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ANÁLISIS CAROLINA 01/2019

THE FRAUGHT PATH FORWARD: AND THE INTERNATIONAL CONTACT GROUP*

David Smilde and Geoff Ramsey March 4th, 2019

On February 7 the multilateral the government of Nicolás Maduro International Contact Group (ICG) and the opposition about the held its first meeting to address the organization of new elections. On Venezuela crisis. Originating with that visit they found that the two the (represented by sides were not ready to negotiate France, Germany, Italy, the which effectively stalled the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, initiative. On February 24, the EU’s Sweden and the United Kingdom) High Representative again called for2 but also including several Latin credible presidential elections as a American countries (, way out of Venezuela’s crisis. But and ), it resolved to instead of saying the EU was actively work with international partners to working for this, stated it “stands “establish necessary guarantees for a ready to support this process.” credible electoral process, within the earliest timeframe possible,” and to In this article we suggest that the enable the delivery of humanitarian International Contact Group is the assistance.1 most promising alternative for facilitating a peaceful return to Two weeks later it sent a technical democracy in Venezuela. While the mission to Venezuela to speak with path is fraught by skepticism and intransigence, with patience and pragmatism it could produce results. * A previous version of this essay appeared as Smilde, D. & Ramsey, G. (2019, February 12). “El Grupo de Contacto Internacional: la mejor oportunidad de Venezuela.” Español. 2 Press Release. (2019, February, 24). 1 Ramsey, G., & Smilde, D. (2019, February “Declaration by the High Representative on 7). “How the International Contact Group on behalf of the EU on the latest events in Venezuela Can Advance a Path Out of Venezuela.” Council of the European Union. Crisis.” WOLA: Venezuelan Politics and Retrieved from Human Rights. Retrieved from https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/pr https://venezuelablog.org/international- ess-releases/2019/02/24/declaration-by-the- contact-group-venezuela-can-advance-path- high-representative-on-behalf-of-the-eu-on- crisis/ the-latest-events-in-venezuela/

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Beyond Dialogue to recognition of the National As the original meeting was taking Assembly (Asamblea Nacional or place in Montevideo, US Envoy for AN). The AN agreed to Venezuela Elliot Abrams criticized disincorporate the three the effort saying “Maduro has proven representatives of the Amazon state he will manipulate any calls for that the National Electoral negotiations to his advantage and has Committee (CNE) said had been often used so-called dialogues as a elected in flawed processes. And the way to play for time.”3 In the wake Maduro government was to of the most recent visit he repeated recognize the National Assembly and his criticisms, remarking: “ask Jorge release political prisoners. But the Ramos of Univisión what dialogue Maduro government quickly reneged with Maduro is like,”4 a reference to on its commitments, leading even the Maduro’s detention of the journalist Vatican representative to refuse on February 26. further involvement.6

There are good reasons to reject From December 2017 to February dialogue with the Maduro 2018 another round of dialogue government. In 2014 four months of failed.7 This one followed something street mobilization against the closer to a “group of friends” model Maduro government ended when and started with a draft agreement opposition leaders went to dialogue that guarantor countries put together with the government and achieved based on conversations with both the nothing other than demobilizing their government and the opposition. protests.5 However, the government did not agree to the key aspects of it, such as In 2016, dialogue with the postponing the elections until the last government actually led to a trimester of the year, and the plausible accord that would have led dialogue eventually failed.

3 Press Briefing (2019, February 7). U.S. Department of State. Retrieved from https://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2019/288 6 Smilde, D. (2017, February 6). “No 893.htm Miracles in Venezuela Conflict I: Dialogue 4 Abrams, E. (2019, February 26). “Remarks Setbacks Challenge Vatican.” WOLA: at a UN Security Council Briefing on Venezuelan Politics and Human Rights. Venezuela.” Mission to the Retrieved from . Retrieved from: https://venezuelablog.org/no-miracles-in- https://usun.state.gov/remarks/8945 venezuela-conflict-i-dialogue/ 5 Smilde, D., & Hernáiz, H.P. (2014, May 7 Ramsey, G. (2018, February 8). “No Deal: 14). “Opposition Freezes Dialogue.” WOLA: Venezuela Talks in ‘Indefinite Recess’.” Venezuelan Politics and Human Rights. WOLA: Venezuelan Politics and Human Retrieved from Rights. Retrieved from https://venezuelablog.org/opposition- https://venezuelablog.org/no-deal- freezes-dialogue/ venezuela-talks-indefinite-recess/

