International War on Drugs”: a Case for Multilateralism

The Straw Men Reigniting an “International War on Drugs”: A Case for Multilateralism

Yury Fedotov

In drug policy, the problems are never far from the headlines. From opioid overdoses and violence in the Americas to growing tramadol abuse in Africa and methamphetamine trade in Asia, drug threats to health, development, safety, and security are proliferating. Global opium and cocaine production have hit record levels. Drugs are killing people, and governments everywhere are strug- gling to respond. Te international community is grappling with these developments at a 93 time when cooperation and trust are fraying. As UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres said: “Universal values are being eroded. Democratic principles are under siege, and the rule of law is being undermined. Impunity is on the rise, as leaders and states push the boundaries, both at home and in the international arena…Multilateralism is under fre precisely when we need it most.”1 Tese challenges have brought the debate surrounding how best to address the world drug problem to a boiling point. Articles in popular media declare that the so-called “UN’s global war on drugs” is a failure. Some NGOs call for the scrapping of international drug control conventions in favor of the legalization of most drug types.2 Tese suggested policies fy in the face of the positions taken by the vast majority of UN member states, which have repeatedly signaled their intention to work under agreed frameworks. Where do we go from here? Te reference in the title to straw men—fallacious arguments that distort opposing views only to discredit them—is not to dismiss the gravity of the

Yury Fedotov serves as Executive Director of the United Nations Ofce on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and director-general of the United Nations Ofce in Vienna (UNOV). He was appointed to this position, with the rank of under-secretary-general of the United Nations, in July 2010.

Spring/Summer 2019 • volume xxv, issue ii Yury Fedotov situation. Wars on drugs have been waged, and the international community has repeatedly expressed concern about the continuing pursuit of excessive enforcement measures that go against international laws and standards. Te problems are very real, and lives are at stake. Tat is why perspective is needed. To speak of a global, concerted war on drugs sanctioned by the international drug control framework is highly misleading. Suggesting that there exists a monolithic problem—“prohibitionist” drug control as required or promoted by international law—encourages an unrealistic expectation that complex problems in diferent parts of the world can be remedied with a magic bullet. It also discounts the value of a painstakingly agreed-upon multilateral framework, ac- cepted by most governments, that facilitates dialogue involving civil society and other actors to discuss disagreements, share their views, and encourage change. Multilateral frameworks enable cooperation and joint action to tackle problems that no one country can solve alone. Tere remains a clear need for a collaborative, international response that confronts the illicit cultivation, production, and trafcking of drugs, while addressing their medicinal uses and the treatment of those who fall prey to their abuse. We urgently need to move beyond straw man arguments, or we risk losing sight of common ground and common solutions. 94

THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE INTERNATIONAL DRUG CONTROL FRAMEWORK

Addiction, overdose, crime, and violence are drug-related problems that have afected many of us personally and touch on many aspects of our lives. Tey have negative implications for public health and safety, sustainable development and human rights, and international peace and security. However, these concerns are not new.3 Te current international drug control system fnds its roots in the nineteenth century, when eforts to tackle a devastating opium epidemic following the wars fought between China and the British Empire resulted in the forced legalization of opium imports to China. Te Shanghai Conference of the Opium Commission (1909), which was the frst international conference to address a world drug problem, laid the groundwork for the frst international drug treaty, the International Opium Convention of the Hague (1912). Te introduction of the international drug control system had a major impact in reducing opium production worldwide. Global opium production, both licit and illicit, fell by approximately 63 percent between 1906 and 2017, despite massive increases in illicit opium production recorded in 2017. Tis

the brown journal of world affairs Te Straw Men Reigniting an “International War on Drugs” shift is especially dramatic considering the fact that the world population more than quadrupled over this period.4 Tis system has evolved into the present-day framework that is based on the three international drug control conventions: the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs (1961) as amended by the 1972 Protocol; the Convention on Psychotropic Substances (1971); and the Convention against Illicit Trafc in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (1988).5 Enjoying near-universal adherence, these conventions aim to limit the use of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances and their precursors to legitimate medical and scientifc purposes, with the ultimate goal of protecting the “health and welfare of mankind.”6 State parties cooperate and enact domestic legislative and administrative measures to fulfll these obligations, including establishing drug trafcking as a serious crime and ensuring the availability of controlled drugs for medical and scientifc purposes while preventing diversion into illicit channels. Te conventions further address prevention and treatment of drug use disorders. Notably, the conventions do not defne exact medical or scientifc uses—an omission that allows for research and scientifc advancements to continuously inform national approaches. In addition, the 1961 Convention established four “schedules”—lists of substances with specifc sets of control measures ap- 95 plied—based on an assessment of their therapeutic value, risk of abuse, and danger to health. Te 1971 Convention follows suit with four complementary schedules. Te schedules enable a process for addressing the control of specifc substances (changing their scheduling or adding new substances) without requiring modi- fcation of the articles of the treaty.7 Te placement of narcotic drugs, psychotropic substances, and precursor chemicals under international control is decided by the UN member states through the Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND) based in Vienna, Austria. As a functional commission of the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), with normative responsibilities under the drug control treaties, the CND acts as the central policymaking body on drugs in the UN system. CND sessions are conducted in the so-called “Vienna spirit”—all countries, including the 53 members of the Commission (elected by the ECOSOC on a rotating basis) and all other participating member states, negotiate on an equal basis with the aim of achieving consensus. Scheduling decisions are taken based on recommendations by the World Health Organization (WHO) and, in the case of precursor chemicals used for

