The Impact of Decentralised Forest Management on Forest Condition a Case Study of the Community 15 De Agosto, Bolivia

UNIVERSITY OF COPENH AGEN FACULTY OF SCIENCE

Master’s thesis Sofie Hilge Thygesen

The impact of decentralised forest management on forest condition A case study of the community 15 de Agosto, Bolivia

Supervisor: Dr. Christian Pilegaard Hansen, Associate Professor Department of Food and Resource Economics Faculty of Science, University of Copenhagen

Submitted: 31 August 2015 Abstract

Many scholars have argued that decentralisation is an efficient tool to assure forest conservation, however others question the positive impact of decentralised forest management. The objective of the study is to investigate if the implemented decentralisation of the forest management in Bolivia has led to a sustainable forest management in the case study of the community 15 de Agosto. The decentralised forest management is a key issue in Bolivia as the country is experiencing major forest loss and environmental damage. The forest products also represent a major part of the livelihood strategies for a large group of communities adjacent to forest covered areas. Moreover, the forest sector is regarded to be of great importance for the national economy and employs as great number of people. It is therefore of great importance to investigate if the objective of the decentralised forest management is achieved. The study applies a case study approach, investigating the extent of the decentralisation and the impact on forest condition of the decentralisation. The case is investigating the forest management implemented in the community 15 de Agosto, situated in the tropical dry forest Chiquitano, department of Santa Cruz de la Sierra in Bolivia. The impact of the decentralised forest management was investigated applying a mixed methods approach that comprised household surveys, semi-structured interviews, participatory methods, observations and a forest inventory performed in the forest area under management. The data collected was complemented with the official registrations of volume of timber harvested from the area under forest management and the growth rate of the harvested species. It is found that the decentralisation of the forest management is incomplete, as the rights devolved to the community are very limited. The transferred powers have primarily been devolved to governmental offices that are upwardly accountable. Moreover, the impact of the decentralised forest management is furthermore found to be unsustainable, as it permits to high a harvesting rate in relation to the growth rate of the harvested species.

Acknowledgements

I am deeply grateful to the people from the community 15 de Agosto for your kind hospitality. The stay with you have given me many beautiful memories and thought me a great deal. Your knowledge and experience sharing are the foundation for this study. I would also like to give my deepest thanks to COINFO for the logistical support. Your support and guidance during the fieldwork was of great help. The inputs and efforts of Carlos Soliz and Helmut Sonnert from COINFO and Dr. Charlotte Benneker from ABT are highly appreciated. Thank you all for making the study possible. To all of the people I have meet during the fieldwork, I would like to give a big thanks for all the interesting conversations and stories we have shared. My supervisor, Dr. Christian Pilegaard Hansen, thank you for the reflective discussions, encouraging advices and support throughout this process. Finally, I must also acknowledge my family and friends, whom without I could not complete this work.

Financial support helped me to perform this fieldwork: thanks to Agricultural Development grant, Ku; Oticon fonden and Tennis fonden.

Abbreviations

AAA Annual harvesting areas ABT Forest and Land Authority CDF Centre of Forest Development CFO Forestry certificate of origin CM Community member COINFO Intercommunal forest committee of Velasco DBH Diameter at breast height DMC Minimum commercial diameter IAPOAF Annual plan for harvesting activities INRA Land Reform law LPP Popular Participation Law MINGA Intercommunal working association OTB Community secretary PFM Participatory Forest Management PGMF Management plan for the rural community 15 de Agosto POAF Annual harvesting plan of the forest PRA Participatory Rural Appraisal PSP Permanent sample plots TCO original community lands UFM Municipal forestry unit

1. Introduction ...... 7 1.1 The research problem ...... 8 1.2 Problem statement ...... 9 1.3 Objectives ...... 9 1.4 Research questions ...... 10 1.5 Outline ...... 10 2. Analytical and conceptual framework ...... 11 2.1 Conceptualisation of decentralisation ...... 11 2.2 Theoretical framework ...... 12 2.2.1 Accountability, actors and powers in decentralisation ...... 13 2.2.2 Property rights regimes ...... 14 2.2.3 Literature review ...... 17 2.2.4 Summary ...... 23 3. Forest management in Bolivia ...... 24 3.1 Historical development of the land and forest legislation in Bolivia ...... 24 3.1.1 Prior to the Land Reform law 1953 ...... 25 3.1.2 Land Reform law 1953 ...... 26 3.1.3 Forest Law 1974 ...... 26 3.1.4 Decentralisation process ...... 27 3.2 Study area ...... 29 4. Method and methodology ...... 33 4.1 Methodology ...... 33 4.1.1 Mixed methods ...... 33 4.2 Data collection ...... 34 4.2.1 Selection of study area ...... 34 4.2.2 Analysis of management plan for the concerned forest ...... 35 4.2.3 Interviews...... 35 4.2.4 Questionnaires ...... 37 4.2.5 Participant observation ...... 38 4.2.6 Participatory Rural Appraisal ...... 38 4.2.7 Forest inventory ...... 39 4.2.8 Satellite pictures ...... 43 4.3 Data management and analysis ...... 43 4.3.1 Data analysis ...... 43 5. Results ...... 45 5.1 Rights prior to the commencement of the decentralisation process ...... 45 5.1.1 Prior to the land reform law in 1953 ...... 46 5.1.2 Land reform law 1953 ...... 47 4

5.1.3 Forest law 1974 ...... 49 5.1.4 Summary ...... 51 5.2 Decentralisation process of the mid-1990s ...... 51 5.2.1 Prior to the approval of the PGMF ...... 52 5.2.2 Period following the approval of the PGMF ...... 53 5.2.3 Land use under the PGMF ...... 57 5.2.4 Use of forest resources under the PGMF ...... 63 5.2.5 Summary ...... 67 5.3 Accountability ...... 68 5.3.1 Summary ...... 72 5.4 Evaluation of the current management of the forest resources ...... 73 5.4.1 Validity of the PGMF ...... 73 5.4.2 Compliance of the PGMF ...... 77 5.4.3 Summary ...... 87 5.5 The sustainability of the PGMF ...... 88 5.5.1 Sustainability of the use of land ...... 88 5.5.2 Diameter size distribution of species ...... 89 5.5.3 Assessment of the harvesting activities ...... 90 5.5.4 Summary ...... 94 6. Discussion ...... 95 6.1 Discussion of data collection ...... 95 6.1.1 Interviews ...... 95 6.1.2 Gaining access ...... 96 6.1.3 Forest inventory ...... 96 6.2 Summary of main findings ...... 97 6.3 Discussion of main findings ...... 99 6.3.1 Sustainable forest management ...... 99 6.3.2 Confounding and counterfactual factors ...... 100 6.3.3 Incomplete decentralisation ...... 101 6.4 Implications on main findings ...... 102 7. References ...... 105 Appendices ...... 110 A. Forest inventory data ...... 110 B. Comparison of data results from forest inventory and PSP’s ...... 111

List of tables and figures

Figure 1 Analytical framework 13 Figure 2 Map of the Tropical Dry Forest Chiquitano 30 Figure 3 Location of the study site 15 de Agosto 31 Figure 4 Map of community 15 de Agosto 32 Figure 5 Map of the area under forest management and location of sample plots 41 Figure 6 Cultivated crops according to number of households 59 Figure 7 No. Of households cooking with firewood, gas or both 62 Figure 8 Importance of the forest management for the community 67 Figure 9 Accountability relations between involved actors 69 Figure 10 Map of the location of the AAAs 80 Figure 11 Diameter size distribution of selected commercial species 89 Tables Table 1 Bundles of rights associated with positions 15 Table 2 Scientific papers included in the literature review 18 Table 3 Resume of land and forest legislation in Bolivia 25 Table 4 Informants and no. of interviews performed 35 Table 5 Location of sample plots 40 Table 6 Change in powers and rights held by involved actors prior to the commencement of the decentralisation process 46 Table 7 Change in powers and rights held by involved actors following the decentralisation process of the mid 1990s 52 Table 8 Change in powers and rights held by involved actors following the approval of the PGMF 54 Table 9 Description of division of land use 55 Table 10 Comparison of total tree abundance between PGMF and forest inventory 74 Table 11 Comparison of total basal area between PGMF and forest inventory 75 Table 12 Comparison of total volume between PGMF and forest inventory 76 Table 13 Comparison of relative abundance rate according to the commercial value between PGMF and forest inventory 76 Comparison of size of AAA registered in the IAPOAF and POAF compared with measurements performed on Table 14 79 Google Earth Pro Comparisons of average volume per species harvested and average volume according to diameter classes for each Table 15 82 species Table 16 Percentage of trees harvested of the total number of trees with a diameter above DMC 84 Table 17 Commercial value compared to harvest rate 86 Table 18 Annual harvesting rate compared to growth rate 91 Table 19 Regeneration rate compared to the maximum volume permitted for harvesting 92 Table 20 Maximum harvesting rate for commercial species to regrow harvested volume within 20 years 93 Appendix A Forest inventory data Table 21 Data analysis for the forest inventory 110 Appendix B Comparison of data results from forest inventory and PSP’s Figure 12 Map of the locations of the PSPs and 15 de Agosto 112 Table 22 Tree abundance rate 112 Table 23 Basal area 113 Table 24 Total volume 113 Table 25 Species composition 113 Table 26 Relative abundance 114 Table 27 Relative abundance according to the commercial value categories 115 Table 28 Species included in the PSP and the forest inventory 115 Table 29 Frequency 117

1. Introduction

Deforestation is a global problem; about 13 million hectares are deforested every year all over the world (FAO 2010). It brings on numerous consequences: deforestation is responsible for about 15- 20 per cent of human-induced local and global climate change; deforestation erodes biological and genetic resources and can lead to soil degradation and loss of water regulation. Finally, deforestation has negative impacts on the about two billion people whom depend on forests for their livelihoods (Humphreys 2006; Stern 2007; Wiersum 1995). The high deforestation rate and the problems following deforestation have provoked various policy responses. Many of the policy responses includes multiple actors, leading to a decentralisation of the management of forest resources as a way to devolve power and decision-making closer to the local people (Agrawal & Ostrom 2001). Decentralisation of the forest management is argued to lead to a reduction of government bureaucracy, democratic decision-making, and equitable distribution of benefits. Finally a more effective regulation of forest utilisation, support the collective action of institutions governing forest resources, and a way to achieve forest and biodiversity conservation (Larson et al. 2010; Mogoi et al. 2012, Kallert et al. 2000; Kaimowitz & Ribot 2002; Ribot 2001; Andersson 2002; Pacheco 2004; Poteete & Ribot 2011). Decentralisation is argued to be an efficient tool to assure forest conservation, because the local actors and politicians have the specific time and place information needed to adjust better policies than the central governments (Larson et al. 2010; Warner 1997; Arnold 2001; Ostrom 1990). Other studies demonstrate that decentralisation can increase existing inequalities through increased opportunities for corruption and elite capture of rents (Bardhan & Mookerherjee 2000; Plateau 2004; Rile 2003). This is why it is stressed by several scholars that the decentralised forest management needs to be equitable, efficient, participatory, and accountable to assure conservation of the forest resources (Agrawal & Ostrom 2001; Agrawal & Ribot 1999; Persha et al. 2011; Bowler et al. 2012; Porter-Bolland et al. 2011, Pacheco 2007).

Although the impact of decentralised forest management on forest condition is much debated, there has been a great increase in reforms decentralising the forest management throughout the world (Bruce 1999; Agrawal et al. 2008). Since the 1990's the number of rural communities with ownership or control over a forest estate has doubled, making it at least 60 countries claiming to have decentralised some aspect of the natural resource management (Ribot 1999; Agrawal 2001; Sunderlin et al. 2005)

Latin America experienced a shift in the natural resource management from the mid-1980’s where indigenous groups, forest adjacent communities, and migrant smallholders gained forest property rights to large areas of forestlands. Earlier reforms neglected the right of indigenous and other traditional people giving the states the exclusive right over the forest concessions (Pacheco et al. 2012). This study will focus on the forest management in Bolivia, whom already in 1994 started an extensive process of decentralising the forestry sector. Bolivia is one of the 10 countries in the world with the largest area of primary forest, with a cover of 59 million hectares constituting 54.2 per cent of the total area (FAO 2007). However, the Bolivian forests are experiencing major forest loss and environmental damage, represented by a deforestation rate estimated to be as high as 1 per cent of forest cover per year in 2004 – 2005 (Pellegrini 2011). This places Bolivia among the ten countries with the highest absolute forest loss over the last decade (Müller et al. 2012). The forest sector currently contributes with almost 3 per cent of the GDP and employs 75.000 people in the national economy (Pellegrini 2011). The high deforestation rate and economic importance of the forestry sector, has led the Bolivian government to promote land use planning and expand its protected areas. Today Bolivia is regarded to be the country, which has brought the process of decentralisation reforms the furthest in Latin America (Andersson 2003; León et al. 2012; Ferroukhi 2003; Pacheco 2004). The decentralisation process was begun by the Government of Bolivia in the mid-1990’s. A broad range of responsibilities, functions and political decisions over education health, urban infrastructure, and natural resource management were devolved (Andersson 2003). The decentralised forest management is a key issue in Bolivia, as forest products represent a major part of the livelihood strategies for the large group of communities adjacent to forest-covered areas (León et al. 2012; Larson et al. 2010). The great importance of forest products for these forest adjacent communities and the national economy, as a whole, underlines the need for a study of the impact of the decentralised forest management on forest condition.

1.1 The research problem

Bolivia is experiencing a high deforestation rate, with serious implications for the countries natural resources and also the forest dependent community’s livelihood strategies. Following the new paradigm shift in forest management, the Bolivian government, early on reformed the forestry

8 policy to a decentralised management of the natural resources with the aim of securing a sustainable management of the natural resources. The effects of a decentralised forest management on forest condition is particularly important, as it has both great ecological and social significance. Although decentralised forest management has a relatively long history in natural resource management, the impact of decentralised forest management on forest condition remains elusive (Anderson & Gibson 2006; Larson et al. 2007; Lund et al. 2014; Treue et al. 2014; Bluwstein et al. 2014; Nagendra 2002). Although case studies investigating the impact of decentralised forest management on forest condition were identified, several methodological problems were found, see literature review in the following chapter. The choice of method affected the conclusion of the studies. Moreover, few studies have addressed the possible impact of the decentralised forest management on forest condition in Latin America. Only two studies were identified in Bolivia, yet none of which reached conclusive results. It is therefore crucial to examine whether the decentralised management implemented in Bolivia have had a positive impact on the forest condition.

1.2 Problem statement

Has the implemented decentralisation of the forest management in Bolivia, resulted in a sustainable management of the forest resources in the case study of the community 15 de Agosto located in the tropical dry forest Chiquitano?

1.3 Objectives

1) Investigate what changes the decentralisation has led to on the use of forest resources 2) Asses to what extent the forest management has been decentralised 3) Asses whether the current harvesting rate of timber is sustainable compared to the growth rate of the harvested species

1.4 Research questions

A) How was the forest resources managed before the implementation of the decentralisation process?

A.1) What powers and rights where held by the involved actors?

A.2) How was the use of the forest resources?

B) To what extent is the forest management decentralised?

B.1) Which powers and rights are currently held by involved actors?

B.2) How has the use of forest resources changed?

B.3) How is the accountability relation between the involved actors?

C) Is the current forest management complying with the official regulations?

C.1) Does the management plan apply with the official regulations?

C.2) Is the community complying with the management plan?

D) Does the current forest management assure a sustainable management of the forest?

D.1) Is the management, currently applied by the community, sustainable?

D.2) Does the management plan present a sustainable management of the forest resources?

1.5 Outline

First, the analytical framework developed for the investigation is presented. This is followed by a presentation of the theories, conceptual framework and the literature review, which the analytical framework is based on (Chapter 2). The next chapter presents the historical changes in land and forest legislation, followed by a description of the study area (Chapter 3). Then the methodology used for the development of the research design and the methods applied for the data collection is presented (Chapter 4). This is followed by the results from the data analysis, structured around the analytical framework and answering each of the sub-research questions (Chapter 5). Finally, the main findings of the study are discussed and the implications of the findings are reflected upon (Chapter 6). 10

2. Analytical and conceptual framework

First decentralisation will be conceptualised, then the analytical framework applied for the study will be presented. This is followed by the theoretical framework. Finally, the literature review is presented.

2.1 Conceptualisation of decentralisation

As already mentioned, decentralisation of the forest management is argued by several scholars to lead to positive effects. However, in practice there is a great variation in the design of the decentralisation reforms. It is argued that the current forestry discourse labels everything as decentralisation, hereby reminding that forest policies referred to as decentralisation should be carefully analysed and not taken for granted (Ribot et al. 2010).

There are various definitions of decentralisation, most define it as “any act in which a central government formally cedes powers to actors and institutions at lower levels in a political administrative and territorial hierarchy” (Agrawal & Ribot 1999: 475). To investigate the problem statement of this study, a more operationalisable definition of decentralisation is needed. The objective of the study requires an investigation of the degree of decentralisation actually occurring on the study site. It is found that distinguishing between two types of decentralisation presented by Agrawal and Ribot (1999) is helpful in the investigation of the actual extent of decentralisation in the case study. Deconcentration is the first type, referring to a process where “...powers are transferred to lower- level actors who are accountable to their superiors in a hierarchy...” (Agrawal & Ribot 1999: 475). In deconcentration the empowered actors are liable to actors higher up in the hierarchy, thereby not assuring an increased responsiveness to lower-level actors. The other type of decentralisation, political decentralisation differs from the first by emphasising downward accountability, “... powers are transferred to lower level actors who are downwardly accountable ...” (Agrawal & Ribot 1999: 475). Political decentralisation is in this sense a strategy of governance to facilitate transfer of power closer to those who are most affected by the exercise of power, and can thereby enhance local empowerment and decision making over development and natural resource use (Agrawal & Ribot 1999). Political decentralisation will in the following be named as decentralisation.

Decentralisation of the forest management is a way to implement a more participatory management (Bruce 1999). The actual management system implemented with a decentralisation of the forest management is often referred to as Participatory Forest Management (PFM). It is argued that implementing PFM is the best way to achieve forest and biodiversity conservation and socio-economic benefits for forest adjacent communities (Larson et al. 2010; Mogoi et al. 2012; Kallert et al. 2000; Edmunds & Wollenberg 2003; Ribot 2004; Sikor & Nguyen 2007). Based on the underlying assumption that communities will conserve the forest if they can benefit from the conservation (Warner 1997). This underlines the importance of analysing the decentralisation reform and to what extent a transfer of powers to lower-level actors has occurred.

2.2 Theoretical framework

To assess the effects of the political reform an analytical framework was developed. The analytical framework is presented in figure 1, which draws on the theoretical framework for analysing decentralisation by Agrawal and Ribot (1999) and the conceptual framework by Schlager and Ostrom (1992). The analytical framework also draws on insights from the literature review on former studies concerned with the impact of decentralised forest management on forest condition. These are presented in the following sections.

Figure 1 Analytical framework

(Compiled by author, source; Mohammed and Inoue 2014; Agrawal and Ribot 1999; Schlager and Ostrom 1992)

2.2.1 Accountability, actors and powers in decentralisation

The framework for analysing decentralisation by Agrawal and Ribot (1999) in the article Accountability in decentralisation: A framework with South Asian and West African cases, presents an important part of the analytical framework, because the framework has been very influential in analysing the extent of democratization achieved by decentralised natural resource governance (Coleman & Fleischman 2012; Mohammed & Inoue 2014). The framework enables an analysis of the presence of a downwardly accountable local actor, the presence of such is a prerequisite for an actual constitution of decentralisation (Agrawal & Ribot 1999; Ribot 2001; Mohammed & Inoue 2014).

The framework presents three dimensions necessary to investigate the extent of the decentralised

13 natural resource management. The first dimension is accountability, Agrawal and Ribot (1999) argue that it is only likely that decentralised forest management can be used as a measure to reach an efficient and equitable resource management when powers to make decision-making are transferred to downwardly accountable local authorities (Ribot 2001). Moreover, it is underlined that for the local institutions to respond to local needs and aspirations the presence of a democratic process is essential (Ribot 2004). Actors is the second dimension in Agrawal and Ribot's (1999) framework, actors are those who exercise powers over public resources. The actors have different types of powers and are located in particular relations of accountability. The relations depend on the constitution of powers of each actor (Agrawal & Ribot 1999). Powers is the third dimension of the decentralisation framework. Agrawal and Ribot (1999) distinguishes between four different decision making powers, 1) the power to create rules or modify old ones, 2) the power to make decisions about how a particular resource or opportunity is to be used, 3) the power to implement and ensure compliance to the new or altered rules and 4) the power to adjudicate disputes that arise in the effort to create rules and ensure compliance (Agrawal & Ribot 1999). Although the framework is useful for analysing the extent of decentralisation, Mohammed and Inoue (2014) argues that the framework has three shortcomings. Firstly the framework fails to consider that the decision making power on property rights can be held by a wide variety of actors. The second shortcoming is the underlying assumption that the empowering of local institutions will result in sustainable forest management and rural development. Mohammed and Inoue (2014) argue that the framework needs to be broadened to verify if the decentralisation actually results in a positive social and environmental impact. The third shortcoming is that the framework does not link the impact of the decentralisation on the forest condition to other confounding or counterfactual factors such as history, social, biophysical and/or economic factors (Mohammed & Inoue 2014).

2.2.2 Property rights regimes

The first shortcoming will be met by integrating the conceptual framework by Schlager and Ostrom (1992) from the paper Property-rights regimes and natural resources: a conceptual analysis, which identify different types of property-regimes according to the diverse bundles of rights held by the resource users. Rights are the product of rules, as rules prescribe the authorization and rights are the authority to undertake particular actions related to a specific domain (Schlager & Ostrom 1992). By integrating the conceptual framework by Schlager and

Ostrom on rights in the analytical framework, overlapping rights, thereby meet the first shortcoming presented by Mohammed and Inoue (2014). Schlager and Ostrom’s concept of rights will be used for the analysis of the rights held by the different actors, because their framework demonstrates how the types of rights can interplay and enforce each other. It is thus underlined that although the rights are independent of each other, the possession of some rights does not have a meaning without the possession of others, e.g. it does not make sense to have the right to sell or lease your land if you do not have the right to access and withdraw resources from the land (Schlager & Ostrom 1992). Schlager and Ostrom (1992), distinguish between rights on an operational level and a collective- choice level. Rights are followed and complied with at the operational level, whereas rights are changed on the collective-choice level. The right to access and withdraw resources are on the operational level and do therefor not give any rights to change the use of natural resources. At the collective-choice level rights are divided into three levels, called; management, exclusion and alienation. Management describes the right to regulate internal use patterns, e.g. developing a harvesting plan. Exclusion describes the right to decide who may have the right to enter a property and determine what qualifications must be met in order to access the resource. Finally, alienation describe the right to sell or lease either or both the right to manage and to exclude (Schlager & Ostrom 1992). Following the distinction of the types of rights, Schlager and Ostrom presents four types of property rights holders, see table 1 below.