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The opposition was certainly not and that produces non-binding blameless in these processes. In 2014 results. If he really valued dialogue it was they who pulled out of the that sometimes leads to dialogue, in large part because of uncomfortable but binding their own divisions.8 Insiders suggest obligations to change, he could that, in 2018, the fact that the simply recognize the National opposition divisions over who would Assembly. A democratic state is, be the presidential candidate were after all, little more than an part of their decision to pull out, institutionalized dialogue. However, especially when compounded by the he will not do that because government’s unwillingness to is a minority in the legislature and provide clear guarantees for free cannot control it. In the AN, the elections. Furthermore, strategic debate would be carried out by errors, such as canceling street democratically chosen mobilizations during the 2016 representatives, in proportion to their dialogue reduced their effectiveness support by the public (at least in and generated rancor among their December 2015). With the two-thirds base that has turned into a strong majority they obtained, the antipathy towards anything that opposition would have far reaching sounds like dialogue.9 powers.

In each case, sitting down for talks The ICG’s Terms of Reference10 with the Maduro government gave have been well-formulated to not fall the latter some breathing room and into the dialogue trap. It has an demobilized the opposition. Since explicit mandate “not to be a 2014 Maduro has continually called mediator” nor to promote dialogue, for dialogue. However, he only seeks but to push for the conditions needed it as long as it occurs in a non- for credible elections to occur so that institutionalized space he can control Venezuelans themselves can elect their leaders. Of course actually

8 Smilde, D., & Hernáiz, H.P. (2014, May carrying out this initiative will mean 14). “Opposition Freezes Dialogue.” WOLA: some sort of “dialogue” in the sense Venezuelan Politics and Human Rights. Retrieved from of communicating with and https://venezuelablog.org/opposition- understanding others. However, the freezes-dialogue/ communication is not between the 9 Smilde, D. (2019, January 8). “Venezuelans reject Maduro presidency – government and the opposition. This but most would oppose foreign military operation to oust him.” The Conversation. 10 (2019, January 31). “The Terms of Retrieved from Reference of an International Contact Group https://theconversation.com/venezuelans- on Venezuela.” Council of the European reject-maduro-presidency-but-most-would- Union. Retrieved from oppose-foreign-military-operation-to-oust- https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/380 him-109135 43/st05958-en19-icg-terms-of-reference.pdf

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communication takes place between Fortunately, Uruguay seems to be the ICG representatives and playing on two fields at the same Venezuela’s political actors, through time and hosted the ICG meeting the a sort of shuttle diplomacy. An next day in which the group restated encounter between the two sides its commitment to new elections. would only happen if and when an agreement is brokered. Increasingly, Uruguay has made clear that it is more in line with the Proceeding in this way will reduce EU thinking on the issue. While at the opposition’s political costs vis-à- first the administration of Tabaré vis their base and radical wing who Vázquez was more interested in the are loath to sit down with Chavismo proposal to organize dialogue with and could prevent any kind of no preconditions, it has become clear agreement being met. There is also that Uruguay has abandoned this no reason that such a negotiation idea. Vázquez implicitly would undermine opposition street demonstrated this commitment by mobilizations, given that there is no participating in the technical visit to media spectacle or alternative forum Caracas and made it explicit in a drawing the attention away. February 14 joint statement11 with Proceeding in this way will also Argentine President . make it more difficult for Maduro to Some of this initial hesitation was use the dialogue to distract from his due to divisions within the governing authoritarian government, and there Frente Amplio coalition, but these will need to be clear mechanisms for have been smoothed out. On fulfilling whatever agreements are February 27, José “Pepe” Mujica reached. explicitly called12 for new presidential elections in Venezuela, The ICG will indeed have to deflect which is deeply significant as he is what will be constant pressure to 11 sponsor hollow dialogue. On the eve (2019, February 14). “Macri y Vázquez piden elecciones en Venezuela.” El País. of the ICG meeting, , Retrieved from Uruguay, and Caribbean nations https://www.elpais.com.uy/informacion/polit ica/macri-vazquez-piden-elecciones- issued a statement in favor of a venezuela.html separate “Montevideo Mechanism,” 12 Ramsey, G. [@GRamsey_LaTam]. (2019, which would promote a dialogue February 27). This is an important move. Mujica’s MPP party is the largest without conditions. Unsurprisingly, #Uruguay’s governing Frente Amplio Nicolás Maduro immediately backed coalition. By making this statement he is the idea. However, this initiative was firmly siding with the EU/Contact Group proposal, and against some kind of empty stillborn as the Venezuelan dialogue with no preconditions [Tweet]. opposition has made clear it would Retrieved from https://twitter.com/GRamsey_LatAm/status/ not participate in such an effort. 1100900516874334213

