Country Profile Bolivia 2003
UNODC Country Office Bolivia
This is not an official document of the United Nations.
The designations employed and the presentation of the material in this document do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the secretariat of the United Nations International Drug Control Programme, concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area or its authorities, or concerning the delimitations of its frontiers and boundaries.
This document has not been formally edited. It is meant for discussion and is not an official document of the United Nations.
Prepared by:
UNODC Country Office Bolivia Casilla 9072 La Paz Bolivia
Telephone: +591-2-279 59 35 Fax: +591-2-215 27 46 E-mail: [email protected] Internet: [email protected]
UNODC
Country Profile Bolivia 2003
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1. GENERAL SUMMARY STATISTICS ...... 1
2. BACKGROUND AND OVERVIEW OF THE DRUG AND CRIME SITUATION ...... 2
3. SUMMARY STATISTICS ...... 3 3.1 Drugs ...... 3 3.2 Crime ...... 4
4. THE YEAR IN REVIEW: MAIN EVENTS ...... 4 4.1 Major political and economic events ...... 4 4.2 Drugs ...... 7 4.3 Crime ...... 8
5. GENERAL SETTING...... 9 5.1 Major characteristics of the country (relevant to the drug and crime problem)...... 9
6. DRUG SITUATION...... 11 6.1 Production and cultivation ...... 11 6.2 Manufacture ...... 12 6.3 Trafficking ...... 13 6.4 Diversion of drugs and precursors ...... 14 6.5 Drug prices ...... 15 6.6 Demand...... 15 6.7 Costs and consequences ...... 18 6.8 Money-laundering ...... 18
7. CRIME SITUATION ...... 19 7.1 Main characteristics...... 19 7.2 Trends ...... 20 7.3 Issues of specific concern...... 21
8. POLICY...... 22 8.1 Drugs...... 22 8.1.1 National drug control framework ...... 22 8.1.1.1 Conventions adherence...... 22 8.1.1.2 Legislation ...... 22 8.1.1.3 Drug control institutions...... 22 8.1.1.4 Main characteristics of national drug control policy...... 23 8.1.2 Licit control (drugs and precursors)...... 23 8.1.3 Supply reduction...... 24 8.1.4 Demand reduction...... 26 8.1.5 Money-laundering control measures ...... 26 8.1.6 International cooperation...... 27 8.2 Crime ...... 29 8.2.1 National crime prevention framework...... 29 8.2.1.1 Organized Crime Convention adherence (once adopted)...... 29 8.2.1.2 Legislation ...... 29 8.2.1.3 Crime control institutions ...... 29 8.2.1.4 Main characteristics of national crime prevention strategy...... 29 8.2.2 Extradition agreements ...... 30 8.2.3 New legislation approved after 11 September 2001 ...... 30 8.3 Cooperation with international bodies ...... 30
REFERENCES ...... 31
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Country Profile Bolivia 2003
UNODC Country Profile Bolivia 2003
UNODC
Country Profile Bolivia 2003
1. GENERAL SUMMARY STATISTICS
SUMMARY STATISTICS
Comparative aggregate average: Country Indicator value High human Developing development countries Human Development Index rank (2001) 104 out of 162 Land Size of country (sq km) (1999) 1,098,580 Arable land (sq km) (1999) 190,740 Population Population (million) (2000) 8.3 Population growth (%)(2000) 2.3 0.30 1.40 Life-expectancy at birth (2000) 62.6 77.30 64.50 Population age 15 and above (%) (2000) 60.4 80.50 66.60 Population age 15 to 24 (%) 19.7 13.60 18.60 Share of urban population (%) (2000) 64.8 78.1(1998) 39.0(1998) Economic development GDP growth (%) (2000) 2.4 1 2.50 GDP per capita, current US $ 964.0 21,770 (1998) 3,260(1998) GDP per capita, PPP $ (1999) 2,355.0 23,410 3530.00 Trade: Imports as share of GDP (%) (2000) 25.1 21.7(1998) 30.2(1998) Trade: Exports as share of GDP (%) (2000) 17.6 22.7(1998) 31.7(1998) Share of agriculture in GDP (%) (2000) 22.0 2.5(1998) 13.5(1998) Total external debt, % of GNP (1998) 72.8 42.80 Poverty and unemployment Population living below national poverty line (2000) 67 Income distribution ratio (20% richest / 20% poorest) 8.6 Unemployment rate (1997) 4.2 7.0(OECD)(98) Youth unemployment rate 12.8(OECD)(98) Health Public expenditure on health (% of GDP) (1998) 1.1 6.2 2.2 Population with access to essential drugs (%) (1999) 70.0 Doctors per 100,000 people (1992-1995) 51.0 246.0 78.0 AIDS cases per 100,000 people (2001) 2.0 99.1 28.9 Education Adult literacy rate (2000) 85.5 98.5 72.9 Combined enrolment ratio (primary, secondary, tertiary) 70.0 91.0 61.0 (1999) Radios per 1,000 people (2000) 675.0 1,005.0 185.0 Televisions per 1,000 people (2000) 119.0 621.0 162.0 Telephone lines per 1,000 people (2000) 61.0 524.0 58.0 Internet users per 1,000 people (2000) 120.00 4.97 0.26 Sources: World Bank, UNDP, DESA, FAO
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Country Profile Bolivia 2003
2. BACKGROUND AND OVERVIEW OF THE DRUG AND CRIME SITUATION
In July 1988, the Coca and Controlled Substances Regulatory Law, Law 1008 was enacted. This law regulates the production, distribution and trade of coca leaf, including illegal coca crop eradication. It also establishes rules for the importation, distribution and sale of controlled chemical substances. The new Penal Procedures Code entered in force in July 2001. It updates the penal procedures, as well as judicial procedures for crimes related to illegal drug production and trafficking.
The Law 1008 defines three areas of production: (1) traditional, located mainly in Yungas of La Paz; (2) transitional with “excess” coca production, covering virtually all coca plantations in the Cochabamba Tropics (known as the Chapare) and a few areas of recent colonization in the La Paz; and (3) illegal, covering the rest of the national territory. In this respect, Law 1008 authorizes coca plantations in Yungas of La Paz of up to 12,000 hectares for the purposes of “acullicu” (chewing of coca leaves) and other traditional uses. The coca crops in the Chapare are declared to be in transition and are subject to eradication and alternative development.
Until 1997, coca leaf crops with the potential for manufacturing 200 metric tons of cocaine annually (20 to 25 per cent of world cocaine production) existed in Bolivia. As of June 2002, potential manufacture of cocaine stood at 70 metric tons.
During the period 1998 to September 2002, net coca eradication reached 21,400 hectares — equivalent to 56 per cent of the total surface of illicit cultivation that existed in 1997. This eradication effort precipitated social conflicts instigated by coca union leaders who were (and still are) not about to give in so easily. On various occasions, coca leaders mobilized their supporters and blockaded the country’s main highway from Cochabamba to Santa Cruz (including the Yungas of La Paz). They demanded, among other things, that the Government halt eradication.
In June 2002, there were approximately 24,400 hectares of coca in Bolivia. Of this amount, 12,000 hectares are considered to be legal under Law 1008. In 2001 and 2002, the area of new coca crops has reached approximately 15,000 hectares annually, mostly in new regions such as national forest reserves in the Chapare as well as in the Yungas of La Paz.
Investments in alternative development expanded the legal economic base in the Chapare and most recently in the Yungas. The area under legal alternative crops — such as bananas, pineapples, citrus fruits, timber, palm heart and many others — has increased in recent years to over 120,000 hectares. At the same time, a large segment of the population that benefited from alternative development activities has gained access to basic education, health and sanitation. The region has a developed road infrastructure, electricity and other productive infrastructure. Furthermore, especially in the Chapare, new economic actors have appeared. They are attracted by these promising trends. These include 150 producers associations and more than 40 private business enterprises involved in agricultural production, agro-industry, the forest sector, and the service sector, including tourism.
In Bolivia, 2002 was a year of important changes. In August, a new Government took office. A new political scenario has emerged. In a regional context, the country faced a more difficult economic situation, marked by a deep economic recession.
The Government of President Sanchez de Lozada, installed on 6 August 2002, has continued with the anti-drug policy objectives established in the National Strategy to Fight Against Drugs Traffic1998-2002, known also as the “Dignity Plan”. Its objective was to take the country out of the illicit drug circuit. It applies a comprehensive policy based on alternative development, eradication of illicit coca crops, prevention of drug abuse and control measures. This plan has been adopted as a State policy. It goes beyond governmental eras, allowing continuity and a long-term vision in the application of anti-drug policies within the country.
Looking ahead, the Bolivian strategy to combat illicit drugs is facing at least two major challenges. First, future alternative development efforts in the Chapare and the Yungas have to consolidate the progress made over the past years. Also, they should expand viable and sustainable agricultural, agroforestry, livestock and forestry activities to those peasant families previously involved in coca cultivation. Secondly, a comprehensive strategy should be implemented for reducing coca production to the level authorized by Law 1008. This strategy should be based on alternative development and drug law enforcement and prevention. Most importantly, there should be a clear understanding of exactly where the
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Country Profile Bolivia 2003 line is drawn between traditional coca production areas and areas producing illicit coca crops.
Concerning crime, security and crime levels have become major causes of concern in Bolivian society during the last number of years. The Bolivian Government must update its crime prevention policy.
3. SUMMARY STATISTICS
3.1 Drugs
Cultivation (area in hectares, potentially harvestable after eradication) % change
(year 2002 2001 as a % 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002** compared of global to 2001) estimates
Coca bush* 45,800 38,000 21,800 14,600 19,900 24,400 23 9.4 * Including 12,000 hectares of licit coca, as allowed by the national legislation (Law 1008) for traditional use. Source: UNODC, Global Illicit Drug Trends 2002. ** U.S. Department of State.
Production (in metric tons) % change
(year 2002 2001 as a % 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002* compared of global to 2001) estimates
Coca leaf 70,100 52,900 22,800 13,400 20,200 24,800 23 6.6 Source: UNODC, Global Illicit Drug Trends 2002. * U.S. Department of State.
Potential manufacture (in kg) % change
(year 2001 2001 as a % 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002* compared of global to latest estimates year 2000)
Cocaine 200,000 150,000 70,000 43,000 60,000 70,000 17 7.2 Source: UNODC, Global Illicit Drug Trends 2002. * Estimated.
Seizures (in kg) % change 2001 as a % (year 2001 of global 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002* compared to estimates year 2000)
Cocaine 12,325 11,346 7,712 5,599 4,614 3,714 -17.6 1.3
Coca leaf 80,090 110,202 63,911 59,704 80,576 78,277 35.0 n.a.
Cannabis 3,617 320 2,160 3,745 7,056 8,699 88.4 0.8 Source: UNODCCP Global Illicit Drug Trends 2002. *Until September.
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Country Profile Bolivia 2003
Drug abuse prevalence: ages 12 to 50 (at least once a year)
Drug % Global estimates (kg)
Marihuana (cannabis herb) 2.5 9,000
Cocaine hydrochloride 1.3 3,000
Coca paste 1.3 3,000
Hallucinogens 0.6 NA Source: CELIN (National Police).
