DOCSLIB.ORG

Karsten Frey, M.A. Am Fürstenweiher 61 69118 Heidelberg

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Karsten Frey, M.A. Am Fürstenweiher 61 69118 Heidelberg Inaugural Dissertation zu Erlangung der Doktorwürde der Fakultät für Wirtschafts und Sozialwissenschaften, Ruprecht-Karls-Universität Heidelberg Elite Perception and Biased Strategic Policy Making: The Case of India’s Nuclear Build-up vorgelegt von Karsten Frey, M.A. Am Fürstenweiher 61 69118 Heidelberg Oktober 2004 ii C O N T E N T 1. Introduction 1 PART I: The Model: Nuclear Weapons and National Interests 7 2. Theory: Balancing Interests 9 2.1. Defending the Old-fashioned 9 2.2. Structural Causes of Nuclear Arms Races 10 2.2.1. Structural Realist Paradigms 10 2.2.2. The Concept of Nuclear Deterrence 12 2.2.3. The Emergence of Nuclear Arms Races 14 2.2.4. Opacity and Transparency in Nuclear Proliferation 15 2.3. Power Politics and the Balance of Interests 17 2.3.1. Power, Security, and Interests 17 2.3.2. Status Change and Reputation of Power 19 2.3.3. Bringing Morgenthau’s ‘Policy of Prestige’ Back In 21 2.3.4. The ‘Neoclassical Realist’ Approach 23 2.4. Foreign Policy and Domestic Government 29 2.4.1. Psychological Factors in Nuclear Policy Formulation 30 2.4.2. The Problem of Public Opinion 31 2.5. Nuclear Arms and the Risk of War 34 3. Model: Elite Perception, National Interests and India’s Nuclear Policy 38 3.1. The South Asian Security Environment 38 3.2. Status Seeking as National Interest 42 3.3. An Explanatory Model to India’s Nuclear Policy Making 44 3.4. Elite Perception and Nuclear Policy Making 47 3.4.1. Who are the Elite? 47 3.4.2. The military-strategists 52 3.4.3. The politico-strategists 53 3.4.4. The scientific-strategists 54 3.5. Psychology and Strategy 55 3.6. Related Explanatory Concepts of India’s Rise as Nuclear Power 58 3.6.1. India as Emerging Power 58 3.6.2. The Concept of India’s Strategic Culture 60 iii 4. Methodology 62 4.1. The Unit of Analysis 62 4.2. The Period of Anaylsis 64 4.3. Explanatory Variables 67 4.4. The Synthesis of Quantitative and Interpretive Methods 70 4.4.1. Methods of Quantitative Analysis 71 4.4.2. Positivist Epistemology and Interpretive Methods 72 5. Elite Perception and India’s Nuclear Course: Tracking Empirical Evidence 76 5.1. India’s Elite: Between Diversity of Opinion and Bomb Lobbying 76 5.2. The Crucial Years: Changing Attitudes on the Bomb 78 5.2.1. Debating Nuclear Issues: Some General Trends 78 5.2.2. Phase I: The Strategic Debate 80 5.2.3. Phase II: The Non-proliferation Debate 81 5.2.4. Phase III: The Determined Debate 82 5.2.5. Phase IV: The Liberated Debate 83 5.3. Towards A “National Consensus” 84 5.4. Findings of the Quantitative Analysis 86 6. The Origins of India’s Nuclear Weapons Programme 88 6.1. Preconditions for India’s Nuclear Development 88 6.1.1. Nuclear Weapons and the Nation-building Process 88 6.1.2. Nehruvian Moralism 90 6.1.3. Development and Security 92 6.1.4. Pre-Independence Developments 96 6.1.5. The National Endeavour 96 6.1.6. Institutional Developments 99 6.1.7. Self-Reliance and International Cooperation 101 6.2. Establishing the Nuclear Weapons Option 103 6.2.1. Nuclear Energy for India’s Development: End of a Myth 103 6.2.2. Institutional and Political Adjustments 105 6.2.3. Creating A Nuclear Weapons Infrastructure 108 6.2.4. Indira Gandhi’s Rise 109 6.2.5. Vikram Sarabhai: Realism not Symbolism 111 6.2.6. The Ritual of Demonstrations 114 6.3. The Period of India’s Nuclear Slow-Down, 1974 – 1979 117 6.3.1. Which Course after Pokhran I? 117 6.3.2. Domestic Turmoil 118 6.4. Developing Nuclear Weapons Capabilities 119 6.4.1. Changing International