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viewed as an immense moral United States, implicitly referring to authority among leftist sectors in some left Democrats who have Uruguay that were still somewhat increasingly adopted the term for supportive of Maduro and were their politics. Thus, this is clearly one critical of Vázquez’s policy. of the main foreign policy planks in Trump’s 2020 reelection campaign The United States and failing would be politically This ICG initiative has to deal with costly. skepticism from the United States. The U.S., of course, has responded to The most recent strategy for driving Venezuela’s crisis not only by a wedge between Maduro and his vociferously supporting National armed forces was to send Assembly President Juan Guaidó’s humanitarian aid to Venezuela’s claim to the interim presidency, but border, making military officials by leveling comprehensive sanctions decide between their loyalty to the against Venezuela’s state oil Maduro government or their loyalty company and time and again to their hungry fellow citizens. This mentioning that “all options are on effort was unsuccessful. Not only did the table.” The goal is to encourage they fail to get aid into the country, the military to turn on Maduro and they were not able to flip a instead recognize Guaidó. significant number of members of the armed forces to any significant The recent speech by Donald Trump degree. In the process, the initiative in Miami made clear that it is drew the criticism of aid unlikely he will put the issue on the organizations such as the back burner. While in Afghanistan International Red Cross13 as well as and Syria Trump’s “America first” regional human rights groups,14 for vision is holding sway, in Latin not fulfilling the basic principles of America policy it is his humanitarian aid, including: neoconservative advisors that are in neutrality, impartiality, charge. He represented the push for a transition in Venezuela as just the first step in an effort to free Cuba and 13 Lugo, L. (2019, February 1). “Red Cross Nicaragua as well. When that Talks to US about risks of sending happens, he said, “this will become Venezuela aid.” Associated Press. Retrieved from the first free hemisphere in all of https://apnews.com/55b00d320d744b498566 human history.” He also mentioned 14c432c0d686 14 socialism from beginning to end in (2019, February 21). “Joint Statement: Meeting the Needs of Suffering Venezuelans the speech, repeatedly tying the Will Require Expertise and Commitment to situation in Venezuela to those who Humanitarian Principles.” Retrieved from https://www.wola.org/2019/02/humanitarian want to install socialism in the -aid-venezuela-civil-society-statement/