Spring/Summer 2019 • volume xxv, issue ii Yury Fedotov the manufacture of controlled substances, the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB). Te INCB, an independent body established under the 1961 treaty, monitors implementation of the conventions. Te UN Ofce on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) provides secretariat functions to the CND. It also supports countries to implement the conventions and address drug supply and demand as well as related challenges of organized crime, corruption, and terrorism, and it produces the annual World Drug Report. Tis is the basic framework and “ecosystem” of the international drug control system: member states act through the CND with the support of UNODC, WHO, INCB, and a number of other UN entities. Te international legal framework established through the conventions has been further elaborated in the 2009 Political Declaration and Plan of Action on International Cooperation Towards an Integrated and Balanced Strategy to Counter the World Drug Problem.8 Te Political Declaration set 2019 as a target date for states to eliminate or reduce signifcantly: (a) the illicit cultivation of opium poppy, coca bush, and cannabis plant; (b) the illicit demand for narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances and drug-related health and social risks; (c) the illicit production, manufacture, marketing, distribution, and trafcking of psychotropic substances, including synthetic drugs; (d) the diversion of and il- 96 licit trafcking in precursors; and (e) money-laundering related to illicit drugs.9 Tese targets, like other aspirational global goals, refected the determina- tion of member states to address common challenges, in this case “to tackle the world drug problem and to actively promote a society free of drug abuse in order to ensure that all people can live in health, dignity and peace, with security and prosperity.”10

IDENTIFYING THE MODERN DAY DRUG PROBLEM

Over the decade since the adoption of the 2009 Declaration and Plan of Action, production and manufacturing of opiates and cocaine have reached the highest levels recorded.11 Synthetic drugs continue to expand, and the market of new psychoactive substances (NPS) remains widely diversifed. While prevalence of use has remained substantially stable in relative terms, there are more substances available—in number, in quantity, and in more combinations—than before. In recent years, a few countries have moved toward legalization of cannabis for recreational use, which the INCB has termed incompatible with legal obligations under the conventions.12 Illicit drug and precursor trafcking, along with organized crime and

the brown journal of world affairs Te Straw Men Reigniting an “International War on Drugs” money-laundering, continue to present acute challenges for law enforcement and criminal justice responses. Te nexus of organized crime and terrorism has been the focus of political attention from the UN Security Council and other actors but remains under-researched.13 Non-medical use of regulated prescription drugs, in some cases diverted from licit channels but in large part illicitly manufactured, constitutes a major problem.14 Te continuing opioid epidemic in North America has resulted in a record number of overdose deaths in the United States—70,237 in 2017 alone.15 Tere are signs of an opioid epidemic stemming from the non-medical use of tramadol—a substance not under international control—in north and sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East. Some 31 million drug users sufer from drug use disorders, meaning that their drug use is harmful to the point where they may need treatment.16 Globally, deaths due to drug use—both directly as a result of overdose and indirectly due to HIV and other diseases—were estimated at 452,000 in 2016.17 Despite improvements, evidence-based prevention and treatment services are not reaching those in need. Even in some high-income countries, such as the United States, only one in 10 people with drug use disorders has access to a minimum package of services. Women in particular have difculty accessing the drug treatment and HIV prevention services they need. Young people also face 97 signifcant barriers, including low awareness, lack of tailored services, stigma, f- nancial limitations, and challenges related to age of consent and confdentiality.18 Services may not be afordable or covered by insurance. In the absence of standards or monitoring mechanisms and assessment, services may not be ef- fective and based on evidence supporting their use, or they may be conducted by unqualifed personnel. Tis means that even in places where treatment, care, and rehabilitation are theoretically available, the needs of people may not be met and the services provided may not be in accordance with international standards, which highlights the importance of voluntary treatment that respects human rights and the dignity of service users. Te treatment situation is more problematic still in prison settings.19 Excessive incarceration as a response to drug ofenses, including those of a minor nature, remains a serious concern. A related challenge is the lack of alternatives to conviction or punishment at dif- ferent stages of criminal proceedings, ranging from pre-trial to post-sentencing measures. A continuing problem related to drug supply is insufcient availability and access to controlled substances for medical and scientifc purposes, including those used for palliative care and treatment of drug dependence. As a result,

