changes? Bish summarizes that "as size increases, council members will be less representative of their constituents, and have less knowledge of subarea clifferences."' This distancing of politicians from the electorate has become an afterthought to the search for greater efficiency in modem day utban regions and minimizes the politicai and representative role of municipalities as valid functions of local govemment.

Sancton, Andrew, Merger Mania: the Assault on tocal Government. Westmouni: Pnce-Patterson, 2000,143.

Sancton points to ment studies of municipal reorganimtion in Ontario in which consultant reports (e.g. see KPMG report prepared for the Greater Task Force) show that minimal savings are achieved hughconsolidation. He questions whethet municipal govenunents reap savings in ihe provision of services when municipalities are amalgamated. See Sancton, 1996,284.

See Bish, Robert, "Regional District Review - 1999: issues and Intejurisdictional Comparisons." Victoria: Local Govemment Institute, September 1999b.

Sancton, 1996,267.

Peter Self is not refemng specifïcally to menopolitan consolidation reform but instead he is refemng to generic questions of public administration. 'The Diemmas of Administration" in Ariniinistrative Thcones adPolitics London: George Men & Unwin Ltd, 1972,247-299.

Bi& Robert, "Amaigamation: is it the Solution?" Repared for the Coming Revolution in conference, Halifax, 27-29,1996,S. In order to test the hypothesis that metropolitan consolidation equates with more efficientkost effective govemance, a two site case study was conducted; the

Halifax region, which was restmctured in Apnl 1996, and Greater Victoria, which has not been resûuctured but confronts similar regional pressures. A bief analysis of uhan centres such as Winnipeg, Edmonton, and Toronto provides an historical, comparative context on the debate that metropolitan consolidation reform equates greater etlïciency and cost savings.

Basis For Study

Throughout the 1990s, senior govemments have show an increasing interest in the manner in which metropolitan areas are govemed with a particuiar focus on achieving pater fiscal efficiency within such regions. This thesis assesses how two provincial govemrnents formulate metropolitan options and how their intervention into the urban fabric impacts local government structures and functions. Cornmentary within the Iiterature on urban governance suggests that provincial govemments used mettopolitan reform as a means to addcess pmblems specific to urban centres and often did so "unilateraüy.. .without the use of referenda to gain popuiar acceptance of local governent reform Jim Lightbady suggests that early refoms were

oflen precipitated by their own cathartic moments, by a crisis perceived or somehow invented in service delivery. For Toronto, it was potable water; for Montreal, the 1969 police strike; and for Winnipeg in the late 1950s, the intermunicipal inability to ...coordinate the building of bridges over rivers.1°

Subsequent refoms, as noted by Lloyd Axworthy in "Winnipeg", highlighted the conclusions by provincial governments that metropolitan reform was usehl as a solution to the problem of "ineffective decision making, inefficient administration, and apathy among the populace."" Feldrnan and Graham agreed with Axworthy in contending that within Canada, metropolitan reform has traditionally been a reactive approach to dealing with urban problems, especially crises associated with service delivery and g~wth.'~This preoccupation with the role of local govemments as service providers minimized the political and representative raison d'être of municipalitie~'~and would later be revisited as the governance of city-regions would corne to dorninate the next wave of reforms. If in the 1950s and 1960s, reforms were

Feldman, Lionel D. and Katherine A, Graham "Local Govenunent Reform in Canada" in Local Govemment Reform and Reorganitaiion. New York: Kennikat Press Corp., 1997,167.

'O Lightbody, lames "A new perspective an clothtog the ernporer: Canadian meaopolitan f', function and fiontiers". Canadion Public Adniinistraiion, 1997, vol 40 (3). 439-440.

" hworthy, Lloyd "Canada: Winnipeg" in InrentationoI Hondlrook on Local Govenment Reorganitation. Westport: Greenwood Ress, 1980,42.

I2Feldman and Graham, 1997,153,

Tindal, C. Richard and Susan Nobes Tindal, Local Covemment in Ca~da.P' ed. Scuborough: Nelson Thomson Learning, 2000,161. aimed at solving pmblems of infrastructure and service delivery, then in the 1990s, reduction of govenunent spending at al1 levels forced provincial governments to examine the way city regions were king managed and how they might increase urban

efficiency.

Within the litetanire on urban govemance, the term 'efficiency' has held

several meanings. Michael Keating defines eficiency as the determination of "which

scale of structure can produce most service at least cost."14 Similarly, for Howlett and

Rarnesh, "efficiency evaiuation attempts to assess the costs of a program and judge if

the sarne amount and quaiity of outputs could be achieved ...at a lower co~t."'~They

consider the measurement of inputs and outputs extremely significant in eras of

budgetary cutbacks and downsizing of government. Likewise, Peter Self defined

general organizational efficiency as the "balancing of administrative inputs and

outputs, and the optimum allocation of available cesources among competing

demands."16 While a strong emphasis has been placed on the importance of

efficiency as a variable of measurement, Self insisted that "[flew efforts have been

made to unravel the meanings of efficiency in public administrati~n'*~'and noted that

-- - l4 Keating, Michael "Size, Efficiency and Demaracy: Consolidation, Fngmentation and Public Choice" in Theones of Ur6an Polirics. London: Sage Publications, 1995,117.

'' Howlea, Michael and M. Ramesh Sîudyhg Public Policy Policy Cycles and Policy Subsystemr. Don Mis: Oxford University Press, 1995, 17 1.

l6 Self, 1972,255.

l7 Ibid., 273. 6 the "economic sense of efficiency is comprehensive to the extent that it can reduce al1 relevant values to comrnon monetary tenns."18

In an effort to move beyond the narrow focus on financial considerations, Al

Johnson highlighied ihe multi-dimensional, and hierarchical nature of the term eficiency. The conventional notion of efficiency, defined by Johnson as

'administrative eficiency', is the exercise of "reducing administrative expenses, eliminating waste and extravagance, and speeding up service to the While an important part of eficiency, administrative efficiency should not operate in a vacuum and instead is complemented by another dimension that, in Johnson's opinion, is even more significant - that of "politicai eftïciency". Political eficiency is defined as "making the right policy decisions, of selecting the appropriate programs in order to achieve îhe govemment's objective^."^^ Johnson stresses the importance of politicai effîciency by emphasizing that "[olne bad policy decision - for example, the construction of an uneconomic railway or road - will cost the taxpayer more thande savings which can be achieved by administrative e~ficienc~."~'The final definition offered, "service &ciency", is described as a 'heterogeneous group of public service objectives, including sewice to the public [and] responsiveness to public opinionu.

I8 Ibid., 264. l9 Johnson, AJ. "EffScitacy in Goverurnent and Business" in Public Administmtion in (huzui~: Selected Readhgs. Agincourt: Methuen Publications, 1977, 152.

Ibid., 153. This dimension of efficiency is "measwed in terms of the effectiveness with which it provides public services within the context of constitutional g~vernment.'~~~

Recognizing that efficiency is a broad md complex notion, Johnson cautions that

"efficiency in govemment must [not] be measund... in economic terms alone.""

While Johnson's definitions of eficiency were published in the late 1970s, they remain as cautious to the 1990s consolidation debate with its emphasis on traditional economic efficiency.

Placing an emphasis on the fiscal implications of metropolitan reform has caused cestructuring, but not necessarily consolidation, to be of serious concem in

Halifax, Montreal, Hamilton and Toronto. While some provincial governments have looked to consolidation of many municipalities into one larger metropolitan entity as a means of making local govemment more efficient, Andrew Sancton cautions that

"reducing the number of municipal govemments does not necessarily mean less g~vemment."~

Therefore, two central questions rernain: i) does consolidation actually increase efficiency?; and ii) are the claims of cost savings borne out by those promoting "less govemment and consolidation". While municipal structure plays a part in any discussion of metropolitan reform, this thesis fmuses prïmarily on whether

ibid., 154. ri ibid., 154.

ibid., 154.

%mcton, 1996,267, there is justification in the argument that bigger is better in tems of metropolitan

rcstmcturing and specificaily, if metropolitan consolidation reform fulfils its efficiency/ cost savings promise.

In order to adequately address the subject matter, this thesis examines only the

efficiency dimensions of metropolitan restmcturing. It is important to note, however,

that the separate dimensions of accountability and accessibility are important

variabIes within the wider debate and their interconnectedness - with each other and

to efficiency - are areas of interest for future research.

The research design for this thesis includes a comparative case study analysis

of Halifax - an amalgamateci region, and Victoria - a non-amalgamated region but

one, as will be dernonstrateci, that faces similar pressures to Halifax. The research

includes an in &pth analysis of Greater Halifax over time, pre and post consoIidation

and the Capital Region in Victoria will be examined over the same period of time.

Cost savingdefficiency variables wiii be exmined in both case study sites to assess

the hypothesis rhat metropolitan consolidation reform equates with greater efficiency

and cost savings.

The primary means of gathering data is through the examination of

govenunent documents (task force reports, royal commission reports, speeches, and

budgeting/ia.xation documents) and academic comentary (books, journal articles) on

metropolitan refonn and intergovermentai relations. AdditionaI research included semi-structund interviews" with locai-regionai pditicians, public servants and academics who provided commentary and anaiysis on current literature and the recent expexience of metropolitan reform in the two Canadian urban centres of Victoria and

Halifax.

Case Study Sites

Site One: Halifax

The Halifax Regional Municipality (HRM), is a unitary goveming structure

resulting from the consolidation of the of Halifax and Dartmouth, the of

Bedford, and the Halifax Municipdity. The region was legislated into

existence by the provincial government on April 1, 1996. The Halifax region has a

1996 population of 342,966 and represents, in terms of the number of municipalities

amaigamated, one of the srnallest regional govemments in Canada. Tables 1 and 2

include a list of municipalities, a population breakdown by municipality and council

representation per citizen buth pre- and pst-arnalgamation. The Halifax Regional

Municipaiity has been selected for study as it represents a cecent example of

metropolitan consolidation refonn where debates over efficiency were paramount in

changing the region's governing structure.

26 The SFü Ethics Cornmittee appmved interview schedule. See Appendix A.

10 Figure 1, Halifax Regionai Municipality

Source: Halifax Regional Municipality, htt~://www.re~on.hdifax.ns.ca//desimcodcons/imagedon1.jpg TABLE 1

ELECTED REPRESENTATION IN THE HALIFAX REGION PR.CONSOLIDATION

Manicipirlities Popdation Number of Lacai Number of Citized 19W Coundllon Local Codor Bedford 13,638 7 1,948 Dartmouth 65,629 15 4,375 Halifax 113,910 13 8,762 Halifax County 149,669 25 5,986 Total 342.966 60

TABLE 2

ELECIED REPRESENTATION IN THE HALIFAX REGIONAL MUNICIPALITY

Former Popuiation Number of District Number ot~itizens( Munidpriüties 1996 Coudors District Cwneülor Bedford 13,638 1 13,638 Dartmouth 65,629 5 13,125 Halifax 113,910 8 14,238 Halifax County 149,669 9 16,630 Total 342,966 23

Source:

Halifax Regional Municipality "The Role of Municipal Govemment in a New Era: Halifax's Perspective", October 1999.

Statistics Canada, 1996 Census of Canada.

Vojnovic, Igor Municipal Consolidation in the 199ûx An Analysis of Five Canadiun Municipulities. Toronto: ICüRR, 1997, 100. Elected Representcrtion

1 H Pre Arnalgamtion (

Municpaliîies

Figure 2. A Cornparison of Elected Reptesentation in the Halifax Region, Pre and Post Amalgamaiion Site Two: Victoria

The Capital Region is located at the southeast corner of Vancouver Island. The region's population of 309,336 is distributed through 2 cities, 8 and 2 toms, which range in size korn the smalIest at 1,703 people (Metchosin) to the largest at lMY791 idn ne^)?

The Capital Region represents a non-amalgarnated form of regional

government that is based on the voluntary co-operation of member municipaiities.

The regional district system in British Columbia is described by Richard and Susan

Tindal as "one of the most imaginative and flexible goveming arrangements found

anywhere in s ana da."^' While other provinces have tinkered with the structure of

metropolitan regions as a response to the pressures of urban growth, the regional

district system in British Columbia cemains as the preferred model. The "reluctance

of the provincial govemment to introduce more major changes"2g in response to

increasing growth pressures, that is, a jack of movement toward consolidation,

implies a stronger focus on governance rather than added layers of govemment.