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independence, humanity, and doing The U.S.’s flirtation with military no harm. action could actually generate more interest in the ICG among not only Plan B was apparently to use the the Venezuela government but other Maduro government’s rejection of international actors as well. It is humanitarian aid to call for important to remember the example international military intervention. of the Contadora process in Central However, this strategy seemingly America during the 1980s.17 The backfired as, over the course of the U.S. was a belligerent actor in the next two days, there were resounding region and actively opposed this rejections of the use of force by the initiative. Rejection of the U.S. role international community. In the was one main cause of international February 25 meeting of the support of the initiative. Confronting Group, member countries explicitly the U.S. on Venezuela policy could rejected the use of force.15 It is actually facilitate the EU’s unity on especially important that the its own Venezuela policy since its Colombian and Panamanian main challenge comes from countries governments joined in this statement, with left governments that hesitate to because they previously declined to appear interventionist. And finally, sign a Lima Group statement U.S. rejection of the ICG initiative rejecting the use of force on could make any agreement more September 15.16 Costa Rica did not palatable to Chavismo and its allies. sign the document. The sticking point for them appears to have been Nevertheless, there is reason to think the statement’s insistence that that the United States may share Maduro must leave for new elections more aims with the ICG than it to occur, which fits with some of the publicly lets on. On February 15, ambiguity in the ICG’s own Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and statements EU High Representative of Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Federica Mogherini met in Brussels and an EU source told the press that the two 15 Smilde, D. (2019, February 26) “Venezuela Weekly: Opposition Stalls as agreed that “new elections” offered Push for Military Action Rebuffed.” the best path out of the crisis.18 As Retrieved from https://venezuelablog.org/venezuela-weekly- opposition-stalls-push-military-action- 17 Purcell, Susan K. (1985). “Demystifying rebuffed/ Contadora.” Foreign Affairs. Retrieved from 16 (2018, September 15). “Declaración del https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/centr Grupo de Lima.” Gobierno de Perú, al-america-caribbean/1985-09- Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores. 01/demystifying-contadora Retrieved from 18 (2019, February 15). “Mogherini, Pompeo https://www.gob.pe/institucion/rree/noticias/ agree elections are best way to restore order 19021-declaracion-del-grupo-de-lima in Venezuela.” Agencia EFE. Retrieved

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well, National Security Council ability to organize against the advisor Mauricio Claver Carone government and allow Maduro to recently signaled that the U.S. might ratchet down his authoritarian get behind an offer of new elections project, just as Fidel Castro did in by Maduro as long as it were 1960s Cuba. accepted by National Assembly President Juan Guaidó.19 The opposition needs to be encouraged to reach out to elements The Opposition of Chavismo in a more concerted and Developing a solid relationship with convincing way. The fact that we the opposition and buy-in from them haven’t seen major defections from is probably the best way to prevent the military or from Maduro’s the U.S. from scuttling the initiative. civilian coalition suggests that those The opposition understandably sees around him do not see their interests the U.S. as their main ally and is reflected in the transitional loath to take any independent stance. government that Guaidó is offering. There can be little doubt that without A potential amnesty offer has not U.S. threats of “the most serious proved to be attractive enough, consequences,” the Maduro meaning the opposition may have to government would have arrested consider offering something more Guaidó in the days after he assumed robust, perhaps including some sort the interim presidency. But the of power-sharing with Chavismo. A opposition needs to realize that time recent piece from the Finnish is not on their side. Within a month Institute of International Affairs or two, U.S. oil sanctions could suggests the best path forward would significantly alter the playing field. be a transition government including Sanctions such as these generally both pro- and anti-Maduro forces impact average people more than that could then negotiate elections.20 government officials. The net effect will be to weaken the population’s There have actually been some signs of openness to this within the opposition. Carlos Vecchio, from https://www.efe.com/efe/english/portada/mo appointed Venezuela Ambassador to gherini-pompeo-agree-elections-are-best- the U.S. by Guaidó, pointed out that way-to-restore-order-in- Chavismo controls 53 seats in the venezuela/50000260-3898843 19 Gómez Maseri, S. (2019, February 10). National Assembly and could work “’Ayuda ingresará a Venezuela, es solo cuestión de tiempo’: EE. UU.” El Tiempo. 20 Wigell, M. & Mikko, P. (2019, February Retrieved from 8). “Negotiating Venezuela’s future: First https://www.eltiempo.com/mundo/eeuu-y- agreement, then elections.” Finnish Institute /entrevista-con-mauricio-claver- of International Affairs. Retrieved from carone-estratega-de-trump-contra-el- https://www.fiia.fi/en/publication/negotiatin regimen-de-maduro-324820 g-venezuelas-future