Spring/Summer 2019 • volume xxv, issue ii Yury Fedotov WHO estimates that each year 5.5 million terminal cancer patients and one million end-stage HIV/AIDS patients, as well as many other people with chronic, non-malignant pain, needlessly sufer moderate to severe pain, particularly in low and middle income countries.20 While data collection has improved in some countries, considerable gaps remain in the available information both within and between regions. Member states continue to discuss ways of strengthening data collection through the An- nual Report Questionnaires, which provide the basis for the UNODC World Drug Reports. Nevertheless, the broad picture provided by this brief overview makes clear that many drug challenges remain, and new threats have emerged. Tis has put the global legal framework for drug control and related commitments under pressure. Some countries have recently announced they would resume or introduce the use of capital punishment for drug ofences, presumably to deter trafckers.21 According to the Ofce of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), drug-related crackdowns are reported to have led to gross violations of human rights. Te International Criminal Court reported in August 2018 that it started a preliminary examination into the situation in the Philippines in relation to crimes allegedly committed in the context of the government’s 98 campaign against drugs.22 Such developments have led a vocal lobby to renew claims that the cure (drug control) is worse than the disease (the efects of drug use and trade)—and that drug legalization is the solution.23 Tis stance appears to be based on the view that the drug control conventions require, enable, or otherwise support repressive drug policies—that is to say, a global war on drugs.

HOW A FALSE “REPRESSION VERSUS LEGALIZATION” DEBATE OBSCURES THE PROBLEMS

Options for addressing the drug problem cannot be reduced to a repression versus legalization debate. To better understand this situation, it is necessary to dispel a few unhelpful oversimplifcations—the straw men standing in the way of potential solutions. Te “war on drugs” is a term that is largely associated with the United States, dating back to President Richard Nixon’s frst presidential campaign, and it is usually used to denote repressive—and often discriminatory—law enforcement measures.24 It is certainly not UN policy. A “war on drugs” is neither mandated nor encouraged by the conventions, which do not stand apart from

the brown journal of world affairs Te Straw Men Reigniting an “International War on Drugs” the international human rights framework and are intended to be implemented in full respect of international human rights law.25 Prohibition is not the aim of the conventions.26 In the most basic sense, the conventions address controlling supply, not banning substances. Tis control is also directed at ensuring access and availability of drugs for medical and scientifc purposes. Te control system supports the need to limit the use of substances to their intended medical use due to the risk of harm—a basic concept of medical deontology and ethics. Te conventions do not justify the use of the death penalty. Te UN Secretariat does not support capital punishment and the secretary-general has called on states to abolish the death penalty, which does little to serve victims or deter crime.27 Capital punishment may also impede international cooperation to fght drug trafcking, as there are national laws that do not allow the exchange of information and extradition with countries that impose the death penalty for the ofences concerned. Te conventions do not require punishment. While possession, purchase, or cultivation of controlled drugs for non-medical and non-scientifc purposes are to be established as criminal ofences, the action taken in response need not be punitive. Treatment, education, aftercare, rehabilitation, and social reintegration are mentioned in the 1988 convention as alternatives to conviction or 99 punishment. Measures taken by countries such as Portugal to de-penalize such ofenses are fully in line with the drug treaties. Te conventions do not brand drug users as criminals and the conventions repeatedly refer to treatment—but never compulsory treatment—as well as reintegration as alternatives to conviction or punishment. 28 A frequent fashpoint in the treatment discussion is the term “harm reduction.” It refers to measures aimed at minimizing the adverse public health consequences of drug abuse, such as needle and syringe programs, opioid substitution therapy, condom programs, and targeted information, education, and communication, including on overdose prevention. “Harm reduction” strategies have attracted controversy, with some arguing that mitigating the negative efects of drug use encourages more or continued use.29 Nevertheless, the measures—which are detailed in the WHO, UNODC, and UNAIDS technical guide for countries to set targets for universal access to HIV prevention, treatment, and care for injecting drug users—have been recognized as part of a continuum of care, complementary to drug demand reduction eforts through prevention and treatment and in line with the conventions.30 Te UNODC has taken the pragmatic approach of focusing on supporting eforts to ensure