-- Population figures are based on year 2000 estimaies. See httpJ/~~~.Md.bcsa~rps/factsheetlpop,gtow.hm

28 Tindal, Richard and Susan Nobes TiLocal Governmnt in Cam&. Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson Ltd, 1995,123-124. Capital Regional Dktrid

Figure 3. The Capital Regional District

Source: B.C. Stats TABLE 3

EJXCTED REPRESENTATION IN THE CAPlTAL REGIONAL DISTRICT

Numkrot CRD Citized Board Locrtl Wcigated Coundllor _Votes-.. - - .-

Central Saanich 2,276 -:,' =-- '1 . Colwood 2,095 -_.- 1- Esquimalt 2,431 :-:--' -* 1-- , . Highiands 243 --'5 -:-3 Langford 2,770 :- 1 Metchosin 1,020 -- I North Saanich 1,585 1 Oak Bay 2,66 1 L Saanich 1 1,977 5 Sidney 1,282 1 Victoria 8,741 3 View Royal

Source:

Capital Regionai District, Population Growth, http://www.crd.bc.calmslfactsheetl~~~erow.html

British Columbia, Municipal Affairs and Housing, "1998 Municipal Siatistics for Capital Regional District," Background

The legd relationship between provincial govemments and their municipal counterparts has been descnbed as that of superior-subordinate. Under Section 92(8) of the Constitution Act 1867, municipdities are created by the provinces and derive ail their powers and cesponsibilities hom them. Feldman and Graham observe that

"[wlhile al1 provincial govemments have this extensive power ...[t]he politicai reality of the formai power relationship is characterized by variations in provincial assertivene~s"~~.Similarly, John Meligrana stresses that the "constitutional neglect of local state powe m... suggests that sub-provincial units of govemment are subject to change simply because they cm be changeci'''. And while, in the U.S. context Victor

Jones notes, the "right of a legislature to mate, modify, or destroy is just a right, that is, it is only a legal author@ to a~t"~',in Canada, provincial govemments "are able to exert their authority often enough that local governments can still be cdled 'tenants at wi11"'~~- the term coined by United States hdge Dillon.

30 Feldman, Lionel D. and Katherine A. Graham hrgaining For Cities. Municiplities and Intergovernmental Relations: An Assessmmr, Toronto: IRPP, 1979,s.

" Meligrana, John Territorid Stmtegies of ha1Gmernment Reorganùation: the urban political geography of municipal annexation in three Canadian cities: London, Edmonton and Parksville, PhD. dissertation. Bmaby: Simon Fraser University, 1998.21.

Jones, Victor "Beavers and Cats: Federal-Local Relations in the ünited States and Canada" in Meech Luùe: Front Centre to Periphery. Vancower. The Centre for Human Settlements, 1988.90,

33 Ibid., 91. Throughout the latter part of the 20' century, govemments at dl levels in

Canada have been faced with increasing fiscal challenges. Federal govemment offloading of services and responsibilities to the provinces has been one response - and this has had a huge subsquent impact on municipal structuresY as provinces have responded in Like form. Not oniy do municipal govemments have to struggle to take on additional responsibilities rekgated to them by the provinces, but have also had to discover ways in which to increase their revenue base beyond that of property taxation?' This source of municipal revenue has become insuftlcient to cover the additional responsibilities relegated to hem from senior levels of govemment.

The pressures of growth and the increasing population shift fiom rurai to urban areas in the late 20' cenhuy led municipalities to consider reform as one response in dealing with said changes. These considerations were attempts by municipalities to find their own solutions to metropditan problems as opposed to the more recent trend of provincial governments imposing solutions upon municipalities.

The notion of municipal reform had its mots in postwar expansion when cities felt the need to expand beyond their borders and faced increased service responsibilities.

Plunkett and Hooson suggest that local govemment sttuctures were created "when conditions of transportation and the requirements for public services necessitated

35 Propecty taxation, a tniditional source of revenue for municipalities, is not sufficient to cover the expenses that corne dong wiîh additionai responsiiities off loaâed by the provincial government. Municipal govenunents looked KIcitizeas, as conmmers of services, to pay for the seMces îhey use; such as additional fees for garbage collection, pay parking at community facitities, and increasing rates geographicdy smaller units of municipal govenunent and when much less was demanded of govemment"36. Metroplitan refoms during the 1950s and 196ûs were attempts to change the structure of local govemment to address problems of service delivery and disjointed planning. In assessing this early refonn era, James Lightbody asserts that "no municipal boundary was ever changed in any of the first Canadian reforms; a new goveming apparatus was simply tacked on to what was aiceady in place'". And while municipal govemments generaily recognized the problems, debates such as those in the postwar Toronto region before the Ontario Municipal

Board showed a relative unwillingness to agree on inter-municipal solutions. While regionai govemments showed themselves in the form of two tier and sometimes unitary models (e.g. Winnipeg), the more ment trend in municipal restnictunng has emphasised consolidation. A number of provincial govemments are experimenting with consolidation as a means of fitting form to function and tackling questions regarding govemance and "planning for growth management within ...metcopolitan

~ettin~s"~~.That not al1 are provides a unique basis for comparative assessrnent of the consolidation e€ficiency/ cost savings hypothesis.

for water supply. See Hobson, P. and F. St-Hilare Urhn Goveniance and Finance: o question of who does wht. Monueal: iRPP, 1997.

36 PIUtlJLe4 TJ and W. Hwson ''Municipal Structures and Services", Canadian Public Policy, v.L(3). Summer 1975,367.

Lightbody, l997,Ml.

Smith, Patrick J. 'Yioveming Metroplitan Change: public plicy and govemance in Canada's City Regions" in Chduut Meimpolitics, Toronto: Copp Clark Lid, 1995.16 1. 19 Throughout the 1990s, there has been considerable consolidation not only of urban municipalities in Canada but also local goveming units such as school boards. in an effort to be more fiscaiiy eficient.lg numerous provincial govemments have imposed cestructuring on local goveming unitsa thmughout the . In Nova

Scotia, for example, municipal consolidation in Halifax occurred despite changes of govemment at the provincial level as the Liberal party had presented itself as not favouring amalgamation versus the goveming Conservative party who were forcefully pressing ahead with consolidation. In the May 1993 provincial election, the new

Liberal party, whose campaign included anti-amalgamation rhetoric, defeated the niling Conservative government. While the new Liberal govemment mpoused a gradua1 approach to metropolitan reform, they did a policy reversai in October 1994 and announced that arnalgamation of the Halifax region would ûe provincidly imposed. This announcement was met with much public backlash to such a drastic change of structure at the local leve14'. The more ment consolidation of

Metropditan Toronto (but not Greater Toronto) represented a consolidation of

39 nieNew Brunswick Minisay of Municipalities ,Culture and Housing suggests 'fiscally efficient' means the abiüty 10 "provide more efficient, cost-effectivesecvices by reducing duplication and designing a more equitable system of taxation with local accountabiiity". Quoted in Sancton, 1996, 274.

011 non-metroptitan consolidation, there has been a significant reductian in the number of school boards, for example in , stands out as examples. See Camey, R and F. Peters l'ûoverning Education: the Myh of Local Connol* in Lightbody, J. (ed) Ca~dianMetropolitics: Govemuig our Cities. Toronio: Copp Clark Ltd, 1995,249.

4' TiiaI and Tidal, 2000,134. 20 municipalities themselves into an even bigger form of unitary regional govemment42- not unlike Halifax. Those who have supported bigger, conmiidated regions have argued they will be more efficient than the individuai municipaiities that existed before them. As noted above, however, this idea is debated." The more efficient, bigger is better hypothesis is the focus of this thesis.

Structure

Chapter hvo goes from the bcoad perspective of the introductory chapter to a nmwer focus in setting out the methodology that is used throughout the thesis. In this chapter, there is an examination of definitions of 46efficiency"and assessrnent of variables used in pst studies on metropditan testructuring to test efficiency. On that basis, specific "tests" are developed for the Halifax and Victoria cases. This chapter provides comment on how to measure metropolitan eficiency and identifies and qualifies variables used for testing the efficiency of the two case study sites; Victoria and Halifax.

in cbapter ithree, a brief history of metropolitan refonn is presented and becomes the foundation upon which cornparisons to more recent reforms are drawn.

In examinhg the underlying reasons behind refonns in the early reform period, the inadequacies of the respows over time highlight the nedfor a cethinking of regional

"Enid Siack assesses ihe as encompassing Mem Toronto and the regions of Durham, Haitoa, Peel, and York, Slack, Enid 'Fiance aml Govemance" in iJrban Govenurncc and Fke.Monacal: IRPP, 1997,3. structures and bring the current round of reforms to the fore. A bief examination of the challenges many urban centres experienced between the 1950s and 1970s is

undertaken and the structural reactions of cities identified. Utbon centres that were in the forefront of Ctus early reform era include Edmonton, Winnipeg md Toronto and

the metropolitan responses of each city are examined.

In chapters f'r and Pive, the case study of two metropolitan regions, Halifax

and Victoria, are presented. The variables that were determined in chapter two are

used to test the efficiency of each region over time and do provide quantitative data

upon which to comment on the eftÏciency/ consolidation debate.

Chapter six takes the findings of the previous two chapters and compares

whether the variables measured support the hypothesis that metropolitan resmicturing

achieves cost savings and increased local government efficiency, Trends identified

fiom the case study are then applied more broadly to metropolitan refortn in Canada

and provide a basis to comment on the debate within the literature on urban

governance that metroplitan consolidation reform is, on the one hand, a more

efficient, cost effective way to plan and govern urban regions -or ahernatively, that it

fails to hlfil its efficiencyi cost savings promises.

"~eeSancton, Andrew Governing Cw&'s Ciry Regions: adop~ing@na to fruiction. Monmal: ûWC, 1994. 22 CEWTER TWO

VARIABLES

As mentioned previously, there exist a variety of definitions of "efficiency" that range from focussing on narrow considerations (Le. financial) to those that are more multi-dimensional in nature. This section will identify and discuss efficiency variables that commonly appear in discussions around the topic of meûopotitan

resmicturing. From this starting point, specific "tests" were developed to measure cost savings for the Halifax and Victoria case study. This section provides comment on how to measure metropolitan efiiency, and identifies and quantifies variables

us4 for testing the efficiency of the two case study sites; Halifax and Victoria.

Commentary within the literanire on metropolitan cestructuring point to

severai areas where cost savings can be achieved and thus create a more efficient

goveming structure at the local level. These areas support the 'bigger is better'

philosophy of modem day reforms. The underlying bais of tecent refotms suggest

that some municipalities have become, primarily due to their smail size, tw fiscally

challenged to carry out municipal responsibilities, that the elimination of duplication

within a region will generate cost savings, and that economies of scale will be

achieved in semice provision.'

' TUidai and Tindal, 2000,167. The first factor, it is argued, that, due to mettopolitan restnicturing, brings about cost savings is the paring dom of govemment. Charles Campbell suggests, in the 1993 lnterim Report of the Municipal Reform Commissioner for Cape Breton

County, that municipal cestructuring has the "largest impact in the general govemment categow2- a category that comprises a municipality's legislative and

administrative costs. mile significant emphasis is placed on the savings reaped from

replacing multiple councils in a region with a single council, the savings are

insignificant as compared with savings that stem from trimming administrative costs

of these municipal units? Similady. KPMG. in their npon on the potential cost

savings from consolidating , the Fresh Start Report, predicted

that the opportunities for savings in the general govemment category were not only

significant but would be the "first place to look for savings from arna~~amation.'"

They argued, "[aJmalgarnation would eliminate the need for a multiplicity of councils

[and] administrative oficers.'"

Many cornmentators challenge the idea of substantid saving king found in

this category. Specifically Robert Bish and Andrew Sancton suggest that savings in

this area are so insignf~cantthat they can be gained without formd changes to a

Campbell. Charles A. Intenm Report of the Municipal Refom Commissionerfor Cape Breton Counry. Halifax: Deparment of Municipal Affairs, 1993.60. ' Campbell, 1993,60. 'KPMG "Fresh Sturt: An Eitinrare of PotemiziSmings and Costsfiom the Creation of Single Tier Local Governmentfor Toronto". December 19%. Appendix A.

ibid., Appendh A.

24 region's goveming structure. In examining local government expenditures, Bish explains, "only 5 percent goes for govemance and policy-making, of which usudy less than one haif of one perçent goes for the cost oielected officiais.'*

Richard Tindal is harshly critical of the 'less govenunent' argument from pro- amaigamation forces. He notes that this highly bantered suggestion is "probably the most vague [of aii arnaigamation claimsj and is essentiaüy an anti-govemment attitude that is part of the right-wing revolution that has been sweeping across North

~merica."' The end result, according to Tindai, is not less government but bigger govemment.

Economies of Scale

A second area in which the metropolitan experiment can produce cost savings is by capturing economies of sale within a region. Katherine Graham et al. suggest that the "perceived presence of economies of scale that may be gained by providing some services at a regional rather than a municipd level is ...[a] delivery organization issue pushed onto the agenda by fiscal cons ide ration^."^ The economies of de argument is frequently promoted by supporters of amaigamation as a means of

"elirninating duplication and o~erla~"~in service provision. Linked to (or perhaps

Bish, Robert The Cost of Municipal Electcd Oficials in the Capid Region of British Columbia" Victoria: Local Goverurnent InstiNte, 1999a, 1.

'~indal,C. Richard, 'Municipal Resmicnuing: the Myth and the Wity." Municipl World 107,3 (March 1996), 7.

8 Graham, Katherine, Susan Phiilips with Man Maslove Urhn Goventance in Cu&: Representation. Resources, andRestructuring. Toronto: Harcourt Bract Canada, 1998.2W.

Ibid., 207. 25 inherent in) the economies of scde argument is the idea that when efficiencies are achieved on a regional scaie, the per capita cost of services will naturaiiy be reduced as the "quantity of the service provided inc~eases."~~Fiscal pressures on govemments at ail levels are evident by the seeking out, especidly by municipal govemments, of ways to reduce services as a means of trimming budget expenses.