Patterns 119 6.4.2. Indira Back Again 120 6.4.3. Towards Technological Breakthrough 122 iv 7. Structure and Process of India’s Nuclear Policy Making 125 7.1. Nuclear Authorities 126 7.1.1. Formal Nuclear Decision-Making 126 7.1.2. Institutional Flaws and Imprudent Nuclear Decisions 127 7.1.3. The Post-Brasstacks Debate on Institutional Reforms 129 7.1.4. The Post-Pokhran Institutional Reforms 134 7.1.5. Consolidating Nuclear Command and Control 138 7.2. Nuclear Science 141 7.2.1. Between Science and Politics: The Scientific Establishment 141 7.2.2. Self-Reliance and Indigenous Development 148 7.3. Nuclear Politics 154 7.3.1. Nuclear Weapons and Partisan Politics 154 7.3.2. Pokhran II: Electoral Politics BJP Style? 156 PART II: Nuclear Weapons and India’s Security 161 8. Systemic Proliferation Incentives within the South Asian Region 163 8.1. The Structure of India’s Regional Strategic Environment 163 8.1.1. Pakistan’s Nuclear Threat 164 8.1.2. Chinese Nuclear Threat 167 8.1.3. Pakistan-China Threatening Axis 170 8.1.4. Extra-Regional Nuclear Threats 171 8.2. India’s Strategic Thinkers 172 8.2.1. The Military: Politics of Self-Restraint 172 8.2.2. The Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA) 176 9. The “Diabolic Enemy” Stereotype: Indo-Pakistan Relations 180 9.1. The Roots of Indo-Pakistani Antagonism 180 9.1.1. Regional Balance of Power 180 9.1.2. Introducing the Nuclear Dimension 181 9.2. Indo-Pakistani Nuclear Shadowboxing 184 9.2.1. Getting Down to Brasstacks 184 9.2.2. The Hidden Nuclear Competition 188 9.3. After Pokhran II: Learning to Live with Pakistan’s Bomb 190 9.3.1. Redefining Indo-Pakistani Nuclear Relations 190 9.3.2. From Pokhran to Kargil 195 9.3.3. The Period of Consolidation 197 9.3.4. The Stability-Instability Paradox 199 9.3.5. Pre-Emptive Strike Imperatives 208 10. The China Factor in India’s Strategic Thinking 210 10.1. The Emergence of the Sino-Indian Strategic Relationship 210 10.2. Elite Perception and the Chinese Threat 212 10.2.1. Rajiv’s Policy of Rapprochement 212 10.2.2. The Changing Image of China in the 1990s 213 10.2.3. Redefining Sino-Indian Relations after the Tests 216 10.2.4. Indo-Chinese Relations in the Post-September 11th World 224 v PART III: Beyond Security: Nuclear Weapons and National Prestige 225 11. India’s Self-Image as Emerging Power 229 11.1. Elite Perception, Nuclear Weapons and International Status 229 11.2. The Emerging Debate 230 11.3. From Prestige to Security and Back Again 236 11.4. Axiomatic Arguments 240 11.5. Joining the ‘Nuclear Club’ 245 11.6. India as Emerging Power: Prepared Ground 256 12. The “Colonialist” Stereotype: Indo-US Relations 259 12.1. US Non-Proliferation Pressures and Indian Sensitivities 259 12.2. The USA and the International Non-proliferation Regime 264 12.3. The Strobe Talbott Mission 268 12.4. From Non-proliferation to Test Ban 274 12.5. India-US Relations after the Tests 277 12.6. Paradigm Shift in Indo-US Relations 280 13. The Symbol of “Injustice”: The International Non-Proliferation Regime 291 13.1. The Emergence of the Non-proliferation Debate 291 13.1.1. Restrictions on Civilian Nuclear Technology Transfer 291 13.1.2. Negotiations on the Non-Proliferation Treaty, 1968 293 13.1.3. The Revival of the International Non-proliferation Debate 296 13.2. The Period of Unambiguous Ambiguity 297 13.3. Escalating Rhetoric on the International Non-proliferation Debate 304 13.3.1. The Bomb Lobby and its Challengers 304 13.3.2. Hardliners’ Emerging Dominance 309 13.3.3. Mounting Pressures from the Nuclear Scientific Community 315 13.3.4. Indefinite Extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, 1995 318 13.4. Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty 320 13.5. The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, 1996 324 13.5.1. The Domestic CTBT Debate: Dialogue of the Deaf 325 13.5.2. Creating the CTBT Stalemate 331 13.5.3. The Lonely Moralist: The Geneva Negotiation Process 332 13.5.4. After the CTBT: Cutting the Losses 338 13.5.5. The CTBT Debate in the post-Pokhran Period 340 13.6. Joining the Club and Closing the Door 347 14. Conclusion: Regional Ties and Global Aspirations 351 Appendix A: Note on Methodology 377 Appendix B: List of Cited Newspaper Articles 381 Bibliography 389 vi Tables: Table 4.1.: Phases of India’s Nuclear Development 64 Table 4.2.: Regrouped Variables 69 Table 5.1.: Attitude towards the bomb (issue-wise) 76 Table 6.1.: Chronology of India’s Nuclear Course, 1947 – 1960 98 Table 6.2.: Chronology of India’s Nuclear Course, 1962 – 1974 106 Table 6.3.: Chronology of India’s Nuclear Course, 1980 – 1986 121 Table 7.1.: India’s Scientific Leadership 142 Charts: Chart 2.1.: Patterns of Balancing Interests 28 Chart 3.1.: The ‘Nuclear Subsystem’ 39 Chart 3.2.: Nuclear Weapons and India’s National Interests 45 Chart 3.3.: The Role of India’s Strategic Elite 51 Chart 5.1.: Attitude Scale Time Series Comparison 78 Chart 5.2.: Issue-wise Nuclear Reporting 79 Chart 5.3.: Issue-wise Nuclear Reporting (mid-1986 – mid-1991) 80 Chart 5.4.: Issue-wise Nuclear Reporting (mid-1991 – mid-1996) 81 Chart 5.5.: Issue-wise Nuclear Reporting (mid-1996 – mid-1998) 83 Chart 5.6.: Issue-wise Nuclear Reporting (mid-1998 – mid-2003) 84 Chart 5.7.: Polarisation Index of 11 Variables 86 Chart 7.1.: Frequency of Articles on Domestic Issues (in % of total sample) 125 Chart: 7.2.: Reform Proposal of India’s Security Making Institutions by B.S.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Nishaan – Blue Star-II-2018
    II/2018 NAGAARA Recalling Operation ‘Bluestar’ of 1984 Who, What, How and Why The Dramatis Personae “A scar too deep” “De-classify” ! The Fifth Annual Conference on the Sikh scripture, Guru Granth Sahib, jointly hosted by the Chardi Kalaa Foundation and the San Jose Gurdwara, took place on 19 August 2017 at San Jose in California, USA. One of the largest and arguably most beautiful gurdwaras in North America, the Gurdwara Sahib at San Jose was founded in San Jose, California, USA in 1985 by members of the then-rapidly growing Sikh community in the Santa Clara Valley Back Cover ContentsIssue II/2018 C Travails of Operation Bluestar for the 46 Editorial Sikh Soldier 2 HERE WE GO AGAIN: 34 Years after Operation Bluestar Lt Gen RS Sujlana Dr IJ Singh 49 Bluestar over Patiala 4 Khushwant Singh on Operation Bluestar Mallika Kaur “A Scar too deep” 22 Book Review 1984: Who, What, How and Why Jagmohan Singh 52 Recalling the attack on Muktsar Gurdwara Col (Dr) Dalvinder Singh Grewal 26 First Person Account KD Vasudeva recalls Operation Bluestar 55 “De-classify !” Knowing the extent of UK’s involvement in planning ‘Bluestar’ 58 Reformation of Sikh institutions? PPS Gill 9 Bluestar: the third ghallughara Pritam Singh 61 Closure ! The pain and politics of Bluestar 12 “Punjab was scorched 34 summers Jagtar Singh ago and… the burn still hurts” 34 Hamid Hussain, writes on Operation Bluestar 63 Resolution by The Sikh Forum Kanwar Sandhu and The Dramatis Personae Editorial Director Editorial Office II/2018 Dr IJ Singh D-43, Sujan Singh Park New Delhi 110
    [Show full text]
  • Igcnewsletter