Spring/Summer 2019 • volume xxv, issue ii Yury Fedotov that services reach those who need them, without insisting on terminology and explicit reference to harm reduction.31 Te idea that prisons worldwide are flled with people convicted for drug use is not refected in the data. In most countries, the response to the drug problem is not centered on disproportionate punishment of drug trafckers or criminalization of drug use.32 It is true that national authorities intercept drug The relationship between drugs and users much more often than drug traffickers, violence is complex, and drug markets with fve times as many do not automatically lead to violence. people coming in contact with the authorities for drug possession than for drug trafcking.33 However, the latter are more heavily punished in terms of custodial sentences, and there are three times as many people held in prison for drug trafcking than drug use. Countering crime and homicidal violence linked with drug cartels, notably in the Americas, represents a critical challenge. But the relationship between drugs and violence is complex, and drug markets do not automatically lead to violence. Tons of heroin have fowed from Afghanistan along the Balkan route for decades, but homicide rates in the region have been both low and declining.34 100 An oft-cited “unintended consequence” of drug control, namely the exis- tence of a criminal market, is not in itself a reason for abandoning regulation in exchange for accommodation.35 Every regulation has the unintended consequence of creating a market opportunity for those who circumvent the rules. Criminals make money by selling prohibited materials. At any given moment, there are sellers and buyers for drugs, fully automatic frearms, child pornography, endangered species products, and other items that the international community has collectively decided to prohibit. Laws exist to prevent such social harm. Tere is little reason to think that in a legalized drug market restricted and regulated by the government a black market ofering stronger drugs for less money would be eliminated. Legalization potentially expands the customer base. Criminal groups specialize in contraband and counterfeit, from cigarettes to medicines and many other goods. Moreover, with respect to cannabis legalization, so far it is illicit markets, and not hoped-for tax revenues, that appear to be fourishing.36 Tere are legitimate concerns about the health and social efects of cannabis use that should be discussed, particularly as commercial interest in the cannabis industry rapidly picks up speed.37 Cannabis use has increased across the United States since 2007. Te number of persons who used cannabis at

the brown journal of world affairs Te Straw Men Reigniting an “International War on Drugs” least once over the previous year rose by some 60 percent, and the number of persons who used it in the past month rose by 80 percent. Most worryingly, the number of daily or near-daily users, refecting the most problematic users, rose by almost 130 percent over the 2007–2017 period.38 Tis rise may refect an increase in reporting due to less stigmatization, but also could be due to a decreased perception of harm, especially among young people.39 Tere is a considerable body of scientifc evidence indicating that initiating drug use and the development of dependence is the behavioral expression of a complex set of psychobiological vulnerabilities and conditions; considering drug use a refection of individual choice misses these nuances.40 Lower socioeconomic groups pay a higher price for initiation as they may have greater difculty accessing appropriate treatment and other services for drug dependence.41 We underestimate risks at our peril. Te opioid crisis in North America is a case in point, with the roles of pharmaceutical companies, marketing, and prescription practices in the genesis of the epidemic now coming under intense scrutiny.42 Although the current system has not succeeded in reductions, it has helped to contain some of the problems. Without leaning too heavily on counterfactu- als, drug use, while increasing along with population growth, has not risen in step with production.43 According to the WHO, some 15 million people, aged between 30 and 69, die prematurely. Over 85 percent of these deaths are in 101 low and middle income countries and are driven by fve major risk factors— tobacco use and alcohol use among them.44 Deaths due to illicit drug use—less than 600,000 people, potentially kept in check by international regulation and cooperation—have remained far below the estimated seven million dying from tobacco use and the nearly three million dying from alcohol use annually.45 Tese problems caused by legal drugs impose signifcant costs on societies (and their taxpayers).

EVOLVING INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES

As global drug challenges have evolved, so too has the international response. In 2016, the UN General Assembly held a special session (UNGASS) on the world drug problem. Tere, member states unanimously adopted an outcome document, which was the result of nearly two years of negotiations undertaken with broad participation from governments, international and regional organi- zations, and civil society.46 Te document reafrmed member states’ commitment to implementing the 2009 Political Declaration and Plan of Action and outlined an “integrated,