Table 1 Bundles of rights associated with positions

Owner Proprietor Claimant Authorised user Access and withdrawal x x x x Management x x x Exclusion x x Alienation x (Source: Schlager & Ostrom 1992)

The authorized user defines individuals holding rights at the operational level. The authorized users possess the smallest bundle of rights out of the four types of property rights holders. They have the right to enter a defined physical property and to obtain the products of a resource, which is referred to as withdrawal, on the condition that they comply with the rules of access. The rights of the authorized user are defined by others who hold the collective-choice rights of management and exclusion. The second type of user is claimants, they possess the same right as authorized 15 users plus the collective-choice right of management, thereby having the authority to decide how, when, and where harvesting may occur and whether the structure of a resource may be changed. They cannot however exclude other users from the resource, nor lease or sell their right of management to others. The third type of user is proprietors. These have the same rights as the claimants plus the right to exclude, and can therefore determine who may access the resource and the use of the resources. However, they do not have the right to lease or sell these collective rights. The fourth user type is called owners, holding both the collective-choice rights of management and exclusion, but also the right to alienate their collective-choice rights, meaning they are allowed to sell or lease out their rights to others (Schlager & Ostrom 1992). The rights outlined above can be held either de jure or de facto. De jure rights “are given lawful recognition by formal, legal instrumentalities” (Schlager & Ostrom 1992; 254). Holders of de jure rights are more certain that their rights will be sustained, in case their rights are challenged in a juridical setting. In case the rights are de facto, these rights are less secure as they “… originate among resource users. In some situations resource users cooperate to define and enforce rights among themselves.” (Schlager & Ostrom 1992; 254). De facto rights are less secure, as these are not related to government authorised property rights. Conversely, de jure rights hold no value, if the holder of the rights fails to enforce the rights. The de facto and de jure rights are often found to be overlapping, and even conflicting. The division of rights in de jure and de facto is essential when investigating the manifestation of decentralisation on the ground, as insecure property rights can have great impact on the management of the forest. A local community will have lower incentives to conserve the forest resources, if their rights to access and withdraw resources from the area are insecure.

The analytical framework by Agrawal and Ribot (1999) will be applied to analyse the extent of the decentralisation. This will be supplemented with the conceptual framework presented by Schlager and Ostrom, which will broaden the analysis to also include the property rights held by the different actors. The second shortcoming of the framework was argued to be the lacking investigation of the impact the policy reform on the forest condition. that is the impact of the forest policy on the forest condition. This along with the third shortcoming, concerning the confounding and counterfactual factors affecting the policy impact will be further investigated in the following literature review.

2.2.3 Literature review

A large body of empirical work has investigated the impact of PFM on forest condition. The rational for conducting the review is to explore what impact and contextual factors have been identified in previous studies concerning the effect of PFM on forest condition. The literature review was used fo the development of the analytical framework. Moreover, the literature review will present an investigation of the confounding and counterfactual factors that may affect the policy impact on the forest condition. Finally, the literature review provides a critical reflection of the methods applied for the evaluation of the policy impact.

The table 2 below shows a list of the scientific papers included in the literature review and the categories investigated in the papers. Each category will be discussed more thoroughly in the following.

Table 2 Scientific papers included in the literature review

condition

Inconclusive in regards to forest forest to regards in Inconclusive

Sustainable

Not sustainable Not

Increased cover forest

sustainable

Improved forest condition - but not not - but condition forest Improved

Sustainable

Improved forest condition forest Improved

Inconclusive if sustainable if Inconclusive

Maintained forest condition forest Maintained

Improved forest condition forest Improved

Inconclusive in regards to forest cover forest to regards in Inconclusive

Not sustainable Not

condition

Inconclusive in regards to forest forest to regards in Inconclusive

Improved forest condition forest Improved

Increased cover forest

Improved forest condition forest Improved

conservation?

forest management lead to forest forest to lead management forest

Conclusion: Does participatory Does participatory Conclusion:

Spatial

Baseline scenario Baseline

Spatial, temporal and baseline and temporal Spatial,

None

Spatial

Temporal

Baseline scenario Baseline

None

Baseline scenario Baseline

Spatial

Temporal

Baseline scenario Baseline

Temporal

Spatial and temporal and Spatial

Spatial

Spatial and baseline scenario baseline and Spatial

Baseline scenario Baseline

factors for policy impact policy for factors

Investigation of confounding confounding of Investigation

Perception based Perception

Inventory

inventory

Remote sensing and and sensing Remote

Perception based Perception

based

Inventory and perception perception and Inventory

Refers to other studies Refers other to

based

Inventory and perception perception and Inventory

Perception based Perception

based

Inventory and perception perception and Inventory

Inventory

Remote sensing Remote

Inventory

Perception based Perception

Inventory

Remote sensing Remote

Perception based Perception

based

Validated perception perception Validated

impact

Indicators of policy policy of Indicators

Investigated

Not investigated Not

Investigated

Not investigated Not

Investigated

Not investigated Not

Investigated

on the study site study the on

Extent of decentralisation decentralisation of Extent

Tanzania

Mexico

Tanzania

Nepal

Philippines

Nepal

Bolivia

Cambodia

Mexico

India

and Uganda and

Bolivia, Kenya, Mexico Mexico Kenya, Bolivia,

China

Tanzania

Mexico

Bolivia

Ethiopia

India and Nepal and India

Country

Vyamana (2009) Vyamana

Vester and Navarro-Martinez (2007) Vester Navarro-Martinez and

Treue et al. Treue (2014) et al.

Toms (2008) Toms

Shrestha and McManus (2008) McManus and Shrestha

Pulhin et al. (2007) et al. Pulhin

Poudel et al. (2014) et al. Poudel

Pandit and Bevilacqua (2011) Bevilacqua and Pandit

Nagendra (2002) Nagendra

Leon et al. (2012) et al. Leon

Lambrick et al. (2014) et al. Lambrick

Durán-Medina et al. (2007) et al. Durán-Medina

Datta and Chatterjee (2012) DattaChatterjee and

Coleman and Fleischman (2012) Fleischman and Coleman

Chen et al. (2013) et al. Chen

Blomley et al. (2008) et al. Blomley

Barsimantov and Kendall (2012) Kendall and Barsimantov

Andersson and Gibson (2006) Gibson and Andersson

Ameha et al. (2014) et Ameha al. Agrawal (2009) Agrawal Reference (Compiled by author)

The literature review contains 20 scientific papers, from 11 countries: Nepal (6), Mexico (4), Bolivia (3) and Tanzania (3) dominate the sample in terms of number of studies. These countries were some of the first to implement PFM. The rest of the countries except for India (2) are represented with one study only (China, Cambodia, Philippines, Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda and Bolivia). According to Bowler et al. (2010), out of 34 studies investigating the impact of PFM on forest condition, 60% of the studies were concerned with India and Nepal. Likewise, Casse and Milhøj (2011) find that out of 56 case studies, 36 case studies were investigating the effect of PFM on forest condition from either India or Nepal. The majority of the empirically based research is focused in Asia, whereas studies concerned with PFM in Latin America and Bolivia are scarce.

Impact of PFM on forest condition in Bolivia

Only few studies investigate the impact of participatory forest management on the forest condition in Bolivia. One study performed by Andersson and Gibson (2006) applied remote sensing to evaluate the forest condition. The objective was to compare the impact of the decentralised forest management in 30 municipalities using remote sensing images. The study concludes that decentralisation can produce highly variable environmental impact, due to the municipalities’ different responses to the decentralisation policy. The study does however not investigate the extent of which the decentralisation is implemented in the communities. The study by León et al. (2012) of the Yuracaré people in Bolivia argues that the local institutional context has been ignored in the decentralisation process. Although the study identifies great alterations in the local forest governance, no difference is observed in the forest condition. However, these findings are inconclusive, as several problems are identified in the performed forest inventory, due to historical changes and number of sample plots in relation to the total area. Also the comparative study performed by Coleman and Fleischman (2012) concludes that no change in forest condition is found after the implementation of the decentralisation policy. This conclusion is however based on a perception-based evaluation of change in the forest condition. The problems related to the perception-based method for the evaluation of policy impact on forest condition will be discussed in the following.

Policy

It is important to investigate to which degree the management is decentralised on the ground, in this study referred to as policy output. This way it is possible to verify if there is a causal link between the policy and the impact on forest condition. Acknowledging the great variety of institutional set ups within the concept of PFM, the effect of PFM on forest condition will surely depend on the nature of the policy on ground. Moreover, it is necessary to evaluate to what degree PFM has been implemented, as several studies has pointed out that PFM does not exist in areas that officially are designated as managed under PFM (Lund et al. 2009; Casse & Milhøj 2011; León et al. 2012; Bruce 1999). The table above shows that five of the 20 empirical studies have not empirically investigated if PFM has been implemented on ground. None of the five studies investigates how PFM is practiced in the study site, which has been selected because of their registration as an area under PFM (Lambrick et al. 2014; Nagendra 2002; Blomley et al. 2008; Pandit & Bevilcqua 2011; Treue et al. 2014). It is found that most studies investigate whether the PFM community has a local forest management group and what rules that have been established in regards to access to the forest area. These two factors are argued to be the first manifestation of the existence of PFM (Lund et al. 2009). It does not require a lot of resources to investigate this, as it can be confirmed by written material or through a few interviews with involved actors. This also shows in the literature review, as 13 out of the 20 studies confirms the existence of a forest group in the study area. However, the presence of a forest group is not an assurance of an implementation of a decentralised forest management, as this requires downward accountability to the lower-level actors. Only few of the studies investigate downward accountability in relation to the management of the forest, despite the fact that several studies in the literature review report problems concerning elite capturing on the study sites (Agrawal 2009, Pulhin et al. 2007, Shrestha & McManus 2008, Toms 2008). It can be discussed if it is correct to evaluate the effect of PFM on forest condition, when problems like elite capture is registered, as this can lead to deterioration of the forest condition (Lund et al. 2009). Finally, is it found that few studies investigate the types of powers transferred to the communities. This is of great importance, as several studies find that the state often retains ownership and control over the forest resources (Cronkleton et al. 2010). There is thus a risk that communities are required to follow rules developed by higher-level actors, which may lead to deterioration of the forest due to lack of insight in the effects of the regulations.

Policy impact

There is great variation in methods chosen to evaluate the impact of the PFM. Seven out of the 20 studies have used either perception based or validated perception based method. The validated perception based refers to studies where the impact has been evaluated based on a combination of local community members perception of possible change in forest condition and a transect walk performed in the forest area (Lund et al. 2009). Five out of the seven studies concludes that forest condition has improved, and the last two are inconclusive. However, several problems arise when applying forest users’ perception to evaluate the effect of PFM on forest condition. One problem is the forest users’ potential interest in declaring the forest condition better than it is, due to the risk of a more restricted access to forest resources in case forest degradation is observed. Moreover, PFM schemes run over many years, which may complicate forest users’ evaluation of the changes in forest condition. Some people point to the first-hand experience by the forest adjacent communities in observing the changes in forest condition before and after the implementation of participatory forest management (Pandit & Bevilacqua 2011). However, it is argued that depending on the history and livelihoods of the communities they will have better or worse preconditions to evaluate the forest conditions, as agricultural communities may not have sufficient knowledge concerning forests. These considerations are supported by Lawrence et al. (2007), who finds that villagers’ evaluation of ”quality” forest was not necessarily the most ”bio diverse” forest. Three of the studies have backed up their data from the forest inventories with data gathered with the perception-based method. A total of eight studies has thus applied forest inventory to evaluate the effect of PFM on the forest condition, out of which only four of the eight studies finds that PFM has a positive effect on the forest condition (Lambrick et al. 2014; León et al. 2012; Poudel et al. 2014; Vester & Navarro-Martinez 2007). This means that compared to the studies only using perception based, fewer studies conclude that PFM has improved the forest condition or assures a sustainable use of the forest resources. Only the studies applying the inventory method are able to conclude if the implemented PFM is sustainable or not, the other methods only concludes on forest condition and forest cover. Although a downside of forest inventory the method is that is very time consuming, thus limiting the study to cover smaller areas. An alternative method applied is remote sensing. Four studies have applied remote sensing, two of which conclude that PFM has led to an increased forest cover (Toms 2008; Barsimantov & Kendall 2012), and one that is inconclusive in regards to forest cover (Durán-Medina et al. 2007). The fourth study combines inventory and remote sensing and reaches the conclusion that the PFM 21 implemented is not sustainable. This demonstrates one of the downfalls of remote sensing, as the forest cover can remain or increase, while degradation of the forest condition is taking place, e.g. over harvesting of certain species, thus changing the biodiversity of the forest.

Confounding and counterfactual factors

Several scholars have pointed out that the policy is not the cause of the effect on the forest condition alone, as several other factors can affect the use of forest resources and consequently also the impact of PFM. Methods for investigating the confounding and counterfactual factors in the scientific papers can be divided into three categories, spatial, temporal and baseline. Eight studies apply the baseline approach comparing the performance of PFM with the scenario prior to the implementation of PFM. If this method is only based on respondents knowledge, there is a risk that they are either not capable of making the estimation or answers strategically (Lund et al. 2007). The spatial method is another approach where PFM is compared to other tenure regimes. However, big variation in forest condition prior to the tenure change, or differences in enforcement of the tenure systems may represent implications for a comparison (Lund et al. 2007). This is underlined by scholars pointing to the impact of physical features like forest size, resource scarcity, dependency etc. as factors that may determine the impact of a decentralisation process (Bowler et al. 2012; Agrawal & Chhatre 2006; Behera 2009; Brown & Lassoie 2010; Hayes & Persha 2010). The third method is the temporal, where the effect of PFM is analysed over time. This method is useful for discovering change in possible confounding factors pointed out by scholars. Factors like; change in the forest adjacent communities’ livelihood strategies, changes in the national and international market for timber, alternative income activities for community members, change in the precipitation etc. Access to market is another factor that can affect the harvesting level of the forest resources. On the one hand, tenure reforms can open up for alternative income streams for communities but on the other hand, this channel may open for transfer of economic rents to other actors better positioned in the forest markets (Larson et al. 2010), e.g. local sawmills or timber transporters. Several of the studies combine these methods, which is a more convincing method, as it both provides an analysis of forest management under different management regimes, and demonstrates the dynamics of conservation over time (Lund et al. 2007). Although the impact of decentralisation is argued to depend on various internal and external factors, there is to date no definitive evidence

22 as to what set of factors have greater relevance for explaining specific impacts (Ferroukhi 2003; Agrawal and Gibson 1999; Kaimowitz et al. 1999; Ribot 2001; Pacheco 2004).

2.2.4 Summary

Several factors are necessary to investigate when assessing the impact of decentralised forest management. The literature review served to expand the study area beyond property rights and relations between actors holding decision-making powers. It served to uncover that an investigation of the historical context is necessary to analyse the causal relation between the policy output and impact on forest condition. Moreover, the literature review also allowed for an exploration of strengths and limitations regarding the applied methods, which have been useful in the development of the research design. The theoretical framework concerning decision making powers by Ribot and Agrawal (1999) and the conceptual framework on property rights by Schlager and Ostrom (1992), along with the literature review has been drawn on to develop the analytical framework, which depicts the relation between context, actors, rights and accountability and the policy impact on forest condition. The analytical framework functions as the structure of the analyses to be able to investigate the problem statement for the study.

3. Forest management in Bolivia

This chapter will present a description of the historical and current forest management in Bolivia, which will be used later for the analysis of the change in rights and decision-making powers held by involved actors before and after the commencement of the decentralisation process. Moreover, the examination of the changing forest policy in Bolivia will work as basis for the analysis of the rights held and claimed by the actors and to analyse the extent of the decentralisation. Finally, the chapter will present the study area, which is the context for the analysis of the impact of the decentralised forest management on the forest condition.

3.1 Historical development of the land and forest legislation in Bolivia

This section presents the change in forest policy in Bolivia. Focus for the chapter is the rights transferred to the rural communities, however rights transferred to other actors will also be presented, as these influence the rural communities de jure and de facto rights. The policies enacted in the mid-1990’s are considered to have affected local forest use the most (Benneker 2008; Pacheco 2004; Kaimowitz et al. 1998; Cronkleton et al. 2009). To analyse the extent of the decentralisation policies and the impact of the policies on the forest condition, it is necessary to assess the change in rights and decision-making powers held by involved actors prior to the enactment of the policies and after the enactment.

The table 3 Resume of the land and forest legislations Prior to decentralisation Key Policy Features Objective: redistribution of land and diversification of the economy and substitution of imports Result: In lowland Bolivia, unequal division of land – rural communities were not acknowledged rights over their land, in some cases they were expelled 1953 Land Reform Law from their land. Large enterprises where favoured for timber concession, because the rural communities did not possess the equipment to meet the demands for the timber concessions. Objective: development of the forest sector for socio economic benefit through the use and protection of forest resources. Results: Land rights and forest user rights were separated. All forest were declared state owned. 1974 Forest Law Rural communities where granted access and withdrawal rights to forest resources. Timber concessions continued to be granted the large enterprises. The government held right to grant large enterprises right to withdraw resources from community land. Decentralisation process Key Policy Features Objective: transform provincial sections into municipalities, and devolve powers and resources to the municipal government. 1994 Popular Participation Law Results: No new functions in regards to the natural resource management were devolved. Objectives: To secure access to land for landless people, guarantee property rights over land, guarantee sustainable use of land, legalize the land market and asses if land use complies with its socio economic function 1996 Land Reform Law Results: Indigenous people and groups of communities were permitted to claim collective ownership over land, thereby obtaining exclusive rights over all renewable natural resources and the right to participate in the use and sustainable exploitation of non-renewable natural resources. Objectives: to manage the forests sustainably and to improve local peoples access to benefit from the forest resources. Results: The Government of Bolivia maintains the ownership and control over 1996 Forest Law No. 1700 the forest resources. The user rights to benefit from forest resources are maintained for the rural communities. Moreover, with an approved management plan the right to commercialize forest resources on their territory against a royalty payment. (Compiled by author, source: Pacheco 2007; Benneker 2008; Cronkleton et al. 2009; Stocks 2005; Larson et al. 2010; World Bank 1994; Faguet 2002; Hernaiz & Pacheco 2000; Kaimowitz et al. 1998)

3.1.1 Prior to the Land Reform law 1953

Before the time of the Spanish colonisation, the Chiquitano region was populated by indigenous farmers, hunters, gatherers, and nomadic groups. With the arrival of the Spanish conquerors, in 1542, large groups of indigenous people were exported to the Eastern part of Bolivia to work in the mines of Potosi. In 1691, the Jesuits arrived to the region, with the objective of converting the indigenous populations to Catholicism. The Jesuits implemented large-scale agriculture and livestock production, supplied with workforce from the indigenous populations. The indigenous populations however continued their crops production for subsistence use. The Jesuits assured the foundation of the Chiquitano identity and territory, with the introduction of a common language

25 for the different ethnic groups called Chiquitano. In 1767, the Jesuits where expelled from the region, and the slavery of the Chiquitano population by the Spanish conquerors begun by installing livestock farms with the workforce of indigenous people. This system was different from the one performed by the Jesuits, as the indigenous populations were forced to work for free and under poor conditions (CEJIS 2003).

3.1.2 Land Reform law 1953

The government of Bolivia enacted in 1953 the Land Reform law, with the objective of redistributing the land to the farmers, diversify the economy, and substitute imports. Although the Land Reform is considered to have effectively distributed land rights to farmers in the highlands, in the lowlands it lead to a colonization with an unequal division of land due to the free submission of land through individual grants, and the system of land grabbing was characterised by an abuse of political power rights (Benneker 2008). The Land Reform did not acknowledge the lowland’s indigenous groups rights over the areas they occupied resulting in the expulsion of lowland indigenous people by big landowners (Pacheco 2007; Stocks 2005).

3.1.3 Forest Law 1974

The first forest law was enacted in 1974, with the objective to secure a “development of the forest sector for socio-economic benefit through the use and protection of the forest resources” (Marinissen 1998:161 reproduced in Benneker 2008). The land rights and forest user rights were separated, as the Forest Law declared all forest to be state owned. This implied that the government of Bolivia had the right to grant forest user permits for forests on both public and private land (Benneker 2008). With the enactment of the forest law 1974, the private timber companies were given exclusive rights to exploit forest resources, as it was impossible for the rural communities to meet the requirements. To receive the timber concession the companies were asked to present a forest management plan, a reforestation program and demonstrate that they had the capacity to transform logs (Benneker 2008). This required the possession of sawmills or other processing plant, as it was prohibited to use chainsaw to process timber. Nor did the rural communities have any legal rights to prohibit timber companies to enter the land they occupied (Cronkleton et al. 2009). The rural communities where referred to as forest tribes and the law allowed the rural communities to freely harvest forest products for domestic use (Benneker 2008; Larson et al. 2010).

3.1.4 Decentralisation process

The government of Bolivia started implementing a structural adjustment program in the mid- 1980's, which led to, amongst other things, market liberalisation and a reduction of public spending (World Bank 1994; Pacheco 2004). The development was continued in the early 1990’s with the implementation of various reforms, which aimed to minimise the role of state and promote private investment. Decentralisation was thus a part of a larger change, with the goal of limiting the role of the state (Pacheco 2004). The laws that are considered to have affected the local forest users the most are, the 1994 Popular Participation Law (LPP)1, the 1996 Land Reform law (INRA2), and the 1996 Forest Law No.3 1700 (Benneker 2008; Pacheco 2004; Larson et al. 2010).

