Vol. 4, no. 2 2013 PRISM Vol. 4, no. 2 2013
A journal OF THE CENTER FOR COMPLEX OPERATIONS PRISM ABOUT PRISM is published by the Center for Complex Operations. PRISM is a security studies Editor journal chartered to inform members of U.S. Federal agencies, allies, and other partners Michael Miklaucic on complex and integrated national security operations; reconstruction and state-building; relevant policy and strategy; lessons learned; and developments in training and education Associate Editors to transform America’s security and development Mark D. Ducasse Stefano Santamato
Copy Editors COMMUNICATIONS Dale Erikson Sara Thannhauser Constructive comments and contributions are important to us. Direct communications to: Nathan White Editor, PRISM Advisory Board 260 Fifth Avenue (Building 64, Room 3605) Dr. Gordon Adams Fort Lesley J. McNair Washington, DC 20319 Dr. Pauline H. Baker Ambassador Rick Barton Telephone: Professor Alain Bauer (202) 685-3442 Dr. Joseph J. Collins (ex officio) FAX: Ambassador James F. Dobbins (202) 685-3581 Ambassador John E. Herbst (ex officio) Email: [email protected] Dr. David Kilcullen Ambassador Jacques Paul Klein CONTRIBUTIONS Dr. Roger B. Myerson Dr. Moisés Naím PRISM welcomes submission of scholarly, independent research from security policymakers MG William L. Nash, USA (Ret.) and shapers, security analysts, academic specialists, and civilians from the United Ambassador Thomas R. Pickering States and abroad. Submit articles for consideration to the address above or by email to Dr. William Reno [email protected] with “Attention Submissions Editor” in the subject line. LtGen John F. Sattler, USMC (Ret.) Dr. James A. Schear This is the authoritative, official U.S. Department of Defense edition of PRISM. Any Dr. Joanna Spear copyrighted portions of this journal may not be reproduced or extracted without permission Dr. Ruth Wedgwood of the copyright proprietors. PRISM should be acknowledged whenever material is quoted from or based on its content.
The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are those of the contributors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any other agency of the Federal Government.
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www.ndu.edu/press UN Photo/Lason Foounten
Girls wave and flash victory signs at passing helicopter during a military parade in the western city of Zawiya, Libya, held to mark the anniversary of an uprising last year that cleared the way for the anti-Qadhafi forces’ march on Tripoli. The Arab Spring: Safeguarding U.S. Interests for the Long-Term
By James A. Larocco and William L. Goodyear
he “Arab Springs” that are underway throughout the region share some common features, including the yearning and visible desires for a variety of “Freedoms From”: freedom from T the oppression of dictators and their stooges, freedom from economic exploitation, and freedom from censorship, to name a few. At the same time, these countries have not even begun the national dialogue on what they want “Freedom For.” Do the peoples of this region want democratic competition or the replacement of one oligarchy for another, market or statist economies, full freedom of expression, or limited national and individual discourse? In our view, as the United States looks at the region, we need to acknowledge several realities:
■■ The transitions taking place in the region may well last decades, not simply years; ■■ Each country will choose its own path; ■■ The United States and other nations can shape that path, but only through a carefully calibrated set of policies and programs, recognizing that the nations in transition will ultimately assert sover- eignty over their own futures; ■■ The stakes for the United States and its allies are high: while “success” may not provide all the U.S. wants, “failure” would have significant negative long-term consequences for U.S. interests, including vital security interests; ■■ These transitions are indeed historic, and as such, provide an historic opportunity for the U.S. to shape a new Middle East; ■■ While U.S. economic opportunities for the future may lie in East and South Asia, threats to the U.S. national security interests will continue, if not increase, in the MENA (Middle East and
Ambassador James A. Larocco is Director of National Defense University’s Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies (NESA). Mr. William L. Goodyear is a research associate at NESA.
PRISM 4, no. 2 Features | 3 LAROCCO and GOODYEAR
countries under transition have been Part I: The Arab Springs in History encouraged by the $770 million regional fund Assessments of the “Arab Spring” by Western scholars and commentators have been extremely North Africa) region. As attractive as pivoting divided. Optimists have predicted a paradigm to Asia/Pacific may be, the U.S. must keep a shift in which overthrown dictators will be sharp focus on the MENA region for many replaced over time throughout the region by rep- years to come. resentative democracies that guarantee human rights. At the other extreme, some argue that these As a new administration takes office, a reset movements signal the rise of Islamists bent on of the U.S. approach to the MENA region is in establishing societies and polities in strict compli- order. The first step is to reaffirm the values that ance with Sharia law, with minorities and women will guide our policy toward the region, with a in particular losing their rights and freedoms. clear restatement of those values publicly and Two years on, we have found that nearly privately to both new and older leaders in the all the early predictions – both optimistic and region. The second step is to complete a coun- pessimistic – have missed the mark. The failure try-by-country comprehensive analysis of its of Western academics, scholars, and commenta- strategic interest to the U.S., its trajectory toward tors to accurately understand these movements success or failure, and the ability to effect positive can be partly attributed to a desire among these change that prevents failure and preserves and scholars to see the Arab Spring as a repudiation preferably enhances U.S. interests. The third step of the notion of Arab exceptionalism; rather, in is to develop those policies and programs that their view it proved that Arabs aspire to the same will best ensure that failure is avoided and U.S. democratic values and institutions as the West. interests are preserved and sustained. The fourth Yet, in order to truly understand what hap- step is to have a full, straightforward dialogue on pened in the Arab world from the end of 2010 and the short and long-term values, policies, strategies continuing until today, one must look back to the and programs with Congress and with regional history of the development of nation-states in the leaders. Unless this program achieves buy-in by region since the fall of the Ottoman Empire. both, it cannot be sustained. The lessons of history teach us that through- Countries under transition have been out the past century, Arab states have suffered encouraged by the $770 million regional fund from a fundamental absence of legitimacy. proposed by the last administration and still Simply put, the peoples of this region will under debate in the Congress. That fund should not accept states that do not conform to their be approved, reaffirming the United States’ com- national desires and aspirations. mitment to shaping a path toward success for The Arab Spring is only the most recent the MENA nations in transition. At the same example of the consequences of this “legitimacy time, how these funds and bilateral programs gap.” It demonstrates that approaches to the are developed should be guided by the approach region that are not tailored bilaterally and do outlined above. Thinking regionally, while act- not fully take into account the specific political ing bilaterally will best serve U.S. interests in cultures of each country, as well as the region at the long run. large, are destined to fail.
4 | Features PRISM 4, no. 2 THE ARAB SPRING AND U.S. INTERESTS NATO Review NATO Tahrir Square in Egypt
The End of Empire and the Rise of Arabism were ruled felt a progressively weaker connection 1922 marked the end of the over 600-year reign to those in power. The Hashemites, who led the of the Ottoman Empire. Long before that point, Arab Revolt against the Turks in order to re-es- elites throughout the empire had criticized the tablish the caliphate in the wake of CUP reforms, Ottoman caliphate as “backwards” and a source would eventually exploit this gap.2 of weakness vis-à-vis European powers. Yet, the Meanwhile, the same ideological forces that Tanzimat reforms intended to transform the had inspired other nationalist movements around empire into a modern state that these elites insti- the world at this time had already been operat- tuted had the effect of alienating the diverse pop- ing throughout the Arab world. Arab thinkers, ulations that it governed by disrupting long-es- both Christian and Muslim, had posited their tablished social and economic practices. This own unique national identity based on the Arabic alienation grew at the beginning of the 20th cen- language and a shared history that deemphasized tury when the Young Turks, under the Committee religious differences prior to the Arab Revolt. of Union and Progress (CUP), instituted even The dissolution of the Ottoman Empire more extreme reforms that recast the empire as became an opportunity for Arab nationalists a primarily Turkish national state. These reforms to take a more prominent role in determining had the effect of eroding the legitimacy of the the political future of the region. Though Arab empire as the state began to disregard the cultural nationalists, like Saad Zaghlul in Egypt, were and religious norms that had defined the relation- largely suppressed in the colonial period follow- ship between rulers and ruled in the region for ing World War I and lasting until after World War centuries.1 The result was a growing gap between II, the ideology of Arab nationalism successfully the state and its subjects, one in which those who spread throughout the region.
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The desire for a unity of the Arab umma that in the Arab world were forced to either abandon reflected the character of the Arab population the policies they had developed based on these motivated a number of different political and ideologies (as in the case of Sadat’s Egypt) or to anti-colonial resistance movements. These move- use increasingly repressive measures to enforce ments found their most prominent manifesta- them (as in Ba’thist Syria and Iraq). tions in the governments of Gamal Abd al-Nasser As these states lost the popular mandate to and the Ba’thist regimes in Syria and Iraq. govern, they often turned to more authoritarian While vastly differing on a number of measures to maintain their grasp on power. In important issues, Nasserist Egypt and Ba’thist many cases opposition parties were banned from Syria and Iraq shared some common ideological participating in the political process and dem- underpinnings. Most important among these was ocratic institutions were simply used to rubber the commitment to the pan-Arab ideal (a single stamp decisions made by de facto dictators. Arab nation-state) and to implementing socialist By the 1990s, whatever elements of civil-so- economic policies. Indeed, the most successful ciety that had existed in many Arab states was political movements in the Arab world during the completely suppressed in favor of an elaborate middle of the 20th century included some form of security apparatus designed to protect the state these two themes among their ideological pillars. and enforce the rule of law. Ultimately, however, the pan-Arabist movement After the failure of radical leftist opposition was unable to achieve its lofty goals. forces to affect change in the 1980s, the only The brief experiment of the United Arab credible opposition to increasingly authoritarian Republic demonstrated the practical difficulties regimes came from Islamists who had became behind actually putting Arab nationalism into energized, among other things, by the 1979 practice. Arab nationalists had to contend with the Islamic Revolution in Iran. growth of other national identities that built upon Islamists generally took one of two the histories of specific parts of the Arab world. approaches to their opposition to the new Yet, even more importantly, Arab national- security state. The first was to engage in vio- ists failed to adequately improve the livelihoods lent resistance to the regimes they operated of the majority of their citizens. Rather than under. Groups such as al-Jama’at al-Islamiyyah instituting a new form of egalitarian politics and conducted a wide-ranging campaign of terror economics, Arab nationalist leaders simply sub- designed to overthrow these governments and stituted themselves for the Ottoman and colonial institute Sharia law. class of elites. The disparity between wealthy and The other approach Islamist groups took was poor continued to grow, once again undermining to work through volunteer organizations within the legitimacy of the state. the existing system to build social mobilization networks. The Muslim Brotherhood was among The Security State and Islamism the most prominent of these groups. The 1970s and 1980s marked another era of tran- Through networks of hospital, schools, and sition for the region. The waning of Soviet power charity organizations, the Muslim Brotherhood and influence and the repeated failures ofA rab and similar groups throughout the region were states to effectively unify did much to discredit able to generate massive popular support and the Arab Nationalist/Socialist ideology. Leaders goodwill. Their activities were designed to
6 | Features PRISM 4, no. 2 THE ARAB SPRING AND U.S. INTERESTS demonstrate the relevance of Islam to contem- Indeed, in answering the question of what porary social, economic, and political conditions the Arab world wants “Freedom For,” it seems as and provided an obvious counterbalance to the though no single answer will be sufficient. What inadequacies of the authoritarian regimes they is clear, however, is that the ideological pillars operated under. Furthermore, attempts to sup- of Islamism, nationalism and state responsibil- press these organizations seemed to only increase ity for the economy will define the political and their followings. As became evident in the after- economic parameters of the region. math of the Arab Spring, by the beginning of the That is to say, in order for states to obtain a second decade of the 21st century these groups popular mandate to rule they will have to employ were by far the largest and most well organized elements of each of these ideologies. The inher- political groups in the region. ent diversity of the populations of the various states of the Arab world means that each state The Arab Spring and State-Society will interact with these ideologies in ways that are Relationship in the Arab World both connected and radically different. If one imagines that the Arab Spring marked the As these ideologies increasingly shape the beginning of a new era of state-society relation- direction of each country’s domestic and foreign ships in the Arab World one could reasonably ask: policies, it will become very clear that the most What is the ideological basis for that relationship? effective way for the United States or any other While the peoples of the Arab World cer- country to deal with region is to “think regionally tainly demonstrated in the Arab Spring what they but act bilaterally.” wanted “Freedom From” (oppression, authoritar- Part II: Thinking Regionally, ianism, and corruption), it is not at all clear what Acting Bilaterally they want “Freedom For”. Islamists were able to sweep into power What does it mean to think regionally, but act in Egypt and Tunisia following the downfall of bilaterally? On an operational level, it means authoritarian regimes there, but this was due as using coordinated bilateral agreements and rela- much to their high degree of organization and tionships to achieve regional goals and objec- experience in social mobilization as it was to any tives. Putting this into practice, however, is more popular mandate to rule. difficult than it sounds. The region is entering a Meanwhile, the disorganized and fractured long and difficult period of transition whose end- secular political groups – key in the downfall of state is nearly impossible to predict. Defining these regimes – were unable to contend strongly regional goals and objectives at this early stage in elections. of the transition is almost certainly a futile effort. All this indicates that the messages of these The United States must remain committed to parties were not nearly as important as the vehi- promoting the values of democracy, human cles used for disseminating it. That a secular and rights and free market economics. nationalist government was elected into power That said, we need to remove the blinders in Libya only strengthens this theory. Islamists from our eyes. While we Americans view democ- under Gaddafi had never been allowed to orga- racy and all this entails as a value, a goal as well as nize locally or nationally and were unable to a process, there are many in the Arab Spring who unite effectively. view democracy simply as a process to achieve
PRISM 4, no. 2 Features | 7 LAROCCO and GOODYEAR goals and put in place values that are inconsis- Key strategic interests and equities are those tent, if not diametrically opposed, to our concept things that, if compromised, would constitute of what democracy means. an absolute failure of U.S. foreign policy in the Hamas in Gaza is a vivid example of this. region. They are the things that the U.S. would Just six months after coming to power in Gaza via be willing to take serious and significant actions, what were judged largely free and fair democratic even going to war, to defend. It is important for elections, Hamas leaders staged a successful coup the United States to clearly articulate these inter- to seize the reins of power. There are those in the ests so that it can craft an approach to the region Arab Spring countries who have secured seats in that allows it to act bilaterally to promote our parliaments and assemblies through democratic fundamental values, but without risking our key elections who are crystal clear as to their un- and strategic equities. Doing so will also help our anti-democratic values and goals, while there regional allies pursue courses of action that ben- are others who have yet to demonstrate their efit our shared interests. commitment to democratic values such as equal Matrix of Key U.S. Strategic rights for all, including women and minorities. Interests in the Region The United States will have to walk a tricky path to maintain its influence in the region, pro- In few regions throughout the world are U.S. mote our fundamental values while also tailoring interests more intertwined and interconnected policies and programs to deal with each country’s than they are in the Middle East. Depicted below specific state of transition. There is no short cut or is a “matrix” of what we believe to be the United template and no real historical parallel. We must States’ most important strategic interests in the do the hard work of shaping new approaches to Middle East. The matrix demonstrates the hier- each of these countries. archy that exists among U.S. strategic interests as A practical way of thinking regionally and well as the reality of their contingency upon each acting bilaterally in the Middle East during this other. While it may be impossible to define “suc- period of transition calls for the United States to cess” for our strategies and policies for the Arab first clearly define and articulate our key strategic Spring, being unable to secure any one of these interests and equities in the region. interests would almost certainly spell failure. In all our travels throughout the region, we repeatedly hear a common complaint: “We Energy Security. Today, the growth of the world are not sure what U.S. policy and priorities are. economy is heavily dependent upon the It seems to change from day to day. It’s human availability of cheap and plentiful energy, most rights one day, basing rights another. It’s eco- especially in the form of oil and natural gas. Oil nomic transparency one day, preferences for alone accounts for 33% of total world energy American investment and exports the next. We consumption while natural gas takes up another therefore find it difficult to shape our own pol- 24%.3 Yet, that 57% does not even begin to tell icy to develop the kind of productive relation- the full story of how crucial petroleum is to the ship we must have: one that respects our sov- United States and global economies. ereignty, identity and interests while achieving We believe it is fair to assert that with the fall common ground with the United States’ goals of the Soviet Union and communist ideology, the and objectives.” most prominent existential threat to the U.S. is
8 | Features PRISM 4, no. 2 THE ARAB SPRING AND U.S. INTERESTS
Diagram A plentiful energy for the global market for the foreseeable future. The U.S. has historically done 1. Energy this either by producing that energy for global Security consumption, or by working with foreign gov- ernments to make energy sources available and keep world prices at a level that does not harm 5. Maintaining 2. Freedom Israeli of economic growth. Security Navigation US Strategic Interests these countries must remain free from foreign interference and domestic unrest
4. Counter 3. Non- Violent Proliferation While the United States is certainly work- Extremism ing to develop new technologies and sources of energy that will minimize its dependence on oil, the fact remains that until a substitute for oil the availability of energy in adequate, continuous is found it will continue to be one of the most and sustained volumes at affordable prices. important strategic resources on the planet. Petroleum products, and particularly oil, No other region is more crucial to providing have unique features that make them indispens- for the world’s energy needs than the Middle East. able to world use. The fact remains that there The region is home to 48% of total world proven is no single product that can provide the same oil reserves. Additionally, vast fields of natural amount of energy that oil does while also being gas are present throughout the Gulf (approxi- as easily transported and converted into as many mately 16% of world reserves) and others have essential products (gasoline, plastics, fertilizers, recently been found in the Mediterranean.6 For etc.). To measure the true importance of oil to the United States to meet its other foreign policy the economy, it is generally estimated that a sus- commitments, support its allies and promote tained increase of $10 per barrel to the price of strong global economic growth, it is absolutely oil will shave 0.2% off the global economy in the crucial that these energy sources remain available following year – this for an economy that only to the world market. grows by around 3.5% a year in good times.4 Ensuring the availability of these energy Still, the economic dimension to energy sources to world markets means that certain key security is only part of the story. Oil is a military conditions in the region will have to be main- strategic necessity of the highest order. In 2010 tained. Firstly, countries with crucial energy alone, the U.S. military consumed 5 billion gal- reserves will have to be secure and stable. These lons of fuel in military operations – making it the countries must remain free from foreign inter- world’s single largest consumer of petroleum.5 ference and domestic unrest. The best way to Military leaders understand that demand ensure this is by promoting regional economic for oil will only increase in the coming years. growth and integration while also combating Thus, the United States will remain commit- destabilizing forces like terrorism and nuclear ted to ensuring the availability of cheap and proliferation. If the security of these countries
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China, India and other developing countries of this trade is only likely to grow in the upcom- demand lifestyles more similar to the United ing years as the global economy becomes more States and Europe and more integrated pushing people in China, India and other developing countries to demand lifestyles more similar to those of their counter- is not maintained, then access to their energy parts in the United States and Europe. reserves will be nearly impossible. Freedom of navigation is also a key aspect Secondly, the sea-lanes and passageways that of U.S. global military strategy. In order to pro- these energy sources pass through to reach global mote global stability and security, the United markets must remain safe and open. The U.S. States must be able to maintain a military pres- Energy Information Administration has identi- ence throughout the world. This presence is not fied six key “choke points” at which significant possible if countries do not respect the right of quantities of world oil pass each year. Three of innocent passage of foreign warships through these choke points are in the Arab world – with territorial waters. This right is so crucial to U.S. almost 20% of global oil traded each year passing foreign policy interests that in 2011 alone, the through the Strait of Hormuz alone.7 The closing U.S. Navy conducted operational assertions of of any one of these choke points would have a freedom of navigation in 14 different countries, drastic effect on the price of oil and could leave often on more than one occasion. Indeed, with- key U.S. allies in Europe and Asia without the out this right, it is clear that it would be nearly oil supplies they need to keep their economies impossible for the United States to achieve its in working order. other strategic objectives, such as non-prolifera- tion and countering violent extremism. Freedom of Navigation. While safeguarding sea- Free and secure maritime passage around lanes and naval passageways to ensure global the globe is fundamental to the global order. energy security is certainly the United States’ One need only look at the places on the planet number one priority in the region, it is clear where this right is challenged, such as Somalia, that freedom of navigation is also an import- to see the consequences of allowing this freedom ant strategic interest in its own right. Since to be curtailed. 1982, the United States has staunchly main- tained that no nation may unilaterally restrict Non-Proliferation. Nuclear non-proliferation the rights and freedoms of the international has been a primary U.S. strategic objective in community in navigation and over flight and the Middle East and around the world since the other high seas uses.8 Indeed, in many respects, end of World War II. The destructive capabil- maintaining Freedom of Navigation is one of ities of nuclear weapons are unparalleled in the fundamental pillars of U.S. foreign policy human history. We still do not fully under- throughout the globe. stand the long-term health and environmental Maintaining the peaceful maritime rights of consequences of a nuclear attack on a country, all nations is crucial to the normal functioning its land and its people. The recent environmen- and flow of global commerce.9 Over 80% of the tal tragedy in Fukushima, Japan has further bulk and 70% of the value of total global trade is demonstrated that, even in situations where a transported over the high seas.10 The importance country has developed its nuclear capabilities
10 | Features PRISM 4, no. 2 THE ARAB SPRING AND U.S. INTERESTS purely for energy generation, the potential for region. It slows economic progress and con- devastating consequences from accidental mal- tinues the cycle of sectarian violence that has function is extraordinary. historically kept the region unstable. It is clear that nuclear weapons bring with Countries undergoing transition are facing them a host of dangers even for countries in rel- ever-escalating threats of terrorist violence as the atively stable regions and without pressing secu- security regimes of former dictators are eroded. rity concerns. It is even clearer that introducing The attacks on the American consulate in Libya nuclear weapons into a region as volatile as the are only the most recent and prominent exam- Middle East carries with it risks of an even higher ples of how terrorists are using the instability of magnitude. While the United States is commit- transition to consolidate their base of support ted to preventing any nuclear proliferation, the and conduct attacks on those that are attempt- most pressing immediate objective is to deny Iran ing to strengthen state institutions and promote nuclear weapons. Should Iran acquire a nuclear national unity. Even before these attacks, Libya weapon, nearly all of the United States’ other stra- had become a conduit of arms and drugs for ter- tegic interests in the region would be put at risk. rorist organizations in the Sahel. The threat to our allies’ security and interests, Syria is threatening to join Libya as an area as well as stability in the region is only one aspect in which extremist organizations can operate of a nuclear-armed Iran. In our view, the most freely. The initially largely non-ideological profound consequence of Iranian development opposition has splintered into a number of of a nuclear weapon would be closing the curtain increasingly radicalized resistance units, many on the very principle of nuclear non-prolifera- of whom are funded and supported by interna- tion, a principle every U.S. administration has tional jihadists. As the violence there escalates to declared a pillar of U.S. values and vision for increasingly horrific levels and the interior of the more than half a century. country becomes more and more ungovernable, It should also be remembered that Iran it is very possible that terrorist organizations will was an original signatory of the Nuclear Non- be able to use the chaos to launch attacks against Proliferation Treaty and, should it develop a any number of regional targets. weapon, it would be the first signatory to break Terrorist activities extend beyond sectarian the treaty. In ending the principle of non-prolifer- or jihadist goals. Pirates in the Gulf of Aden ation, a nuclear Iran would set off a nuclear arms threaten key oil shipping lanes while those in race in the Gulf that could spread throughout the Mali engage in human and drug trafficking. The region and beyond, reversing 50 years of U.S. presence of these organizations in the region foreign policy efforts. undermines the monopoly of force tradition- ally held by the state. For countries undergoing Countering Violent Extremism. The last decade transition, terrorist organizations pose a serious of American foreign policy towards the greater threat to the state’s ability to establish the rule of Middle East has revolved to a great extent law or build a civil society. around the issue of combating terrorist activities The consequences of a curtailment of U.S. in and emanating from the region. Terrorism counterterrorism capabilities could precipitate the not only threatens civilian lives, but also under- failure of a number of other key regional equities. mines the legitimacy of states throughout the If transitioning countries are unable to contain
PRISM 4, no. 2 Features | 11 LAROCCO and GOODYEAR NATO Review NATO Free elections in Tunisia, 2011.