As Graham et al. succinctly express, govemments "spend less by doing less"'l thus reinforcing the sometimes forgotten links between the cost of a service and the level

(and appropriatenessl*) of the service provided. This observation is echoed by

Richard Tindal as he States

a larger municipality may be more efficient for delivering some municipd services, but it will aiso be Iess efficient for delivering others. Moreover, if municipaiities are made too large, diseconornies of scale adse - because of problems delivering services within remote areas within an enlarged jurisdiction, and because of bureaucratic congestion."

By examining, on a regional basis, the cost of services, the related tax rates, and the cost of general govemment, both pre- and pst-amalgamation, initial conclusions cm begin to form around the question of efficiency and metropditan testructuring.

" Graham, Phillips, with Maslove, 209.

IZ This comment reflects one example in the Halifax Regional Municipality whereby residents are paying for a service hmwhich they denve no benefit. Due to amalgamation and the sharing of -ce costs across the region, residents of the former Town of Bedford iue paying for sidewaiks, but have no sidewallcs in their municipality. Masuring Efficiency

There has been little academic treatrnent in measuring the claims put forward by consultants and provincial govemments regarding the efficiency of consolidating municipalities. James Lightbody and Robert Bish have both examined the pet capita cost of elected officials within a region as a rneans of drawing conclusions behveen goveniing structure and council multiplicity. Building on this indicator, an examination of effkiency within different regions cm begin by:

Cornparing oved govemment expenditures - what is the per capita cost to govem a region?

Comparing per capita cost of elected officials and staff - this is important in comparing regions of sirnilar size but with differing governing structures, and also significant to the amdgamation argument that cost savings are yielded by reducing the number of elected officials and reducing administrative duplication.

Comparing expenditures in selected service areas and examining their share of the total budget will shed light on the level of savings.

Comparing changes within budget areas over time within a given region - may reffect changing priorities or other realities depending on the service undergoing examination.

These measurements will help provide a clearer picture on the consolidation equais cost savings hypothesis and will be a foundation of cornparison for the case study sites of Halifax and Victoria. 1950s TO PRESENT

This chapter presents a brief history of metropolitan reforrn in the pstWorld

War II period. Specifically, an examination of the challenges urban centres experienced stemming from pwth pressures between the 1950s and 1970s is undertaken and the structural/ govername ceactions of cities identified. Specifically, cities that found themselves in the forefront of this early reform era include Toronto,

Winnipeg and Edmonton and the metropolitan responses of each city will be outlined.

It is upon this foundation that discussion and analysis of the current reform period and the study sites of Halifax and Victoria are examined.

Earlv Refonn Era

ONTARIO

Toronto

The local govemment system in the inmediate decades following Word War

Ii underwent extensive refom as many cities struggled to cope with growth

management pressures. Nowhere were tbese pressures more evident tban in Toronto

and its munding municipalities. The significant increase in population in the late

1940s and eariy 1950s put tremendous stress on the region's ability to provide basic services. Richard and Susan Tindal note that growth management pressure put strain on îhe region's water supply, sewage treatment facilities, public transportation system, and the provision of weKm se~ices'~and "demonstrated the incapacity of local governments to povide basic local micawith any degree of efficicncy."" In respnse to the servicing crisis kingfelt in the Toronto centred region and the need for a CO-ordinatedapproach to development, the of Ontario established, in

1953, the Mu~cipahyof Metmpolitan ~orontol~(Metm Toronto) which included the City of Toronto and twehe surrounding municipalities. Canada's first regional govemment, described as "radicai and yet simpley9".was a two tier structure where the local municipalities constituted the lower tier and Metm Toronto, responsible for the coilrdination of regional services, constinited the upper tier. initial observations of Metro Toronto's ability to cope with the post ww service crises proved promising.

As expressed by Tindai and Tindai, "Metropolitan Toronto was substantially successfiil in combating the servicing problems facing the member municipalities, particularly as regards sewers, water supply, education, and general financial

~tability'"~and these accomplishments were most evident within the initial years of operation of the new structure.

l4Tidal and Tiadal, 1995,9 1.

I5 Smith, 1995,166. l6 Farrow, John and Phcia Rosct 'Tbe Rccent History of Local Govenunent Refonn in Four Canadian Centres". TmiiIo: Canadian LTbInsu'tute, 1999,18.

'7 Tindd and Tindal, 1995.91. A decade after Metro Toronto was created, a royal commission, led by Car1

Goldenberg, was established to review and revisit the issue of regional governance.

The royal commission was prompted by an application in 1962 by the City of Toronto requesting a focmal amalgamation of the municipalities within Metro so to reap savings by reducing administrative costs and taking advantage of economies of scale.lg The application, as suggested by Andcew Sancton, was "based entinly on arguments relating to the equitable sharing of tax bases [and] to the need for land-use planning ...There is not a single claim in the Goldenberg report that municipal consolidation will lead to cost sa~in~s."~~The Goldenberg report, while denying

Metro's application for amalgamation into a unitary stmcture, did produce a recornmendation upon which the Province acted. The Province forced amalgamation within the lower tier by reducing the "number of municipalities within the region from thirteen to six.2' The forced arnalgamations generated considerable local controversies... but the province found that the political heat was manageable and the changes were instituted on 1 January 1967."~~

Municipal reform remained high on the provincial political agenda and "as part of a large-de provincial reorganization of municipal govemments in wbanizing areas, the...Greater Toronto Am?... was delineated between 1971 and

l9 Sancton, 1996,269.

2L The six municipalities wece Toronto, Etobicoke, North York, Scatborough, York and East York Fmwand Roser, 1999.18-

* Smith, 1995, 170. " This area included the four regional municipalities surroundhg Mem Toronto. 30 1974 by the creation of four two-tier regional municipal govemments (around Metro

~oronto)."" Evaluation of Toronto's regionai govenunent structure continued and in

1974, former Ontario Premier John Robarts was appointed to spearhead another review. The Robarts Commission bbrecommendedthat the basic metro structure and its six municipalities be maintaineci [and suggested] changes to the election of metro councillors."~ The province did not act on any of the recommendations, in part - as explained by Warren Magnusson - because "strengthening Metro (especiaily at the expense of the province's jurisdiction) would have increased the extent to which

Metro could be seen as a cornpetitor to the provincial govemment.''26

Metro Toronto's reform experience in ihis early era was premised on

"structural changes designed to improve administrative efficiency and the provision of sewices."" In Toronto's case, the wodd was watching their response to the sewicing crises king felt within the region and in effect, they lay the groundwork for other urban centres in Canada to experiment with municipal strictures as a way of dealing with growth management pressures.

Fmwand Roset, 1999,18.

26 Higgins, Donald Local and Urbon Poliiics in Gan&. Toronto: Gage Educational hiblishing Company, 1986, 198.

Tindal and Tindal, 1995.99. MANITOBA

Wipeg

Metropolitan reform in Winnipeg, the largest urban centre in Manitoba, was precipitated by seMcing challenges similar to those found in Toronto and across

Canada. Tindal and Tindai explain that a "considerabk number of intermunicipal special purpose bodies operated in the Greater Winnipeg area and ...their very existence pointed to the need for some form of area-wide govemment."28 The first post World War II provincial govemment review of the local govemment structure came with the establishment of the Greater Winnipeg Investigating Commission in

1955. The Commission supported a two-tier mode1 of metropolitan govemment, similar to Toronto, and in 1960, the Metropolitan Corporation of Greater Winnipeg was estab~ished.~ Metm was responsible for planning, zoning, sewage disposal and water - responsibilities that had previously ken assigned to special purpose bodies? As expressed by James Lightbody, the Duff Roblin -1ed Conservative governrnent's vision of Metro supported the view that the "proper role of local govemment [was] restricted to pmiding service to properîy (and business) ownership?' He hirther explains that the Metro concept was not fully embraced as "[olpponents in the legislature were mainly afraid that Metro would lay the groundwork for eventual

Tidd,l995, LM.

Higgins, 1986,204. "Tidal and Tindd. 1995,103. a~nal~arnation."~~Two yeam later, a review of the Metro structure was undertaken - primarily as a result of the political friction chat existed between City and Metro councillors - with only minimal changes king irnp~emented.~~

In 1969, a change in party at the provincial level - hmConservative to the NDP (led by Edward Schreyer) - brought the idea of a different form of regional government structure for Winnipeg and its area municipalities to the fore, The

Province introduced, in 1970, a White Paper that recornmended a complete amalgamation of the Gmater Winnipeg area - a Unicity - a single-tier structure

"aimed at promoting econornic growth, administrative efficiency, area-wide equity in levels of municipal services and pperty taxes, and pater opportunities for citizen participation through.. .community committees and residents' advisory groups.""

The Unicity structure would be adopted and subsequently come into effect on January

1, 1972.1~ In discussing the signifieance of this form of rnetropolitan or region-wide government, Tindal and Tindal explain that "rnuch more than amalgamation of municipalities was involved... and the administrative centralization for efficiency in service delivery was to be offset by a number of provisions for political decent~alization."~~

" Lighibody, James 'The Refonnof a Mempoliun Government: The Case of Winnipeg, 197 1". Canadian Public Policy. vo1.4, no, 4, Auûunn 1978,493.

" Ibid., 492.

Tindal and Tindai, 1995.1û4.

Sancton, 2000.58.

3s Axworthy, 1980.35-36.

36 Tindai and ïïidai, l99S,lO5. Review of the Unicity structure proved to be a mixed bag of successes and failures. Lightbody notes that "[r]eorganization had little overall impact on the fiscal decisions of the region's local govemment. There was no significant shift in priorities between old and new even though gross ovetall expenditures rose sub~tantiall~,"~~Likewise, Axworthy comments that the 'Winnipeg reorganization was old-fashioned refom. It was designed primarily to overcome problems of fragmentation and of link pvemmental unity in planning and admini~tration."~'

ALBERTA Edmonton

Like other urban centres in Canada, the Edmonton region felt its share of growing pains in the post World War II period; however, the discovery of oil in

Leduc, an Edmonton area municipality, in 1947 had a significant impact upon an already growing region. Higgins explains that "[p]etroleum came to rival wheat as the basis of Alberta's economy, and oil fuelled the dramatic expansion of Calgary and

Edmonton into major urban Rapid gmwth in the Edmonton region was

"felt immediately.... Virtually every sector of the urban infrastructure - housing,

" Lightbody, 1978,502. '' Axworthy, 1980.42. 39 Higgins* 1986,215. schools, roadways, üansportation, and public administration - was woefuily inadequate to meet the dempod cceated by rapid emnomic growthMa

Within the region, Edmonton was the dominant centre with smaller cities, toms, and fonning a concentric circle amund it!' Strained inter-municipal relations resulting from growth pressures were characteristic of the early reform period. Ted Thomas relates that the "most controversial issues pitting Edmonton against its neighburing communities in the last quarter century has involved boundary changes and govemance of the region as a whole."" He summarizes the problem as follows:

Edmonton's dominance as a commercial and governmental centre with overwhelming influence is feared and resisted by many of the region's smailer communities. Local officiais admit thai although the communities are interdependent in many ways, their residents continue to be parochiai and lrk a knse of region?

In order to maintain local autonomy and resist any movement toward municipal restructuring, the provinciai government offeredfinancial assistance to Edm~nton.~ However, financial assistance proved to be a band-aid solution to the problems king felt by Edmonton and its surrounding region. In 1954, the Social Credit provincial govenunent established a royal commission to examine the

%ornas, Ted Wmonton: Govemance and Planning in the Metropolitan Region" in Metropolitan Govenurnce RevLrited: AmricadCunudion Intergoventmental Perspectives. Berkeley: Institute of Govenunental Sîudics Ress, 1998,262.

41~h~~,1998.246.

421bid.. 249.

'%id., 248-249.

Higgins, 1986,215. boundaries and govemance structures of both Edmonton and Calgary. The McNally Commission "recommended largescale amaigamation of the core cities with the residential and industrial area on theu fringe~'~primarily to equaiize tax bases and standardize service levels in the region. The Commission's recommendation met with opposition at the provincial level and was never implemented - much to the dismay of the City of Edmonton who was looking to increase its size through arnalgamation with surroundhg municipalitiesP6 Over the next few decades, it would become clear that the legacy of the McNally Commission was to fuel the debate that metropditan restnicturing was synonymous with "political consolidation where the existence of a uniform may best be govemed by a single goveming unit as for planning, fiscal equity, and sonomic &velopment.'*' Edmonton, however, continued to press forward with its expansionist agenda and between 1956 and 1961, inmemental boundary changes increased its tenitory over fi@ percent - even though the provincial government opposed an enlarged region as recommended by the McNally CommissionJ8 A change of govemment provinciaily in 197 1 from Social Credit to Conservative gave hop to Edmonton that an enlarged city with a wider tubase might yet be achieved. It should be noted that the process for arnending boundaries in Alberta begins with a petition to the Local Authorities Board which fiad the authority to accept or reject an application put before it. However, in 1975, the bMunicipal Govemment Act was amended to

46 Masson, Jack Alberta's Local Governtnenrs: PolihCs and Demcmcy. Edmonton: The U~versity of Alberta Ptess, 1994,162.

%asson, Jack "Edmonton: The Uns& Issw of Expansion, Governrnentai Reform and Provinciai Economic Diversification" in Politics adGovenunent of CIhn Cd:Selected Readings. Toronto: Methuen Publications, 1981.441. 36 require that decisions of the [Board] be referred to the provincial cabinet for appro~ai.'~~A hrther amendment in 1978 gave the cabinet not only the power to approve or deny Board decisions but, as Jack Masson explained, allowed them to "prescribe conditions that the order is subject to and approve the order subject to those conditions. Thus, theoretically, the cabinet had ultimate control over municipal expansion and development, the [Board's] decisions being only an interîm tep"^^ The City of Edmonton put forward another application for significant boundary expansion in 1979 after "having been thwarted repeatedly in its efforts to amalgamate surrounding comrnunitie~"~'and frustrated by the provincial govemment's decentralist stance. Their application for expansion was met with strong opposition and after a lengthy pmess, Edmonton received, in 198 1, a modest one-fifth of the land area they were seeking?' Tindal and Tindal describe Edmonton's experience in the early reform period as being a "piece-meal, fragmented approach which [did] not consider the overail needs of the entire urban

BRITISH COLUMBIA

In the post WWlI era, municipalities within British Columbia evolved as part of a metropolitan govemment structure that was less formai and more loosely based

49 Masson, Jack Alberta's Local Governments and Their Politics. Edmonton: The Pica Ress, 1985, 48.

Ibid, 1985.48. Thomas, 1998,295.