Popular Participation Law

The enactment of the LPP in 1994 was an important step towards the administrative decentralisation of the state. The LPP transformed the provincial sections into municipalities, and furthermore devolved substantial powers and resources to the municipal government (Faguet 2002; Andersson et al. 2006; Pacheco 2004). The LPP made the municipalities responsible for local school, health facilities, roads and water systems. The municipal governments were to finance the new responsibilities with the collection of urban property taxes, along with the finance received from the central government, which were to allocate 20 percent of the annual budget to the municipality governments in proportion to their population (Pacheco 2004). However, in regards to natural resource management, no new functions were devolved to the municipal governments.

INRA

The Land Reform law, known as the INRA law, was enacted in 1996 (Pacheco 2004). The main objective of the law was to 1) secure access to land for landless people, 2) guarantee property

1 ”Ley de Participación Popular” 2“Ley del Servicio Nacional de Reforma Agraria” No. 1715. Known as the INRA law, due to the institution created to implement the law called “Instituto Nacional de Reforma Agraria” (National Institute of Agrarian Reform). 3”Ley Forestal No. 1700” 27 rights over land, 3) guarantee the sustainable use of the land, 4) legalise the land market, and 5) asses if land use complies with its socio economic function (Hernaiz & Pacheco 2000; Benneker 2008; Cronkleton et al. 2009). This was done by introducing “original community lands” (TCO)4, giving indigenous people and rural communities a possibility to claim collective ownership over the land, exclusive rights over all renewable natural resources and the right to participate in the use and the sustainable exploitation of non-renewable natural resources within their territory (Hernaiz & Pacheco 2000; Larson et al. 2010). The communal land is inalienable, indivisible, irreversible, and collective and mortgage free, and exempt from taxes. The distribution and use of the resources in communal land is determined by the use and costumes of the local residents, as long as they follow the land and forest legislation (Cronkleton et al. 2009; Larson et al. 2010).

Forest Law 1700

With the enactment of the new Forest Law 1700, the Government of Bolivia maintains the ownership of the forest resources, thus regulating the timber extraction on private, communal and indigenous lands (Benneker 2008). The two main objectives of the Forest Law 1700 are to manage the forests sustainably and to improve local people’s access to benefit from forest resources. The Forest Law 1700 gives previously excluded groups such as rural communities the exclusive user rights to benefit from forest resources for subsistence use (Benneker 2008; Larson et al. 2010). The communities are furthermore allowed to commercialize their forest resources, as long as they have an approved management plan, and pay a royalty based on the area logged (Cronkleton et al. 2009; Kaimowitz et al. 1998; Larson et al. 2010). With the Forest Law 1700 the royalty payment switched from being volume-based timber taxes to an area-based royalty. This was done to give the timber companies an incentive to reduce the size of their area under concession, moreover the timber enterprises now have to use the forest more intensively and extract a wider variety of species to satisfy their demand for timber (Kaimowitz et al. 1998; Benneker 2008). The regulations on forest management have also changed. Under the 1974 Forest Law, management regulations required reforestation, whereas under the Forest Law 1700, management regulations are based on natural regeneration, logging cycle and reduced impact logging. The management plans have to comply with various requisites described in the “Technical norms 248/98”5 (Resolución Ministerial No. 248/98). One of the required requisites is that the forest

4 ”Tierra Communitarias de Origen” 5 ”Normas technicas 248/98” 28 operations are performed on large areas of forest, as this is required to cover the investments and costs of the operation. In most cases, the development of the management plan exceeds the expertise and economy of the rural communities, which is why many plans have either been developed with the help from projects supporting forestry development or from timber companies interested in obtaining access to the forest area (Cronkleton et al. 2009). In the results chapter (5) the regulations for commercialisation of timber on community land will be discussed further.

In order to complete these new functions the municipal governments are expected to create “Municipal forestry unit” (UFM)6. Their task is to identify the area for municipal forest reserves, allocate the municipal forest land to relevant actors, help with the development of forest management plans, monitor compliance of forestry regulations and promote forest plantations and agro-forestry (Kaimowitz et al. 1998; Pacheco 2004). To secure the cohesion of the new legislation the Forest Law 1700 the monitoring mechanisms of the forest sector was restructured with the creation of the “Forest Superintendence”7 today called “Forest and Land Authority” (ABT)8 (Cronkleton et al. 2009). The function of ABT is to allocate forest concessions and thus support and monitor the work of the UFM, it is furthermore expected, in case of violations of the forestry regulations that the ABT is to intervene, not the UFM. Prior to the ABT, “Centre of Forest Development” (CDF)9 held the responsibility to ensure compliance of the forest regulations and management plans. However, in reality the CDF did little to secure a sustainable forest management, as its main concern was collecting timber royalties. This was also evident in the widespread corruption and illegal logging practices of the time (Kaimowitz et al. 1998; Pacheco 2004). The ABT is the primary entity responsible for collecting forest taxes and controlling illegal logging and forestry crime, for allocating concessions and forest permits, and finally authorizing and monitoring forest management plans.

3.2 Study area

The study area is situated in the eastern part of Bolivia, in the tropical dry forest called “The tropical dry forest Chiquitano”10, which extends to Paraguay and Brazil. The dry forest is located

6 ”Unidad Forestal Municipal” 7 “Superintendencia Forestal” 8 “Autoridad de Bosques y Tierras” 9 “Centro de Desarollo Forestal” 10 ” Bosque Seco Chiquitano “ 29 between the humid climate of the Amazon and the arid climate of the Chaco, see map 2 below.

Figure 2 Map of the tropical dry forest Chiquitano

(Source: Bosque Modelo Chiquitano, 13.08.2015)

The region has a tropical semi-humid climate, with only two seasons, where the rainy season falls in the summer time and the dry season falls in the wintertime. The rainy season falls in the period of November to March, with a maximum rainfall in the month of January concentrating 70% of the total annual rainfall (Vides-Almonacid et al. 2007). The tropical dry forests are considered to be some of the most fragile forests, due to their slow regeneration capacity, and the high risk of forest fires in the dry season (Sanchez-Azofeifa et al. 2003; FAO 1995; Vides-Almonacid & Justianiano 2011). This underlines the importance of a further investigation of the management of the forest resources in the region. Information on community forest management is scarce. In 2006, the number of communities with a management plan was approximately 52, covering about 298,500 hectares (Benneker 2008). The case study is of the community 15 de Agosto, situated in the Tropical Dry Forest Chiquitano. The below demonstrates the location of the community in Province of Velasco in the department of Santa Cruz de la Sierra.

Figure 3 Location of the study site 15 de Agosto

(Complied by author, source: Google Earth Pro)

The community obtained an approved management plan, “Management plan for the rural community 15 de Agosto” (PGMF)11 in 2004-2005. This permitted the community to commercialise timber from the community land, the community performed their first harvest in 2005, the permit was given to a multiple-function land, meaning that part of the communal land is conserved for forest use and the other part for cultivation (PGMF 2004:1). The community members practice slash and burn cultivation of yucca, corn, sesame and chia. There are also two livestock groups in the community, a fishpond and cultivation of beehives. The history of the community, land use and performance of harvesting activities will be presented further in the results section. The map below demonstrates the division of the community land, the white line demonstrates the area designated for agricultural cultivation, and the red line demonstrates the area designated for forest management. The cultivated plots are sporadically placed in the area around the community houses. The landmarks in the community have been marked and illustrated with photos. The land use and forest management will be further explored in the results chapter.

4 Map of the community 15 de Agosto

(Compiled by author, source: GPS waypoints and photos collected during fieldwork, Google Earth Pro)

11 ”Plan general de manejo forestal – communidad campesina 15 de Agosto” 32

4. Method and methodology

This chapter will present the selected research approach. Subsequently, a description of the methods applied is presented. Finally, the analysis strategy for the data collected is outlined.

4.1 Methodology

As already mentioned, changes in forest harvest or forest condition is difficult to link directly to the decentralisation of forest management, because of the many confounding factors like changes over time in market access and prices of forest and agricultural products, livelihood strategies, access to credits etc. (Treue et al. 2004; Lund et al. 2014). Moreover, changes in management can take decades to materialize in the forest condition (Lund et al. 2014; Blomley et al. 2008). To circumvent this problem, Anderson and Gibson (2006) argues for a context dependent approach, saying that the forest condition assessment should aim only at the changes that can be directly related to the policy changes, and be supplemented with an analysis of the changes in the forest management and use. This study applies a case study method, as the strength of case studies is the ability to explain the presumed causal links in complex phenomena’s that are too complex to understand with survey or experimental strategies (Yin 2003). Applying a case study approach for this study is therefore argued to be useful for the evaluation of the impact of the decentralised forest management in Bolivia.

4.1.1 Mixed methods

A case study encompasses a mix of quantitative and qualitative methods. The combination of quantitative and qualitative research techniques is referred to as mixed-methods (Johnson & Onwuebuzie 2004; Lund et al. 2014). The purpose of using mixed methods is to mix research approaches to complement the strengths from both research methods and to minimize the weaknesses, to answer the research questions the best way possible (Johnson & Onwuebuzie 2004). A study performed by Lund et al. (2014) evaluating the conservation impact of decentralised forest management in Tanzania, concludes that the mixed methods approach is functional for investigating the link between policy change and impact on forest condition. This study will apply a mixed-method approach, by collecting subsequently quantitative and

33 qualitative data, in order to integrate the data concurrently in the analysis of the findings. This approach secures the possibility to seek for convergence and contradictions of the data from the different methods. This allows for the possibility of the data to compliment and clarify the results. Moreover enables the discovery of contradictions opening up for a further development of the research question (Johnson & Onwuebuzie 2004).

4.2 Data collection

In the following, the applied methods for the data collection will be presented. A description of each method is presented followed by a reflection on the necessity of the use of the method and the use of the collected data.

4.2.1 Selection of study area

Several criteria’s were included when deciding upon a study area. The first criteria was that the community should have the right to communally manage a forest area as a consequence of the decentralised forest management in Bolivia, because the objective of the study is to evaluate the impact of the decentralised forest management on forest condition. Due to the long response time in forest condition on change in management, another criteria was that the forest adjacent community had held the management rights for more than five years. Moreover, it was required that the community had a valid management plan, as a way to secure that the participatory forest management had actually been implemented. Another criterion for the selection of the study area was access to the managed forest area. The fieldwork was planned to take place during the rainy season, which implied that a low precipitation rate was also an important basis for the selection of study site. Due to these criteria’s, the tropical dry forest Chiquitano was selected as study area. Contact was made to the non-governmental organisation “Intercommunal forest committee of Velasco” (COINFO)12, who is an association of rural communities, they support rural communities with the implementation of their forest management. The elected director from COINFO along with the forest engineer of COINFO recommended the community 15 de Agosto on the background of the above outlined criteria. Once acceptance from the community had been received, the fieldwork was initiated in the community.

12 ” Comité Intercomunal Forestal de la Provincia Velasco” 34

4.2.2 Analysis of management plan for the concerned forest

In the beginning of the fieldwork, the management plan, PGMF, was obtained and studied thoroughly. This gave important insight in the legal framework of the community forest management, the permitted resource use, as well an overview of involved actors, their role and responsibility in the management. The examination of the management plan helped form the basis of the investigation, as the involved actors comprehension and implementation of the plan was investigated.

4.2.3 Interviews

During the fieldwork, several interviews were performed with community members, forest officials, NGO workers and forest engineers, either identified from the examination of the management plan or through the information given by former informants. The broad range of informants selected made it possible to gain a better understanding of the different perspectives and interests behind the applied forest management. The organisational structure and interest of the involved actors is relevant as the involved actors’ interest and points of view can affect the actual execution of the forest management. In case they do not have the correct knowledge of the management regulations or disagree with the regulations, this may change their implementation of the management plan. Below is a table demonstrating the number of semi-structured interviews performed and number of respondents according to the different actors.

Table 4 Informants and no. of interviews performed Respondent category Number of interviews Number of respondents Community members 16 21 Representatives from NGOs 5 6 collaborating with the community Forest officials 3 3 Timber company representatives and 2 2 employees Total 26 32 (Compiled by author source: fieldwork)

The respondent category, community members, includes both, representatives from the community council, representatives from the forest group and regular community members. Members from the community council and the forest group were targeted in the beginning of the fieldwork, to gain greater insight in the organisational structure. Besides, from interviewing representatives from the community council and the forest group, it was also sought to have a great variety of respondents in age and gender, and from different families.

The sampling strategy selected for the qualitative data was purposeful selection, due to the need for descriptive knowledge concerning the forest management before and after the implementation of the communal forest management. It was therefore necessary to target the sampling of informants that were likely to be able to address the research topic. Informants where selected through the identification of involved actors by reading the management plan, but also by asking key informants for relevant contacts. Depending on the informant and his role in the management, the questions were adjusted. Interviews with community members were mostly concerning the management of the forest and their collaboration with external actors. The interviews with officials, NGO workers and forest engineers where structured depending on their knowledge about the management, as some had personal experience collaborating with the community, whereas others had a more general knowledge of the forest management in Bolivia.

The interviews are a wide mix of the types of interviews presented in Gilliam’s (2000) verbal data dimension. This goes from unstructured interviews like conversations and open-ended interviews to more structured interview types like semi-structured questionnaires and semi structured interviews. The majority of the interviews can be categorised as a mix of open-ended interviews and semi-structured interviews. Interview guides, were elaborated for each group of actors. However, the questions were in all cases adjusted to the answers given by the informants. Interviews conducted with forest officials, NGO workers and forest engineers were in most cases conducted in their respective offices, allowing for interviews with less distraction and interruption. For many of the interviews with the community members, the interviews were conducted in their respective homes. This meant that other family members at times joined the interview, expressing their agreement or disagreement with the informant, others elaborated further on the topics discussed. When possible and permitted the semi-structured interviews were recorded and subsequently transcribed in note form. This helped improve the planning of the following interviews, as this

36 process made it more clear what information was necessary to have elaborated or confirmed. Plenty of information was also obtained through naturally occurring conversations the informants had previously been informed about the purpose of the stay in the community. The information obtained during the conversations would either be noted down in the moment of the conversation, but most often as soon as possible after the conversation had finished. This method made it possible to cover a larger number of topics and informants than with the performance of semi-structured interviews alone (Gillham, 2000). Finally, participation in the communal meetings, and listening to the community member’s conversation helped in the process of discovering new connections and themes that had not been thought of beforehand. This represents the most unstructured interview form (Gillham, 2000), as there was no input from the researcher except for the physical presence at the meetings.

4.2.4 Questionnaires

Another interview form, also mentioned in Gillham's (2000) table of verbal data dimension is questionnaires. The questionnaire were elaborated with questions that were both semi-structured, to open up for the informants evaluation of the management and structured and closed questions, to allow the elaboration of statistical data, that was supported by data collected during the interviews (Gillham 2000; Bryman 2006). The questionnaire was performed with the community members, to gain better insight in their use of the forest resources and participation in the decision making of the forest management. For the gathering of questionnaire data, a simple random sampling was applied. This sampling strategy assures that “all possible groupings of a given size have an equal chance of being picked” (Rea & Parker, 1995). Every second household was sought to be interviewed. In case nobody was home or if the household member was not interested in participating in the questionnaire survey, the next house was selected. When conducting the questionnaires the interviewer passed by all the houses in the village, and conducted the interview when possible. The availability of the informants thereby determined the sample size. During the fieldwork 22 questionnaires were performed, with one informant from each household. The community consist of 60 households in total however, some of them were at the time uninhabited, due to employment possibilities outside the village, or abandoned (Fieldwork data).

4.2.5 Participant observation

The majority of the three months fieldwork was passed living in the community, in the communal assembly house. This made it possible to conduct participant observation, which provided an in- depth view of the daily lives of the community members. The community members had been informed on communal meetings and through daily encounters that my presence in the community was with the objective of investigating the forest management. It was furthermore made visible for the community members, that observations were made by scribbling down the observation in the moment, when possible. The participant observation helped get behind the community members articulated perception of the forest management, and understand how social and cultural traditions affect the decision-making and performance of the forest management. The participant observation also helped clarifying situations where the community members gained access to the forest resources by making use of their illegal access (Ektvedt 2011), this became clear with their hunting activities.

4.2.6 Participatory Rural Appraisal

Several participatory rural appraisal (PRA) methods had been planned before the fieldwork begun however, it was clear after the first few communal meetings that the meetings were dominated by men, and only a very small group of the whole community. Although attendance in the communal meetings was high, several informants, both men and women, said that they did not feel comfortable expressing their opinion in the community meetings, for various reasons. Some of the reasons were lack of knowledge about the discussed topics, while others argued that it would be pointless as a small group of men dominates the discussions. Due to these early experiences, and the fact that the fieldwork was conducted in the middle of the sesame harvesting season, which complicated the reunion of various community members at the same time, it was decided not to perform all the PRA methods that had been planned. Timeline interviews were conducted with several elder community members, to gain insight in the history of the community and possible changes in the forest management over the years. The information from these interviews were supplemented with transect walks in the area of the community, as many historical events had a relation to specific landmarks in the community land. The walks where at times performed without the company of a community member, allowing new observations to arise, that would then be clarified through interviews in the following days. At other times the transect walks where performed with the company of community members. The 38 transect walk helped with the development of the maps of the area, as they were performed using a GPS.

4.2.7 Forest inventory

A forest inventory was conducted to assess if the current management of the forest resources on the community land belonging to 15 de Agosto is sustainable. Sustainability is a term used in many different contexts, and has been given many different meanings. For the objective of the study the following operationalisation of the term has been selected, “Sustainability is here defined as harvesting where the estimated off-take of woody biomass does not exceed the estimated re-growth over a given period.” (Treue et al. 2014). When relevant the term sustainable has been widened, e.g. considering the land use and in the discussion of the implications of the findings. However if not mentioned otherwise in the following, sustainability is understood as the above-mentioned definition. The objective of with the forest inventory is to evaluate the quality of the PGMF developed for the community 15 de Agosto and to verify if the current harvesting rate is sustainable in regards to the growth rate. The forest inventory was conducted on the area designated for the harvest of timber. The PGMF allows the community members to conduct harvesting activities for commercial purpose on “Annual harvesting areas” (AAA)13. When the AAA is located a forest inventory is made for the area presenting the number of trees approved for harvesting, this is presented in the “Annual harvesting plan of the forest” (POAF)14. Once the approved trees have been harvested, then a final report stating the volume of timber harvested is developed, this is called, “Annual plan for harvesting activities” (IAPOAF).15 The first idea were to perform the forest inventory in the AAAs, however once the sample plot centres where mapped out in Google Earth Pro and compared to the location of the AAAs as registered in the IAPOAF and POAF, it was clear that the local informants recollection of harvesting year nor location was in some cases incorrect. This may be because several of the harvesting activities are performed over a longer period. Below is a table demonstrating the year narrated by the local informants and compared to the data form the IAPOAF and the POAFs from 15 de Agosto.

13 ”Area annual de aprovechamiento” 14 ”Plan operativo de aprovechamiento forestal “ 15 ”Informe anual del plan operativo de aprovechamiento” 39

Table 5 Location of sample plots AAA according to local AAA according to the IAPOAF Plot informants and POAF 1 2013 2013 2 2013 2013 3 2014 2011-12 4 2014 2011-12 5 2007 - 6 2007 - 7 2006 2006-07 8 2014 2011-12 9 2014 2011-12 (Complied by author, source: Google Earth Pro, IAPOAF 2006-2007, 2009-2010, POAF 2011-2012 and IAPOAF 2013)

Two sample plots where thus performed in the area under forest management, however not an area that had been harvested from in the time of the PGMF. The data is however still useful for the purpose of evaluating the quality of the PGMF and to validate the use of the harvesting rate from another study performed in the same forest. Data from the forest inventory will only be presented for eight out of the nine sample plots, as it was found that data from the sample plot 6 had been measured wrong, see appendix A. Measurements were conducted on the AAAs from 2006 - 07, 2011-12 and 2013, these are the only years registered harvesting activities took place. The map below illustrates the area designated for forest management, area encircled with a red line. In the map the AAAs from 2006-07, 2011-12 and 2013 is also demonstrated. Finally are the centres for the sample plots for the forest inventory demonstrated named with the number of the sample plot.

Figure 5 Map of the area under forest management and location of sample plots

(Compiled by author, source: Google Earth Pro, IAPOAF 2006-2007, 2009-2010, POAF 2011-2012, IAPOAF 2013 and GPS points registered during fieldwork)

The specific location of the sample plots in the AAAs where determined by applying a systematic sampling strategy. During the harvesting activities main roads passing through the AAAs are established, these are roads wide enough for trucks to enter into the forest area under management. From the main roads smaller trails are cleared, these are made for the chain saw operators and either the skidder or tractor to be able to enter to collect the harvested timber. The systematic sampling strategy was thus performed by predetermining distances accessed on the main road and trail once inside the AAA. The AAA was accessed following the main road, once inside the AAA, it was sought to follow the trails 50 meters, and then form there cross in another 50 meters, the centre of the circular plot was thus the point where the 50 meters where reached. The circular plot measured a radius of 15 meters for live trees and 20 meter radius for stumps, the distance from the centre to the border of the plot was also measured with the GPS. Although aware of the high insecurity following when measuring the radius of the sample plot with a GPS, this strategy was decided, as the vegetation of the forest was very dense, with a lot of small branches and plants. 41

Measuring the sample plot radius with a measuring tape, would have been more exact, however it would have meant an even smaller sample size. In each plot, trees with a diameter of 5 cm or larger of diameter at breast height (DBH)16 were measured at DBH and, and the tree species identified by a local informant. For all stumps with a diameter above 5 cm, the diameter was measured at 20 cm above ground, or at the top of the stump if less than 20 cm above ground level and species identified. A local informant identified the age of the stump, the age estimation was performed using the following intervals 1-2, 3-5, 6-10 and more than 10 years. Finally, for the tree located nearest to the plot centre and the thickest tree in the sample plot, the total height was measured. For the two trees, the diameter was measured at 20 cm above ground and at DBH (Treue et al. 2014). Registering the measurement and species of the stumps allowed for a check-up of the adherence of the management plan. Using the growth rate from the study by Pawlowski and Mariaca (2007) of the different tree species, it is possible to estimate whether the executed harvesting strategy allows for a sustainable regeneration of the remaining trees within 20 years as stipulated in the PGMF. The forest inventory was conducted with the help from local community members, all the sample plots were measured by a group of three people, one being the author of the report. The author of the report were in all the inventories noting down the information given. The second helper would conduct the diameter and height measurements, after having received a thorough introduction to the instruments used. The third person, a local community member, helped identify the tree species and clear the path to the trees. Two different community members were used to help identify the tree species. One was the president of the forest group who had through participation in the development of the technical plans for the management activities acquired knowledge about tree species and was thus capable of identifying the tree species. The other had also for many years helped with the execution of the technical plans for the management noting down the tree species and helped with the timber harvesting of the trees which acquire knowledge about the species to assure that the right trees are logged. Both informants studied the bark characteristics, leaf shape, and wood features to identify the species. The age of the stump was in most cases confirmed to be according to the registered year for harvesting activities in the AAA. The physical appearance of the stump such as bark colour, presence and size of sprouts and condition of exposed wood were taken into consideration while identifying the age of the stumps.