Spring/Summer 2019 • volume xxv, issue ii Yury Fedotov multidisciplinary, mutually reinforcing, balanced, scientifc-evidence-based and comprehensive approach” to drugs. Te outcome document also elaborated on operational recommendations addressing demand reduction, including prevention and treatment; the availability of controlled substances for medical and scientifc purposes; supply reduction; human rights; challenges and new trends; international cooperation; and development.47 In the UNGASS outcome document, member states emphasized that the three international drug control conventions “allow for sufcient fexibility for States parties to design and implement national drug policies according to their priorities and needs, consistent with the principle of common and shared responsibility and applicable international law.”48 It is not a one-size-fts-all approach, but an adaptable framework that can respond to evolving challenges while enabling efective and increased international cooperation. Critics condemned the UNGASS outcome document when it was agreed upon. According to these critics, the document neglected to address the failings of the global war on drugs, and instead was a “turgid” restatement of business as usual.49 Te outcome document has since come to enjoy a more positive assessment from those same observers, with calls for building on the progress refected in the text. It has been recognized as instrumental in expanding the 102 scope of global drug policy debates and as a signifcant step forward in addressing health, development, human rights, gender, and other issues.50 Governments have pursued a follow-up process through the CND to put the recommendations into practice. A ministerial segment at the CND session in March 2019 adopted a Ministerial Declaration committing member states to accelerating implementation of agreed commitments, from the 2009 Politi- cal Declaration and Plan of Action, the 2014 joint ministerial statement, and the 2016 UNGASS outcome document.51 Te declaration further proposes a review in 2029 of progress over the next decade with a mid-term review at the 2024 CND session. Te vast majority of member states continue to support working together under this framework to address drug challenges; talk of polarization or imminent collapse of the global system misses this basic fact.52 Legalization has centered on one substance, cannabis, out of the some 276 psychoactive substances under international control.53 Canada, which legalized recreational cannabis in October 2018, has repeatedly emphasized that it has no intention of legalizing any other scheduled drugs, and that it remains a strong supporter of the international drug control system.54 Tis hard-won consensus represents a frm foundation for multilateral

the brown journal of world affairs Te Straw Men Reigniting an “International War on Drugs” cooperation, which is clearly necessary given the transnational dimensions of drug problems. Going forward, we could more usefully concentrate international community attention and support on identifed priorities. Resources to implement commitments vary considerably, and these varying capacities lead to considerably diferent outcomes. Tere are a multitude of social, economic, and other factors that infuence vulnerability and potential for criminal exploitation. Confict-afected as well as low and middle income countries in particular face challenges with investing in efective responses, whether to support health and social services ofering drug use prevention and innovative treatment, or to fund law enforcement training and sophisticated investigative techniques to deal with drug gangs and insecure borders. Cybercrime and cryptocurrency money laundering on a global scale pose an even greater challenge for these countries.55 Drugs have a major impact on development, and development challenges afect the nature and dynamic of the drug problem. Alternative development is an approach aimed at reducing the vulnerabilities that lead to involvement in illicit crop cultivation and ultimately eliminating such cultivation. Research has shown that the success of alternative development depends on the achievement of broader development goals. Te development of viable economic alternatives is also important to address other illicit drug-related activities, including in urban areas.56 Te need for responses addressing both demand and supply, by 103 countries of origin, transit, and destination, has also been repeatedly emphasized by member states. Nevertheless, we are witnessing the failure of shared responsibility and development assistance. Drug problems clearly cannot be solved in isolation, but countries are too often left on their own to cope. Tis can never justify rights violations, but desperation can make zero tolerance look viable or even desirable. Excessive, hardline measures to counter drug and crime threats appear to be met with popular support in countries with diferent cultural contexts.57 People are worried about their safety and the impact that drugs are having on their communities. In both the UNGASS outcome document and the 2019 Ministerial Dec- laration, governments acknowledged the need to strengthen technical assistance “to assist Member states to efectively address the health, socioeconomic, human rights, justice and law enforcement aspects of the world drug problem.”58 Tis commitment to leave no one behind is also prominently contained in the globally agreed Sustainable Development Goals, namely in Goal 17 on partnerships.59 In practice, this requires reliable resources, especially for developing countries, to address drug challenges. Tis encompasses assistance to draft and

Spring/Summer 2019 • volume xxv, issue ii Yury Fedotov implement national legislation in line with international commitments; facilitate international cooperation, such as extradition and mutual legal assistance; and provide training as well as equipment for institutions of law enforcement and justice, healthcare, social services, and more—including to apply international standards for prevention and treatment services for drug use disorders, HIV, and related diseases. It is easy to condemn but much harder to truly support. Te international community needs to make good on pledges to share in the burden. Evidence- based prevention, treatment, and alternative development are clearly long-term propositions, and funding needs to be consistent and sustainable. If we want to encourage health- Drug problems clearly cannot be centered, rights-based, solved in isolation, but countries are proportionate criminal too often left on their own to cope. justice responses, then we need to build capacities and train law enforcement to act accordingly, to uphold the rule of law as intended. Te 2019 Ministerial Declaration represents a broad accord on the need for efective, balanced, multilateral action. It draws on conventions that are near- 104 universal and accelerates work on specifc and concrete recommendations to tackle organized crime, protect human rights, enable development, and ensure rights-based treatment and support. Dismissing this achievement as prohibitionist or blindly bent on continuing an international war on drugs precludes meaningful discussion and potentially hinders positive change. Implementa- tion remains a formidable challenge, with considerable existing gaps between knowledge and practice, intention and action. We would do well to strengthen W consensus and seek to make the system work for more people. A