üiggins, L986.217.

Tiidal and Tindd, 1995,143. than regional models found elsewhere in Canada. The regional disûict system was quickly and quietly put in place by the provincial government over a five year perid in the mid 1%0s. This "gentle imposition"" - the terrn coined by Paul Tennant and David Zimhelt - occurred not only in the major urban centres but aiso across the entire province. Neil Swainson explains that

[tlwenty-eight regional districts had emerged by the end of 1967 and had covered ail but the northwestern and largely inhabited corner of the province. ..Although not classified as municipaiities, these regional districts have become a significant part of [B.C.'s] local government struct~re5~.

Structuraily, regional districts resembled federateds6 models - a feature similar to that of earlier domsin Toronto and Winnipeg during the late 1950s and early 1960s.

The significance of regionai districts begins first with the sheer territorial size that they encompass. With aimost the entire province covered by regional districts,

"most are geographically very large, averaging about four times the size of a westem

U.S. county (and the largest westem U.S. county is lacger than any eastem U.S. state), and ...even larger relative to curai governments in the est of anad da."^ Second,

" See Te~ant,Paul and David Zinihelt, "MempolitanGovemment in Vancouvec the Strategy of Gentle Imposition." Canadian Public Adminimation 16, 1, Spring 1973.

"Swainson. Neil 'nie Provincial-Municipal Relationship" in The Reins of Powec Governing British Coldia. Vancouver. Douglas & McIntyre Ltd., 1983, 240-241, s6 DCsCCibCd by the Ministry of Municipal Miairs as meaning 'two or more leveIs of government where citizens interact diictly with each lcvd in terms of voting and receiving services." See "A Primer on Regional Districts in British Columbia" regionai districts were created to "administer certain functions over wide areasWs8 and were perhaps, as imptied by Tindal and Tindd, sparked by the widespread growth of speciai purpose bodies in the Greater Vancouver region and the rejection of the provincial government to consider a metropolitan goveming structure for that

Tenant and Zimhelt argue, however, that cegional districts did not emerge in response to any crisis at the local level, but mfiected more appropriately the need of civil servants within the Department of Municipal Affairs to "provide a framework for orderly development of local govemment [for] the future.''m In discussing the regional district concept, the government of the day stressed that it was an alternative to the more fonnal mettopolitan structures king implemented in other parts of the country.

Dan Campbell, former Minister of Municipal Affairs, describes the creation of regional districts as '%nctional amalgrnation in which a board is established to undertake services and administer them jointly'"' over a given region. They aiso provideci "increased options for unincorporated areas, where more activities are desi~dbut itopration to municipai status is net...'" Therefore, regional districts were seen to enhance planning and coordination functions beyond the physical

" Tindal and Tindal, 2000, 14 1,

59 ibid.,l40.

Tennant and Zirnhelt, 1973, 127.

British Columbia, Ministry of Municipal Affairs, Regio~iDhtricm in British Columbia, 197I: a geneml review: a series of questcom und answers, L97 1.1.

"Bi& 1999b. Il.

39 boundaties of municipalities and provide a vehicle whereby residents in mral or semi-rural areas could mess services.

bitially, regional districts were not mandaled any formal responsibilities and

"instead it was left to the board of directors of each dishict to decide on the responsibüities they wished to assume.'" In 1967, they were "given responsibility for regional hospitai capital financing, in large part, to introduce badly needed fairness in access to health services.'" As time went on, regionai districts soon

"became responsible for the adoption of an offîcial plan, for the development of community planning secvices in their constituent electoral areas, for building inspection, and for certain 'local wocks and services'."6s Robert Bish notes that the

"expansion of their activities in response to local decisions, accompanied by a willingness to pay for those activities, indicates that they have filled an important gap.9d6

The regional district mode1 is one that is evolutionary in nature and, according to the Ministry of Municipal Affairs, has achieved a level of success due to the following attributes6':

Tindai and Tindal, 2000, Ml.

64 British Columbia, Minishy of Municipal An&, '"A Primer on Regionai Districts in British Columbia." htm J/WWW.~~~~.Q~V.~~/LGPOLICY/MAR/C~~~I-5.

Bish, Robert, Local Govemmnt Ut Bntkh Cuiumbia. 2d edition. Richmond: Union of British Columbia Municipaiities, 1990.48.

678ritish C~lumbiibMinistry of Municipi Affairs, "A Rimer on Regional Districts in British Columbia." 7-8. Voluntary - regional disuicts are seif organizing and pmvide services that theù memben 1 residents agree they should pmvide.

Consmual - regional disîricts are consensual creatures by design. They rely on 'borrowed powet*, that is they only do what their municipal members and the public agree they shouid do.

Flexible - regiond districts have a high degree of flexibiiity to choose the services they wish to provide and at what scale.

Fiscai &uivalence - the legislation for regional districts requires a close matching between the benefits and costs of services. The intent is that residents 'pay for what they get'.

Sc@ bodaries - every service provided by regional districts has a defined area, or a custom boundary, which attempts to match the cost recovery witb the beneficiaries of the service.

In describing the successful implementation of regional districts rhroughout ihe province, Tennant and Zirnhelt state that

the public ...was not involved and cemained ignorant of the developments and their significance. Opposition to the new level of govemment did not develop among the Local officiais because provincial officiais ptoceeded circumspectly, doaking compulsion in option, presenting the new in tansof the otd, while disdaimhg great intentions?

This implementation strategy, even though top dom, was less imposing on municipalities than other types or reforms in the same era.

"Tennant and Zinihelt, 1973,138. NOVA SCOTIA

Greater Haüfax

Municipal reform in the Halifax region has been the focus of much debate and discussion over the past fifty years. While the legacy of metroplitan reform dates back to the 1940s, a "permanent inter-municipal body was not creaied until 1962. me] Halifax-Dartmouth Regional Authority, later called simply the Metropolitan

Authority... was an ad hoc attempt to formalize intermunicipal cooperation ..."@and was established to "coordinate and provide a number of physical and transportacion

service^."'^ However, because the Mevopolitan Authority was largely a voluntary body, the "municipal units refused to invest it with major functions such as regional planning, industrial development, police, fire-protection or capital programs."7'

The experience of regional cooperation without a formai stmcture in place was highlighted by intermunicipal wrangling, especially as related to service-related infrastructure. Two issues in particular, waste disposal and solid waste matment, questioned whether problems related to infrastructure could be better handled in a more fonnalized regionai structure. The lack of ability of the Metropolitan Authority to resolve issues in these areas throughout the 1980s and into the early 1990s was a signal that a more formal structure needed to be put into place.

Meanwhile, during this early reform era, municipalities were making boundary adjustments on their own initiative by swallowing up pieces here and there

69 MiUward, Hugh "OreaterHaiii: Public Policy bues in the Post 1960 period." Canudhn Jaunial of UkResearch, 51, June 19%, 12.

"Farrow and Roset , 1999.2. of the large rural municipaiity of Halifax County - Dartmouth in 1961, Halifax City in 1969, and the creation of the Town of Bedford in 1980.7~ The evolution of municipalities across the province bas followed a similar path. The structure of local govemment has "been added to, altered and adjusted over time to adapt to changing circumstances, usually one problem at a time, generally without any clear overall

~oncept."~ Reconceptuaiizing municipal boundaries wu to kcome one of the primary focuses of a larger study of government reorganization.

Discussion and debate over establishing a regional govemment became visible in two waves. The first wave of reforrn was evi&nt in June 1974 when the Report of the Royal Commission on Education, Public Services, and Provincial-Municipal

Relations in the Province of Nova Scotia was released. The appointment of the Royal

Commission stemmed from the "general concem over heavy and increasing burdens of taxation on property, particularly residentid property, and the difficulties the municipalities have in pmviding adequate municipal services in the face of the rising cost of ed~cation."'~ The mandate of the Royal Commission was to "examine the

mort appmpriate distnbution of provincial and local responsibilities'" and two

recommendations were seen as king pariunount. First, the Commission

recommended that the provision of services be divided among the municipalities and

* Tindai and Tindai.1995, 137.

Nova Scotia, Task Force on Local Govemment "Report lo the Govertunent of Nova Scotia", April 1992.25.

"Nova Scotia, Report of the Royal ConmU;rion on Wucation, Public Services and Provincial- Municipal Rehtions. Volume IL Halifax: Queen's Riater, 1974,l-S. the Province depending on whether they were of local or general benefit. Services of local benefit included 'Yi and police protection; Street lighting; public works expenditures... and general govemment expenses (the legislative and administrative costs of local govemment)"76and would be the responsibility of municipalities as the benefit of the seMces are denved within a specific geographical area. Services of general benefit, which are services enjoyed by the wider provincial community, would include "education; public health and hospitah; public welfare; the administration of justice and civil defence."" Second, the Commission envisaged a

"municipal structure consisting of eleven with responsibility for detailed iand-use planning and with responsibility for the financial and administrative capability for the planning and provision of local service^."'^

The recommendations made by the Graham Commission were never acted upon, as Tindal and Tindal speculate, due to the "degree of detail, the vast and comprehensive nature of the recornmendations [ana the iack of detailed argumentation of al te mat ive^"'^. However, popular opposition to such sweeping changes at the local level is also a factor in the provinciai govemment's lack of action in implementing any of the Task Force's recommen&tions. Donald Higgins explains that "when the report was referred to a seledon cornmitta! of the provincial

'' Tidal and Tindal, 1995.135. '' Nova Sco tia, 1974, 3-23. * ibid., 3-23. " ibid., 1974,2-80.

79 Tidal and Ti,1995,136. legislation for study, the committee made no recommendations regarding implementation of the report; it confined itself to merely summarizing the considerable amount of opposition generated by [it~.'~The Minister of Municipal

Affaits, Sandy Jolly, announced in 1975 that the Graham Commission report "would be merely a 'useful guide' in developing policies on municipal re~r~anization"~'and it would not be until the early 1990s that metcopolitan restructuring would be given another serious second look.

SUlMMARY

The focus of metroplitan restnrcturing in the eady refonn era was one of resolving crises in service delivery, due to significant population increases and rapid urbanization following World War IL However, in the l970s, new pressures, such as fiscal challenges, boundary fragmentation, and increased interdependence among municipalities revealed the inadequacies of speciai purpose, area-wide authonties established in pcevious decades?'

* Higgins, 1986,182,

"Smith, Patrick J. "Urban and Metroplitan Governance: Limits? Lessons? Latitudes?" in [Irban Solutions to Global Problem Vancouver: CenQp for Human Setfiement, UBC and instiîute for Governance Studies, SFU, 1996.1 14. 4s Recent Reform Era

ONTARIO Toronto

The 1998 consolidation of the six member municipalities of Metropolitan

Toronto was a striking event characterizing, through its sheer grandiosity, the "decade

of tumultuous change1"' which the 1990s represented for municipal govemments

across Ontario. The political philosophy of the NDP provincial govemment " - during the deep recession of the early 1990s - was that amalgarnation was necessary to promote economic development ... in the province as a whole." Ironically, when

Mike Harris' Conservative govemment came to power provincially in 1995, their

stance on municipal reform appeared to be the exact opposite of the view held by the

NDP. Prior to the election, Harris stated "[tlhere is no cost to a municipality CO

maintain its name and identity. Why destroy our roots and pride? 1 disagree with

resmicturing because it believes that bigger is better. Services always cost more in

larger communitie~,"~~As will be noted in describing recent reforrns in Halifax. the

premier of the day later changed his position on malgrnation and the language of

cost savings emerged as the main driving force behind the reform. Consolidation

would "eliminate a layer of govemment, reduce overlap and duplication, and cut the

a Sancton, 2000, 101. " ibid., 103.

Barber, John, "Harris'Words Come Back to Bite Him." Globe and Mail, Febniary 19, 1997, A2.