3.2 Crime (1996 to 2001)
Number of crimes 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Total crime (1) 42,767 45,712 49,667 50,370 43,330 37,553 Homicide (2) 2,051 2,327 2,446 2,625 2,686 2,177 Violent crime 4,348 4,248 4,981 5,134 5,498 6,895 Property crime 14,075 15,877 15,823 13,742 14,496 14,925 (1) This figure does not include vehicular offences or drug-related offences. (2) As defined in Bolivian Penal Code.
4. THE YEAR IN REVIEW: MAIN EVENTS
4.1Major political and economic events
The year 2002 was a year of important changes. In August, a new Government took office. A new political scenario has emerged. In a regional context, the country faced a more difficult economic situation, marked by a deep economic recession.
Early in the year, political parties started their campaigns for the national elections that were held on 30 June. Each of the three leading parties obtained over 20 per cent of the national vote. The difference between them was less than two points. The majority-favoured MNR party led by Mr. Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada (former President for the period 1993 to 1997). A major surprise was when the leader of the coca movement, Evo Morales of the MAS party, came in second; and a coalition led by NFR party under Manfred Reyes Villa came third. The MIR party, led by former President Jaime Paz Zamora (1989 to 1993), got fourth place.
The national elections produced a new political alliance. First, there was a small margin between the three most popular parties. This led to the formation of a new Government based upon a coalition of two parties (the MNR and the MIR). According to the National Constitution, to pass laws and other public rulings, a two thirds majority vote is required in Congress. This applies to key issues, such as approving national budget or development laws. Therefore, the above- mentioned coalition required more votes to support its policies.
Second, new political parties have emerged. Once such party is the MAS, led by Evo Morales. Among other things, this party supports coca growers throughout the country. There is also the MIP, led by Felipe Quispe. Mr. Quispe is also the leader of the Confederation of Syndicates of Agricultural Workers in Bolivia (CSUTCB). He represents the people of the high plateau area of the department of La Paz.1
Third, the emergence of Mr. Morales’ MAS party in the Bolivian Congress is important for future political process, not
1 This leader became notorious during the year 2000. At that time, massive roadblocks by peasants and coca growers paralysed the country for weeks. These protests and actions were made in demand of social benefits and against laws the peasants considered to be adverse to their interests. As a result, the Government agreed to 40 petitions out of a list of 50 presented by the joint organizations representing agricultural workers, coca growers and other labour representatives.
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Country Profile Bolivia 2003 only because it is the second political force in the country, but also because it represents a powerful coalition where different thematic and regional interests are represented. Indeed, the MAS party has expressed its opposition to the current Government, including drug issues.
Political analysts have characterized the above situation as the emergence of a new political party system, dealing with a complex agenda within an adverse scenario. In this new system, there are two main forces. One includes traditional parties such as the MNR and the MIR, and the other is made up of leftwing-radical-indigenous parties — such as the MAS and the MIP.
On 6 August, President Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada took office. As leader of the MNR party, his Government is based on a political alliance with the MIR, as mentioned above. He has guaranteed governance and the strengthening of Bolivian democracy (the political agreement in which the coalition is based has been called the “National Responsibility Government”). The need to achieve stability led the MNR to share 40 per cent of the government institutions with the MIR (i.e. ministries, vice-ministries, embassies and others). This is remarkable since the MIR was in fourth place in the elections. However, this is no surprise as the MAS and the NFR parties (second and the third place respectively) placed themselves in the opposition.
The President requested a period of 90 days organize the plans of the new Government. The Government is still in the process of preparing the National Plan for Economic and Social Development (November 2002). The content of the future National Plan has been outlined in the “Bolivian Plan 2002-2007”, a political agreement between the MNR and MIR parties, encompassing the following 12 areas:
1. Reducing unemployment: This is the most urgent problem for Bolivian society, particularly young people in rural areas. In this regard, the Plan aims to: (i) strengthen public investment in the building of infrastructure, roads, and services (such as provision of gas, electricity and water; (ii) promote private investment and activities by means of public and private financing for up-grading production and technology, opening access to markets and productive credits — with artisans and small producers as the special targets; and (iii) give special attention to tourism, eco-tourism and environmental issues.
2. Defining a State policy for gas and hydrocarbons: Aimed for their industrialization and widespread use.
3. Revising, improving and modifying the privatization process: Payment of complementary retirement bonds and study of on future investment of collective privatized funds are envisaged. These funds will be used to build infrastructure and basic services. Railways will be re-established to meet the needs of rural areas.
4. Developing a productive change in the agricultural sector: The aim is to improve the quality of life of the peasants, and to strengthen agro-industries by offering opportunities for credit production commercialization and development.
5. Improving education by means of the “future scholarship”: This can be accomplished with educational credits and conditions that may allow universal access and quality training for Bolivian youth — with special emphasis on the introduction of information technology into the educational process.
6. Developing policies for universal health insurance.
7. Executing an extensive programme for the construction of social housing: There will be provision for credit and long-term financing.
8. Fighting against corruption: This will be done through actions that strengthen the judicial power, and also guarantee adherence to the law and discourage impunity.
9. Reforming of the Political Constitution of the State: Meeting the demands of Bolivian society with the incorporation of the Constitutional Referendum and other measures that guarantee a real participation and will of the people.
10. Developing activities for social, economic and cultural inclusion of native cultures: This includes the Quechua, Aymara, Guaraní and other indigenous groups seeking unity in diversity and reinforcing the bonds between city and the rural areas.
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Country Profile Bolivia 2003
11. Guaranteeing an effective exercise of women’s rights, equal opportunities for young persons and fair treatment for the elderly.
12. Assuming Bolivian culture as the base of human development and axis for political, social and economic development.
To reach these goals, the Government has proposed a total budget of US $ 5,000 million for the period 2002 to 2007. In November 2002, it announced that US $ 4,090 million had been secured from international financing institutions, as follows:
· Andean Development Bank (CAF) US$ 1,800 million · World Bank US$ 1,112 million · Inter-American Development Bank US$ 1,000 million · Nordic Fund (co financing IDB/WB) US$ 38 million · International Monetary Fund (IMF) US$ 140 million
TOTAL US$ 4,090 million
The new political situation is partially explained by the violent social conflicts of the last two years. To establish an understanding among all stakeholders, Government seeks to establish a proactive dialogue.
During 2001, several developments took place that later had repercussions vis-à-vis the 2002 elections. The Aymara leader of the peasant organization CSUTBC, Felipe Quispe (“Mallkú”), initiated massive roadblocks in November 2000. The Government was forced to give in to their demands. In 2001, Mallku organized the Movimiento Indigenista Pachakuti (MIP), which obtained a small but significant vote in the elections.
In June 2001, the Government sent military troops to the Yungas to eradicate coca in the areas defined as being non- traditional. This caused violent confrontations between military troops and coca growers. The military troops were withdrawn within hours, and an agreement was signed.
In the Chapare during the second semester of 2001, coca growers continued their demand for a “cato” (40 x 40 metres of coca cultivations for each family). The Government did not comply with this demand. Government representatives tried to placate the farmers by offering each family US$ 930 per year. This was not accepted. As a consequence, coca growers made roadblocks again in early November 2001. A violent confrontation occurred in Cochabamba with several deaths. These were attributed to coca leader Evo Morales. By 2002, it was estimated that at least US $ 200 million had been lost due to these social conflicts.
In December, a process began to retire the coca leader from congress, to withdraw his parliamentary immunity in order to make him liable to face legal charges. He this was done, bringing more protest from the popular sectors. Soon after, Morales announced the creation of the political party Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS). This party became the second political aggregation during the elections held six months later.
During the months that followed the election of President Sanchez de Lozada, several meetings were held. The issues of eradication, demilitarization and alternative development were closely analysed. Several commissions were established for this purpose. The coca leaders asked that eradication be suspended for 90 days until the basis for future agreements were reached. The Government maintained that the eradication of excess coca would continue (allowing the cultivation of 12,000 hectares in the Yungas region, in accordance to Law 1008). However, it improvements in alternative development were open for discussion. Regarding alternative development, the Government proposed revising future interventions in this area to include peasant participation. However, as of October, no concrete agreements have been reached.
The issue of demilitarizing the Chapare region was analysed. The Government proposed that military forces would maintain their presence in the area and provide logistic support. The coca farmers´ movement has expressed their opposition to military presence. As of October, no progress has been made on this issue.
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Country Profile Bolivia 2003
The Government is preparing a National Strategic Plan for Alternative Development. According to the Plan, programmes and projects are being considered for the areas of that will be evacuated, in coordination with the Prefectures and Municipalities of Cochabamba, Potosí and Oruro, among others.
4.2 Drugs
The Government of President Sanchez de Lozada has continued the anti-drug policy objectives established in the National Strategy to Fight Against Drugs Traffic1998 to 2002, also known as “the Dignity Plan”. Its objective was to take the country out of the illicit drug circuit. It applies a comprehensive policy that is based on alternative development, eradication of illicit coca crops, prevention of drug use and control measures. This plan has been adopted as a State policy. It goes beyond governmental eras, allowing continuity and a long-term vision in the application of anti-drug policies within the country.
Since January 1998, an accelerated process of eradication of illicit coca has been taking place in the Chapare. However, new cultivation and replanting of already-eradicated areas reduced the net impact of coca eradication. Some 21,400 hectares of illicit coca have been eradicated from 1998 through June 2002. This is equivalent to 56 per cent of the existing illicit cultivation in 1997. In June 2002, there were approximately 24,400 hectares of coca in Bolivia — of which 12,000 are considered to be legal under Law 1008.
During the period 2000 to 2002, despite the eradication of 9,200 hectares illicit crops per year, there was a 67 per cent increase in coca cultivation (from 14,600 to 24,400 hectares). This increase is most likely the result of persistent coca production and illicit drugs trafficking.
The price of coca leaf increased sharply, reaching a record US$ 6.1 per kg of dried coca leaf in December 2001, mainly for production of cocaine. The price of coca maintained an annual average of US$ 5.7 per kg, generating higher income than legal alternative development crops (unfortunately the price of coca is at least twice that of alternative development crops). The price of coca represents a challenge for alternative development programmes. Many of the peasants still have the perception that the income of alternative development crops should be able to compete with the that of coca.
As a result of eradication efforts in the Chapare, the impact of the coca-cocaine industry on the Bolivian economy was reduced substantially. In 1995, coca-cocaine activities represented approximately 6.8 per cent of the GDP. In 2002, this was reduced to 0.7 per cent. However, this figure reached 1.6 per cent in 2002.
In 2001, violent confrontations between coca farmers and military/narcotic police increased drastically. This shows an growing resistance of coca farmers to eradication. As a result of these confrontations, in 2001 eight civilians/police officers died — as compared to the 3-year period 1997 to 2000 in which 20 civilians/military-police died. One civilian and a policeman died in the first months of the new Bolivian administration.
