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Home , Robin Hahnel, Social ownership

The Catastrophe

How is catastrophical and Participatory offers hope

Daniël Hemink

Student number: 0563765

Supervisor: dhr. dr. P.A. Raekstad

Second reader: dhr. dr. S. Rezaeiejan

June, 2017

Master Thesis Political Science, track: International Relations Acknowledgements

I should like to express my most sincere gratitude to my supervisor, dhr. dr. Paul Raekstad, who was most helpful in constructing my thesis. Paul was as generous with his time as he was with his advice. I preferred dhr. dr. Said Reazadjian as a second reader, for Said is an inspiring lecturer and sympathetic man. Both gentlemen have had a positive influence on my critical and creative thinking.

I enjoyed the studies Political Science and History at the University of Amsterdam. I want to thank the staff of the UvA, my fellow students, and my family and friends who were close to me in both the good times and bad. I dedicate this thesis to the anonymous writer of this 17th century poem:

The law locks up the man or woman Who steals the goose off the common But leaves the greater villain loose Who steals the common from the goose

The law demands that we atone When we take things we do not own But leaves the lords and ladies fine Who takes things that are yours and mine

The poor and wretched don’t escape If they conspire the law to break This must be so but they endure Those who conspire to make the law

The law locks up the man or woman Who steals the goose from off the common And geese will still a common lack Till they go and steal it back

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Abstract

There is abundant evidence which shows that capitalism does not work well: returning crises, growing inequality and degradation of our environment. This thesis argues that within capitalism we are facing a ‘Commons Catastrophe’ (CC). This catastrophe is in multiple ways related to how we deal with everything we share: the commons and the community are disrupted and our ecosystem is in grave danger. A CC occurs, if:

[1] A sequence of events that disrupts the commons and the community occurs and/or

[2] Unsustainable levels of ecological degradation are reached which risk the complete destruction of the world we live in.

Because of the CC in capitalism, it is imperative to envision and install alternative models of society. This thesis puts (Parecon) forward as a viable alternative to capitalism. The primary purpose of this study is to determine to what extent Parecon could prevent a CC. The secondary purpose of this thesis is to show how mainstream economic discourse promotes capitalism and objects participatory models.

This thesis has a tripartite structure. First the newly coined, disjunctive concept of CC is presented. After that, it is investigated to what extent capitalism leads to a CC. In the second part of this thesis, the viability of Parecon as an alternative to capitalism is examined. In the third and final part, it is investigated to what extent Parecon could forestall a CC.

It is theoretically plausible that Parecon could forestall a CC because of the social of the commons. In Parecon, the community –in contrast to the state or private parties- has economic decision-making power and incorporates social costs and social benefits in its deliberations. Parecon upholds , economic justice and human . Parecon opposes mainstream economic discourse and entails a positive notion of the commons and the community.

Keywords: capitalism, Commons Catastrophe, Participatory Economics, economic democracy, economic justice, human solidarity, ecological sustainability, , community.

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Table of Contents Introduction ...... 6

Research Question ...... 6

Conceptualisation ...... 6

Historical Discourse ...... 7

Thesis Outline ...... 9

Relevance ...... 11

1. The Commons Catastrophe ...... 12

1.1 History and Discourse of the Commons and Capitalism ...... 13

1.1.1 and other conventional concepts...... 14

1.1.2 Life, and ...... 14

1.1.3 The Second ...... 16

1.1.4 New movements, new commons...... 17

1.2 The Destructive Logic of Capitalism ...... 20

1.2.1 Capitalism as natural state and the freedom myth...... 21

1.2.2 Capitalism means dependence...... 23

1.2.3 Market enclosure...... 24

1.3 Ecological Degradation & Capitalism’s Crisis Management ...... 28

1.3.1 Planetary boundaries...... 28

1.3.2 Green capitalism...... 29

1.3.3 Neoliberal crisis management...... 30

2. Parecon: a Viable Alternative to Capitalism ...... 32

2.1 There Is No Alternative? ...... 32

2.2 Parecon ...... 33

2.2.1 Goals...... 33

2.2.2 Institutions...... 34

2.3 Objections to Parecon ...... 37

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2.4 Examples of Participatory Movements ...... 41

3. Parecon and the Commons Catastrophe ...... 43

3.1 How Does Parecon Prevent a CC [1]? ...... 43

3.1.1 How does Parecon deals with the commons? ...... 44

3.1.2 Does Parecon disrupts the community? ...... 45

3.2 How does Parecon prevent a CC [2]? ...... 48

3.3 Reservations ...... 50

3.4 Answer to Garret Hardin and ...... 50

Conclusion ...... 53

What I Did Not Do ...... 54

Summary Part 1 ...... 54

Summary Part 2 ...... 56

Summary Part 3 ...... 58

Place in Debate ...... 58

Further Research ...... 59

Final Remarks ...... 61

Literature ...... 63

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Introduction Capitalism is catastrophical. The market system disrupts the society and leads to an ecological disaster. Whether it is the depletion of common resources like oil or the pollution of the like the ecosystem: the current catastrophe is intrinsically related to the commons. Capitalism leads to the disruption of society and deteriorates what we hold in common. To elucidate this process, I coin the term Commons Catastrophe (CC).

Research Question In order to prevent a CC from occurring, an alternative model has to be put in practice. Robin Hahnel and (1991a) created Participatory Economics (Parecon). I assess whether Parecon is a viable alternative to capitalism. Parecon is an economic model that is based around participation, self-management and social ownership of the commons. My research question is: to what extent could Parecon prevent a CC from occurring?

Conceptualisation For analytical purposes I divide CC in two parts. A CC occurs, if:

[1] A sequence of events that disrupts the commons and the community occurs and/or

[2] Unsustainable levels of ecological degradation are reached which risk the complete destruction of the world we live in.

CC is a disjunctive concept: one of the two attributes has to occur for CC to exist. For CC to occur [1] or [2] is sufficient and one of the two attributes is necessary to exist. I deliberately chose ‘catastrophe’, implicating a disastrous state of affairs and the probability of an end to humanity. When conceptualising CC [1], I paraphrase William McNeill’s (1989, p.1) description of a catastrophe: “some sequence of events that disrupts established routines of life and inflicts suffering or death on many”. Instead of ‘established routine’, I focus on ‘commons and community’.

The idea of reason in Enlightment philosophy cut men off from nature and created the ‘civic community’. The CC [2] implicates that people are part of nature; nature’s catastrophe equals human’s catastrophe. The society is embedded in the limited, natural world. Hence, the implicit idea of unlimited wealth and continuous in capitalism is flawed.

In this thesis I use capitalism to denote the dominant system of human organisation wherein markets are crucial to the economy. Whether capitalism is described as

6 capitalism or , it is not working well. Within capitalism, natural commons like fossil fuels are depleting (CC [1]) and global commons like the ecosystem deteriorate (CC [2]). The commons paradigm is a frame for thinking beyond growth. In the critique of capitalism, the market narrative today often makes way for the commons as an analytical tool. Moreover, the ascent of the commons paradigm in academic literature can be seen as a symptom of the failures of capitalism. Like McCarthey (2005), I employ the commons as part of counterhegemonic projects.

The contradiction of the concept of commons lies in the fact that when goods are privatised in capitalism, they are not viewed as common anymore. For instance, if all the forests in the world are privatised, one could still consider them commons, because they do not belong to certain private parties yet are part of the world where all and everybody belongs too. For the interest of clarity, I coin the concepts capitalist commons and participatory commons. The former denotes commons that are market-dependent and are rapidly privatised, the latter denotes everything we share as common. Furthermore, the participatory commons describes commons that are governed by the community.

Historical Discourse The First Enclosure that began around 1500 in England revolved around the transfer of common lands from the community to private ownership (Wordie, 1983). This process of privatisation marks the beginning of capitalism. Thus, from the advent of capitalism, the commons is inseparable from this . A market is needed to trade goods and connect producers and consumers with each other. Over time, the society became market- dependent: everyone became dependent on the market for its basic needs and fulfillment of their potential, whether it was an individual person or a company (Brenner, 2006; Wood, 1999, 2002).

In their famous Manifest, and state that class struggle begins with the destruction of the primordial commonwealth (Marx & Engels, 1998, p.7). Following the German historian Friedrich Wilhelm Maurer, they viewed jointly owned land as the archetype of society. The flourishing of a society depends on the way it deals with what is in common. Karl Marx wrote in Capital (1976) that enclosure of the English commonwealth played a pivotal role in the transition from a feudal to a capitalist system. The correlation of social problems and enclosed is already evident in ’s Utopia (2016).

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Marx and Engels view Thomas More with his 1516 work Utopia as predecessor of their communistic doctrine (Marx & Engels, 1998, p. 5). Thomas More (2006) criticized the enclosure of the commons for bringing about social problems in sixteenth century England. Hitherto, the local communities relied on the common grounds for their livelihood. Following the enclosure of the commonwealth, the commercial interests of wealthy commercial landowners were prioritized over the interests of local communities.

The enclosure of the commons leads to economic and social problems. Yet, private ownership is inherent to capitalism. The mainstream economic discourse does not entail optimistic notions of . Garret Hardin writes in ‘Tragedy of the commons’ (1969) about jointly owned land that is prone to overuse and depletion. Over time, the subsequent measures to prevent this (privatisation and intervention) have not prevented the tragedy of the commons. Many economic models fail to recognize the value of cooperation. Instead, rational choice and private ownership of the commons are championed. The deadlock of market-dependence leads state and non-state actors, whether capitalist or non-capitalist, to throw in the towel and find a way to deal with a system that is viewed as impossible to replace.

In the last decades there is a countermovement discernible. The most important protagonist of counterhegemonic discourse is Elinor Ostrom. She made an important contribution to the work on the commons. Ostrom (2015) proposes eight principles that are foundational to governing the commons in a successful way. Ostrom argues that there is an alternative way, outside of the scope of the market and state actors: the community could manage the commons successfully if the proposed principles preeminent. In this thesis I argue it is necessary to alter the system itself, because in capitalism the commons are not governable.

In Parecon, the community manages the commons. The absence of a CC in Parecon implicates that cooperation is rational. Rationality points to a sensible and justifiable decision. If a CC [2] occurs, it will possibly include death and suffering to every individual. An individual can rationally choose to prevent this by opposing capitalism and install a new system (together with other individuals). Moreover, if a CC [1] exists, the society is in demise. The society is made up by individuals. Therefore, it can be viewed as rational if individuals opt for another system. In this line of thought, ‘rational humans’ could choose for Parecon, because in Parecon the individual needs are reconciled with the collective needs.

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Thesis Outline The proposed tripartite argument structure is as follows: capitalism leads to a CC (chapter 1), Parecon is a viable alternative to capitalism (chapter 2) and Parecon prevents a CC (chapter 3). The primary purpose is to investigate to what extent Parecon could prevent a CC. The secondary purpose is to explore how mainstream economic discourse favors capitalism and is not receptive to alternative participatory models of economy. The first chapter elaborates on the concept of CC. Through the lens of the commons paradigm I will argue how capitalism is defect and to what extent capitalism is incapable of forestalling CC. Throughout chapter 1 I employ elements of critical discourse analysis and focus on relations between discourse and social elements like power relations and ideologies (Fairclough, 2013, p. 9).Within a historical framework I illuminate the pessimism which surrounds the common paradigm. This thesis uses insights from language studies, history and environmental studies, yet the focus is on political philosophy.

The ‘’ and the ‘growth imperative’, both perpetuated by neoclassical economists, are used in a narrative about progress. The ‘social perspective’ of capitalism leads to a certain world-view (Fairclough, 2013, p. 11). Capitalism is linked to the freedom of individuals and enterprises. I term this ‘the freedom myth’. Yet, these principles give way to the enclosure of the commons. Present day neoliberalism propels enclosure and destruction of the commons at an unprecedented scale. The market dependence that is essential to capitalism, leads to the of the commons. In the Second Enclosure of today, immaterial things like rights and global commons like the ocean are being privatised (Barnes, 2001). Because these commons are traded in the market, they are prone to market failures (Young, 2011). These market failures disrupt the commons and the community. In short: the privatisation of the commons leads to a CC.

Unlike optimists, capitalism cannot account for making the world a green place to live: ecological dangers are not prevented and sustainability issues are not incorporated sufficiently into the statutory aims. Capitalism gives way to the supremacy of self-interest. Decisions arising from individual logic are not necessarily the best decisions for the entire society. Individual rationality can lead to collective irrationality. The rise of capitalism equals the demise of the commons. Mainstream economic discourse entails a negative historical connection between capitalism and the commons paradigm.

On the local level, community initiatives are undermined in capitalism. Common resources are extracted for the benefit of private parties. Private parties do no invest substantially in

9 sustainable solutions. On the state level, capitalism is not capable of organizing a just society containing economic democracy, economic justice and human solidarity. On a global level our ecosystem is deteriorating rapidly. Capitalism’s indifference to human well-being is evident in what Loewenstein (2015) calls disaster capitalism. Not only harbors capitalism crises, it even exposes mechanisms to from them. Crises often lead to individual gains and collective losses (Klein, 2007). Capitalism is the root of the demise and does not entail a solution for local, national or global environmental problems.

Capitalism exposes a sequence of events that disrupt commons and community, hence CC [1]. Furthermore, it leads to destructive levels of ecological degradation, hence CC [2]. The capitalist narrative of the commons adds to the catastrophism. In chapter 1 I argue that a CC is evidently present in capitalism.

In the second chapter I will present Parecon as a viable alternative to capitalism. First, I will explain what goals and institutions define Parecon. Then, the critique of Parecon is investigated. The working of Parecon entails many technical difficulties. In line with Hahnel (2016), I assert that in theory Parecon is a viable alternative to capitalism. When investigating the viability of Parecon, I do not include transformational obstacles. Thus, I will not incorporate the transition from capitalism to another economic system and the installment itself. Chapter two is about whether Parecon is viable after installment.

In the third chapter, as a conclusive part, I will investigate to what extent Parecon could prevent a CC. Just like the evaluation of a CC in capitalism, I will assess CC [1] and CC [2] separately. Because of social ownership of the commons everybody owns everything we share in Parecon. is no force for inequality anymore. In a Participatory Planning procedure morality can be applied to economic decision-making. Human solidarity is strengthened because of balanced job-complexes that provide in the equal distribution of less empowering and desirable jobs. Economic democracy is necessitated by the participatory structure of the economy. The effort ratings in Parecon and a fair allocation of resources lead to economic justice. Furthermore, ecological deliberations are likely to be included in the assessment of councils’ proposals. It is theoretically plausible that CC is prevented in Parecon. Furthermore, Parecon can structure a flourishing society. The ideal theory of Parecon informs idealism in economic thinking, hence, opposes the mainstream economic discourse.