46 number of politicians"" - rhetocic that would corne to dominate the icent refom era. The about face in provincial policy direction left many questioning amalgamation as a reform option as "tbere was no pcevious cationale for it, either in restructuring smdies or in the Conservatiw Party's past po~itions."~

The creation of megacity Toronto also represented the first time that changes were made to the structure of Metro since 1967~when the lower tier was reduced from thirteen municipalities to six. The population of the region now encompasses

"2.4 million people, theteby creating a municipality more populous than five of

Canada's In questioning the effstiveness of amalgarnation. Tindal and

Tindal state that "its creation did nothing to address the need for an overail goveming

body for the GTA [Greater Tomnto ~rea]."~And while this may be a shortcoming

of amalgarnation, the primary focus on the eEficiency and cost savings, as in other

refom efforts, was central to the province's motives. It is unclear at this time

whether cost savings have ben realized thmugh this reform exercise. Andrew

Sancton suggests that "less han three years after thousands of citizens were

mobilized to fight the megacity's imposition and thousands more voted against it in

municipal referendums, most simply rcept it as part of life in ~omnto.'"' Given tbat

both and megacity mayor Me1 Lastman gained re-election in the early

86 Sancton, 2000, 122-123,

" Tuidal and Tindai, 2000,104.

Sancton, 2000,49.

"Tindal and Ti,2000,103. " Ibid..lOll. period after amalgamation, perhap the realization of cost savings in larger regions is not as significant as the rhetoric of it.

NOVA SCOTIA

Halifax

While various reports and papers have discussed the idea of regional govemment in the Halifax area sinœ the release of the Graham Commission report in

1974, it was not until 1991 that cestructuring was given a serious second look. This second wave of reform became visible with the establishment, by the Minister of

Municipal Affairs of a Task Force on Lofai ~ovemment?~The political climate ai the provincial level was one of willingness to take action on issues confronting municipalities. Allan O'Brien explains that the

[p]rovincial policy on restructuring had historically been one of responding to municipal requests until, in 1992, the [Don] Carneron- led Tories launched a Task Force on Local Government to develop a new concept of appropriate local govemment responsibilities, structure, and boundacies together with the practicai means to ensure that this concept can be put in place within approximately four mon th^?^

The quick tirneframe for implementation related to the Cameron-led Tories desire to

push the reform through before the next provincial election, The Task Force report

9' Sancton, 2000,139. * Tindal and Tîndal, 2000,137. identified the counties of Cape Breton, Pictou, Halifax, Colchester, and Kings as cnticai regions in need of major restnichuing and stated that reform in these areas should be the fmt pciority of the provincial govement.M Resmichuing in the remainder of the province was seen as necessary but could be achieved through minor boundary adjustments rather than the more significant reform to a unitary govemment structure, which was recommended for the criticai regions?' The Task Force recommendation was based on the conclusion that the "existing frarnework for municipal govemment was inadequate, because municipal politicai boundaries did not match setdement patterns."96

A key change to the provincial govemment structure came in May 1993 when the provincial govemment changed from Conservative to Liberal. The Liberai carnpaign highlighted their opposition to the Tories' municipal reform package and noted that they would favour a more gradualist mode1 of reform. A week pnor to the election, Liberal leader John Savage was noted as saying:

...1 am of the opinion that the present govemment's proposai for unitary govemment as the direction for municipal refonn is dictatorial, top down and shows a serious lack of understanding of the complexities of municipal govemment. It also shows a total disregard for Nova Scotian's pride in the histocy and individuaiity of their communities.*

93 O'Brien, Allan "Municipal Refonn in Halifax", Policy Options, 170, September 1996,20.

Nova Scoùa, 1992.27-30- '* Ibid., 31-33.

% Fmwand Roset, 1999,2.

YI O'Brien, 199620. Whüe the Liberai government espouçed a graduai approach to reform and the new

"Minister of Municipai Affairs, Sandy Jolly, went about the province assuring municipal otfcials tbat vnalgamation would not be forced upon them"" &y did a policy reversal in October 1994, srion after municipal elections had been held. And while Savage did appear to flip flop on the issue, Iimiting amalgamation to Halifax and Cape Breton appeared to be a mixed blessing, as the previous governing party was looking at a province wide policy of consolidation. As explained by Fmow and

Roset, the change in policy direction was also seen as a "necessary as part of an overall strategy to reduce government spending and to piornote economic dcvclopment. Legislation enabling the Halifax Regional Municipality was approved in May 1995 with "relatively Me difficulty in the legislature because the official opposition, the Conservatives, were the ones who had launched the

amalgamation plans in the first place.'m Amalgamation in Halifax was pmvincially

imposed with the new Halifax Regiond Municipality brought into formai existence on April 1, 1996.

SUMMARY

The recent refonn era is characterized by issues of govemance of metroplitan

regions. As explained by Patrick Smith, "[c]entral to solutions on our governability

are answers to questions about structure and capacity, leadership and function and

98 Ibid.. 20.

99 Farrow and Roset, lm, 3. appropriate role(s) for senior, local and regional govemmental jurisdi~tions."'~'The trend throughout the 1990s, toward the consolidation of municipalities into larger regional entities, was based on fiscal considerations of provincial govemments that

"municipal politicians and municipalities were inherently wasteful, inefficient, and incapable of cooperation.*"" As in the previous reform era, the fmson challenges relating to service delivery was paramount and given the current context, one cm only begin to wonder if municipal govemments are merely administrative arms of their senior counterpart. Has municipal restructuring resolved the problem? Tindal and Tindal are not convinced "...we seem to end up with enlarged municipal structures which are (or swn become) tw small to deal with the servicing challenges of their areas and yet have become too large to constitute 'local' govemment as we have known it."Io3 Does consolidation lead to increased efficiency and cost swings or are these promises left unfulfdled? An analysis of the Halifax Regional

Municipality and Victoria's Capital Regional District will test this hypothesis.

'm Sancion, 2000.93.

'O' Smith, 1996,103. lm Sancton, 2000,112. lmTindal and Tindal, 1995,75. CBAPTER FOUR

SiTE ONE: THE HALIFAX REGIONAL MUNICIPAlSrY

The Halifax Case

The Halifax Regional Municipality came into legislative existence on April 1,

1996. The region stmggled during the amalgamation transition phase with costs associated with restnicturing escalating toward $26 million. These costs represent a serious tum of events as, in the early 1990s, amalgarnation was to produce $9.8 millionL" in projected savings, with transition costs king limited to $10 million.

Problems Duting the Transition Phase

Unlike other regions in Canada, the Halifax region had remained relatively static in the early postwar period with the primary changes to municipal structures king boundary adjustments. Sporadic annexations showed themselves as cities within the region grappled with growth pressures as witnessed "in 1961, [when]

Dartmouth annexed portions of Halifax County, increasing its population by 90% and increasing its area by nine times. A 1969 annexation by the City of Halifax nearly quaàrupled its area and increased its population by a thi~d."'~~While additional land was king swallowed by Halifax and Dartmouth in the 1960s, by 1980, the region becarne more fragrnented when the Town of Bedford was created from part of

Halifax County. Beyond annexations, the City of Halifax had not tinkered with mempolitan restructuring as did other cities in response to growth management pressures of the early reform era. Without, perhaps, this past experience in testructuring, several problems arose which contributed to an amalgamation exercise associated with significant financial costs instead of desired savings.

In retrospect, the problems read like a "how-not-to do" manual on metropditan restructuring and in sharing their experience with other cities, perhaps the experience of Halifax will alert others to the pitfalls involved in undertaking similar restnicturing programs. Tht major problems are summarized as follo~s:~~~

a The transition process was top down - imposed by the provincial government without the support or "buy-in" from local municipalities.

The transition process happened too fast and implementation was on a piecemeal basis.

Irnplementation Commissioner William Hayward was given extraordinary powers and dictated the process.

Each of the former municipalities initiated capital projects that would not have been pursued under normal circumstances, leaving al1 municipalities except the City of Halifax with budget deficits.

Hannonizing the many collective agreements was chailenging and characterized by work slow downs, strikes, and salaries escalating to the highest level.

'" Information stem hminterviews conducied with academics, elected officiais, and senior administration in Halifax, See also Sancton, 2000. Expectatiom of Amdgamation

According to Ken Meech, cunent Chief Administrative Officer (CAO) of the new region and former CAO of Halifax County, arnalgamation was expected to:'07

reduce duplication in management (las govemment).

i decrease or maintain local tax rates while services improved.

take advantage of economies of scaie (hmproviding services over large areas).

These general expectations and their related impact on cost savings may have been captured had the transition to a single regionai govemrnent been met with widespread acceptance. However, in the case of Halifax, the idea of provincially imposed arnalgamation was met with local backlash - a process not welcomed by politicians or residents who were vocally opposed to the forthcoming changes. Specificall y, initial resistance to amaigarnation was highlighted inLo8:

a (perceived) sense of loss of community identity and history.

the creation of a region that would encompass urban, suburban, and rural areas and where 5% of the rural population was spread out thniugh 70% of the region's land mas.

the prediction of increased costs (and not cost savings).

the reality of differential tax rates and services throughout the region.

'O7 Meech, Ken 'The Rote of Municipal Goverment In a New Era". October 1999.

'08 Ibid., and Meech, Ken '1IalifBx Regional Municipaiity: Experience wiih Amalgamaiion". June 1999. 54 decreased politicai representation, therefore the creation of a regional govemrnent that would be less responsive to the needs of citizens and less knowledgeable of the subareas within the region.

Measu~menîs

Keeping in minci the two points hypothesized at the beginning of the paper: i) that metroplitan consolidation would increase efficiency?; ii) that claims of cost

savings would be borne out by those promoting "less governrnent"?, what criteria was evaiuated to test the case of Halifax? In order to provide comment on the efficiencyf cost savings hypothesis, the following three tests were conducted:

Test #1 -

Selected service mas were charted in terms of their total annual expenditures

between 1990 and 1999 to determine the pattern of the per capita cost of the service

over time. In the pst-amalgarnation pend, this masure becomes important in

analysing whether the per capita cost of a service has increasedldecreasedlstayed the

same. Trends within this time hune wiii be identified and then later used as a basis

for cornparison with the Capital Regional District. The services selected for review

include General Govemment Services, Fire Services, and Police Protection.

Test #2.

The second test conducted exarnined the municipal tax rates over the same

period in the former municipalities of the Halifax Regional Municipality. It is

55 expected that the tax rate will rernain the same or decrease as a result of amalgarnation.

Test #3:

The third test examines the overall cost of governrnent between 1990 and

1999. The argument follows that consolidating four municipalities into one was expected to produce significant savings by elirninating waste and duplication inherent in a fragmenteci metropolitan structure.

Test #l

The first test conducted examined several service areas to detennine if cost savings have ken achieved in service provision as a result of amalgamation. It is important to note that in 1991, budget reporting was changed from the cdendar year

(January to kember) to the fiscal year (April to March), therefore, the 1991192 budget figures represent the financial picture over an 18 month penod

-t -t

The first service examined was the general government services sector as this was the area where the most savings due to amalgamation would be realized. The annual cost of this sector was measured over time to determine if, on a regional basis, the per capita cost of legislative and administrative services increased, decreased, or 56 remained the same as a result of amalgamation. Table 4 Lists total expenditures within the general govemment category between the 1990 and 1998/99 fiscal years so to derive per capita costs that will be used for cornparison.

TABLE 4

PER CAPïïA COST OF GENERAL GOVERNMENT SERVICES

(in thousands of dollars)

Total Expendiluns 26,117.9 34,385.1 28,0121 27920.0 28,343.6 34,260.8 19,155.0 20,373.0 24,247.7

Population 321930 326,577 329,622 332,321 335,488 337,899 341,463 345.304 348,844

Source: Nova Scotia, Housing and Municipal Affairs, "Municipal Sbtistics", 1990-1998.

Table 4 illustrates that per capita cost swings have been realized in the general

govemment sector in the early years after amalgamation. This is due, in part to the

reduction of administrative staff and elected officials in the region. While reduction in

the number of elected officials is charnpioned by amalgamation supporters under the

guise of 'less government', what impact did it have in Halifax where the number of eIected officiais decnased from sixty to twenty-four?'a4 Igor Vojnovic observed that in the new regional structure, "total salary costs for councillors were only reduced by 25% even though the number of councillors was reduced by 6O%""O - a savings in total operating expenditures of 0.û78. To place the cost savings of the general government services in proper context, the total expenditure in this category was trimmed to $24,247,700 in 1998/99 from a combined regional tocal of

$28,343,668 in 1994/95 - a savings of 14%.IL'

h looking back over the eariy transition stage, Ken Meech advises that the

"presumption that amalgarnation reduces the staff numbers quired to provide services similar, if not better than, prior to amalgamation, thereby reducing cost savings"lL2is ironic. He suggests that sta€fiig levels be maintained, no< nduced, primariiy to draw on the experience of staff memkcs and to promote a smooth transition from the old governing structure to the new. While the immediate connection between expenditure reduction in the general government category and amalgamation is strong, does it represent a significant savings in terms of overaii expenditure? Table 5 pments the general governrnent services category as piut of the reg ion's overall operating expenditures.

'" See Tables 1 and 2 for a breakclown oEeIected officiais by municipality, pre- and post- amalgamation.

"O mndal and Tiial, 2000,176177.

Nova Scotia, Housing and Municipai Mairs. "Municipal Starisu'cs". 1994/95 and 1997i98.

Meeçh, Ken "Impacts ofAnutlgdon: The FMifhx Eitpetience", AMI 1999.15. 58 TABLE 5

GENERAL GOVERNMENT SERVICES AS A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL OPERATING EXPENDlTURES

(in thousands of dollars)

Total

Source: Nova Scotia, Housing and Municipal Affairs, "Municipal Statistics", 1990-1998.