terrorist organizations and activities, the region development that the youth believe the transi- could face stalled economic growth, increased tions will bring. violence and a breakdown of the social order. Israelis are understandably anxious over the directions that many of the transitions seem to Maintaining Israeli Security. Israeli security is be taking. The loss of long standing relationships essential to promoting a number of U.S. stra- with members of the former leaders of the Arab tegic objectives. At the same time, it has always world have left Israeli leaders wondering how been clear that U.S. commitment to Israel’s they will be able to reconstruct a security network security transcends those interests; indeed, it is that had been integral to their national defense. a moral commitment with deep roots among On the one hand, they worry that the Sinai American society and people. has become a zone of instability with the con- A comprehensive peace between Israel and stant threat of attacks emanating from there. If all its neighbors, U.S. counterterrorism strategies, this occurs, Israel may be forced to take actions and the longer-term goals of regional economic that would almost certainly put them at odds integration all depend upon the continued secu- with new leadership in Egypt and elsewhere in rity of the Israeli state. If Israeli security cannot the Arab World. be guaranteed in the future, then the likelihood The transit of weapons, including Fajr of regional conflict will increase significantly and longer-range missiles, through the Sinai was a transitioning states, especially Israel’s neighbors, pre-requisite of the arming of Gaza and the spike will see their hopes dashed for new investment, in attacks on Israel that led to Israel’s decision loans and trade necessary for the economic to strike Gaza in mid-November 2012. Without
12 | Features PRISM 4, no. 2 THE ARAB SPRING AND U.S. INTERESTS question, the increased flow of arms was a result Diagram B Key Countries of transitions within both Egypt and Libya. In addition to events in the Sinai, the break- Key US Bilateral down of order in Syria has provided new oppor- Relationships tunities for Hezbollah to expand their opera- tions. If they are able to create a corridor between southern Lebanon and western Syria, they could High Priority open up a new front from which to attack Israel. Egypt Medium Priority Jordan Yemen Unique Case The reprisals that would almost certainly fol- Syria Tunisia Libya Bahrain low could lead to the first regional war in over 3 decades. Promoting peace between Israel and its also important for the U.S. to recognize the ways regional neighbors has been a priority for the in which regional states are interconnected and United States since the end of World War II. that the failure to ensure stability in one can eas- Allowing for regional conditions to deteriorate to ily lead to chaos in another. Thus, the following the point that Israeli security is threatened would list indicates the priority of each state to ensuring constitute a major failing of American foreign that U.S. regional strategic objectives are attained. policy and would seriously jeopardize many of High Priority the U.S. most important objectives in the region. Egypt. Egypt has long been the largest recipient Part III: Creating Conditions for a Positive End-State of U.S. aid and funding in the Arab World and for good reason. Egypt holds the primary stra- The strategic interests of the United States are tegic position among Middle Eastern countries now in a very precarious position. Middle Eastern because of its proximity to Israel and the peace countries, and especially those undergoing tran- treaty that has prevailed for more than a gener- sition, face a number of serious threats that ation, its geographical location straddling two could jeopardize their security and stability and continents and its control of the Suez Canal. A plunge the region into turmoil. In order to secure stable Egypt at peace with Israel that helps to a positive end-state for the region, the United maintain free shipping lanes and joins in the States and like-minded regional allies must work fight against terrorism is the single most cru- together to create the necessary security, political, cial ally in maintaining U.S. interests among and economic conditions for success. those countries in transition. A destabilized Most importantly, as the U.S. by necessity Egypt puts all American interests in the region must pursue a more resource-driven policy, at risk. choices must be made with care and foresight. Thinking regionally, while acting bilaterally Jordan. Though Jordan lacks any significant nat- seems unavoidable in order to achieve U.S. goals ural resources, the country plays an important under the constraints it now faces. role in maintaining regional stability. It has pro- In the following section, we list the key bilat- vided a safe haven for hundreds of thousands eral relationships the U.S. must build and hold to of refugees from Palestine, Iraq and, now, Syria. ensure that our vital interests are maintained. It is It maintains a key peace treaty with Israel and is
PRISM 4, no. 2 Features | 13 LAROCCO and GOODYEAR
actively involved in countering violent extrem- If Syria continues to breakdown and desta- ism. Moreover, it has made significant strides bilizing forces are allowed to use the chaos to towards building a civil society and transitioning cause trouble in the rest of the region, the influ- towards a more democratic form of government. ence of foreign powers like Russia and Iran would likely grow throughout the region. They would there exists a clear potential for a complete be able to provide more support to actors who breakdown of order in the country seek to disrupt democratic transitions and slow economic growth, thereby further dividing an already fractured region. Yet, Jordan faces very serious threats to its Yet a stable and secure Syria could offer a stability. It is estimated that it will hold nearly whole range of possibilities for achieving U.S. 250,000 refugees from Syria as we enter 2013. interests in the future. Not only could it curb Jordan’s precarious finances and energy situation Iranian influence and weaken terrorist and jihad- have prompted increased unrest with unprec- ist groups like Hezbollah, but also it could ease edented public criticism of the government, pressures on regional allies like Jordan. including the King. Without a rapid and sus- We consider the United States’ most urgent tained infusion of billions of dollars of support and critical decisions in 2013 for U.S. long-term from the outside world, it is not clear how the interests regarding Arab Springs must focus on government will be able to continue to provide Syria and Egypt. for its citizens as well as the refugee population. There exists a clear potential for a complete Bahrain. As home to the 5th Fleet, Bahrain is breakdown of order in the country. If that hap- the linchpin for U.S. energy and maritime pens, a cornerstone of American foreign policy security objectives in the Middle East and, in efforts in the region will be removed. fact, for much of the world. U.S. naval presence there allows the U.S. to protect not only the Syria. Horrific violence in Syria is continuing world’s largest oil field to the west, but also to spin out of control, claiming the lives of tens the entire Gulf region while ensuring freedom of thousands of civilians and forcing hundreds of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz, of thousands more out of their homes and into allowing oil to flow securely to world mar- refugee camps in Turkey, Jordan, and Lebanon. kets. It also will be the point from which the The refugee problem is so severe in fact that “pivot” to Asia will be most clearly manifested. some estimate that millions of refugees will be A continued U.S. presence on Bahrain will be dispersed throughout the region as the conflict critical to ensuring that the sea-lanes between could continue indefinitely without resolution. the Mediterranean and the Pacific Ocean Their presence in countries that are already remain open and secure. Furthermore, a stable facing significant refugee challenges could be a Bahrain that is an active member of the Gulf tipping point that forces a severe breakdown of Cooperation Council (GCC) can help ward of law and order in the region. The refugee issue Iranian influence in the Gulf. is no longer simply a humanitarian issue; it In securing our vital strategic interests in is now a strategic issue that threatens stability Bahrain, the U.S. appears to many to be tram- throughout the region. pling on our values of democracy and fair
14 | Features PRISM 4, no. 2 THE ARAB SPRING AND U.S. INTERESTS representation. Some claim that our foreign pol- away from Yemen. U.S. leadership remains key in icy of double standards is most clearly illustrated keeping Yemen high on everyone’s radar, includ- by our stance toward Bahrain. As we secure our ing and especially Saudi Arabia and the GCC. interests, we must not forego our commitment to our values. Of all the dilemmas we face in deal- Tunisia. The Arab Spring began in Tunisia in ing with the Arab Spring, searching for the right December of 2010. To many, Tunisia is the formula that will persuade and assist Bahrain in country with the best odds to transition to a reconciliation is arguably the thorniest challenge stable democracy. The United States has ded- to our diplomacy, but the stakes are high for the icated more funds to civil society promotion credibility of our values and principles. in Tunisia than it has to any other country in the Arab Spring. Indeed, to many in the United Medium Priority States and abroad, Tunisia’s ability to integrate Yemen. Yemen is geographically located on the Islamism, nationalism and state responsibility periphery of the core Arab states and, as such, for economic policies to provide opportunities is not as intimately linked to U.S. interests as for its citizens will be the barometer of success states like Egypt and Jordan. However, Yemen’s for the Arab Spring. position at the Bab Al-Mandeb and the Gulf of Unique Case Aden makes its stability a crucially important factor in maintaining freedom of navigation as Libya. Libya stands as a unique case among the well as global energy security. Piracy remains major Arab countries in transition. It is the only a serious threat to commercial shipping in one of these countries with significant deposits the area and transnational efforts have been of oil and, as such, has the potential to harness required to contain it. these resources to rapidly build a successful Additionally, Yemen is home to Al-Qaeda and stable government. Yet, it remains true that in the Arabian Peninsula and other jihadist a breakdown of the Libyan state would not groups that plot attacks against not only the directly jeopardize the majority of American United States, but also its key allies, especially interests in the region. Saudi Arabia. These groups have the potential to Instead, Libya remains critically important disrupt the ongoing transitions throughout the because it constitutes a key energy source for U.S. region and are a constant threat to any stability allies in Europe. Moreover, a stable and prosper- that might emerge in the coming years. ous Libya could help to stem the tide of migrants In the case of Yemen, defining success is from North Africa into Europe and help to pro- seemingly impossible, but failure stares at us mote economic integration and stability in the every day and would have far-reaching reper- Trans-Sahel region. cussions for U.S. interests and those of its allies. In contrast, a weak and unstable Libya would The GCC and the Friends of Yemen have played only serve to exacerbate an already horrific crisis a constructive role in setting Yemen on a path to in the Sahel. It provides a porous border through successful political transition, but recently more which illegal weapons, human and drug traffick- pressing issues elsewhere, including Syria and ing occur. Iran, as well as resource constraints on many While the U.S. initially assumed a lim- of the donor countries, have diverted attention ited role in assisting with Libya’s transition
PRISM 4, no. 2 Features | 15 LAROCCO and GOODYEAR and instead looked to the UN, Arab allies and 3 BP Statistical Review of World Energy, June 2012, available at
Notes
1 See Cleveland, William L., A History of the Modern Middle East (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2004), 89-100. 2 Ibid., 161.
16 | Features PRISM 4, no. 2 “Train as You Fight”Revisited: Preparing for a Comprehensive Approach
By Sebastiaan Rietjens, Paul C. van Fenema and Peter Essens
n 1973 General William F. DePuy, first commander of the U.S. Army’s Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), emphasized that it was necessary to expose soldiers to realistic battlefield Iconditions before they experienced actual combat.1 Doing this should improve the soldiers’ prepa- ration and thereby, in the long run, their effectiveness and efficiency. DePuy’s belief was widely shared and led to the development of new training methods and a training philosophy that is often referred to as “train as you fight”. Ever since, military training programs have continuously been improved and better shaped towards the real threats that soldiers were facing in the theater. A clear example reflecting the new philosophy was the establishment of the US Combat Training Centers (CTCs). The five pillars upon which the CTC program is based, require (1) that participating units be organized as they would for actual combat, (2) a dedicated, doctrinally proficient operations group, (3) a dedicated, realistic opposing force (OPFOR), (4) a training facility being capable of simulating combat conditions, and (5) a base infrastructure.2 This suggests that the main focus in training is to develop a combat ready force that is physically and psychologically prepared to fight and win wars.3 The dominant focus on combat readiness is also mentioned in a 2006 RAND report reviewing for the United States Army its leadership development. The authors concluded that whereas changes in operational environment were identified (e.g. “operations other than war”), “adaptation has centered largely on the more tan- gible elements and mechanics of war.”4 Indeed, as the RAND report mentions, many of today’s crisis operations demand that political, economic, developmental factors besides the security ones have to be addressed simultaneously, because they are highly interrelated.5 Since this requires specific expertise and domain knowledge, global interventions are increasingly about coordinated and cooperative approaches of civilian and
Dr. Maj. Sebastiaan Rietjens (Royal Netherlands Army) and Dr. Paul C. van Fenema work for the Netherlands Defence Academy. Dr. Peter Essens works for the Netherlands Organization for Applied Scientific Research.
PRISM 4, no. 2 Features | 17 RIETJENS, VAN FENEMA, and ESSENS
military actors, and state and non-state actors prepare for the complexities of modern oper- such as international and non-governmental ations. This comprises coordination and inte- organizations (IO/NGOs): a Comprehensive gration with other government organizations, Approach to operations. with civil organizations such as IOs and NGO, with representatives of other ministries (e.g. approximately 300 military from the Netherlands, Foreign Affairs, Development Cooperation) United States, United Kingdom, Germany, Norway and with actors of the host nation such as local and Italy, and 130 representatives of civilian authorities. agencies joined the exercise This article starts by laying down the multi- tude of actors that are involved in contemporary crisis operations. It then addresses coordination This new and dynamic constellation of par- demands and efforts involving these actors with ties and disciplines, an ad hoc social system on an emphasis on training and mission-specific its own, requires new competencies and skills preparation. The fourth section elaborates on in interacting with these diverse perspectives a unique and relatively large interagency exer- and understanding the complex interrelations. cise, Common Effort. The exercise was hosted However, in most military training institutes, in September 2011 by 1 (German/Netherlands) American and European alike, one observes only Corps (1GNC)8 in Germany. It was organized very limited incorporation of these new require- together with the Netherlands and German ments.6 In some institutes (e.g. Marine Corps Ministries of Foreign Affairs. As opposed to ear- Training and Education Command (TECOM)), lier civil-military exercises where subject matter cultural awareness has become one of the train- experts role-play, in this project civil organiza- ing objectives,7 while in others (e.g. CIMIC Centre tions exercised themselves in order to learn to of Excellence in The Netherlands) relatively small better interact, coordinate and cooperate with the numbers of dedicated Civil-Military Cooperation military, in addition to other internal objectives. (CIMIC) personnel are trained to support the After an extensive preparation period of about commander’s mission. Just as within the CTCs, one year, approximately 300 military from the training focuses mostly on the development of Netherlands, United States, United Kingdom, combat ready forces. Readiness for operating in Germany, Norway and Italy, and 130 represen- complex environments with civil, military and tatives of civilian agencies (e.g. GOs, NGOs, local actors and effectors is largely ignored, even IOs, Police, Ministries) joined the exercise and though this is quite likely demanded in many were trained working within a comprehensive current and future theaters – in addition to tra- approach. A fictional scenario centered on the ditional (kinetic) warfare. Horn of Africa enabled the participants to train Notwithstanding the importance of com- their people, and test their organizations´ func- bat training, this article emphasizes the impor- tioning and interactions with each other for over tance of fully incorporating a comprehensive 5 days. The process and outcome of this exer- approach to operations and involving profes- cise is described here and used as an example sionals from relevant organizations in exercises. for future exercises and comprehensive training Such efforts are not only highly beneficial but methods. The article concludes with recommen- also necessary for military units to properly dations for the way ahead.