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Relevance Notwithstanding the advantages of short-term growth and a certain degree of wealth distribution, in the twenty first century the failures of capitalism are clearer than ever: returning crises, inadequate measures against pollution, no common ground for sustainability measures, and growing inequality between the rich and poor. The list goes on. Still, capitalism is in place. Our global modern economy struggles with the challenges of global common resources like water, air and the entire ecosystem. We are losing this battle and are overstepping planetary boundaries, entering what is called ‘the 6th mass extinction’ (Rockström et al, 2009; Ceballos et al, 2015).

Still the notion seems widespread that ‘there is no alternative’ (TINA). Margaret Thatcher, the Prime Minister of The United Kingdom from 1979 to 1990, ushered this phrase implicating the global victory of welfare over other economic systems, especially and . This TINA-doctrine demonstrates the way in which capitalism is taken for granted the last decades. Even so-called ‘socialists’ seem to adhere to the dominant model of capitalism. The introduction of welfare state capitalism is seen as a socialist accomplishment to make capitalism more humane. This thesis joins the debate about substituting capitalism with alternative models of society by arguing CC occurs in capitalism. I assert Parecon is the right model to replace capitalism with.

The last decades, scholars and activists use the commons paradigm as an important part of a counterhegemonic project (Bakker, 2007; Boyle, 2003, 2008; Bollier, 2001, 2013, 2014; Hahnel, 2015a; McCarthey, 2005; Rowe, 2013; Shiva, 2002, 2016; Young, 2011). In Parecon, the notion of capitalist commons is replaced by the participatory commons. Additionally, this thesis takes part in the debate over private and collective property. Parecon leads to a flourishing society and the absence of is an important part of its ideal. As the secondary aim of this thesis, I want to elucidate the pessimistic notion of the commons that is visible in the mainstream economic discourse; the capitalist narrative objects participatory movements that have a focus on community and social ownership of the commons.

I coin the concept of CC to denote the grave dangers we are exposed to within capitalism. A CC is evident in capitalism. Preventing the CC is crucial to the survival and the sustainability of human species. I term the concept of Commons Catastrophe to give urgency to the implementation of a new system. Parecon is put forward as a viable alternative to capitalism. In this thesis, I defend the position that an alternative to capitalism, namely Parecon, can prevent a CC.

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1. The Commons Catastrophe We are at a crucial moment in human history. We face what I term the Commons Catastrophe (CC). A CC occurs if:

[1] A sequence of events that disrupts the commons and the community occurs

and/or

[2] Unsustainable levels of ecological degradation are reached which risk the complete destruction of the world we live in.

For a CC to occur, [1] or [2] is sufficient and one of the two attributes is necessary to exist. In this chapter I investigate to what extent capitalism leads to [1] and/or [2]. CC is a disjunctive concept, because one of its attributes is needed to establish a CC. My thesis specifies the possession of either one attribute or another: all other instances are excluded. In this chapter, I elaborate on this concept of CC. Because of analytical purposes I differentiate between an endogenous and exogenous notion of CC. I coin the neologism of CC to give urgency to installing an alternative to the deadlock of capitalism. In this part I will elaborate on what CC exactly is.

First, in a historical assessment (1.1), I will give an overview of the concept of the commons, and qualify its discourse as an overall pessimistic one. I bring forward the contextual and the historical relation between commons and capitalism and place my work within a counterhegemonic tradition. Further, I differentiate between capitalist commons and participatory commons.

In the second section (1.2) I will elucidate the first, endogenous notion of CC [1]: A system constitutes a sequence of events that disrupts commons and community. I investigate the way commons are dealt with in a market society: a society that is based upon a (Polanyi, 1957). I analyze how the commons fall prey to capitalism’s destructive logic via market enclosure: “the process through which resources held in common for all to use are gradually being taken over by corporate interests” (Bollier, 2001). Furthermore, in the capitalistic doctrine, the commons and the community are marginalized. If something is privatized, it is not common anymore: hence, capitalist commons. Economic justice, economic democracy and human solidarity are in demise and in this process the commons as well as the community are disrupted. The first section is mainly a theoretical enterprise.

I treat the empirical world of environmental destruction separately in the final section (1.3) of this chapter. It is about the second, exogenous notion of CC [2]: A system reaches

12 unsustainable levels of ecological degradation risking the complete destruction of the world we live in. This exogenous notion of CC (for example global warming) is partly a function of the endogenous notion (carbon dioxide pollution derived from capital accumulation), yet partly about the world outside the scope of markets (if capitalism was eliminated today, we would still face global warming). Additionally, in this section I argue that capitalism is not consistent with sustainability issues (capital accumulation leading to pollution is not reconcilable with anti-pollution measures).

In the here and now, the majority of the world needs a fair and just system which guarantees justice, democracy and solidarity. As populations grow, CC becomes ever more pressing. Economic justice, economic democracy and human solidarity are factors that correlate with ecological sustainability. One of the peculiarities of capitalism is that, unlike the demise of democracy, justice and solidarity, environmental destruction does form a real threat to many capitalists. The end of this chapter draws attention to capitalist measures to prevent ecological degradation.

1.1 History and Discourse of the Commons and Capitalism In the last decades, critical discourse analysis plays an important part in social research1. I use discourse in this sense: ‘a way of construing aspects of the world associated with a particular social perspective’ (Fairclough, 2013, p.11). In this sense, capitalism is a social perspective. In this section I give a short assessment of the ‘capitalism induced’ discourse of the commons. Discourse analysis illuminates how capitalism infects the concept of the commons. Further, I put mainstream concepts of collective decision-making forward.

The commons concept is from its advent correlated with capitalism. From the fifteenth to the twentieth century, the majority of English commonly owned land was transferred into private hands (Wordie, 1983). The First Enclosure can be considered the transition from to capitalism (Marx, 1976). Before capitalism things were already held in common2. Yet, the

1 Critical discourse analysis conflates critical social analysis with language studies. Critical social analysis has a normative and explanatory component. It is normative in the sense that it evaluates existing realities and assesses the relation between realities and certain values which are considered (whether contentious or not) fundamental for a just society. It is explanatory for it tries to explain existing realities by structures and mechanisms that drives them. In this thesis I want to make use of critical social analysis to illuminate how the disruption of the commons and the community as well as ecological destruction can be explained as an effect of forces associated with capitalism. (Fairclough, 2013, p. 9). 2 Romans already wrote about ‘communis’ which refers to things held in common. Yet, modern usage of commons, referring to ‘land held in commons’, originates in the late 15th century (Harper, 2011). This coincides with the advent of the First Enclosure in England.

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First Enclosure marked the beginning of the widespread disruption of the commons and the community.

Karl Polanyi (1957) calls enclosure ‘a of the rich against the poor’ (p. 37). Undisputedly, the wealthy landowners were the beneficiaries of this policy measures. Commonly owned land gave commoners labour opportunities. During the First Enclosure, local farmers lost their jobs (Wordie, 1983). Harvests were not directed to the community, but commercialized by small groups. The enclosure deprived the poor of their livelihood. The advantages were that property systems were innovated and production increased (Boyle, 2003, p. 44). Yet, the disadvantages outweighed the advantages. In the sixteenth century Thomas More (2016) wrote that enclosure was unjust and harmful in its consequences.

1.1.1 Tragedy of the commons and other conventional concepts. The rather conventional notion of the commons that More (2016) employs, denotes commonly owned land, like forests, a pasture or woodland. These lands were cultivated by commoners: a broad social division referring to ‘ordinary’ people with little political or economic power. ’s Tragedy of the commons (2009) reflects on how shared common resources are overused and eventually depleted. First published in 1968, for decades this article helped build a narrative where the concept of commons is linked to tragedy.

Garrett Hardin uses a fable of common grazing pasture where group of cowherds work. He considers it rational for every herd to maximize his or her profits. Hence, the cowherd will opt for the most grazing as possible for his cows. If every rational individual acts out of self- interest, this process leads to overgrazing. This could eventually deplete the grazing pasture.

In the twenty-first century, under the influence of game-theory, the community, the commons were interlinked in new concepts of decision-making. Besides the tragedy of the commons, prisoner’s dilemma and collective action also rendered a pessimistic outlook on the commons (Bollier, 2002)3. All concepts are about forces in human nature that supposedly dismiss rational cooperation. Long-term advantages or common interests are rejected in favor of the short-term vision of the ‘rationalist, self-interested individual’ (Ostrom, 2015).

Research after research used these concepts as a base for one of their main arguments: it is irrational for any rational human to work together when there is no direct reward. The

3 I will not elaborate on the concepts of the prisoner’s dilemma or the collective action problem. For an extensive treatment of both concepts and their interlinkedness I refer to a lucid article by Robert Hardin (no family of Garrett): Hardin, R. (1971). Collective action as an agreeable n‐prisoners' dilemma. Systems Research and Behavioral Science, 16(5), 472-481.

14 concepts focus on liberty and property. Individuals are seen as the sole holders of property hereby contradicting collective property. Theories that involve the rational choice of individuals do not take community-based action into account.

1.1.2 Life, Liberty and property. It is insightful to understand the political philosophy that underpins capitalism. The TINA-doctrine shows that protagonists of capitalism use political philosophy to construe economic policy and denounce alternatives of capitalism. The tragedy of the commons is a good example of how neoclassical theory is interpreted4. This concept points to a liberal tradition based on . According to Locke (1713), everyone has natural rights to life, liberty and property. The government is morally obliged to serve people with this trident in mind. In (2017), the second father of classical liberalism, wrote about the "invisible hand" guiding the course of free markets. of Locke protects individuals and puts them in a reciprocate relation with the state. From the fable of Hardin was distilled: private property should be promoted and/or the state should regulate the economy. In his treatment of private rights of property and individual freedom, Locke used concepts of Thomas Hobbes. In Leviathan Hobbes (2006) paints a picture of a world with constant chaos. reigns if it is not for a sovereign (the state) who can install the rules to live by and has coercive power to keep its subjects in place. According to Hobbes, motivation of humans is based on what is good for them. People naturally fight with one another to obtain own good5. Consequently, cowherds will naturally opt for the most profit and need guidance.

The tragedy of the commons-concept informs politics, culture and science to this very day (Euler 2015, p. 33). Government intervention and privatised property are seen as the possible solutions for the tragedy of the commons. Conservative neoliberal thought diminishes the role of the state, so private ownership suited the capitalist project better. The ‘natural economic order’ is served best when everybody seeks to fulfill self-interests. The market will adjust itself to the greatest benefit of all (Friedman, 2009).

Neoliberals use its Darwinian logic to marginalise collectively managed property (Bollier 2002, p. 9). The concepts public and community are separated from private and individual. In mainstream economic -capitalist induced - theory four types of goods are discerned: private

4 Garrett Hardins Tragedy of the commons (2009) arguably is one of the most famous and cited concepts in the realm of economics and natural resources literature. 5 Not hindered by feminist notions, Thomas Hobbes uses ‘men’ instead of ‘humans’.

15 goods, club goods, common resources and public goods. Instead of using inclusiveness and non-competitiveness, the categories are classified on the basis of and rivalrousness. Private goods, like bread and wine, are rivalrous. This means the bread and wine cannot be consumed by two persons at the same time. Private goods are also excludable, for one person can be excluded from eating cheese when he cannot purchase it. See figure 1 for the other classifications; notice the capitalistic trace.

Figure 1

Excludable Non-excludable

Private Goods Common Resources Rival

Non-rival Club Goods Public Goods

The term public good denotes what is already open to everyone. In a market society, the state usually purchases this good when pressure from groups or individuals informs public policy (Bollier, 2002, p. 12).

In the capitalist narrative, the common property institutions are seen as counterproductive.6 This could be the case, because the commons are confused with open-access regime, in which a resource is open to everyone without restriction (Bollier, 2002, p. 12). Hardin’s (2009) tragedy of the commons, as he later acknowledged, was about pastures with open-access. There was no authority, let alone regulation. Still, neoliberals stubbornly turn to above mentioned theories as legitimization for their policies.

There is, however, plentiful evidence that contradict this line of reasoning. On a global scale, internet proves that this conviction is unattainable. Many open source networks connect people who are exchanging information and software. More or less anonymous individuals share ideas, programs and reviews all the time. They do this without asking for anything but improvement of the system in return. When things are not commodified, and not market- dependent, there is more room for cooperation. I come back to this later on in my thesis.

6 Capitalism is the mainstream economic model. The capitalist narrative (i.e. story) is part of neoclassical or liberal discourse.

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At the local level, volunteering of any kind shows people want to ‘make a difference’ without personal ‘gain’ (capitalistic terminology). They earn respect and help out their community. Family members and friends help each other out constantly without reward other than love and affection. In these instances, price and profit are not involved while progress is reached.

1.1.3 The Second Enclosure. At this point in time we are amidst a Second Enclosure (Boyle, 2003)7. The “enclosure is the historical antonym and nemesis of the commons”, as ‘commons historian’ Pete Linebaugh (2014, p. 1) wrote down so eloquently. In the First Enclosure, peasants were driven away from the land by wealthy land owners (Wordie, 1983). The Second Enclosure has its focus on immaterial things like knowledge, or things not considered commons before like our ecosystem. It is undeniable that the level and scale of the enclosure heightens over time: first the land was enclosed, now the sky has no limit. In the 1990’s, the practice of and privatisation was more widespread than ever before. The capitalist narrative entailed the same slogan as after World War II: “the free world”. The neoliberal era coincided with the end of the Cold War; a defeat of communism.8The process of privatisation of today’s Second Enclosure is similar to the First Enclosure, because it is about turning into private ownership.

1.1.4 New movements, new commons. During the proclamation of the victory of capitalism in the 1990s, its opponents began clearing their throat. An enclave of opposition to the alleged triumph of capitalism was formed. It was part of the ‘Third Way’: an alternative viewpoint to communism and capitalism. In the next chapter I bring forward a model that originated during this period: Parecon. The last decades non- game-theory informed new studies and insights in many fields. A current boast in literature concerning the commons is partly derived from economic theory about property and institutions, property arrangements and common pool resources. The environmental turn provided a body of literature that described the relation between human actions and environmental consequences (Mancilla, 2016).