Table 5 illustrates that costs for general govemment services were reduced by 2.2% in

the immediate year following amaigamation. These savings, however, may not be as

significant as they appear as municipalities went on spending sprees in the year

before amalgamation and therefore, one should examine the years prior to

amalgamation to detennine the impact of savings. Even though a modest reduction

has ken achieved in this budget category, it is not due, as amalgamation contenders

suggest, primarily to the reduction in number of elected officiais as the "amount of

money involved is so smaü that significant savings are not As well. as

the dust settles in the early years following amalgamation, the percent of the

operating budget king spent on the general govenunent services category is increasing to levels similar to those before arnaigamation.

Fire Service

Ljke other service areas in the new rnunicipality, fire services experienced its share of challenges in the transitionary period of amalgamation. These challenges included: 'l4 delayed integration of the six departments due to contract disputes.

each department was working under different contracts with different pay scaies from April 1996 through Spring 1998. The new collective agreement brought pay levels to one harmonized level, thus causing substantial wage increases as pay rates were leveled up.

rnany employees took advantage of early retirement packages and this left rnany senior-level positions vacant. While these positions were supposed to be filled with junior-level staff, only haif of the positions left vacant by retirements have been filled.

A new communications system was needed to facilitate communication between the six departments - a cost directly associated with amalgamation.

Given the expectation that consolidating services would eliminate wasteful duplication and improve service levels, were costs reduced in this area as a result of amalgamation? Table 6 examines the per capita cost of fire services over time to determine if efficiencies, as defined fiscally, have been achieved in the provision of fie services.

114 hwer, Jome and Joseph Ryan, "HRM Fi and Emergency Service: A Cost Analysis - Re and Post Amdgamation." 60 TABLE 6

PER CAPITA COST OF FIRE SERVICES

(in thousands of dollars)

1990 1991192 1992(93 1993194 1994195 199Y% 1996197 1997E98 199a199 Total

Population 321,930 326377 329,622 332,321 335,488 337,899 341,463 345,304 348,844

Source: Nova Scotia, Housing and Municipal Affairs, "Municipal Statistics", 1990- 1998.

In examining the per capita cost of fire services, it appears a slight reduction in costs has ken achieved - although not a dramatic reduction since total expenditures are just slightly lower than the year prior to amalgamation and almost the same as the year after. In fact, the total expenditure for fire services has ken declining since the

1994195 budget year with an increase king shown in the 1998199 budget year. Table

7 shows the percentage of total operating expendims tfiat are devoted toward fi services. TABLE 7

FlRE SERVICES AS A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL OPERATiNG

EXPEND=

(in thousands of dollars)

Totai Opeiating Expendinires 434,747.0 570,999.8 478,250.7 483,284.6 479,651.1 510,359.7 424.455.7 43 1,338.0 436,4840

Totai Fire Services 30392.0 42329.4 341a1.9 29,103.8 35,878.4 34,268.6 34,165.0 33,241.0 34,093.0

Source: Nova Scotia, Housing and Municipal Affdrs, "Municipal Sîaiistics", 1990-1998.

Since arnalgamation, a greater percentage of the budget has gone into fire services,

dthough the trend appears to be leveling in the immediate years. It is interesting to

note that in terms of dollars spent, the level of expenditure is slightly above what it

was at the start of the 1990s.

-n -n

Consolidation of municipal police forces into orie regionai force was a

challenging pmcess, but unlike a lot of the amdgamation process in general, the

transformation was pIanned out and phased in over a year-long tirne fiame prior to

arnalgamation being impIemented and continued well into the year afker cons~lidation!'~ Weîhe benefit of time and planning should ensure for a smooth transition, Jeder O'Donoghue notes that "because police services was one of the first services to amalgamate, the transition took place in a changing politicai environment [and] this made the transition more diffie~lt.""~Adding to the diffculty were the fo~owin~:~"

that the force would be comprised of police services from Halifax, Dartmouth and Bedford, with the RCMP continuing juridiction in the former Halifax County - the rural entity within the region.

a that a new regional collective agreement would not be ratified until 19 months into the process and until it went into effect, inequaiities persisted among the various jurisdictions.l"

that misconceptions about amalgamation will be evident. These include the following seven asswnptions:

I. that amalgamation is a simple process. 2. assuming staff will embrace the potentiai of cost savings as the major driver for organizational change.

3. that operationai efficiencies will be realized in the short tenn,

4. that the cornmunity, stafi, bargaining agent/police association, and politicians will work together to build a new organization.

'IS O'Donoughue, Jeder Guidebookfor the Amalgantution ofPolice Semices in Cana&. : Canadian Association of Police Boards. 1999.9-1 1.

ibid., 9.

'17 ibid., 5-10. "'ODonoughue notes that, for example, Dartmouth's collective agreement spccified minium stafnog levels and cransfer protocols ktdid not dow staff to be transferred wtside the fxmr municipality iaio other parts of the region even after amalgamation became offcial. 63 5. that the pmess can be carried out quickly.

6. that there are no start up costs.

7. that cost savings can be realized in tbe short term.

Given the transition experience noted above, have fiscal efficiencies ken achieved in police protection? Table 8 examines the cost of police protection between 1990 and

1998 to see if cost savings were gained as a result of amalgamation of multiple police forces into one Iarger police force.

TABLE 8

PER CAPITA COST OF POLICE PROTECïiON

(in thousands of dollars)

1990 1991192 1992193 1993194 1944195 1995196 WXEW 1997/98 1998/99 Total Expenditurcs 3 1.137.7 41,399.5 34,507.2 35,877.0 36.182.4 44,693.6 43,155.0 45,485.0 45,450.1

Population 321,930 326537 329,622 332.321 335,488 337.899 341.463 345,304 348.844

Source: Nova Scotia, Housing and Municipal Affairs, "Municipal S~tistics",1990-1998.

The observation that is very pronounced in Table 8 is the jump in total expenditures,

and accordingly, in regional per capita cost not at the time of amalgamation, but the

year prior. This coincides exactly with the provincial implementation of the Service

Exchange agreement, which, in terms of police protection, saw the Province hand over responsibility for police protection to nirai municipdities - to Haiifax County in the case under examination.

Test #2

The second test conducted examined the municipal tax rates for the urban, suburban, and nird areas over time (pre- and pst-amalgamation) to set! if trends developed that may be attributed specificaily to amalgamation. Tax rates in the

Haiifax Regionai Municipaiity are comptised of a general rate (urban, suburban, or curai) and the area rate for services received, such as sidewaiks, transit, street lighting and local improvements"9. Tables 9 shows the residentiai tax rates between 1990 and 1999100 in each of the former municipalities of the Hdifax region.

TABLE 9

MUNICIPAL TAX RATES - RESIDENTIAL

Bedford 1.28 1.71 9 1.48 1.49 1.38 1.38 1.41 1.41 1.41

Halifax City 1.34 1.76 1.46 1-49 1.49 1-48 1.48 1.54 154 154

Halifax 0.73 0.97 0.89 0.88 0.90 0.90 0.90 1.04 1.04 1.04 County

Source: Nova Scotia, Housing and Municipal Aaairs, 'Municipal Siatistics", 1990-1998.

'19 Halifax Regional Municipality, Taxaàon Division, hm-JJ~~~~e~on.halifax.ns.calrevenue/ tanmain.hmil 65 The fmdings suggest mixed results in the analysis of residential tax rates. The former Town of Bedford exhibited high tax rates in the latter part of the 1980s with the 1990s characterized by increases, decreases and then a leveling of rates as amalgamation was being planned and implemented. The former City of Dartmouth has seen residential tax rates inctease incrementally until 1996 with modest deciine in the early years following amalgamation, The only urban municipality whose tax rates have steadily increased since 1990 is the former City of Halifax. Tax rates in this municipaiity, while increasing, had shown signs of leveling between 1992-1996; with rates increasing mderately since amalgamation was imposed. Finally, the former municipality of Halifax County - the rural entity of the region -ha dso seen tax rate increases in the pst amalgamation era. Municipal Tax Rates - Residential

-Bedford

Halifax City

-Halifax County

Year

Figure 4. A Comparison of Municipal Tan Rates in the Hdifnx Region, 1990-2000.

Test #3

The third test examined the total cost of govenunent expenditures to determine if the overali cost of goveming has decreased as a result of amalgamation.

Table IO shows the per capita cost of toral operaiing expenditures between 1990 and

1998/99 and Figure 5 higfilights the per capira cost trend during this period. TABLE 10

PER CAPlTA COST OF TOTAL OPERATING EXPENDlIVRES

(in thousands of dollars)

Total Operating Expendinires 434.747.0 570W.8 478,250.7 483,284.6 479,651.1 510,359.7 424,455.7 43 1.338.0 436.484.0

Population 321,930 326,577 329.622 332,321 335,488 337,899 341,463 345,304 348,844

Regional Pet Capita Cost 1350.44 1748.44 145091 1454.27 1429.71 151039 1243.0s 1249.15 125123

Source: Nova Scotia, Housing and Municipal Affairs, "Municipal Statjsiics", 1990-1998.

Figure 5. Per Capita Cost of Total Operating Expenditures Table 10 shows that the per capita cost of total operating expenditures has remained relatively stable, although showing a slight upward trend, in the pst amalgamation years. The total operating expendinires witbin the region were seen increasing untii amalgamation, with a sharp decline king seen in the first year of amalgamation.

This dip is especially pronounced because of the excess in expenditures that preceded the formal amaigarnation. Between 1994i95 and 1998/99, a 9% reduction in total operating expenditures has been achieved.

SUMMARY

In conducting the three tests, it does appear that some prelirninary trends are king identified with respect to efficiency arguments. There have been some savings in the provision of general govemment services and to a lesser extent in fire and police protection. Municipal tarates have increased since amalgamation in every former municipaiity except Dartmouth. Finaily, with respect to operating expenditures, it does appear that savings have ken yielded in the short term. SiTE TWO: T'FIE CAPITAL REGIONAL DISTRICT

The Victoria Case

The Capital Region in British Columbia was created by the Province in 1966 to "provide and coordinate selected local, regional and municipal services for its geographic area. These services include[d]:'"

Municipal finance Community health and hospital planning Environmental waste management Recreation, parks and leisure services Reguiatory services Affordable housing

The governrnent of British Columbia is approaching regional growth wi thin its urban based regional districts in a different way than tmveling the consolidationist path like so many provincial govemments throughout the 19%. In fact, there has been no amalgamations in Western Canada that have corne close to rivaling the large scde consolidation efforts found in the East, primarily in Onîarb and Nova Scotia

'" CapitaI Regional District, "A Guide to kCapital Region's Growth Suategy Rojectn April2000. c-2. In the Capital Region, the focus has instead been on regional govemnce instead of added layers of govemment.

In the mid 1990s. the provincial govemment legislated the Growth Strategies

Act which "establishes agreement on a vision and common social, economic, and environmentai priorities and objectives, at a regionai scale. It aiso commits the regional district and affected municipalities to a course of action to meet those obje~tives."'~' The significance of the Regional Growth Strategy lies in the re- instatement of the planning function at the regionai level - a responsibility that was revoked by the Province in 1983.'~

The Capital Regional District exemplifies the 'pay for what you get, get what you pay for"la notion, meaning that under the regional district system, municipalities have found greater flexibility in service provision than their counterparts under unitary or tiered systems. This allows for an interesting comparative case with the

Halifax Regionai Municipaiity as it is an illustration of an alternative governing structure from the single tier mode1 that has become the moâel of choice througtiout the 1990s. In order to compare the two cases, the tests conducted for the Halifax case were replicated for the Capital Regional District. It is important to note that since the

Victoria case is used to provide comment on the 'emciency equals cost swings' claims, it will not be treated in the same detail as the Halifax case, which is the ptimary case under examination.

12' 12' Ibid., 1.

'" ~bid.,2. Test #1

General Government Services

The rhetoric used throughout the 1990s painted a picture of multi councilled

regions as king wasteful, redundant, and over-govemed. The Capital Region has a

total of 88 elected ofticials that serve individual communities within the region. As

such, one would expect that such a fiagmented regional structure would have higher

costs associated with not only the provision of services, but also the cost of

governing. Table 11 plots the per capita cost of general govemment services over

time, 1990-1998.

TABLE 11

PER CAPRA COST OF GENERAL GOVERNMENT SERVICES

(in thousands of dollars)

Population 226,149 257,848 255,926 275.404 275,589 274,691 290.572 301,762 303,854

Source: British Columbia, Municipal Affairs, "Annual Report of Municipal Stau'stics", 1990-1998. In exarnining the data, the total expenditure in general govemment services has been increasing over the entire period king charted. Even with the increased fragmentation within the region, resulting from the incorporation of Langford in 1993 and the Highlands in 1994, the total cost of governing has increased by only 6.7%'"

Table 12 examines the cost of general govemment setvices as part of the total operating budget.