    ISSN 0972-5741 Volume 98 October 2013 IGCNewsletter IN THIS ISSUE Interaction with Eminent Personalities • Interaction with Dr. R. Chidambaram Technical Articles • Kinetics of Extraction of Ruthenium with Tri n-Butyl Phosphate/Dodecane • Effect of External Perturbation Induced Charge Order Melting of Pr0.5Ca0.5MnO3 on YBa2Cu3O7 Thin Film Young Officer’s Forum • Design and Development of Universal Signal Conditioning System for I&C of Future FBRs Young Researcher’s Forum • Development of Computational Intelligence Systems for Parameter Estimation and Event Identification in Fast Breeder Reactors News and Events • Graduation Function of the Seventh Batch of Trainee Scientific Officers of BARC Training School at IGCAR • Summer Training in Physics and Chemistry (STIPAC - 2013) • BITS Practice School Conference/Meeting Highlights • Quality Circle Annual Meet (QCAM) - 2013 Forthcoming Meeting/Conference • Recent Advances in Information Technology (READIT) Visit of Dignitaries Awards & Honours INDIRA GANDHI CENTRE FOR ATOMIC RESEARCH http://www.igcar.gov.in/lis/nl98/igc98.pdf IGC Newsletter From the Editor From the Editor Dear Reader It is my pleasant privilege to forward a copy of the latest issue of IGC Newsletter (Volume 98, October 2013 issue). In this issue we have had the privilege of Dr. R. Chidambaram, Principal Scientific Advisor to the Government of India, Chairman of the Scientific Advisory Committee to the Cabinet and former Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, sharing his experiences with a team of young officers. In the first technical article Shri N.K. Pandey and colleagues have discussed the extraction kinetics of ruthenium with tri n-butyl phosphate/dodecane system. In the second technical article Shri Dipak Kumar Baisnab and colleagues have described the experimental studies of the effect of external perturbation such as substrate induced strain, applied current and magnetic field on Pr0.5Ca0.5MnO3 on YBa2Cu3O7 thin film heterostructures.
    [Show full text]
  • A Thousand Suns: Political Motivations for Nuclear Weapons Testing
    A Thousand Suns: Political Motivations for Nuclear Weapons Testing by Whitney Lyke Raas B.S., Physics (2001) University of California, Los Angeles Submitted to the Department of Political Science in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Masters of Science in Political Science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology September 2006 C 2006 Massachusetts Institute of Technology All rights reserved Signature of Author Department of Political Science August 14, 2006 Certified by , M"A '."'r-,. t , %ff S- HirveySap 4sky Professor of Political Science, Emeritus Thesis Advisor Accepted by Roger Petersen MASSACHUSETTS INST•UTE. Associate Professor of Political Science OF TECHNOLOGY Chairman, Graduate Program Committee SEP 2 12006 ARCHIVES LIBRARIES A Thousand Suns: Political Motivations for Nuclear Weapons Testing by Whitney Lyke Raas Submitted to the Department of Political Science on August 14, 2006 in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Masters of Science in Political Science ABSTRACT Nuclear weapon testing is the final step in the nuclear development process, an announcement of ability and strength. The consequences of a nuclear test are far from easy to bear, however: economic sanctions can be crippling and nuclear capability automatically makes one a nuclear target. Why, then, do states test nuclear weapons? This thesis aims to determine the answer to this question using India as a model. It is well known that India tested nuclear weapons in 1974 and in 1998, but less well known are the near-tests of 1983, 1995, and 1996. This thesis examines the situation in these years and the details of the nuclear decisions based on four hypotheses: technical concerns, security and power, domestic politics, and norms and ideas.