18 | Features PRISM 4, no. 2 “TRAIN AS YOU FIGHT” REVISITED
Challenges of working with sets of actors also contribute to this complexity.18 a multitude of actors An issue particularly influencing the interaction Most researchers and practitioners support the between governmental agencies, such as defense idea that successfully coordinated or harmonized and foreign affairs, is the unbalance in both per- civilian and military efforts are key to successful sonnel as well as finances. Operational military stabilization, relief, reconstruction and counter- organizations mostly have substantial numbers insurgency efforts.9 Coordination and coopera- of people at junior levels with numbers decreas- tion are imperative to create the best conditions ing towards the top (pyramid form), whereas for stability, humanitarian relief, and develop- civil organizations tend to have relatively small ment. No single actor can address this alone, and numbers of junior personnel, compared to mid it has to be done simultaneously.10 and higher levels (nearly inverted pyramid).19 If The relationship and interactions between we look at the financial side, the division is just civil and military actors is however faced with opposite. In most deployed units, civilians are many challenges. A first challenge is to define responsible for the majority of the funds to be who coordinates with whom. Within military spent, most often on reconstruction and devel- as well as civilian circles, multiple–and conflict- opment projects. In addition, diversity brings ing–stances on the appropriateness of the com- barriers for interaction, stemming from a mul- prehensive approach are part of everyday reality. titude of sources, such as language, style, values, Some IO/NGOs are reluctant to be associated cultures, competencies, structures, methods and with a potentially unwelcome military force and resources.20 21 Finally, lacking a unified theory of thereby lose their protective patina of neutral- change, the conceptual challenge is to align the ity. Stoddard11 refers to these principled organi- often very different opinions about what consti- zations as being the “Dunantists”12 who want tutes change and what instruments to use: what to avoid any suggestion of partiality, whereas or what combination is most effective at what “Wilsonian”13 organizations generally act more moment given the conditions, and how can that pragmatically and therefore interact more easily be measured to demonstrate progress or adjust with military forces. the approach.22 Secondly, the context of crisis operations is often chaotic, unstable and conflictive. Needs of diversity brings barriers for interaction, stemming the local population are high and there is a seri- from a multitude of sources, such as language, ous lack of knowledge, finance, and political and values, cultures, methods and resources legal structures.14 Another challenge for the civil– military relationship is the temporary nature of the coalition parties involved.15 Since civil actors Adding to the diversity is the sheer number and their military counterparts frequently have of actors in a mission area. In most areas, the different objectives and different ways of achiev- main NGO players number in the tens rather ing these,16 they look favorably on cooperation as than hundreds. However, in extreme and dra- long as they expect it to serve their best interests.17 matic complex emergencies, NGOs multiply. This can easily lead to opportunistic behavior. At the height of the relief operations in Kosovo Moreover, differences in organizational culture, there were over four hundred NGOs,23 and it has expertise, methods and objectives between two been estimated that there were between 3,000 to
PRISM 4, no. 2 Features | 19 RIETJENS, VAN FENEMA, and ESSENS
generalizations on either “the military” or “the Allport’s Intergroup Contact theory claims civil” community can therefore hardly be accurate that contact between groups reduces the effects of stereotype and prejudice.27 Contact gener- ates learning about the other group, changes 20,000 NGOs operating in Haiti after the 2010 behaviors towards the other group, generates earthquake.24 A similar diversity factor holds for person-to-person affective ties (empathy), and military actors. The number of different units and reshapes the group’s appraisal of the outside their sizes vary enormously per mission area. In world.28 This development is stronger when Afghanistan for example, Operation Enduring certain conditions are met: equal group status Freedom (OEF) and the International Security within the situation, orientation toward coop- Assistance Force (ISAF) are deployed at the same eration and common, superordinate goals, time, each consisting of many different (national) authority support, cross-group friendship.29 In units operating within their own national caveats. addition, reduction of feelings of intergroup In fact, the ISAF military units have 102 national uncertainty and anxiety, which developed from caveats.25 These include rules on patrolling by concerns about how one is perceived, how one daylight only or rules that geographically bound should behave, or whether one is accepted, troop deployment. Caveats are necessary for has shown to be critical to achieve the positive legitimacy in military’s home countries. Yet this impact of intergroup contacts.30 further complicates the general stance of civil We propose that a deliberate and structured actors, be they humanitarian organizations, local contact approach should be used as an effec- population or authorities, toward cooperating tive mechanism to improve open orientation with the military. How to govern this network towards other parties, increase understanding of organizations is a daunting and paradoxical and building cooperation. Even interaction with challenge: many organizations do not like to be a limited set of parties, at best chosen for being represented by others, yet they also do not want representative for and a hub to their network, to invest heavily in endless numbers of meetings can improve communication and interaction with other organizations. with other parties that have not (yet) been met. Actors involved in crisis operations dif- Contact with members of a group transfers its fer from one another in many different ways. effects to the whole group,31 and interaction with Generalizations on either “the military” or “the one group transfers to other groups of the same civil” community can therefore hardly be accu- kind.32 In conclusion, there is substantial evi- rate. The civil community stands for a broad dence that intergroup interactions–given certain spectrum of civil parties, comprising governance, conditions–will lead to improved understanding human relief, police, justice, economic develop- and a broader orientation toward the diversity of ment roles. Civil-military simplifications may the actors. These findings support a strong argu- persist from earlier times where the military had ment for organizing interagency interactions in a sole actor role in war-like phases of a conflict. training and preparation exercises. How can we But also social identity processes may contrib- achieve this with the military and civil parties? ute to these simplifications linked to in-group How can we prepare for better dealing with the out-group perceptions, which are strongly complex diversities of military-civil collectives, connected to stereotyping and prejudice.26 keeping a check on the amount of effort it takes?
20 | Features PRISM 4, no. 2 “TRAIN AS YOU FIGHT” REVISITED
Training and preparation for cited as contributing to the poor success rate and the comprehensive approach: lack of sustainability of international peace and Moving beyond improvisation stability operations.38 In many operations, civil-military coordination Although there is no single solution to is improvisational, pragmatic, and ad hoc.33 34 improve civil-military coordination at the When meeting on the ground in theater, person- local level, the logic of improved preparation nel works out solutions overcoming differences is expected to lead to efficiency gains, greater for the common good. As such, coordination respect for the comparative advantages of civil- evolves over time in response to specific needs ian and military actors, and enhanced mission on the ground. There is merit in this ad hoc effectiveness. However, as was raised in the intro- approach. Some argue that every crisis has unique duction, most military training and education characteristics in which strategies and structures programs focus on purely military objectives and for civil-military relations need to reflect the spe- include the comprehensive approach only to a cific and dynamically evolving circumstances. limited degree.39 That being true, there are at least two reasons to search for constants: to build on experiences lack of coherence is one of the factors often and become more effective; and to train and pre- cited as contributing to the poor success rate and pare to become more proficient. The gap between lack of sustainability of international peace and the received training and the requirements to stability operations establish order on the ground results in a tremen- dous responsibility of the battalion command- ers and their junior officers. As experiences from Over the last few years some of the train- international missions such as the Balkans and ing and exercises have been improved and partly Afghanistan show, commanders had to tailor adjusted to the new dynamics of the modern much of their operations to the unexpected chal- battlefield. Several armed forces training cen- lenges they faced, rather than execute the sort of ters have introduced role-play exercises to allow mission they were tasked, organized, and trained their personnel to become accustomed with the to perform.35 In these conditions civil-military local situation and civil actors. These exercises, coordination depends strongly on the person- however, have been mostly scripted by soldiers alities involved and the qualities they brought and in most exercises the roles of development to the table, rather than on planning and stan- workers, diplomats or local powerbrokers are dard operating procedures.36 As a consequence, being played by soldiers themselves, or by retired many differences occurred within and between or ex-civil personnel hired for the occasion. Some rotations and contingents. These differences level of industry has developed around this, with included priorities, budgets, and involvement of professionalism, but also with good-willed ama- the local population. Such an approach yields teurism. Since this is role-playing, there is little inefficient use of limited aid resources, delayed assurance of realistic and valid civil behavior and humanitarian relief efforts, enhanced inconsis- perspectives of the parties that are role-played. tency between rotations, and leads to conflicting In reality, many, often subtle, sensitivities char- objectives in the post-conflict environment.37 acterize the civil-military interface. Hence, exer- This lack of coherence is one of the factors often cises would certainly benefit from structured
PRISM 4, no. 2 Features | 21 RIETJENS, VAN FENEMA, and ESSENS
participation of a wide variety of civilian actors During the entire preparation period, the from the actual professional organizations and German and Netherlands Ministries of Foreign communities (e.g. diplomats, IO and NGO rep- Affairs committed personnel. For most participat- resentatives). Playing themselves, they could be ing NGOs and IOs however, such commitment involved in the preparation of the exercise, define was perceived a major obstacle. Unlike 1GNC their own training objectives and play their own, most civil organizations, including both minis- real role in the exercise itself. This would enable tries, had only very limited resources and person- military as well as civil actors to approach the nel available for preparing the exercise. Despite “train as you fight” philosophy even more realis- this, several more interagency meetings were held tically, extending it to “train as you interact”. The to develop the exercise. It was agreed that the scenarios should include kinetic and non-kinetic “The overarching aim of the exercise is to develop elements, just like real-life operations, creating a shared perception of the Comprehensive varying role distributions. Each participating Approach and a broad understanding of the organization can achieve its training objectives mechanisms that enable its implementation”.41 and benefit from mutual interaction and syner- To reach this aim, the exercise participants gies. They can effectively bridge their common formulated a staggering number of 161 different training background and theater-specific needs. training objectives that were finally aggregated During the exercise they can mutually adjust their into 12 main objectives. Examples of these objec- mechanisms and concepts to the local situation tives were to develop and trial: in a mission area. Precisely the latter approach was taken by the 1(German/Netherlands) Corps ■■ Principles and mechanisms to facili- (1GNC) in the project and exercise Common tate civil-civil and civil-military information Effort in 2011. The next section describes prepa- exchange; ration, execution, and outcomes of the exercise. ■■ Mechanisms to conduct collabora- tive Conflict Analysis, Knowledge and Plan Design of exercise Common Effort Development prior to deployment and in In September 2010, the German-Netherlands theatre; Corps (1GNC) based in Munster, Germany, led ■■ Mechanisms to call upon and deliver by Lieutenant General Ton van Loon, initiated (in-extremis) military support; project Common Effort. At the first so-called ■■ Principles and mechanisms to achieve interagency meeting in November 2010, the idea comprehensive operational assessment and for a common exercise was embraced by the strategy review. Ministries of Foreign Affairs of both Germany and The Netherlands. Their commitment was deemed Based on these training objectives and in essential to bring NGOs and IOs on board.40 From accordance with the capabilities of the partici- the beginning the relationship between 1GNC pating organizations, a script was developed by and the ministries had to be fostered through a working group comprising experts from the intensive dialogue. 1GNC stressed that it was not various fields of expertise including foreign pol- their intent to lead the process but only to facil- icy, development aid, police, UN and the mili- itate it. As such 1GNC served as a secretariat for tary. Geographically the script was located in the Common Effort during the entire process. Horn of Africa.42 The script resembled many of
22 | Features PRISM 4, no. 2 “TRAIN AS YOU FIGHT” REVISITED
Annex B to Common Eort Comprehensive Design Figure 1: Draft Strategic Design for Tytan – Exercise Common Eort Dated 18 Jul 11 Stabilise State Build Precursors Peace Build Common Objective Increased The IC objective for East Cerasia is 12 Legitimacy to set the conditions for Governance in Tytan 6 15 17 22 Authority enduringregional peace and stability & Capacity through: • Helping to create a safe and Viable & secure environment in Tytan, Gulf Diplomacy Enduring of Canopia, and Southern part of 1 7 14 20 Political the Red Sea. Settlement • Providing humanitarian assistance. Social & Developement 2 23 Economic • Strengthening of mechanisms for 19 Progress regional conflict resolutions. 18 • Strengthening inclusive national institutions so they 4 8 11 Immediate can provide sustained human Humanitarian Relief & security. Basic Security • Enabling economic progress and 16 development. 9 3 21 Adequate • Strengthening rule of law. Defence-Security 5 10 13 Security & • Maintaining territorial integrity of Justice System Tytan, in line with relevant UNSCR.
CUSFOR Mission G-Day NIMFOR Mission G+365 UNAMIT Mission 3 Years + Key Decisive Conditions for Building Stability in Tytan Diplomacy Governance IC Stabilisation Aim for Tytan 1 International Support for solution 6 Broad political dialogue established With international partners to create the 7 Generate Political Will for SSR 12 Democratisation - Political Process accepted by all Conditions for a safe and stable state under 14 Negotiations to end armed opposition. 15 Anti-Corruption Measures Eective which Tytan's territorial integrity is respected 20 Regional Trade Re-estab & Legitimate 17 GoT under Constitutional Framework and there is a political process aimed at 16 SASE for IDP Returns fostering greater regional stability; and internal Defence – Security stability born of eective, representative, 22 Institution strengthening in Community transparent and accountable government 3 Protection of Civilians (SASE) acting in the interests of the people and the 5 Disrupt opponents of peace Development & Humanitarian nation, strong institutions (including eective 9 Develop SSR Strategy 2 Eective UN led co-ord & funding security forces), the rule of law and Respect for human rights; an inclusive and equitable 10 Border security of Tytan improved 4 Free access for Aid agencies society with a viable suicient and 13 Maintain territorial Integrity of Tytan 8 Distribution of Aid is Safe & Secure self-sustaining legitimate economy.’ 21 Capabilities of TYTAN Security Forces improved 11 Humanitarian Situation Stabilised 18 Tytan govt co-ord aid response 19 National Recovery and Devt Plan 23 Framework for Long term Devt established NB: The details of these Key Decisive Conditions ( inputs, activities, measures of eect, and risks) are planning work in progress the current challenges around which 5 vignettes in dispute over river water consumption for e.g. were developed. irrigation purposes. Interagency coordination The first was labeled security sector reform subjects that were stressed included a regional (SSR), encompassing e.g. judicial, prison, police political strategy, human security development, and defense reform. In the script the SSR program and military support to civil organizations. was critically endangered by a badly handled Disaster relief was played in the third prison revolt and the statement of a regional vignette. The area was confronted with an power broker who claimed to re-arm militia. earthquake, causing civilian casualties and large- Subjects that were considered of importance scale destruction in an already underdeveloped for the interagency coordination included the region. A humanitarian crisis developed while development of a multilateral SSR policy and infrastructure critical to the relief effort turned collaboration with host nation officials out to be damaged or destroyed. As the area The second vignette considered humanitar- was incapable of implementing crisis response ian assistance. In the script two countries were mechanisms the international community,
PRISM 4, no. 2 Features | 23 RIETJENS, VAN FENEMA, and ESSENS
under UN leadership, was to coordinate the identification with one common mission. Figure disaster relief effort. During the exercise itself 1 depicts this design. Five lines of operation are this event was not being played as such due to identified: governance, diplomacy, development, an overburden of some of the participants. humanitarian and defense-security. To reach the end state of a line of operation, milestones were discussions amongst all partners led to defined, so-called key conditions for building the realization that different perspectives of stability in Tytan, the fictitious host nation in all partners are required to reach a the exercise.44 comprehensive assessment Following the comprehensive design, the individual participants continued their internal planning processes. A final conference was held in The fourth vignette dealt with anti-piracy. In September 2011 just before the actual start of the the story the humanitarian community faced the exercise, to harmonize the plans of all participants. disruption of resource flows towards the theater The exercise was geographically situated in when several large shipping companies refused the Horn of Africa, labeled as East Cerasia in the to sail to ports in light of increased piracy. To script. One of the countries in this region, Tytan, address this issue the civil-military coordination is a vulnerable pro-western democracy full of had to focus on a regional political strategy, a ethnic tensions. The country is very poor, a con- targeting and information strategy, and sea and dition that is compounded by weak government coastal security. and economic mismanagement. Tytan is the The final vignette focused on continuous victim of the aggressive policies of its neighbor- civil-military coordination. The training audience ing country, Kamon, to achieve ethnic domina- was confronted with institutional requirements tion in the region. The deteriorating situation for coordination. These requirements emanated in Tytan and the passing of a UNSC Resolution from binding commitments, organizational authorized the deployment of a NATO interim weaknesses, (temporary) capability shortfalls or multinational force in Tytan (NIMFOR). 1 opportunities for success. (German/Netherlands) Corps (1GNC) has been After having developed the script, the part- nominated to provide the land component of ners started the process of a comprehensive sit- NIMFOR and Commander 1GNC has been uational assessment. This meant defining root appointed as Military Head of Mission (MHoM) causes of the conflict, mapping stakeholders and of NIMFOR. The Governments of Germany and conflict drivers, and assessing the key factors and the Netherlands have agreed to coordinate the trends. Discussions amongst all partners led not civilian efforts in support of the NIMFOR mis- only to a common understanding of the situation sion on a bi-national basis and have appointed but also to the realization that different perspec- a German diplomat to the post of Civilian Head tives of all partners are required to reach a com- of Mission (CHoM). prehensive assessment.43 In addition, several (non) govern- During a planning conference early May mental organizations and UN agencies are 2011, participants defined common objectives involved in the exercise, including Kinderberg, of the mission. This led to a comprehensive Cordaid, Technisches Hilfswerk, World Food campaign design and created a higher level of Program (WFP) and the United Nations High
24 | Features PRISM 4, no. 2 “TRAIN AS YOU FIGHT” REVISITED
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). The the UN’s SRSG. After two days it was decided that Special Representative of the Secretary General the CHoM would report through both a German (SRSG) is the senior UN Representative in East and Dutch national hierarchical line within the Cerasia and has the overall authority over the respective ministries of Foreign Affairs. However, activities of the United Nations. by then most NGOs and IOs perceived CHoM as an integral part of NIMFOR and treated their Observations from Exercise Common Effort interaction with the CHoM as such. In any case, the challenge is to step over The exercise Common Effort was held in the Air the obstacles and to actively engage in order Force barracks in Munster, Germany, September to resolve the issues via communication and 18-23, 2011.45 An evaluation team, led by the not- cooperation. It took most civil participants just for-profit, independent research organization, a few days to understand the relationships and Netherlands Organization for Applied Scientific their role. This resulted in a steep learning curve Research (TNO) as independent party, performed adapting with open mindset, dealing with fric- observations, interviews and a survey in order to tions, and discovering mutual capabilities while assess the civil-military interaction during the building relations. In the final evaluation session exercise.46 In their First Impression Report the most civil parties confirmed that they had a bet- evaluation team concluded that the first days ter understanding of the processes of the other were characterized by confusion amongst most parties and how to build communication lines. participants,47 with issues such as role unclarity, Moreover, the established social network with unwarranted assumptions and stereotypes from personal contacts was seen as highly beneficial lacking knowledge about each other and com- for future missions. mand structure unclarity. In particular for the civil parties a serious preparation gap was observed, in their First Impression Report the evaluation with most people being new to the situation team concluded that the first days were of many different, civil parties, and unknown characterized by confusion amongst most military culture, work processes, and terminol- participants ogy. The majority of the training audience had not been involved in the partners’ preparation phase meetings, and many participants struggled A mechanism that was introduced by to catch up with the large read-ahead material. 1GNC to facilitate the civil-military interface This was unlike the military training audience, was the so-called Inter-Agency Centre (IAC). who prepared themselves quite well and in most This responded to the needs of both 1GNC and cases showed up 1-2 or more days before the the civil parties as they were interested in what actual exercise started. This observation reflects structures or mechanism might support the civil a structural difference which was commented to military interaction best. The IAC was embedded be close to reality, and which has implications within the 1GNC military force structure. It pro- we will discuss later. A clear example of role vided a selection of military liaison officers and unclarity was whether the CHoM and his office experts (both military and civil) with different were part of the NATO Interim Force and how fields of expertise, including governance, cultural the role of CHoM related to that of the office of issues and rule of law. The aim of the IAC was
PRISM 4, no. 2 Features | 25 RIETJENS, VAN FENEMA, and ESSENS
to support coordination and de-confliction of opportunity to meet and connect before being humanitarian, diplomatic, development and deployed. The ratio between the costs and the security efforts by linking civil stakeholders to benefits differed for most participants. For 1GNC, matching military specialists or sections, while the exercise was generally perceived having a very at the same time contributing to the military’s positive cost-benefit ratio. Through the exercise decision making processes.48 Most participants the corps was able to interact with many civil of the exercise appreciated the concept of the actors and position itself as an ideal training plat- IAC as an intermediary. The IAC implementa- form for the comprehensive approach. 1GNC tion was an experiment that provided rich infor- covered almost all the costs related to the exercise mation on the dynamics of such a function. The with a project budget of approximately 300,000 intermediary role also caused issues, such as Euro and committed a large number of person- cumbersome communication channels. As a nel.49 However, these costs are considered to be result (and also because all were located at the relatively low, compared to most traditional same location for the exercise) civil organiza- military exercises. 1GNC personnel is tasked to tions indicated that they wanted to talk to their train during peacetime, anyway. For most civil military counterpart directly, and not via an organizations the costs were in the absorption intermediate such as the IAC. of personnel that participated in the exercise. The location was an issue that highly influ- Especially for smaller size NGOs, having per- enced the outcome of the exercise. As the exercise sonnel participate during an entire week brought took place at one location, representatives of the along a severe burden. But, also for these organi- different organizations were in close proximity zations the ratio between costs and benefits was from one another, and saw each other at the generally perceived as very positive. meals and the outside smoking places. This led to Conclusions and way ahead many informal interactions, for example between military and civilians. Those interactions would Many of today’s crisis operations demand that most probably have been impossible in a real political, economic, developmental, as well as crisis due to the distances and the insecurity situ- security factors have to be addressed simultane- ation. Moreover, part of the interactions would be ously. As a result, the interactive relationships deemed undesirable due to the association of civil between civilian and military actors are of crucial representatives with the military from NIMFOR. importance for mission success. This paper has shown that the civil-military relationship is con- for smaller size NGOs, having personnel fronted with a wide array of challenges. To arrive participate during an entire week brought well prepared in a mission area it is necessary along a severe burden for both military and civilian actors to be aware of and understand these challenges. Few institu- tions however seem to put much effort into doing Despite the many challenges, participants this. Some include courses on cultural awareness valued the exercise, mainly because of intense or lectures on the UN and roles of IO/NGOs. And exposure to civil and military ways of work- in most of the exercises that focus on the com- ing and thinking. Those with little or no field prehensive approach, military personnel or hired experience saw the exercise as an important civilians play roles of different organizations,