In the past, coca farmers accused law enforcement personnel of intimidation, theft, etc. Presently, both groups (coca farmers and police) accuse each other of human rights violations. With growing violence and the death of soldiers and coca growers alike, more emphasis has been placed on the issue of human rights. The Government, the Congress, the ombudsman, the church, NGOs and media are all concerned about the human rights of the people in the areas where coca eradication is being implemented. On the other hand, the eradication efforts have become more diffic ult — not only because of the increasing violence, but also because of the expansion of coca crops to remote regions.
Despite the increasingly tense atmosphere in the Chapare and the Yungas (as described above), the area of alternative crops has increased to encompass 120,700 hectares of land. UNODC focuses its alternative development projects on the forestry sectors and vocational training activities. These contribute to reducing poverty. The following graph shows the increase of legal crops in the last years, as compared to the decrease in coca cultivation.
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Country Profile Bolivia 2003
Alternative and net coca crops (hectares) 140,000 120,000 100,000 80,000 60,000 40,000 20,000 0 1986 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Alternative Crops Net Coca Crops
Until 2000, the Chapare was considered to be the most important region for the cultivation of coca in Bolivia. However, during 2002 it has been estimated that the so-called ‘surplus coca’ in the Yungas of La Paz might be in the range of 6,500 to 7,500 coca hectares, over and above the 12,000 hectares of legal coca permitted by Law 1008.
In June 2001, following the initiation of alternative development activities in the Yungas, the Government sent military forces to the region to eradicate coca crops in the areas in transition (illicit areas). This led to roadblocks and other strong protests. Finally, the Government signed an agreement with coca farmers, evacuating the military from the region. As a consequence of this unsuccessful eradication attempt in the Yungas, the Government decided to abandon forced eradication. It has subsequently initiated a process of voluntarily eradication through signed agreements with the communities of the Yungas. These agreements guarantee the peasants individual compensation of US$2,500 per hectare as well as alternative development projects benefiting the communities. According to the Government, 41 hectares of excess coca were eradicated in 2001 in the Yungas of La Paz.
Currently, a strategy for alternative development and eradication for Yungas of La Paz is being elaborated by the Vice- Ministry of Alternative Development. In the coming months, this work will be concluded and will include the Chapare region.
4.3 Crime
During 2001, the most serious crimes reported to the police were: robbery (14,925 cases), acts of violence, including homicide and serious assault (2,177), fraud (3,325), forgery (1,452) and child abuse (985). For 2002, 37,553 cases of crime were registered in the country.
Approximately 40 per cent of all crimes in 2001 were related to robbery, being the most reported crime. Murder and violence against persons resulting in injuries, represented 29 per cent of all crimes in 2001. Firearms were increasingly employed in robbery and homicides.
In 2001, the cases of crime and violence increased in comparison with previous years, particularly 1999. The number of people who died, the cases of homicide and the number of homicide attempts have shown a major increase compared to the previous year. During the last months of 2001, the country witnessed several corruption scandals involving Government officials, growing crime rates and evidence of a criminal network that had infiltrated the national police authorities. Furthermore, after the resignations of President Banzer, various public corruption scandals related to his regime were disclosed. Investigations on irregularities included, inter alia, Mr. Banzer´s purchase of an aircraft in 1998 as well the purchase of overpriced vaccines by a former minister of health.
The gradual entering into force of the new penal code in 2001 has strengthened the observance of constitutional
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Country Profile Bolivia 2003 guarantees as well as the protection of human rights. Furthermore, the New Penal Code has improved and accelerated the judicial process
5. GENERAL SETTING 5.1 Major socio-economic characteristics of the country During the period 1975 to 1985, there was an increasing international demand for cocaine. This led to a substantial rise in the production of illicit coca leaf (particularly in the Chapare) and a growing coca-cocaine industry in the country. This situation was exacerbated by a profound economic and social crisis that Bolivia was going through during the first half of the 1980s. These conditions worsened poverty throughout broad sectors of the population. The economic and social crisis, explained to a large extent by the dramatic fall in international tin prices and overwhelming external debt, practically destroyed the national means of production. Thus the GDP growth rate between the years 1982 and 1986 hit negative levels, and accumulated annual inflation in 1985 reached the spectacular figure of 11,700 per cent.
The combination of both factors (the growing international demand for cocaine and the socio-economic crisis) created the perfect environment for the expansion of the area of coca cultivation. Coca cultivation increased 20 times between 1960 and 1989. It went from 2,600 hectares to 52,900 hectares — equivalent to a potential production of 220 metric tons of cocaine annually. At this time Bolivia began to be stigmatized as one of the main producers of coca leaf and cocaine in the world.
With respect to the economy, the income provided by illegal drugs affected the exchange rate vis-á-vis the US dollar. The national currency was overvalued, and legal exports lacked incentives. Illegal drug activity in 1988 was worth US$ 461 million dollars — equivalent to 9.2 per cent of the GDP. Cocaine trafficking represented 87.3 per cent of the country’s legal exports. The coca/cocaine economy created significant distortions in employment, salaries, price levels and deterioration of national institutions.
Before 1988, as an effect of the expansion of illegal crops and drug production, the Chapare already showed distortions in salaries and in the prices of goods and services. This even effected the city of Cochabamba itself (the department’s capital). In many cases, legal production activities were displaced, as operating costs increased. The farmers of the Chapare, with virtually no Government support in the absence of State control mechanisms and institutions, opted to cultivate coca leaf. Coca offered them a higher income than legal crops.
Regarding corruption, the coca-cocaine economy penetrated the some State institutions. It affected police, military and judicial officials. It also infiltrated the political environment, distorting the institutional foundations of the democratic system.
Until the mid-1990s, Bolivian society viewed illegal drug production and trafficking as an external problem. The issue did not get much public attention (although related scandals did receive both national and international attention from the media). This does not imply that Bolivian citizens accepted drug traffickers. In fact, 95 per cent were in favour of interdiction policies. Public opinion did not take a more decided position against illegal drugs, until there was a rise in crime and violence, growing internal drug use among youth and the deterioration of Bolivia’s international image.
Beginning in August 1997, the fight against illicit drugs became one of the main pillars of the national economic and social development plan. In October 1997, the so-called “National Dialogue” took place. This consisted of a series of workshops (discussion roundtables) organized by the Government of former President Banzer. The purpose was to build a consensus with civil society regarding the framework of Government policies that would direct Government action. Various sectors of Bolivian society participated in the “National Dialogue”. These include political parties, representatives from civil society, the church and other national institutions.
Regarding the “Dignity Roundtable”, there was a consensus that Bolivia had to extricate itself from the circuit of illegal drug trafficking and production by the year 2002. The extent of this consensus gave momentum to the formulation of the so-called “Bolivian Strategy for the Fight against Drug Traffic ”, also known as the “Dignity Plan”. In it, the desire of both the Government and the public to put an end to the scourge of illicit drugs was clearly established. This included the total eradication of excess and illegal crops. Since early 1998, the Government has systematically applied this anti-drug strategy, producing substantive results. However, since 1999, the economic growth declined dramatically (as shown in the following table). Therefore, the fight UNODC Page 9
Country Profile Bolivia 2003 against drugs has taken place in a strife-ridden socio-economic and political situation.
With respect to the impact of the coca-cocaine industry on the Bolivian economy, it reached its highest level in 1988. At that time, it represented 9.2 per cent of the GDP and 87.3 per cent of the country’s legal exports. In 1997, these figures decline to 3.9 per cent and 27.7 per cent, respectively.
During the period 1998 to September 2002, the net area of coca eradication was 21,400 hectares — equivalent to 56 per cent of the total area of these illicit crops in 1997. This implied a reduction of the potential production of cocaine by 65 per cent. Consequently, the impact of the coca-cocaine industry on the Bolivian economy was substantially reduced. Main economic indicators 1997 to 2002
Indicator 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002* GDP real growth (%) 4.9 5.2 0.4 2.4 1.2 2.5 Annual inflation (%) 6.7 4.4 3.1 3.6 0.9 1.7 Trade balance (US$ million) -684.4 -879.0 -704.0 -600.1 -356 -384 Public debt (US$ million) 4,482 4,654.6 4,573.8 4,360.5 4,412 4,131 Service public debt (US$ million) 356.3 415.1 316.5 348.5 268.6 154 Relation service public debt/export (%) 24.9 30.1 25.0 23.6 29.9 19.3 International net reserves (US$ million) 1,066.1 1,063.4 1,113.6 1,084.8 1,077 905 Foreign private investment (US$ million) 598.9 869.8 1,013.9 730.8 826 905 Fiscal deficit (% of GDP) -3.3 -4.7 -3.8 -3.7 -6.9 7.0 Source: Policy Economic Analysis Unit (UDAPE) * Preliminary data.
In 2001, the total income effect of the coca-cocaine industry represented 1.1 per cent of the GDP, while cocaine exports only reached 3 per cent compared to legal exports. As a result of the expansion of the area of coca crops during 2001 and 2002, the impact of the total income effect of the coca-cocaine industry increased to 1.6 per cent of the GDP by 2002. For further details, see the following graph.
In relation to employment generated by the coca-cocaine economy, it is worth noting that until 1997 approximately 67,000 people were involved, directly or indirectly, in the production of coca-cocaine. In 2002, it has been estimated that this figure has decreased to 40,000. The Chapare and the Yungas continue to attract migrant peasants that inhabit rural zones of the country, oftentimes searching for increased income from coca production.
Impact of the coca/cocaine industry Total income effect as (%) of GDP 10.0 9.2
8.0 6.8 6.1 6.2 6.8 6.0 4.5 5.0 4.6 3.9 4.0 3.0 2.2 2.0 1.6 1.1 2.0 0.7
0.0 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
2001 and 2002, preliminary data.
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Country Profile Bolivia 2003
6. DRUG SITUATION
6.1 Production and cultivation
New scenarios are developing with respect to drug production and processing. Coca cultivation seems to have extended into new areas, such as the borders of the Chapare and the Yungas regions, where new plantations are being found within protected national parks. Also in 2002, anti-narcotics police found seven clandestine laboratories in the city of El Alto. In these laboratories, large quantities of precursors, tools and chemicals for cocaine production were confiscated, as well as over 100 kg of cocaine.
Three cocaine maceration pits were discovered in the Yungas. They were destroyed by UMOPAR rural anti-narcotics police unit. This is unusual considered to be unusual. It is a sign of the production of coca products in the area. Consequently, surveillance and control of chemicals is being stepped up in the area. Law 1008 allows the cultivation of 12,000 hectares of coca leaf, destined for traditional use. The police are considering the possibility that the Yungas will become a transit region for Peruvian cocaine into the department of Beni, on the frontier with Brazil. Also, drug processing and trafficking have been discovered in Yapacani, in the department of Santa Cruz, bordering Cochabamba. Several laboratories and large quantities of drugs were confiscated there.