TABLE 12

GENERAL GOVERNMENT SERVICES AS A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL OPERArnG EXPENDITURES

(in thousands of dollars)

Total General Govemment 20,263.2 21360.8 24,137.0 25.3281 25500.2 25,878.6 26,8627 28354.9 32,040.1

Source: British Columbia, Municipal Affairs, "Annual Report of Municipal Statistics", 1990-1998.

figure is derived fiom comparing expendinues in 1992. ihe year befon structurai change began. with 1995, the year after it ended. 73 Table 13 illustrates that there is slight variability in the budget dollars dedicated to

this sector - ranging from 6.89 to 7.92 percent, with an increasing share of the budget

king spent on general governent services since the mid 1990s.

Fire Services The provision of fire services within the Capital Region falls within two

distinct categories - paid forces in the larger municipalities versus volunteer forces in the smaller ones. This reality is reflected in the regional per capita costs as generated

in Table 13.

TABLE 13 PER CAPITA COST OF FIRE SERVICES

(in ihousands of dollars)

1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 l9!M 1997 1998 Total Eirpenditures 16,347.4 18,5221 19.735.1 21,360.8 21.6 103 22,492.0 22,674.9 23,2493 23,237.1

Population 226,149 257,848 255,926 275,404 275,589 274,691 290,572 301.762 303.854

Source: British Columbia, Municipal Affairs, "Annual Report of Municipal Siatistics", 1990- lW8.

Table 13 reflects that fewer resoutces are dedicated to £ire services in the region and

therefore, the per capita costs are kept at a stable level, especially since 1993. Table 14, which examines the percent of the total operating budget dedicated to fire services, shows an regionai average of 6% is king spent on fm senrices.

TABLE 14

FIRE SERVICES AS A PERCENTAGE OF TOAL OPERATING EXPENDïïüRES

Total Fin Services 16,347.4 18,522.1 19,735.1 21,360.8 21,6103 22,492.0 22,674.9 23,249.3 23,237.1

Source: British Columbia, Municipal Affairs, "Annual Report of Municipd Statistics", 1990-1998.

Administration of Justice The provision of police services within the Capital Region is varied depending on the size and geographic location of the community. Member municipalities that employ their own police force include: Central Saanich, Esquimalt, Oak Bay, Saanich and Victoria. Other municipalities, such as Colwood Langford, North Saanich,

Sidney, View Royai contract out this function to the RCMP,while Metchosin and the

Highlands are poiiced by the Provincial contingent. Table 15 examines the per capita cost of administration. TABLE 15

PER CAFiTA COST OF ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE

(in thousands of dollars)

1990 1991 1992 1993 19W 1995 1996 1997 1998 Total Expendinires 27,769.2 30,7795 33.903.2 36,2145 40,8733 41.971.8 43,494.6 43,694.4 46,6269

Population 226,149 257.848 255,926 275,404 275,589 274,691 290,572 301,762 303,854

Source: British Columbia, Municipal Affiairs, "Annual Report of Municipal Statistics", 1990-1998.

Table 15 illustrates that the total expenditures on administration of justice has

increased incrementally throughout the entire decade, with 40% more king spent in

this area in 1998 than in 1990. Liewise, Table 16 signals that an increasing share of

the regional budget is going toward this budget category.

TABLE 16

ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE AS A PERCJM'AGE OF TOTAL OPERATING EXPEND~S

1990 1991 Pl92 1!J93 1994 1995 1996 199t 1998 Total

Total Administraüon of Justice 27.7292 30,7793 33,903.2 36,2145 40.873.3 41.971.8 43,494.6 43,694.4 46,6269

Source: British Columbia, Municipal Affairs, "Annuai Report of Municipal Statistics", 1990-1998. 76 Test #2

The second test examined municipal tax rates in order to draw comparisons with the Halifax case. Table 18 notes a breakdown of residentiai tax rates, including levies for schools, hospitals, and the regional district, over time among the various municipaiities of the Capital Regional District.

TABLE 17

MUNICIPAL TAX RATES - RESIDENTIAL

1990 1991 l!J92 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Centrai Saanich 1.25 0.90 0.92 0.75 0.70 0.79 0.75 0.77 0.900.89 Colwood 1.34 1.01 1.06 0.85 0.78 0.75 0.79 0.82 0.840.90 Esquimalt 1.56 L.12 1.12 0.94 0.81 0.88 0.93 0.96 0.92 1.03 Highlands 0.71 0.73 0.82 0.88 0.88 0.91 Langford 0.93 0.84 0.81 0.83 0.86 0.860.92 Metchosin 1.27 0.92 093 0.77 0.70 0.68 0.74 0.75 0.76 0.77 Nonh Saanich 1.07 0.75 0.76 0.62 0.59 0.57 059 0.60 0.59 0.62 Oak Bay 1.66 1.18 1.16 0.98 0.91 0.89 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.95 Saanich 1.54 1.10 1.10 0.91 0.86 0.83 0.88 0.90 0.900.94 Sidney 1.47 1.06 1.09 0.88 0.82 0-78 0.81 0.81 0.820.85 Victoria 1.69 1.20 1.17 O.% 0.91 0.87 0.93 0.93 0.96095 View Royai 1.00 0.67 0.81 0.66 0.62 0.61 0.62 0.65 0.67 0.69

Median 1.41 1.04 1.08 0.88 0.80 0.79 0.82 0.84 0.870.91 Average 1.39 099 1-01 0.84 0.77 0.77 0.80 0.82 0.84 0.87

Source: British Columbia, Municipal AfFairs, "Annual Report of Municipal Statistics". 1990-1998. Table 17 reveals that on average, tax rates have been decreasing throughout most of the 1990s with only the start of an upward trend being seen in recent years. As weU, there is not much ciifference in tax rates between the urban municipaiities and those that have a more rural flavour.

Test #3

The third test examined the overall cost of governing so to draw conclusions between a multi-council (Capital Regional District) and a unitary council (Halifax

Regional Municipaiity) system of regional government.

TABLE 18

PER CAPïïA COST OF TOTAL OPERATING EXPENDITURES

(in thousands of dollars)

Total olmating Expendilutes 285,064.6 300.265.3 314,081.0 345,418.9 363.1 14.8 375,719.2 385,220.7 390,869.6 404.37 1.9

Population 226,149 257,848 255.926 275,404 275,589 274,691 290572 301,762 303.854

Source: British Columbia, Municipal Affairs, "Annuai Report of Municipal Statistics", 1990-1998. Within the Capital Region, total opetating expenditures have been pcimarüy increasing throughout the entire decade. This is refiected in incremental increases in the pet capita cost through the rniddle years of the 1990s, as evident in Figwe 6.

-

Figure 6. Per Capita Cost of Total Operating Expendinires

Since the tests conducted for the Halifax case have now been replicated, the resutts found in this chapter will be compared to those of the previous chapter to see if conclusions can be drawn regarding the hypothesis that consolidation equais cust savings and efficiency. CEIAPTER SIX

CASE STODY COMPAREON

As the previous two chapiers have exarnined the case study sites of the

Halifax Regional Municipaiity and the Capital Regionai District in Victoria, how do the cases compare given the three tests that were preformed?

Test #1

Test #I exarnined selected service areas to determine if i) the correlation between the cost and the level of service varied given different regional government structures, and ii) if cost savings were achieved for Halifax through the process of amalgamation. In terms of General Government services, Tables 19 and 20 compare the two case study sites.

TABLE 19

PER CAPlTA COMPARISON OF GENERAL GOVERNMENT SERVICES

199û 1991 1982 1ffl 1994 1995 1- 1997 1998

HRM 81.13 10529 8498 84.02 84.48 101.39 56.10 59.00 6951

CR0 89.60 82.45 9431 91.97 9253 9421 92.45 94.63 105.45 Pm Capita Cornparbon General Gwsrnment Sarvices

Figure 7. Per Capita Cornparison of Gened Government Services

in comparing the General Govemment Services category, it is interesting to note that for both case snidy sites, expenditures have remained relatively Bat, with increases here and there in the early to middle years of the decade. The sharp increase shown for Halifax in 1991 is due to a change in budget practices and reflects an 18-month period, rather than a twelve-month period. In the Capital Region, expenditures in this category are beginning to show incremental increases, and over the course of the decade, expenditures have grown by 37%. The Halifax Region, in cornparison, shows a more variable result as expenditures ballooned in the year prior to amalgamation and then dropped dramatically in the immediate years foliowing amalgamation. While it does appear that cosc savings have been shown for Halifax in the General Government services category, it is interesting to note that in tem of

8 1 percentage of overall operating expenditures, there is less than 2.5% difference, as illustrated by Table 20.

TABLE 20

GENERAL GOVERNMENT SERVICE!S AS A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL OPERATING EXPENDïïURES

1990 1991 fW2 1#3 1994 1995 1988 1W 1998

HRM 6.01 6.02 5.86 5.78 5.91 6.71 4.51 4.72 5.56

CRD 71 7.08 7.60 7.33 7.02 6.89 6.97 7.31 7.92

This is significant because the Capital Region experienced increased fragmentation in their municipal structure as the Highlands and hgford were incorporated in the early 1990s and a combined 88 elected oficials versus 24 for Halifax - a difference of 27%, govern the Capital Region. As well, the expense of generd government services for Halifax in tenns of percent of the total operating expenditure does not suggest 'significant' savings as claimed by ihose supporting amalgamation. In tenns of the other service areas, how do the two regions compare?

Fire Services

With respect to fire services, the regional per capita cost is lower in the

Capital Region than in Halifax and this is most likely due to the presence of volunteer

€ire forces across the region. TABLE 2 t

PER CAPITA COMPARISON OF FiRE SERVICES

HRM 95.03 130.23 103.64 87.58 106.94 101.42 99.65 96.27 97.73 CRD 72.29 71.83 n.11 77.56 78.41 81.88 78.04 7ï.05 76.48

This reality is reflected in the percentage of the total regional operating budget spent on fire services in the Capital Region, which is illustrated in Table 22. Halifax, which has paid municipal fire services throughout most of the region, has higher operating costs and devotes more budget monies to this area than does the Capital Region.

TABLE 22

FIRE SERVICES AS A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL OPERATING EXPENDWS

HRM 7.04 7.45 7.14 6.02 7.48 6.71 8.05 7.71 7.81 CRD 5.73 6.17 6.28 6.18 5.95 5.99 5.89 5.95 5.75 Police Services

In the final service area compared, police services, the per capita cost of this service is higher in the Capital Region than in Halifax with a 15% difference between the two regions.

TABLE 23

PER CAPWA COMPARlSON OF POLlCE SERVICES

199û 1991 1992 1893 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998

HRM 96.72 126.77 104.69 107.96 107.85 132.27 126.38 131.72 130.43

CRD 122.79 119.37 132.47 131.50 148.31 152.80 149.69 144.80 153.45

In tens of overall expenditure on police services, the Capital Region dedicates a greater portion of its budget to this function than does Halifax. However, the trend as reflected in Table 24, suggests that an increasing percentage of the operating budget is king placed on police services - a priority for both regions as they continue to manage the pressures of growth.

TABLE 24

POLICE SERVICES AS A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL OPERATING EXPmlTURES

HRM 7.16 7.25 7.22 7.42 7.54 8.76 10.17 10.55 10.41

CRD 9.73 1025 10.79 10.48 11.26 11.17 11.29 11.18 11.53 84 In addition, the increase in expenditure in 1995196 for police services in the Haüfstx

Region reflects the reaüty of the implementation of the Provincial-Municipal Service

Exchange agreement. With Service Exchange, one of the service areas offloaded by

the Province to the Region was the provision of police protection in ~ralareas. This

exchange of responsibility has caused noticeable cost increases for the Region and

has complicated weighing the impact of arnalgamation on the provision of police

services.

Test #2

In analyzing municipal tax rates between Halifax and the Capital Region, there is

striking difference in the tax rates between the two regions - with at minimum a third

more tax king paid in Halifax than in Victoria. Table 25 shows the average

residential tax rates over time in both regions.

TABLE 25

COMPARISON OF AVERAGE RESIDENTIAL TAX RATES

1990 1991 1992 1983 1994 1995 1998 1997 1998 1999 HRM 1.19 1.58 1.33 1.37 1.38 1.35 1. 1.35 1.38 1.38

CRD 1.39 0.99 1.01 0.84 on on 0.00 0.82 0.84 0.07

A further examination of budget documents in the Capital Region revealed that other

service costs such as transit and sewer should be factored into the residential tax rates to provide greater comparability to ihe Halifax case. With this point noted, trends are still evident. The Capital Region bas seen their tax rates decrease or remain at relatively the same level throughout most of the 1990s with increases being seen beginning in 1997. For Halifax, there has been an increase in tax rate in the short tem following amalgamation but as is seen in Table 25, the tax rates have not decreased following amalgamation and are presently at the same levels as in 1993 and

1994.

Test #3 :

In terms of the total cost of operating expenditures, there has been savings yielded in the immediate years following amalgamation in Halifax. While the region spent more per capita in the early to midàie years of the 1990s than did Victoria, the imposition of amalgamation is reversing this earlier trend. This being said, there exists only a 6% difference in per capita costs between the two regions under examination, as seen in Table 26.