7 Scholars differ in how many stages of enclosure they discern and what typifies them. For instance, according to James Boyle (2008) we are now amidst a second enclosure movement where the human mind is being enclosed. 8 The Cold War can be described as an ideological battle between capitalism and communism. In the end, communism by many was seen as the loser, as antidote to freedom. Francis Fukuyama (1989) proclaimed ‘the end of history’: western liberalism triumphed and its belief in the free market was transferred all over the ever more globalised system of nation-states and regional arrangements. Communism has its obvious similarities with the commons paradigm, especially its arduous relationship with capitalism. I would consider it an omission not to point to the demise of communism and its probable impact on envisioning alternatives to the free market.

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Despite the predominantly pessimistic narrative on commons, recently there is reason for optimism. The last decades transnational movements began to emerge that coincided with the growth of the World Wide Web and open source networks (Bollier, 2014). People from different cultures started to play computer games with each other through peer-to-peer communication.9 The Linux software development community sprang up and sites like Wikipedia embellish the digital universe with information for and by everyone that wants to get involved10. National and international groups share deep convictions on sharing the commons and protecting them, evident in the and other anti-globalization protests.

Nobel Prize in Economics winner Elinor Ostrom shows in her work how communities are able to manage natural resources in a successful way, without the government or private agents interfering11. Ostrom (2015) composed eight principles for managing the commons12. In my view, it is harmful that Ostroms work gives rise to the idea of a ‘governable common’.

Ostrom (2015) depicts instances, where government and law do not interfere vehemently. Her examples entail irrigation systems in Spain and the Philippines, grazing pastures in Switzerland, and Japanese forests. These projects are not under tight control of capitalism. In time they will be, because of the thirst for expansion that defines capitalism. I follow Rosa Luxembourg’s (2003) argumentation that the logic of capitalism entails the expansion into non-capitalist areas in order to attain new markets for labour as well as trading of goods.13

The seventh principle that Ostrom proposes to protect the commons is: “The rights of appropriators to devise their own institutions are not challenged by external governmental authorities” (Ostrom, 2015, p. 101). A market society inherently challenges non-market actors. I contend that ‘higher’ authorities will oppose community appropriators when certain commons resources are significantly valuable within the economy of a particular area. The

9 The online-game industry has grown enormously over the last decade and became a ‘media force’ to be reckoned with (Williams, 2002). Multi-player online battle arenas with hundreds of millions of users are the domain of games like Call of Duty, Witcher III and Heroes of the storm (‘King Pesmerga’, ‘Tanqus’, ‘DonMarino’). 10 Both Linux and Wikipedia are non-profit organisations. The owners of Linux and Wikipedia could, however, use their data for infinite business opportunities. 11 Officially, The Nobel Prize is called Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences. 12 Among other things: define clear group boundaries, ensure that those affected by the rules can participate in modifying the rules, use sanctions for rule violators and provisions have to be made for dispute resolution. 13 Furthermore, current day globalisation points to an ever more integrated world wherein different markets in geographical distant places are tied to one global capitalist system.

18 market will eventually absorb these commons since market allocation supposedly leads to the greatest benefit to all.

Furthermore, when the market society will not be directly involved in extracting a common resource, capitalism is directly harmful in its effects on society as a whole and the ecosystem we live in. An environmental catastrophe affects everything we hold in common. These parts of the CC will be discussed in the next sections.

Still, the value of Ostroms work for common resources can hardly be underestimated. Throughout her work, Ostrom explains how the commons paradigm is about a shared understanding of allocation of scarce use rights. Consequently, when we do not share the same conception of commons, we do not have everything in common. Since the emergence of much commons research, there is ample differentiation of the conceptualization of the commons.14

It can puzzle the student of the CC and reader of this thesis how the commons is used and what is meant by it. When common resources like fish in the sea or parks are being privatised, they are not common anymore in the capitalistic sense. For the interest of clarity, I would like to distinguish the latter from the former. I coin the concepts participatory commons and capitalist commons to discern two types of commons

The participatory commons denotes parks and roads but also knowledge and democracy: everything we share is common. If commons are privatised, they are still commons. Ostrom takes a naturalistic notion of commons and does not employ the commons as a social construct. The participatory common depicts a natural or manmade resource that is common, and should consciously be held and used in common. It is a social construct because in discourse it is materialised in a certain manner.

Consequently, there is no participatory commons without what Linebaugh (2014) refers to as commoning: people that govern the commons. In this thesis I investigate whether the community, as opposed to the state or a corporation, should govern the commons. I study the absence of this process in a market-based system like capitalism, a defect leading to CC. This chapter is about how the commons are market-dependent within capitalism and being

14 Differentiation between tangible and intangible common assets is not uncommon. Next to commons, there are anti-commons depicting commons resources which are used less when privatised. Some scholars discern different realms of the commons: natural resources, public domains and gift economies. David Bollier (2013) calls “the robust circulation of gifts within communities” an indispensable condition for a (p. 8). The concept of the global commons refers to the entire ecosystem, oceans and the atmosphere. ‘Who owns the sky?’ asks Peter Barnes (2011) when investigating the limits of privatisation.

19 privatised rapidly so I will investigate the capitalist commons. The next chapters are about a new system and to what extent CC could be prevented in a future model of society; hence, I will make use of the participatory commons.

This section showed the obscure togetherness of the terms commons and capitalism. The liberal notion of ‘life, liberty and property’ fueled the narrative of capitalism as mainstream economic discourse and a liberal philosophy typified commons as ‘anti-progress’. This is part of the TINA-doctrine. When postulating CC in a capitalist system, it is imperative to explain what this dominant capitalist system entails. What is ‘the sequence of events’ within capitalism that composes a catastrophe? I will focus on this question in the next section.

1.2 The Destructive Logic of Capitalism CC [1] A sequence of events that disrupts the commons and the community occurs

Capitalism is the dominant model of our world. Protagonists of capitalism have tied it strictly to freedom, democracy and prosperity. Capitalism is a system where ‘economic units rely on the market for everything they need’ (Brenner, 2006, p.23). From the advent of capitalism on, inescapable market dependence leads to commodification of the commons. This commodification process in turn implicates privatisation of commons. In this section I will elaborate on this ‘sequence of events’ which can be considered the first, endogenous part of CC, the motor of disruption: capitalism constitutes a sequence of events that disrupts the commons and the community.

Figure 2

The Destructive Logic of Capitalism

Capitalism’s Market Market Commons Dominance Dependence Enclosure Catastrophe

I introduced the concepts of the commons and capitalism and elucidated their interconnectedness in economic discourse. This section is about why a CC is unstoppable in a world where capitalism prevails. The CC is the consequence of both the enclosure of the commons, and at the same time, the demise and neglect of the commons. I treat the enclosure of the commons meaning the legal process of transferring common resources to private hands.

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In my analysis of CC I use the capitalistic notion of common; they are not common anymore when privatised. The CC points to the demise of economic democracy, economic justice and human solidarity and the advancement of ecological degradation.

I define economic democracy as substantial participation of humans in the economic process, with as its central tenet that people have decision-making power in proportion to the extent that they are affected by a decision (Hahnel & Albert, 1991a). Economic justice means a fair distribution of wealth and allocation of resources, human solidarity points to a sense of community that reconciles individual with collective needs and ecological sustainability is about making the human organisation compatible with environmental concerns. These categories are all intertwined.

1.2.1 Capitalism as a natural state and the freedom myth. Capitalism has a firm grip on world affairs. Today, neoliberal capitalism dominates society in political, cultural and economic ways (Heynen & Robbins, 2005; Giroux, 2004; Jessop, 2002). Neoliberal capitalism is presented as an inevitable and natural state (Davies & Bansel, 2007). Perry Anderson (2000) describes neoliberalism as ‘the most successful ideology in world history’. One can trace back capitalism to the philosophy of John Locke. According to Locke (1713) capital adds value to nature. The person who has capital has the natural right to own the natural resources. This right implicitly diminishes the rights of the community. In the narrative of capitalism there are strong ties with freedom and democracy. I refer to this as the freedom myth.

Milton Friedman is one of the most well-known and articulate protagonists of neoliberalism. Friedman (2009) thinks free institutions (institutions outside the scope of the coercive state) should flourish. The self-regulatory market is king. Friedman echoes the theories of Locke and Hobbes15. The market eliminates the source of coercion by staying free of political authority. Government is in place to organise human experience and serve communities. If we –as a thought experiment- substitute government with community, its defect becomes more visible. Following Friedman’s line of thought, private corporations and individuals have to be free from the community, have to be free to act out of self-interest.

15 It may seem I use narrative and discourse interchangeably. With narrative I point to a story, which is made ‘whole’ by its tellers: there should be no gaps in the storyline. A ‘good’ story must be coherent and comprehensible. When using discourse I point to the overall social practice of producing, distributing and consuming texts within a social context that informs this practice and is affected by it.

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People in the tradition of John Locke and Milton Friedman link freedom to capitalism. In this line of thought, it is not difficult to distillate a ‘natural’ connection between democracy and capitalism. The individual supposedly holds the freedom to reign. Today, it is often questioned whether capitalism and democracy are a great fit (Hamzaee et al., 2017; Krogh, 2014; Streeck, 2015). I will elaborate on economic democracy later on in this section.

The freedom myth entails that capitalism leads to ‘freedom of the individual’, whether this refers to individual humans or individual corporations. The theory of freedom does not involve models of how common resources are depleting. Furthermore, the ‘freedom of the community’ is a non-issue in mainstream economic discourse.

An issue apparent from classical Athens until the present time, the freedom of the individual versus the community’s , is evident in the commons paradigm. The connection of freedom and market is false in more than one way. First, people are dependent to a market; therefore, market logic controls movement of actors within it. Market failures and crises have a great impact on people’s lives16. Furthermore, certain people work within factories for wages that are minimal, and they possibly hate the factory work. Just because there is possibly no other source of income nearby to sustain their livelihood they are -in one way or another- forced to work there. For their basic needs they are relying on the market. The factory could produce cigarettes, while the workers hate smoking. The common good is not incorporated in the aims of market actors. They aim for profit.

Second, the market itself is not free, not without manipulation. In present day neoliberalism, state Treasuries interfere constantly with the market by means of adjusting interest rates. Additionally, organisations like WTO and IMF are meant to support the ‘free market’ when giving loans to poor countries and facilitate the process of managing exchange rates. Laissez- fair policy is always planned in modern day capitalism. The core of neoliberalism in economic policy is deregulation, privatisation and laying a foundation for economic enterprise in securing property rights (Stiglitz, 1999). The discrepancy between the philosophy and policy of IMF and WTO implicates capitalism’s inconsistency. On the one hand IMF and WTO “are institutional bastions of belief in the free market system” (Stiglitz, 1999, p. 587). On the other hand they regularly interfere in markets by adjusting exchange rates, smoothing trade and helping out creditors that are in troubled water.

16 I will elaborate on this in the next section.

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Why the state cannot interfere with the market and make the system more just? How exactly does the state adhere to neoliberal policy? concludes in The Great Transformation (1957) that both the nation state and the market economy come together in one concept: the market society. Not only private actors (e.g. humans) in Wood’s analysis are market dependent, the state is market dependent too, or perhaps formulated more sharply: a market economy involves a society of which the institutions are overpowered by market mechanisms (Polanyi, 1957).

The state apparatus, it can be argued, is just as enclosed as the rest of the commons. does not circumvent capitalist forces. The state is part of the market society. The corporations need the state for the creation of its laws. The state should enforce these laws and uphold democracy, since capitalists do not want to change the status quo (Boettke, Coyne & Leeson, 2008). National policy is influenced by scholars and lobbyists of neoliberal stripes, which can best be described by the example of the Chicago School.

Milton Friedman was part of the Chicago School. This was a school of thought strongly connected with neoliberalism.17 ’ economic interventionism, where a state for example interferes within market society by way of fiscal adjustments, was seen as the enemy (Gray et al., 2015). Friedman and others advocated deregulation in order to support growth rates, should sell off assets to corporations and social programs should be on the margins of government policy.

1.2.2 Capitalism means market dependence. It is clear capitalism is dominant and its narrative is filled with the freedom myth. Furthermore, state and capitalism come together in a market society. The next step in the sequence that means catastrophe is market- dependence. Ellen Meiksin Wood (1999) differentiates between market-enablement and market-dependence. Protagonists of capitalism often refer to the market as enabler of human potential. People can turn to the market for profit, self-reproduction, their basis needs, well-being and improvement of life-style. In The politics of Capitalism (1999) Wood begins her argument postulating the market as imperative. The imperative market is about how people are forced to respond to the capitalist market. There is no way around dealing with it.

17 The protagonists of this school of thought were referred to as the ‘Chicago Boys’. They were affiliated with the University of Chicago. Their compeers at The University of California at Berkley were known as the ‘Berkley Mafia’. Both groups were influential advisers on financial and monetary policies. They advised governments in the United States of America as well as abroad, for example in Chile.

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Like Brenner (2006) and Wood (1999, 2002), I look at capitalism through the lens of market- dependence. This market-dependence automatically makes economic factors subject to imperatives of competition and growth. In pre-capitalist society, the market did not have the central place in human life it eventually acquired. Producers, like peasants, generally were in possession of land. Exploitation consisted of coercion. In short, a landlord could attain a part of the production of a farmer simply by force; supposedly it returned the favor with ‘protection’18.

Certain strategies are necessary for success in the market: specialization, seeking low-cost techniques, enhancing labor productivity. Competitiveness, growth-imperative and private ownership are features of the market economy. Accumulation and innovation are driven by competition. Wood argues that simply because there is a market, there arises a market- dependency. This market dependence entails the commercialization of society, the commodification of the commons and the privatisation of the commons. Capitalist narrative focusses on market opportunities and circumvents market failures.

Both Keynesian and neoliberal politics could not hinder crises returning and could certainly not keep up growth rates after the post-war boom. They differ in that Keynesian politics refers to measures that adjust the system and neoliberal politics is characterised by laissez-faire. Yet, whether it is Keynesian obstruction or neoliberal enhancement, both economic thoughts focus on market opportunities instead of markets inherent failures19.