Cannabis cultivation has continued to increase in Bolivia. In April 2002, 3.98 metric tons of cannabis were seized. This amount represents more than half of the total cannabis confiscated during 2001. The anti-drug police (FELCN) stated that due to intense coca eradication efforts, drug traffickers are looking for marihuana, and that it is being grown for the internal market. In view of the increase in seizures of cannabis cultivation in Bolivia, the United States Ambassador offered technical assistance to control the production and use of cannabis in Bolivia. The local production is mostly destined for internal consumption by youth in La Paz, Cochabamba, Sucre and Santa Cruz.
In the last five years, Bolivia has reached a gross coca crop reduction of 55,668 hectares, in illicit and so-called “surplus” coca areas — both voluntary and compulsory eradication. However, new coca cultivation reached 34,278 hectares.
In June 2002, the United States Department of State informed that the total area of coca crops in Bolivia was 24,400 hectares, out of which 5,400 hectares are in the Chapare, 18,700 are in the Yungas of La Paz and 300 are in Apolo in the north of La Paz, as can be seen in the following table. Remaining illicit coca at mid-2002 is in the order of 12,400 hectares (equivalent to about 32 metric tons of cocaine). This does not include 12,000 hectares of legal coca cultivation allowed for traditional purposes (mainly in the Yungas).
Traditionally, Bolivia has been a coca leaf-producing country. Coca leaf was used to supply its domestic demand for cultural and religious customs, including coca chewing in mining and agricultural sectors as a remedy against fatigue. During the 1970s and especially 1980s, a significant increase of coca leaf production had taken place in the country, in response to the growing global demand for illicit cocaine. Since mid-1988, following the approval of the Coca and Controlled Substances Regulatory Law (Law 1008), the country started to fight illicit coca cultivation and drug trafficking.
Law 1008 defines three areas of production: (1) traditional, located mainly in the Yungas of La Paz; (2) transitional with “excess” coca production, covering virtually all coca plantations in the Cochabamba Tropics (better known as the Chapare) and a few areas of recent colonization in the Yungas of La Paz; and (3) illegal, covering the rest of the national territory. In this respect, this law authorizes coca plantations in the Yungas of La Paz of up to 12,000 hectares for the purposes of “acullicu” (chewing) and other traditional uses, while the crops in the Chapare are declared to be in transition and are subject to eradication and alternative development.
The coca bush has been cultivated since ancient times in the subtropical region of Bolivia called the Yungas. The Yungas is located in the department of La Paz, at an average elevation of 1,800 metres above sea level. It is estimated that in the Yungas the yield of 1 hectare of coca is between 0.8 and 1.0 metric tons. Likewise, it has been estimated that 1,000,000 Bolivians consume 5.25 kg per year per person of coca leaf in its natural state for “acullicu”. Another quantity is utilized for medicinal practices and social or religious purposes. This is equivalent to approximately 9,200 metric tons annually for traditional consumption.
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Country Profile Bolivia 2003
Since the end of the 1970s, the Cochabamba Tropics, better known as the Chapare, (average elevation 400 metres above sea level) has been characterized by coca leaf farming for the manufacturing of cocaine. It is estimated that in the Chapare 1 hectare of coca produces 2.7 metric tons of leaf, from which approximately 7.3 kg of cocaine can be obtained.
Coca cultivation and eradication Coca Gross New coca Net Eradicated Year cultivation eradication cultivation eradication seedlings (hectares) (a) (hectares) (hectares) (hectares) (m2) 1990 50,300 8,087 5,608 2,479 55,763 1991 47,900 5,488 2,987 2,501 39,929 1992 45,300 5,149 2,709 2,440 24,093 1993 47,200 2,400 4,097 -1,697 13,500 1994 48,100 1,100 1,958 -894 4,932 1995 48,600 5,493 5,993 -495 97,549 1996 48,100 7,512 7,012 500 84,238 1997 45,800 7,026 4,726 2,300 16,843 1998 38,000 11,621 3,821 7,800 67,519 1999 21,800 (b) 16,999 799 16,200 62,076 2000 14,600 (c) 7,953 753 7,200 33,800 2001 19,900 9,435 14,735 -5.300 39,566 2002 24,400 11,848 14,160 -2,312 55,661 Source: Government-DIRECO; ODCCP, Global Illicit Drug Trends 2002. 2002; U.S. Department of State. (a) Includes 12,000 hectares of licit coca - after eradication. (b) Includes 1,646 hectares of abandoned coca estimated by USAID. (c) Includes 300 hectares abandoned coca.
6.2 Manufacture By 2002, the potential production of cocaine in Bolivia was estimated at 70 metric tons (down from 200 metric tons in 1997). Almost all of the illicit coca leaf production in the Cochabamba Tropics is converted into cocaine base. This is done by locally organized groups of peasants and their collaborators in Yapacani (Santa Cruz), the city of El Alto and other small villages of the high valleys.
Cocaine base is normally sold to drug trafficking organizations that operate mainly in Santa Cruz, Cochabamba and Beni — to be processed into cocaine hydrochloride. Also, an increasing amount of coca paste and cocaine base produced in Peru is transiting through the country (crossing the borders of the departments of Pando and La Paz) mainly for smuggling into Brazil and Argentina. The following graph shows the sharp downward trend of potential cocaine production since 1990.
Potential production of cocaine (metric tons) 300 255 225 240 240 250 220 220 215 200 200 150 150
100 70 43 60 70 50
0 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
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Country Profile Bolivia 2003
During the last two years, the number of detected and destroyed factories, laboratories and maceration pits increases significantly, due to the revitalizing of the coca-cocaine industry in the country.
Destruction of illicit factories, laboratories and maceration pits 1997-2002
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002* Destroyed factories (from leaves to 1,066 1,245 925 628 1,006 1,070 cocaine base) Destroyed laboratories (from 19 25 12 6 5 5 cocaine base to hydrochloride) Destroyed maceration pits 1,481 1,659 1,179 790 1,292 1,466 Source: Anti-narcotics Special Force (FELCN). * Until September.
To manufacture 1 kg of cocaine hydrochloride, the following precursor chemicals and solvents are normally used: coca leaves (370 kg), kerosene-solvent (110 litres), lime (160 kg), concentrated sulphuric acid (1 litre) or other acids, sodium carbonate or bi-carbonate (6 kg), potassium permanganate (0.5 litre), ammonia (1.5 litres) and acetone (13 litres) or, alternatively, 13 litres of other can be used together with 0.5 litre of hydrochloric acid.
6.3 Trafficking
As mentioned above, new scenarios have appeared for drug trafficking. For example, the processing and trafficking of cocaine has been discovered in the city of El Alto, located next to La Paz. Therefore, urban unemployed youngsters have now been introduced to illicit drugs. Also, coca cultivation seems to have extended to new locations, such as Yapacaní, along the borders of the Chapare and in the Yungas. The growth of cannabis has been detected in the departments of Tarija, Chuquisaca and Cochabamba.
According to the Government, relatively small criminal organizations are operating in the country in the trafficking of cocaine, mainly organized along family-lines. The majority of these local organizations seem to have established links with international criminal organizations — not only in the neighbouring countries of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay and Peru, but also to organized crime syndicates in Colombia, Mexico and Spain.
Cocaine from Bolivia is smuggled primarily to Argentina, Chile, Brazil, and Paraguay by land, river and air. According to the Government, four main routes are used to smuggle cocaine to Brazil, as follows:
· In the north, a common route is via Riberalta and Guayaramerín. · In the east, a route through Trinidad via rivers from the Chapare, then on to San Cristobal, San Ignacio, or San Matias, and finally Brazil. Another route is Montero-Cotoca-Pozo del Tigre-San Jose-Robore-Puerto Suarez or Ravelo. · In the south, the routes to Brazil go via Paraguay, starting in Montero continuing to Cotoca, Samaipata and Vallegrande, and then to Puerto Villazon. Trafficking also takes place to and through Argentina and Chile. To Argentina, the main routes go through Yacuiba and Bermejo. · In the west, most trafficking to Chile seems to pass through Tambo Quemado. In addition, Peruvian drug traffickers are using Bolivia as trafficking route, smuggling cocaine through the Yungas to Brazil.
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Country Profile Bolivia 2003
Anti-narcotics operations, seizures and arrests for drug trafficking, 1997-2002 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002* Number of anti-narcotics 3,923 4,912 4,481 3,596 3,309 3,021 operations Seized drugs (tonnes) 15.9 11.7 9.9 9.3 11.7 12.4 Cocaine Base 10.8 8.9 6.9 5.0 4.3 3.4 Hydrochloride 1.5 2.4 0.8 0.6 0.3 0.3 Marihuana 3.6 0.3 2.2 3.7 7.1 8.7 Heroine 0 0.1 0 0 0 0 Arrested persons 3,428 4,073 3,505 3,414 2,948 2,443 Source: Anti-narcotics Special Force (FELCN). * Until September.
Cocaine seizures in 2002 have decreased in comparison to prior years. Only 3.4 metric tons of cocaine was seized in 2002. In 2001, this figure reached 4.3 metric tons, indicating a 20 per cent decrease. At the same time, the potential production of cocaine increased to 70 metric tons in 2002. Interdiction efforts in 2001 seized about 8 per cent of the estimated potential cocaine production capacity (60 metric tons), as opposed to about 5.6 per cent only of the potential cocaine production (43 metric tons) in 2000. During 2002, seizures of cocaine amounted to only approximately 3.7 per cent of the potential cocaine production. Also up to September 2002, 8.7 metric tons of marihuana were seized.
Potential cocaine production and seizures
200 11.3 (8%)
150 Seizures of Cocaine 7.7 (11%) 100 4.6 (8%) 3.7(5%) Potential 150 5.6 (13%) Cocaine Metric tons 50 Production 70 60 70 43 0 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
6.4 Diversion of drugs and precursors Overall precursor and solvent seizures increased in 2002, as a result of the increasing activities of the coca-cocaine industry in Bolivia. The control systems established for the import and domestic trade of the chemical substances, as well as more effective regional cooperation with neighbouring countries in this field, is increasingly preventing diversion of precursor chemicals from licit channels. Seizures of precursor chemicals, 1997 to 2002 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002* Hydrochloric acid (litres) 9,946 1,408 5,001 767 920 1,662 Sulphuric acid (litres) 9,881 16,506 7,583 11,117 4,964 25,503 Acetone (litres) 5,438 623 5,945 3,087 2,108 863 Ammoniac (litres) 623 4,412 263 80 83 101 Sulphuric ether (litres) 3,152 28 9 15 0 2,059 Petrol (litres) 12,371 46,839 110,858 9,714 8,278 11,408 Kerosene (litres) 16,074 10,815 7,499 4,950 4,516 4,944 Diesel (litres) 159,832 481,826 171,856 123,456 144,662 124,317 Sodium bicarbonate (kg) 11,406 13,659 5,938 5,112 1,844 3,490 Potassium permanganate (kg) 128 36 82 4 33 2 Lime (tonnes) 107 286 56 20 49 49 Source: Vice-Ministry of Social Defence. Anti-narcotics Special Force (FELCN). * Until September. UNODC Page 14
Country Profile Bolivia 2003
6.5 Drug prices
As a logical result of successful eradication, especially in 1999 and 2000, the price of illicit (dried) coca leaf in the Chapare climbed since mid-1999. In December 2001, the average coca price was US$ 6.1 per kg of dried leaf — up from US$ 2.4 in July 1999 and US$ 1.5 in January 1999. During 2001 and 2002, the average price of coca leaf in the Chapare stabilized at approximately US$ 5.7 per kg, as can be seen in the graph below.