NOTES

1. Antonio Guterres, “Remarks at the Opening of the 73rd Session of the General Assem- bly,” (Speech, UN General Assembly, New York, September 18, 2018). 2. See: Jack Guy and Hilary Clark, “Report Says the UN’s Global ‘War on Drugs’ Has Been a Failure,” CNN, October 22, 2018; Max Daly, “Te World’s War on Drugs Has Failed Yet Again,” Vice, October 23, 2018. 3. United Nations Ofce on Drug and Crime (UNODC), A Century of International Drug Control (Vienna: UNODC, 2008), 20–32, https://www.unodc.org/documents/data- and-analysis/Studies/100_Years_of_Drug_Control.pdf. 4. Ibid. 5. UNODC, Te International Drug Control Conventions (Vienna: UNODC, 2014), https://www.unodc.org/documents/commissions/CND/Int_Drug_Control_Conventions/

the brown journal of world affairs Te Straw Men Reigniting an “International War on Drugs” Ebook/Te_International_Drug_Control_Conventions_E.pdf. 6. Ibid., 23. 7. UNODC, “Scheduling procedures,” https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/commissions/ CND/Mandate_Functions/Mandate-and-Functions_Scheduling.html. 8. United Nations, Political Declaration and Plan of Action on International Cooperation towards an Integrated and Balanced Strategy to Counter the World Drug Problem (Vienna: United Nations, 2009), https://www.unodc.org/documents/commissions/CND/CND_Sessions/ CND_52/Political-Declaration2009_V0984963_E.pdf. 9. Ibid., 14. 10. “Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development,” Resolution 70/1 (adopted by the General Assembly, September 25, 2015), 13. 11. UNODC, World Drug Report 2018 Booklet 1 (Vienna: UNODC, 2018), 8. 12. Uruguay (2013), Canada (2018), and a few U.S. states have legalized cannabis, although cannabis remains illegal under U.S. federal law; “Statement by the INCB,” Inter- national Narcotics Control Board, October 17, 2018, https://www.incb.org/incb/en/news/ press-releases/2018/statement-by-the-international-narcotics-control-board-on-the-entry- into-force-of-bill-c-45-legalising-cannabis-for-non-medical-purposes-in-canada.html. 13. UNODC, World Drug Report 2017, Booklet 5 (Vienna: UNODC, 2017), 11. 14. UNODC, World Drug Report 2018, Booklet 1, 7–9. 15. “Overdose Death Rates,” National Institute on Drug Abuse, https://www.drugabuse. gov/related-topics/trends-statistics/overdose-death-rates. Last updated January 2019. 16. UNODC, World Drug Report 2018, Booklet 1, 7. 17. UNODC, World Drug Report 2018, Booklet 2, 24. 18. Facing Addiction in America: Te Surgeon General’s Report on Alcohol, Drugs, and 105 Health (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 2016) https:// addiction.surgeongeneral.gov/sites/default/fles/surgeon-generals-report.pdf; UNODC, World Drug Report 2018, Booklet 5; HIV and Young People Who Inject Drugs (Geneva: World Health Organization, 2015). 19. UNODC, International Standards for the Treatment of Drug Use Disorders (Vienna: UNODC, 2017), https://www.unodc.org/documents/drug-prevention-and-treatment/ UNODC_International_Standards_for_the_Treatment_of_Drug_Use_Disorders_ March_17_ebook.pdf; Treatment and care for people with drug use disorders in contact with the criminal justice system, draft pre-launch publication (Vienna: UNODC, March 2018), https://www.unodc.org/documents/UNODC_WHO_Alternatives_to_Conviction_or_Pun- ishment_2018.pdf. 20. “Access to Control Medications Programme,” WHO Briefng Note (Geneva: World Health Organization, April 2012), https://www.who.int/medicines/areas/quality_safety/ ACMP_BrNote_Genrl_EN_Apr2012.pdf. 21. See: Michael Saf and Amantha Perera, “Sri Lanka to Begin Hangings Within Months, Ending 43-Year Stay on Executions,” Guardian, February 7, 2019, https://www.theguard- ian.com/world/2019/feb/07/sri-lanka-to-begin-hangings-within-months-ending-43-year- stay-on-executions; Faisal Mahmud, “Over 100 Drug Dealers Surrender in Bangladesh Crackdown,” Al-Jazeera, February 16, 2019, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/02/drug- dealers-surrender-bangladesh-crackdown-190216165728814.html; “Egypt Approves Death Penalty for Drug Dealers,” Middle East Monitor, January 31, 2019, https://www.middleeast- monitor.com/20190131-egypt-approves-death-penalty-for-drug-dealers/. 22. Ofce of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions (New York: OHCHR, 2016),