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for the transition from there.21 Vice- The opposition will have to President of the AN Stalin González relinquish aspirations of significant said more broadly: “we need to give structural reform before elections space to sectors of Chavismo that are happen. You cannot ask people to not Maduro because we need make the painful sacrifices that political stability.”22 On February 23, significant reform inevitably entails Guaidó himself issued a message to without democratic legitimacy. This Chavismo, saying: “I doubt that may seem obvious, but there is a Hugo Chávez would accept what long and troubling history of Maduro has brought to the armed liberalism without democracy in forces and to Venezuela: hunger, that pushes for violence, repression, and fear.”23 “progress” without seeing the need Such assertions receive howls from for developing consensus among opposition radicals and in the those most affected.24 Indeed, the Venezuelan Twittersphere, but they riots of February 1989 known as El are promising signs nonetheless. Caracazo, which marked the beginning of the end for Venezuela’s democracy were caused by a new 21 Leon, I. (2019, February 14). “Carlos president pushing forward a radical Vecchio: El chavismo está invitado a construir la transición desde la AN.” Efecto structural adjustment package after Cocuyo. Retrieved from campaigning as a free-spending http://efectococuyo.com/politica/carlos- populist. The idea of a long vecchio-el-chavismo-esta-invitado-a- construir-la-transicion-desde-la-an/ transitional government that reorders 22 Pons C., Cohen, L., & Spetalnick, M. Venezuelan society before elections (2019, February 14). “Venezuela’s Maduro ramps up legal fight against Guaido’s will undoubtedly be pushed by some challenge.” . Retrieved from opposition sectors. https://www.reuters.com/article/us- venezuela-politics-aid/venezuelan- opposition-urges-international-community- However, the Venezuelan opposition to-help-aid-get-in-idUSKCN1Q325K is as complex as any coalition. 23 Guaidó, J. [@jguaido]. (2019, February Guaidó’s party, Voluntad Popular, 23). 1/3 Estoy saliendo de hablar con los militares que hoy se incorporaron a la ruta itself has democratic resources. constitucional. Nos reiteran que lo que hoy While its role in demanding Nicolás hay en la FAN es miedo, necesidad e irrespeto. Son soldados que en algún Maduro’s resignation in February momento tuvieron ilusión por la carrera 2014 –less than one year after militar y hoy son prisioneros del terror Maduro was elected president and [Tweet]. Retrieved from https://twitter.com/jguaido/status/109951198 less than two months after his 9536284673?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwc amp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E10995 11994263261184%7Ctwgr%5E363937393b 24 Mahoney, J. 2002. The legacies of 636f6e74726f6c&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2 liberalism: path dependence and political Felcooperante.com%2Fla-pregunta-de-juan- regimes in Central America (Baltimore: The guaido-que-maria-gabriela-chavez-no-podra- Johns Hopkins University Press). responder%2F

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coalition received strong support in serious confidence-building regional elections– does not speak measures before credible elections well of its democratic commitment, can be held. These include releasing they have consistently supported political prisoners, naming new primaries in the opposition while members of the National Electoral other parties have preferred closed- Council, and ending bans on all door mechanisms. They also opened political parties and politicians in the the door to a transgender legislative electoral process. It is also clear that candidate and have done Maduro will have to cede control considerable grassroots organization over the electoral process to neutral with students. Putting forward a forces. After the electoral abuses of young politician like Juan Guaidó the past three years, it is indeed was a long overdue movement in the difficult to imagine a legitimate Venezuelan opposition; it shows that election with Maduro overseeing it. Voluntad Popular has a level of democratic vision not as developed Of course, carrying out these in the other opposition parties. measures would virtually ensure that Maduro will be voted out of power, The Maduro Government and he and his coalition know that. Of course, getting the buy-in of the But they must see that this may be Maduro government is perhaps the their last chance to relinquish power most difficult of all. After putting in a dignified, non-violent way that down the opposition’s effort to bring could not only ensure their physical in humanitarian aid, they feel survival but the political strengthened. They are convinced representation of the significant they will be able to weather the swath of the population that still current storm, reinforce social and supports the government. Going out political control, restore the economy with some modicum of grace could given Venezuela’s ample resources, salvage the memory of Chavismo and eventually normalize relations from the ignominious depths it has with the world. However, they need sunk to. to realize that the most likely scenario for the future would be that Given the difficulty of the task of Venezuela could just as well fall into reconstructing Venezuela and the a state of perpetual anarchy, just sacrifices it will entail, political organized enough to maintain the representation of all sectors of governing networks of corruption society will be necessary and and power. Chavismo could be in a position to participate. There would be ample The ICG has communicated that possibilities for Chavismo to come Maduro will have to engage in back in electoral form. Maduro