16 1.3 m above ground 42

During the conduction of the forest inventory, general observations were done. Clarifying questions to the local informants was performed and helped to gain a greater insight in the observations made during the forest inventory.

4.2.8 Satellite pictures

Satellite pictures from Google Earth, of the study area are available from 2013, and were used to get an overview of the area, place the AAA plots, and study distance to identified landmarks and the community. By studying the satellite pictures it was furthermore possible to identify variation of areas, the cause of the variation was then discussed with the local informants. Due to the lack of earlier satellite pictures, it was not possible to analyse change in the forest condition over the years and from before the implementation of the decentralised forest management using the satellite pictures. The satellite pictures have also been used in the elaboration of maps demonstrating the different areas on the community land.

4.3 Data management and analysis

During the fieldwork, data was recorded in different ways depending on the situation and the method applied. Most of the interviews were recorded, if the informant gave his/her consent to this. This was supplemented with notes to capture non-verbal observations, which helped in the analysis of the data. In case it was not possible to record, or the informant did not accept that the interview was recorded, notes were made either during the interview and/or at a possible moment following the interview. The interviews were transcribed as soon as possible after the performance to help the preparation of the next interviews. The data collected for the forest inventory, was noted down during the measurements in a table. After ended fieldwork the data were put into Microsoft Excel 2010 and checked for any errors.

4.3.1 Data analysis

The quantitative data concerning forest composition and harvesting rates have been analysed using Excel 2013 and Google Earth Pro, explanations of the calculations performed follows the presentation of the data in the results chapter. The coding of the qualitative and quantitative data was performed using a thematic analysis

43 strategy. The coding scheme is based on categories designed to capture the dominant themes in the collected data (Franzosi 2004). The coding scheme design reflects the broader research issues presented in the analytical framework. The data analysis program Nvivo was applied for the thematic coding of the qualitative data, Excel was used for the data processing of the quantitative data. The thematic analysis strategy was applied, because the case study design is an embedded case study, containing more than one unit of analysis. Within the study of the decentralised forest management in Bolivia attention is also given to several subunits, accountability between the actors, forest condition, development, and quality of the PGMF etc. The embedded case study design is useful, as the case study is concerned with a causal relation between policy output and policy impact on forest condition. The causal case study design is required to assure reflection on internal validity by investigating several subunits within the case study it is possible to uncover external factors affecting the impact of the policy impact on forest condition (Yin 2003). Uncovering of the thematic themes in the data, furthermore enables a triangulation of the data from various data collection methods, this secures and in-depth understanding of the findings (Bryman 2006; Selener et al. 1999). To further, assure the triangulation of data the various data collection methods were performed parallel.

5. Results

This chapter is structured around the analytical framework presented in chapter 2. The first and the second section presents the actors involved as well as the decision-making powers and rights held by the actors. The first part is concerned with the period prior to the decentralisation process while the second part is concerned with the period after the decentralisation process. The third part of this chapter analyses the accountability relation between the involved actors as a foundation to the investigation of the extent of the decentralisation process. The fourth part of the chapter evaluates the PGMF including the quality and the compliance of the PGMF. Finally, the impact of the decentralisation policy is assessed with an analysis of the harvesting activities and regulations compared to the growth rate of the commercial tree species. The chapter is followed by a discussion of the results.

5.1 Rights prior to the commencement of the decentralisation process

The chapter starts by presenting the historical management of the forest resources. This will provide an overview of the actors involved in the management of the forest resources, the powers and rights held, and finally the use of forest resources over the years. Table 6 demonstrates an overview of the change in powers, and de jure and de facto rights held and claimed by the involved actors during different periods of land and forest reforms. This will be further elaborated in the following parts.

Table 6 Change in powers and rights held by involved actors prior to the decentralisation process Land use Forest use

Powers Rights Powers Rights

Create rules Create decisions Make Implement and ensure compliance ensure and Implement disputes Adjudicate Access Withdrawal Management Exclusion Alienation rules Create Make decisions Make compliance ensure and Implement Adjudicate disputes Adjudicate Access Withdrawal Management Exclusion Alienation

Policy Actors Government of 1953 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x Bolivia Timber x x x x companies

Pirates o o o Land Reform Landlord x x x x x x x x x

15 de Agosto x x x

Government of 1974 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x Bolivia Timber x x x x companies Forest 15 de Agosto x x x x o o o o x x x x law Timber x x o o o merchants (Compiled by author) x – Referring to exercised powers and de jure held rights o – Refers to the de facto claimed rights

5.1.1 Prior to the land reform law in 1953

The Chiquitano region was inhabited by rural populations who accessed and withdrew natural resources for subsistence use. These rights continued with the arrival of Jesuits, whom however also implemented large-scale agricultural production with the work force from the rural populations. This changed with the expulsion of the Jesuits when the Spanish conquistadors came to settle in the region. They put up large farms, forcing the rural population to work for free and under poor conditions. It also meant that the rural populations were restricted from making use of their customary rights.

5.1.2 Land reform law 1953

Land rights

The abuse of the rural populations continued with the introduction of the land reform law from 1953. The land reform law created an unequal division of the land due to the free submission of land and thus enabled the big landlords to expand their land to areas formerly belonging to rural populations. The lack of acknowledged land rights to the rural people resulted in their expulsion, by the big landlords, from the land they occupied. At this time, most families of the community from 15 de Agosto worked for a landlord in a property called San Martin (CM 10). The landlord allowed the community members to live on his property in exchange for their labour. This system maintained the families enslaved by the landlord (CM 4). The community members did not receive any salary, “they [the forefathers] worked between 13-14 hours [pr. Day] without payment, only to receive a simple meal” (CM 4). The landlord allowed the community members to cultivate a small piece of land, ”they [the forefathers] were only given a little week to make their field of half a hectare, after that they had to work all the days of the week” (CM 2). In San Martin the community members were organised with a “cabildo” (community council), where the highest position was the chief (CM 4). The tradition of the community council dates far back to the time of the colonisation the chiefs were the ties between the missionaries and the community. Later during the time of the landlords the chiefs were in charge of organising the work tasks and assuring that the people worked. The rules, however, were decided by the landlords (Garrett (Ed.) 2006; CM 4).

During this time, the landlord held and exercised substantial powers creating rules, making and implementing decisions, ensuring compliance and adjudicating disputes. The landlord was not accountable to the community members nor to officials or other governmental actors. The landlord in San Martin had assumedly obtained the land titles for the land as he had family ties with the government officials (CM 4). The landlord held the position as owner of the land as he determined the management of the land and excluded external actors, including the community members, from accessing and withdrawing resources from his land. The landlord also alienated the rights to access, withdraw and manage small land plots to the community members. The community members thus held the position of claimant over their small piece of land. However, the decision-making powers held by the community members were very restricted as the landlord still held the power to create rules, e.g.

47 the landlord did not allow for the community members to hold any animals (CM 4). Nor did the community members hold the de jure rights to withdraw resources from other land areas belonging to the landlord.

Forest rights

At the time of the enactment of the land reform in 1953 the region experienced a major activity of illegal logging, referred to as “pirateo” (timber piracy) (COINFO 1, CM 2). ”In this time there was no control with the forest, the pirates, they entered with trucks, felled the trees in front of the truck, and transported the timber away.” (COINFO 1). One community member explained why nobody tried to stop the illegal logging activities, “those who had money in San Ignacio started to distribute the forest, to look for timber, nobody stopped them. Because it was the officials themselves who did it.” (CM 4). It was especially the tree “El Morado”, (Machaerium scleroxylon), the pirates were searching for because, “El Morado was called “palo de oro” (the golden stick) because it was so valuable”. (CM 4). The extraction of illegal timber was so great at this time that the forest engineer from the COINFO argues that, “if it had continued at this rate then it would have led to complete deforestation” (COINFO 1). The great extraction rate is confirmed by a forest engineer from the UFM recollecting, “when I was a boy, I saw trucks passing full of Morado” (UFM 8). The Government of Bolivia held all decision-making powers of the use of the forest resources and exercised these powers by issuing concessions to timber companies, thus holding the de jure rights to alienate the rights to access, withdraw, manage and exclude. The Government of Bolivia was at this time the owner of the forest resources. However, the intensive harvesting activities by the pirates show that the government did not possess sufficient resources to ensure that people in the rural areas actually complied with the rules. The timber pirates, although argued to have been cooperating with state officials from San Ignacio, had no de jure rights to access and withdraw the resources. The pirates enforced the de facto rights among themselves and acted as if they were claimants as they also decided the quantity and methods for harvesting the timber.

5.1.3 Forest law 1974

Land use

With the enactment of the forest law 1974, the rural communities were acknowledged as forest tribes. However, no property rights where granted to the rural communities. After the forest law 1974, the forefathers of the community members from 15 de Agosto started to plan to move to their own land. The chief of the community at the time narrates how “the landlord named me the chief as a punishment, and told me to make the people [the community members] work. I told her to pay them I did not want to tell them to work for free.” (CM 4). He recalls convening the community members for a community reunion where he proposed, them to find a place where they could build their own community (CM 4). This lead to the establishment of the community 15 de Agosto. The community members settled on a piece of land adjacent to the San Martin property. The property was found with the help of the agrarian judge and the Bishop of the region who helped ensure that all communities in the Municipality of San Ignacio de Velasco obtained a paper documenting the coordinates of their property (CM 4). However, the formal property title was not obtained until 2012. Although the community members obtained an official document with the coordinates of the property the Forest Law only acknowledged them de jure access and withdraw rights of forest resources for subsistence use. The community controlled the land as de facto communal land, claiming the de facto right to manage, deciding the use of the land and distributing small land plots for each household. The community members held decision-making powers to ensure compliance by claiming de facto rights to exclude external actors from accessing the community land.

Forest use

With the inauguration of the Forest Law in 1974, all forests where declared state owned, both forests on private and community land. The user rights for subsistence use of forest resources was maintained for the rural populations. This right was practiced by many community members seeing as how 15 out of 22 respondents declare to have entered into the forest before the implementation of the PGMF. At this time, the primary reason for entering the forest was to hunt animals. Others narrate to have collected firewood and fruits in the forest. Materials for constructing the houses are also explained to have been collected in the forest during this period (Questionnaire). Besides collecting forest resources for subsistence use, the community commercialised the timber. At this time, the community members claimed the de facto rights to decide the management of the 49 forest by exchanging timber for the transportation of building materials to the construction of the community church (CM 4). The commercialisation of timber continued in the following period, “after 1982 we started selling timber again, we only sold Tajibo (Tabebuia sp.), Roble (Amburana cearensis (Allemao) A.C. Smith) and Morado (Machaerium scleroxylon), not the other species” (CM 22). This was done without a permit from the owner of the forest resources, the Government of Bolivia. One informant recalls, “before if the community needed money for a communal project, we would go together to the forest and sell trunks – without doing all the paperwork” (CM 26). The decision to commercialise the timber was always done by the community jointly. However, the benefits gained from the timber commercialisation was limited. The community did not hold the de jure rights to manage the resources nor the right to exclude external actors from the area, which at times challenged the community’s de facto management of the land. One community member narrates how “one man took a lot of timber, and made a lot of money on that. The community only received payment for the work – he even made us work during night, without paying us more” (CM 26). The community could not complain to the public authorities, because they did not hold the de jure rights to manage nor to exclude others. Another time when a company build a sawmill in the community to make railroad ties out of the tree species Soto (Schinopsis brasilensis Engl.), the sawmill was in the community for no more than one year. Although some of the community members worked on the sawmill, “the community did not gain anything, we did not see any money. The community was rich on timber, we could have had very nice houses, but the people came and exploited us” (CM 12). The lack of de jure rights limited the community’s possibility to benefit from the natural resources. There is no registration of the volume of timber commercialised in this period, however one community member recalls, “before we would sell timber, if the community agreed, but not in great quantity, only some 5-6 cubic meters no more.” (CM 16). To a certain extent, the community managed to ensure compliance of their claimed rules holding the de facto right to exclude external actors who before the establishment of the community had accessed and withdrawn forest resources. “People from outside came to the area to harvest timber, they came in trucks going into the forest. However, this was when we were still living in San Martin. When we arrived in 75', nobody from outside entered, but at that time there was no more Morado left” (CM 2). One explanation for the pirates to stop entering the area of 15 de Agosto is argued to be because there were no more Morado left. The owner of the sawmill company argues that, “the illegal timber harvesting only took place in the private properties, not in the communities, because there were so many people to protect the land” (Owner of sawmill 9). However, everybody

50 acknowledges that the area suffered from the overharvesting of the pirates (CM 7; Owner of sawmill 9; CM 2). In any case, the community acted de facto as proprietor of the land managing to exclude the pirates from their land.

5.1.4 Summary

In the period of the land reform from 1953 and the forest law 1974, the Government of Bolivia maintained the position as owner of the forest resources. Rights to access, withdraw, and manage forest resources were alienated to timber companies, excluding the rural communities from benefiting commercially from the forest resource. Only in 1974, were the rural communities acknowledged user rights of forest resources for subsistence use. However, following the establishment of 15 de Agosto the community members claimed de facto rights to manage and exclude external actors from the community land. The lack of de jure rights limited the communities ability to benefit from the forest resources.

5.2 Decentralisation process of the mid-1990s

The decentralisation process begun in the mid-1990s and several of the implemented policies from that time still form the basis of the decentralised forest management in Bolivia today. In this section, the impact of the decentralisation process on land and forest use will be analysed. Firstly, the period following the enactment of decentralisation policies will be analysed. Followed by an analysis of the period after the approval of the PGMF. It is sought to uncover the change in rights held by the actors and as well as the confounding factors affecting the change in land and forest use. The table below presents an overview of the land and forest rights held by involved actors in the period before the enactment of the decentralisation policies compared to the transferred powers following the enactment of the decentralisation policy of the mid-1990s.

Table 7 Change in powers and rights held by involved actors following the decentralisation process of the mid-1990s Land use Forest use Powers Rights Powers Rights

Create rules Create Make decisions Make Implement and ensure compliance ensure and Implement Adjudicate disputes Adjudicate Access Withdrawal Management Exclusion Alienation Create rules Create Make decisions Make Implement and ensure compliance ensure and Implement Adjudicate disputes Adjudicate Access Withdrawal Management Exclusion Alienation

Policy Actors Government of 1974 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x Bolivia Timber companies x x x x

Forest law 15 de Agosto x x x x o o o o x x x x o o

Timber merchants x x o o o Government of 1996 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x Bolivia

Before the 15 de Agosto x x x o o o o x x x x o o approval of the PGMF Timber merchants x x o o o

(Compiled by author) x – Referring to exercised powers and de jure held rights o – Refers to the de facto claimed rights

5.2.1 Prior to the approval of the PGMF

The enactment of the Forest Law No. 1700 permits rural communities to commercialise timber from their forest area as long as the community holds an approved management plan. The community 15 de Agosto obtained a management plan for their forest resources in 2004 making the community “... one of the oldest communities in the municipality with a management plan” (UFM 8). Until the approval of the management plan, community members are still “(…) secured exclusive rights to forest resources on their community land” (BOLFOR and MDSMA, 1997, 32: II). Because, “no prior authorization is needed for the right to use forest resources for traditional, domestic subsistence purposes in the communal land, as long as it is for non-commercial purposes” (BOLFOR and MDSMA, 1997, 32:III). The forest law No. 1700 thus maintains the exclusive user rights of forest resources for subsistence use from the Forest Law of 1974.

However, there is no evidence indicating that the community stopped its commercial harvesting activities. On the contrary, they explain to have agreed to develop a management plan only to be able to continue with the harvesting activities, “we had to make the PGMF to be allowed to sell the timber” (CM 22). Before the approval of the PGMF, the community thus continued to make decisions about use of the forest resources, claiming the de facto rights to sell timber from their community land. Likewise, the merchants buying timber from the community land continued to claim de facto rights to access and withdraw by determining the price and benefits paid to the community for their timber. In the same period, the INRA Law was enacted. The INRA law allowed rural communities to apply for collective ownership over land. This meant a devolution of de jure rights to access, withdraw and manage the land and gave the community the position of claimant. As illustrated in table 7 above, no actual devolution of powers had taken place, as the community at this time had not obtained a property title nor an approved management plan. However, with the approval of the management plan, the rights held by the community changed. This will be analysed in the following.

5.2.2 Period following the approval of the PGMF

With the approval of the management plan, several changes in the rights and decision-making powers took place, as demonstrated in the table 8 below. The table compares the powers and rights held by the community and other involved actors before and after the approval of the PGMF.

Table 8 Change in powers and rights held by involved actors following the approval of the PGMF Land use Forest use Powers Rights Powers Rights

Policy Actors 1996 Government of Bolivia x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x

Before the 15 de Agosto x x x x o o o o x x x x o o PGMF Timber merchants x x o o o

2005 15 de Agosto x (x) x x (x) x x x x x (x) (x)

UFM x x

After the Guapomo x x PGMF ABT x (x) x (x) (x) x x x Government of Bolivia x x x x (Compiled by author) x – Referring to exercised powers and de jure held rights o – Refers to the de facto claimed rights (x)-referring rights or powers that are partially held.

Development of the PGMF

The development of the management plan was begun by a group of forest engineers forming the Guapomo Society with the objective of helping rural communities make their management plans in order for them to be able to benefit from their forest resources in a sustainable manner (PGMF 2004: I; UFM 8). The group initially assisted four communities of which 15 de Agosto was one of them. The Guapomo Society was supported by the German Development Service, the German Corporation for International Cooperation and professionals from the Centro de Investigación Agrícola Tropical (Centre for Tropical Agriculture Research) (UFM 8; CM 16). The decision to develop the PGMF was agreed upon in a community assembly (CM 16). The community decided to accept the offer of developing the PGMF, as they “did not have more money.” (CM 11), referencing to the money they had previously earned on timber. The community demonstrated that they held the power to make decision about the use of the forest resources. Once the community agreed to make the PGMF, “they [The group of engineers] went to the forest. They took coordinates every 100 meters [200 meters according to the PGMF 2004: 17].” (CM 11). According to the PGMF, a forest inventory was performed. The assessed forest composition and regulations included in the PGMF will be presented later in the analysis for an assessment of 54 the PGMF and the regulations presented. Once the PGMF had been developed, it was sent to the ABT for approval (UFM 8). To finance the first harvest, contact was made to sawmill owners interested in collaborating with the communities. The investments were refunded after the completion of the first harvest (Owner of sawmill 9). To take care of the administrative work in relation to the harvesting activities a forest group was set up, formed by community members.

With the approval of the management plan, the communal land was divided into two major areas; one for forest and the other for agricultural use. The table below demonstrates the size of the community land and the zonation of land use according to the PGMF 2004.

Table 9 Description of division of land use Area description Ha Community land 6002.89 Total area under forest management 3435 Sub-division of area description  Area for commercial harvesting 3370  Protected area 34.93  Savannah woodland 30.75 (Source: PGMF 2004)

According to the PGMF approximately 93.6% (5618.13 ha) of the total area is covered in dense forest and thin forest. The rest of the total area, 6.4% (383.6 ha) is covered in perennial crops and natural and cultivated pastures (PGMF 2004; 4). It is not explained in the PGMF what considerations lies behind the division of areas, however the community was asked how large an area they needed for the fields. Finally, “they decided, because the total area is 6000 ha [the communal land]. They decided to designate 3000 ha for the fields and 3000 for the forest management” (CM 15). However, it was also indicated that, “the management plan is paid per ha. Therefore the company [Guapomo Society] that was hired selected the largest area possible, without considering if the entire area would serve for the forest management.” (CM 15). Another explanation for the division of the communal land is related to the land use plan developed for the municipality San Ignacio de Velasco. This plan has divided the total area of the municipality into two types of land use; one is designated for agricultural use and the other is designated for forest management. The community 15 de Agosto is situated on the middle of two types of land use. However, as pointed out by a forest engineer working for the municipality, “although a large part of the municipality is designated for forest management, when one goes there you see that it is not

55 covered in forest, but still we continue to demand that people in these areas do not deforest” (UFM 8). It is thus not clear if the division of the communal land in the PGMF (2004) was determined considering the community members’ cultivation of the land or if it was done according to the division of land use determined by the municipality. Or as a third option that it was decided by an economic interest. The community members were consulted in the decision-making however, the engineers and the municipality have also had a part of the decision-making in regards to the use of land. Moreover, the municipality has succeeded in implementing and ensuring compliance of their land use zonation.

Property title

When the community obtained their approved PGMF, they still did not have the property title, which was obtained in 2012. With the enactment of the INRA law in 1996 rural populations were able to apply for collective ownership over land. However, the formalisation of land allocation and land rights have been slow (USAID). This was also the case of the community 15 de Agosto (CM 15), it is argued to be due to the administrative organisation. Although documents stating that the property belonged to them were accepted in the past, “today they require the property title for every project [Communities applies for money to conduct different projects benefitting the community e.g. school bus, ambulance etc.], but that is only recently.” (CM 15). The property title is thus important to receive public support for communal development (CM 16). The community members also recognise that the property title secures their future existence on the community land (CM 2). A community member underlines that “the government cannot sell the territory either, because now we have the property title” (CM 16). The property title also permits the community to execute their exclusive de jure rights to the land and forest resources, “now with our property title, it is correct, nobody can come from outside and we cannot go to other lands” (CM 17). They are thus secured the right to exclude outsiders’ withdrawal of the natural resources in their property. However, the community members express that they are somewhat bound to the community land as they have no right to sell the land, “we have the property title, which allows us to work the land, but we cannot sell the land” (CM 15). At the time of the development of the PGMF, it was possible for the community to receive the approved management plan without a legal property title, “the management plan was made with papers documenting the process of obtaining the property title. This was valid for the ABT (…) because almost no community had a property title it was therefore not possible to ask them to

56 document their property title in order to make the management plan.” (CM 15). Today however, the community would not have been allowed to sell timber from their property as explained by a forest engineer from the government forest office ABT, “in order for us to permit them [The communities] to access the forest resources, they need to have the property title. This is the first requisite which needs to be” (ABT 19).