26 | Features PRISM 4, no. 2 “TRAIN AS YOU FIGHT” REVISITED thereby overlooking the often-subtle sensitivities “newcomers” and have therefore less insight in that characterize the civil-military interface. local practice and social power structures. As a Exercises moving beyond civilian role-play- result they need the interaction with the present ing such as Common Effort can fill this gap. civilian organizations, as well as with actors of These cannot solve all the issues that arise in the host nation. This stresses the requirement to the civil-military interface, but can provide an prepare for effective relation building as part of opportunity to practice styles and behaviours, their operational proficiency. and evaluate mechanisms for interaction. In such a process military and civilian actors are military are often “newcomers” and have confronted with each other’s working methods, therefore less insight in local practice and social professional vernaculars and cultures. This can power structures facilitate increased awareness and understanding and reduce the effects of stereotype and prejudice often hampering real-life operations. Exercises like Common Effort require care- Comparing the exercise Common Effort with ful management of cost-benefit ratios for those Allport’s conditions for intergroup contact shows involved. Despite the many obstacles that came that despite the organizations having individual up in that exercise, all partners valued each oth- objectives there was an orientation toward coop- er’s roles and opinions and several cross-group eration and common, superordinate goals. The friendships developed during the exercise. shared appreciation of the situation and the com- During the exercise feelings of intergroup prehensive mission design were clear examples of uncertainty and anxiety could be reduced due to this. The group status however differed consid- the open environment where one was allowed to erably. Despite the large presence of civil actors, make mistakes. This contributed to achieving a the military far outnumbered the civil actors. The positive impact of intergroup interactions. After preparation gap that was identified in Common the exercise one manager of a sourcing organi- Effort was also a result of the different capacities zation indicated that while enthusiasm is fine that both types of actors were able to dedicate for the exercise, the result should also show in to the exercise. In this respect it is important to policies (doctrine) to consolidate the benefits notice that military organizations are often tasked at organization level. Indeed, to achieve a pos- to train during peacetime. For UN agencies, IOs itive cost-benefit ratio, experiences should be and NGOs, however, this is not the case, mostly translated into concrete guidelines, policies, and because it is an unaffordable luxury in terms of measures. Dissemination of these policies within money and time. Generally these organizations participating organizations is most effectively have far smaller budgets and numbers of person- done through seminars and presentations with nel available to dedicate to such exercises. Such a involvement of the participants themselves using preparation gap seems not to mirror operational situational narratives and anecdotes. reality and one might even argue that in reality A “train as you fight” philosophy requires the military is the one facing a preparation gap. that civil and military personnel prepare to inter- In many cases IOs and NGOs are relatively famil- act in realistic conditions–that is playing them- iar with the local circumstances due to previous selves, with realistic dilemma’s. Comprehensive activities in that particular area. Military are often training methods and efficient exercise models
PRISM 4, no. 2 Features | 27 RIETJENS, VAN FENEMA, and ESSENS
following a Common Effort philosophy should 11 Abby Stoddard, Humanitarian Alert: NGO Information and its Impact on US Foreign Policy (Sterling: be developed to realize that. Conducting (parts Kumarian Press, 2006). of) the exercise without colocation could be an 12 Abby Stoddard, “Humanitarian NGOs: Challenges option to improve the cost-benefit ratio. Even and trends,” HPG Briefing 12, (London: Oversaes stronger would be to have these exercises embed- Development Institute, 2003). “‘Dunantist’ humanitari- anism is named for Red Cross founder Henry Dunant. ded in the participating organizations’ education The oldest of today’s ‘super-NGOs’, Save the Children UK, and training programs. In any case, such delib- was created in the Dunantist image at the end of the First erate and structured contact exercises should be World War. Others in this tradition include Oxfam and MSF. ‘Dunantist’ organisations seek to position themselves developed together with civil parties in order to outside of state interests” establish high performance before meeting each 13 Abby Stoddard, “Humanitarian NGOs: Challenges other in a mission. and trends,” HPG Briefing, no. 12 (July 2003), available at
28 | Features PRISM 4, no. 2 “TRAIN AS YOU FIGHT” REVISITED
20 Rietjens & Bollen, 2008, op. cit. 42 The elaboration on the script is based on the docu- 21 C. Gourlay, (2000), “Partners Apart: Managing ment “Exercise control and Script” (NATO Unclassified). Civil-Military Co-operation in Humanitarian 43 Project team Common Effort (2011). How to make Interventions,” Disarmarment Forum, no. 3, (2000), 33-44. comprehensiveness common and practical. 22 D.C. Becker and R. Grossman-Vermaas, “Metrics for 44 Point paper, 2011, op.cit. the Haiti Stabilization Initiative,” PRISM, 2, no. 2 (2011), 45 Due to the size of the exercise, it is not possible 145-158. to discuss all the findings. Therefore several of the main 23 A.M. Fitz-Gerald and F.A. Walthall, “An inte- findings are presented. grated approach to complex emergencies: The Kosovo 46 P.J.M.D. Essens, T.A. de Vries, P.L.E.M. Everts and Experience,” The Journal of Humanitarian Assistance. S.J.H. Rietjens, (2012). “‘Common Effort’: an experiment Document Posted 16 August 2001. in collaboratively building a comprehensive approach. 24 Kristoff and Panerelli, “Haiti: A Republic of NGOs?” TNO report,” TNO-DV 2012 C094. United States Institute of Peace, Brief 23, (April 26, 2010). 47 Evaluation Common Effort 2011: First Impression 25 Clingendael, “Security and Conflict Programme Report, presented at end session by Dr. Essens, 23 Sept, (CSCP),” (2007). CSCP Policy Brief, no. 1, (5 July 2007). 2011 . 26 A.D. Galinsky, and G. Ku, “The Effects of 48 See leaflet of Inter Agency Centre (2011 ) , available at Perspective-Taking on Prejudice: The Moderating Role of
PRISM 4, no. 2 Features | 29 U.S. Navy photo/ Public Domain
The Military Sealift Command hospital ship USNS Mercy sails the Pacific Ocean on June 15, 2010. Since 1993 the U.S. has responded to some 28 foreign internal conflicts and over 50 humanitarian responses, every year. Inevitable Conflicts, Avoidable Failures Preparing for the Third Generation of Conflict, Stabilization, and Reconstruction Operations
By Johanna Mendelson Forman and Liora Danan
oreign internal conflicts clearly remain a permanent feature of the U.S. foreign policy landscape, especially since the United States regularly participates in efforts to stabilize countries affected by F conflict and then helps them recover afterwards. Yet U.S. government officials and the American public in general have difficulty accepting the inevitability of U.S. involvement in such efforts. To ensure lasting progress and security in post-conflict situations, the United States must adjust its approach from a focus on large military operations to preparing adequately for small-scale, long-term interventions. Most U.S. military deployments since the end of the Cold War have been in “small wars” or what the Department of Defense once called “military operations other than war.”1 Yet the military has usually been more prepared to fight large, technologically advanced wars than smaller contin- gencies that require greater integration with civilian capacities. As a consequence, each time the U.S. military is deployed to a complex–but “small”–emergency, it has had to relearn lessons on the ground about the best way to manage these types of contingencies. Civilian participation in stabilization and reconstruction efforts is likewise inevitable, but civilian institutions are even less prepared for such work than the military. Lessons learned over the last decade are only recently being institutionalized, through offices like Department of State’s Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations (CSO) and the U.S. Agency for International Development’s Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI). In part this is due to bureaucratic politics. But in large part it is because government officials, Congress, and
Johanna Mendelson Forman is a senior associate with Americas Program at CSIS where she works on the Americas, civil-military relations, and post-conflict reconstruction. Liora Danan is a fellow with CSIS Program on Crisis, Conflict, and Cooperation, where she works on conflict and stabilization issues.
PRISM 4, no. 2 Features | 31 MENDELSON FORMAN and DANAN
the American public do not acknowledge that individuals involved in conflict, reconstruction, the civilian expertise and resources needed to do and stabilization operations. this work is inadequate relative to the demand. There is danger, however, to overstating The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have col- how pervasive these pathologies are. In truth, ored perceptions about whether and how the those institutions and individuals had many suc- United States should operate in conflict and cesses and made many improvements within post-conflict environments. In many ways, those Afghanistan and Iraq and in smaller, less-visible wars were exceptional: the scale of effort, the conflicts outside of those theaters. In Afghanistan, number of troops deployed, the number of U.S. for example, there has been a 43% reduction of casualties, and the amount of money were all enemy attacks over the past year; Afghan security far higher than any other U.S. intervention since forces, up 31% from 2010, now lead half of all the war in Vietnam. Many in Washington have combat operations; and school attendance rates concluded that U.S. interventions will not come for girls have increased 67% since 2001.2 In Iraq, close to that size any time in the near future, and there has been progress in transforming the secu- so the capabilities developed to participate in rity sector, and the decline in attacks on civilians those conflicts need not be emphasized in future has been noted by the United Nations report strategic decisions. on the country situation. Long-term stability, of course, will depend on the government’s ability the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have colored to ensure that these new forces remain part of perceptions about whether and how the United the governance solution, and not an obstacle to States should operate in conflict and post- development.3 conflict environments Still, after nearly two decades of experience in stabilization operations, civilian and military planners continue to face critical questions. Are In other ways, however, those conflicts lessons focused on more efficient engagement? brought to light the key challenges facing the How can incentives be altered so that the United United States as it participates in foreign internal States is prepared for ongoing small-scale crises conflicts at any scale. Problems have included so that they do not explode into larger, more civilian-military coordination, international complex operations that require far more costly civilian coordination, the inability of civilians military engagement? to move freely and interact with populations in This paper highlights the history of U.S. conflict zones, the inability to measure progress, involvement in these activities, the risks of the difficulty of translating tactical and opera- not being sufficiently prepared, and the basic tional success into strategic success, the desire requirements for effective engagement. The first to do for foreign partners what they should be two sections of this report briefly review the first doing for themselves, and the tendency to take two generations of U.S. engagement in what shortcuts. In other words, the pathologies that was then called “post-conflict reconstruction” exist in the U.S. response to the smallest con- and later termed “stabilization and reconstruc- flicts were shown in high relief in these large-scale tion.” The first generation, from the end of the conflicts in a way that, in the popular imagina- Cold War to the terrorist attacks of September tion, has reflected poorly on the institutions and 11, 2001, was characterized by strong interplay
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between the United States and multilateral orga- next. From Central America to the Balkans, the nizations in coordinating to help countries in common thread was that eventual peace agree- conflict. The second generation, from 9/11 to the ments provided a roadmap for reconstruction. end of the “surges” in Iraq and Afghanistan, was This first generation post-conflict reconstruction influenced by the Post-Conflict Reconstruction efforts were also models of partnerships among Commission’s work on the essential tasks needed the United States, the United Nations, and other for reconstruction and, later, by new doctrine for international donors, including for reconstruc- counterinsurgency. tion operations on the ground. After combat operations in Iraq and the end of the “surge” in Afghanistan, we have entered a elections were often used as an exit strategy for third generation in which skepticism about the military operations value of and capabilities for doing this work is on the upswing. After a decade of conflict, the public is tired and resources are declining. The During the 1990s, Western donors began a report’s third section, therefore, considers the cur- convening process to review the types of chal- rent state of the field in light of the political and lenges that arose from conflicts in weak and economic mood of the United States today. The fragile states. International development agen- conclusion section provides broad recommen- cies started to focus their attention on how to dations based on the lessons of the past decade.4 work in countries where violence threatened to destabilize the status quo. Loss of Soviet support The First Generation: 1989–2001 led to the implosion of many African countries By the end of the Cold War, the United States that had served as Cold War proxies, with deeper had been involved in a significant number of implications for foreign assistance. In Central military interventions. A tremendous amount America, the wars that had plagued El Salvador, of military activities and civilian efforts were Guatemala, and Nicaragua were ending due to allocated to “catching up” with the frequency of the discontinuation of Soviet resources to insur- these interventions. During this time frame, the gencies. Eastern Europe’s demise also left a fund- United States was engaged in a rapid-fire series of ing vacuum, but more importantly, an apparent events, including the unraveling of Somalia in the need to help demobilize militaries, reform the early 1990s, the overthrow of a democratically security sector, and integrate former Soviet satel- elected government in Haiti, a full-fledged hot lite states into the mainstream of Western Europe. war in the Balkans, and genocide in Rwanda. Early humanitarian interventions raised further The interventions were first characterized as questions about how to sustain a more stable humanitarian ones that were authorized by the environment after the initial crisis was subdued. UN Security Council, where the United States Elections were often used as an exit strategy for provided military and civilian support to multi- military operations, and donors interpreted them lateral operations. The United States was engaged as signaling the end of post-conflict efforts. in some overseas operations, then referred to as The World Bank created a Post-Conflict Unit humanitarian interventions, almost every other to support both research and short-term funding year during this decade; lessons learned from to help countries overwhelmed by new forms of one conflict or crisis were rarely applied to the instability in the absence of former hegemons.
PRISM 4, no. 2 Features | 33 MENDELSON FORMAN and DANAN
The unit sponsored ground-breaking research by analysts including Paul Collier who created new paradigms for understanding conflict drivers and indicators for potential conflict, which captured the thinking of governments seeking solutions to the challenges of stabilization and rebuilding. Collier’s research also found that more than half of the conflicts returned to active fighting within five years, despite reconstruction efforts.5 UN Photo/Marco Dormino The U.S. government was especially inter- Two UN Police Officers of the United Nations ested in finding a way forward in managing the Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) assist threat of weak states in a world that had over- National Police Officers at a checkpoint. night been transformed from a bipolar political environment to one where the United States was for Humanitarian Response (now the Bureau the dominant global actor. U.S. government offi- for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian cials began to explore what it would take to equip Assistance, or DCHA) marked a departure from all relevant government agencies–civilian and conventional approaches to development. OTI’s military alike–with the necessary tools to trans- mission was to integrate the immediate needs form a society from war to peace, from chaos to for political transformation with the tools of a capable state. During this period there was a development to produce tangible results. The hope that working with the prevention concept office helped to quickly develop programs and would help the international community to iden- disburse resources in places in transition. OTI’s tify the necessary tools to avoid fighting. This ability to integrate its rapid-response model into rethinking of conflict in the post–Cold War era the mainstream of development programming, resulted in a report of the Carnegie Commission however, remained an ongoing challenge in an on the Prevention of Deadly Conflict in 1996. agency whose culture was more accustomed to It opened the way for understanding how the working on long-range development. United Nations would become a necessary part- Throughout the first generation, approaches ner with the large Western donor states in bring- to societies emerging from conflict were more ing together the operational tools to prevent war. of a tactical exercise than the result of any stra- In the development arena, the U.S. Agency tegic thinking about the field. In spite of some for International Development (USAID) was also important efforts in the Balkans, Kosovo, East caught up in the challenge of how to provide Timor, Haiti, Guatemala, El Salvador, Liberia, humanitarian assistance in countries emerging Sierra Leone, Rwanda, and Burundi, the tendency from conflict that would be quick, effective, of the U.S. government was to throw resources at and targeted for immediate political needs. a problem rather than create a government-wide Ordinary tools that USAID had for putting in strategy to address specific needs. This began place programs to support development were to change in the Bill Clinton administration considered too long term to help places that were with the publication of Presidential Decision coming apart. In 1993, the creation of the Office Directive 56 (PDD-56), which attempted to cod- of Transition Initiatives (OTI) in the Bureau ify an interagency framework for coordinating
34 | Features PRISM 4, no. 2 INEVITABLE CONFLICTS, AVOIDABLE FAILURES the U.S. response to post-conflict emergencies.6 of George W. Bush had promised to put in place The immediate result of this effort was a better on reconstruction. But the timing of the work operational program in the case of Kosovo. On coincided with the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan the military side, the increased mission focus on and the beginning of a new phase in U.S. reconstruction projects was creating tension in nation-building efforts.7 an institution that was moving away from the traditional war-fighting role towards a broader it was apparent that civilian agencies of integration of stabilization projects. This change government were ill-prepared to manage was not at first embraced by our soldiers. The reconstruction work in a conflict-affected so-called military operations other than war environment became a transformative effort for the U.S. mil- itary as the evolving nature of warfare led to a growing role for military support in such activi- The 9/11 attacks on the United States trans- ties as community development, elections, and formed the U.S. approach to dealing with fragile police training. This tension would become quite states. In Afghanistan, government institutions clear after the invasion of Iraq in 2003. had been greatly damaged by decades of conflict. The Taliban had taken control of the country, The Second Generation: 2001–2011 allowing al Qaeda forces to grow and Osama bin In 2001, the Center of Strategic and International Laden to plan the 2001 attacks. Studies (CSIS) and the Association of the U.S. At the outset of hostilities, it was apparent Army began a project to explore a new frame- that civilian agencies of government were ill-pre- work for post-conflict reconstruction that pared to manage reconstruction work in a con- built on the interagency focus of PDD-56. The flict-affected environment. In 2002, as the United goal was to layout a set of recommendations States prepared for an invasion of Iraq, and with a based on lessons from the first generation of war ongoing in Afghanistan, the Pentagon argued rebuilding. The Commission on Post-Conflict that in the absence of an agreed-upon frame- Reconstruction included important leaders in the work for nation building, it should become the field from Congress, nongovernmental organiza- U.S. government’s focal point for reconstruction tions (NGOs), scholars, and other international activities. By January 2003, President Bush issued agencies. Based on lessons from first-generation National Security Directive 24, formally giving efforts in this field, the project team formulated DoD primacy in the post-invasion effort in Iraq.8 specific recommendations for the field, including This directive granted the department authority a reconstruction task framework based around to assert leadership in planning of operations, four pillars: security, justice and human rights, in spite of misgivings that Secretary of Defense socioeconomic well-being, and governance. Donald Rumsfeld had expressed about nation Project leaders recognized how difficult it was to building. While there were important bureau- implement the framework due to the dispersion cratic reasons that DoD wanted the upper hand of U.S. capabilities across so many government in planning, the department in practice was at a agencies, both military and civilian. The CSIS disadvantage. It lacked the institutional knowl- project research sought to inform a new policy edge and capacity to perform many of the essen- directive that the recently elected administration tial tasks in any reconstruction program; had no
PRISM 4, no. 2 Features | 35 MENDELSON FORMAN and DANAN experience helping build local government; did Change came forward with a set of recommen- not have good relationships with either interna- dations that included creating a Peacebuilding tional or local NGOs, except in terms of human- Commission among a group of states to support itarian assistance; and lacked a coordinating the ongoing needs of fragile states after the imme- mechanism for actions with the United Nations diate security and humanitarian needs had been and international financial institutions. While met. It identified a need for the United Nations DoD sought an advantage in communication to address the prevention of mass atrocities as and messaging, it was not very successful in com- part of its future work. It published its findings peting for Iraqi hearts and minds. in a report by the Secretary General of the United In 2005, the transfer of authority from Nations explaining why new, borderless threats the Department of State to the Department of were as problematic to security as threats caused Defense for the management of reconstruction by rivalries between states.10 efforts was completed when Defense Directive The 2008 elections brought a change to U.S. 3000.05 was issued.9 This policy committed the policy. The Barack Obama administration, with Pentagon to develop robust stability operations Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in the lead, reas- doctrine, resources, and capacities and defined serted civilian leadership in the area of recon- stability operations in terms of military and civil- struction. With the war in Iraq almost over, and ian activities. While a civilian coordinator for the war in Afghanistan still unresolved, Clinton reconstruction and stabilization (S/CRS) had undertook a whole-of-government review of how already been created at the State Department a the U.S. government could improve stabilization year earlier, in 2004, it was not until 2008 that and reconstruction operations, arguing that a S/CRS actually engaged in supporting stability diplomacy, development, and defense (or 3-D) operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. approach was essential. Clinton, however, noted The U.S. approach to stabilization and that coordination had still lagged behind, in reconstruction efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan spite of the growing expertise and capacity that was at that point firmly established as a military existed inside the government to respond to the mission. The Pentagon had significant resources rebuilding needs. A Quadrennial Diplomacy and for reconstruction activities, but it was also appar- Development Review (QDDR), which finally ent that there would be no short-term fix for sta- appeared in 2010, marked the culmination of bilizing governance in either Iraq or Afghanistan. thinking on the civilian side for how best to pro- This worried military officials who saw their mis- vide policymakers with a means for speaking sion as a short-term project. with one voice in managing the reconstruction At the same time that the United States was and stabilization agenda.11 This review, however, engaged in Iraq and Afghanistan, other countries was more a roadmap than an operational frame- were also destabilizing. These situations were work for civilian leadership. being managed by the United Nations, which The Third Generation? was conducting its own stabilization operations, but simultaneously undertaking its own review of Now, with U.S. troops withdrawn from Iraq and how it would continue to work with fragile states a departure date of 2014 set for Afghanistan, U.S. in a changed political environment. By 2005, the conflict and stabilization operations may be enter- High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and ing a third generation.12 The United States is likely
36 | Features PRISM 4, no. 2 INEVITABLE CONFLICTS, AVOIDABLE FAILURES UN Photo/Marie Frechon A member of the Indian battalion of the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic of the Congo (MONUC)
(based on historical experience) to find itself that the demand for this kind of work is not likely involved in a foreign internal conflict at some to subside, although the complexity of address- point in the near future, and when it does, that ing instability in the future will challenge U.S. involvement will likely trigger a renewed desire to military and civilian capacities. Since 1993, the learn and institutionalize the lessons of the past. United States has responded in some way to as At the moment, however, this third generation is many as 20 foreign internal conflicts, and twice as marked mainly by skepticism including by mem- many humanitarian responses, every year.13 The bers of Congress, who fund these activities, and U.S. capacity for conflict and stabilization oper- from civilian and military planners, who are still ations simply cannot meet this level of demand. unclear whether the metrics to determine success If limits cannot be placed on the frequency of have reflected the real situation on the ground. intervention, then either the capacity for inter- U.S. and international policies and interven- vention needs to be increased, or the capacity tions have certainly evolved with mixed results for prevention needs to be increased. As demand in terms of helping war-torn countries rebuild. continues, the United States has shown that is Much of this work has not been institutionalized, not always able to balance this trade-off. and the case has not been made to the American Aside from the regional bureaus at the State public that most U.S. efforts going forward are Department, which have overall responsibility for unlikely to follow the Afghanistan and Iraq U.S. policy in particular countries, and USAID’s model. Nor has the case been successfully made Office of Transition Initiatives, which was created
PRISM 4, no. 2 Features | 37 MENDELSON FORMAN and DANAN U.S. Army photo by Sgt. Christopher Hammond/Released photo by Army U.S. Afghan girls pose for a photo in their school classroom during a humanitarian aid supply operation conducted by Afghan soldiers with the 9th Commando Kandak and coalition special operation forces in Nizam-e Shahid district, Herat province, Afghanistan, Nov. 25, 2011.