    [Show full text]
  • Report Idea 1
    Science Policy and Security AAAS activities are helping to promote the responsible use of science and technology to improve human well-being. From testimony on technologies for detecting “dirty bomb” components, to a highly regarded fellowship program and gold-standard R&D budget analysis, AAAS seeks to provide objective, authoritative scientific and technological insights to policy-makers. In 2005, AAAS science policy efforts focused on improving innovation, promoting international collaboration, enhancing national security, and more. Innovation and Competitiveness in the United States AAAS urged the President and Congress to take strong steps to sustain American innovation by investing in high-risk, breakthrough research and by improving science education at all levels. “We do not want to put our country and our knowledge-based, technology-driven economy in the position of ‘catch-up,’” wrote Gilbert S. Omenn of the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, then AAAS President, in a 9 December letter to U.S. President George W. Bush. Meanwhile, AAAS Chairman of the Board Shirley Ann Jackson contributed to the National Academies’ report, Rising Above the Gathering Storm, and worked with the Council on Competitiveness Innovation Initiative. Those efforts culminated with the National Summit on Competitiveness, hosted by the U.S. Department of Commerce in conjunction with other Cabinet-level departments and business organizations. As president of Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, Jackson also wrote to President Bush, warning that “our science and technology position is a looming national crisis because it robs us of our capacity for innovation.” President Bush subsequently released his American Competitiveness Initiative, which proposes broad investment in research and development, education, entrepreneurship, and innovation.
    [Show full text]
  • Indian Strategic Doctrinal Transformation: Trends and Trajectory Summar Iqbal Babar, Muhammad Nadeem Mirza
    Indian Strategic Doctrinal Transformation: Trends and Trajectory Summar Iqbal Babar, Muhammad Nadeem Mirza To cite this version: Summar Iqbal Babar, Muhammad Nadeem Mirza. Indian Strategic Doctrinal Transformation: Trends and Trajectory. Journal of Security and Strategic Analyses, Strategic Vision Institute Islamabad, 2021, 6 (2), pp.79-100. halshs-03161526 HAL Id: halshs-03161526 https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-03161526 Submitted on 7 Mar 2021 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents entific research documents, whether they are pub- scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, lished or not. The documents may come from émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de teaching and research institutions in France or recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires abroad, or from public or private research centers. publics ou privés. Indian Strategic Doctrinal Transformation: Trends and Trajectory Indian Strategic Doctrinal Transformation: Trends and Trajectory Dr. Summar Iqbal Babar and Dr. Muhammad Nadeem Mirza1 Abstract From being one of the biggest proponents of non- alignment to becoming a state aspiring to be a regional hegemon, India has gone through a huge doctrinal transformation in its strategic thinking. This paper addresses evolution of this transformation while detailing major military doctrines such as Nehru doctrine, Sunderji doctrine, Cold-Start doctrine, Indian Maritime doctrine, Indian Land Warfare doctrine, and Indian Joint Armed Forces doctrine. This continuous doctrinal transformation aims at seeking a more synchronized modernization of the military, creating synergy to fill operational gaps and enhance agility for swift manoeuvrability under a nuclear overhang.