5.2.3 Land use under the PGMF

In this section it will be analysed how the land is used, the total area under cultivation, regulations that needs to be complied with and also the agricultural activities performed in the community. It will be analysed how decision-making powers and rights have actually been devolved to the community members and how the implementation of the PGMF has changed land use in the community.

Area under cultivation

The PGMF stipulates that the community land was to be used as a multiple-functional land where part of the land is conserved for forest use and another part of the land for cultivation (PGMF 2004; 1). According to the “Directriz operative – 001/2000” (Operational Guidelines) each applicant is permitted to clear 3 ha per year for cultivation. Meaning that a household with two adults can apply for up to 6 ha per year to convert into fields (Directriz IOP – 001/2000). It is argued, that “the limitation of 3 ha per year is made to secure that the land designated for cultivation is not cleared for wood to use for firewood” (ABT 19). The community practices slash and burn cultivation. The average area cultivated by the households in 15 de Agosto is 1.8 ha, the largest area cultivated by one household is 5 hectare. The average cultivated area has increased slightly compared to ten years ago where it was estimated to be approximately 1.75 hectare. At that time, the largest cultivated area was also 5 hectare (Questionnaire data). One reason for the increased area cultivated is the improved transportation making it easier to bring crops to sell on the market in San Ignacio (CM 10). However, several community members argue that it is difficult to work areas larger than 1 or 2 hectare, because the land is cleared with shovel and axe (CM 12). The simple cultivation methods mean that “a person can only cultivate two hectares per year, three [Hectares] if you get help, more is not possible [paying a neighbour to help] “(CM 13). Today three households own a

57 chainsaw out of the 22 asked (Questionnaire data). Several households clears the land for cultivation using the chainsaws. Besides paying other community members to help cultivate the land some community members are able to rent a tractor from a nearby family of Mennonites who cultivate their land with large machineries (Informal conservation – CM). The possibility of renting machines to clear the land is another factor enabling the community members to cultivate larger areas of land than 10 years ago.

Apply for permission

Under the management plan regime, the community members are obliged to jointly apply for permission to cultivate the land on a yearly basis, “today there is more paperwork, you have to make an application. We make the application for the whole community” (CM 12). There is no cost to apply for permission to cultivate the land. The fields are managed by each family and therefore “sometimes it happens that people wants the same area, but then they [the community council] just give them the fields next to each other, we solve it by talking” (CM 10). Once the fields have been divided “the OTB [Community secretary] and the Chief make a list of the fields with the name and identification number and a photocopy of the identification card. Then they hand it in to the UFM and they send it to ABT. Only then a technician comes to collect the points [geographical points] for the fields.” (CM 16). Once the points have been taken for the fields the community has to send in an application for permission to burn the area for cultivation (CM 16). Another regulation is that the border of the field has to be cleared before burning is allowed, “before they did not check the fields, but today you clean the area around the fields, to assure you only burn the area of the field, and that the fire does not spread to other areas” (CM 12). The regulations imposed by the Government of Bolivia, through the ABT, are enforced by fines (CM 2). Whereas the community members previously claimed de facto rights to manage the land, now the community members have been acknowledged the de jure rights to access, withdraw and manage the land. However the de jure rights to manage the land is shared with the ABT who creates rules concerning land use e.g. determining land size permitted per household for conversion to fields. The ABT also determines how the land is to be used e.g. by implementing the regulation concerning clearance of the border of the fields. The ABT also holds the power to implement and ensure compliance; this is done by issuing fines if regulations are not followed. Finally, the power to adjudicate disputes is partially held by the community members as the legislation acknowledges their customary governance institutions. However, if the dispute cannot

58 be solved communally it will be sought to be solved at the public authority (Informal conversation - CM).

Crops cultivated

When the community first arrived to the location of 15 de Agosto the households mostly cultivated corn, yucca and plantain. Today they also grow sesame and chia because “sesame and chia gives the best deal” (CM 10). This is another factor for the increase in cultivated areas as these crops generate a higher income. The production of chia and sesame started when a company came and taught how to cultivate it and to buy the production. The chia and sesame are exclusively for selling and are not consumed in the households (CM 2, 12, 13, 15, 16). The figure demonstrates the frequency of cultivated crops per household.

Figure 6 Cultivated crops according to the number of households 18

No household of 6

0 Sesame Corn Plantain Yuca Rice Other

(Compiled by author, source: questionnaire data)

Chia does not figurate in the graph which is likely due to the fact that when the questionnaire survey was conducted it was not the season for chia. However, several community members narrated to have cultivated chia the previous years and are likely to cultivate it again when the season comes. Sesame is the most frequently cultivated crop, as narrated by a community member, “I have three hectares, and two of them are cleared. I have cultivated two hectares of sesame, because this is what helps me the most economically.” (CM 11 – The Chief). Few community members are concerned about the negative effect sesame and chia production have on the soil, as

59 they need to use pesticides in the production (MINGA17 24). Several informants confirms that male heads of the households have temporary jobs outside of the village (CM 10, 11). The extra income generated by the production of sesame and chia is argued to be of great importance for the community seeing as how one of the big problems the community is struggling with is migration to the bigger cities. The community officially has a count of 320 inhabitants, and 60 houses. However as pointed out by the chief of the community, “we have the same number of people settled in the community as outside of the community” (CM 3). This trend is changing now, “with the sesame production people are able to maintain their families, when we did not cultivate sesame, people left the community. Only the women stayed with the kids” (CM 16). The community members still possesses the decision-making power to determine which products they want to cultivate on the land.

The location of the field depends on the crop. One community member argues that “we do not clear virgin forest land, because close to here there are forests only 3-4 years old which is easy to get permission to cultivate on” (CM 3). Another community member confirms that the community members do clear virgin forest to make their fields because “the cultivation of rice needs virgin forest, this is why the fields are being placed further and further away.” (Informal conversation - CM).

Livestock

The first livestock project was established by the MINGA. The group was accounting for 200-300 livestock but as a result of the group’s dissolvement, the livestock was set free (CM 12). Up until today, it is still possible to find various tracks from the wild livestock in the forest area. Some argue that it is likely that the livestock feeds on new seedlings (Informal conversation – COINFO). After the termination of the livestock project with MINGA the municipality of San Ignacio de Velasco offered to borrow interested community members a horde of cattle. The cattle are offered as a part of the project of “recuperacion de barbecho” (Recovery of fallow land). After a few years, the community was able to buy the livestock from the municipality “the livestock is ours now, because the municipality sold the livestock to us. We paid per kilo.” (CM 12). Today the group supported by the municipality has around 250 livestock and has divided them between the

17 “Asociación de Grupos Mancomunados de Trabajo” (MINGA) 60 group’s 19 members (CM 12, 22). The group is estimated to have 100 hectares of pasture (CM 22). There are two livestock groups in the community; the other livestock group was supported by district administration of Santa Cruz. The group has 60 livestock and has already paid for the livestock it was given. The group encountered problems with the pasture that has resulted in only small livestock, which at the moment does not give any benefit (CM 20). Before planting pasture, the soil is used for agricultural crops: ”First we cultivate yucca or corn, and then we plant pasture and build the fence” (CM 12). Several actors criticise the project of recovery of fallow land by converting it into pasture land for the livestock, for several reasons. First of all because no actual recovery of the fallow land is taking place, the land is not recuperated for cultivation of crops. The achievement of the project is to offer an alternative income generating activity. However, and this is related to the second critique, the number of livestock the families currently hold are not nearly enough to sustain a household. It is argued that not even 20 livestock would be enough. The “recovery” of fallow using livestock is therefore argued to lead to an increase in deforestation of the communal land, as large areas are needed to support the big groups of livestock (CM 15; MINGA 24).

Firewood

The majority of the households in the community are still cooking with firewood, however as demonstrated in the graph below a few of the households also have the possibility of cooking with gas. Only one household answered only to cook with gas. This was argued to be due to the hard work cooking with firewood (Questionnaire data).

Figure 7 No. of households cooking with firewood, gas or both 16

6 No households of 4

0 Firewood Gas Firewood and gas

(Compiled by author, source: questionnaire data).

19 of the 22 asked households collect firewood in the fields or in the area next to the fields. Two households did not respond as they primarily use gas for cooking. Only one respondent answered that the firewood was collected both from the fields and ”el monte”, meaning the forest. The forest can both refer to the area under management but also the forest found in the area designated for fields (Questionnaire data). It is however more likely that they collect the firewood from the chacos or the forest around the fields as, ”this forest is closer, therefore it is easier to enter” (Questionnaire data). It was moreover clarified by the head of the forest group that, ”We are not allowed to enter into the forest area under management to collect firewood” (Informal conservation - CM). However, this is not correct. As mentioned earlier the customary right to use forest resources for subsistence use is maintained in the Forest Law No 1700 (BOLFOR and MDSMA, 1997). Despite the community members’ de jure rights to access and withdraw forest resources for subsistence use, this is only exercised in the area designated for cultivation, as this is more accessible for the community members.

Hunting

Although the Forest Law No 1700 maintains the rural communities’ customary right to use forest resources for subsistence use it is underlined that hunting is strictly prohibited (BOLFOR and MDSMA, 1997). This is also underlined in the PGMF (PGMF 2004). The community members

62 do not follow this restriction, six out of 20 households expressed that they practiced hunting in the area under forest management (Questionnaire). Before the implementation of the forest management plan, only four households confessed to hunting in the area. The community members claim de facto rights to hunt in the area.

5.2.4 Use of forest resources under the PGMF

This section will present the implementation of the PGMF in practice in regards to the harvesting of forest resources and use of profit from the harvesting activities. This is done to be able to analyse what changes in decision-making power and rights held by the community members the approval of the PGMF has led to. The section is followed by an analysis of the accountability and power relations identified between the involved actors.

Harvesting activities

The community members and a technical forest engineer from COINFO decide the location of the AAAs, “We explore the forest and determine a location where there is great abundance of the timber species. Then according to the permitted area size, we mark the limit of the area.” (COINFO 18). The selection of the AAAs is not systematic. However, the current president of the forest group is implementing a more systematic approach (CM 7). Once the limit of the AAA has been marked, the forest inventory for the AAA is made by making a grid of trails across the area. For every 500 meters main tracks are made with the use of chainsaws, these are wide enough for trucks and skidders to pass. For every 100 meters on the main tracks a smaller trail is made (COINFO 18). The forest inventory is called POAF and is a schematic measurement of the trees with a DBH higher than the minimum diameter acceptable for commercialization. The minimum diameter will be explained further in an upcoming chapter. The POAF is made by the community members in collaboration with the technical forest engineer from COINFO:” We divide them into groups and they go registering the quality of the trees and mark the trees according to the quality. They also measure the trees and note down the diameter. If the tree has a diameter large enough for harvesting the tree is either marked for harvesting or as “semillero” [Seed spreader, trees left to secure the regrowth of the harvested species], every fifth tree with a diameter higher than the minimum, is left as semillero” (CM 7). Once the whole area has been investigated, the technical forest engineer and forest engineer from COINFO writes the POAF based on the registrations

63 made during the forest inventory. The community pays for all preparations of the harvesting activity, “it costs money to make the POAF, and therefor if they do not have the money to make the POAF then they have less negotiation power. Meanwhile if they save the money for the POAF then they can raise the price for the AAA – because the buyer sees the quantity of timber” (COINFO 27). The POAF gives the community more negotiation power in regards to selling the timber as the buyer can see and select the amount of species in the area. The only registration of the costs of the harvesting activities, found, is a study performed by Pawlowski (2006) of the first AAAs harvested in five communities from the municipality of San Ignacio de Velasco, one of which is 15 de Agosto. According to the study, the cost of the POAF is 3% of the total costs and the total costs of the harvesting activities were approximately 50% of the total income from the commercialisation of the timber. However, 15 de Agosto was the community that achieved the highest income per m3 (Pawlowski 2006). The POAF is then presented to potential buyers. This is done by COINFO, “COINFO evaluates the value of the area, and looks for a buyer of the whole area” (CM 7). The company do not have to buy all the logs large enough for commercialisation in the AAA, but the community is not allowed to sell one part of the area to one company and the remaining to another company (Owner of sawmill). In most years, the community 15 de Agosto has sold timber to the same sawmill in San Ignacio, who then sells the cut boards to companies in Santa Cruz. It is explained that it is not possible for the community to harvest, process and sell the timber to companies in Santa Cruz on their own. “The area and the quantity of timber allowed for harvesting is very great and the local community does not have the tools acquired, nor the transportation or necessary contacts to potential buyers, therefore the use of the companies [sawmill company]” (COINFO 1). Once a buyer has been found for the POAF, “if we [the community] agree to sell the timber, we go to a notary with a lawyer to sign the contract with the timber company” (CM 11). Then the POAF is sent to the ABT for approval. Once the POAF is approved, the harvesting can proceed. The logs are collected using a tractor or skidder (COINFO 16). On the main tracks, areas are cleared to make log yards. The logs are then transported with trucks to the final log yard located next to the community. At the final log yard, “we measure the logs, the length and the minor and major diameter to see what quantity we are bringing” (Transporter 6). These measurements are needed to fill out the “Forestry certificate of origin” (CFO)18. The CFO certifies the origin of the product and secures permission to transport, storage, process and trade of the forest products (ABT 2015).

18 ”Certificado forestal de origen” 64

Since “the timber is not transported all at once. Therefore if they make 50 CFOs, and they then return to harvesting more timber, then they have to return and make another CFO” (COINFO 16). Each transporter needs to be equipped with a CFO to document that the timbers have been legally harvested, “we [the transporters] bring the logs to the sawmill in San Ignacio, from San Ignacio we transport the boards to Santa Cruz” (Transporter 6). At last, the buyer and the forest engineer from COINFO write the final report, the IAPOAF. The community 15 de Agosto is currently still in the process of finishing the AAA 2013 and 2014, i.e. transporting the timber out of the forest and finishing the final IAPOAF (Informal conversation). There are several reasons for the delay, lack transportation and skidders also the rain complicates the transportation of the timber (COINFO 16). Other factors delaying the harvesting activities are the paperwork and the time waiting for approval of the different documentations. Once the AAA has been harvested, it is not allowed to return to the area and harvest. The PGMF developed for the community is only valid for 20 years and will have to be renewed by the ABT before they can return to the AAAs and harvest.

Use of money from the forest resources

A part of the profit from the harvesting activities is spend on paying the royalty as declared in the Forest Law No 1700, “the holder of the authorization is required to pay an annual operation fee for the harvested area according to the approved management plan” (BOLFOR and MDSMA 1997, 32:I). The community pays the royalty to the ABT. The performance of this payment is confirmed by the owner of the sawmill in San Ignacio, “the ABT is monitoring. The sawmills pay taxes. The community also pays taxes for the hectare that they harvest” (Owner of sawmill 9). The royalty was for 2006 registered to be equivalent to 1 $US/ha of the AAA. There are no recordings on the profit made from the forest management (CM 14). Even the president of the forest group states, “I do not know how much money we make from the management” (CM 7). The community members are however, in the process of improving their registration of costs and expenses with the acquisition of a laptop with the money from the forest management (CM 14). The chief of the community estimates the profits to be higher in the last years. ”Today we receive 57.000 dollars per year [net income]. It has increased because three years ago we only made 19.000 dollars” (CM 11). It is decided at community meetings, what the money should be spent on. One community member narrates, “with the profit from the first AAA from 2005-6 we bought an engine for the community. The electricity did at this time not reach the

65 community. People put up poles to construct the first electricity system. This way we had light until 22 at night” (CM 14). The community also spend some of the money on communal events and festivals (CM 14). Other years it has been decided, to divide the profit from the forest management between the community members (CM 22). The community recently decided to spend money on the renovations of the church in the village, “now we are renovating the church, we have invested 15.000 dollars.” (CM 11). However, very little progress has been observed and several community members expressed a suspicion about the management of the money. The money has been withdrawn, but the renovation of the church has not progressed a lot during the 3-5 years it has been underway (CM 20). Other community members explain that the community has several administrative expenses, which are covered by the profit from the forest management, “all the resources [Communal services paid for by the municipality] you see, are achieved with the profit from the forest management. The community members do not pay for the management of the forest nor for the travels the authorities have to make and the communal paperwork. It is all paid for with the money from the forest management” (CM 14). This is argued to be of great benefit for the community as, “the water system cost two years of work, going and insisting [to the municipal authorities] that they installed the water” (CM 14). Following the installation of the water system, the community invested in a water pump in hopes of renting out the function to the neighbouring community, who does not have a water system installed, ”The plan is to rent the service of the water pump to San Antonio, so that we can gain money on this investment” (CM 14). This is possible because, when the municipality arranged for electricity to be put up in the community, the community decided to invest so that they have tree-phase electricity system to be able to run a water pump, instead of only installing single-phase electricity, as found in neighbouring communities (CM 16).

Importance of the PGMF

Several argue that the PGMF is of great importance to the community, “now we know what species you can harvest. The organisation [COINFO] has helped a lot. Regarding the legal question, they have also helped a lot. Now with the control the timber has more value”. (CM 15). All the asked households answer that the forest is of great importance to the community (Questionnaire). Below is a graph showing the reasons why the community members find the forest important to the community.

Figure 8 Importance of the forest management for the community members 8 7 6 5 4 3

No respondentsof 2 1 0 Profit Work To maintain To construct To be able Other possibility the forest houses to renovate reasons the church

(Compiled by author, source: Questionnaire)

The profit generated from the forest management is the major reason followed by the management as a tool for maintaining the forest. Other reasons mentioned is the environmental benefits the forest brings, both in the protection of the soil and as a place for animals to live. Others argue that the forest is important because it is where they hunt for meat. Finally, the forest is considered important because it provides timber for the construction of tables and chairs (Questionnaire). As demonstrated in the graph above, the community members still collect some forest resources for the construction of houses in the area under forest management. Although they do not depend on it as much as before (CM 12). In the following chapter, it will be analysed if the forest management is sustainable according to the regeneration rate, however, it will only be calculated based on the registered harvesting activities in the area under forest management, as it was not possible to estimate how much timber was collected from the area for the construction of houses. Moreover, it is argued to be a very small amount of timber as many of the houses have not been rebuild since the foundation of the community (Observation).

5.2.5 Summary

Although the Forest law 1700 was enacted in 1996 the actual transfer of powers did not manifest itself for the community members from 15 de Agosto until the approval of the PGMF. Even though several rights have been devolved, e.g. securing the communities land tenure, it is clear that actual decision-making powers have actually decreased. The community went from having substantial

67 decision-making powers in regards to land use to only having decision-making power regarding types of crops cultivated and location for fields. With the approval of the PGMF, the community obtained the de jure rights to access and withdraw resources from the forest. These had already been transferred to them, but the lack of a management plan detained them from being able to exploit these de jure rights. The community has moreover obtained de jure rights to exclude external actors from accessing their forest area, which was previously held with claimed de facto rights. The community has also been assigned partial de jure rights of management and alienation, however these are conditional upon the formal forest management regulations. The community has gone from having the power to create rules and making decisions regarding the forest management to being limited in their decision-making power and now only decides whether to harvest timber from an AAA or not. With the official recognition of the customary rules, the community has gained the power to adjudicate disputes.

5.3 Accountability

Having analysed the historical context of the study site and the devolved decision-making powers and bundles of rights following the approval of the PGMF, this chapter analyses the accountability. Accountability is a key element in the analytical framework as “accountability are critical if devolved powers are to serve local needs efficiently and equitably” (Agrawal and Ribot, 1999; 474). The figure below demonstrates the actors involved in the decision-making concerning the management of the forest resources in 15 de Agosto. The arrows demonstrate if a downward and/or upward accountability relation has been identified between the actors.