Monthly average coca price in the Chapare (US$ per kg)
7 6.1 6.0 6.0 6.1 5.8 5.7 5.7 5.9 6.0 5.6 5.6 5.7 5.7 5.7 6 5.4 5.6 5.7 5.4 6.0 5.6 5.3 5.3 5.3 5.3 5 5.6 5.6 4.9 5.4 5.3 5.5 5.4 5.5 5.0 5.1 4.9 4.8 4.8 4 3.7 US$ 3 2.4 2.1 2.0 2.0 2.0 1.7 2.4 2 1.5 1.5 1.4 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.5 1 1.5 1.4 1.3 1.3 0 Jan. Feb. Mar. Apr. May. Jun. Jul. Aug . Sep. Oct. Nov. Dec.
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Average annual cocaine prices in Bolivia (US$ per kg), 1997 to 2002
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Cocaine base 740 780 1,050 1,430 1,500 1,300 Cocaine hydrochloride 1,320 1,380 1,620 1,850 2,200 2,000 Source: Drug Enforcement Administration (2002: preliminary data).
6.6 Demand
It is only since the early 1990s that drug abuse trends in Bolivia have been periodically and systematically measured through national epidemiological studies. These studies have been undertaken by the local NGO “Latin-American Centre of Scientific Research” (CELIN) and more recently the company “Científica”, subcontracted by the Government itself. However, methodological differences pose some difficulties for exact comparison. Nevertheless, the trend clearly reflects a rapid increase of abuse of illicit drugs since 1992, with a tendency to stabilize (or even decrease slightly) during the year 2000 among the general population. For instance, since the early 1990s, it is estimated that cocaine abuse in Bolivia has quadrupled to four metric tons annually. At present, 37,000 people may be addicted to cocaine. However, it should be noted that in Bolivia no official registry exists on drug abusers. The table on the next page provides the last data available on drug prevalence.
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Country Profile Bolivia 2003
Annual and monthly illicit drug use prevalence in Bolivia (%)
Drug Prevalence 1992 1996 1998 2000 Life 2.5 3.9 4.7 4.2 Marihuana Year 0.6 2.0 3.1 2.5 Month 0.2 0.7 1.3 1.4 Life 5.8 7.1 5.3 3.9 Inhalants Year 2.9 4.0 3.4 3.0 Month 1.3 1.6 1.5 1.5 Life 1.2 2.4 2.1 2.0 Cocaine hydrochloride Year 0.2 1.5 1.3 1.3 Month 0.1 0.5 0.7 0.6 Life 1.2 2.6 2.2 1.9 Coca paste Year 0.3 1.7 1.3 1.3 Month 0.2 0.7 0.6 0.6 Life 0.4 1.0 1.3 1.0 Hallucinogens Year 0.1 0.6 0.7 0.6 Month 0.03 0.2 0.3 0.2 Life 9.1 11.2 9.8 8.8 Total illicit drugs Year 3.6 7.1 6.4 6.1 Month 1.7 3.2 3.4 3.4
Source: "Drug Use Prevalence Studies" Centro Latinoamericano de Investigación Científica (CELIN). It includes the urban population from 12 to 50 years of age.
Marihuana abuse has shown a steady increase since 1992. Cocaine abuse showed a rapid growth during the period 1992 to 1996. Since then, it has decreased slightly among the urban population in the age range of 12-50 years (last 5 years). The same table reflects the global trends in the country for all illegal drug abuse. It may be interesting to point out that use of amphetamine type stimulants (ATS) up to this year has not been reported by the police or health authorities. However, anecdotal reports state that it may be found in major Bolivian cities.
Research on student populations were produced in the country, as a response to the need to collect information on the situation affecting this high-risk group. Comparative studies with neighbouring countries show that illicit drug abuse among youth is lower in Bolivia. However, the most recent surveys have shown a remarkable growth in the abuse of marihuana and hallucinogens, which include ATS (ecstasy), as can be seen in the following table.
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Country Profile Bolivia 2003
Comparative studies on drug use among student populations in Bolivia
Drug Prevalence 1993 1996 1999 (1) 2002 (2) Life 2.6 3.5 3.5 6.5 Marihuana Year 1.6 2.9 2.5 5.2 Month 0.8 1.3 1.3 2.0 Life 2.5 2.7 3.1 3.6 Inhalants Year 1.7 1.9 2.1 2.7 Month 1.0 0.9 1.2 1.2 Life 0.7 1.3 1.7 1.5 Cocaine Year 0.5 1.1 1.2 1.4 hydrochloride Month 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.7 Life 0.8 1.0 1.7 1.8 Coca paste Year 0.6 0.8 1.2 1.2 Month 0.3 0.4 0.6 0.6 Life 1.0 2.8 2.9 3.5 Hallucinogens Year 0.8 2.1 2.0 2.4 Month 0.4 0.7 0.8 0.9 Life 4.8 6.6 n.a 9.4 Total illicit drugs Year 3.5 5.3 n.a 7.9 Month 1.6 2.4 n.a 3.9 Sources: (1) "Drug Use Prevalence Studies among Bolivian Students” Centro Latinoamericano de Investigación Científica (CELIN No. 24). 1993 and 1996 Include urban student population 12 to 21 years of age, 1999 includes urban and rural student population, and are to be compared with caution. (2) “Prevalence of drug use in school population – 2002” Vice-Ministry of Social Defence, Prevention and Rehabilitation - OPINE, 2002 (preliminary figures based on a research made in 18 cities in the context of subregional project AD/RLA/1999/D75).
Also, household and student surveys have consistently shown that the public opinion believes that access to illegal drugs is increasing and easy, as the following table shows.
Perceived drug abuse trends (last five years) Strong Some Some Strong Stable Category Drug decline decline increase increase
Coca base X Cocaine-type Cocaine hydrochloride X
Cannabis Cannabis herb X
Hallucinogens X
All illicit drugs X
The retail prices for some illegal drugs are shown in the table below. Comparatively, prices of these drugs are lower than in other consuming countries, maintaining the stimulus for their traffic and production.
Drug US $ Cocaine paste 1 gram 1.65 Chlorhidrate cocaine 1 gram 5 to 8.15 Marihuana 10 grams 1.13 to 8.15
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Country Profile Bolivia 2003
6.7 Costs and consequences
The Government budget for 2002 to combat illegal drugs is US $ 10.5 million as follows:
Ministry of Government / Direction and Coordination of Anti-narcotics Policy US$ 2,100,000 Special Anti-narcotics Police Forces (FELCN) US$ 700,000 National Direction for Legal Coca US$ 900,000 National Direction for Controlled Substances US$ 1,000,000 National Direction of Seized Goods US$ 300,000 General Direction of Prevention and Rehabilitation US$ 100,600 Vice-Ministry of Alternative Development US$ 1,000,000 DIRECO US$ 4,400,000
Total US$ 10,500,600
No recent or detailed figures are available on the budget/financial resources of the police, prosecution, courts and prisons, as a whole. However, it was estimated that in 1996, the overall budget of the Ministry of Government (which includes the police and penitentiary system), the Ministry of Justice, the Office of the General Attorney and the Judicial Power totalled US$ 150.2 million.
Drug surveillance
Epidemiological studies produced by the former Vice-Ministry of Prevention and Rehabilitation provided analysis in 1977 and 2000, for drug abuse and its consequences in Bolivia. In 1997, a two-week "epidemiological window" survey was carried out in three cities (La Paz, Cochabamba and Santa Cruz). In 30 treatment and rehabilitation centres, 430 people were surveyed, including a special rehabilitation programme for children in Cochabamba. The main conclusions were: (1) the occupation of available beds was estimated at 70 per cent of capacity; (2) 84 per cent were men, 14 per cent women; (3) the average age of patients was 34 years, with 20 per cent of the sample in treatment were under 19 years of age; (4) among drug abusers, the age of first use of marihuana, cocaine and coca paste ranged from 12 to 15 years of age; (5) the first illegal drug used was marihuana; (6) the illicit drug considered as having "major impact" on health and social consequences was coca paste; and (7) 55 per cent of the patients in rehabilitation centres had some form of stable work before starting treatment.
In 1997 and 2000, similar studies were undertaken among patients in emergency rooms (no drug screening methods were used in these studies). The main findings include: (1) according to the doctors, 1.5 per cent of the cases were considered to have been related to illicit drugs; and (2) 9 per cent of suicide attempts/overdoses were related to the abuse of tranquillizers. These studies were supported by OAS/CICAD.
Regarding the year 2000, a conservative estimate of people undergoing treatment for drug abuse in Bolivia is 1,300 patients out of 1,720 beds available in 53 centres nationwide. In a recent 2002 national study among the student population, the prevalence of illegal drugs seems to have doubled in comparison with the data for 1999. For more details, please refer to section 6.6 Demand.
Concerning drug-related HIV/AIDS, this is not well documented in Bolivia. There are reports of 804 HIV positive cases as of the end of 2001, out of which approximately 40 per cent are declared symptomatic AIDS cases. From the total HIV cases, approximately 1 per cent was related to drug use or high-risk behaviour involving drugs (especially cocaine injection).
6.8 Money-laundering
In the beginning of the 1990s, it was estimated that the level of money-laundering in the country was approximately 8 per cent of the GDP. Today, it is estimated that this figure is 0.3 per cent of the GDP, which would represent approximately US$ 30 million per year. In other words, money-laundering is declining. However, there is no sign of a major decrease in corruption and smuggling.
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Country Profile Bolivia 2003
The following table shows the increasing number of cases investigated by the Financial Investigation Unit (FIU) of the Bank Superintendence since it became operational in 1999, as well as the cases forwarded to the judicial system:
1999 2000 2001 2002 Number of cases investigated by the FIU 13 43 20 46 Number of cases forwarded by the FIU to the judiciary 2 7 7 10 Source: FIU
During 2002, there were 10 cases forwarded to the judiciary, out of which 5 were found related to drug trafficking and 2 were related to corruption. In 2001, out of the 20 cases investigated, 11 were related to the financial system and 9 were related to other institutions.
The major techniques used in Bolivia for money-laundering are:
· Deposits of large amounts of cash right into the financial system behind financial transactions by shade companies. · Contraband of vehicles into Bolivia from Brazil. · Contraband of merchandise and electro domestics into Bolivia, mainly from Argentina, Brazil and Chile. · Insertion of money into the construction sector.
A commonly used contraband scheme is as follows: Drugs enter into Brazil from Bolivia. In order for the drug traffickers to reinvest their profits in their home country Bolivia, cars or merchandise are purchased in Brazil and smuggled into Bolivia. Once in Bolivia, the goods are sold in a legitimate enterprise. False envoys serve as justification for the purchases/expenditures. Due to the lack of follow-up and control of accounting, the traffickers have a good chance of getting away using this scheme. In 2001, it was discovered that a large number of stolen luxurious Mercedes Benz cars entered Bolivia from Brazil. Various politicians possess stolen Mercedes and the cases are now under investigation.