Spring/Summer 2019 • volume xxv, issue ii Yury Fedotov http://ap.ohchr.org/documents/dpage_e.aspx?si=A/HRC/32/39/Add.2; “Killings of suspected ‘drug ofenders’ in Bangladesh must stop – UN Human Rights Chief,” Ofce of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), June 6, 2018, https://www. ohchr.org/FR/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=23178&LangID=E; United Nations, Report of the International Criminal Court: Note by the Secretary-General (New York: UN, 2018), https://www.icc-cpi.int/itemsDocuments/a_73_334/N1826367.pdf. 23. UNODC, Organized Crime and its Treat to Security (Vienna: UNODC, 2009), 1. 24. “Public Enemy Number One: A Pragmatic Approach to America’s Drug Problem,” Richard Nixon Foundation, https://www.nixonfoundation.org/2016/06/26404/. 25. Note by the Executive Director, “Drug control, crime prevention and criminal justice: A human rights perspective,” UNODC, March 3, 2010, https://www.unodc.org/documents/ commissions/CCPCJ/CCPCJ_Sessions/CCPCJ_19/E-CN15-2010-CRP1_E-CN7-2010- CRP6/E-CN15-2010-CRP1_E-CN7-2010-CRP6.pdf. 26. UNODC, Drug Policy Provisions from the International Drug Control Conventions (Vienna: UNODC, 2014), 1–2, https://www.unodc.org/documents/hlr/Drug_policy_provi- sions_from_the_international_drug_control_Conventions.pdf. 27. Antonio Guterres, “Remarks at Panel on Transparency and the Death Penalty” (statement for the UN in New York, October 10, 2017), https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/ statement/2017-10-10/secretary-generals-remarks-panel-%E2%80%9Ctransparency-and- death-penalty%E2%80%9D. 28. Te UNODC has been promoting treatment and not punishment for more than a decade; See: From coercion to cohesion, discussion paper (Vienna: UNODC, 2009), https://www.unodc.org/docs/treatment/Coercion_Ebook.pdf; UNODC, Treatment and care 106 for people with drug use disorders in contact with the criminal justice system, draft pre-launch publication (Vienna: UNODC, 2018), https://www.unodc.org/documents/UNODC_ WHO_Alternatives_to_Conviction_or_Punishment_2018.pdf. 29. UNODC, Reducing adverse health and social consequences of drug abuse: A comprehensive approach (Vienna: UNODC, 2009). 30. UNODC, Political Declaration on Countering the World Drug Problem (Vienna: UNODC, 1998), https://www.unodc.org/documents/commissions/CND/Political_Decla- ration/Political_Declaration_1998/1998-Political-Declaration_A-RES-S-20-2.pdf; World Health Organization (WHO), UNODC, Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS), WHO, UNODC, UNAIDS Technical Guide 2012 Revision (Geneva: WHO, UNODC, UNAIDS, 2012). 31. International Narcotics Control Board (INCB), Report of the International Narcotics Control Board (Vienna: INCB, 2000), Para. 445. 32. United Nations, What we have learned over the last ten years: A summary of knowledge acquired and produced by the UN system on drug-related matters, Conference room paper submitted by the UN secretary-general (Vienna: UN, 2019), 24, https://www.unodc.org/ documents/commissions/CND/CND_Sessions/CND_62/ECN72019_CRP10_V1901490. pdf. 33. Ibid. 34. UNODC, UNODC Global Study on Homicide (Vienna: UNODC, 2019). 35. UNODC, Making Drug Control ‘Fit for Purpose’: Building on the UNGASS Decade (Vienna: UNODC, 2008), https://www.unodc.org/documents/commissions/CND/CND_ Sessions/CND_51/1_CRPs/E-CN7-2008-CRP17_E.pdf. 36. Patrick McGreevy, “Lawmakers Want to Cut California’s Pot Taxes to Help Lagging Legal Market,” Los Angeles Times, January 29, 2019.