Figure 9 Accountability relations between involved actors

(Compiled by author)

Despite of the transfer of rights and decision-making powers to lower level actors, the Government of Bolivia is still the owner of all forest areas. The Government holds the power to make rules. This power is further enforced by the upward accountability relationship from the ABT to the Government of Bolivia. This is because ABT holds substantial decision-making powers, the power to make decisions regarding the use of a particular resource. This is exemplified by one community member’s explanation, “the forest office [ABT] decides what we are allowed to do. They tell us what land we are allowed to work. I do not like it, if it is communal property” (CM 10). The ABT also holds the power to implement and ensure compliance as declared in the Forest Law 1700. “The Forest Superintendence [now ABT] can at any given moment, at the request or complaint inspect to verify if the legal obligations and contracts, including the given implementation and application of the Management plan are followed” (BOLFOR and MDSMA, 1997; article 33: I). Forest engineers, lawyers and forest technicians manage the ABT. Their task is to make sure that the official regulations stated by the Government of Bolivia are followed. The UFM has been transferred very little decision-making power in regards to the community forest management in San Ignacio. Following the Forest Law 1700, the municipality is responsible for providing 69 technical advice to local forest users and assisting the ABT in the enforcement of the national forest laws, as explained by a forest engineer from the UFM “we are working hard together with ABT to ensure the compliance of the official laws” (UFM 8). This is done by informing the communities about the legislations. COINFO is a NGO founded by the communities in the municipality. The objective of the NGO is to help the communities with the management plan of their forest. Elections are held every second year with representatives from the 14 associate communities. The director must be a representative from one of the 14 associate communities (COINFO 1). Besides, information meetings are held yearly where “the representatives can come and tell the problems they may have” (COINFO 1). COINFO has a downward accountability relation to the communities, but does not hold any decision-making powers independently. To administrate the harvesting activities, a forest group was established in the community with the implementation of the PGMF. The objective of the forest group is to implement the recommendations laid out in the PGMF. The highest authority, also in regards to the forest management, is the community council consisting of elected community members with the chief as the head of the council. The forest group consists of the President, who is in charge of monitoring all activities regarding forest management. The legal representative is responsible for preparing contracts, finding buyers etc. The secretary registers all costs and profits during the harvesting activities (Constitution for the forest group – PGMF 2004). The chief of the community monitors the work of the forest group, “I [The Chief] collaborate with the legal representative, president and secretary from the forest group. The forest group collaborate with COINFO. The forest group tells me if we need to convene to a community assembly to discuss a proposal.” (CM 11). The representatives in the forest group are elected in the same way as the community chief. The forest group is thus upwardly accountable to the community council and downwardly accountable to the community members through the mechanism of election. The same is the case for the community council. Once a year, the elected community members in the community council and the forest group can hand in their denunciation or community members can decide to give their position to another person in the community (CM 11). This takes place in the communal assemblies where everybody can participate (Informal conversation). The forest group is responsible for exercising the communally held powers of making-decision about how to use a particular resource. The forest group and the community council are downwardly accountable to the community members through the annual elections in which all adult villagers can vote, run for a position in the forest group and be selected on the basis of simple majority vote. A mechanism

70 securing the downward accountability relation between the forest group and the rest of the community members is the community assemblies. The communal meetings are arranged as needed. That is when there are decisions or information to be given communally. It is argued that “approximately 60-70% of the community participates in the communal assemblies” (CM 11). Great attendance to the communal meetings was observed during the stay in the community and meetings were held approximately every week. Out of the 22 community members asked, 18 answered ‘always’ in regards to their participation in the community assemblies while four answered ‘sometimes’ (Questionnaire). Several community members confirm that decisions concerning the forest management are presented at the community assemblies, “sometimes in the community assembles, they talk about what will be done in the management, how many cubic meters they will harvest and for what they will use the money” (CM 10). Although several comment that they do not participate in the specific decision-making, “I do not interfere with the decisions concerning the contracts, because the forest management has its administration [The forest group]. They monitor how many cubic meters is harvested etc.” (CM 13). This was also visible in the questionnaire results, 13 of 22 answered that they participated in the decision-making concerning the forest management. One answered to participates in some of the decisions and eight informants did not participate in decision-makings concerning the forest management. Only one of the eight explained that the lack of participation was due to age. Another reason was that, “it is a job for the men” (Questionnaire) giving lack of knowledge concerning the forest management as explanation. Others explained that the reason was the forest group, “they do not notify us”, “the family, which constitute the authority, does not let us participate” or “they are very few those who make decisions concerning the forest management” (Questionnaire). Other informants repeated the criticism of the forest group. One community member commented, “they only need the signature from the legal representative to take out money. I do not trust in the administrative group [Forest group and community council]” (CM 26). This is however argued not to be correct, “the legal representative cannot take out, not even one cent, not without the signature of the others” (CM 14). At several community meetings, information was shared and decisions, concerning the forest management, were discussed, however, very often by the same group of men (Observation).

The forest group is also responsible for gathering people to help with the harvesting activities in the area under forest management, “we call for a reunion in the community and ask who in the community would like to work with the forest inventory. All of those who wants to join, comes along.” (CM 7). Then with the help from COINFO, the community members interested in

71 participating in harvesting activities are capacitated, “although there are a lot who knows by now, but we capacitate every year” (COINFO 18). They are taught to identify species, perform measurements and to mark the trees with metal labels, and identify the semilleros. By giving community members an alternative income, it enables especially the men to stay with their families instead of migrating to other areas for paid jobs, “we pay people from the community for the work in the forest, 60 bolivianos daily” (CM 7). However, with the emergence of the cultivation of chia and sesame less people are interested in joining the work in the forest management (Owner of sawmill 9). According to the questionnaire, 17 household representatives confirmed that at least one member of their household had at some point participated in the harvesting activities in the area under forest management (Questionnaire). On average the participation was estimated to be 17 days. The most days registered was 60 and the fewest amount of days was one (Questionnaire). This is dependent on which tasks they are capable and willing to participate in; some only participate in the forest inventory whereas others also join the actual harvesting process. The main reason for participating in the forest inventories and the harvesting activities is the payment. Others argue that it is because it interests them to learn about the activities. Others again argue that it is a part of their responsibility as community members (Questionnaire). The forest group is formally upwardly accountable to the ABT for accurate record keeping and compliance of the official regulations.

5.3.1 Summary

The Government of Bolivia holds less decision-making powers than before the implementation of the Forest Law 1700. However due to the upwardly accountable relation from the ABT to the Government of Bolivia, it still holds the power and can also reclaim the powers devolved to the ABT. This demonstrates how although the different sets of powers in decision-making and rulemaking can be allocated to lower-level actors, the implementation of an actual decentralisation depends on the accountability relation. No downward accountability relation from the government officials to the community was identified. Within the community, strong downward accountability relations are identified. These relations are further enforced with supplementary mechanisms such as elections and communal assemblies. The community has obtained the power to adjudicate disputes following the approval of the PGMF. The devolution of powers from the Government of Bolivia, to the community council who moreover is downwardly accountable to the rest of the community members, is argued to be the

72 primary dimension of decentralisation. This devolution of powers broadens participation of the local communities and enhances the responsiveness of the empowered actors. However, the devolved powers are few, and the community no longer holds the self-claimed power to create rules. As the actors holding substantial decision-making powers are identified to be accountable to the superior authorities of the government, it is argued that the decentralisation incomplete.

5.4 Evaluation of the current management of the forest resources

This section will investigate the current harvest of timber resources. Firstly, the quality of the PGMF developed for 15 de Agosto will be analysed. Secondly, it will be investigated if the current harvesting rates complies with the regulations outlined in the PGMF (2004) and the Resolución Ministerial No. 248/98.

5.4.1 Validity of the PGMF

The PGMF contains a forest inventory performed to determine the rate of harvesting based on the forest composition, moreover to assess if the community can benefit from applying harvesting activities. According to the Forest Law 1700, the objective with the PGMF is to develop an instrument that, based on an evaluation of the characteristics and the potential of the forest area, presents a description of sustainable activities applicable in the forest area. It is underlined that these activities need to be in accordance with the standards and regulations of protection and sustainability presented in the Forest Law 1700 and thus the relevant authorities should approve the PGMF. In the following, the quality of the PGMF will be analysed in regards to the objectives of the PGMF as outlined above (BOLFOR and MDSMA, 1997, Article: 3.B). Moreover how the presented harvesting regulations have been developed in accordance to the characteristics of the forest area. This will be done by comparing data from the PGMF with data calculated from the forest inventory performed in the study area. The forest inventory performed in the study area consists of a total of nine sample plots, however the sample plot nr 6 (see appendix A), demonstrates a very high number of trees compared to the other sample plots. Data from this plot nr. will not be used in the final data analysis, as it is clear that an error have taken place in the measurement of the sample area using the GPS. Unless other is stated, the data from the forest inventory presented in the following have been calculated from the data collected from eight sample plots. 73

Actual size of the inventory

The PGMF stipulates to be based on a forest assessment performed by systematically distributing 90 measuring plots on eight lines. The measuring plots were 20 m wide and 175 m long (0.35 ha) bringing the total inventoried area to 31.5 ha. Only trees with a diameter larger than 20 cm DBH were measured. The species, height, quality of trunk, and information regarding understory vegetation, streams, topography etc. were also noted down (PGMF 2004: xi).

However, it is found that the data presented in the PGMF is only based on one of the 90 units, as the numbers are in correlation with the only data sheet presented in the annex demonstrating measurements from the area belonging to 15 de Agosto. The PGMF is thus presenting the results of the forest composition as being based on a forest inventory performed on 31.5 ha even though it was only performed on 0.35 ha.

Total tree abundance

The PGMF argues that the total tree abundance is 96 trees/hectare for trees with a diameter of 20 cm at DBH or higher (PGMF: 19). Studying the appendices of the PGMF, it was found that this number had not been calculated in relation to hectare. The actual total tree abundance from the PGFM and the forest inventory is presented in the table below.

Table 10 Comparison of total tree abundance between PGMF and forest inventory Total tree abundance – DBH ≥20 Trees/ha PGMF 273.6 Forest inventory sample plot size 15 m radius 274.6 (Compiled by author source: PGMF and forest inventory)

There is a difference of 1 tree/ha in tree abundance between the results gathered from the PGMF and the forest inventory.

Basal area

The PGMF does not present the formula used to calculate the basal area. Pawlowski and Mariaca’s

(2007) formula was applied when calculating the basal area from the forest inventory:

BA = π/4*(DBH/100)2

In the PGMF, the basal basic area is presented as 9062 m2/hectare (PGMF; 19). As mentioned, the presented basal area has not been converted into m2/hectare. The actual basal area from the PGMF forest inventory is compared to the basal area found in the forest inventory, in the table below.

Table 11 Comparison of total basal area between PGMF and forest inventory Total basal area – DBH ≥20 m2/hectare PGMF 25.7 Forest inventory including stump diameters 21.4 (Compiled by author source: PGMF and forest inventory)

There is a difference of 4.3 m2/hectare between results of the PGMF and the forest inventory. This difference is likely to be due to the few sample plots measured in the forest inventory and the small size of these, which results in a high statistical insecurity. Another factor is the use of a GPS for measuring the radius of the sample plots in the forest inventory. The data indicates that the GPS has continuously measured a smaller distance to the sample plot centre.

Volume

The formula used to calculate the total volume (Vt) in the data from the forest inventory is also taken from Pawlowski and Mariaca (2007):

Vt = BA * Atm *0.65

Atm = Average of total height 0.65 = form factor

Again, the total volume presented in the PGMF is incorrect, arguing that the total volume is 32.15 m3/ha (PGMF; 19). In the table below the actual total volume for the PGMF is demonstrated along with the total volume calculated from the forest inventory.

Table 12 Comparison of total volume between PGMF and forest inventory Total volume m3/ha PGMF 91.6 Forest inventory including stump diameters 216.2 (Compiled by author source: PGMF and forest inventory)

The table shows a difference of 124.6 m3/ha in the total volume. There are several plausible explanations for the great difference in volume. The reflexions presented above concerning statistical insecurity of the data gathered from the forest inventory are likely to affect the volume calculations as well. The method applied for estimating height during the performance of the forest inventory for the PGMF is another explanation, as this was estimated by eye. Another explanation is that the forest is argued to be highly heterogeneous, thus affecting the calculation of total basal area (see appendix B).

Relative abundance rate of species

Table 13 Comparison of relative abundance rate according to the commercial value between PGMF and forest inventory

PGMF Forest inventory Commercial value DBH ≥20 DBH ≥20 Very valuable species 4% 9% Valuable species 19% 31% Little valuable species 24% 38% Species without commercial value 53% 21% Grand Total 100% 100% (Compiled by author source: Pawlowski and Mariaca (2007), PGMF (2004) and forest inventory)

The PGMF has calculated the relative abundance of species according to the commercial value, including more species than the small selection presented in the PGMF. Therefore, for the presentation of the abundance of species identified in the forest inventory, the list of species found in the study by Pawlowski and Mariaca (2007) has been used. However, a few differences in the categorisation of the species have been identified. Pawlowski and Mariaca (2007) categorise Morado (Machaerium scleroxylon Tul.), Roble (Amburana cearensis (Allemao) A.C. Smith) and Tajibo (Tabebuia sp.) as very valuable species, whereas the PGMF presents Morado and Roble as very valuable species, and Tajibo is only categorised to be a valuable species. This may be the reason for the difference found in the relative abundance for the species without commercial value, which is 30 percent point. With the very valuable species, there is only a difference of 5 percent 76 point. Moreover as argued above, the heterogeneous structure of the forest is likely to also be the cause of the difference, especially as the forest inventory performed for the PGMF has most likely been performed in the same zone of the forest, if they followed the explained method of a systematic placement over one line, as explained earlier.

Quality of the PGMF

Although the Forest Law 1700 argues that, the management plan should present regulations of harvesting activities that considers the forest composition of the concerned area under forest management. The data concerning the forest areas’ composition presented in the PGMF is misleading and is on several occasions presenting false information due to incorrect calculations. Moreover, in different parts of the PGMF, information is presented as data concerning the community 15 de Agosto but other community names and representatives are written on the documents. It is probable that parts of the management plan have been copied from management plans developed for other communities. There are places in the plan where it refers to the community “Cruz del Sur” and a different legal representative than the one selected for the community 15 de Agosto at the time of the development of the plan. (PGMF: 34). Another place in the PGMF, the number of community members from San Antonio de los Tajibos is presented as an estimation of available work force for the completion of the harvesting activities. (PGMF: 14). In addition, some of the annexes with the forest inventories are named as inventories from San Antonio de los Tajibos (PGMF: Annex).

5.4.2 Compliance of the PGMF

Before evaluating if the PGMF is presenting a sustainable management of the forest resources, it will be investigated if the community complies with the regulations presented in the PGMF and if these follow the official regulations presented in the Technical Norms 248/98 regarding commercialisation of timber on communal land. The Technical Norms 248/98 are based on the regulations outlined in the Forest Law 1700 and supplements with a concrete description of the basis required for the preparation of “management instruments for tropical and subtropical forests, on forest concessions in properties with areas greater than 200 hectares”. (Resolución Ministerial No. 248/98; 1). It is underlined that the main objectives with the development of the PGMF is the

77 conservation and sustainable use of forest resources and ecosystems in general.

Mechanisms to assure compliance

Although Santa Cruz de la Sierra department has a long history of illegal timber logging, the community members confirm that no outsiders enter the community land, “nobody from outside enters, because the entrances go through the community, and the other sides (of the community land) are encircled by wire fence and there are no roads that enters”. (CM 7). The forest engineer helping the community with the application of the management plan confirms this observation (COINFO 18). The illegal timber logging has decreased considerably in the region. It is argued to have changed a bit with the enactment of the forest law 1700 in 1996 as, “before there was no control, this is why they could take all the valuable timber.” However, the actual change happened around 2010 when the governmental forest organisation ATB had a new director, who started charging fines for illegal timber harvesting. It is narrated that some people prefer abandoning their property to avoid having to pay the fine because the fine is greater than the value of the property, “before there was great deforestation, because it was easier to pay the fine than to do it legally” (UFM 8). Today nobody buys illegal timber due to the high fines. This has limited the encounters of illegal timber logging substantially, bringing the number down to only a few. Another change, which has improved the legal timber logging activities, is that “the prices have also been regulated, before it was cheaper to buy illegal timber, because the procedure of harvesting the timber legally was very expensive. This is not the case today” (UFM 8). The decrease in illegal logging is also a result of the transferred powers to the military, “before they were not allowed to stop a truck, but now with the new powers they are allowed to stop them and to confiscate everything in the truck” (UFM 8). This is confirmed by a military official, “we [The military] have the power to stop a truck and see if they have the paper of origin of the timber, if they do not have it we contact the ABT” (Military 23). This transfer of power to the military is of great importance, as the ABT has few resources compared to the size of the area they are responsible in monitoring, “when we have time we go, but the truth is we have very little time to monitor the area” (ABT 19). However, several informants confirm that the ABT is monitoring. The improvements are confirmed by the owner of a sawmill, who has been buying timber from 15 de Agosto since they began with the forest management, “now the ABT is working a lot better. All the trucks that arrive to the sawmills, arrive with documents.” (Owner of sawmill 9). The

78 following results will therefor only present the timber declared to the ABT in the POAF’s and IAPOAF’s.

Area permitted for harvesting

The PGMF (2004) proposes, based on the total area size designated for forest management and the harvesting cycle, that the size of the area authorized for harvesting is 168.5 hectare/year (PGMF 2004; 28). This size of the AAA has been determined based on the minimum harvesting cycle of 20 years permitted in the technical norms (Technical Norms 248/98; 22). A community member points out a problem concerning the division of the area, “they did not make the management plan very exact. In the 3000 ha [Designated for the forest management] there are areas of fields [Natural grasslands].” (CM 15). It is therefore likely that there will not be sufficient forest land to harvest 168.5 hectare/year. The table below demonstrates the hectares for recent the AAA’s:

Table 14 Comparison of size of AAA registered in the IAPOAF and POAF with measurements performed on Google Earth Pro Average size of AAA AAA / year Source 2006-2007 2009 – 2010 2011-2012 2013 PGMF - Hectare 265 291.8 319.9 180.2 151 Google Earth Pro 265.1 292.6 321.2 181.1 151 measured - Hectare (Compiled by author, source: IAPOAF 2006-2007, 2009-2010, POAF 2011-2012, IAPOAF 2013 and Google Earth Pro)

The size of the AAAs were verified using the polygon lineal in Google Pro. The small variations in area size is argued to be due to variable accuracy, which needs to be taken into consideration when measuring on images and variable resolution. It is therefore found that the size of the AAAs registered in the IAPOAFs and POAFs is correct. Several of the AAAs have been gathered so that two years of AAAs have been applied for together. According to the technical norms 248/98, it is allowed to gather up to three AAAs (Resolución Ministerial No. 248/98:21). From the table it is clear that the AAAs from 2006-2007, 2009-2010 and 2011-2012 does not surpass the permitted area as two AAAs have been gathered allowing the community to harvest timber on a total area of 337 hectares. The final AAA from 2013 surpasses the yearly area size permitted with 11.7 ha. According to the technical norms 248/98, it is allowed to deviate from the determined area size as long as the deviation is less than 20% of the permitted size. The deviation in the AAA from 2013 surpasses the permitted area size with 6.5%. Moreover,

79 the technical norms underline that the deviation must be equalised within five years (Resolución Ministerial No. 248/98: 21). The harvesting areas are held within the permitted size when calculating the average size of the AAA’s. As mentioned earlier, there is no evidence indicating that harvesting activities have taken place outside the indicated areas. The community 15 de Agosto has thus followed the guidelines for the permitted harvesting area.

Figure 10 Map of the location of the AAAs

(Compiled by author, source: Google Earth Pro, IAPOAF 2006-2007, 2009-2010, POAF 2011-2012, IAPOAF 2013 and GPS points registered during fieldwork)

From the map above it is possible to see that the areas further away from the community have been selected as AAA’s. However, the placement of the AAA is not predetermined, the usual buyer of the timber from the community explains that, “I look at the POAF and say okay what can we do to benefit from the area a bit more, expanding the AAA a bit more here, and delimit the area a bit here” (Owner of sawmill 9). This may be problematic for the community in the long run as the quantity and quality of timber in the forest is not homogeneous. Moreover, the species distribution

80 is also very heterogeneous, which is pointed out by a community member, “it is not possible to divide it in equal areas, you have to see where there are areas with wood” (CM 15).

Permitted minimum diameter

Another regulation is the “minimum commercial diameter” (DMC)19, these are presented in the technical norms 248/98 (PGMF 2004; 25). In the PGMF, is it argued that the DMC is recommended as most of the commercial species belong to the ecological guild, the long-lived pioneer species, which needs light. Only two of the commercial species, Momoqui and Jichituriqui, belong to another ecological guild, the partial shade-tolerant species, which can tolerate shade in some of its growth stages, though it is not a necessity (PGMF 2004; 25). Table 15 demonstrates the DMC for the commercial species found on the communal land. From the forest inventory in the PGMF, the average volume/tree/hectare is calculated according to diameter classes. This is used to compare the volume harvested for each species from the AAAs to be able to investigate if the harvested timber have followed the regulations of minimum DMC.

19 “Diámetro mínimo comercial” 81

Table 15 Comparison of average volume per species harvested and average volume according to diameter classes for each species from the PGMF

Average m3/tree/ha Average m3/tree/ha Average m3/tree/ha Average harvest rate for diameter class (30-for diameter class (40-for diameter class (50- m3/tree/ha from Species DMC 39) from PGMF 49) from PGMF 59) from PGMF AAA’s

Ajuano (Pterogyne nitens Tul.) 40 1.1 1.7 3.5 5.2

Cuchi (Astronium urundeuva 40 0.9 1.5 2.7 2.2 (Allemao) Engl.)

Curupau (Anadenanthera 45 0.9 1.7 2.2 2.1 columbrina (Vell. Conc.))

Jichituriqui (Aspidosperma sp.) 40 0.8 1.4 3 1.5

Momoqui (Caesalpinia 40 0.8 1.5 2.4 2 pluviosa DC. )

Morado (Machaerium 40 0.8 1.5 2.1 3.7 scleroxylon Tul. )

Picana (Cordia sp.) 40 1 1.8 2

Roble (Amburana cearensis 50 1.9 3 9.1 (Allemao) A.C. Smith )

Sirari (Copaifera chodatiana ) 40 0.9 1.4 2.3 3.7

Soto (Schinopsis brasilensis 40 0.9 1.6 2 3.4 Engl.)

Tajibo (Tabebuia sp .) 40 0.9 1.5 2.6 6.9

Tasaá (Poeppigia procera C. 30 0.4 / 0.8* 1.4 2.2 1.8 Presl .) (Compiled by author, source: PGMF 2004, document on DMC, POAF/IAPOAF 2006-2007, 2009-2010, 2011-2012 and 2013) * Calculated for the diameter classes (20-29/30-39)

From the table above, it is clear that the harvested trees exceed the DMC. Some of the species even seem to exceed the DMC with more than 10 cm – as they also greatly exceed the average volume for trees in the diameter class of 50-59. This applies to the species Ajuano, Morado, Roble, Sirari and Tajibo. These results are in contrast to information received from different community members, “before the trees were not harvested if they did not measure more than 40, now they do not have to measure more than 30 [Diameter]. Now the forest is left poor, before it was not like that. Today they benefit a lot.” (CM 16). A forest engineer from COINFO explained however, that the DMC had never been changed. Stumps encountered in the area under forest management during the forest inventory performed, all had a diameter higher than 40 cm and with and average diameter of 69.6 cm. All seven stumps were of the species Tajibo. The harvested timber is this found to have a diameter larger than the DMC.