There was one important case managed by the FIU that included international coordination with Brazilian authorities. It was the identification of money-laundering operations in Bolivia of money originating from drug trafficking operations in Brazil. These operations, which went on for a period of 7 years, were made in Bolivian banks located in border cities. During this period, US$ 261 million was laundered and sent to the Biblos Bank in Beirut, Lebanon. This case also included arms trafficking.
7. CRIME SITUATION
7.1 Main characteristics
Security matters and levels of crime have become a major cause of concern for Bolivian society. People feel less secure than before. However, determining the extent of the problem is often difficult, as statistics that are available are considered to be relatively inaccurate. They are thought to undercount actual levels of crime in the country.
However, crime statistics (please see references section for more information) do suggest a signific ant increase in crime. The number of recorded crime cases increased by 35 per cent between 1995 and 2000 (37,400 to 43,300 cases). The highest figures were reported in 1999. In 2001, there were more than 37,500 reported cases, showing a
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Country Profile Bolivia 2003 decrease in crime figures. One fairly reliable indicator of crime levels is the comparative homicide rate. This confirms that Bolivia has relatively high levels of violent crime.2
A particularly well-publicized recent case illustrates not only the severity of crime, but also suggests high levels of police complicity. On 14 December 2001, a band of eight robbers assaulted a security van carrying over US$ 400,000. The chauffeur and two security policemen were killed, and three other passengers injured. Four days later, most of the band was captured. However, only 60 per cent of the money (approximately US$ 250,000) was recovered. The band was made up of Peruvian and Bolivian criminals. There were two high-ranking police officers directly involved (one colonel and one major) and several other policemen. When the investigation pointed to other policemen, a car bomb exploded outside the Command Headquarters of the Police in Santa Cruz. This act has not been explained. It is interpreted as a warning for other police officials to discontinue further investigations. These events made it clear that high-ranking police officers have established rogue networks involving politicians and other police authorities. This has caused loss of confidence and trust, and created a severe crisis within the organization. The Government promised to make all efforts to curtail the actions of criminal organizations operating in the country. It asked for international cooperation to support the investigations and to advise on a reform of the police organization.
The following data indicates the most common crimes during the last two years:
· Crimes against property (robbery) represent 40 per cent of all crime in 2001. This figure was 33 per cent in 2000; · Murder and violence against persons resulting in injuries represented 28 per cent of all crimes in 2000 and 29 per cent in 2001. Firearms are increasingly used not only in robbery, but also in homicide; · Fraud and deceit (economic) represents 18 per cent of total crime in 2000 and 12 per cent in 2001; · Family and child abuse (violence, etc.) represents 12 per cent of all crime in 2000 and 9 per cent in 2001; · Forgery represents 4 per cent in 2000; and · Other crime (arson, etc.) represents 1 per cent in 2000.
7.2 Trends
According to official data, the general crime trends in Bolivia over the period 1996 to 2001 are as follows: · Crimes against property (robbery) have shown a slight increase (6 per cent) in 2001 in comparison with the figure reported in 1996; · Homicide and violence against persons have increased significantly, with a growth rate of 31 per cent, particularly homicide;
2 A more reliable indicator of general crime levels can be obtained by comparing victimization survey data for Bolivia with that of other Latin American countries. This data suggests that most categories of violent and property crimes in Bolivia are either higher than or consistent with the average for other countries where the International Crime Victims Survey has been conducted – Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica and Paraguay. A victim survey is conducted by asking a representative sample of the population of any country the number of times, and in what ways, they have suffered from criminal victimization over a period of time. The data above is presented as a percentage of respondents who, over a one-year period, have been victims of any crime. In theory, it should be possible to extrapolate this figure to the population as a whole. The victimization survey data indicates that while the average burglary levels across six Latin American countries was 5.3 per cent, the level for Bolivia was 6.7 per cent. Bolivia also showed comparatively high levels of robbery (6.2 per cent). Although high, this was below that of the six-country average of 7.8 per cent. In the case of assault with force, a rate of 3 per cent was recorded for Bolivia against an average of 2.6 per cent for the six Latin America countries. Such high levels of crime are also reflected in the concern of the Bolivian population about public security. Today, the people in Bolivia feel much less secure than they did a few years ago. So-called “traditional” crime still prevails, as compared to transnational crime — though the latter is also increasing. In this connection, it is important to note that existing national legislation does not contain specific dispositions to prevent and control such crime, other than money-laundering legislation.
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· Fraud and deceit (economic) also show a sharp upward trend (70 per cent growth); · The same applies to forgery with a growth rate of 80 per cent; · Corruption figures have increased in 37 per cent; · Cases where the involvement of organized criminal groups are suspected to have also grown markedly, approximately 100 per cent; and · Most registered crime is concentrated in the cities of La Paz and Santa Cruz (more than 75 per cent of all cases). In addition, 93 per cent of all crime was registered in urban areas during the period 1996 to 2001.
7.3 Issues of specific concern
Juvenile delinquency (gangs) is an issue of growing concern. At present, the Government has listed 450 youth gangs in the country. A youth gang in Bolivia is normally composed of 10 members, mainly males. They engage in the destruction of property, drug dealing, violence between gangs for territorial control, and gang theft of automobiles or their parts.
In December 2001, conflicts between coca producers, merchants and transporters increased. Roadblocks were formed and there were many confrontations. This was done as a protest against the eradication process and promulgation of Supreme Decree No. 26415. Supreme Decree 26415 prohibits the circulation, handling, drying, and commercialization of coca leaf outside the legal traditional production zones. According to Government sources, a possible alliance of drug traffickers and terrorists may be creating a guerrilla group that would create a surge in violence in the Cochabamba Tropics.
There are credible reports that Bolivia is a country of origin for trafficking in human beings to be used for forced labour in neighbouring countries. There are no reliable estimates as to the extent of the problem. Women and adolescents, especially from indigenous ethnic groups in the high plateau region, appear to be more at risk of being trafficked. Victims generally are trafficked to Argentina, Brazil and Chile to work in agriculture, factories, trade and as domestic employees.
Bolivia confronts a serious problem of corruption. The 2001 corruption perception index of Transparency International — which ranks countries between 10 (clean) and 0 (corrupt) — scores Bolivia at 2. The country ranked 85 of the 93 states surveyed.
The Bolivian General Accounting Office has estimated that financial damage to the State due to corruption amounts to over US$ 100 million. Corruption has three common forms: bribery, diversion of public funds and misappropriation of public goods. The General Accounting Office has said that sanctions are not strong enough and the State does not have appropriate legislation. Therefore, corruption is a calculated risk because the sanctions are weak.
The FIU has reported 12 cases of corruption up to 31 December 2001, and several others are being investigated. For example, during April 2001 it was disclosed that donations that were originally destined to people affected by an earthquake in Aiquile, Cochabamba, were diverted. This affected 4.3 million Bolivians. The District Attorney said he had no knowledge of the case and ordered further investigations. Donations from international donors were transferred to private accounts.
As mentioned above, the present government of Sanchez de Lozada is committed to combat corruption. The President follows an inter-institutional approach, involving the Government, the judiciary and other relevant institutions. The Vice- President has created a specific unit to fight against corruption, and he is responsible for a comprehensive approach.
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8. POLICY
8.1 Drugs
8.1.1 National drug control framework
8.1.1.1 Conventions adherence
Bolivia is party to the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs as amended by the 1972 Protocol, the 1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances, and the 1988 Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, which was ratified in 1990 with observations regarding the legal use of coca for traditional purposes.
8.1.1.2 Legislation
Since mid-1988, the Coca and Controlled Substances Law (Law 1008, approved in July 1988) has been the country’s main legal instrument to control the drug problem. Law 1008, inter alia: (1) regulates the import, distribution and sale of precursors and other controlled substances; (2) regulates production, distribution and commercialization of licit coca for traditional use; (3) establishes the framework of judicial procedures and penalties for drug-related offences; and (4) defines the framework of the disposal of confiscated assets. Law 1008 has undergone substantive amendments since its approval. In particular, the following changes should be mentioned:
· Decree 24196 for the Administration of Seized Goods from Drug Traffic (December 1995). · Release on Parole Act (Law 1685, February 1996), which is applicable in cases of unjustified delay in the administration of due process, also allowing provisional release. · Criminal Code Reforms Act (Law 1768, March 1997) introduced, inter alia, administrative and criminal regulations concerning money-laundering. · On 25 March 1999 a new Penal Procedures Code was approved. This new law has important implications for Law 1008, as it modifies the procedures of penal cases including drug-related offences. This new law amended over 100 of the 400 articles of the 1972 Penal Code.
The new Penal Procedures Code was approved in March 1999. Among other things, it introduced two important instruments in the fight against drugs. These are controlled deliveries and undercover agents. This new law has updated the penal procedures dimension of Law 1008, including the role of the Special Anti-narcotics Forces (FELCN). It entered into force on 1 July 2001. Trials and the court system is constituted of a combination of judicial judges and public judges from civil society. There are stricter time limits for detention, and prosecutor-led police investigations have taken place in accordance to this new Penal Procedures Code Law. It also permits the Bolivian police to conduct controlled deliveries of drugs and controlled chemical substances and the use of undercover police agents.
On 26 November 2001 the Government issued Supreme Decree 26415 that aims at improving the Government control of the handling, drying, circulation and commercialization of coca leaf.
8.1.1.3 Drug control institutions
Overall drug control policy development and coordination is the responsibility of the Bolivian Drug Control Council (CONALTID). This inter-ministerial body is composed of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs (Chairman), Government, Finance, Defence, Health, and Agriculture, Livestock and Rural Development. The Vice-President of Bolivia participates in the meetings of the Council, if and as required. The Vice-Ministers of Public Investment and External Financing, Foreign Affairs, Alternative Development, and Social Defence, Prevention and Rehabilitation are collectively in charge of many day-to-day matters of CONALTID.
The Vice-Ministry of Alternative Development of the Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock, and Rural Development is responsible for the planning and evaluation of alternative development activities and coca eradication. It includes the Regional Alternative Development Programme (PDAR) that coordinates and monitors the alternative development programmes and projects in the Cochabamba Tropics and in the Yungas of La Paz, and the National Alternative
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Development Fund (FONADAL), responsible for the funding of alternative development activities. The Vice-Ministry of Alternative Development also includes the General Direction of Agricultural Reconversion (DIRECO), responsible for the coca eradication activities and prevention of new coca cultivation and seedlings. In accordance with the 1994 Law on Decentralization and Popular Participation, some alternative development activities in the Chapare and in the Yungas are also being coordinated with the relevant prefectures and municipalities, as appropriate.