    [Show full text]
  • Winners of Awards and Medals, and Memorial Lecturers Iim Honors
    WINNERS OF AWARDS AND MEDALS, AND MEMORIAL LECTURERS IIM HONORS HONORARY MEMBERS Purpose Eligibility For distinguished services to IIM Membership is not mandatory the Metallurgical Industry, / No posthumous selection. Research, Education & to The (Total number of Living Honorary Indian Institute of Metals Members not to exceed 100) Out of the HONORARY MEMBERS elected so far, 42 are deceased. Living: 75 1 1949 Late Jehangir J. Ghandy 76 2003 Late P Ramachandra Rao 2 1952 Late G.C. Mitter 77 2004 Dr. S. K. Bhattacharyya 3 1954 Late P.H. Kutar 78 2004 Prof. Subra Suresh 4 1956 Late K.S. Krishnan 79 2005 Dr T K Mukherjee 5 1958 Late M.S. Thacker 80 2005 Prof Hem Shanker Ray 6 1960 Late G.K. Ogale 81 2005 Late K P Abraham 7 1961 Late S.K. Nanavati 82 2005 Dr Sanak Mishra 8 1963 Late K.H. Morley 83 2006 Dr. Baldev Raj 9 1965 Late Dara P. Antia 84 2006 Prof. Akihisa Inoue 10 1966 Late Morris Cohen 85 2006 Dr. C. K. Gupta 11 1967 Late B.R. Nijhawan 86 2006 Dr. R. A. Mashelkar 12 1972 Late J.R.D. Tata 87 2006 Late V R Subramanian 13 1973 Late Brahm Prakash 88 2007 Shri B. Muthuraman 14 1973 Late C.S. Smith 89 2007 Prof. Thaddeus B. Massalski 15 1973 Late B. Chalmers 90 2007 Prof. Subhash Mahajan 16 1974 Late Dr. M.N. Dastur 91 2007 Dr. Rajagopala Chidambaram 17 1975 Late P. Anant 92 2007 Shri Baba N. Kalyani 18 1976 Late F.A.A.
    [Show full text]
  • Pakistani Nuclear Doctrine and the Dangers of Strategic Myopia
    PAKISTANI NUCLEAR DOCTRINE AND THE DANGERS OF STRATEGIC MYOPIA Timothy D. Hoyt The formal introduction of nuclear weapons into South Asian regional security raises important questions about the stability of the region. As two traditionally hostile states induct nuclear weapons and so- phisticated delivery systems into their militaries, what will keep them from utilizing these new weapons for coercion or warfare? Proliferation “opti- mists” argue that states will be deterred from destabilizing actions by the inherent mismatch in costs and benefits or risks and potential gains from challenging a nuclear-armed adversary.1 Proliferation “pessimists” point to the dangers of the spread of nuclear weapons; the myriad of things that can go wrong once nuclear weapons are introduced into an already heated con- flict situation; and the lack of careful thought and planning that might go into the development, deployment, and use of nuclear forces.2 Timothy D. Hoyt is Visiting Assistant Professor for the Security Stud- ies Program, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C., and Professor of Strategy in the College of Continuing Education, a nonresident program of the U.S. Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island. The conclusions expressed here are the author’s own and do not reflect the opin- ions of the Naval War College or any other official organization. Asian Survey, 41:6, pp. 956–977. ISSN: 0004–4687 Ó 2001 by The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. Send Requests for Permission to Reprint to: Rights and Permissions, University of California Press, Journals Division, 2000 Center St., Ste. 303, Berkeley, CA 94704–1223.
    [Show full text]
  • The Newspaper of SRMIST
    The Newspaper of SRMIST For private circulation only Volume 13 Number 1 The Founder Chancellor flanked by the Vice Chancellor (left) and Pro Vice Chancellor (Right) on the announcement of 300 Scholarships The Founder Chancellor Presenting a memento to Mr.N.Gopalaswami, former Chief Election Commissioner 2 2019 | Spectrum | Volume 13 Number 1 Photo taken during “Train the Trainer” program “Train the Trainer” STAFF WRITER 1 To train the students/faculty Management team of EY in selected Mr E.V. Abhishek Anand the intern etc., where around l30 on the subject by name the areas of US Taxation for a final year MBA student of lnterns-from various colleges With the expanding role of “International Taxation and Individuals, US Taxation for SRM School of Management, all around India including business globally, Faculty of Technology” Partnership firms, US Taxation SRM Institute of Science and leading B Schools like IIMs Management, SRM Institute of for Corporate and Transfer Technology, Kattankulathur 2 To hire the students for Summer took part in the race, and where Pricing during the academic as a “SELECT INTERN” for Science and Technology (formerly Internship with a stipend of E.V. Abhishek Anand got the year 2018-19 for a period of the fiscal year 2019 to attend known as SRM University) ` 20,000 per month opportunity and brought laurels provides a platform for the 10 days in their EY office at the EY’s annual International to SRM School of Management, students and the companies by 3 To hire the students for Bengaluru. Leadership Conference along SRM Institute of Science and permanent role in EY Global with 9 other interns from India signing mutually beneficial MoUs Also 8 out of 18 final year Technology, Kattankulathur.