specifically to address short-term stabilization the future will be essential in many parts of the needs, the key civilian institutions for stabili- world. The United Nations has acquired enor- zation and reconstruction are USAID’s Bureau mous experience in this work in the past decades. for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian The Peace Support Office in the Secretariat has Assistance (DCHA) and the State Department’s been an added complement to the Peacebuilding new Bureau for Conflict and Stabilization Commission, functioning as a coordination arm Operations (CSO), which has subsumed S/CRS. that integrates the operational components of DCHA faces institutional constraints as a result of peacebuilding with the planning and strategies congressional skepticism toward USAID. CSO is needed for UN agency field activities. But indi- a new institution and inherits S/CRS, which was vidual states have at times relied on the United barely given a chance to succeed, limited both Nations to take on missions they themselves have by the regional bureaus and available resources. wanted to avoid, and UN capacity is limited as Outside of the United States, many other well. Opportunities exist not only to improve bilateral and multilateral institutions are involved coordination with these traditional partners, but in this work. U.S. agencies have not always suc- also to increase engagement with regional orga- ceeded in coordinating with them at the strate- nizations such as the Economic Community of gic level or in the field. But given the declining West African States (ECOWAS) and the African resources any individual country is willing to Union; with developing countries who are contribute to these efforts, burden sharing in increasingly organizing themselves through
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mechanisms such as the G7+ group of fragile there will need to be a more integrated approach states; and with emerging powers such as Brazil, to security and development that includes both Turkey, and China, who have demonstrated a civilian and military actors willingness to participate in these efforts–but who sometimes have global objectives related to conflict-affected states that do not align with under authorities of the Department of Defense U.S. interests.14 rather than the Department of State, and this Aside from questions about when to inter- “has altered the relationship between the two vene and possible partners for cooperation, departments with respect to design, implemen- experts and practitioners have identified many tation, and direction of U.S. security assistance remaining opportunities for how to improve programming.”15 Clearly, new tools are needed to engagement in conflict and stabilization opera- manage the structural issues that affect instability tions. There is a growing recognition of the need in the countries in question, and those tools that to move from a sole emphasis on state building already exist must be fully employed in a way that and institution building toward a more pragmatic supports the development of weak states. engagement with de facto authority structures, Recommendations for the including non-state actors and hybrid political Next Generation: institutions on the ground. This is particularly relevant in conflict-affected countries, where sig- As this brief review demonstrates, the demand nificant territory is often controlled by a non- for conflict and stabilization operations is likely state actor or a rogue government official. Local to remain a constant for the foreseeable future. and local-national politics in violent and con- The transnational nature of many threats to peace flict-affected countries, however, are notoriously and stability will continue to increase the com- difficult for outsiders to understand. These types plexity of these operations, and the United States of situations do not lend themselves to military will need to understand the conditions under solutions, but require a greater need for police, which intervention can be successful. Whether to improved local institutions that manage justice prevent conflicts or to respond to them, there will and community-based development opportuni- need to be a more integrated approach to security ties that address fundamental structural needs. and development that includes both civilian and Because civilian development budgets are military actors. Addressing crises in an ad hoc being reduced, there is also an immediate need manner all but guarantees that interventions, to identify strategies and approaches that can do whether preventative or reactive, will be more more with less. Experts participating in the CSIS expensive in lives and dollars than they need to workshops suggested improved engagement with be. Six recommendations for building upon our veterans returning from Afghanistan and Iraq; knowledge and our current capacity suggest a increased participation of private-sector actors; way forward. and better utilization of experts in local envi- ronments. And almost all experts cite the need 1: Design planning processes around a set of objec- for improved interagency coordination in this tives that are commensurate with existing capabili- work. Over the last decade, new security assis- ties and resources. Realistic expectations are essen- tance authorities and programs have been created tial for the future of conflict and stabilization
PRISM 4, no. 2 Features | 39 MENDELSON FORMAN and DANAN operations. Being honest up front about what fragile states carefully, supporting actors that are U.S. institutions are capable of achieving and agents of change instead of trying to be the central what recipient-country institutions are capable agent of change. Serious progress must be made of absorbing is necessary to avoid raising expec- in engaging legitimate local ownership. It is also tations that cannot be met. Realistic planning important to expand the base of partners on the will improve the likelihood that objectives are ground to include more local talent. Local leaders met and that Congress, in turn, will approve not only have better knowledge of the environ- resources for future operations. Planning for ment, the stakes of mission success are also higher the “army we have” (as it were) rather than the for them. “army we wish we had” is critical for success. The U.S. government should also fulfill the 3: Engage emerging global powers on reconstruc- vision articulated in the QDDR–to ensure that tion and stabilization. Several emerging powers, civilian capacity for this type of complex work is including Brazil, Turkey, India, and China, have developed in a way that supports local country already expanded their investments in coun- needs. This means building up a strong civilian tries emerging from conflict. Their approach to force from government and the private sector assisting countries in transition may not always that can be rapidly deployed to help sustain coincide with that of the United States, but these security gains. Planning based not mainly on rising powers can help support and sustain gains a country’s supposed needs, but on an under- that were made through their own resources and standing of that country’s capacity to absorb knowledge of different regions. For example, the assistance, is equally critical. Real success is India and Turkey can provide valuable devel- likely to come in avoiding catastrophes rather opment options for helping to prevent places than creating great societies. like Afghanistan from falling back into conflict. Similarly, Brazil has been an invaluable partner 2: Create a plan to build institutional capabilities in helping to train police and provide security for prevention and reconstruction. If the short-term in countries such as Haiti. Its use of trilateral focus is on planning around what is achievable, cooperation projects has helped leverage its the long-term focus should be on building U.S. limited resources with U.S. programs in many institutions with the capacity for preventing con- parts of Africa. China has also been using its flict, which would reduce the likelihood of future own resources to promote economic develop- interventions. But success at reconstruction will ment in many unstable regions of Africa, while be determined not only by what the United States also sending peacekeepers and police to UN can contribute to the immediate needs, but also missions. While U.S. leadership is still highly by the on-the-ground capacity it leaves behind valued, burden sharing can mean more effective for rebuilding. State-level institutional reforms engagements. are important but insufficient. State building has focused too much on capacity and not enough 4: Make the private sector a partner from the on stability and local legitimacy. The countries in outset to promote a more sustainable future.The which the United States is operating face serious 40 poorest countries are also the most resource sovereignty concerns in a way that was not the case rich. Yet U.S. use of loan guarantees through two decades ago. The United States must engage the Overseas Private Investment Corporation
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(OPIC), or the way Treasury Department offi- the presence of the private sector in the early cials help promote credible financial systems, phases of reconstruction planning is now a given have often exacerbated the economic challenges these countries face. There is a growing recog- nition that the United States needs to look to people, these types of problems require improved partnerships with the private sector in countries internal security forces–especially policing skills that are fragile, but that could potentially emerge and stronger connections with economic devel- as viable nations if technical assistance were opment programs that address job creation and coupled with strong incentives for investment. access to education. New types of instability It has taken far too long for this awareness to demand a rethinking of how best to prevent enter into the planning of many reconstruction conflict through structural changes in the econ- efforts, but the presence of the private sector omy and in governance. Lessons learned about in the early phases of reconstruction planning rebuilding after war may also help bring local is now a given. A better understanding of the expertise and local voices into the process. Each private-sector role remains to be developed.16 new problem demands country-specific solu- Greater focus on local capacity for entrepre- tions, and U.S. government officials will need to neurial endeavors has also led many donors to work effectively with local actors, other donor consider working not only with micro-lending in partners, and international organizations. post-conflict environments, but also in fostering small and medium enterprises (SMEs) as a means 6: Operationalize the lessons from Busan and the of providing jobs and sustainable economic World Development Report. In 2011, the Busan growth.17 The use of new resources to help local Conference on Aid Effectiveness, held in South businesses rather than international contractors Korea, produced a “New Deal for Fragile States.” would be an enormous and constructive change This initiative, led by 19 of the 40 states catego- in many weak and fragile countries. The private rized as fragile, recommends that institutions such sector can lead not only with resources, but also as the World Bank acknowledge that the devel- in respect for rule of law and good governance. opment of these countries is a critical means for The challenge will be for donors to help balance preventing them from falling back into conflict the needs of local investors with the ongoing and chaos. The New Deal endorses a common fra- requirements for security that enable commerce gility assessment in affected countries; assistance and industry to flourish. strategies that are locally designed and led; mutual accountability between aid donors and recipients; 5: Improve civilian-military cooperation to respond transparent revenue management by fragile states; to complex operations that arise not only from and multi-stakeholder dialogue on development traditional conflicts but from crime and violence priorities in fragile states. It also recognizes the as well. Urban conflict arising from transna- growing voice of the G7+ country ministers, who tional criminal activity accounts for 88% of the are now asserting their own demands for develop- lethal violence that countries experience today.18 ment assistance that addresses the specific needs Whether it is the gangs of Central America and of these poor countries, rather than allowing assis- Mexico, or the favelas (slums) of Rio, or the vio- tance to be imposed from the outside without lence associated with trafficking of drugs and adequate regard to individual country needs.19
PRISM 4, no. 2 Features | 41 MENDELSON FORMAN and DANAN U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Eric C. Tretter/Released Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Eric C. Navy photo by U.S. United Nations police guard the main gate at a medical site in Port-au-Prince, Haiti, during Continuing Promise, August 21, 2011.
The 2011 World Development Report, in con- lessons into operational capabilities. The United sidering the particular challenges of development Kingdom, France, Canada, and other donors, for in fragile and conflict-affected states, concludes example, have been working together to opera- that development actors must mobilize around tionalize the World Development Report, and a coherent, inclusive plan, rather than focus on moves such as this should be encouraged among various parts of the technical institutional reform other donors as well. process. It will be important to invest in citizen Conclusion security, justice, and jobs, and to address issues such as crime reduction or civilian protection, Since the end of the Cold War, it has become rather than only emphasizing issues that are seen increasingly clear that nation building imposed as directly affecting U.S. national security, like from the outside is unlikely to create the social counternarcotics or counterterrorism.20 capital on the ground necessary for stable insti- These efforts are not the final word on con- tutions. Local leadership, coupled with citizen flict, stabilization, and reconstruction operations, engagement, has proven the only way to ensure but they are useful for providing two import- that international investment in stability and ant focal points for efforts to improve practice. reconstruction helps to catalyze sustainable The challenge for the United States and other change. Security provision alone is insufficient international donors will be to translate their for rebuilding–the private sector, religious
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networks, women’s groups, and the international 4 The content of this paper has been informed by two workshops convened by CSIS in the spring of 2012, community must all be engaged in creating the 10 years after the creation of the joint CSIS/Association of foundations for long-term stability. U.S. leader- the U.S. Army (AUSA) Post-Conflict Reconstruction (PCR) ship will continue to be required in the future, Commission. In March 2012, a group of 22 experts met particularly when weak and fragile states pose for a half-day meeting at CSIS, “Politics and Prospects for Stabilization and Reconstruction: PCR Ten Years Later.” risks to U.S. security. But the future of U.S. efforts 5 Paul Collier et al., Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil in this field may well be focused on address- War and Development Policy, (Washington, DC: World Bank ing new forms of violence, not from wars, but 2003), 22. 6 PDD/NSC 56: Managing Complex Contingency from criminal elements and transnational actors Operations,” The White House, May 1997, available at who count on the weakness of states to impose
PRISM 4, no. 2 Features | 43 MENDELSON FORMAN and DANAN
States, (December 2011), available at
44 | Features PRISM 4, no. 2 Regime Change Without Military Force: Lessons from Overthrowing Milosevic
By Gregory L. Schulte
“Gotov je!” (“He’s finished!”) —Serb resistance slogan, directed at Milosevic
fter a decade of war in Afghanistan and Iraq, the Obama Administration has adopted a new defense strategy that recognizes the need to limit our strategic ends in an era of increasing A limits on our military means.1 The strategy calls for armed forces capable of conducting a broad range of missions, in a full range of contingencies, and in a global context that is increasingly complex. It calls for doing so with a smaller defense budget. Opportunities for savings come from reducing the ability to fight two regional conflicts simultaneously and from not sizing the force to conduct prolonged, large-scale stability operations. Seemingly missing from the new defense strategy are the types of wars we fought in Afghanistan and Iraq. Both started with forcible changes in regime – the armed ouster of the Taliban and Saddam Hussein from their positions of power. In each case, the rapid removal of leadership was followed by lengthy counterinsurgency operations to bring security to the population and build up a new govern- ment. The duration and difficulty of these operations and their cost in deaths, destruction, and debt were not understood at their outset. Whereas past defense strategies foresaw the prospect of forcible regime change,2 the new defense strategy does not. Thus, absent a direct threat to U.S. vital interests, any future endeavors to oust unfriendly leaders are likely to be pursued by non-military means. U.S. military forces may play a supporting role at most. Libya and Syria demonstrate the new defense strategy in action. While regime change has been an objective, the United States has worked through partners and limited or ruled out the use of military force.
Ambassador Gregory L. Schulte recently joined the faculty of the National War College in Washington, DC. He was a Special Assistant to the President on the staff of the National Security Council during the overthrow of Slobodan Milosevic.
PRISM 4, no. 2 Features | 45 Schulte
If U.S. policymakers consider non-military Milosevic was weakened, his political legitimacy regime change in the future, they may wish to tarnished at home and abroad. look for lessons learned before Afghanistan and Milosevic’s confrontation with the UN and Iraq, lessons learned from the 2000 overthrow NATO isolated him internationally. He also faced of Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic. While the growing opposition domestically. In September circumstances were unique and perhaps uniquely 1999, opposition rallies in twenty cities in Serbia favorable to a democratic transition, many of the urged Milosevic to resign. The police and army lessons are probably enduring. cracked down, but Milosevic’s regime had dif- ficulty suppressing opposition leaders and the Deposing a Dictator3 student movement OTPOR – Serbian for “resis- In 2000, Slobodan Milosevic, then president tance.” OTPOR, a loosely organized network of of what remained of the Federal Republic of activists trained in peaceful resistance, used a vari- Yugoslavia,4 set the stage for his own demise. He ety of nonviolent tactics to excoriate the regime did so by calling for elections, seeking to bolster and build popular support. his legitimacy at home and abroad, while miscal- In January 2000, OTPOR organized an culating his own ability to fix the results. Orthodox New Year’s Eve rally against Milosevic’s rule. In April, 100,000 citizens of Serbia gathered despite instigating ethnic violence and genocide in Belgrade to call for early presidential elections. in Bosnia and Croatia in the early 1990s, he had In May, Serbian opposition parties, despite a emerged unscathed as leader of Serbia history of fragmentation and in-fighting, united under the Democratic Opposition of Serbia. They put forward a single candidate for the elections: Personally and politically, Milosevic had Vojislav Kostunica. survived North Atlantic Treaty Organization In July, Milosevic made his mistake, (NATO) Operation Allied Force, 78 days of air announcing early elections in September. strikes against Serbia and its forces in Kosovo Milosevic probably gambled that he could con- the year before. While longer than the United trol the media, divide the opposition, and deny States or its allies anticipated, the campaign of them time to organize and build support. He military strikes and non-military measures ulti- probably also gambled on stuffing the ballot mately succeeded, compelling Milosevic to halt boxes, particularly those coming over the border ethnic cleansing in Kosovo, withdraw Serb secu- from Kosovo, still nominally part of the Yugoslav rity forces, and consent to the introduction of republic. a UN administration and NATO-led force, but The democratic opposition of Serbia stayed leaving Milosevic in place. united. In August, OTPOR launched a country- Milosevic was a survivor. Despite insti- wide campaign dubbed “Gotov je!” – “He’s fin- gating ethnic violence and genocide in Bosnia ished!” Volunteers pasted “Gotov je!” stickers and Croatia in the early 1990s, he had emerged across Serbia, including over Milosevic’s cam- unscathed as leader of Serbia and signatory of paign posters. the 1995 Dayton Peace Accords. Many analysts For the September elections, OTPOR and predicted that the 1999 NATO air strikes would the opposition recruited, trained, and organized cement Milosevic’s grip on power. Instead, more than 30,000 volunteers to monitor the
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Milosevic’s death precluded justice, but his removal from power set the stage for bringing democracy to Serbia and bringing Serbia back into Europe. While NATO’s relations with Russia were severely strained, the interests of the Serb people, the region, and the United States and its allies were well served. Supporting the Overthrow
DoD photo by Senior Airman Sean Worrell, Worrell, Airman Sean Senior DoD photo by (released) Air Force U.S. The people of Serbia ousted Milosevic, but Former President Bill Clinton speaks to American, British, and French troops deployed to Skopje, they had help. Even before NATO’s air strikes, Macedonia, on June 22, 1999. Many of the troop will President Clinton and his foreign policy team become part of KFOR. had decided that Slobodan Milosevic, while a vote. The United Nations (UN) and NATO col- signatory of the Dayton Peace Accords for Bosnia, laborated to interdict stuffed ballot boxes coming was an obstacle to peace throughout the region. from Kosovo. When the observers announced the In September 1998, in the face of anti-Albanian victory of Kostunica, the Milosevic-controlled violence in Kosovo instigated by Milosevic, Federal Election Commission called for a run- the U.S. Administration agreed to develop and off. A united opposition refused and called for implement a strategy to weaken his rule. a general strike. In December 1998, the basic strategy was In October, coal miners – previously among approved. The first element was to strengthen Milosevic’s strongest supporters – went on strike democratic forces in Serbia, including the and then led a march on Belgrade, using a bull- political opposition, student movements, and dozer to push away barricades. Serbia’s police independent media. The second element was and military, in contact with the opposition, to bolster President Djukanovic of neighboring refused to intervene. It seemed that Milosevic Montenegro, an increasingly independent prov- had passed the tipping point that all despots fear: ince of the federal republic, as a counterweight to when the regime fears the people more than the Milosevic. The third element was to undermine people fear the regime. Milosevic’s pillars of power. These were identified Milosevic acknowledged defeat on October as his security services, finances, and control of 6 after a private meeting with the Russian foreign the media. minister. Standing before the television cameras, This basic strategy, adapted as necessary Milosevic looked stunned. His self-confidence to changing circumstance, remained in place shattered, he was finished. “Gotov je!” had gone through the 1999 air campaign, which helped from slogan to reality. set the conditions for Milosevic’s removal, and Under international pressure, the Serbian through 2000, when Milosevic was removed government arrested Milosevic in April 2001, and from power. then extradited him to The Hague to be tried for Setting the Conditions war crimes before an international tribunal. The “Butcher of the Balkans” died of a heart attack NATO’s air campaign, initiated in March 1999, before his trial could conclude. was aimed at protecting the Albanian population
PRISM 4, no. 2 Features | 47 Schulte
in Kosovo, not at toppling Milosevic. In April, by diplomatic efforts, economic sanctions, and with Milosevic refusing to meet NATO demands, information operations designed to isolate the Administration agreed to a strengthened Milosevic and undermine his pillars of support. effort to support his removal. In a major address, A “Ring Around Serbia” of radio stations broad- President Clinton publically called for a “demo- cast truthful information into the country, under- cratic transition in Serbia, for the region’s democ- cutting Milosevic’s efforts to squash reports of racies will never be safe with a belligerent tyranny defeats and defections. NATO aircraft dropped in their midst.”5 leaflets reminding the Serbian people of the lux- urious lifestyle of Milosevic’s son while their own NATO aircraft dropped leaflets reminding the sons were being sent to Kosovo to fight. Serbian people of the luxurious lifestyle of In the final weeks of the air campaign, the Milosevic’s son while their own sons were being United States used the diplomatic end game to sent to Kosovo to fight keep Milosevic isolated internationally. A newly issued war crimes indictment against Milosevic helped discourage diplomatic free-lancing by As Allied Force extended into May, the outside parties. The goal was to deny Milosevic Administration broadened its politico-military international recognition that he could use planning from air strikes backed by diplomacy to restore political legitimacy at home. In the to a more comprehensive strategic campaign. end, rather than sending Ambassador Richard The campaign encompassed a wide range of dip- Holbrooke to negotiate a settlement with lomatic, information, military, economic, and Milosevic, who would have used such a meeting financial measures and sought to bring pressure to elevate his standing, a NATO general met with directly on Milosevic and his regime. A diplomatic Serbian counterparts to agree on military techni- effort, lead by Strobe Talbott, the U.S. Deputy cal arrangements to codify his surrender. Secretary of State, was designed to show Milosevic NATO’s air campaign weakened Milosevic. that he was faced with increasing international It also strengthened the resolve of the nineteen isolation and a withdrawal of Russian support. NATO allies that Milosevic had to go. This set the Immediate military objectives of the strategic stage for a concerted international effort, after the campaign plan remained focused on reducing air strikes, to force him out. Serbia’s ability to conduct operations in Kosovo. Forcing Him Out However, intermediate objectives now included exacerbating the security forces’ discontent with In July 1999, a month after the successful conclu- Milosevic’s leadership, convincing Milosevic “cro- sion of NATO’s intervention, the President’s for- nies” that a settlement – including through his eign policy team agreed to pursue an aggressive possible removal – would be better than contin- democratization program for Serbia. The pro- ued recalcitrance, and building public discontent gram continued efforts to undermine Milosevic’s and opposition with Milosevic’s continued rule. sources of power, including through support for NATO air strikes began including regime-re- independent media. It also put increased empha- lated targets such as leadership, state-controlled sis on building a cohesive and effective oppo- media, and crony assets that met legal target- sition. President Clinton publicly announced ing requirements. They were complemented additional funding to support democracy.