The Vice-Ministry of Social Defence, Prevention and Rehabilitation of the Ministry of Government is responsible for law enforcement as well as prevention/rehabilitation functions. In the area of law enforcement activities, the following entities develop the following activities: the National Direction for Controlled Substances is responsible for the control of precursors and chemical substances in the country; the National Direction for Legal Coca is responsible for the control and administration of legal coca; the Special Anti-narcotics Police Force (FELCN) is responsible for drugs and precursors law enforcement operations; the Prevention Direction is responsible for planning and evaluating drug abuse prevention; and the Rehabilitation Direction is responsible for planning and evaluating drug abuse rehabilitation.
The Ministry of Justice and Human Rights, through the Vice-ministry of Human Rights is responsible for the observance of human rights. To this end, decentralized offices of Human Rights and Public Defence are distributed around the country, including in the Cochabamba Tropics.
8.1.1.4 Main characteristics of national drug control policy
The Bolivian Government is headed by President Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada, who took office on 6 August 2002. The national drug control policy is a state policy and consequently will continue applying the main drug control policy components of the former administration. The new Government has defined an open position to discuss with different social and political sectors issues of special interest for drug control. These issues include military participation in the eradication of coca. No official document stating the main approaches for drug control policy has been presented as yet.
The former drug control policy entitled “Bolivian Strategy for the Fight against Drug Traffic 1998-2002” was also know as the “Dignity Plan”. It was composed of four key elements: (1) coca eradication; (2) alternative development; (3) drug law enforcement; and (4) drug abuse prevention and rehabilitation. After final elaboration of the strategy, a new component focusing on a social conflict resolution programme was added. The main objective of this strategy was to take the country out of international drug trafficking by the year 2002.
8.1.2 Licit control (drugs and precursors)
In 1996, a law for the regulation of medicinal products was issued. Among other things, it regulates the production, commercialization, prescription and sale of pharmaceutical products (and special medications) for human use. The main objectives of this law, are to guarantee the quality and efficiency of pharmaceuticals, to establish a reasonable list of drugs (bearing in mind social costs and benefits), and to regulate the prescription of psychoactive drugs.
The Vice-Ministry of Health is responsible for the control of importation, quality and domestic distribution of licit drugs. Precursor control falls under the responsibility of the Vice-Ministry of Social Defence. Although institutional links are not as evident as in the other areas of drug control, licit drug control activities are coordinated with the Vice-Ministries of Social Defence, as well as Prevention and Rehabilitation. Administrative weaknesses and corruption remain main concerns and hindrances for effective and efficient control of drugs and precursors.
There is a tendency to an increase in the importation, distribution and use of psychotropic drugs, as reported by specialists in treatment centres. The drugs most used are benzodiazepines, opiate analgesics or codeine, hypnotics and stimulants. No reliable data exists on the number of people abusing these drugs. However, the health authority has strengthened control over the sale of these drugs by ensuring that drugstores demand prescriptions.
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8.1.3 Supply reduction
The Bolivian anti-drug policy reflects an integrated and balanced approach. It places equal emphasis on alternative development, illicit coca eradication and drug law enforcement. However, most investments are made in alternative development. According to Law 1008, all coca eradication should be carried out by manual or mechanical methods. This law also establishes that under no circumstances may chemical products that might harm the ecological balance of the environment be used.
The main concern of alternative development is the peasant family. The chain that links the farm with consumer markets begins on the rural family parcel of land and ends at the channels of distribution. These can be highly structured and competitive. The majority of peasant families tend to minimize their risks — instead of maximizing their benefits. Their first and foremost concern is to satisfy the basic needs of their family, including the provision of adequate food. Only then do they seek to generate a surplus — always trying to avoid any unnecessary risk.
Producers faced with agriculturally and/or ecologically difficult conditions (plagues, unstable markets, limited access to information, supplies and credits) tend to be very cautious. Likewise, cultural, social and ecologic al factors must also be considered. These are the challenges that alternative development must face. Alternative development aims at reducing risks for farmers and businessmen. It promotes the creation of systems and chains of production that meet three basic requirements: quality, quantity and continuity. Experience has shown that if producers stop complying with these three requirements, they will lose their market and break the chain of production.
The first years of alternative development in the Chapare were devoted to establishing a basic infrastructure that enabled the utilization of the region’s productive potential and improvement of living conditions. The alternative development programme in the Chapare has built and improved the network of secondary roads to the main road network. This facilitates the transportation of products to national and international consumer centres. Likewise, the programme has expanded the infrastructure and improved the basic services of health, education, potable water and sewers. Also, an electrical energy distribution network for domestic use was installed.
Since the mid-1990s, the roles of the production and marketing systems have increased significantly. Achieving adequate quality in sufficient quantities and in a sustainable way continues to challenge producers. However, now the main difficulty is selling those products.
Regarding productivity, the alternative development programme has also carried out important agricultural research that has allowed for the identification of alternatives to coca production. These include bananas, palm hearts, pineapples, citrus fruits, passion fruits, timber and green peppers. Moreover, the alternative development programme has supported the development of agriculture, agro-forestry, forestry and agro-industries. This support has brought about an over 150 per cent increase in alternative crops during the period 1986 to 2001 — going from 40,500 hectares in 1986 to 112,535 hectares in 2000, and up to 120,700 hectares in 2001. The following graph shows the structure of the alternative crops in 2001.
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Alternative crops in the Cochabamba Tropics - 2001
Bananas 11.3% Other crops Black pepper 19.3% 0.3% Cassava 5.1%
Mandarins 5.2%
Oranges 14.4% Pastures 25.8% Pineapples 2%
Palm heart 2.6% Passion fruit Plantains Rice 7.3% 0.1% 6.8%
Evolution of alternative crops in the Chapare (hectares)
Crop 1986 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Bananas 7,962 10,762 12,408 13,600 14,190 10,988 13,559 12,450 12,554 13,600
Black peppers 24 31 40 34 79 61 163 183 356 Cassava 3,400 4,156 5,234 5,900 6,473 6,773 6,171 8,000 8,226 6,550 Oranges 2,500 5,037 7,227 7,320 12,829 14,262 15,545 16,300 17,204 17,400 Palm heart 227 309 600 642 3,321 4,876 3,000 3,646 3,160
Passion fruit 63 85 45 186 580 788 158 186 148 Pineapples 338 2,608 3,355 2,200 3,424 3,804 3,952 1,660 1,664 2,012 Plantains 3,038 3,484 4,795 5,300 7,442 10,212 9,201 8,300 8,637 8,800 Rice 8,500 6,177 7,985 8,100 11,576 6,851 6,775 8,000 8,152 8,230 Mandarins 500 2,741 3,893 4,100 5,275 5,852 5,656 6,020 6,227 6,300 Other crops 2,875 3,977 4,435 4,700 7,519 10,035 12,826 16,221 17,246 22,972 Pastures 11,500 20,561 20,646 25,000 22,769 23,539 25,678 28,232 28,610 31,199 TOTAL 40,613 59,817 70,403 76,905 92,359 96,296 105,088 108,504 112,535 120,727
The figures presented show that alternative development has produced a change in the structure of production in the agricultural sector in the Chapare during the last 15 years. The crops are gradually improving both qualitatively and quantitatively. From an economy based mainly on the production of coca leaf, the Chapare has moved to a legal and diversified production base.
During the period 1987 to 1997, the Government applied an individual economic compensation policy. This was done in parallel to the advances in alternative development. The objective of the compensation policy was the voluntary reduction of so-called “excess” coca crops in the Chapare. It offered each peasant monetary compensation for each hectare that was voluntarily eradicated. In 1987, the amount was set at US$ 350 per hectare. Between 1988 and 1993, the compensation was increased to US$ 2,000 per hectare reduced. Between 1994 and 1997, it was as high as US$ 2,500 per hectare. Additionally, during the period 1994 to 1997, peasants who eradicated their coca fields also received an in-kind contribution equivalent to US$ 500 per hectare. UNODC Page 25
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Individual compensation did not bring positive results. Instead, it generated a vicious circle. Many peasants who eradicated their coca fields and received economic compensation, soon began to plant coca in other places. After some years, this resulted in a negative net eradication. Between 1987 and 1998, more than US$ 100 million dollars in cash was paid to peasant coca producers, but excess crops remained almost constant.
Since late 1997, a more vigorous illegal coca eradication policy has been implemented. It is not only better organized, but also better controls new coca plantations. With respect to the individual monetary compensation policy, a fundamental change was introduced — from individual to community compensation. Compensation was “in-kind” and it decreased over time until reaching zero per hectare as of January 2002.
However, after the unsuccessful eradication attempts in the Yungas in June 2001, the Government has reintroduced the individual monetary compensation — but only in the Yungas. Currently, the Government policy is that the farmers that sign voluntary eradication agreements receive an individual compensation of US$ 2,500 per hectare as well as alternative development projects.
As counterpart to alternative development work and the eradication of illegal crops, drug law enforcement is playing an important supporting role. The main goal of interdiction was to eliminate the production and illegal trafficking of drugs at different key points — from the provision and movement of illegally used precursor chemicals, to the dismantling of laboratories and maceration pits, and the arrest of those linked to drug and precursor traffic. Effective interdiction caused an increase in drug production costs and the lack of precursors, causing a drop in cocaine purity and a decreasing demand.
8.1.4 Demand reduction
In less than a decade, drug abuse in Bolivia has increased noticeably. The drug prevention programme seeks to reduce the growing local demand for marihuana, cocaine and other illegal substances. It also aims at educating the public about the dangers of drug abuse and its concurrent effect on the economy.
The prevention programme, uses both formal and informal educational venues (schools, institutions, community groups, television, county fairs and marketplaces). It also uses the media and group targeting techniques. These methods bring a greater awareness of substance abuse and its dangers.
The rehabilitation strategy is focused on the individual interests of the drug addict and is aimed at social reintegration. To improve rehabilitation methods and the environment of the drug addict, the Government promotes clinical research and improved knowledge of risk factors, community mobilization and family participation. Concerning treatment, reform and improvement of existing centres in various cities is needed. Better training of technical personnel is necessary for diversified therapeutic methods — including self-help groups, ambulatory treatment and social training.
Some progress was made in the fields of drug prevention and rehabilitation during the last years. However, the limited financial resources available to these sectors, both from the national budget and international cooperation, remain a major obstacle.
8.1.5 Money-laundering control measures
Bolivia has a strong and clear legal framework for money-laundering control. However, to date institutional and other weaknesses have hampered the proper functioning of the Financial Investigation Unit (FIU), attached to the Superintendence of Banks.
In March 1997, by way of amendment to the Penal Code of 1972, legislation was passed making money-laundering a crime. The same law, Law 1768, established the FIU. It stipulated that the details of the authority of the FIU would be defined by supreme decree. Supreme Decree 24771 on the powers of the FIU followed in July 1997. Although the existence of the FIU was legally confirmed, it did not become fully operational until June 1999, following the recruitment of its Director and his staff by the end of 1999.
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The Superintendence of Banks is a powerful institution in the Bolivian financial sector. It is the primary entity in the control of public resources and in intermediation in the Bolivian financial system. The Superintendence enjoys excellent relations with the national and international banks, as it has yet to fine a bank for irregularities and tends to support them during judicial investigations. It has no personnel specifically assigned to money- laundering legislation. The Superintendence and the FIU are in close contact.