Young (2011) discerns three types of market failure. First, under a private-property regime it is rational for the owner of resources to use up the resource completely before investing in other resources. Second, certain arrangements can include usage of resources that deteriorates land instead of choosing for production that improves the land. Third, commodification of resources may lead to negative like climate change20. Bollier (2014) adds that extreme market dominance tends to undermine civic trust and inhibits a shared vision that is required in a well-functioning society. The CC [1] points to this kind of disruption of the commons and the community.

18 See the next subsection: according to Bollier (2001), a kind of ‘feudal’ era could return in the advancement of the dystopia of the market enclosure. 19 After the financial crisis of 2008, there was a resurgence of Keynesian policies named ’New ’ (Gilchrist et al., 2016). History has showed, however, that neoliberal and Keynesian policy cannot hinder crises from returning. 20 costs are paid for by the community. For example, the externality cost air pollution normally is not being incorporated in the costs of a production process.

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1.2.3 Market enclosure. Why is there no regulation that prevents market enclosure? The proposals to prevent privatisation are often viewed as paternalistic (Friedman, 2009). Liberal thought consists of the idea that corporations can freely come to a shared decision, hence make a fair deal. This has everything to do with the role of the legislator: the state. The state is a market player and deregulation is part of the ideal of the free-market. A market is not free when heavily regulated. On the contrary, initiatives that enhance market functioning are widespread. Competition on a global level led to even more national deregulation than already was the case in the 1980s and 1990s. Market society is a system where the state is submissive to the market. In a market society, the commons and the community have a negative connotation. Market dependence leads to the commodification of the commons. Commodification refers to the creation of an economic good. For example, a price is attached to water in order to be traded within the market (Bakker, 2005). This commodification in turn leads to privatisation because wat was formerly common (water) is turned into private ownership.21. This is typical for the capitalist common because it is about commons that are market-dependent and are being privatised.

I explained how capitalism is framed within a liberal ideology and is the dominant social perspective on world affairs. Further, capitalism means market dependence leading to commodification and subsequent privatisation of common goods. Why does the privatisation of the commons leads to a CC [1]?

In short, it is unfair because it disproportionately benefits the capitalist elite and deprives the community of the common resources. An unfair system leads to the disruption of the commons and the community: hence, a CC [1] occurs. Privatisation is about growth and capital accumulation in the short-term; it does not involve deliberations that involve a just society over a longer period of time. What is more, a sense of community is not strengthened because the focus on . Privatisation is the motor of the CC.

The First Enclosure had its positive effects: away with the master-commoner relationship and ‘vassals’ transformed into ‘freeholders’ (Wordie, 1983; Bollier, 2014). A ‘commercial’ elite got a hold of the commons. This led to greater harvests and lower costs in the short-term. Yet, mass-privatisation, deregulation and globalization put more distance between capitalist

21 I use privatisation and market enclosure interchangeably, although market enclosure refers to market forces as coercive in the process of commodification of the commons and privatisation denotes the process of private actors getting ownership of the capitalist commons.

25 owners and localities. Local entities benefit from long term plans and long-lasting commitment.

Local communities have an investment horizon spanning over decades. Indigenous communities in the United States, when making deliberations about what to harvest and consume, consider the impact on the seventh generation from now (LaDuke, 2017). Yet, market-dependence means living by the rules of the market. Rational corporations pursue short-term profit and, like in the fable of Hardin, do not make costly long term analysis and policy prescriptions.

The slogan of localities is “All for one, one for all” (Linebaugh, 2014, p. 13). Human solidarity is at the heart of a good functioning society. If we zoom in from a global to local level, we see commoning in every form and shape. In the near future, capitalism can throw us back to medieval fiefdoms, as Bollier (2002) warns us. When everything is mediated by the market, in which everything is privately owned, “every minor property-holder demands tribute for the right to cross his land or ford his streams” (p. 23).

Capitalism’s respect for property rights, both intellectual and material, can make a student of commons feel like a sane person hospitalised. In the first place there was no respect at all for common property. The rights of the community were trampled upon since the First Enclosure (Wordie, 1983). A legal framework permits extensive property rights of corporations and the unbounded attainment of wealth. Often, promising community-based projects are doomed unless they are handled as private property and protected by law in that respect (Eisenberg, 2012). The case of New York city-gardens illustrates neoliberal encroachment within the urban space. In the evolution of enclosure, it is evident that more and more is enclosed, from material to immaterial things. Market-dependence implicates that the logic of the market dictates the workings of society.

We should seek for a humane and productive balance between commons and markets, Bollier (2002) states. I do not agree. As Young (2011) explains, the market will absorb the commons, and the laws of the market will not protect the commons: resources are used up when no longer profitable, the degradation of land could be considered a non-issue and negative externalities are not taken into account.

The all-encompassing market dependence and subsequent market enclosure leads to the absence of economic democracy (the capital elite holds power over common resources and productive forces, everyone is market dependent so market failures have great impact on

26 people’s lives, the capitalist elite makes economic decisions that affect the majority of people’s live), economic injustice (externality costs paid for by community, less social programs, and decrease of human solidarity (focus on individual needs instead of community needs, focus on competition and accumulation of capital that makes human beings competitors instead of cooperators). Our sense of commons and community is equally undermined. A system where individual gain and outmanoeuvring competitors is rewarded does not strengthen the sense of commons and community.

Taken ecological sustainability into account, we face a disastrous end if neoliberalism has its unlimited way. The concern with ecological degradation is shared by capitalists. Yet, market imperatives do not allow for sustainable solutions. How do capitalist forces adhere to crises and possible catastrophe? In order to asses CC [2] I will elaborate on sustainability issues within the capitalist framework in the next section.

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1.3 Ecological Degradation & Capitalism’s Crisis Management CC [2] Unsustainable levels of ecological degradation are reached which risk the complete destruction of the world we live in.

The market enclosure claims common resources. Additionally, market forces are not capable of retaining the commons when facing destruction. The destructive logic of capitalism can be disguised by its protagonists, but global warming is noticed by every sensible individual. I established so far that the narrative of the commons is filled with pessimistic notions of collective ownership. Furthermore, capitalism’s destructive logic implies a CC [1] by enclosure. For the marginalised people, the attainment of the participatory commons is essential. Then, the economic decision-making power of the community can be restored and a fair system put in place. For the wealthy people, often, the symbol of disaster is the demise of our ‘global commons’ ecosystem (CC [2]) for even many capitalists take environmental degradation seriously.

This section treats the exogenous notion of the CC: capitalism reaches unsustainable levels risking the complete destruction of the world we live in. It is about the forces outside of the system that point to disaster. Notwithstanding its disastrous effect on our ecosystem, capitalism is passive when it comes to real solutions.

The second section of this chapter primarily describes the societal downfall. Now I will investigate the ecological degradation within capitalism. We are at the most dangerous moment in the history of humanity. This section is about the end of the world and we know it: ecological destruction. I asses the inevitability of environmental catastrophe and the way capitalists deal with capitalism’s inadequacy to rescue the planet.

1.3.1 Planetary boundaries. For some scholars it is easier to imagine the end of the world than the end of capitalism (Kovel, 2007). I like to argue that both endings likely will coincide if nothing fundamentally changes. The Stockholm Resilience Centre have made a report where they state that we have crossed, or are near crossing nine ‘planetary boundaries’: climate change, the disruption of the nitrogen phosphorus cycles, ocean acidification, ozone depletion, freshwater usage, land cover change, species extinction, aerosol landing and chemical use (Röckström et al., 2009). Garrett Hardins most influential article about the tragedy of the commons is constructed with the notion in mind that is derived from Enlightment thought: the division between human and nature. Hardin views humans as separable and superior to natural world. The term

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Anthropocene refers to a human-dominated geological epoch (Lewis & Maslin, 2015). People show a lack of respect for ecological concerns when they view themselves as dominant and tend to modify (the rest of) nature for their own benefit22. What could be considered sensible and justifiable community action is overruled by individualistic logic.

You do not have to search for doom thinkers to understand the fragility of the earth and the role humans play in its destruction. As John Bellamy Foster (2011) explains, Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels were influenced by scientists who studied human destruction of the natural environment. In Capital Marx (1976) asserts capital accumulation is disregardful of the destruction of its own human and natural bases, because it gives no other purpose than the pursuit of individual benefit.

As already stated in the last section, the local and indigenous communities recognise the importance of future generations, but the market by its very nature does not. Profit maximization is about the here and now, not about future prospects. Market does not integrate future generations into the plans for the present. Barnes (2001) describes air, water and forests as ‘our shared ’. Within the capitalist paradigm, ‘inheritance’ usually points to capital being transferred.

The tragedy of the commons in a reversed way is evident in the pollution of our shared inheritance. Instead of taking something out of the common ground, now something is put into the common air. However inescapable market enclosure is, why not circumventing the CC through somewhat like a capitalist backdoor? I summarise why this is unheard of, besides the fact that it obscures the fact that the capitalist system is rigged.

1.3.2 Green capitalism. For some, like the current American president, simply denying truth about ecological destruction seems the only ‘sustainability measure’. Others try to use capitalism in order to make the world more sustainable. Privatisation often is a cure worse than the disease. Recent years green capitalism is a so-called ‘environment-friendly’ approach to capitalism. Some people, Al Gore is one of them, suggest green capitalism is the answer to environmental degradation. Green corporations with ‘social responsible’ policy prescriptions supposedly will lead the way to a bright future. It is hard to proof if it is just a public relations strategy in response to social activism, which is appropriately called 'greenwash’. The proliferation of ‘green’ unintentionally seems to reveal the goal: keep making dollars.

22 As if their own benefit differs from the common good.

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Green capitalism is a way for the economic elite to stay in power. Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) is about surpassing profit to attain social beneficial goals (Karnani, 2014). Rather, CSR should be about that. Due to systemic focus on short-term growth and benefits, capitalists are not interested in future sustainability issues. The emission-trading has shown to promote profits while increase the amount of carbon-emissions. This is because large companies that trade emissions effectively have an advantage over their competitors and can produce more. The concept of fossil capitalism is termed, because capitalism is intrinsically linked to fossil fuels (Altvater, 2009). Since large companies still rely heavily on fossil fuels, the level of pollution increases. Hence, market-based ‘solutions’ often are worse than nothing (Foster, 2011; Stevens, 2017).

The case of Coca-Cola in India is a poignant example of how corporate social responsibility leads to a CC. Coca-Cola had a clear defined CSR yet never followed through when the opportunity was there to make enormous profits. The extraction of ground water at Coca-Cola factories led to a water crisis that disrupted the commons and the community in an Indian region (Karnani, 2014).

1.3.3 Neoliberal crisis management. Following the Marxist line of thought, one could argue that a crisis leads to revolution. Did the crises of the last century led to the overturning of a system? No. Capitalism’s sinister side is most apparent when it comes to crises, no matter what kind. Crises are used by protagonists of capitalism to enforce enclosure (Klein, 2007). When people are in shock by what happened it is the best moment to enforce things that are unpleasant, because it takes time for people to notice what just happened and to organise in protest. Friedman (2009, p. ix): “only a crisis – actual or perceived – produces real change. When that crisis occurs, the actions that are taken depend on the ideas that are lying around”. All too often, these ideas stem from capitalist theory.

The Chicago School economists argued that a market crash could spark right-wing revolution just like it could lead to left-wing . This theory became known as “the crisis hypothesis”. Each crisis, more is earned by the capital elite compared to before the crisis. Massive private gains coincide with public losses. (Klein, 2007).

Already since the 1980s it is evident that climate change poses a serious threat to humans as well as the rest of nature (Heynen & Robbins, 2005). The world governance institutions – regional constructs, nation states, corporations and non-governmental organisations- have

30 achieved little since the widespread information burst about ecological destruction. Prognoses on ecological destruction are not getting moderate over time.

The CC [2] demonstrates the lack of cooperation in a capitalist system, leading to unsurmountable problems. The protagonists of capitalism want to camouflage its demise by the inception of green capitalism or CSR. This only obscures the fact that the capitalist system is the root of the disaster and cannot halt a CC.

Ellen Meiksin Wood (1999) puts it bluntly: “our choice of political strategies clearly depends in large part on what we think is possible and impossible in any given conditions. And what we think (...) what capitalism is” (p. 1). As long as capitalism is viewed as a natural state and is linked to freedom, and we postulate freedom of the individual as a condition for a happy life, we are on the wrong track that brings us a CC.

The concept of the CC helps us to see the urgency and danger of the way capitalism deals with the commons, whether it is on a local or global level. Robin Hahnel (2015a) poses certain questions concerning the commons: What is the commons? Whom should the commons benefit? Who should be in charge of the commons? Hahnel goes on explaining how these questions concerning the commons would be answered by Parecon. I try to go beyond his work in coining the term CC.

We need a change of philosophy, we need a change of economic discourse, and we need a change of the entire economic system. Hobbes described a world of chaos. This Leviathan world sufficiently describes the state of affairs in capitalism. In the competition for profit, commons of any kind and communities everywhere are disrupted. Preventing a CC is still possible through strengthened conservation efforts, but time is running out (Ceballos et al., 2015). This chapter is about the CC; why a disastrous end of our world is a possibility if not probability, and why the recovery of the commons is of the utmost importance in present day society. It may be the last chance to save humanity.

Capitalism and its market logic will not prevent a CC. There are several alternative models to capitalism. In the next chapter I will address the viability of one of them: Parecon. In the third and final chapter I will assess whether this model can prevent the CC.

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2. Parecon: a Viable Alternative to Capitalism In this chapter I will explain what the goals and institutions of Parecon are and how it should function ideally. To investigate whether it is a viable alternative to capitalism, I will make use of a comparison between Parecon and capitalism. Furthermore, I will evaluate the critique of Parecon. Parecon belongs to the domain of ideal theory for it is about a description of how a theory would work ideally. I assume what Rawls (2009) calls ‘strict compliance’ which means that the principles of Parecon will be strictly complied with and followed by everyone (p. 351).

The two dominate forms of twentieth century society, capitalism and communism, were not sufficient in constructing a prosperous society where human solidarity reigns. Crises expose the fact that both communism (which sides with the state) and capitalism (which sides with market) do not function well. Hahnel (2013, p. 94) summarises that capitalism failed because of its “antisocial bias” and communism failed because of its “antidemocratic bias”. From 1989 onwards it has been reported that capitalism won the battle of the ideologies when the curtain fell and the Cold War resorted to an end (Fukuyama 1991; Fischer 2009).