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Using that funding, non-government orga- to discredit him – while fully recognizing that nizations like the International Republican he would spare no effort to rig them. The plan Institute (IRI) and National Democratic Institute involved supporting the political opposition in (NDI) began providing advice and support to presenting a unified challenge and maximizing independent civil organizations and opposition the cost to the regime of committing electoral parties. IRI helped organize training of OTPOR fraud. Planning involved efforts to expose cheat- in strategic non-violence. NDI used polling ing, channel public anger, and encourage civil data to help opposition candidates understand disobedience immediately after a stolen vote. Milosevic’s political vulnerabilities and the The administration also developed a plan to importance of unifying behind one candidate. deter Milosevic from launching a spoiling attack With U.S. encouragement, neighboring countries on Montenegro, concerned that he would do provided a safe place for the opposition to meet, so as a way to interdict support for the opposi- strategize, and train. tion or as an excuse to call off the elections. The Vojislav Kostunica was a committed Serb United States provided diplomatic and economic nationalist and by no means the “U.S. candi- support to the Djukanovic government and con- date.” Indeed, he and his close advisors had ducted robust information operations based on a decided anti-American streak. However, the military activities in the region in order to keep administration believed that Kostunica would Milosevic and his generals uncertain about a pos- abide by his country’s constitution and interna- sible NATO or U.S. response to an attack.6 tional commitments. Equally important, polling The administration also sought to bring data showed Kostunica was the only member of Russia on board. The White House urged the the opposition who could beat Milosevic. Quiet Kremlin to support a unified opposition and U.S. engagement, backed with polling data and the removal of Milosevic by the end of the year conditions on electoral support, encouraged the should the elections be stolen or Milosevic opposition to unify behind him. launch an attack on Montenegro. Securing With the opposition growing stronger, in Russian support was a challenge, given Moscow’s February 2000 the President’s foreign policy opposition to NATO’s air campaign the year team adopted an updated strategy for regime before, but seemed to pay off in the end game, change. The strategy pressed forward with isolat- when Milosevic stepped down immediately after ing Milosevic and promoting opposition unity a meeting with the Russian foreign minister. and effectiveness. It targeted sanctions against At the beginning of September, with Milosevic’s regime and its supporters and sought the opposition unified and polling showing to demonstrate that his removal would benefit decreasing popular support for Milosevic, the the Serb people. Finally, the strategy sought to President’s foreign policy team reviewed its strat- shore up Kosovo and Montenegro against any egy. They agreed on a subtle but significant shift attempt by Milosevic to foment a crisis to distract in objective: rather than treating the elections from his growing problems in Serbia. as an opportunity to discredit Milosevic and After Milosevic’s July call for elections, the thereby support regime change over the lon- administration again updated its plans. The ger term, the administration would support the updated plan, agreed in August, aimed at making opposition in using the elections to achieve his the elections a referendum on Milosevic – seeking immediate removal.
PRISM 4, no. 2 Features | 49 Schulte
Concerned that Milosevic would use an been barred, and opened the door to economic active American role to rally nationalists behind recovery through the restoration of trade and him, the President’s foreign policy team decided investment. Over the longer-term, the prospect to take cues from the Serb opposition immedi- of EU accession gave considerable incentive to ately following the elections. It further decided to implementing democratic reform and coopera- keep the Europeans in the forefront to showcase tion with the international war crimes tribunal. the broad based nature of international oppo- Keys to Success sition to Milosevic’s rule. It agreed to encour- age Moscow to support the opposition publicly, Success did not manifest itself in a coup d’état which it did not, and tell Milosevic to go pri- or a bullet to the head. Milosevic’s decision to vately, which it possibly did. step down was his own. No longer alive and a Efforts to oust Milosevic came at the end of liar when he was, we will never know what moti- President Clinton’s second and last term in office. vated Milosevic during his final days in power. There was reason for concern that Milosevic or Presumably he calculated that his grip on power his supporters could perceive that they would was about to be lost and that his personal inter- “wait out” the Clinton Administration. With ests – perhaps even his personal survival – were White House encouragement, both Presidential best served by stepping down. candidates signaled support for Milosevic’s Opposition leaders and student activists removal, and efforts were made to convey their played the lead role in putting Milosevic in this positions to those around Milosevic. position. However, their courage and determi- nation would probably have been for naught Consolidating the Results without the international effort, organized by the When Vojislav Kostunica assumed the Yugoslav United States, to level the playing field and under- presidency, the United States and European Union mine Milosevic’s legitimacy and sources of power. (EU) laid out a road map for normalization of Keys to success for the U.S.-led international relations. President Clinton wrote to Kostunica effort included: personally to underscore the U.S. administration’s commitment to normalization and the consolida- ■■ Understanding and undermining tion of democracy in Serbia. U.S. developmental Milosevic’s sources of power; assistance shifted from support for the political ■■ Isolating him and delegitimizing his lead- opposition to institutional reform. ership at home and abroad; ■■ Quietly uniting, training, and supporting lifting of UN and other multilateral sanctions the domestic opposition; helped establish the legitimacy of the new ■■ Preparing to consolidate a transition to a government new, democratic leadership; ■■ Deterring a spoiling attack on Montenegro.
The lifting of UN and other multilateral Also key was the international nature of sanctions helped establish the legitimacy of the effort. Secretary of State Madeline Albright the new government, allowed it to return to and her senior advisors were in regular contact international organizations from which it had with European counterparts. The EU pointedly
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excluded Serbia from a new Stability Pact for played an important role on the periphery of Southeast Europe, demonstrating that a dem- Serbia: stabilizing Kosovo through the estab- ocratic Serbia had a place in Europe, but that lishment of KFOR and deterring a Serb spoiling a Serbia ruled by Milosevic did not. With U.S. attack on Montenegro. Thus the main military encouragement and support, former activists contribution was to contain within Serbia the from new NATO members helped train OTPOR, struggle for its leadership. and military officials from NATO partners in the region warned their counterparts in Serbia Milosevic, while brutal, never directed at Serbs against support for a falling regime. the same the level of violence used by other Another key to success was the interagency regimes nature of the effort. Senior interagency bodies met regularly to approve strategy and review implementation. A senior advisor to the Secretary Together these efforts tipped the psychologi- of State oversaw strategy development and imple- cal climate in Serbia in the direction feared by all mentation. An ambassador in a neighboring despots: to the point where the regime feared the country coordinated efforts in the field. The people more than the people feared the regime. staff of the National Security Council coordi- At first a slogan, “Gotov je!” – “he’s finished” – nated interagency efforts, including sanctions, became reality. information operations, and politico-military Lessons for Regime Change planning. The Intelligence Community played a critical role in this whole-of-government effort Regime change without force succeeded in through its analysis of political developments Serbia, but the context was unique. Milosevic, and opportunities within Serbia as well as other while brutal, never directed at Serbs the same the supporting activities. The United States Agency level of violence used by other regimes against for International Development (USAID) played their own citizens. The Serb opposition was able a similarly important role through its support for to use peaceful resistance and the ballot box; democratization activities through nongovern- other regimes may more ruthlessly suppress any mental organizations such as the NDI and IRI. dissent. The United States had strong partners in A final key to success – indeed a prerequisite ousting Milosevic, united through alliance and – was a Presidential decision at the outset that a shared horror of his atrocities; other regimes U.S. national interests, including peace in the might not be so regionally isolated. Europe was Balkans and the success of our military commit- able to exercise significant “soft power” through ments there, required the removal of Milosevic. the attractive prospect of EU accession; such Presidential commitment remained essential, instruments might not always be so available or including in face of an end game that could have effective. The eventual ouster of Milosevic did not turned violent, but fortunately did not. lead to a widespread breakdown in governance The role of the military was limited, though and security; this could be a real risk in other it did play an important supporting role. In 1999, cases, particularly if prolonged internal division Allied Force did not seek to dislodge, Milosevic has weakened institutions or degenerated into but an important secondary objective was to sectarian strife. Finally, Milosevic lacked the will loosen his grip on power. In 2000, the military or means to lash out against the United States
PRISM 4, no. 2 Features | 51 Schulte
and EU; other leaders, threatened with overthrow, the experience of overthrowing Milosevic offers may be ready to strike the U.S. or allied home- some general lessons. Specifically, it suggests a lands, or forces with terrorism, cyber attacks, or whole-of-government approach to: even weapons of mass destruction. ■■ Develop an in-depth intelligence assess- interfering in a country’s internal political ment of the regime, its supporters, and its vul- structure entails great uncertainty and risk nerabilities; ■■ Identify and undercut key pillars of power (e.g., police, state media, close associates); Thus any consideration of regime change ■■ Attack the regime’s legitimacy through inter- as an end must start with an understanding of national isolation and information operations; the context, to include: the international and ■■ Secure the widest possible international regional environment; the country, its people, support, particularly in the regime, and use and its institutions; and the nature and interests it to show that regime change will lift inter- of the regime. Is the regime vulnerable to inside national isolation and bring benefits to the and outside pressure? Is there a viable opposition country; with capacity to govern and values and interests ■■ Help the opposition to unify, to identify aligned with our own? How might a regime react regime weaknesses, to communicate with the with its survival threatened? What about third- public, and to expand its operations; party reactions? What risks might these pose to ■■ Co-opt or marginalize potential spoilers, U.S. interests? Is there adequate domestic support whether opposition leaders or outside powers; in the U.S. and partner countries, particularly if ■■ Convince the ruler that being out of power the risks materialize? Absent an imminent threat, is safer for himself and his family than being can the United States credibly defend the legit- in power; and/or convince those around him imacy of what amounts to interference in the that forcing his departure is essential to their internal affairs of a sovereign state? political, economic, or personal survival; Interfering in a country’s internal political ■■ Block courses of action that the ruler might structure entails great uncertainty and risk. In take to distract the population, undercut the the case of Serbia, success was by no means guar- opposition, or fracture international cohesion; anteed. U.S. efforts to oust Milosevic spanned ■■ Lead an international effort, synchronizing two years. They could have easily spanned the activities of others, leveraging their knowl- two administrations, particularly had not edge and influence, while minimizing U.S. vis- Milosevic misjudged in his call for early elec- ibility as necessary to protect the opposition tions. Widespread violence in Serbia, a spoiling legitimacy; attack against Montenegro, or renewed fighting ■■ Prepare to consolidate an expeditious tran- in Bosnia or Kosovo were all real risks that were sition to democratic government by extending fortunately avoided. A regime change strategy recognition, providing assistance, lifting sanc- is no sure thing, particularly without the use of tions, and otherwise helping to establish its military force. legitimacy at home and abroad; If regime change is deemed desirable and ■■ Seek and showcase U.S. domestic bipar- feasible despite these uncertainties and risks, tisan support to discourage the regime from
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concluding or suggesting to its supporters that of this work, as is partnering with other countries it can outlast a particular administration. that have resources and influence to help consoli- date a democratic transition. Whether supporting As reflected in the very first step, the role regime change or preparing for its aftermath, a of intelligence is essential. Foundational intel- conscious decision needs to be made about the ligence for regime change requires collecting level of U.S. visibility. In some cases, it is prudent against some very hard targets: the perceptions, to hide the hand of the United States, or to mask intentions, and decision-making process of an it as part of a larger effort, to avoid tainting the autocratic leadership and the networks of people, opposition or causing unhelpful reactions by power, and money that cement its grip on power. governments supportive of the regime or suspi- Intelligence also must play a role in validating or cious of our motives. questioning the assumption of policy makers. Will, for example, power transition without vio- the Defense Department might need to conduct lence? Will key institutions hold or disintegrate? planning, exercises, and preventive deployments, Is the opposition capable of effective governance? preferably together with allies or partners How are third parties likely to react? Skillful and knowledgeable diplomacy is also essential. Maintaining cohesion between The military might have a role, but largely the U.S. and its international partners is criti- in support. Even without strikes from the air or cal. This is a classic role of traditional diplomacy “boots on the ground,” the Department of Defense and public diplomacy. However, another type can support intelligence collection directed at the of diplomacy is also required: diplomacy that regime and its security forces. It can also help, as reaches into the society and its governing struc- appropriate, with providing the opposition intel- tures to develop understanding of the regime and ligence, training, and other support. The Defense its control mechanisms, to seek out strengthens Department can contribute to whole-of-govern- and vulnerabilities, and to build partnerships ment efforts to weaken the regime’s sources of with the opposition and civil society. This type power. This might include information and cyber of diplomacy may be conducted in safe havens operations to disrupt command and control of in neighboring countries. It may increasingly security forces, thereby sowing confusion, sapping be conducted in the cyberspace of the country morale, encouraging defections, and degrading itself. It may be conducted among and through the regime’s ability to conduct internal security the country’s diaspora, including in the United operations. It might include using military-to-mil- States. It may also be conducted through regional itary relationships with countries in the region to partners with contacts and understanding that contact elements of the regime’s security forces exceed our own. and to encourage, facilitate, and even reward Simultaneously, diplomatic and develop- defections. Finally, the Defense Department might mental efforts need to lay the groundwork to need to conduct planning, exercises, and preven- help the opposition assume the responsibilities tive deployments, preferably together with allies of governance. Plans and capacity for election or partners, to help deter regime military actions monitoring, institution building, and security and reassure neighboring countries that might force vetting and reform are important aspects otherwise feel threatened.
PRISM 4, no. 2 Features | 53 Schulte The Council of the European Union The Former Serbian Prime Minister Vojislav Kostunica (right) with former EU High Representative Javier Solana at press conference.
Implications for Ousting Assad Regime change in Syria is most likely to A dozen years after supporting a successful come from within. Moreover, the violence and change in regime in Serbia, the United States has sectarian conflict do not bode well for a peaceful now committed to non-military regime change and democratic transition after Assad’s removal. in Syria. While some lessons from Serbia may Compared to Serbia, the U.S. influence is lim- apply, the circumstances are vastly different. ited over the violence struggle for power within Syria is not Serbia. The sectarian politics Syria, particularly given the conflicting interests and level of violence are completely different. So inside and outside that country. Nevertheless, the are the leaders and their opponents. Milosevic, United States and its partners may still have some while brutal, never directed at his opponents leverage to shape the outcome. the same level of violence used by Assad. The Relevant lessons from the overthrow of Serbian opposition was relatively unified and Milosevic center around the need to work with used peaceful opposition and the ballot box, like-minded countries to increase opposition whereas the Syria resistance is divided and has unity, undermine Assad’s sources of power, and taken up arms. Milosevic had the diplomatic prepare for transition after his ouster. Given support of Moscow and Beijing, as Assad does the enormous risks of armed intervention, the today, but never the active backing of a state like military role is best kept limited to supporting Iran. And Milosevic, unlike Assad, did not have whole-of-government activities to undermine the access to chemical weapons. morale and cohesion of Assad’s security forces
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and to working with neighboring countries such undercutting these sources of power in partnership as Turkey and Jordan to deter Syrian military with a unified opposition may be the best way to provocations and contain the violence to Syria. loosen a tyrant’s grip on power and ultimately convince him that “he’s finished.” Conclusion
In a world of continuing challenges and increas- ing complexity, regime change will retain its Notes apparent attractions. Ousting a tyrant can seem more attractive politically and acceptable morally 1 “Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for st than dealing with a despotic regime. Deposing 21 Century Defense,” , January 2012, available at
PRISM 4, no. 2 Features | 55 Photo by Staff Sgt. Kaily Brown
A team leader for a U.S. Special Operations Cultural Support Team, hands out utensils in the village of Oshay, Afghanistan. Changing of the Guard: Civilian Protection for an Evolving Military
By Larry Lewis and Sarah Holewinski
ivilian casualties can risk the success of a combat mission. While not new, this is a lesson US defense forces have had to repeatedly relearn. Historically, civilian protection and efforts to C address harm became priorities only when external pressures demanded attention. As the Pentagon reshapes its defenses and fighting force for the next decade, continuing this ad hoc pattern in the future is neither strategically smart nor ethically acceptable. The budget submitted this year to Congress by Secretary of Defense Panetta charts a strategic shift toward smaller and more clandestine operations. Our forces will need to become leaner and more agile, able to take decisive action without the heavy footprint of recent wars. There are good political and economic reasons for this; certainly, maintaining a large military presence around the world is no longer feasible. Yet, as America loses its military bulk, it cannot afford to lose its memory as well. General Dempsey, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, called upon the military to “learn the lessons from the past decade of operations.” One of those critical lessons is that strategic objectives and ethical leadership are undermined if civilian protection is not integrated into the military’s overall approach. A growing body of research, including that conducted by this article’s authors, shows that civilian casualties (CIVCAS) and the mishandling of the aftermath can compel more people to work against U.S. interests. Indeed, America’s image has suffered for years under the weight of anger and dismay that a nation, which stands by the value of civilian protection in wartime, seemed indifferent to civilian suffering. Over time, U.S. commanders in Iraq and Afghanistan began to understand this calculus and took action. They began publicly expressing regret for civilian losses and offering amends for civil- ian deaths, injuries, and property damage, first in Iraq and then in Afghanistan. Military leadership
Dr. Larry Lewis, is the CNA Representative, JCOA, Joint Staff J7 JCW. Sarah Holewinski, is Executive Director, Center for Civilians in Conflict.