According to Law 1768, financial institutions report all suspicious transactions or accounts to the FIU. The FIU then investigates and makes a decision as to whether the case should be handed over to the judiciary. To avoid complaints, three members of the FIU must sign a case summary before it is passed to the Ministry of Justice. The Ministry of Justice then begins the whole investigation over again — potentially sending the same requests for information to the banks as the FIU had done previously. If the case is potentially related to drug trafficking, then the Ministry of Justice may decide to involve FELCN.
The limited coordination between the FELCN and the FIU is detrimental for the overall fight against both drug trafficking and money-laundering. The FIU has not clearly identified exactly what they want from the FELCN, and the FELCN does not seem eager to work with the FIU. It should be made very clear that FELCN has no power to raise the veil of banking secrecy.
In mid-1999, the FIU was accepted to the Egmont group. The FIU has not yet worked directly on a case with an FIU from another country, nor has it seriously requested assistance or information from one. Since it has made investigations on public corruption, to date the FIU has gained good standing and recognition from various public institutions.
8.1.6 International cooperation
The total approved volume of the technical cooperation programme of UNODC amounts to US$ 25.4 million and the annual delivery has been as follows: US$ 3.4 million in 2001 and US$ 5.4 million in 2002. Five UNODC-funded projects are executed by government agencies (with administrative assistance of the UNDP local office).
Two major alternative development projects are executed by UN Specialized Agencies (FAO and ILO) and the UNODC Country Office executes one project. Ongoing projects cover all key drug control sectors, in accordance with the priority areas as established in the UNDCP Cooperation Programme 1998-2002. UNODC assistance plays a strategic and catalytic role in support of the national drug policy.
In Bolivia, there is excellent coordination among donors and cooperation agencies in support of the national socio- economic development policy, in the context of the annual Consultative Group meetings and related local working groups. From January 1998 to July 1999, the UNODC Country Office acted as leader of the local working group for the “Dignity” Pillar, in preparation of both the 1998 and 1999 Consultative Group meetings. During that period, UNODC coordinated a large number of local working group meetings with representatives from the international community, including the elaboration of several joint position papers.
Regarding alternative development, the following table provides a summary of the ongoing programmes and projects in Bolivia.
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Ongoing alternative development projects with international cooperation (US$)
Programme/project Funding agency Period Total
Consolidation of counter narcotics alternative development efforts USAID/B 1998-2004 124,620,000 (CONCADE) Support programme to the alternative development strategy in the Chapare European Union 1998-2004 26,510,000 (PRAEDAC) Management, conservation and utilization of forest resources in the Cochabamba UNODC 1997-2003 14,855,900 Tropics and Yungas of La Paz - Phase II (BOL/C23) Palm heart and citrus plant Spain 1998-2002 708,977 Vocational training and promotion of micro-enterprises in support of coca UNODC 2000-2004 5,015,400 reduction strategy in the Cochabamba Tropics (BOL/E07) National planning and management system for alternative development UNODC 1998-2003 600,000 (BOL/D69) Subtotal Cochabamba Tropics 172,310,277 Development programme of the valleys of Arque and Tapacarí (PRODEVAT) European Union 1998-2002 8,991,000 (1) Initiative for development of Yungas of USAID/B 2002-2003 28,000,000 La Paz Improvement of rural roads Spain 2002-2003 2,500,000 Medicinal plants project Spain 2002-2004 900,000 Road project la Asunta – San Miguel de Italy 2002- 2003 5,000,000 Huachi Banana project CICAD -OAS 2002-2003 1,900,000 Cacao project CICAD - OAS 2002-2003 1,500,000 Land use management and monitoring system for the Yungas of La Paz UNODC 2001-2003 362,000 (BOL/F57) GLEAM project CICAD -OAS 2001 -2003 1,757,100
Subtotal the Yungas of La Paz 50,910,100 Total 223,220,377
Bolivia has been certified annually by the United States Congress for its accomplishments in its fight against drug trafficking and has received international recognition for the efforts made.
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8.2 CRIME
8.2.1. National crime prevention framework
8.2.1.1. Organized Crime Convention adherence
During the high-level conference held in Palermo from 12 to 15 December 2000, Bolivia signed the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, including the two protocols to combat trafficking in human beings and migrants. Bolivia has not yet ratified the Convention.
8.2.1.2 Legislation
The new Penal Procedures Code consists of 442 articles. Among other things, it aims to improve and speed up the judicial process and to further protect constitutional guarantees as well as human rights. It includes improved investigation methods, and oral and public trials by civilian juries. Also, in the fight against transnational crime and drugs, this law introduced two new instruments: undercover agents and controlled delivery.
In 2001, the first oral trials were presented, meaning substantive savings in time and judic ial costs. Public opinion in general is in favour of this new Penal Procedures Code Law, which replaced the previous law dated 1972.
8.2.1.3 Crime control institutions
The key crime control institutions are:
· Judicial power: Supreme court, judiciary council, departmental justice courts, Attorney-General’s Office; district prosecutors offices. · Legislative power: Senate commissions on: (1) constitution; (2) justice; (3) judicial police; (4) public ministry; (5) human rights; (6) electoral regime; and (7) lower chamber commissions. · Executive power: Ministry of Government (Vice-Ministry of Interior and Police matters; national police; national penitentiary system); Ministry of Justice and Human Rights (Vice-Ministry of Justice and Vice-Ministry of Human Rights). · The National Council for Civic Security and Public Order (see below).
8.2.1.4 Main characteristics of national crime prevention strategy
In October 2002, the Government of President Sanchez de Lozada created the National Council for Civic Security and Public Order. It is composed of various councils at the national, departmental and municipal levels (including one for national borders). Their tasks are to:
· Elaborate a new national integrated plan; · Design policies and strategies; · Obtain financing nationally and internationally; · Do an analysis of the security situation; · Coordinate institutions; and · Follow-up on the above.
In August 1997, the Government approved and started the National Security and Civic Protection Plan, through the Ministry of Government and the National Police. It covers the following areas:
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· Prevention of anti-social and criminal conduct; · Control of the sale of alcoholic drinks; · Control of consumption of psychotropic substances; · Crime prevention; and · Migration control. This plan was re-launched in the following years. The most recent development is the creation of the above-mentioned National Council for Civic Security and Public Order.
8.2.2 Extradition agreements
Bolivia has signed extradition agreements with the following countries: Belgium (1908); Brazil (1938); Chile (1910); Ecuador (1913); Italy (1890); Peru (1916 and 1932); Spain (1990); the United Kingdom (1892); the United States (1995 and 1998); and Venezuela (1883). In addition, Bolivia signed an extradition agreement with the MERCOSUR countries and Chile, which is not yet ratified.
8.2.3 New legislation approved after 11 September 2001— the fight against terrorism
In November and after the tragic events of 11 September, the Bolivian Congress promulgated 12 new laws against terrorism. Among the most important are the following:
§ Adherence of Bolivia to the International Agreement against hostage taking. § Adherence of Bolivia to the Protocol for vigilance, for the repression of illegal acts in civil and international airports. § Adherence of Bolivia to the Convention on prevention and punishment of criminal acts against international persons and diplomatic agents. § Adherence of Bolivia to the International Agreement for the repression of criminal acts involving bombing. § Adherence of Bolivia to the Convention for the repression of financing of terrorism.
8.3 Cooperation with international bodies
The Government of Bolivia reports to the INCB annually on the licit and illicit drug control, although the data provided to the Board is not always accurate. In mid-1999, a technical INCB secretariat mission took place. The mission took note with satisfaction of the coca eradication achievements in the Chapare. It was reiterated, however, that the existing traditional use of coca is not in line with the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs. This issue was previously observed by an INCB mission that took place in 1993. During the last years, the INCB appreciated the substantial results in the reduction of illicit coca bush cultivation in the Chapare. However, it expressed concern over the risk that illicit coca bush cultivation in Bolivia may shift to the Yungas.
Form 18 to 22 June 2001, an official INCB mission took place in Bolivia. Meetings were held with high-level authorities of CONALTID as well as sectoral Vice-Ministries. The main findings of the mission were that the reduction of coca cultivation has shown great progress in the last years. There were observations on the registry of controlled psychotropic drugs by the Ministry of Health. The mission recommended that measures should be adopted to obtain a more efficient control.
In 2002, the Bolivian Government submitted the Annual Report Questionnaires to the CND using the information provided by the information management system, SINALTID. The system was developed with the technical assistance of project BOL/D79 Support to National Council on Drug Control, CONALTID.
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REFERENCES
General:
Vice-Ministry of Alternative Development, Alternative Development and Eradication of Coca Crops, Bolivia, 2002.
National Strategy for the Fight Against Drug Traffic, 1998 – 2002, (“Dignity Plan”), Bolivia, 1998.
Bolivia with Dignity, Facts and Perspectives about the Fight against Drugs, Bolivia, 2001.
Dignity Plan, A Call to the International Community, Bolivia, 1999.
Dignity Plan, Main Technical Document, Bolivia, 1999.
Dignity Plan, Technical Documents on Alternative Development, Eradication, Prevention and Rehabilitation, Interdiction and Conflict Resolution, Bolivia, 1999.
INCB Annual Reports.
Bolivian legislation:
Coca and Substances Law (Law1008), Bolivia, 1988.
Decree 24196 on the Administration of Seized Goods from Drug Trafficking, Bolivia, 1995.
Release on Parole Act Law 1685, Bolivia, 1996.
Criminal Code Reforms Act (Law 1768), Bolivia, 1997.
New Penal Procedures Code Law, Bolivia, 2000.
Ante Project for Demand Reduction of Drugs and Psychotropics, 2001.
Law 1737 of Pharmaceutical Products, 1997.
Statistics:
Vice-Ministry of Social Defence, FELCN (Anti-narcotics Special Forces), “Statistics regarding seizures of drugs and precursors”, Bolivia 2000-2001.
Vice-Ministry of Alternative Development, DIRECO (National Direction of Agricultural Conversion) – “Statistics regarding Eradication of Coca Bushes”, Bolivia 2000 -2001.
National Police, Judicial Technical Police, ”Criminal Statistics Memory” (for the 1995-1996 period, as well as years 2000 and 2001).
Bank Superintendence, Financial Investigation Unit, “Statistics regarding Money Laundering” Bolivia, 2001.
Latin-American Centre of Scientific Research – CELIN, “Drug Use Prevalence Studies” Bolivia, 2000.
UNDCP, Global Illicit Drug Trends 2001, Vienna, 2001.
UNODCCP, Global Illicit Drug Trends 2002, Vienna, 2002.
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Other Reports:
USAID – Bolivia, ”Bolivia’s Coca/Cocaine Economy in 1998: A Computer Model”, Bolivia, 1999.
Organization of American States / Inter-American Commission against Drug Abuse, OAS/CICAD, Vice-Ministry of Prevention and Rehabilitation, Bolivia (SIDOC project, 1997).
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