Standing trees left for reproduction

The PGMF has adapted the maximum permitted harvesting rate presented in the technical norms (PGMF 2004; 25). The harvesting rate is presented “as a safety factor, it is under no circumstance permitted to harvest more than 80% of the abundance of trees in the AAA. The abundance of trees includes all trees with a diameter higher than the DMC …” (Resolución Ministerial No. 248/98; 22). This regulation has been implemented to secure the reproduction of the harvested species. This is also of knowledge to the community members. One explains, “all the trees that have the measure [DMC], every fifth tree is left standing as semillero.” (CM 4). The current director of the forest group underlines, however, that the semillero should be of good quality, “every fifth tree, the fifth is the semillero of each species, of the best quality” (CM 7). During the fieldwork for this study, several semilleros were identified in the area under forest management. These were marked with a red “S” on the trunk. The table below demonstrates the percentage of trees harvested of the total number of trees that meets the DMC.

Table 16 Percentage of trees harvested of the total number of trees with a diameter above DMC AAA 2006-2007 2009 – 2010 2011-2012 2013 Species Percentage of trees above DMC harvested %

Ajunau (Pterogyne nitens Tul.) 80.0 30.8 73.3

Cedro (Cedrela fissilis Vell .) 200.0*

Cuchi (Astronium urundeuva ** 0.0*** 25.3 82.4 (Allemao) Engl.) Curupaú (Anadenanthera 26.3 80.1 columbrina (Vell. Conc.))

Jichituriqui (Aspidosperma sp.) 25.4 54.2

Momoqui (Caesalpinia pluviosa 26.0 67.8 DC. ) Morado (Machaerium scleroxylon 31.8 0.0 25.3 74.2 Tul. )

Paquió (Hymenaea sp.) 0.0

Picana (Cordia sp.) 125.0*

Picana negra (Cordia alliodora 33.3 50.0 (Ruiz & Pazon) Oken .) Roble (Amburana cearensis 90.6 74.9 26.1 98.1 (Allemao) A.C. Smith )

Sirari (Copaifera chodatiana ) 36.3 0.0 25.6 76.3

Soto (Schinopsis brasilensis Engl.) 0.0 0.0 25.2 80.2

Tajibo (Tabebuia sp .) 57.3 65.2 25.0 84.9

Tarara (Centrolobium microchaete 25.0 0.0 26.0 71.7 (C. Martius ex Benth.) Lima ) Tasaá (Poeppigia procera C. 25.0 10.2 Presl .)

Verdolaga (Buchenavia sp ) 0.0

(Own calculations from source: IAPOAF 2006-2007, 2009-2010, POAF 2011-2012, IAPOAF 2013) *Indicates an error in the first forest census, where some of the trees has been registered as the wrong species, resulting in the number of harvested trees exceeding the total number of trees with diameter approved for harvest. ** The empty spaces indicates that no trees with the approved diameter was identified in the AAA. *** The 0.0% means that trees with the approved diameter was identified in the AAA, however no trees of this species was harvested.

The table shows that the limit of 80% has been surpassed in the AAA’s from 2006-07 and 2013. In 2006-07 the harvesting limit was exceeded by 10.6 percentage points on the tree species Roble.

The harvesting rate of the same tree species was also exceeded in the AAA from 2013 by 18.1 percentage points. That same year, the harvesting rate was also exceeded for the tree species Cuchi by 2.4 percentage points, Tajibo by 4.9 percentage points and finally Soto by 0.2 percentage points. The high harvesting rate can affect the regeneration of the species and spatial distribution of the species. It is important to underline that although over-harvesting is registered, the harvested volume was approved by the ABT before the harvesting activities took place. In the POAF, the actual harvesting rate it not calculated. Therefore, the surpassing harvesting rates have been approved without the actors’ knowledge hereof. When performing the POAF, the community members are teamed up. There are thus several smaller groups counting and registering the possible harvesting volume, allowing for an error to occur. The table also demonstrates that the community does not harvest the maximum amount allowed for several species. This is likely to be determined by the demands on the market. The owner of the sawmill who has bought timber from the community’s forest management for many years explains that she only buys the species and volume that she is certain of selling in Santa Cruz (Owner of sawmill 9). Another reason is the change in prices, “when the prices are low, then we leave the species in the forest. There is no lose. This is why it would be great if we had an external market. The low price in the market affects everybody.” (Owner of sawmill 9). Everybody is affected in the sense that the less species the community commercialises, the less profit to cover the expenses. Another reason is that some species are more valuable than others. The table below demonstrates the species harvested during the different AAA’s categorised according to its commercial value. The maximum harvesting rate is included to analyse if there is a connection between overharvesting and the value of the timber.

Table 17 Commercial value compared to harvest rate Maximum harvesting Commercial value categories 2006-2007 2009- 2010 2011-2012 2013 rate %

Very valuable species Morado (Machaerium scleroxylon Tul.) x x x 74

Roble (Amburana cearensis (Allemao) A.C. x x x x 98 Smith )

Tajibo (Tabebuia sp .) x x x x 85

Valuable species Cuchi (Astronium urundeuva (Allemao) x x 82 Engl.) Curupau (Anadenanthera columbrina (Vell. x x 80 Conc.)

Jichituriqui (Aspidosperma sp.) x x 54

Momoqui (Caesalpinia pluviosa DC .) x x 67

Sirari (Copaifera chodatiana ) x x x 76

Soto (Schinopsis brasilensis Engl .) x x 80

Tarara (Centrolobium microchaete (C. x x x 71 Martius ex Benth.) Lima )

Less valuable species Tasaa (Poeppigia procera C. Presl. ) x x 10

Species without commercial value None

Others Picana negra (Cordia alliodora (Ruiz & x x 50 Pazon) Oken .)

Picana (Cordia sp .) x -

Cedro (Cedrela fissilis Vell.) x -

Ajunau (Pterogyne nitens Tul.) x x x 80

(Compiled by author, source: PGMF (2004) and IAPOAF 2006-2007, 2009-2010, POAF 2011-2012, IAPOAF 2013)

It is clear to see that the very valuable species have been sought to be harvested every year, except for the Morado in the AAA from 2009-2010. The overharvest of the species Roble, Tajibo and Cuchi could be related to the high commercial value of the species. The least valuable species is Tasaa with highest harvesting rate registered to be 10 %. The PGMF concludes that commercialising timber from the area under forest management is

86 profitable for the community, based on an assumption that there is a market for at least 12 species encountered in the forest area. Moreover, the PGMF assumes that the market will expand to include even more of the species encountered in the area (PGMF 2004; 12). However, the market has changed and one community member narrates, “the first year we did not sell as much as now. The first year we only sold Tajibo and Roble, however today we sell up to 7-8 species. This means a higher profit and more work for the people”. (CM 16). This is confirmed by the owner of the sawmill, who has been collaborating with the community since they first begun implementing the forest management (Owner of sawmill 9). In the AAA from 2009-2010, only two species were sold, Tajibo and Roble. These are two of the three species estimated to be the most valuable species. In the AAAs from 2011-2012 and 2013 the community managed to sell timber from 13 different species. The first explanation is that the positions in the forest group were changed as a completely new directory entered the group in 2011. Another explanation to the change in harvested species is that both amount of timber and tree species commercialised depend on the market. It is explained that, “three years ago a market for other species opened” (Owner of sawmill 9). This is also clear in the table with the great increase in number of species commercialised from 2011 onwards. An expansion of the market has also increased the export of certain species, “at the moment we only export Tajibo and roble to Argentina and also Curupau, but there is not a good market, because these countries have also started to benefit from their forests” (Owner of sawmill 9). It is further elaborated that, “the market is very insecure, for example the other year we charged 8 Bolivianos [1.15 USD], but now it is only 5.80 Bolivianos [0.83 USD], the company is losing now when we have to pay for the cargo and cut.” (Owner of sawmill 9).

5.4.3 Summary

The PGMF is argued to be of poor quality, primarily because the information presented concerning the forest inventory is incorrect. Besides no evidence is found indicating that the PGMF presents regulations that have been adjusted to this specific forest area to assure a sustainable forest management of the area. The PGMF presents the overall regulations already presented in the Technical Norms 248/98. In regards to the compliance of the regulations for commercialisation of timber resources, overharvesting of the most valuable species has been registered, however for most of the species the maximum volume permitted is not harvested. This overharvesting seems to be occurring due the design of the POAF. The other regulations are complied with.

5.5 The sustainability of the PGMF

In the following, it will be investigated if the current management of the forest belonging to 15 de Agosto is sustainable. It will both be investigated according to the actual implementation of the forest management but also in regards to the official regulations to find out whether or not they actually stipulate a sustainable forest management. Firstly, it will be analysed if the area designated to agricultural cultivation is large enough to ensure that the agricultural activities will not encroach on the area designated for the forest management. Secondly, it will be investigated if the regeneration of the commercialised species is secured under the current harvesting activities.

5.5.1 Sustainability of the use of land

The community is currently cultivating approximately 108 hectares and at least 118 hectares have been converted into pasture for livestock production (Questionnaire and informal conversation - CM). If it is assumed that the 108 hectares are cultivated for a minimum of two years, the community will be able to apply a rotation cycle of 45 years on the area, assuming that the total area is suitable for agricultural use. This number is only to give an idea of the current agricultural activities. It is relevant to investigate the current land use activities in case the area for cultivation is too small to secure the future cultivation activities. This would increase the possibility of encroachment occurring in the area currently designated to forest management. Several insecurities are related to these calculations, as it is not possible to estimate the possible decrease or increase of the area cultivated. However, it is very likely to assume that the area will increase due to the better connection to external markets and availability of machinery facilitating the cultivation process. Moreover, both the political discourse and the goals of the NGO MINGA, who are collaborating with the community, are arguing for implementation of larger machinery in the agricultural production, more specifically provide a tractor for the communities (MINGA 24; Presentation held by the political candidates). In addition, both livestock groups have doubled their livestock population and have already managed to pay back the number of livestock’s they were lent in the start-up of the project. These are all factors indicating that the use of the land will intensify and hereby most likely increase the area under cultivation. If the community cultivated the maximum area permitted, that is 6 hectares per household, then the rotation cycles would have to be 14 years, if they stay within the area designated for cultivation. It is found that the size of the land designated for agricultural use is sufficient for the community to continue the use of land within this area. 88

5.5.2 Diameter size distribution of species

To assess the impact of the current management on the forest condition, the diameter distribution will be analysed for selected commercial species to detect tendencies in the regeneration patterns. A selection criteria for the species subject to the diameter size distribution was that they are commercial species, and therefore likely to continuously be harvested in the future. Moreover, the species were selected based on the number of measurements performed on the concerned species. The figure below demonstrates the diameter size distribution of the selected species calculated on the average of nine plots.

Figure 11 Diameter size distribution of selected commercial species

(Compiled by author, source: Forest inventory)

The figure demonstrates differences in the species’ diameter size distribution. Both Jichituriqui and Momoqui present an inverted J curve, which indicates a good regeneration as it demonstrates a stable recruitment status of new seedlings (Lieberman et al 1996, Tesfaye et al. 2010, Girma and 89

Mosandl 2012). The species Tasaa and Tajibo demonstrates a Gaussian pattern where there are many large trees with few small tress. This indicates poor recruitment (Girma and Mosandl 2012). These results are backed up by the diameter size distribution performed during the preparations of the PGMF (2004). The diameter size distribution was assessed for trees with a diameter of 20 cm or higher at DBH, demonstrating that there is a greater abundance of trees measuring average diameter size than of the smaller and larger trees. The PGMF concludes that the 20% semilleros left standing of the commercial species is sufficient to secure the future regeneration of the species. (PGMF 2006: 25). However, the diameter distribution calculated from the forest inventory indicates that leaving 20% of the species Tasaa and Tajibo may not be sufficient to secure their regeneration. Especially for the tree species Tajibo, these results are concerning as it was demonstrated in the previous section (see table 17) that Tajibo is a very valuable commercial species and has been harvested in all the years for the AAA’s. Moreover, one year it was overharvested with 5 percent points. The Tasaa is of low commercial value and the highest harvesting rate is registered to be 25%.

5.5.3 Assessment of the harvesting activities

This part will seek to compare the volume of harvested timber with the growth rate of the commercial species. This will be followed by an investigation of a comparison of the volume harvested if the community harvested the maximum limit of 80% to the regeneration rate.

Validation of comparison of results with former study

Due to constraints in time and resources, data concerning growth rate from the study by Pawlowski and Mariaca (2007), “Estructura, composición y dinámica del Bosque Seco Chiquitano”20 has been applied. This study is the only one, to my knowledge, who has calculated the regeneration rate of the trees in the same zone as the case study area. In the appendix B, data on the forest composition from the forest inventory is compared to the data the study by Pawlowski and Mariaca (2007). Based on the comparison of the two data sets, it is found that they are comparable. Small differences are identified which may be caused by the errors in the methods applied for the forest inventory presented previously. Moreover, the forest is very heterogeneous in the species

20 Structure, composition and dynamic of the Dry Forest Chiquitano 90 distribution, adding on to the differences found between the two studies. This is also demonstrated when investigating differences in forest composition between the PSP’s from Pawlowski and Mariaca’s (2007) study. It is therefore argued that it is reasonable to use the growth rate from Pawlowski and Mariaca’s study to assess the sustainability of the forest management performed in 15 de Agosto.

Annual harvesting rate compared to the regeneration rate

The average annual harvesting rate from 15 de Agosto is compared to the average yearly commercial growth rate presented in the study by Pawlowski and Mariaca (2007), in the table below. The column to the far right shows the year it will take for each commercial tree species to grow the annual volume harvested.

Table 18 Annual harvesting rate compared to growth rate

Average harvesting volume Annual commercial volume Years for the trees to regrow Species m3/ha/year increment m3/ha/year the harvested timber volume Curupau (Anadenanthera columbrina (Vell. 1.1 0.01 107.9 Conc.)

Jichituriqui (Aspidosperma sp.) 0.3 0.02 16.7

Momoqui (Caesalpinia pluviosa DC.) 1.1 0.05 20.6

Morado (Machaerium scleroxylon Tul.) 0.4 0.003 126.9

Roble (Amburana cearensis (Allemao) A.C. 0.7 0.01 50.9 Smith )

Sirari (Copaifera chodatiana ) 0.5 0.003 169.3

Tajibo (Tabebuia sp.) 1.2 0.006 202.7

Tasaa (Poeppigia procera C. Presl .) 0.6 0.006 99.2

Average value 0.8 0.02 99.3

(Compiled by author, sources: Pawlowski and Marica (2007); IAPOAF 2006-2007, 2009-2010, POAF 2011-2012, IAPOAF 2013)

Overall, the species will take more than the declared 20 years as minimum harvesting cycle to secure a sustainable management. Only the species Jichituriqui is estimated to regrow the harvested volume in less than 20 years, needing only 16 -17 years. Another species close to regrow the harvested volume within 20 years is the Momoqui. However, the rest of the commercial species need between 50 and 202 years to regrow the harvested volume. This results in a proximate average of 99 years for the yearly harvested volume to regrow. The current harvesting rate is therefor found 91 to exceed the regrowth rate by far.

Maximum harvesting rate permitted compared to the regeneration rate

As demonstrated earlier, the community is allowed to harvest up to 80% of the commercial species with a diameter larger than DMC. However, the actual harvesting rate is on average only 46% of the total commercial species. The table below demonstrates how many years it would take the different species to regenerate in case the maximum harvesting rate of 80% was harvested. The table is calculating the harvested volume at 80% based on numbers from the IAPOAF and POAF’s and comparing this to the growth rate.

Table 19 Growth rate compared to the maximum volume permitted for harvesting

Years for the trees to regrow the maximum Species harvest volume permitted Very valuable species Morado 281.4 Roble 64.5 Tajibo 389.8 Valuable species Curupaú 163.2 Jichturiqui 49.8 Momoqui 30.2 Sirari 390.7 Less valuable species Tasaá 758.2 Average value 266.0 (Compiled by author sources: Pawlowski and Marica (2007); IAPOAF 2006-2007, 2009-2010, POAF 2011-2012, IAPOAF 2013)

The commercial species that need the least years to regenerate the harvested volume is Momoqui with 30 years, followed by Jichituriqui with 49 years. Of the very valuable commercial species, Roble is the one, which needs the least years to regenerate with only 64 years. From the table above, it is clear that the regulations presented to ensure a sustainable forest management, are not sufficient in the case of areas under forest management in the same area as the community 15 de Agosto.

Minimum harvesting cycle compared to regeneration rate

The table below demonstrates the maximum harvesting rate for the different species with a limit of 20 years to regenerate.

Table 20 Maximum harvesting rate for commercial species to regrow harvested volume within 20 years

Current average App. harvest rate accouting to Species harvesting rate a 20 years regeneration period Momoqui 46.9 % 50 % Curupau 53.2 % 10 % Jichituriqui 39.8 % 30 % Morado 43.8 % 5 % Roble 72.4 % 25 % Sirari 46.1 % 4 % Tajibo 58.1 % 4 % Tasaa 17.6 % 2 % (Compiled by author, source: Pawlowski and Mariaca 2007; IAPOAF 2006-2007, 2009-2010, POAF 2011-2012, IAPOAF 2013)

The harvesting cycle was determined to be 20 years in the PGMF and is the minimum harvesting cycle permitted. However, it was narrated by a forest engineer from the municipality that, “the minimum cycle of the harvesting plan is 20 years, not all the plans are the same, I know one where the harvesting cycle is 30-35 years. This was the policy of the company” (UFM 8). This, despite the fact that, “there are many people who do not think that 20 years is enough, but think it should be 40 years” (UFM 8). However, different information was presented by the forest engineer from ABT, “studies demonstrate that harvesting one area and returning 20 years later will be positive. (…) This study was performed on level of Santa Cruz.”(ABT 19). It has not been possible to find this study. The argumentation is elaborated by the sawmill owner explaining that the harvesting activities are helping the species to regrow, “we are oxygenating the forest. Where the trees are harvested, life is given for new trees, because the trees do not grow under the shade” (Owner of sawmill 9). Others point to the fact that the trees harvested are much older than 20 years, “it makes sense that the forest is left poor, because the trees that they harvest are not only 20 years old but up to a 100 years” (COINFO 16). In any case, 15 de Agosto is not guaranteed that they will return to the area to conduct the harvesting activities, even though this is the statement from the ABT, “after 20 years you return to harvest the forest” (ABT 19). There is no formal documentation promising this, “the plan says that after 20 years we can renew the management plan. I am not ahead of this, but I believe there is a way” (CM 15). However, it is presented by several that it is 93 a decision to be made in the community, “the community does not have the right to change the management plan. The PGMF is for 20 years, when the 20 years finish the community can decide if they want to continue harvesting timber in their forest area.” (UFM 8).

5.5.4 Summary

Based on the above, it is clear that the current harvesting level is unsustainable in regards to the regeneration rate of the commercial species. Moreover, it is demonstrated that the current harvesting rate may endanger the current composition of species. The results are even more worrying when calculating with the maximum harvesting level permitted. In the following, the implications of these results will be discussed.

6. Discussion

This thesis set out to investigate if the decentralised forest management in Bolivia is sustainable based on the case study of the community 15 de Agosto. This chapter will present and discuss the main findings. Firstly, the methods applied for the investigation of the study will be discussed. Secondly, the main findings for each research question will be presented. Thirdly, the main findings will be discussed in relation to former studies investigating impact of decentralised forest management on forest condition. Finally, the implications of the main findings will be discussed.

6.1 Discussion of data collection

The current study has applied the study design of an embedded case. The main unit of the study is the sustainable forest management in Bolivia implemented through communal forest management. The smaller units of the study are concerned with the decision-making powers and rights held by the community members in 15 de Agosto and the use of forest resources. Other sub-units are concerned with the accountability relation between the involved actors. A number of data collection methods have been applied in the process of investigating the different units of analysis. These will be considered when assessing the relevance and implications of the results.

6.1.1 Interviews

It is likely that insights provided by the informants were influenced by hidden agendas and interests. It was attempted to reveal possible interests by first clarifying the informants’ role in the forest management and thereafter making notes if any observations confirmed this suspicion. Regarding the uncover of any illegal harvesting activities, it may be that none were found due to a lacking interest in revealing such activities, especially since the implications have been made even stricter. However, informants were honest about a few cases of illegal activities taking place at other sites even though these informants had the responsibility of preventing the illegal harvesting. In comparison to the case study of 15 de Agosto, no signs of illegal timber harvesting were found. Data concerning illegal harvesting activities was gathered from a greatly varied group of actors and all confirmed that illegal harvesting activities do not take place in the study area, as it is almost impossible because of the current level of monitoring and severe consequences. The varied group of informants have also been helpful to uncover possible biases and hidden agendas. Information concerning activities taking place some years ago was challenging for the informants

95 to recollect. Both because the informants that had taken part in these activities were elder community members and because no records had been kept about the use of forest resources over the years. Another factor that may have skewed the information concerning the use of forest resources prior to the PGMF is that these activities were performed illegally. Informants may then have feared that this could lead to serious consequences for the community today. However, as discussed further below, it has not been the objective of this thesis to evaluate the exact amount of timbers harvested from the area before the implementation of the PGMF. Instead, the aim of the investigation have been to gain insight in the changes lead on by the management implemented and to assess if these secure a sustainable management of the forest resources.

6.1.2 Gaining access

The findings on forest conditions are limited due to difficulties in accessing the forest area. The fieldwork was conducted from February to April, which is usually at the end of the rainy season. The weather had great impact on the performance of the forest inventory as the forest area was not accessible during days with heavy rain nor the following days because the roads were flooded. On several occasions, the scheduled forest inventory had to be cancelled for this very reason. Another factor that complicated the performance of the forest inventory was that the fieldwork coincided with the sesame harvesting. The harvesting of the sesame is very dependent on the weather and the maturity of the seeds. It was difficult to find locals with knowledge about the tree species that had the time to take a full day off to conduct the forest inventory. The long distance to the AAAs as well as the dense forest made it difficult to perform the forest inventory on more than two sample plots pr. day. It was tried to reach the AAAs on bike however, the roads were either to muddy or in a too bad condition. A vehicle would not have helped either.