    [Show full text]
  • 1 Minutes of the Meeting of the Executive Council Held on Saturday
    1 MINUTES OF THE MEETING OF THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL HELD ON SATURDAY, THE 3rd NOVEMBER, 2012 AT 2.00 P.M. IN THE COUNCIL ROOM, UNIVERSITY OF DELHI DELHI-110007 No. 5 PRESENT 1. Prof. Dinesh Singh Vice-Chancellor - Chairman 2. Prof. Vivek Suneja Pro-Vice-Chancellor 3. Prof. Sudhish Pachauri Dean of Colleges 4. Prof. Umesh Rai Director, UDSC 5. Dr. Savita M. Dutta Director, C.O.L. 6. Prof. Satwanti Kapoor Proctor 7. Mr. Anurag Shokeen 8. Dr. Deepak Malhotra 9. Mr. Javid Chowdhury 10. Prof. Prabhjot S. Kulkarni 11. Dr. K.S. Bhati 12. Mr. Rajib Ray 13. Prof. S.C. Bhatla 14. Dr. Satender Kumar Joshi 15. Dr. Shiba C. Panda 16. Mr. V.K. Misra 17. Prof. Upreet Dhaliwal SPECIAL INVITEES 1. Prof. Ajay Kumar 2. Prof. J.M. Khurana 3. Prof. Kamala Sankaran 2 4. Sh. R.N. Vashistha 5. Sh. Sanjay Jha 6. Mr. Z.V.S. Prasad Ms. Alka Sharma, Registrar - Secretary WELCOME 34/ At the outset, the Council welcomed the following who had become member of the Executive Council: 1. Prof. Satish Deshpande, Dean, Faculty of Social Sciences 2. Prof. Upreet Dhaliwal , Dean, Faculty Homoeopathy 3. Sh. Vinod Kumar Misra, Visitor’s Nominee 4. Sh. Naveen Chawla, Visitor’s Nominee 5. Sh. Z.V.S. Prasad, Special Invitee APPRECIATION 35/ The Council placed on record its deep sense of gratitude and appreciation for the services rendered by the following during their tenure as member of the Executive Council: 1. Prof. I. Usha Rao, Proctor 2. Prof. H.S. Prasad, Dean, Faculty of Arts 3.