2.1 There Is No Alternative? Still, capitalism seems inescapable. In Capitalist Realism: Is there no alternative? Mark Fischer (2009) uses the term ‘capitalist realism’ to convey how capitalism is commonly viewed as the only viable economic and political system. He goes on stating it is impossible to even imagine an alternative to it.

The last decades even left-wing politicians have argued that it is not wise to spend much energy in fighting capitalism. There is no alternative, so get on with it, seems the motto. This is called the There Is No Alternative-doctrine (TINA) and was first publicly stated by Margaret Thatcher, the Prime Minister of The United Kingdom from 1979 to 1990. Socialist political parties as well as leftwing scholars often focus their energy on how to adjust capitalism to make it more social instead of envisioning alternatives. Hardin (2009) seems to agree: “We must admit that our legal system of private property plus inheritance is unjust — but we put up with it because we are not convinced, at the moment, that anyone has invented a better system. The alternative of the commons is too horrifying to contemplate. Injustice is preferable to total ruin” (p. 34). In this thesis I argue the opposite: capitalism leads to total ruin of the commons. An alternative that is capable of preventing us from a catastrophe should be put in place.

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2.2 Parecon In ‘Parecon and the next system’ (2009) Robin Hahnel states that capitalism is no longer sustainable. He puts many reasons forward: the middle class is shrinking, the financial system is in recurring crisis, and in the near future we could face irreversible climate change. I agree with Hahnel: we need systemic change. I try to go beyond Hahnel. First, I argue a Commons Catastrophe is evident in capitalism. The society should change to prevent disaster. Second, I investigate to what extent Parecon could prevent a CC from occurring. This chapter is about what Parecon entails. What are its aims and how it achieves them? How so is Parecon a viable alternative to capitalism?

2.2.1 Goals. When devising Parecon, the creators first thought about what an ideal economy looks like. Parecon is not a transition model and the proponents do not offer a clear strategy how to get to a well-functioning Parecon. No short-term solutions are given either: Parecon is about an end-state and in this thesis I treat it as an ideal. Together with Michael Albert, Robin Hahnel designed Parecon23. It is defined as a participatory model because people are encouraged to participate on every level of economic decision-making. Hahnel and Albert (1991a) challenge the mainstream economist assumption that allocation should be carried out either by markets or central planning. They argue a participatory approach is necessary to achieve the desired goals within a society.

Hahnel and Albert set four goals they want to achieve through Parecon: economic justice, economic democracy, human solidarity and economic efficiency. In Alternatives to capitalism: Proposals for a democratic economy (2016) Hahnel explains that by economic efficiency he means “using scarce productive resources where they are most socially beneficial and not wasting people’s hard work”. In my assessment of Parecon in the next chapter, economic efficiency will be incorporated in environmental sustainability.

23 Robin Hahnel is Professor Emeritus from the in Washington DC. For several decades he has been active in left politics. He taught in the economic department of universities all over the globe. Since Robin Hahnel is more of an active member of the scholarly community than Michael Albert, I focus on Hahnel’s work in this thesis. Robin Hahnel’s most recent books are: Of the people, by the people: The case for a participatory economy (2012), Economic justice and democracy: From competition to cooperation (2013) and The ABCs of : A modern approach (2015b).

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2.2.2 Institutions. Parecon offers an alternative to the capitalist model. It fits in the anarchist tradition, because people hold the power over production resources. In order to attain an egalitarian society, the following institutions are proposed: democratic workers and consumer councils, job-balancing complexes, remuneration based on effort and Participatory Planning. In Parecon, workers and consumers are organized in workers and consumer councils. These councils are democratic. Social ownership of the commons substitutes private ownership. Workers councils are federated across industries, whereas consumer councils are geographically federated. The neighborhood council belongs to a federation of neighborhood councils which, in turn, belongs to a regional or city council which belongs to a state council. Councils send delegates to ‘higher’ level councils. The purpose of federating is that consumption and production decisions which affect different numbers of people are weighed in properly by different sized councils and federations. The ‘lower’ levels can recall and instruct delegates and these delegates can always be rotated (Hahnel, 2014).

The production is carried out within a non-hierarchical setting: each member of the work place has one vote and is involved in the decision-making process and planning procedure24. In larger work places, members can create various sub-units that have decision power over certain issues that only concern the workers within that specific sub-unit. Obviously, long- term plans could be discussed more thoroughly than shorter plans.

In capitalism, the coordinators (managers) and owners decide what labour is worth and remunerate on the basis of economic output within the market economy. People who are less able or talented, but work hard, are doomed. In Parecon remuneration is distributed on the basis of workers’ efforts and sacrifices (Hahnel, 2012). These workers’ efforts are rated by a committee of their working mates. The more sacrifices a worker makes, the more consumption rights a worker gets. When due to circumstances someone is in need of things (e.g. health issues or tragic accidents), that person can make that apparent in the self-activity proposals of the consumer council. Other councils can approve out of solidarity.

A job-balancing complex is put in place to assure that empowering tasks are as evenly distributed as possible over the labour force. Additionally, jobs are balanced for desirability. Empowering tasks are tasks that improve the economic status and decision-making power of

24 According to proponents of Parecon, you can opt to participate wherever you would like. A person could apply for a certain workers council in a certain area and take place in a consumers council on another level than the neighborhood level. When applying for a job or a seat, your application has to be approved by relevant councils or federations.

34 the individual performing the task25. Even If one egotistically raises the empowerment level of his or her own balanced job-complex, the overall empowerment level would be higher than before. In this way, selfish measures lead to social benefits (Hahnel, 2012).

According to proponents of Parecon, people who have many empowering skills and knowledge belong to a ‘coordinator class’. The coordinator class has immeasurably more economic decision power than the average labourer. If everyone is to be invited to participate in the economic decision-making process, people have to be equally informed about the economic system. The job-balancing complex is installed to make sure that the ‘formal’ right to participate is translated into an ‘effective’ right to participate (Hahnel 2015, p. 284). Specialization is not forbidden. In Parecon, each person would still be doing only a few tasks, but some of them will be more enjoyable and empowering than others.

Every family belongs to a consumer council of the neighborhood. Members of neighborhood councils write down their consumption requests in conjunction with their effort ratings. It is hard to be greedy, because one cannot take more than the effort rating allows for. Moreover, a federation of workers and consumer councils can view their dislike with consumer proposals that seem unwise or not solidary with other people. What is more, the consumer councils function on different levels within society (neighborhood, ward, city and state) so they can take ‘social consumption’ into account. Capitalism focusses on individual consumption and does not take into account what consumption is best for an entire group of people.

Just like Ellen Meiksin Wood (2002), Hahnel and Albert associate market-dependence with capitalism: survival and social reproduction of actors are dependent on the market. The capitalist system is driven by competition and egotistical behavior. According to the proponents of Parecon, a ‘want-based’ system should be transformed in a ‘need-based’ society. This implies that Parecon is not about greed and getting as much as one can, but it proposes a system where the needs of everybody prevail. Parecon focusses on fulfilling those needs in a fair manner. The Participatory Planning (PP) process goes beyond the market and

25 I illustrate this by an example of a factory. In a factory we find cleaning personnel, administrative workers, technicians, assembly line workers and managers. Some jobs are more empowering and desirable than other jobs. A cleaning lady does not have as much knowledge about the economic decision- making process as the manager. Within capitalism, she is not in the position to influence the economic process like a manager does. Not only can a manager reprimand people or even fire them, a manager learns about all different aspects of a factory and has a lot more meetings to discuss the economic process with colleagues than the worker that is sweeping floors. This overview leads to knowledge about the production process and in this respect is more empowering than cleaning the factory (although for some people cleaning is more desirable than managing). According to Parecon proponents, this manager, together with lawyers, engineers and other ‘coordinators’, forms a that is more able to participate fully in an economic environment than other workers who have less empowering tasks.

35 is central to the way Parecon counteracts greediness or personal gain. PP supports workers and consumer councils within the planning procedure of production and consumption. How does PP work?

Figure 3

How do consumer and workers councils function within Participatory Planning?

1. They access relevant data from last year.

2. They receive information from facilitation boards estimating this year's probable changes in prices and income in light of existing knowledge of past investment decisions and changes in the labor force.

3. They receive information from higher level production and consumption councils regarding long-term investment projects or collective consumption proposals already agreed to in previous plans that imply commitments for this year.

4. By reviewing changes in their own proposals made during last year's planning they assess how much they had to scale down their consumption desires or their plans to improve the quality of work life, and look to see what increases in average income and improvements in the quality of average work complexes are projected this year over last.

5. Using last year's final prices as indicators of social costs and benefits they develop a proposal for the coming year, not only enumerating what they want to consume or produce and implicitly what they think society's total output should be, but also providing qualitative information about their reasons. (Albert & Hahnel 1991b, p. 11)

PP is a democratic and decentralised planning procedure, because the planning is done by participants in different levels and groups, namely workers’ councils and federations, consumers’ councils and federations and the iteration facilitation board (IFB). The IFB is a facilitating body that calculates opportunity costs and social costs for all goods. Opportunity costs entail the costs of natural resources, labour and capital. Social costs entail the costs that production infringes on society, like pollution and depletion of resources.26 The IFB is made up by workers and its task is to aid the planning procedure and give the necessary information to fine-tune demand and supply.27

26 Social costs resemble externality costs, but do not cover production costs. These production costs are incorporated in the opportunity costs. 27 According to Hahnel (2012), an algorithm can be used to change the work force of IFB periodically, since work at the IFB is empowering: it increases knowledge about the economic process.

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The IFB sets up indicative prices, which are based on the estimated social costs and opportunity costs. In a work place a council is formed by its members to decide what is to be produced for the next year. Workers councils make production proposals, consumers make consumption proposals. Workers proposals incorporate everything that is needed to produce a certain goods or service, including the pollution that is involved. Workers can revise their proposal on the basis of the newly calculated costs and resubmit them. In several rounds of the planning process it is decided which council is going to do what, hence the term ‘iteration’. Proposals that contain the least social costs and the most social benefits are more likely to be approved by other councils than the proposals which are less beneficial to society.

In short: the workers and consumers councils determine the supply and demand in partnership with the IFB. The iteration process ends when there is no excess demand and a mutually agreed upon plan is devised.

2.3 Objections to Parecon Generally speaking, TINA politics has two effects: it condones laissez-faire politics and obstructs democratic and deliberative procedures (Séville, 2016). No government or ruler could seek to remove the inalienable rights to life, liberty and property (Locke, 1713). Following the classical liberal notion of the "invisible hand" that guides the course of free markets, the law cannot be used by a government to influence an economic outcome (Smith, 2017). Following the capitalist narrative, liberty and property cannot be limited or transformed by the community in any way. The market should be ‘free’. Capitalist narrative does not account for a replacement of the market by PP.

Capitalist proponents often assert that economic costs are more easily to measure than social costs. This gives them reason to ignore externality costs and even disassociate the burden of society from the market. It will possibly take up more time to measure social costs, but proponents claim that the decisions that are taken are much better for society than in capitalism because social costs are not incorporated in capitalism (Hahnel, 2015b).

Second, the capitalist narrative implies that without competitive markets there is no innovation because there is not much private profit to gain. In Parecon, innovation is immediately transferred to other work places. The incentive for innovation is mostly based on “social serviceability” (Hahnel, 2015b, p. 288). Social serviceability refers to the way a community benefits from an innovation. A workers council that is of great service to a community is likely to get more proposals approved in the future. Notwithstanding a social

37 incentive, I argue that in capitalism innovation is instantly rewarded by great benefits and it will take substantial technical adjustments to Parecon to make sure innovation on a large scale is encouraged. In Parecon, one workers council could wait until the Research and Development unit of another council makes the innovation.

Neoliberals marginalise collectively managed property, as explained in chapter 1. Milton Friedman states (2009) that either a ‘voluntary cooperation’ through the market place or a central direction involving the use of coercion is necessary for a well-functioning economy (pp.12-13). Hahnel (2013) argues that Parecon does not fit any of the two categorizations. It is apparent that the freedom myth lets Friedman to believe that everything outside of the domain of capitalism leads to coercion. Parecon involves voluntary participation in the economic process and therefore does not involve coercion. Friedman goes on stating that as long as freedom of exchange is maintained, the market permits people the freedom to sell and buy whatever they want. Hahnel (2015b) states that there is no economic democracy because it is not one person one vote, but one dollar one vote. Market-dependence leads to inequalities that are largely indiscriminate to hard work, and, therefore, a one dollar one vote-system is unfair.

Further, critics of job-balancing complexes state that talent and study are not taken into account sufficiently. The argument entails that a dentist should be doing dentist work all the time, because time and costs are invested in his profession. Moreover, this dentist could be a very talented one. If he does ‘less empowering’ tasks within a balanced job-complex, his capabilities would not be used efficiently. Hahnel (2015a, p. 285) points to reports that show that more participation within the work place and more variety lead to more productivity. Any loss in efficiency caused by talent not used sufficiently, would be compensated by the increase in productivity due to more workers participation.

Robin Hahnel tends to counter valid critique on technical issues within work places in this matter: councils decide how they function by voting and can discuss and adjust technicalities. Self-management would have to lead to balanced job-complexes that are subscribed to by all participants. It is plausible that within a small workplace that revolves around a dentist, that particular dentist automatically has the most power in economic decision-making. Yet, federations of workers and consumers could establish the routine that dentists can do the job of a dentist all the time or three dentists can share the tasks of a dentist workplace.

Critique of Parecon not only is found at proponents of the capitalist tradition. David Schweickart is a well-known market socialist. He proposes worker’s self-management and social control of investment, yet he gives a central place to markets in his model of ‘economic

38 democracy’28. Schweickart (2006) claims the installment of IFB gives rise to a powerful class since data has to be assessed and combined in order to make it possible for people to study. Wokers at IFB have no discretionary power over the planning procedure. Hahnel (2015) argues that workers within the IFB can rotate and, ultimately, IFB can be eliminated by councils. It is not obvious what IFB would be replaced with in the latter case.