6.1.3 Forest inventory

Initially, it was planned to perform the forest inventory using a sample strategy selecting the sample plots in the cross joints of a grid on each AAA. However, once in the forest area, it was clear that it would not be possible to implement this strategy because the area was too large, and because the dense vegetation in the forest area limited the possibilities for entering into the AAAs. Consequently, the sample strategy was changed, applying a systematic sampling strategy locating the sample plots using a predetermined distance. The forest inventory was performed on a small

96 part of the area designated for forest management. For this reason, the inventory data has mainly been used to evaluate the quality of the PGMF. The inventory data was also used to assess the use of growth rate from the study by Pawlowski and Mariaca (2007) to compare to the harvest rate of the study area. The size of the sample plots were measured using a GPS and this could have resulted in some variation in the size of the sample plots, thereby affecting the data from the forest inventory. One of the nine sample plots demonstrated a great deviation compared to the others (See appendix A). The reason for this is argued to be due to the use of GPS for the measurement of the sample plot. This sample plot has not been used in the final calculations on forest composition. The statistical insecurity found in the forest inventory data has been taken into consideration by not drawing conclusions based on small variations in data comparison. Therefore, the data presented from the forest inventory is only based on the average calculations or groups of tree species. The data collected from the study area for the forest inventory has only been used when possible to compare to other data results. The findings are primarily based on data gathered from the POAFs and IAPOAFs. It could be argued that there is a chance the official regulations are not demonstrating the actual harvesting activities. In any case, if illegal harvesting is taking place in the study area it means that the POAFs and IAPOAFs present a smaller harvest rate then actually executed, which only underlines the severity of the results presented in the study.

6.2 Summary of main findings

In the following, the main findings will be presented. These will answer the problem statement and the research questions.

The objective of the Forest Law 1700 in Bolivia is to secure a sustainable forest management through a decentralisation of the forest management. The problem statement of the thesis was to investigate if the declared decentralisation of the forest management has led to a sustainable management of the area under forest management in the community 15 de Agosto. Sustainability was for this study defined as sustainable harvest of forest resources, “when the estimated off-take of woody biomass does not exceed the estimated re-growth over a given period” (Treue et al 2014:24). With respect to this definition of sustainability, the current management of the area under forest management in the community land of 15 de Agosto was found to be unsustainable. By comparing the annual harvesting rate performed by 15 de Agosto and the growth 97 rate of the species the current management is found to be unsustainable as the regeneration rate of the harvested species is on average 99 years however, the current harvesting is set to 20 years. Moreover, when comparing the maximum permitted harvesting rate with the growth rate, it is found that the official regulations are presenting a highly unsustainable management. The commercial species, if harvested at the maximum permitted harvesting rate, would require an average of 265 years to regenerate, however the official minimum harvesting cycle is 20 years.

The Forest Law 1700 was also developed with the objective of decreasing the great amount of illegal harvesting activities taking place in the years before the forest law. It was found that illegal logging have decreased considerably due to improved monitoring mechanisms, greater repercussions and a diminished market for illegal timber. Studying the implemented management of the forest resources in 15 de Agosto, it was also found that the current harvesting activities comply with the official regulations outlined in the PGMF and that most species are harvested in much smaller quantities than what is permitted. However, in a few AAAs the harvesting rate succeeds the permitted 80%. These results are primarily based on data collected by the POAF and IAPOAF compared to the regulations presented in the PGMF. According to the Forest Law 1700, the PGMF should present regulations on harvesting activities considering the forest composition of the forest area. It is however, found that the PGMF for the forestland in 15 de Agosto does not consider the forest composition. The PGMF for 15 de Agosto presents a management that follows the maximum harvest rate presented in the technical norms 248/98, serving to elaborate the official regulations in the Forest law 1700. Moreover, the data presented in the PGMF for 15 de Agosto concerning the forest composition are miscalculated further underlining that the PGMF does not develop management regulations that are based on the specific forest composition at hand.

Before an evaluation of the impact of the decentralisation process, it is necessary to assess to what degree the forest management has been decentralised. The decentralisation of the forest management was initiated with the enactment of the Forest Law 1700. However, it was not until the PGMF was approved that the new rights where transferred to the community 15 de Agosto. Before the implementation of the decentralisation process, the community members held very limited de jure rights and decision-making powers. The use of forest resources was dominated by the de jure rights held by the government of Bolivia and the de facto rights claimed by timber pirates. In 1974, the community members were devolved de jure

98 rights to access and withdraw resources for subsistence use. However, timber were commercialised by the community claiming de facto rights to manage and exclude from the communal land. Several decision-making powers were transferred with the decentralisation process. The Government of Bolivia has devolved substantial decision-making powers to the national forestry department, ABT. The community of 15 de Agosto has also partially obtained more de jure rights than before. However, it is found that the decentralisation of the forest management is incomplete because the devolution of substantial powers from the Government of Bolivia to the ABT is not decentralisation but deconcentration (Agrawal and Ribot 1999). Although, powers have been devolved to actors accountable to the local community, no downward accountability relations from the government officials to the community were identified. The partial devolution of decision-making powers is argued to be common when dealing with forest resources; the state typically maintains control on how local actors benefit from the forest resources (Cronkleton et al 2010; Larson et al 2010). The community 15 de Agosto could be characterised as an extreme case as they were once selected as an exemplary community due to their good performance in forest management. In any case, the study can still be applied to other forest areas communally managed in the Chiquitano forest as the study demonstrates that the official regulations do not secure a sustainable harvest of the forest resources for this type of forest.

6.3 Discussion of main findings

In the following section, the findings of the study will be discussed in comparison to other studies concerned with the impact of decentralised forest management on forest condition.

6.3.1 Sustainable forest management

The study finds that the applied forest management is unsustainable and that the regulations on harvesting activities presented in the PGMF do not present a sustainable management of the forest area. These findings were confirmed in the study by Brienen et al (2003) performed in another forest type in Bolivia. The study evaluates the regeneration of six different species, none of which are found in the study area, and finds that the minimum permitted harvesting cycle of 20 years is too short to assure the regeneration of the harvested species. Other studies presented in the literature review are either inconclusive or conclude that the forest condition is maintained. 99

However, the methods applied for the evaluation of the forest condition, respectively being remote sensing and perception based, bring on numerous insecurities regarding the conclusions drawn. Moreover, these case studies are limited to drawing conclusions on possible changes in forest conditions and not whether or not the implemented forest management is sustainable. For the studies applying forest inventory to evaluate the impact of decentralised forest management on forest condition different conclusions are found. Three studies concerned with the PFM implemented in Nepal reached three different conclusions. In the study performed by Nagendra (2002), the evaluation of the impact took place only one year after the implementation of the PFM. Since the effects of the implemented policies may take longer before they are measurable in the forest condition, the study was inconclusive. The study by Shrestha and McManus (2008) demonstrated that the PFM implemented in Nepal had led to improved forest condition, however, only because the forest user groups were restricted access to the forest area, therefore concluding that the management is unsustainable. Finally, Poudel et al (2014) argues that the implemented management is sustainable.

6.3.2 Confounding and counterfactual factors

This study presents in-depth knowledge regarding the decentralised forest management in Bolivia. Moreover, the confounding and counterfactual factors influence the impact of the policy on the forest condition (Agrawal and Chhatre 2006). The causal factors are identified by applying a mix of methods. The temporal method was applied to analyse the forest management over time. This method was useful for discovering confounding factors. Several scholars underline the importance of investigating what impact confounding factors like size of forest area, resource scarcity and dependency, change in national and international market for timber etc. have on the forest condition (Bowler et al 2011, Agrawal and Chhatre 2006, Behera 2009, Brown and Lassoie 2010, Hayes and Persha 2010). The baseline scenario method was applied, for the comparison of the powers and rights held before and after the implementation of the decentralised forest management. The baseline method is argued to be problematic when seeking to assess the performance of the decentralised forest management based on the informants’ evaluation of the forest condition before and after the implementation (Lund et al 2009). However, the baseline scenario was applied in order to evaluate the policy and the extent of decentralisation of the forest management implemented. This was

100 necessary as several studies find that the impact of decentralised forest management on forest conditions is evaluated without an actual decentralisation taking place (Lund et al 2009; Casse and Milhøj 2011; León et al 2012; Bruce 1999). Besides, the evaluation of the forest condition was not performed applying a perception based method but by comparing the actual outtake of woody biomass compared to the regeneration rate. Applying a mix of methods on the case study allowed for an in-depth analysis of the forest management and permitted an identification of the causal processes significant for the impact of the forest management policy. It was found that the officially stipulated regulations regarding use of forest resources are the main forces causing the unsustainable management. The temporal method enabled an identification of confounding factors and their possible impact on the policy outcome. Applying the baseline scenario, the pre-existing institutional structures and decision- making powers and rights held by the actors were mapped out. This enabled an analysis of changes implemented with the forest policy, reaching the findings that the decentralisation is incomplete.

6.3.3 Incomplete decentralisation

Several scholars argue that the lack of devolved decision-making powers can result in a negative outcome for the forest condition. As the management is regulated by actors placed far away from the forest resources and who are unable to follow the outcome of the forest regulations. These results are backed up by the case study of the Yuracaré people in Bolivia by León et al (2012) who also conclude that although rural communities have obtained secure tenure rights following the decentralisation process, they have not been devolved substantial rights. The study by Andersson and Gibson (2006) concerning the powers devolved to the municipalities in Bolivia also points out that few rights have been devolved. Although the decentralisation of the forest management is found to be incomplete in the case of Bolivia, downward accountability was strong between the forest group and the rest of the community members in the case of 15 de Agosto. This is argued to be the first indicator of the existence of an actual participatory forest management, as local forest user group may further increase transparency and accountability in the management of forest resources (Brown and Lassoie 2010).

PFM is by several scholars argued to be an efficient tool to ensure sustainable management of the forest resources. However, it is underlined that for this to occur the users of the common-property

101 resources needs to be devolved sufficient decision-making powers to ensure that the applied management is sustainable. Schlager and Ostrom (1992) argues that not only owners hold sufficient rights to manage the common-property resource sustainably but that proprietors are also argued to “face incentives that are frequently substantial enough to encourage similar long-term investments.”(Schlager and Ostrom 1992:1). In the case of 15 de Agosto, it is not possible to categorise the position they hold as they, following the implementation of the PGMF, only partially hold the de jure right to manage and alienate. However, the case study still supports the hypothesis presented by Schlager and Ostrom (1992). The decentralisation is incomplete as the decision- making powers and de jure rights are mainly held by government institutions who are not downwardly accountable and the regulations presented do not assure a sustainable management of the forest resources. It is necessary to stress that as this case study does not illustrate a complete decentralisation of the forest management, it is uncertain if a sustainable management of the forest area would have been achieved if the community had held substantial decision-making powers. Although the community historically commercialised timber and the actual amount has not been possible to determine, it is estimated to be less than before the implementation of the PGMF. However, since the implementation of the PGMF, several other factors have changed. These factors may possibly result in an increase of commercialised timber had the community still held the rights to determine the harvest rate. On the other hand, it is not possible to predetermine if the community would assure the regeneration and biodiversity of the forest. This underlines the importance of a context specific approach as different factors can affect the outcome of decentralised forest management.

6.4 Implications on main findings

A number of studies have investigated the impact of the decentralised forest management on forest condition. This study is the first to analyse the extent of the decentralised forest management on a community level in the tropical dry forest Chiquitano in Bolivia, in relation to the impact of the decentralised forest management. In the following, the implications on the findings will be discussed.

It is found that the decentralisation of the forest management to rural communities in Bolivia is incomplete. Moreover, the management regulations presented for the forest area belonging to 15 de Agosto is not sustainable. The management regulations presented in the PGMF have not been 102 adjusted to the forest composition. This is likely to be the case for a large part of the communities implementing the community forest management in the tropical dry forest Chiquitano as the study indicates that the forest needs a harvesting cycle between five to twenty times longer than the minimum harvesting cycles permitted depending on the harvesting rate. These findings underline the value of mixed methods in the identification and understanding of local complexities, which may have been overlooked if only quantitative methods had been applied.

The conclusions have several implications on the forest management of the tropical dry forest Chiquitano in Bolivia. To secure the conservation of the forest, it is recommended that the current management regulations be reviewed. Several possible solutions can help secure the forest composition and biodiversity of the forest. The implications of these solutions will be discussed in the following. When discussing possible solutions, it is necessary to widen the definition of sustainability, as the management should also be profitable for the communities. If not, they lose incentives for complying with the management regulations. One proposal is to only let the community harvest in the area under forest management once. However, this gives them little incentive to conserve the forest, as future use would not be possible. On the other hand, the current management regulations are only valid for 20 years and then the community has to reapply to renew their PGMF. The community is thus not secured a renewal of the current PGMF. Although aware of this limitation, the community is still following the regulations. However, it is uncertain how the community would manage the forest, if they were not allowed to harvest and make profit from the forest resources. The current overharvesting is not a decision made by the community. On the contrary, the current harvesting rate is substantially lower than the official maximum regulations. Another proposal is to adjust the harvesting rates according to each species (see table 20). It would however, mean a great decrease in the harvested volume of several species. Moreover, this would result in a lower profit from the harvesting activities. It is difficult to estimate if this solution would secure a sustainable management of the forest area in regards to the generated income, as it would imply a decrease of more than half of the current volume harvested. Considering this, a third proposal is permitting the harvesting to take place every three years. Currently, the community is behind on their harvesting activities, a situation that is recognised to be a problem in general. By permitting harvesting to take place every three years, the harvesting cycle would be increased to 60 years. Although to secure the biodiversity, this solution would also require individual harvesting rates according to the species and may only result in the harvesting

103 of the species Jichituriqui, Momoqui and Roble as these are the species with a lower regeneration rate. Roble is estimated to be a very valuable species and is one of the species that has been harvested in all the AAAs, whereas Jichituriqui and Momoqui are classified as valuable species and have only been harvested in the last two AAAs. This solution would also lead to a smaller income for the community. The solutions, mentioned above, would all lead to a decrease in profit of the harvesting activities. Although the community 15 de Agosto is not dependent on the income generated from the harvesting activities, it has helped the community to improve the communal services and infrastructure substantially and has thus played an important role in the development of the community. It is therefore recommended to investigate if changes are possible in the current value- chain for the commercial timber, both examining the possible elimination of middlemen to ensure higher income to the community members but also the requirements needed to access, e.g. the European market. Finally, it could be investigated if it is possible to use other tree species or develop income- generating activities based on non-timber products to help ensure a sustainable management of the forest resources.

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7. References

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Appendices

A. Forest inventory data

In the table below, the data analysis of the data collected in the forest inventory performed in the area under forest management for 15 de Agosto is presented.

Table 21 Data analysis for the forest inventory Sample Count of trees Tree Basal area Volume plot DBH>10 abundance /Ha m2/ha m3/ha Species count Species/ha 1 26 366.08 13 167.2 10 36.6 2 35 492.8 20.9 218.2 14 35.2 3 32 450.56 23.2 175.8 21 21.5 4 36 506.88 24.2 285.2 14 36.2 5 36 506.88 22.2 210.2 15 33.8 6 67 943.36 68.4 482.5 23 41 7 35 492.8 28 191.7 11 44.8 8 50 704 20.1 207.9 17 41.4 9 33 464.64 25.5 313.8 15 31 (Compiled by author, Source: forest inventory) The data from sample plot 6 have not been implemented in the final data analysis, as it is evaluated that the GPS have measured the sample plot size wrong.

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B. Comparison of data results from forest inventory and PSP’s

The growth rate used to calculate if the current harvest rate is sustainable is taken from the study by Pawlowski and Mariaca (2007). In the following, the forest composition found in the study area will be compared to the forest composition from the study by Pawlowski and Mariaca (2007). This comparison is necessary to evaluate if it is reasonable to apply the growth rate from the study by Pawlowski and Mariaca (2007) as the growth rate of the harvested species in the study area.

B.1 Description of study by Pawlowski and Mariaca (2007) The study is based on data from eight permanent sampling plots (PSP), installed between 1999 and 2002. The PSPs measures 100x100 meters and are situated on the land of four communities and four ASL (Group of chainsaw operators) in the tropical dry forest Chiquitano in the province of Velasco. The map below demonstrates the location of the permanent sample plots (PSP) from the study by Pawlowski and Mariaca and the field study. The PSPs are named after the community they are located in; San Miguelito, Cruz del Sur, San Juancito, San Antonio and Asociatión Social de Lugar21 AMISAM.

21 Local Social Association 111

Figure 12 Map of the locations of the PSPs and 15 de Agosto

(Source: Google Earth Pro, Pawlowski and Mariaca (2007) and GPS points registered during fieldwork)

PSPs are installed in areas of similar climate and soil. For the study, results were gathered from the PSPs that had been measured at least three times within a four year period. Only trees with a diameter of 10 cm at DBH or higher were measured. (Pawlowski and Mariaca 2007). Table 22 Tree abundance rate Total tree abundance – DBH ≥10 Forest inventory - Trees/ha PSPs - Trees/Ha

Minimum registered in sample plots 366 365 Maximum registered in sample plots 704 535 Average 498 445 (Compiled by author, Source: Pawlowski and Mariaca (2007) and forest inventory)

The tree abundance found in the forest inventory is higher than in the study by Pawlowski and Mariaca (2007). From the table it is also clear that the tree abundance in the tropical dry forest Chiquitano varies a lot. The difference between the tree abundance found in the forest inventory and the PSPs is likely to be due to the heterogeneous composition of the forest, but also due to the small sample size presented in the forest inventory. 112

Table 23 Basal area Basal area – DBH ≥10 Forest inventory - m2/ha PSPs - m2/ha Minimum registered in sample plots 13 20.3 Maximum registered in sample plots 28 21.7

Average 22.2 20.9 (Compiled by author, Source: Pawlowski and Mariaca (2007) and forest inventory)

The study by Pawlowski and Mariaca (2007) demonstrates a very small difference in basal area, compared to the forest inventory. One possible explanation is the use of the GPS to measure the sample plots in the forest inventory. Another explanation could the selection of location for the PSPs, this is not clarified in the study by Pawlowski and Mariaca (2007). It is possible that more accessible areas were selected, resulting in a more similar forest composition.

Table 24 Total volume Total volume – DBH ≥10 Forest inventory - m3/ha PSPs - m3/ha Minimum registered in sample plots 167.2 210 Maximum registered in sample plots 313.8 213.3 Average 221.2 212.1 (Compiled by author, Source: Pawlowski and Mariaca (2007) and forest inventory) The difference in total volume is a follow of the difference already encountered in the basal area.

Table 25 Species composition Species composition – DBH ≥10 Forest inventory - species/ha PSPs - species/ha Minimum registered in sample plots 21.5 20 Maximum registered in sample plots 44.8 27 Average 35.1 23.2 (Compiled by author, Source: Pawlowski and Mariaca (2007) and forest inventory)

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Table 26 Relative abundance Relative PSPs minimum PSPs maximum PSPs average Forest inventory average abundance of - % - % - % - % species Tasaa 24 49 37 11 Curupau 3 23 10 2 Sirari 0 27 5 0.3 Tarara 0 5 5 0 Cuta 0 10 5 0.5 Moradillo 2 10 5 4 Jichituriqui 2 5 4 3 Momoqui 2 5 4 2 Cari-cari 2 6 3 4 Guayabilla 0 15 3 0.2 Toborochi 1 4 3 1 Blanquillo 0 10 3 2 Cusé 1 5 3 13 Tajibo 0 3 2 2 Cuchi 0 5 1 0.9 Espino Blanco 0 2 1 1 Morado 0 4 1 0,5 Roble 0 2 1 0.2 Ajo Ajo 0 3 1 2 Soto 0 2 1 0.3 Gabetillo 0 2 1 1 (Compiled by author, Source: Pawlowski and Mariaca (2007) and forest inventory)

The relative abundance for individual species from the forest inventory have not been calculated because the sample size was too small to present a viable image of the relative abundance. The minimum and maximum relative abundance rate for the PSPs is presented to demonstrate the internal difference. In the study by Pawlowski and Mariaca (2007), the Tasaa is identified as the most abundant species, representing 37% of all the trees found. From the forest inventory, the most abundant species is Cusé with 13%, followed by Tasaa with 11%. However, out of the 21 species compared only four species has a percent point difference of five or higher. Moreover, the difference between the PSPs is greater than the average abundance rate for the forest inventory.

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Table 27 Relative abundance according to the commercial value categories Relative abundance rate of species Relative abundance Relative abundance Percent point difference according to their commercial rate from PSP for forest inventory value DBH ≥10 DBH ≥10 Very valuable species 4% 5% 1 Valuable species 36% 20% 16 Little commercial value 49% 28% 21 Species without commercial value 11% 16% 5 Other 29% Grand Total 100% (Compiled by author, Source: Pawlowski and Mariaca (2007) and forest inventory)

The others category contains the species identified in the area for the forest inventory, that are not included in Pawlowski and Mariaca’s categorisation of the species commercial value. The greatest difference in relative abundance is observed in the species without commercial value with 21 percent points. Followed by the category including the valuable species. The different abundance in value categories between the PSPs and the forest inventory can be because 12 out of the 40 species included in the PSPs were not identified in the forest inventory. The table below presents the species included in the different commercial value categories by Pawlowski and Mariaca (2007), these species are compared to the species identified in the forest inventory.

Table 28 Species included in the PSP and the forest inventory Species identified in forest Commercial species value Species included in PSP results inventory results

Very valuable species Morado x Roble x Tajibo x Valuable species Cuchi x Curupau x Jichituriqui x Manicillo Momoqui x Moradillo x Paqoi Sirari x Soto x

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Tarara x Verdolago x

Little commercial value Coloradillo x Cusé x Cuta x Gabetillo x Guayabilla Limoncillo Naranjillo Pacobillo x Palo blanco Pata de vaca x Pequi Pitón x Quebra machete Tasaá x Tijerita

Species without commercial value Ajo ajo x Bibosi Blanquillo x Cari-cari x Chichapi Cusecillo x Cusesi Espino blanco x Mapajo x Toborochi x Tutumillo x (Compiled by author, Source: Pawlowski and Mariaca (2007) and forest inventory)

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Table 29 Frequency Frequency rate for Frequency rate for commercial value Forest inventory – commercial value Frequency class PSP - no of species classes - % no of species classes - % Rarely present 33 78.6 39 58.2

Seldom present 6 14.3 15 22.4

Often present 1 2.4 7 10.4

Mostly present 1 2.4 5 7.5

Commonly present 1 2.4 1 1.5 (Compiled by author, Source: Pawlowski and Mariaca (2007) and forest inventory)

The table demonstrates that the forest is highly heterogeneous, due to the high number of species rarely present.

117