TABLE 26

PER CAPITA COMPARISON OF TOTAL OPERATiNG EXPENDlTIJRES

1990 1991 i!!l92 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998

HRM 1350.44 1748.40 145091 145430 1429.70 1510.39 1243.05 1249.15 1251.23

CRD 126052 116450 1227.23 1254.23 1311-79 1367.79 1325.73 129529 1330.81 Given the fragmentation of the Capital Region compared with Halifax, one would expect the difference in per capita costs to be much more pronounced. As for

Halifax, the expectation that annual savings of $10 diion would result through consolidation does no& represent, as suggested by UMA/Doane Raymond, a sigMcant savings when the expenditures of al1 former municipalities iire c~mbined.'~

'= LMAiDoaue Raymond, AnalysrS of AmoIgamarion, Aprii 12.1995. 87 The hypotheses at the start of the thesis were the following: i) does metropditan consolidation actuaüy increase efficiency?; ii) are the claims of cost savings borne out by those promoting 'less govemment'? In examining the case study sites of the Halifax Regional Municipality, a recently consolidated municipal structure, and the Capital Regional District in Victoria, a long-standing regionai district with 12 municipal units comprising the core of the region, three tests were conducted to provide a basis for cornparison that would allow for the resolution of the two hypotheses. The case evidence, as presented in chapters 4-6 lead the author to conclude that the answer to the hypotheses as stated above lies somewhere on the continuum between no and maybe, with the promises of cost savings due to amalgamation rernaining largely unfulfilled.

There is evidence that perhaps some cost savings due to amalgarnation are king seen in Halifax in the years following amaigamation. Reduction in expenditures is most evident in the general governmeat services budget ma, aithough savings here are not due pcimarily to the reduction in the number of eiected officiais, as aileged by pro-amaigamation contenders, but due to the downsizing of administration. The total cost of govemment operating expenditures has aiso decreased pst 19%. when amalgamation occurred, however, with total expendinires increasing in each year following amalgamation, this üemd liiPe wili be one to watch as consolidation grows 88 more distant. While the evidence of m&t savings in general govenunent services and in total operating expenditures is apparent, the degree of savings falls short of the claims that were touted through the consolidation exercise. The analysis of residential tax rates also shows that predictions of rates remaining stable or decreasing, have gone largely in the opposite direction as increases have occurred arnong three of the four former municipal units within the region. This experience is contradictory to the speculations of pro arnalgamation supporters. In comparing the

Halifax Regional Municipality with the Capital Regional District, a much more fragmented regional stnicture, it becomes evident that perhaps other options might have brought about the same results without such a dramatic change to the regionai structure.

The HalifaxIVictoria case studies also shed light on the challenges of conducting comparative analysis. The most significant observation stemming from the case study analysis was the imperfection of data available - most evident in municipal accounting practices and population projections, which were important variables of analysis for this study. In trying to resolve the hypothesis that consolidation increases efficiency and yields cost savings, lessons learned about how one quantifies and compares measures, both within metroplitan regions and between them, in an attempt to get at the question of efficiency, becarne as signülcant as the question itself.

Finding annuai population data from a single source for both case study sites was, for reasons of methodolagical integrity, important. In order to have consistency in how population data was gathered, Siatistics Canada data was primarily used for 89 both case study sites. However, there were challenges in finding popuIation projections beyond the most ment Federal census (1996) for the Victoria case study site. compiles population &ta for the nation's Census Metropditan

Areas (CMAs) and provides population projections based on the 1996 census figures.

Data is available for CMAs (as an entity unto itself) and for the major urban centres within CMAs, however, this is as micro an analysis as is done by Statistics Canada.

The challenge for the Victoria case was that parts of the region - the Islands Trust/

Electoral Areas - were not included in the Capital Regional District analysis as they differ significantly from the core municipalities under review. Statistics Canada lists the Victoria CMA as including the Capital Regional District, which dso includes the

Islands Trust - an entity not included in the case study. Therefore, another source of population information was needed so to gather population projections for the Capital

Region post the 1996 federal census.

in order to find population projections that included al1 municipalities within the Capital Regional District, 1 looked to the projections as included in the annual publication of municipal statistics available through the Ministry of Municipal

Affairs. Population projections compiled by Statistics Canada and B.C. Stats are included in this annual publication and in comparing both sets of projections, it was discovered that there existed a variation between the two sets of data. Table 27 shows the variance in population data provided by the federal versus provincial agency. POPULATION VARIATION BETWEEN STATSCAN AND B.C. STATS

B.C. Sîaîs 250,778 249.93 1 261.%6 288,916 296011 300560 303,528 301.762 303.854

With further investigation, it appeared that the population data provided by B.C. Stats provided a closer approximation of the provincial population trends, especially between the census years of 1991 and 1996. Therefore, similar information was sought for the Halifax case. It was discovered that the Nova Scotia government does include population information in their annual municipal statistics publication, however, they make reference to the most ment federal census instead of providing an annual population projection based on that particular census. As they do not have a similar statistics agency at the provincial level as does British Columbia, the search for a comparable data set to that of B.C. Stats was needed. The search for population projections led to the Halifax Regional Municipality and it was quickly discovered that even though the HRM is the largest region not only in the province of Nova

Scotia, but also in the entice Maritime provinces, such population data is not

compiled. In fact, this researcher learned tbat the Region itseIf does not bother

gathering population gmwth estimates because of what they consider the apparent

futility of the exercise - that is in predicting trends in population growth. Tberefore,

9 1 whiie the provincial population projections in British Columbia were the preferred source for data, as no similar information was available for Halifax, Statistics Canada data was used for both cases in order to preserve methodologicai consistency.

A second challenge with respect to imperfect data came with looking at budget information at the municipal level, both within regions (i.e. comparing municipal budgets within the CRD)and among them (Le. CRD and HRM). With the

Halifax case, it was very difficult to tease out the effects of amalgamation in areas where the Provincial Service Exchange twk place, such as police126and mads.

Because Service Exchange occurred in the year prior to consolidation, the opportunity to evaiuate its impact on particular service areas within the region has been lost and with politicai amaigamation following on its heels, the analysis is fucther complicated. As well, budget-related deficiencies resulting from arnaigamation were apparent:

i) line items within the HRM's budget categories have been renamed andior shuffled into other categories, thus making it difftcult to know exactly what idis not king included in a particular budget are& Here an 'unbundling' was attempted to ensure comparable data.

ii) detailed budget information from the former municipalities is hard to access or not available.

üi) discrepancies exist between the Ministry of Municipal Affairs' budget information and that produced by the HRM, thus making the assessrnent of savings due to amalgarnation a challenge to properly quanti*

lx See thesis pages 64 and 84-85. Budget documenîs within the Capital Region were much more clearly documented and more straight foward to compare among the member municipaiities. This is primarily the result of many municipalities king small in size, ihus providing a more detailed stocktaking of where their dollars are king spent. It is ihis author's observation that budget standardization, especially within regions with council multiplicity, is essential to king able to properly quantify and document change as measured fiscaily. This becornes important when benchmarking and performance levels corne into play as it is difficult to carry out these tasks the more unified a regional structure becomes.

A third challenge involved disentangling the actual process of arnalgamation - that is, in Halifax, the transition from four independent municipalities into one larger entity - €rom the perception of arnalgarnation. This was most evident when andyzing service levels over the transition phase and in assessing the degree of buy-in (or lack thereof) among the municipalities.

A fourth observation that became clearer as one delved further into the question of eficiency hypothesized at the beginning of the thesis, was that the empirical data showed only a very limited part of the examination of consolidation efforts. The prelùninary examination undertaken hem points to the need to dig deeper

- especiaily in the investigation of municipal accounting practices - in or&r to uncover standardizations fit for cornparison among case study sites. This is especially apparent whea examhg service provision between regions so to determine what is king included andlor excluded as part of the overall budget for a given service area.

The above noted challengesi deficiencies are acknowledged to show that there is more research needed before one can bring a definite conclusion to the overarching question of efficiency in consolidating structures.

As one began peeling back the layers of the efficiency question, it became obvious that more substantive issues for municipal govemments are at hand. In comparing Victoria and Halifax - two regions with different goveming structures - it

is abundantly clear that there still exists a shadow of ambiguity over the role that municipal govemments have as a level of government in Canada. The primary

identity appears to be that of service provider/arranger - a role somewhat similar to

the 50si60s reform era where locai govemments were concemed with infrastructure

and service delivery. Given the number of consolidations that have taken place,

especially in Eastem Canada, over the past decade, one can speculate that provincial

govemments still view their municipal counterparts as king predominantly service

providers. The development of the regional district system in British Columbia,

where the role for local govemments has instead emphasized governance and

voluntary cwperation in managing the growth pressures of metropditan regions,

appears to be the exception to the service provider rule. Why else would provincial

governments continue to press forward with arnalgarnations given the questionable

reaiity of cost savings? If the Provincial-Municipai Service Exchange agreement was

any indication, provincial governments need city-regions of a specific size to

download services without the fez that such offloading will lead to bankruptcy of 94 municipal units. In the Halifax Regionai Municipaiity, the special reserves held by the former City of Halifax certainly helped cushion the costs of added responsibilities downioaded by the Province as well as covered some of the debt that the other municipalities brought with them into the new regional entity. Another explanation of provincial government focus on amaigamation is the growing importance of metropolitan areas as players not only on the nationai scene'" but also intemationally. Whatever the reasons behind the fixation on amalgamation, what

Sanction cdls Merger Mania, it is pretty clear that when dramatic changes are imposed on municipal structures, it is the provincial governments who walk away with the cleanest hands, leaving local officiais to feel the bmnt of their policy decisions and given little, if any, financial assistance to aid the transition process dong.

in order to bring the debate about metropolitan consolidation to a more concrete conclusion, more research is needed in examining structures as they undergo change. This is especially timely as municipalities (and their provincial counterpiuts) in Ontario and are contemplating options for metropolitan restructucing in both large cities (e.g. Montreal) and small regions (Le. Niagara).

Finaily, in revisiting the definitions of efficiency discussed at the beginning of the thesis, ones which provide a broder lens beyond the sole focus on financial concems,'" connections between representation, effectiveness, and the fiscal ceaiities

ln See Jane Jacobs, Cities and the Wealth of Nations: principles of economic l@. New York Raadom House, 1984.

See discussion of efficiency definitions on pages 7-8. 95 of 'doing more with less' couid be better reconciled in analyzing our metropolitan areas. It is in this more rounded discussion, that the impact of change between unitary and multi councilled regions can be more fully examined. DUTERVIEW SCHEDLJLE

Halifax, N.S. Novernber 2-5, 1999

Name AiTiliation

John Benoit Director, Fire Programs, Henson College of Public Affairs and Continuing Education, Dalhousie University

Jemy Blumenthal Councillor, HRM

David Carneron Professor, Department of Political Science Dalhousie University

Sheila Fougere Councillor, HRM

Peter Kelly Councillor, HRM

Ken Meech Chief Administrative Officer, HRM

Jack Mitchell Councillor, HRM

Dale Poe1 Professor, School of Public Administration Dalhousie University

Michelle Dann Research Associate, School of Public Administration, Dalhousie University

Walter Fitzgerald Mayor, HRM INTERVIEW OLJESTIONS

From where do pressures to reform the municipal structure derive?

Are the pressures to reform the municipal structure felt locally?

What role does the provincial govemment play in metropolitan reform?

Has metropolitan reform been a high priority on the govemmental agenda? At what level?

Have the pressures to refonn the municipal structure been ever present over the past three decades or do they arise and subside?

How would you characterize provincial - municipal relations?

What steps to encourage or discourage municipal restmcturing have been sought by municipal govemments? Provincial governments? What has been the result?

Are municipal and provincial govemment objectives in reform similar?

What structures are in place to encourage or discourage metropolitan reform?

Did reform proceed with the support of the municipalities involved?

1s municipal reform merely about achieving cost savings?

1s municipal reform a remedy to solve problems of ineffective decision-making, inefficient administration, and apathy among the populace?

Has refonn in Canada traditionally been in response to a crisis or has it been a proactive response to dealing with problems faced by urban areas? Axworthy, Lloyd, "Canada: Winnipeg." Chap. 3 in Intellll~l'onalHandbook on Local Govemment Reorganirriiion: Co~~temporaryVevelopments. Ed. Donald C. Rowat, 33-44. Westport: Gnenwood Ress, 1980.

Barber, John, "Harris' Words Come Back to Bite b."Globe and Mail, Febnrary 19,1997.

Bish, Roberi, Locd Govenunent in British Coiumbia. 2'Ldcd. Richmond: Union of British Columbia MmWLIcipalities,1990.

Bish, Robert, "Amalgarnation: Is it the Solution?" Ptepand for the Comiag Revolution in Lacal Govemmcnt conference, Halifax, March 27-29,1996.

Bish, Robat "I'he Cost of Municipal Elected Ofticials in the Capital Region of British Columbia." Victoria: Local Government InSritute, 1999a. Bish, Robert, ''Regionai District Review - 1999. Issues and htejurisdictional Comparisons." Victoria- Incal Govmunent htiaite, September 1999b.

British Columbia, Ministry of Municipal Affairs, Regid Districts in British ColdiCr, 1971: a generul rmh:a enes of quesiions ond O~~SWCIS,197 1.

British Columbia, Ministry of MunicipalAffairs,"A Rimcr on Regional Districts in British Columbia." http://www.marh.gov.bc.calLGPOLICYWcontent.hrml.

British Columbia, Municipal Affairs, "Annual Report of Municipal Statistics", 1990-1998.

Campbell, Charles A., Interim Report of the Municipal Refinn Commissionerfor Cape Breton Couity.Halifax: Department of Municipal Anah, 1993.

Capital Regional Disüict, Population Growth,

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