In his critique to Parecon, Schweickart (2002) asserts that the model is overburdened with complexity and would not work in the real world. First, it would take up too much time to make, analyze and evaluate all proposals. An obvious counterargument would be that every major improvement of society takes time and effort. Especially when much more people are involved in the decision-making process than before, it will take up much more time. Yet, to challenge his claims more substantially: some time-wasting features of capitalism are not there anymore in Parecon. Pat Devine (2007) points to the fact that also in capitalism much time and energy is devoted to administration and other calculations of marketing. Large corporations can be viewed as planned economies.

Hahnel (2015) argues that in contrast to Parecon, capitalism lets the elite (owners of capital or coordinator class) make calculations and consequently have the economic decision-making power. In Parecon, all workers can participate in the economic process and get more informed during the planning procedure. Hahnel (2015) argues that analyzing proposals by councils does not have to be time-consuming as Schweickart suggests, because councils can easily approve or reject proposals by computer.

Erik Olin Wright (2016) asserts that calculating the value of externalities could become “extremely complex and cumbersome” (p. 27). He argues it is hard to measure the level of pollution and determine which area is exactly polluted by a particular production process. Wright argues that it is problematic when a small scale council has economic decision-making power in processes that affect large populations outside the scope of the council. It is true that it is hard to calculate social costs and the spread of pollution, yet the burden of the costs lay with the community. Whatever the consequences, the community, and not a private party, is able to tackle unforeseeable concerns. Hahnel (2012) suggests councils could be compensated if they accept more pollution than other areas. Moreover, Hahnel (2012) assumes that pollution could be based on the equilibrium of whatever people want to get paid for

28 For more information about the model that Schweickart recommends, see: Schweickart, D. (2011). After capitalism. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.

39 pollution and whatever producers want to pollute. This equilibrium could be reached in an iterative process.

Schweickart (2006) envisions technical problems. How do you measure effort? Are all effort ratings in different work places commensurable? This will cost time and devotion. Hahnel (2015) argues that effort ratings are the only fair assessment of the performance of a worker, because effort as well as sacrifice determine whatever a person adds to his or her innate talent. Skill and talent is viewed as part of the commons and directed to the benefit of all.

Schweickart (2006) asserts that consumer councils cannot come up with consumer proposals for the next year. People would not be able to predict their consumption for one year ahead. Hahnel (2015) argues that in capitalism nothing is planned in advance. Even if half of the yearly consumer proposals are adjusted during the year, it would still be 50% more planning than in capitalism. Although I do not share Schweickarts pessimism, I do not agree with Hahnel’s argumentation. Companies also base their expectations on the figures and tables of last year. Furthermore, marketing strategies include an assessment of demand and supply. Through surveys with focus groups the market for a particular good is assessed.

The main objection of Wright (2016) entails, like Schweickart, the replacement of markets with PP. Wright considers the market far more efficient than PP. Further, he cannot envision how private consumption is deliberated within a group of consumers. Wright (2016, p. 47) rather would install public goods councils as opposed to consumer councils that approve private consumption. I do not agree with Wright. Parecon offers the change to approve products on the basis of social costs. Consumer costs entail much externality costs as well; hence, when it is important to be ecologically more sustainable, a consumer council should decide which products are ‘approvable’.

Additionally, Hahnel (2016) stresses that consumers can hand in proposals anonymously and switch councils. Hahnel emphasizes that PP will not work efficiently instantly. Before it works in the right manner, the population has to be convinced that it is the best way to go. I hold the opinion that if Parecon offers a viable alternative to capitalism the economic discourse will alter and be filled with participation instead of competition. When people are aware of the possibilities of more participation in the economic process, the working of Parecon will improve simultaneously.

Naturally, it will take up much more time to discuss a variety of topics with a variety of people, instead of giving mandate to a small group of owners, producers and coordinators.

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When fundamental goals like human solidarity and economic justice are to be achieved, an investment of time and space is necessary. If it would not entail great effort and time, it would not be a great transformation. When the all-encompassing market is to be replaced by another system, critics can easily dismiss the alternative being “overburdened with complexity”.

2.4 Examples of Participatory Movements Parecon is not implemented yet, but there are constructs that are based on principles akin to Parecon. PP is an important tool in making people more informed in economic matters. In Parecon, people learn to discuss economic policy amongst themselves. Participatory budgeting in Brazil resembles PP and proved to be a great way to “transform informal publics into deliberative publics” (Avritzer, 2000, p. 34). Benjamin Goldfrank (2006, p. 3) states that participatory budgeting had become a “best practice” in the developing world. Dahlgren (2005) asserts that internet can play a major role in facilitating deliberations in the public sphere. The proponents of Parecon argue indicative prices can easily be administered in a computer. Past proposals and initiatives can be viewed easily. Families can use the consumer proposal of last year –saved on the computer- to propose the current year’s plan.

Participatory movements show promising results. In Italy you find medium and large co- operatives that have a better resilience to crises than other firms (Tortia et al., 2015, p. 102). Daniel Altschuler and Javier Corrales (2012) found evidence that participation in one area of life can lead to participation in another. Community-managed schools in isolated communities in Guatemala and Honduras have a substantial impact on democratic participation. This ‘spill- over effect’ is not obvious in capitalism. The only resemblance to the democratic procedure is one dollar one vote, yet the financial inequalities make it non-democratic.

In Parecon workers councils ‘manage’ the work place. The case of the corporations of Mondragon in Spain shows that workers are able to manage their cooperation successfully. Democracy, cooperation and business success go hand in hand in the Basque region (Forcadell, 2005).

Corcoran and Wilson (2010) discern common elements in the success of cooperative movements in Spain, France and Italy. I highlight three elements that are replicable: a sufficient amount of capital is accessible to worker , significant federation and consortia structures that support worker cooperatives and the sense of human solidarity is very important (Corcoran & Wilson, 2010, p. 32-33). I argue that all these elements are visible in Parecon theory. First, in Parecon, workers councils have access to capital when their

41 proposals are approved. Second, work places function within a federative structure. Third, human solidarity is promoted through Parecon’s egalitarian character.

Participatory initiatives can, however, face difficulties as well. In Australia, cooperative initiatives are widespread, yet there is insufficient funding (Tortia et al., 2015). I argue that a turn in economic discourse could provide for more funds. If policy-makers and lobby groups would be informed of the opportunities of Parecon, chances are they increase the funding of those projects that are community-based and have a participatory character. The concept of CC can give urgency to these matters.

What critics consider its weakness can be viewed as its strength: whoever wants to participate in the economic process has economic decision-making power. It will take time and energy to find procedures that suits the needs of participants within PP and society as a whole. Democratic, iterative procedure are key to Parecon. Widespread participation in economic decision-making generates a democratic solution. It is plausible that certain features of Parecon are adjusted by majority rule. The fact that implementation of a system is difficult does not invalidate the system itself. The next chapter investigates to what extent Parecon could prevent a CC.

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3. Parecon and the Commons Catastrophe The central question of this thesis is: to what extent could Parecon prevent the CC? This thesis is not about the transition from capitalism to Parecon. Hence, it is not about how the disruption of the commons and the community exactly is restored and how the ecological degradation is reversed.29 I investigate if a CC would exist in a society where Parecon is installed30. As mentioned earlier, I assume strict compliance: participants conform to the principles and institutions of Parecon (Rawls, 2009, p. 126).

To recap, a CC occurs if:

[1] A sequence of events that disrupts the commons and the community occurs

and/or

[2] Unsustainable levels of ecological degradation are reached which risk the complete destruction of the world we live in.

For a CC to occur, [1] or [2] is sufficient and one of the two attributes is necessary to exist. Thus, it has to be investigated to what extent Parecon could prevent [1] and [2].

In the first chapter of this thesis I outlined why capitalism brings a CC for it fails to bring us four fundamental goals of our society, namely: economic justice, economic democracy, human solidarity and ecological sustainability. Furthermore, it entails an assessment why ecological devastation is not prevented within capitalism. These goals I will use as variables to investigate Parecon’s ability to organise a flourishing society. In chapter 2 I assessed the viability of an alternative to capitalism: Parecon. As part of counterhegemonic theory, I employ the concept of the CC to study the desirability of Parecon.

In my analysis of the CC within capitalism I employ the capitalistic notion of commons: commons are not ‘common’ anymore when privatised. Milton Friedman states in Positive Economics (1994) that economy should be a positivist science that describes the world as it is, not like it should be. Analyzing Parecon defies this line of thought because it is about an ideal economic model. In this chapter I investigate how commons and community could be treated in Parecon and how Parecon involves a sustainable world without an ecological catastrophe.

3.1 How Does Parecon Prevent a CC [1]? CC [1] A sequence of events that disrupts the commons and the community occurs

29 Some parts of ecological degradation, like the extinction of certain species, are irreversible. 30 Hahnel (2012) stresses that Parecon is about an end-state and not about a transition. I follow this line of thought.

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In capitalism commons and community are disrupted hence a CC [1] occurs. Parecon will not lead to a CC [1] if it does not constitute a sequence of events that disrupts the commons and the community. To investigate this, I will treat the commons and the community separately. As the participatory commons show, the commons and the community are intertwined concepts.

3.1.1 How does Parecon deals with the commons? This analysis is about how everything we share is common and can be governed by the community, hence, I discuss the participatory commons. Hahnel views the commons as necessary resources to sustain a certain way of living. Land, water, flora and fauna are considered natural commons. The ‘inputs’ that are called natural capital in the modern capitalist economy (minerals, oil, timber) also belong to this category. Further, genetic diversity and a stable climate are part of the natural commons. In Parecon, the ‘produced commons’ refer to the equipment and infrastructure that involves producing goods. Hahnel also considers informational commons like knowledge or commons. (Hahnel, 2015a, p. 41). In opposition to the privatized commons of capitalism, the participatory commons is collectively owned property in Parecon. This collective stewardship is typical for participatory commons within Parecon. Unlike the capitalist common, the participatory commons are not being privatised and do not exist within a market-dependent framework. Social ownership of the commons is a central tenet of Parecon.

It boils down to the division of private property versus common property. Parecon defies thinking in private property31. The common way of thinking is in terms of competition and the obtainment of goods, and excludability. Parecon is all about inclusiveness, how everything is affected by all. When councils and federations discuss about the commons, they can easily incorporate socially responsible ideas.

If there are no property rights as in the conventional usage, it is clear that everybody pays for externality costs or social costs: social ownership of the commons implicates social responsibility. Externality costs can be incorporated within proposals in order to prevent commons from being depleted. In a private-property regime like capitalism, these externality costs are not incorporated properly. If a proposal contains the use of certain fossil fuels that are rapidly depleting, it can be invalidated in the PP procedure. Consider two proposals:

31 For the sake of clarity and brevity, personal possessions like family pictures or clothing is excluded from the argumentation in this thesis.

44 proposal X contains much more fossil fuels than proposal Y. Yet, they both have the same social benefits for the community. Then, a community will opt for proposal X.

The procedure in PP assigns user rights of the commons to the council that generates the greatest social benefit–to-social cost ratio. Everybody manages the commons and benefits equally from its use (Hahnel, 2015a, p. 41). Obligations cannot be bought off. In capitalism, carbon emissions are traded: if two companies strike a deal, they can sell certain pollution rights to one another. In Parecon, this is not possible. If a product is causing pollution, it is incorporated into the production proposal. Pollution taxes have to be compensated by the polluters. These taxes have to be commensurate to the value of the negative externalities (Hahnel & Wright, 2016).

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3.1.2 Does Parecon disrupts the community? From the advent of capitalism, commoners are driven away by capitalist enclosure. Yet, in Parecon, the people are themselves the ‘owners’ of the commons. We have lost sight of what is common because of the seizing of commons by private actors. Parecon can make participatory commons the norm rather than an alternative concept to the way capitalism deals with the commons. The market economy is something we live in and thereby informs our thoughts. What surrounds someone informs his or her thoughts and the way he or she thinks. Since capitalism is dominant, the theory of Parecon will inform the sense of community in a positive way. To assess the organisation of the community within Parecon, I use three pillars of society: economic democracy, economic justice and human solidarity. I consider these to be the fundamental values of society.

Economic democracy. This concept means that people have economic decision- making power in proportion to the degree one is affected by a decision (Hahnel & Albert, 1991a). Participation of many people within an economic system is necessary to identify economic democracy. In Parecon everybody is invited to participate in the economic process. If a person wants to deliberate on issues that involve a different scale, this person can easily apply for it. A council can determine which delegates it sends to federations. The majority rule is operationalised when a decision affects everyone, for instance, considering public holidays or national infrastructure projects. The group or individuals who are affected by the decision have the appropriate decision-making power. For example, a local council decides over local issues like the creation of local parks and the library’s policy. The ‘commoning’ that Linebaugh (2004) discusses in his work is evident in the workers and consumers councils. The productive commons and other forms of commons (like bread and wine) are governed by the community; the councils and boards that are represented by the community make proposals and subsequently approve them. In this way, Parecon values substantial participation in the economic process. Furthermore, balancing job complexes on the basis of empowering tasks and desirable work supports the equal right to participate.

As Polanyi (1957) argues, instead of the economy being embedded in social relations, social relations are embedded in the economic system. The ‘self-regulatory market’ within capitalism requires the submission of the society to the vagaries of the market. Instead, in Parecon social relations are at the foundation of every economic decision. Workers councils and consumers councils give people economic decision-making power to the extent that they are affected by a decision. The economic process in Parecon is a social enterprise, because of

46 the continuous participation of the community. Deliberations are done by the community, not by a coordinator class.

Economic justice. This concept denotes fair distribution of wealth and allocation of resources. I agree with proponents of Parecon that people should have economic rewards according to the sacrifices they make within the economic structure. Because of the effort ratings there is a fairer system in place than what we are used to: not the share in economic output is the basis of reward, but the sacrifices one makes. Also, the level of consumption or reward is not dependent on physical or intellectual abilities (Hahnel, 2015b). The allocation of resources is more fairly distributed since local, regional and national councils approve each other. When there are grave inequalities in allocation, councils can disperse their view and participants can prevent one council or region from exploiting others. The information-system within Parecon has to be of great quality and transparency. Economic justice will be elevated when people who have never enjoyed economic decision-making power get self-management. People with many talents and skills are able to play the role of expert, but they are not given greater decision-making power (Hahnel, 2015b, p. 290).

The ownership of the productive commons leads to injustice. Technical improvements of past generations are all incorporated in materials and infrastructure. How much output a productive common generates is not the personal achievement of the owner of the common, since it is the outcome of human endeavors over a period of time. Additionally, when an owner pays wages to a labourer this does not compensate for the effort he or she put in. It is simply based on the economic output (Hahnel, 2015b).