    [Show full text]
  • Date of AGM(DD-MON-YYYY) 09-AUG-2018
    Note: This sheet is applicable for uploading the particulars related to the unclaimed and unpaid amount pending with company. Make sure that the details are in accordance with the information already provided in e-form IEPF-2 CIN/BCIN L24110MH1956PLC010806 Prefill Company/Bank Name CLARIANT CHEMICALS (INDIA) LIMITED Date Of AGM(DD-MON-YYYY) 09-AUG-2018 Sum of unpaid and unclaimed dividend 3803100.00 Sum of interest on matured debentures 0.00 Sum of matured deposit 0.00 Sum of interest on matured deposit 0.00 Sum of matured debentures 0.00 Sum of interest on application money due for refund 0.00 Sum of application money due for refund 0.00 Redemption amount of preference shares 0.00 Sales proceed for fractional shares 0.00 Validate Clear Proposed Date of Investor First Investor Middle Investor Last Father/Husband Father/Husband Father/Husband Last DP Id-Client Id- Amount Address Country State District Pin Code Folio Number Investment Type transfer to IEPF Name Name Name First Name Middle Name Name Account Number transferred (DD-MON-YYYY) THOLUR P O PARAPPUR DIST CLAR000000000A00 Amount for unclaimed and A J DANIEL AJJOHN INDIA Kerala 680552 5932.50 02-Oct-2019 TRICHUR KERALA TRICHUR 3572 unpaid dividend INDAS SECURITIES LIMITED 101 CLAR000000000A00 Amount for unclaimed and A J SEBASTIAN AVJOSEPH PIONEER TOWERS MARINE DRIVE INDIA Kerala 682031 192.50 02-Oct-2019 3813 unpaid dividend COCHIN ERNAKULAM RAMACHANDRA 23/10 GANGADHARA CHETTY CLAR000000000A00 Amount for unclaimed and A K ACCHANNA INDIA Karnataka 560042 3500.00 02-Oct-2019 PRABHU
    [Show full text]
  • India's Strategic Thinking and Its National Security Policy
    INDIA’S STRATEGIC THINKING AND ITS NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY A. Z. Hilali The collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War created grave problems for India’s foreign policy. New Delhi no longer enjoys the protection of the Soviet veto in the U.N. Security Council; the new Russian state no longer willingly acts as the guardian of India’s inter- ests in international forums; and Moscow is no longer able to provide soft- currency military equipment deals. This dramatic and rapid shift in the stra- tegic realm provides unprecedented opportunities for India to reassess its in- ternational orientation and maneuver itself into a dominant regional position, beyond the narrow geopolitical confines of the old East-West division, so as to realize fully its economic, cultural, and military potential. Thus, with the emergence of a unipolar world, India is less idealistic, moralistic, and doctri- naire than it was in the years when Jawaharlal Nehru dominated Indian for- eign policy. Although fundamentally the character of India’s nonalignment policy has not changed, pragmatically the country’s policy toward the West is more open and soft as compared to the Cold War period. New Delhi is beginning to come to terms with the new realities of a world in which “non-alignment” has lost meaning. The main challenges for Indian diplomats and policy mak- ers facing the post-Cold War world with its changing security environment are the need to (1) build a strong economic base capable of sustaining the country’s military growth and (2) maintain a higher diplomatic profile.
    [Show full text]
  • Indian Strategic Doctrinal Transformation: Trends and Trajectory Indian Strategic Doctrinal Transformation: Trends and Trajectory
    Indian Strategic Doctrinal Transformation: Trends and Trajectory Indian Strategic Doctrinal Transformation: Trends and Trajectory Dr. Summar Iqbal Babar and Dr. Muhammad Nadeem Mirza1 Abstract From being one of the biggest proponents of non- alignment to becoming a state aspiring to be a regional hegemon, India has gone through a huge doctrinal transformation in its strategic thinking. This paper addresses evolution of this transformation while detailing major military doctrines such as Nehru doctrine, Sunderji doctrine, Cold-Start doctrine, Indian Maritime doctrine, Indian Land Warfare doctrine, and Indian Joint Armed Forces doctrine. This continuous doctrinal transformation aims at seeking a more synchronized modernization of the military, creating synergy to fill operational gaps and enhance agility for swift manoeuvrability under a nuclear overhang. The study concludes that under the present BJP government, Nehruvian influence over Indian strategic thought has reduced significantly and therefore ultimately led to the design and adaptation of more hawkish strategies – such as Land-Warfare Doctrine 2018, hybrid warfare, surgical strike stratagem – which are contrary to the behaviour of a responsible nuclear- weapon state. 1 Dr Summar Iqbal Babar is a Lecturer at School of Politics and International Relations, Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad. Dr. Muhammad Nadeem Mirza is Assistant Professor at School of Politics and International Relations, Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad. 79 JSSA, Vol. VI, No. 2 Dr. Summar Iqbal Babar & Dr. Muhammad Nadeem Mirza Key Words: Land Warfare, Maritime, Nuclear, Surgical strike, Cold- Start Doctrine, BJP. Introduction Coupled with massive military modernization, the Indian strategic outlook has undergone a rapid transformation with the ultimate objective to alter the power equation in South Asia.
    [Show full text]