PRISM 4, no. 2 Features | 57 LEWIS and HOLEWINSKI realized that they could lower their civilian casu- requirement to engage hostage-takers and terror- alty rates if they recorded casualty statistics as a ists in the midst of hostages or other civilians. basis for learning, so they created a tracking cell However, some SOF actions in combat theaters in Afghanistan to do just that. Pre-deployment can carry significant risk of civilian casualties. For training back home began to include seminars example, network-based targeting of enemy net- on the civilian as the “center of gravity” and con- works in Iraq and Afghanistan, where SOF infil- sequence management protocols, on top of the trate villages nightly to capture or kill combatants basic Laws of Armed Conflict. U.S. commanders hiding within the population, puts them in fre- made themselves accessible to civil society and, quent and direct contact with civilians. Illustrating instead of immediately denying incidents of civil- this, SOF in Afghanistan caused a significant ian harm, told the media they would investigate number of the overall civilian casualties between and recognize any civilian loss. 2007-2009, though they were only a small part of These practices are marked progress in mit- the total force. Battlespace owners and Provincial igating both civilian harm and its impact on the Reconstruction Team commanders complained mission, and rise above the conduct of most war- about the negative effects of SOF-caused civilian ring parties in the world, helping to reestablish casualties and uncoordinated actions in their areas U.S. ethical authority in wartime. Yet not one of of operation during this time period. the practices above has been made into standing Adding insult to injury, in the case of clan- U.S. policy, despite how important they have destine special operations, civilians may have proved to our combat strategy and ethos. little recourse when harm is caused; the people As Washington shifts its focus from counter- who caused their losses are nowhere to be found. insurgency to counterterrorism, and from large- During operations where conventional military scale ground operations to more discrete and forces are in the same battlespace as SOF and oftentimes-unmanned operations, the progress maintain a practice of meeting with community U.S. forces have made on preventing and miti- and offering monetary payments to the family for gating civilian harm may soon be lost. Below, we its losses, the required close coordination of SOF analyze three of the Obama administration’s new and conventional forces does not always occur. military priorities that have real implications for As many examples of SOF-caused civilian casu- U.S. efforts to avoid civilian harm in future wars: alties in Afghanistan show—such as incidents in increased reliance on special operations forces Shinwar in March 2007, in Azizabad in August (SOF), new technologies including unmanned 2008, and in Bala Balouk in May 2009—ignoring aircraft systems (UAS), and partnering with civilian harm can exacerbate the negative sec- foreign allies to conduct combat operations. ond-order effects of casualties at both tactical and Applying hard-won lessons of civilian protection strategic levels, turning the local population away and harm response are critical to all three. from U.S. and coalition interests. Ironically, it can also lead to increased pressure to restrict the use Special Operations Forces Out Front of force and thus limit overall freedom of action. The “smaller and leaner” fighting force of the At the same time, the high level of profes- future will emphasize special operations. SOF sionalism and rapid adaptability of SOF make personnel are trained to be the best and most them uniquely suited to understand the mis- discriminate shooters in the world, due to the sion risk associated with civilian casualties and
58 | Features PRISM 4, no. 2 CHANGING OF THE GUARD to figure out ways to better avoid causing civilian recent SOF best practices and lessons garnered harm in new, complex environments. As one pos- from missteps in Afghanistan. The Army recently itive example, in early 2009 SOF in Afghanistan published a handbook on civilian harm reduction adopted specific tactics, techniques and proce- and mitigation—Afghanistan Civilian Casualty dures (TTP) that better protected civilians during Prevention (No. 12-16)—that could serve as a their operations. Under this new approach, US template starting point for SOF doctrine with some SOF greatly reduced their rate of civilian casu- adjustments to better account for SOF missions alties while being more effective in carrying out and the specific focus areas mentioned above. their mission. That shift in priorities and flexibil- SOF tend to have more resources than ity is a model for the rest of the force. The lessons conventional forces for accelerated fielding of learned from this evolving approach should be technology, which gives them a technical edge sustained beyond Afghanistan and applied to in their high-risk, critical missions. That edge the broad range of SOF operations over the next should be used to ensure targets are identified decade and beyond. accurately and with full consideration of col- Highlighting and institutionalizing lessons lateral effects; both efforts can reduce civilian like these is even more important as SOF are harm and make engagements with an irregular increasingly both the pointy tip of the spear and enemy more effective, particularly in wars of pro- also the hand guiding that spear, with growing paganda where garnering local support is vital. influence over military strategy and execution. Additional technologies to aid in the discrimi- Civilian protection and harm mitigation must nation of individuals or battle damage assess- become an accepted and expected component in ment would better enable SOF to avoid civilian all aspects of SOF training, education, and future harm and respond appropriately when it occurs. procurement. Technology developed for SOF—like Predator Specifically, training for SOF should include UAS and advanced intelligence capabilities—has a focus on minimizing civilian harm through already spread to conventional forces over time the use of detailed intelligence, incorporation and, in a trickle-down effect, will continue to of trained indigenous forces with local knowl- benefit the larger defense force overall if used in edge when feasible, and detailed information ways that minimize civilian suffering. on how to discriminate between irregular forces Reliance on Unmanned and non-combatants. SOF should also include Aerial Systems (UAS) TTP such as cordon operations to isolate target areas, discreet use of precision fire support, and America’s use of force will increasing rely on new discriminate use of force in and around objec- technologies, including air force capabilities to tives. Finally, training scenarios should include penetrate enemy defenses and strike over long elevation of civilian casualties as go/no-go criteria distances. Unmanned Aerial Systems, sometimes for most missions along with empowerment of referred to as “drones,” saw major use in Iraq and junior SOF leaders to abort missions if pre-de- Afghanistan, and are slated for a big leap in fund- termined CIVCAS conditions are unacceptable. ing. The Pentagon called for a nearly one-third Lessons for mitigating civilian harm should increase in its fleet in the years ahead. also be incorporated in SOF doctrine and pro- The use of UAS can have military advantages fessional military education. This should include for avoiding civilian casualties in armed conflict,
PRISM 4, no. 2 Features | 59 LEWIS and HOLEWINSKI if used with that intent in mind. Their systems an investment in improved training is a critical feature precision weapons, their sensors have one, given recent lessons on the strategic impact increasingly high-resolution imagery to assess the of civilian casualties. ground situation, and back in the control room, Clandestine use of UAS by the U.S. gov- trained imagery analysts scrutinize a target area ernment raises significant concerns that civil- prior to engaging, which isn’t always possible in ian casualties will not be properly monitored or a full ground operation. investigated, and thus calls into question U.S. Such airstrikes appear to have been success- accountability for the use of force. Identifying ful in targeting some senior leaders of enemy civilian casualties caused by air platforms in par- networks. For example, in Pakistan UAS strikes ticular remains a major challenge no matter the reportedly eliminated Abu Yahya, the number two improving resolution or ability to analyze video leader of Al-Qaeda, as well as several successive feeds. Afghanistan assessments are replete with leaders of the militant group Islamic Movement of examples of airstrikes followed by a battle dam- Uzbekistan (IMU). But there are also good reasons age assessment (BDA) concluding that there were to question the surgical nature and overall effi- no civilian casualties, and then evidence became cacy of these airstrikes outside of traditional com- available indicating the contrary. This situation bat theaters. Members of the British Parliament had two negative ramifications: first, the U.S. was recently wrote to the editor of a national newspa- late in performing consequence management in per in the UK expressing concern that UAS strikes response to real civilian casualties, thus limit- in Pakistan lead to many unaccounted-for civil- ing the effectiveness of any apologies or amends ian casualties, increase radicalization of the local offered for losses and the ability to learn from the population, and undermine the sovereignty of incident; and second, American credibility was Pakistan.1 Human rights organizations argue that compromised as it first stated emphatically that the short-term benefits of UAS strikes may be out- there were no civilian casualties until evidence weighed by the negative impact of creating a war proved otherwise. zone environment in local communities with no This situation can easily describe UAS visible military presence. strikes in clandestine operating theaters, such The assumption that UAS strikes are surgi- as Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia as well, and is cal in nature is also belied by research on recent compounded by the additional challenge of U.S. combat operations in Afghanistan. There, UAS forces not being present on the scene. While the operations were statistically more likely to cause U.S. has repeatedly stressed how UAS strikes in civilian casualties than were operations con- Pakistan cause very few civilian deaths, this posi- ducted by manned air platforms. One reason was tion runs counter to independent investigations. limited training for UAS operators and analysts Below are three examples of strikes in Pakistan in how to minimize civilian harm. Adding or in which third parties claimed CIVCAS occurred improving training on civilian casualty preven- during a time frame when the U.S. stated there tion is a resource decision in direct tension with was no credible evidence of a single civilian death: the increasing demand for more UAS and more operations, since additional training on civilian ■■ March 11, 2011: During a strike on a vehi- protection means time must be taken from some- cle, a follow-up strike was reported to have where else including the mission itself. Still, such killed rescuers that moved onto the scene.
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Several reports stated there were civilian casu- continued insistence of having caused zero civil- alties, ranging from two to five individuals. ian casualties detracted from the credibility of ■■ March 17, 2011: During a strike of a sus- the overall campaign, even though the air cam- pected militant compound, Pakistani author- paign was unprecedented in its discrimination ities and news reports stated that the gather- and restraint with respect to civilian casualties. ing was a jirga (a tribal assembly of elders) Incidents of potential civilian harm caused intended to settle a dispute at a nearby chro- by airstrikes in Afghanistan, including UAS strikes, mite mine. Reported civilian casualties ranged show that initial U.S. estimates tend to be too from thirteen to forty-four. Despite U.S. denials low and independent assessments tend to be too of civilian harm, the government of Pakistan high, with the ground truth often found some- recognized and provided compensation to the where in-between. Commanders in Afghanistan families of thirty-nine individuals killed during learned the value—often, though not always—of that strike. collaborating with independent organizations ■■ May 6, 2011: During a strike on a vehicle, that investigate civilian harm, engaging in open multiple organizations reported that six civil- dialogue, to get at the truth of the incident. ians were killed at a nearby religious school This practice is not being employed in (possibly a militant compound) and a restau- Pakistan, Yemen, or Somalia, signaling that these rant. The U.S. claimed that all casualties were lessons from Afghanistan have not been learned. combatant.2 It appears that the use of UAS strikes as a new U.S. counterterrorism strategy is foregoing the Independent investigations are not always prioritization of transparency, accountability, correct in their assessment of civilian deaths; and responding to potential civilian harm caused however, the inability of the U.S. to adequately by combat operations. Insurgents, local armed investigate the outcome of its clandestine UAS groups, and terrorists have all become adept at strikes calls into question official denials of civil- getting to the media fast with their own version ian harm. The U.S. has stated that these strikes of the truth, which is easy for local populations to kill only combatants; however, operations in believe in the absence of any U.S. evidence offered Afghanistan are replete with examples where all to the contrary. U.S. officials will have to be pre- the engaged individuals were believed to be com- pared to contend with more and more accusations batants, but a later investigation found many or of civilian harm—whether they are true or false. all were civilians misidentified as combatants. Already criticism over U.S. clandestine UAS Even if the U.S. has credible evidence that operations is putting the Administration on the all the individuals killed in strikes outside defensive and growing louder as local popula- Afghanistan were combatants, it has thus far tions, particularly in Pakistan, join in protesting refused to share it to counter potentially false the use of UAS. As the U.S. expands its UAS fleet accusations. This, despite the lesson learned in and uses these assets in declared and non-de- Iraq and Afghanistan that some transparency clared theaters of armed conflict, U.S. defense with the media and allied governments could leaders should be willing to objectively examine build credibility and trust, while informing a common assumptions regarding UAS strikes and population wary of U.S. operations. For example, civilian harm. The US government should under- in Operation Unified Protector in Libya, NATO’s take a review of the potentially negative impact of
PRISM 4, no. 2 Features | 61 LEWIS and HOLEWINSKI U.S. Marine Corps photo by Cpl. Matthew Troyer Cpl. Matthew Marine Corps photo by U.S. Navy Lt. Jessica Kazer, provides continuous medical care to two Afghan civilians while awaiting a casualty evacuation.
UAS strikes, both in counterterrorism efforts and and counter threats. For decades, U.S. forces with regard to civilian harm. The military portion have provided technical training, experience, of the review (there should also be a political and an overall model of war-fighting for part- cost-benefit analysis) would assess known or ner nation forces to emulate. A good case in projected civilian casualty levels caused by UAS point is the capacity-building approach the U.S. in current clandestine operations and identify is currently undertaking with Afghan National lessons and best practices in other operations Security Forces (ANSF). When the ANSF can (e.g., Afghanistan) that could be transferrable. handle its own security and stability operations, This needn’t mean reinventing the wheel. After the U.S. can reduce its investment in sustaining all, reviews like this are done constantly on other a large number of troops while, the plan says, issues of military efficacy. But a key element of providing a more sustainable, long-term solu- U.S. foreign policy such as UAS operations should tion for Afghanistan. be informed by available facts and lessons. Host-nation forces have some advantages over their U.S. counterparts in reducing civilian Partnering with Local Forces Towards Mutual Goals harm thanks to their language and cultural flu- ency. Discriminating between combatants and Partnering with other nations to conduct com- civilians in indigenous situations is a big chal- bat operations offers many benefits—among lenge for U.S. forces, but local forces are able to them, an alternative to sustaining a large U.S. better discern actual hostile intent from behavior footprint on the ground and bolstering other that is locally normative. In Afghanistan, opera- nations so they can provide their own security tions where international forces partnered with
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Afghan forces tended to cause fewer civilian casu- accountability processes (or lack thereof) or in alties than those conducted independently. the aforementioned training. For example, the The Philippines offers a positive example of U.S. typically does not track instances of civilian the U.S. partnering with a host-nation. Over the harm caused by the partner nation. This means past decade, U.S. forces focused on training and that any negative ramifications caused by local an “advise and assist” role to promote effective- forces cannot be immediately accounted for or ness of Philippine security forces against terror- corrected. The U.S. has also overlooked specific ist elements in the southern Philippines. While instruction to host-nation forces concerning civil- mitigating civilian harm during operations was ian harm, beyond the basic requirements of the not an explicit goal of this training, the U.S. ethos Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC). LOAC education was transferred to Philippine forces during close is critical, but it does not instill such important partnering efforts. One Philippine General com- practices as how to track civilian harm, how to mented that US Special Forces “…taught us to take analyze it for lessons learned, how to conduct care of the people,” laying the groundwork for proper investigations and what to do with the Philippine security forces to adopt an approach information, or how to respond to an angry pub- that minimized civilian harm as they pursued ter- lic suffering losses. Moreover, the US regularly rorist elements. This population-centric approach provides training and instruction only on LOAC led to increased cooperation from the population, as the fundamental framework for operations including valuable intelligence, which contributed even when the host-nation security forces should to the Philippines’ longer-term and sustainable or will be applying more restrictive domestic law success in countering terror threats. as the basis of its operations. While the Philippines offers a positive exam- ple of the U.S. partnering with a host-nation, this population-centric approach led to increased examples abound where partnering efforts have cooperation from the population, including not been as productive. The risk, and often reality, valuable intelligence is that local forces will cause civilian harm, thus risking the success of the mission and, in turn, the image of U.S. interventions. Given the strategic costs of not instilling There are two factors that can lead to civilian protection and harm response lessons increased civilian harm in partnered operations. into military partnerships, it is a wonder this The first is a matter of timing. The U.S. doesn’t remains an overlooked issue. When local forces always have control over how quickly an oper- don’t have a civilian protection mindset or ation will move forward with local national ignore losses the population incurs from their forces, which can often translate into poor train- conduct, the U.S. suffers equally, if not more, ing for those forces and little to no training on from the public anger and mistrust of the mis- civilian harm mitigation during crunch-time. sion. Aside from incidental civilian harm that The second factor is that civilian harm—and its can occur during an operation, human rights ramifications—often aren’t prioritized in the violations by local national forces can trigger leg- transactions between the U.S. and local national islative restrictions on U.S. programs and bring forces, including in the agreement to conduct ongoing partnering efforts to a grinding halt, joint operations, in commanders’ guidance, potentially harming strategic partnerships and
PRISM 4, no. 2 Features | 63 LEWIS and HOLEWINSKI killing the momentum of efforts at the tactical they may not be as surgical an instrument as they level. To protect the legitimacy of U.S. efforts have been claimed to be with regard to civilian and promote effectiveness, partnering efforts harm. When used in clandestine scenarios, where between the U.S. and local forces should pri- there are few boots on the ground, the challenges oritize strategies and tactics to mitigate civilian to civilian protection and harm response are com- harm during an operation. pounded, particularly as thorough investigations and any amends for losses are nearly impossible. Conclusions Some Pakistani, Yemeni and Somali communi- Reducing civilian harm and properly respond- ties are directing anger toward the U.S., which ing to civilian losses in armed conflict is a win- may be crippling counterterrorism efforts in the win for America’s shifting strategy. What’s more, longer term. Before fully committing to increased these objectives are entirely possible with lead- UAS use, the U.S. Government should conduct a ership, attention, and focus from U.S. govern- thorough examination of the potential and actual ment officials. negative ramifications of UAS use, specifically ana- The Defense Department is rightly con- lyzing the impact on local civilian populations. cerned about funding, and is thus becoming Partnerships with local national forces increasingly resistant to investing in anything should be carefully crafted to ensure civilian beyond what is seen as necessary for America’s harm reduction and mitigation is a top priority, security. The good news is that measures to inte- including in training, equipping, joint guidance grate civilian protection into the heart and soul of or rules of engagement, and response when civil- America’s military operations—and, importantly, ian harm is caused. These commitments should the new security strategy—are as inexpensive be noted at the outset of any partnership. as they are critical. Many simply entail putting As part of an overarching solution, the someone at the Department of Defense in charge Pentagon has an important role to play in ensur- of this issue, giving the troops proper training on ing the lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan, and other civilian protection, and establishing policies for previous and current operations, do not need to responding to harm when it happens—all efforts be relearned in the future, to the detriment of that can provide a big gain at minimal cost. U.S. goals and interests. There remains no single Specific attention should be focused on SOF, person, team, or office within the Department of UAS operations, and operations that use part- Defense focused solely on civilian protection and nered forces. SOF have in some circumstances harm response. For such an important strategic had a larger propensity to cause civilian harm, issue, it is startling to realize that there remains but can also better adapt to complicated envi- this vacuum in coordinated understanding and ronments, making them potentially even better at action. This vacuum has repeatedly led to mis- reducing unintended casualties. SOF need train- steps and Band-Aid-like corrective action. ing that emphasizes how and why minimizing For example, in the early days of the Iraq civilian harm is a strategic imperative. Planned War, while the U.S. Air Force avoided use of clus- operations should take into account the need to ter munitions in populated areas, the U.S. Army respond to civilian harm when it happens. deployed to Iraq with only one effective count- Unmanned Aerial Systems are becoming syn- er-battery artillery piece, an MLRS system that fired onymous with U.S. counterterrorism strategy, but cluster munitions and caused significant civilian
64 | Features PRISM 4, no. 2 CHANGING OF THE GUARD casualties. Throughout the early days of the Iraq to be recreated for the next conflict, if the strategic and Afghanistan wars, the military did not keep importance of the practice is remembered at all. formal data on civilian casualties caused by its To avoid re-learning these lessons in the own operations until 2008, when a tracking cell future, an arduous process detrimental of the was created by ISAF in Afghanistan. For years into mission and our troops, the issue of civilian casu- the Iraq War, many troops didn’t have the neces- alties requires an institutional proponent: a focal sary gear to safely administer checkpoints. As a point at the Pentagon to advocate progress and result, these troops could not adequately warn coordinate civilian protection best practices and approaching drivers to stop, and often had limited policies across silos, sectors, offices, and branches. recourse to stop them if they did not respond to Specifically, that focal point would study the those warnings. This deficiency, is illustrated in the lessons of past and current engagements and shooting of the rescue car of the Italian reporter encourage development and deployment of Giuliana Sgrena: when the speeding car, rushing new weapons and tactics designed to diminish to the airport after recovering the reporter who civilian harm once the fighting starts; ensure had been in captivity for a month, approached a proper civilian damage estimates are conducted U.S. check point, the car failed to heed warnings in targeting and combat damage assessments are to stop and as a result gunfire was used to stop the made after kinetic operations so that tactics can car. The shooting wounded the rescued reporter continue to improve; maintain proper investiga- and killed an Italian intelligence agent also in the tive and statistical data on civilian casualties; and car. Similar incidents with Iraqi citizens resulted ensure efficient compensation procedures are in in thousands of civilian casualties; the same defi- place for unintentional civilian harm—along ciency was seen with checkpoints in Afghanistan. with whatever new challenges arise regarding The Joint and Coalition Operational Analysis civilian harm mitigation in future conflicts. (JCOA) Division of the Joint Staff J7 has con- America’s new military must, by design, ducted multiple in-depth studies of civilian include a focus on civilians. None of these rec- casualties in Afghanistan, but these studies have ommendations is a silver bullet to successfully primarily informed ISAF and pre-deployment operate oversees while also minimizing civilian training for forces going to Afghanistan. The les- harm, but leadership from top policymakers to sons have not been made required reading for the inculcate all we’ve learned over ten years is criti- next generation of military commanders headed cal. It would be a shame—and strategically detri- to the next conflict. Similarly, training, doctrine, mental—to waste such hard-won lessons. materiel solutions, and policies have not taken these lessons into account for the next conflict. Although training at some bases now incorporates Notes civilian protection principles, this is an ad hoc effort that depends largely on the personality of 1 “Drone Attacks Lead to Terrorism” Letter to the the commander and not on a standard policy pri- Editor, The Times, July 26, 2012, accessed at < http://www. thetimes.co.uk/tto/opinion/letters/article3486743.ece>. ority. And while it is true that commanders in Iraq 2 “The Civilian Impact of Drones: Unexamined Costs, and Afghanistan have been able to offer amends Unanswered Questions,” Center for Civilians in Conflict, via monetary payments to some civilians suffering September 29, 2012, available at http://civiliansinconflict. org/resources/pub/the-civilian-impact-of-drones. losses, this is not a standing policy and will need
PRISM 4, no. 2 Features | 65 Staff Sgt. Edward Braly, USAF
Soldiers from the 1st Battalion, 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne) teach mounted infantry tactics to soldiers from the Malian Army in Timbuktu, Mali, as part of the Pan Sahel Initiative. Building the Capabilities and Capacity of Partners: Is This Defense Business?