Economic inequality is a form of economic injustice. is a cause of environmental degradation as Boyce (1994) argues. The ‘losers’ of capitalism do not have the power to voice their concerns and influence environmental policy. That is evident in the Kyoto treaties. Despite the fact that a majority of the people -it is common sense by now- is aware of ecological degradation and wants a drastic change of policy, only minor achievements are reached.

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Human solidarity. This concept designates the sense of community that reconciles collective needs with individual needs. The community has economic decision-making power. Consequently, human solidarity is foundational to the system. The past actions and proposals of a workers council and consumers council can weigh in when assessing a current proposal. In this way, councils that are social beneficial will gain more work. When they work hard and efficiently, they will be rewarded by the other councils and be granted more work. At a local level, it is easy to emphasize with other local people, whether they are from the same neighborhood or ward. You can help people in need by approving consumer proposals based on need. For instance, when someone is ill or had a car accident the community can help out by bending the rules. The rules can be adjusted at any time in favor of the community needs. When handing over consumers and workers proposals, additional qualitative information can generate human solidarity. Exemptions can be made regarding the possible discrepancy between effort and needs (Hahnel & Albert, 1991b, p. 104). When people understand what other people need and approve certain proposals, empathy is generated.

The balanced job complex does not only support the equal right to participate, it also improves human solidarity. When making deliberations over how to organise a work place, people have to envision which jobs are more desirable and empowering than other jobs. In this way, participants in the workplace know what other people are doing and can better assist them in their needs.

3.2 How does Parecon Prevent a CC [2]? CC [2] Unsustainable levels of ecological degradation are reached which risk the complete destruction of the world we live in.

I assume that there is enough time left for humankind to alter the system in order to prevent an environmental catastrophe. Is Parecon ecological sustainable? Further, can Parecon prevent an ecological catastrophe? Ecological sustainability refers to making human organisation compatible with environmental concerns. Ecological concerns are shared by many, yet the capitalist framework does not seem fit to make the society sustainable. In Parecon, councils can opt for production proposals that are ecological sustainable. There is evidence that social cooperatives and social enterprises bring climate change into their statutory aims (Tortia et al., 2015, p. 269).

In PP, indicative prices are used to reflect social costs and social benefits. The production proposal that contains less social costs and more social benefits than another proposal is likely

48 to be approved by other councils. Social benefits include environmental benefits. The calculation of social costs entails the damage caused by pollution. Furthermore, ecological sustainability is taken into account on different levels. At a local level, federations of residents are stewards of their natural environment and can charge people who emit pollutants in their area (Hahnel 2016, p. 284). In chapter 1 I argued that localities tend to take better care of their environment than capitalist owners that rule from a distance and do not have a long-term connection with the local soil.

In practice, how does PP involve ecological deliberations? Hahnel (2014) states that “genetic diversity, a stable climate, key eco-systems that support all life, and various eco-systems which serve as “sinks” that store and decompose wastes from human economic activity are all treated as part of the natural commons in a participatory economy”(pp. 41-42). These participatory commons entail the global ecosystems that are not only necessary to sustain a certain way of living but necessary for life itself.

Qualitative data with reasoning as well as reports can be submitted along with the proposals. This does not confine to consumer proposals and personal consumption. For example, a work place wants to build a factory in place X. Scientists and Research & Development units of work places that are involved in place X can calculate the pollution costs. Wright (2016) is wright in his assessment that the calculation of pollution is complicated. If the pollution of a production process reaches place Y, then the councils in place Y will have a say in deliberations over the proposals within place X. Yet, in theory it is feasible. If the social benefits of the factory extend to the entire nation, a national council will have an incentive to share the social costs. The cost of private consumption decreases when a lot of councils are beneficiaries and share the burden of ‘pollution ’. Indicative prices will be lower if the state has fewer costs.

Since parents are involved in councils, they would have a great incentive to think about future generations. If future generations are to enjoy the same economic conditions as today, much innovation is needed to improve the natural environment. I argue that this is one of the weaknesses in Parecon. Hahnel (2016) suggests councils can come up with rewards (e.g. higher effort ratings) as incentives for innovation. This resembles the capitalist reward for expansion. The competitive drive within capitalism for one thing makes corporations innovate. This is because in a competitive society the survival instinct kicks in. The risk of innovation is rewarded with great profits. In Parecon, the cost estimates are done by IFB in reciprocity with the councils. Here I reckon Parecon needs adjustment. I consider it an option

49 to standardize the allocation of resources to innovation. A certain percentage of benefits might be put in an ‘innovation deposit’. Hahnel would argue that any proposal on adjustments could be voted on.

How would Parecon confront a global ecological catastrophe? The ‘nested’ federations can be extended to an interregional council and a global council. This global council can decide for global issues like climatological crises and the acidification of the oceans. The installment of the global council can help solve environmental governance issues. In the current system, it is impossible for states to adjust their policy to the ecological concern, because there is no global power that dictates the workings of society. Hence, it is hard for nation states and regional constructs to solve global issues.

An ‘ecological worldview’ gives priority to self-organizing principles and the interconnectedness of everything on earth (Robertson & Choi, 2010). Parecon fits the needs of sustainability: “The process of making decisions in an ecological governance system is participative, democratic, and consensus based” (Robertson & Choi, 2010, p. 92). Whether decisions are arrived upon easily or not, Parecon is based upon egalitarian values within a participatory environment. If there is ecological degradation, reports could lead to instructions for councils to follow. In this process, ecological degradation can be reversed in a homogenous way.

3.3 Reservations I do not argue that in the praxis of Parecon the possibility of a CC is precluded. I assert that it is theoretically plausible that a CC is prevented within Parecon. The implementation of Parecon implies strict compliance of the participants. This chapter shows that recovery of the commons through a system like Parecon is a desirable step to take and promises to prevent a CC. Again, what damage can be reversed and what not, is outside the scope of this thesis.

It is imperative to state that Parecon is about participation. Commoning does not happen automatically; participants have to put effort in the community. However, since participants get effort-ratings, there is an incentive to participate. It is hard to argue whether social serviceability is a great motivation to work hard, but it definitely serves as an incentive.

Parecon offers insights that are applicable to the realm of global environmental governance. Yet, even when Parecon is installed, it is very difficult to change policy or certain institutional arrangements because agents within the system tend to hold on to the status quo and vehemently oppose any measures that are proposed that change the direction of the system

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(Boettke, Coyne & Leeson, 2008). In order to overcome transitional obstacles, it is imperative to enhance the position of subordinate groups (Baker et al., 2016, p. 134). A participatory economy involves participation of formerly subordinate groups. Thus, the position of subordinate groups is enhanced.32

Another challenge to ecological governance within Parecon is the difficulty of getting legislative bodies in line with proposals for change. Yet, this thesis is not about law or politics, but about the occurrence of a CC in economic models. The Hobbesian belief that hierarchical relations are paramount to the organization of society still challenges ecological governance as well as Parecon. The concept of CC and Parecon oppose this hierarchical mindset.

3.4 Answer to Garret Hardin and Elinor Ostrom Hardin stated in a 1998 review of his own work on the commons that he omitted the word ‘unmanaged’ in his work. Hardin adds that either socialism or a private property regime can manage the commons, yet “the devil is in the detail” (Hardin, 1998, p. 683). I assert that commons are disrupted within the private property regime of capitalism, hence, CC [1]. Parecon is best suited to manage the commons. For one thing, there is attention for detail, to the extent even that its criticasters proclaim its unworkability.

In Living within Limits (1995) Hardin asserts that natural sciences emphasize limits and obstructions and the humanities are based upon concepts without limits. By finding a solution for a CC within an economic framework, I try to supersede the divide of natural sciences and humanities.

Hardin (and many adhere to this line of thought) studies rational actors that are solely committed to the fulfilment of their own needs. In this line of thought, cooperation is not considered rational. Yet, rational cooperation does exist (Kreps et al., 1982; Andreoni & Samuelson, 2006; Ostrom, 2015). Furthermore, there is evidence that competition in a local setting leads to less corporation and less pay-offs for members of a group (Barker et al., 2012). The concept of CC gives urgency to cooperation; personal needs align with the needs of the society. Thus, collective needs make it rational to cooperate. When the group is extended to the world community, it can be argued that global cooperation is rational. Hardin

32 An objection that is based on the problem of transition entails the fact that if one country installs an alternative system like Parecon, companies and individuals could move to different world regions, where they could ‘freely’ attain private profit. However, in this thesis I asses Parecon on the basis that it would be installed all over the world at the same time.

51 states that people do not need a “coercive force outside their individual psyches” (Hardin, in: Ostrom, 2015, p. 9). The coming of total destruction and the acknowledgement we are facing a CC at this moment, can hopefully serve as a ‘Leviathan’ for our minds.

Parecon is not about open-access. That would mean that anyone can use up common resources, not hindered by regulation. The authority is the community. Councils can set up checks and balances. Ostrom (2015) has done valuable work in showing that successful management of the commons is possible without relying on markets or centralised bureaucracies. In Parecon there simply is no market or centralised bureaucracy of any conventional kind. Ostrom showed that people can manage social property without market or state.

Ostrom proposed this principle for managing the commons: “the rights of appropriators to devise their own institutions are not challenged by external governmental authorities”. In Parecon, there are no ‘external governmental authorities’. If any, there are ‘internal’ governmental authorities (IFB) that are put in place to help appropriators (the different councils and federations) to devise their own institutions.

In this thesis, the common paradigm is used to show the weakness of capitalism and its in- build potential for disaster. Additionally, looking through the lens of the commons, this thesis illuminates the strength of Parecon, and its mechanisms that could prevent a catastrophe. Parecon could prevent a CC. Social ownership could lead to a flourishing society. Parecon holds the promise of local self-determination through local councils and initiatives. Additionally, global governance opportunities arise that can lead to ecological sustainability.

For a good society a moral framework is necessary. The quintessential capitalist Henry Ford (2007) stated: “There can be no conflict between good economics and good morals (p. 280)”. Good economics can lead to good morals when people decide together on morality issues. Capitalism does not entail morality for a market is indiscriminate to moral issues.

Parecon can recover the commons and restore a sense of community. The disruption of the commons and the community is evident in capitalism, hence, a CC [1] occurs. Parecon is about the participatory commons because everything we share is denoted as common in this model and governed by the community. If the bill for negative environmental externalities is paid for by the councils that cause these effects, these councils will be motivated to lower their environmental pollution. As Wright (2016) argues, it is complicated to calculate

52 pollution and determine the geographical boundaries of pollution. Yet, through the nested councils and federations at a local, national and global level, a CC [2] could be prevented.

Parecon fills the discourse of the commons with optimism. Social ownership is given a positive connotation, hereby opposing the mainstream economic discourse that values private ownership. I argue that Parecon holds the promise of delivering economic democracy, economic justice, human solidarity and ecological sustainability. Thus, it is theoretically plausible that Parecon can prevent a CC. Furthermore, Parecon is antithetical to hegemonic capitalist discourse. If Parecon gets well-known, it can form a viable alternative social perspective on a society that is based on solidarity, diversity, justice and democracy.

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Conclusion Capitalism leads to societal demise and environmental destruction, hence, a CC occurs in capitalism. It is theoretically plausible that a CC could fully be prevented in Parecon: the social ownership of the commons by the community makes the society flourish and prevents ecological degradation.

What I Did Not Do Before summarising what I have tried to put across in this thesis, I will stress what I did not do. However interrelated politics and economy are, I focus on economic models. Yet, following Fairclough (2013, p. 11), capitalism can be viewed as a ‘social perspective’ that defines human organisation. Like capitalism, Parecon can add a perspective to the discourse on how a society could be fundamentally structured. In this sense, this thesis transcends the realm of economics or political theory.

The transformation process from capitalism to Parecon is not included in this research. An objection to the viability of Parecon could therefore be that it is difficult to say how viable the system is. My study involves ideal theory: it investigates whether an idealised version of Parecon is in theory possible. I back up my arguments by empirical results from a certain participatory strand. Yet, these are not Parecon examples since Parecon is not installed yet.

Furthermore, I did not incorporate exit strategies or laid down a vision on how to get to Parecon. I do imply in my assertions that a strategy based around market opportunities is false. When assessing a transformation strategy, the workings of market-dependence will have to be taken seriously. Wright (2016) and Schweickart (2002) hold on to the existence of markets in alternative model of society. I stress the importance of envisioning a world without markets. Market dependence leads to the disruption of the society. Through the concept of CC I point to the necessity of a different model with different features.

This thesis does not deal with short-term solutions in the here and now. Yet, I assert that Parecon as an end-state can inform policy. A vision gets real when we know how to get there. A trip to a different planet (e.g. mars) gets more real when in theory it is possible to go there. I assert that a vision informs the way to go; the proposed route should be paved with idealism.

Summary Part 1 Capitalism is the dominant model of the world. Whether we emblem it with welfare state capitalism or neoliberalism, capitalism is not working well. In capitalism we face a CC. During the history of capitalism, the commons are treated as counterproductive. From the

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Tragedy of the commons by Garret Hardin (2009) it was argued that private ownership or government intervention are the only ways that a common resource can be exploited successfully. A liberal framework created the freedom myth: the ‘free market’ leads to the freedom of individuals. The commons and the community are marginalised in capitalism. The discourse of the commons is filled with capitalism induced pessimism.

In recent years, commons are used as a part of a counterhegemonic project that involves different viable alternatives to capitalism. Elinor Ostrom (2015) proposed eight principles for governing the commons. (2003) explained that capitalism will eventually absorb non-capitalist areas. Following Luxemburg’s line of thought, I argue that Ostrom describes commons that are not yet valuable enough for capitalist forces to adhere to. Furthermore, a CC occurs in capitalism. When the society and the ecosystem are in demise, there is reason to alter our ways. The community is marginalized in capitalism, whether there are rare examples to the contrary or not.

How does capitalism leads to a CC? The answer contains two parts since the CC is a disjunctive concept. Capitalism leads to a CC [1]: A sequence of events that disrupts the commons and the community occurs. The commons are tied to the market in multiple ways. Young (2011) describes three instances of market failure. First, in capitalism it is rational to make sure the resource is used to its limit before using other resources. Second, in a market system it is possible that certain arrangements that lead to land deterioration are preferable to arrangements that possibly improve the land. Third, negative externalities like the acidification of ground water are not incorporated in consumer prices.