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maintains impressive popularity in However, given the likely failure of the current context –around 20% in a the Venezuelan opposition’s current region in which presidents routinely strategy, the lack of international poll in the single digits. In addition, support for military action, and the polls show that close to half of the fact that dialogue without population still have a positive view preconditions is simply a non-starter of Hugo Chávez. This shows the for the opposition, it seems likely potential Chavismo would have as an that the ICG could become an electoral force. While there are attractive option for Venezuela’s certainly doubts that Chavismo is political actors and international even viable as just another electoral stakeholders. Furthermore, the party –given its illiberal and often Maduro government’s current level messianic ideology–, from the of comfort will likely not last long as beginning it has exhibited a complex the ever-increasing economic and intertwining of elements of political pressure they are under will liberalism and Marxism which could generate concern among officials of clearly provide the basis for a more the sustainability of their path. moderate party. The ICG would do well to seek the Moving Forward involvement of other international The International Contact Group is actors with a history of successful not currently the leading form of peace negotiations such as Norway international engagement in the and the Vatican, as well as other Venezuela crisis. Given the apparent countries from the Lima Group lack of political will on each side, it beyond just Costa Rica. While has not yet been able to proceed with countries with strong animosity negotiations. Given the protagonist towards the Maduro Government, role the Trump administration has such as and , would assumed, all other stakeholders, not be helpful, others such as Canada including the Lima Group, have been or could be. The United forced to the sidelines. Countries Nations would be best left to monitor allied with Venezuela, the fulfillment of any eventual international left, and even agreement and monitor elections. progressive Democrats in the U.S. Congress –for the most part new to The scholarly literature makes clear the Venezuela crisis and unaware of that most transitions to democracy the recent history of dialogue– are are neither linear nor predictable. Fits more likely to mention the and starts, setbacks and advances are “Montevideo Mechanism” of typical as contending political actors dialogue without preconditions. navigate a complex and changing field. Historically, the combination

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of external and internal pressure and engagement is the most likely means of generating a non-violent transition to democracy.25 The goal is a sustainable agreement that can change the relationship between the contenders, from enemies that cannot coexist to political competitors that can.26

David Smilde is the Charles A. and

Leo M. Favrot Professor of Human Relations at Tulane University and a Senior Fellow at the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA).

Geoff Ramsey is the Assistant Fundación Carolina, March 2019 Director for Venezuela at the

Washington Office on Latin America Fundación Carolina (WOLA). C/ Serrano Galvache, 26. Torre Sur, 3ª planta 28071 Madrid - España www.fundacioncarolina.es @Red_Carolina

DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.33965.13286

The views and opinions expressed in this text are those of the authors and 25 Bitar, S. & Lowenthal, A. (2015). do not necessarily reflect the official Democratic Transitions: Conversations with policy or position of Fundación World Leaders (Baltimore: The Johns Carolina. Hopkins University Press). 26 Wallensteen, P. Wieviorka, M. Abraham, I. Aggestam, K. Bellamy, A. Cederman, L. Ferret, J. Jeangène Vilmer, J.B. Heitmeyer, W. Muvumba-Sellström, A. Nathan, L. Shinoda, H. Stepanova, E. (July 2018), “Violence, wars, peace, security,” in This work is licensed under Rethinking Society for the 21st Century, Vol. a Creative Commons Attribution- 2: Political Regulation, Governance and NonCommercial- Societal Transformations (Cambridge: NoDerivatives 4.0 International (CC Cambridge University Press), pp. 411–456. BY-NC-ND 4.0)

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