the brown journal of world affairs Te Straw Men Reigniting an “International War on Drugs” 37. INCB, 2018 Annual Report (INCB, 2019); See also: Malcolm Gladwell, “Is Mari- juana as Safe as We Tink?” New Yorker, January 14, 2019; David Gelles, “When the Makers of Marlboro and Corona Get Into Marijuana,” New York Times, December 12, 2018. 38. Key substance use and mental health indicators in the United States: Results from the 2017 National Survey on Drug Use and Health: Detailed Tables (Rockville: Center for Behavioral Health Statistics and Quality, Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration) Table 7.21A, https://www.samhsa.gov/data/sites/default/fles/cbhsq-reports/NSDUHDe- tailedTabs2017/NSDUHDetailedTabs2017.htm#tab7-21A. 39. Andrew M. Seaman, “Teens’ Views on Marijuana Change after Legalization,” Scien- tifc American, December 27, 2016. 40. UNODC, UNODC/WHO International Standards on Drug Use Prevention (Vienna: UNODC, 2018), https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/prevention/prevention-standards.html. 41. UNODC, World Drug Report 2016 (Vienna: UNODC, 2016), xvii. 42. Maria Cramer, “Doctors Bribed with Lucrative Speaking Gigs, Ex-Rep Testifes,” Bos- ton Globe, January 30, 2019; Barry Meier, “Sackler Scion’s Email Reveals Push for High-Dose OxyContin, New Lawsuit Disclosures Claim,” New York Times, January 21, 2019. 43. UNODC, World Drug Report 2018, Booklet 1, 23. 44. WHO, “Ten Treats to Global Health in 2019,” https://www.who.int/emergencies/ ten-threats-to-global-health-in-2019. 45. Ibid. 46. Tirtieth Special Session of the General Assembly, Outcome Document of the 2016 United Nations General Assembly Special Session on the World Drug Problem (New York: UN General Assembly, 2016), https://www.unodc.org/documents/postungass2016/outcome/ V1603301-E.pdf. 107 47. Ibid., 2. 48. Ibid., 3. 49. For example, see: “Diplomacy or denialism? Te Language that the UNGASS Out- come Document Overlooked,” International Drug Policy Consortium, April 16, 2016, https:// idpc.net/media/press-releases/2016/04/diplomacy-or-denialism-the-language-that-the-ungass-outcome-document-overlooked; “Public Statement on the UNGASS 2016 Process and Draft Outcome Document,” Global Commission on Drug Policy, March 11, 2016, https:// www.globalcommissionondrugs.org/docs/GCDP-Position-UNGASS-2016.pdf; “Much Ado About Nothing?” Global Commission on Drug Policy, May 24, 2016, http://www.globalcommissionondrugs.org/much-ado-about-nothing-the-global-commission-on-drug-policy-assessment-of-ungass. 50. “Taking Stock: A Decade of Drug Policy,” International Drug Policy Consortium, 2018, http://fleserver.idpc.net/library/Shadow_Report_FINAL_ENGLISH.pdf. 51. UNODC, Draft ministerial declaration on strengthening our actions at the national, regional and international levels to accelerate the implementation of our joint commitments to address and counter the world drug problem (Vienna: UNODC, March 8, 2019), https://undocs. org/E/CN.7/2019/L.11. 52. Resolution 73/192 adopted by the General Assembly, International Cooperation to Ad- dress and Counter the World Drug Problem (New York: UN General Assembly, 2018), http:// www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/73/192. 53. At the time of writing there is an ongoing discussion between member states on the scheduling of cannabis and its components, see: Changes in the scope of control of substances: proposed scheduling recommendations by the World Health Organization on cannabis and cannabis-related substances, draft decision submitted by the Chair (Vienna: Commission on

Spring/Summer 2019 • volume xxv, issue ii Yury Fedotov Narcotic Drugs, February 27, 2019), https://undocs.org/E/CN.7/2019/L.10. 54. “Statement of Heidi Hulan, Permanent Representative of Canada” (Vienna: In- tersessional Meeting of the 61st Session of the UN Commission on Narcotic Drugs, 2018), https://www.unodc.org/documents/commissions/CND/CND_Sessions/CND_61/ Statements/61st_CND_2nd_ISM_25_June_2018_Statement_Canada.pdf. 55. “Te United Nations Ofce on Drugs and Crime Eforts to Engage with Decision Makers to Strengthen a Culture of Prevention, Particularly in Low and Middle-Income Countries,” Prevention Science, forthcoming. 56. UNODC, World Drug Report 2016, Chapter 2. 57. For example, see: Neil Jerome Morales, “Philippine Survey Shows Big Support for Duterte’s Drugs War,” Reuters, October 16, 2017; Vidhi Doshi, “138 People Killed in 2 Months in Bangladesh Police Crackdown on Drug Dealers,” Washington Post, July 12, 2018. 58. Outcome Document of the 2016 United Nations General Assembly Special Session on the World Drug Problem, 22. 59. “Sustainable Development Goal 17,” Sustainable Development Goals Knowledge Platform, https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/sdg17.

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