The community is disrupted in capitalism. Capitalism involves market dependence: actors within the system are tied to the market for everything they need. The state is part of the market society; the state deregulates the economy and supports privatisation. Privatisation focusses on growth and does not take into account what is important for the community in the long run. The privatisation of common goods leads to a lack of economic democracy, because a small group of people owns common resources. The capitalist elite has economic decision- making power that affects the majority of people. Furthermore, market failures have a detrimental impact on people’s lives. In capitalism, there is economic injustice because externality costs are paid for by community, not by private parties that share the greatest benefits of production. Furthermore, deregulation and a small government are favoured in neoliberalism and social programs are cut.

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Human solidarity is in demise because the focus on individualism overrides collective needs. The growth imperative, accumulation of capital and defeating competitors are key values of the market society. Hence, competition puts people in opposing teams instead of viewing people as part of a community.

In capitalism a CC [2] occurs: Unsustainable levels of ecological degradation are reached which risk the complete destruction of the world we live in. There is evidence that CSR is not taken seriously by large companies when large profits could be made (Karnani, 2014). Naomi Klein (2007) argues that economic crises damage the poor and marginalised. The capitalist elite takes advantage of disaster. Green capitalism or market is not able to be ecological sustainable; concerns for the environment are overridden by short-term concerns about growth.

The production of goods by dominant market players leads to excessive pollution. Capitalist corporations use up much fossil fuel, hence fossil capitalism (Altvater, 2009). Large quantities of fossil fuels are not considered ecologically sustainable. Carbon emission trading makes matters worse for it benefits the ‘heavy polluters’ (Foster, 2011; Stevens, 2017). Since large, ‘successful’ companies still rely heavily on fossil fuels, the level of pollution increases.

Ecological degradation leads many scientists to warn that we are overstepping ‘planetary boundaries’ (Röckström et al. 2009). Climate change is one of the ways the world is in danger (Heynen & Robbins, 2005). Since decades the information about ecological degradation is widespread. Still, the level of deterioration increases. Capitalism is not capable of preventing a CC [2]. As a species we could face extinction if we don’t alter our ways.

Summary Part 2 In the second part of this thesis I assert that Parecon is a viable alternative for capitalism. According to the dominant economic discourse, the liberty and property of the individual cannot be limited by the state or any other (private) actor. This line of thought is not congruent with the focus of collective ownership in Parecon.

Furthermore, without competitive markets, the level of innovation would not be as high as within capitalism. Private profit is no longer a major source of incentive. Mainstream economic discourse does not involve the economic power of the community. Hahnel (2016) explains that social serviceability is a major incentive in Parecon. I argue that innovation in capitalism is at a higher level than in Parecon, because if there is no competition there is no

56 direct need for innovation. In time, social serviceability hopefully turns out to be a great incentive for people in Parecon to work hard and innovate sufficiently.

Non-capitalist critics like David Schweickart (2006) and Erik Olin Wright (2016) assert that a market is more efficient than PP is. Hahnel (2016) contends that the market is controlled by the capitalist elite. People should have economic decision -making power to the extent that they are affected by decisions. The workers and consumers councils in Parecon emphasize participation of its members. This process is time-costly, but computers can be instrumental to calculations and planning. Furthermore, Pat Devine (2007) argues that administrative tasks and marketing in a capitalist economy make up a substantial part of the work load too. I assert that when the market is substituted by the PP and more people are involved in the economic process, it naturally takes up more time. It is reasonable that a major transformation entails major efforts.

Hahnel (2015b) asserts that job-balancing complexes lead to more participation, because jobs are shared on the basis of desirability and empowerment. Schweickart (2006) states that productivity decreases when talent is not used. Hahnel (2015b) argues that more participation and variation of work increases productivity rates. This compensates the presumed loss in efficiency. Schweickart (2006) argues that technical difficulties make Parecon unworkable. I argue that every technical problem could be tackled when encountered. Democratic solutions can be arrived at in councils and federations.

Wright (2016, p. 27) points to the difficult process of calculating externalities. Pollution could exceed geographical boundaries, thereby making it hard for one council to decide over a proposal that involves larger areas. Hahnel (2012) proposes an iterative process wherein pollution taxes can be based upon a balance between the demand for compensation of pollution and the proposed pollution in the supply (i.e. production proposals). Parecon is not perfect and implementation of Parecon is difficult, but this does not make Parecon an unviable system.

Parecon is not installed yet. Still, some participatory movements are akin certain elements of Parecon. Workers cooperatives resemble Parecon’s work places. In Italy there are workers cooperatives that show resilience to crises that is unmatched by capitalist firms (Tortia et al., 2015, p. 102). Daniel Altschuler and Javier Corrales (2012) conclude that community- managed schools have a positive impact on democratic participation in certain areas. The study of participatory cooperations in Mondragon shows that democratic worker-managed companies can be successful as a business (Forcadell, 2005).

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There is still insufficient funding for worker cooperatives. In Australia there are many cooperative initiatives, yet there is not enough funding for support (Tortia et al., 2015). I argue that a turn in the mainstream economic discourse could view cooperative models as beneficial to society. As long as notions of collective ownership contradict economic growth, it seems difficult to find support for participatory initiatives. Empirical cases of successful participatory movements are indispensable in the altering of mainstream economic discourse.

Corcoran & Wilson (2010) investigate which elements successful cooperative movements in Spain, France and Italy hold in common. They state that a number of elements are replicable in other areas. Among these elements are: worker cooperatives are in the possession of sufficient capital, there is a federative structure in place that supports and guides worker cooperatives and a sense of solidarity is existent (Corcoran & Wilson, 2010, p. 32-33). These three elements are discernable in the ideal of Parecon: social ownership of capital makes sure that capital is available to work places, a federative structure of councils on different scales can support work places and, as I emphasize in the next part of this thesis, human solidarity is a key value of Parecon for participants are invited to deliberate on individual and collective needs.

Summary Part 3 The research question of this thesis is: to what extent could Parecon prevent a CC from occurring? I argue that it is theoretically plausible that CC does not occur in Parecon. Parecon, if installed in a correct way will mean a new way of living that is not only more desirable; a system like Parecon is essential to prevent catastrophe.

In Parecon a CC [1] is non-existent: no sequence of events that disrupts the commons and the community occurs. Social ownership of the commons is fundamental to Parecon theory. This not only leads to appreciation of the commons, it enforces the economic decision-making power of the community. Parecon uses the participatory commons instead of the capitalist commons. The commons are governed by the community. Parecon does not entail privatisation. There is no market enclosure or market-dependence because there is no market to begin with. Parecon is about the interlinkedness of the system, not about rivalrousness and excludability.

The community flourishes because economic democracy, economic justice and human solidarity are valued highly. Economic democracy is evident in the participatory structure of Parecon: whoever wants to participate is welcome to do so. Furthermore, balanced job-

58 complexes make sure desirable and empowering tasks are more equally divided than in capitalism is the case. Participation is encouraged on every scale. Social relations are at the core of economic policy. The economy is shaped by social endeavors (Polanyi, 1957).

In Parecon there is economic justice, because of social ownership of the commons. Participants can allocate resources and wealth to other participants that deemed worthy of it. Additionally, workers are rated on the basis of their efforts instead of the share in the economic output. Talents and skills are of use of the community and not directed to the personal benefit of an individual.

Human solidarity is foundational to the workings or Parecon. A non-hierarchical structure puts people in a level playing field. Since councils and federations deliberate over individual and collective needs, people have to understand what other’s needs are. Balanced job- complexes lead to knowledge about the jobs that others do, hence, empathy increases. Furthermore, when a workers council has proven to produce socially beneficial products, it is likely that this council is awarded more work in the future.

In Parecon a CC [2] does not occur: No unsustainable levels of ecological degradation are reached which risk the complete destruction of the world we live in. Within PP, opportunity costs and social costs are taken into deliberations. The production proposal that contains less social costs than another proposal is likely to be preferred if the two proposals are equally beneficial for the society. In this way, ecological sustainability is promoted. Pollution taxes cannot be circumvented or traded. Additionally, moral issues can easily be incorporated in deliberations.

At local, regional and national levels of self-governance, issues of ecological sustainability are dealt with on the same level that is threatened by ecological degradation. It is argued localities can protect their natural environment better than ‘distant’ capitalist forces do. National councils deliberate over national parks and infrastructure. Because of the ‘nesting’ of councils and federations a global council can be installed that deals with global issues like the deterioration of the ecosystem by acidification of the oceans and global warming. In this way, Parecon not only offers hope by forestalling a CC, but Parecon also gives an alternative perspective on (world) governance.

Studying Parecon as a viable alternative to capitalism has a positive effect on the narrative of the commons because it gives the commons back to the community. The commons paradigm defies economic orthodoxies. The promotion of private property and private profits within

59 capitalist discourse leads to a depreciation of what we hold in common. Parecon offers hope for the community and thereby for the society and the ecosystem as a whole.

Place in Debate This thesis opposes the mainstream economic (i.e. neoclassical) discourse which focusses on the market as enabler of human potential. Capitalism is defined by the freedom myth. I argue that within capitalism the freedom of all is at stake: the freedom of the individual diminishes the freedom of the community. This thesis takes position in the debate of which alternatives to capitalism are preferable. In this manner this thesis defies the TINA- doctrine. Envisioning alternatives to capitalism is necessary. I put Parecon forward as a viable alternative to capitalism.

The CC allows for a review of both the commons and capitalism. I find it useful that capitalism, the commons, and catastrophe could come together in one concept. Furthermore, an alternative to capitalism could be assessed in this way. The focus of this thesis is political philosophy, however, I employ ideas and theory from linguistic studies, history and environmental studies. The transdisciplinary approach possibly makes this thesis more vulnerable to critique (Hardin, 1998). Yet, I hope that the coinage of the concept of the CC is considered one of the main assets of this thesis.

Further, I coin the concepts of the participatory common and the capitalist common to add to the commons literature a possibly meaningful distinction. This conceptualisation could be employed in the debate over private and , although it might not leave the realm of this thesis.

Robin Hahnel linked the commons paradigm to Parecon in his article ‘Parecon and the commons’ (2015a). He explains how the concept of the commons is modified in Parecon. Furthermore, he writes about the importance of the commons being owned by everyone. In this thesis I try to go beyond this work in assessing how Parecon can prevent a CC. Furthermore, my secondary aim is to posit this thesis in a counterhegemonic discourse.

I humbly put myself in line with Garret Hardin and Elinor Ostrom. Hardin (2009) elaborated on the tragedy of the commons. For all its capitalist (mis)interpretations, it generated attention to the commons in economic discourse. Ostrom (2015) showed that it is possible to govern the commons outside the realm of private parties or state governments. I argue that the commons and the community not only are vulnerable under capitalism: capitalism is

60 catastrophical. Governing the commons is the task of the community. Only the installment of a new system like Parecon could govern the commons successfully in the long term.

Further Research When assessing a CC in capitalism and Parecon, it makes the option to choose for an alternative system rational. When people are aware of the non-biblical Apocalypse in capitalism, it is sensible and justifiable to opt for a system where a CC is prevented. The spread of information about a CC renders rational persons to choose for Parecon. More research of rational cooperation that focusses on the commons would be very instrumental to the critique of capitalism and the creation and assessment of alternative models of society.

Further research on the transformation process from capitalism to Parecon would be relevant. Proponents of Parecon often focus on the workings of Parecon, but could elaborate more on the practicalities that are encountered when features of Parecon are installed in a capitalist environment. Research about participatory movements shows promising results but is still in a beginning stage.

In chapter 3 I argued how the federation of councils holds promises to be extended to global governance. Ideally, the matters that concern the global commons can be governed by a global council of workers and consumers. I look forward to studies that incorporate nested federations and councils in global environmental governance.

Final Remarks The capitalist rhetoric that promotes profit and competition opposes harmony and cooperation. This is fundamental to a CC within capitalism. This mainstream economic discourse favors individual gains over collective needs. Parecon defies conventional liberal theories and counters false assumptions of growth and freedom within capitalism. The greatest freedom of society leads to the greatest freedom of the individual, not the other way around. Rational cooperation and human solidarity are mutually enforcing. The viability and desirability of Parecon promotes rational cooperation. The civic, capitalist society is viewed as external to nature. Humans are part of nature so it is useful that the society and nature are tied together in the concept of CC.

I argue that we need an alternative model for our society, because capitalism is making the world a dystopia. Parecon is no utopia for it needs hard work, time and dedication to be successful. The world is in need of a new stage of human evolution. The argumentative strategy of this thesis suggests a radical wish that capitalism is but a stage between the ‘old’

61 commonwealth and the ‘new’ participatory commons; between a feudal community and a cooperative community. The ‘old’ commonwealth refers to rapidly privatised forestries and grazing pastures within feudal communities, the ‘new’ participatory commons refers to the process wherein the community takes care of the commons.

In this thesis I give emphasis to the mainstream economic discourse because the focus on profit and individual gain objects alternatives to capitalism. Capitalist rhetoric opposes the economic decision-making power of the community. Parecon can alter this discourse. Successful cooperative movements could lead the way to a new system. This contains a self- fulfilling prophecy: when more scholars, activists and other participants in the society study Parecon , the more Parecon features are installed. If Parecon should need adjustments, participants in Parecon can change the features of the economic structure through the federations and councils. In the process, Parecon will get more viable and desirable.

Let us hope capitalism is but a stage between the commonwealth of medieval Europe and the participatory commons of the global community. In the beginning of capitalism, the system imposed enclosure, property rights, and a hierarchical coordination upon the commoners. This led to a world wherein commoners owned near to nothing. Today, what could well be the final stage of capitalism, the commoners are virtually extinguished for the term is practically meaningless. Furthermore, the community has no substantial power in the market society. The enclosure of the commons paved the way for capitalism. The recovery of the commons could go hand in hand with the installment of Parecon.

Gandhi wrote: “One need not accept all that Tolstoy says (…) to realise the central truth of his indictment” (Tolstoj, 1937, p. 2). I argue that the same is true for Parecon: one does not need to accept all the features of Parecon to learn from its ideal of organizing the commons by the community. Economics should be the art of compromise, not the craft of chicanery. By pointing to a CC in capitalism, urgency is given to the central truth of Parecon: what is for everyone to share is for everyone to govern.

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