By James Q. Roberts
he new defense strategy, “Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense,” released in January of this 2012, makes clear the mandate for the Department of T Defense to continue, in fact to increase significantly, its abilities to improve the capabilities of partners around the globe. In his cover letter to the guidance, President Barack Obama directs us to “join with allies and partners around the world to build their capacity to promote security, prosper- ity, and human dignity.” Likewise, Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta, in his preface, stresses that the department will focus on “strengthening alliances and partnerships across all regions.” This is not traditional guidance for the Department of Defense. Such guidance usually focuses on how to fight and win the nation’s wars. But after more than ten years of combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, and in these times of impending steep fiscal reductions the utility of partners who can share the burden of defending their countries individually, and their regions collectively, has come to the fore. This guidance displays the degree to which the department in general, and the Geographic Combatant Commanders in particular, have come to recognize the value in helping partners improve their capability to govern their own territories. These efforts to help partners defend themselves, and by extension defend us, are gaining greater acceptance across the defense department, within the Executive Branch, and within the Congress. They are evolving from being considered a collateral duty, or a “nice to do if you have the time” – to becoming a principal component of our Phase Zero military activities. During Phase Zero the depart- ment conducts military operations and activities designed to shape the strategic environment, build local solutions to security challenges, and decrease the chances of our having to deploy major force packages later on in the crisis. The strategy parallels the well-proven household adage “a stitch in time, saves nine.”
Mr. James Q. Roberts is acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Combating Terrorism.
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Partner capability building is not cheap. Malign non-state actors could only bed down But, when contrasted to the costs of deploying with the compliance of the hosting government, U.S. forces for combat operations costs pale by thereby shifting solutions back to a more tra- comparison. By way of example, DoD has spent ditional foreign policy calculus between states. approximately $2 billion during the six years that The strategic objective is to close as many ungov- Section 1206 resources have been available for erned spaces as possible – squeezing the malign equipping and training partners. For the surge networks into fewer and ideally less hospitable in Afghanistan we spent $30 billion to deploy safe havens. 30,000 troops for 18 months – or $1 million per Recent experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan man. Preparing others today to be able to govern make clear that the preferred solution is for part- and defend their territory may result in our not ner forces to conduct the lethal component of having to deploy major conventional formations operations, whenever possible. When the partner to confront instability or associated threats tomor- takes the shot, he is displaying his sovereignty to row. This approach holds the promise of being far his own population and to the enemy. He is seen less expensive in both U.S. blood and treasure. as governing. When he relies on us to do so, on Additionally, the new defense strategy rec- his behalf, he forfeits his political legitimacy, and ognizes the continued threat that al-Qaeda (AQ) permits the enemy to brand him as little more terrorists and other non-state actor threats rep- than a puppet of the United States. He is judged resent, and the importance of capable partners incompetent and incapable – easily described by in those fights. “For the foreseeable future, the his enemies as unworthy of leading, his claims of United States will continue to take an active legitimacy undercut by his reliance on the U.S. to approach to countering these threats by monitor- kill his fellow citizens. ing the activities of non-state threats worldwide, We are recognizing the utility of devel- working with allies and partners to establish con- oping partners who we can equip, train, and trol over ungoverned territories, and directly strik- enable with a small, tailored U.S. force package. ing the most dangerous groups and individuals However, once such forces have been built we when necessary.” have also learned that their capabilities tend to atrophy unless the effort can be sustained. In for the surge in Afghanistan we spent most instances we rely on U.S. Special Operations $30 billion to deploy 30,000 troops for Forces (SOF) to conduct these training, equip- 18 months – or $1 million per man ping and advisory missions. However, we are also discovering that SOF, and the Department of Defense, lack many of the requisite authorities for The key goal of this approach is to deny the well-structured capacity building and for provid- use of ungoverned spaces to the terrorists and ing the necessary strategic enablers to make these other illegitimate non-state actor networks by advise and assist missions what they could and enabling the host nation government to expand should be. Although some would argue that the the footprint of its governance to match the foot- Department of State’s Foreign Military Financing print of its sovereignty. If the global footprint of (FMF) authority could meet these requirements, governance could match the footprint of sover- even that program does not include all the nec- eignty there would be no ungoverned territories. essary tools and flexibility required.
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In this post-Cold War era, in which non-state and leverage the two-dozen authorities that could actor threats can attack our homeland from the be employed in this mission area. Even when distant valleys of the Hindu Kush, the building expertly managed, this patchwork of authorities of partner capacity is no longer just a foreign provides incomplete solutions and results in less policy nicety. It is becoming an integral compo- than optimal, and in some cases dysfunctional, nent of national defense. Although operations in capacity building programs. Afghanistan and Pakistan have severely degraded the AQ core, regional AQ affiliates have grown in authorities for this capacity building work are scope and capability, taking advantage of ungov- lagging behind the requirements erned spaces and weak governments. Regrettably, the authorities for this capacity building work are lagging behind the require- This article will describe a more deliberate ments. It is time that the Department of Defense and complete capacity building model, one that and the Geographic Combatant Commanders would permit the U.S. military to work hand in obtain the requisite tools in their own kit bags. glove with partners to develop, deploy, employ, This year the Department of Defense, in close and sustain their capabilities for the years to cooperation with the Department of State, come. Let’s start with some core considerations. requested and obtained from the Congress a new First, these programs must be multi-year. In “pooled fund” authority known as the Global fact, some may need to span a decade, or more. Security Contingency Fund. The length of the program is directly linked to the Advertised as being able to meet current and nature of the threat, the expanse of the un- (or emerging partner capacity building needs, the under-) governed spaces, and most importantly, fund lacks much of what this article argues is the ability of the partner to absorb the training, needed. It is top down driven by the Department equipment (and its maintenance), the enablers, of State, does not envision long term small scale and the concepts governing the execution this engagement with partners (it is a 3-year authority type of network centric warfare against a mobile now), and lacks many of the key requirements and morphing non-state actor enterprise. The such as minor military construction authority, partner must also demonstrate the political will logistics and service support, and other tools to and skill to unite or reunite his populations. provide support for the partner. Most impor- The desired end state is to build an endur- tantly, although up to 80% of the funds in the ing partner capability, one that he can sustain pool will come from DoD; the Combatant over time, with only periodic help from us. Commanders will have little voice in where and Understanding his ability to absorb, and tai- when it will be applied. loring projects to that absorption ability over Therefore, I argue that Combatant time, is our current greatest shortfall. None of Commanders should no longer have to depend our current authorities are steady and long term on Department of State authorities and resources enough to meet this need. Finally, the partner to serve as the vehicle through which they try must know that we are serious in this relation- to accomplish this emerging core defense task. ship. The program cannot be subject to stops Nor should we force them to cobble together or delays, just because a senior from the State programs by demanding that they understand Department needs a “deliverable” for some other
PRISM 4, no. 2 Features | 69 ROBERTS
nation, half way around the globe, because we standard counterinsurgency terms, these forces must zero-base our FMF programs each year, or must be able to isolate the insurgents (or other because the Congress can not seem to pass an malign actors) from the population, by gaining appropriations bill on time. that population’s allegiance and support. Third, each program will be unique – a assistance must combine defense education, “one-size fits all” approach will ensure failure. defense institutional reform, personal and The U.S. forces conducting the programs will governmental accountability, human rights, and need language, regional and cultural skills. They counter-corruption lessons will require political acumen, along with tech- nical and tactical prowess. We are talking about sustained engagement, tailored specifically to the Partnership is all about building a relation- needs and capabilities of each partner. Careful ship. Relationships require patience, a steady and frequent assessments will be necessary to hand, and predictability, from both parties. continually adapt the program, sometimes going Security assistance programs that are zero-based over old ground again, because it did not sink each year may seem more efficient from a man- in the first time. At other times the team may agement perspective. However, telling your part- need to jump forward, or directly provide key ner that you loved them last year, but they did enablers, based on tactical conditions or enemy not make the grade for this year’s programs is no threats or vulnerabilities. way to build his confidence, or to indicate that Fourth, regional approaches involving mul- you have their best interests at heart. tiple partners may be required. The enemy non- Second, strategic patience will be required. state actor network moves across borders with Some partners may progress quickly, others impunity. To close the empty spaces may require much more slowly. Our assistance must com- the cooperation of several regional states. They bine defense education, defense institutional may be disinclined to do so, particularly at the reform, personal and governmental account- beginning. Success likely will require long-term ability, human rights, and counter-corruption engagement with each partner independently, lessons as well as the training of the tactical forces and may necessitate the building of a regional and the headquarters staffs to manage them. We structure where none exists. If a regional insti- should provide equipment, maintenance, spare tution is not feasible then a degree of trust and parts, minor associated construction, and train- a pattern of limited cooperation may be all that ing for each of these to ensure the partner can can be achieved. achieve some degree of autonomy. We need an Fifth, political will varies greatly between authority to provide a variety of key enablers as partners, and will ebb and flow within partner well – transportation, services, supplies, intelli- national political structures. Only a long term gence, and the like. sustained commitment will attenuate the fluctu- The goal is to leave behind a security sector ations and periodic lack of political will. Turning capability for governance – legitimate governance away from the weak-kneed partner only further – that can reach to the far corners of the part- weakens him, and cedes space to the enemy. We ner’s territory, and can develop and maintain the must do our best to set aside frustrations when support of the recipient nation’s population. In partners do not behave as we would, or as we
70 | Features PRISM 4, no. 2 BUILDING THE CAPACITY OF PARTNERS would like them to. Patience and sustained but and language skills. During this phase many part- subdued political pressure are the best approach. ners will inflate their current capabilities, in an Sixth, we must recognize that good enough effort to avoid embarrassment, and to appear bet- is indeed good enough. Our usual approach is ter than they are. Their national leadership will to remake the partner in our image – “to be like likely focus on the high visibility, high price toys Mike.” But in reality most partners do not want they use as the gauge of their relationship with to, and usually cannot, measure up to our expec- the United States. “We want F-16’s, because you tations. Nevertheless, in most instances some gave them to our neighbor to the East last year.” rudimentary partner capabilities, applied con- Overcoming these hurdles is not easy, but sistently over a long period of time can degrade F-16’s are not of much use against an indirect the threats adequately to keep them localized and enemy who is living among the population and incapable of strategic reach. That is good enough mobilizing them to combat the host nation for our purposes. Low technology solutions that forces and institutions using terrorist and insur- the partner can sustain (with just a little help) pay gent tactics. Getting buy-in on the nature of the much better dividends than high tech systems threat and the causes of current instabilities is that cannot be maintained or absorbed. part of this early phase. The next portion of this paper will describe a cycle for the development of partner capability “we want F-16’s, because you gave them to our and capacity. Capability is the “what” and capac- neighbor to the East last year” ity is the “how much” of what we are trying to build. This cycle is will require tailoring for each partner – and may require repetition of several, or The assessment team must be able to see even many, of its phases. Each phase requires an through these ruses, yet do so without calling the attendant authority. The focus must be on build- partner’s bluff. At the same time, the team should ing relationships between trainers and trainees, be evaluating the operational environment, while avoiding arrogance and hubris – not easy including the weather, terrain, and the society as tasks even for seasoned special operators. a whole, and the nature of the enemy or enemies. There are other intangibles that must be collected Phase One: Assessment of the Partner Nation’s Forces as well. What is the literacy rate of the popula- tion? What is it for officers, non-commissioned This is perhaps the most critical step in the pro- officers, and troops of the partner nation forces? cess, for it will determine the pace and content What levels of mechanical or technical exper- for all of the follow-on activities. During the tise are the norm? What are the ethnic, tribal, assessment the Security Force Assistance (SFA) or religious distinctions in the armed forces? team must judge both what is needed and (most In the government? In the society? What is the importantly) at what pace the partner can absorb current public perception of the partner forces? the training, equipment, education, doctrine, Thugs? Corrupt kleptocrats? A tribe apart? Brutal and institutional development assistance. The suppressors of the slightest opposition? All (or assessment phase will likely require several none) of the above? Determining which host weeks of concerted effort by a knowledgeable nation units and organizations are our best bets and skilled team with regional, cultural, technical for partnering is a core requirement of this phase.
PRISM 4, no. 2 Features | 71 ROBERTS DoD photo by Pfc. Brian Chaney, U.S. Army (released) Army U.S. Pfc. Brian Chaney, DoD photo by A U.S. Army soldier assigned to Charlie Company, 703rd Brigade Support Battalion, 4th Advise and Assist Brigade, 3rd Infantry Division walks with Iraqi soldiers during a road march as part of a training exercise at Al Asad Air Base, Iraq, on May 4, 2011.
Phase Two: Basic Training, Equipping, associated spares, tools, etc., for personal gain, and Educational Engagement or who are directed by their officers or political Although our lexicon talks of equipping and leaders to do so. Having gear sit in warehouses training, it is my opinion that we would be bet- or parking lots while waiting for the trainers to ter served to start with training, then proceed to arrive is dysfunctional and undermines our cred- equipping. Conducting combined training would ibility – from the outset. permit the team to continue assessing the partner The types, technical sophistication, and force, round out their views of capabilities and quantities of equipment we provide must be tai- absorption rates, and most importantly create lored based on the above assessment results. For demand for the new equipment. If the partner many partners, less sophisticated, more rugged, understands the training concepts, integrating the and less complex equipment is far more efficient equipment into the concept is far simpler. than trying to outfit them with current models of Delivering even minor quantities of equip- U.S. gear. As a general matter, our equipment is ment in advance of the associated training too high tech and too dependent on fastidious usually results in neglect of the equipment at maintenance, to be very useful in much of the best. Worse is immediate graft and corruption Third World. For complex machinery like air- by unscrupulous partners who sell end items or planes and helicopters, using systems with which
72 | Features PRISM 4, no. 2 BUILDING THE CAPACITY OF PARTNERS the partner is already familiar, is often the most away from peacetime engagement and training, effective way to build or improve a capability. to enabling partner military operations. At this Alternatively, providing them gear we used 20, point the stakes go up for the partner forces and 30, or even 50 years ago may also be an efficient for the trainers, who now become combat advi- way to proceed. sors. Providing such advice is an inherently polit- As we train units at the tactical level, we ical decision that the President must make, even should engage in parallel with the partner head- when the advisors are not intended to participate quarters and ministry levels. The goal is to ensure directly in partner led combat operations. the ministry leaders and senior officers under- stand the intent of our capacity building efforts, advising and assisting come naturally and are a and recognize what these forces can and cannot normal outgrowth of the combined training they achieve. Ensuring the chain of command appreci- have been conducting with the partner force ates how to employ the new capabilities reduces chances for miscalculations, and may decrease the impulse to disband the units, just because the It is for these reasons I argue that advising chain of command does not understand or trust and assisting and providing strategic enablers what they have been up to. should not be an integral component of a legis- lative capacity building authority, although that Phase Three: Combined Training authority should recognize that these follow-on Once the partner capability has been developed tasks might be required. Instead, for partners who and can conduct rudimentary operations, we need are under direct pressure from malign actors, the to increase their understanding and confidence Geographic Combatant Commanders should by conducting a series of combined training exer- request authorities to conduct advise and assist cises that test capabilities at increasing levels of missions, or the Secretary of Defense can provide sophistication – at the squad, platoon, company, such authorities in advance through the publica- and where possible battalion levels. Advancing tion of Execute Orders. from one to the next of these levels of training Phase Four: Advise and Assist will require more skill of the officer and Non- Commissioned Officers (NCO) corps, better plan- For the operator, advising and assisting come ning, better communications and coordination, naturally and are a normal outgrowth of the com- improved logistics, etc. Once the partner force has bined training they have been conducting with displayed skills in these scenarios, we can move on the partner force. In many ways combat is what to the next phases. the training has been all about, so from an oper- ator’s viewpoint, this is when the fun begins – it Phases Four and Five – Advising and Assisting, Providing Strategic Enablers is what they came to do. But for the policymaker such a transition These are not integral to traditional capacity is not to be taken lightly. All of a sudden activi- building programs, but are absolutely essen- ties which were in the benign realm of helping tial if we are going to help a partner confront a partner improve his capabilities have shifted a current threat or instability in his territory or to hunting bad guys down, and killing them. region. At the same time, they represent a shift Additionally, U.S. forces, who formerly were just
PRISM 4, no. 2 Features | 73 ROBERTS
part of the training landscape are now on the nation, the threat, their willingness to permit bas- edge of combat, perhaps in the middle of it. For ing, their capabilities, availability of U.S. assets, Washington it is all about risk. So Washington and other local and regional political military will place appropriate constraints on forces considerations. doing the advising and assisting – from the Although providing such capabilities is gen- size and types of weapons and equipment they erally not of high risk to the U.S. forces partici- deploy with, to how far forward they may go pating, the risk is not zero. Furthermore, pro- with their partners. Depending on the environ- viding such assets further commits U.S. policy ment other constraints can come into play as in support of the partner, and comes with its well. Each advise and assist mission will be sub- own Washington-based political baggage. I can ject to a variety of factors. No single model can hear colleagues from the Hill asking me now, be prescribed. Some may meet a War Powers “What? You’ve given these guys all this training notification threshold. and support and they still can’t find Mr. X? Who is incompetent here, them or you?” Phase Five: Provide Strategic Enablers Phase Six: Assess Capabilities, Once the parameters of the advise and assist rules Provide Booster Shots have been developed there is a second set of U.S. resources that must be addressed. I refer to these Whether the partner is in combat or just pre- as the strategic enablers – those capabilities that paring for it, we must improve our ability to will serve as combat multipliers to the partner’s assess how we, and they, are doing. Measuring basic tactical capability. In this group are such outcomes in this business is not easy. Our system things as intelligence and intelligence sharing, is designed to assess outputs – so we can quickly intelligence and operations fusion and coordina- determine what gear and how much of it we have tion, long-range communications, close air sup- provided. There are endless annual reports to port, and tactical and operational airlift. Some Executive Branch leaders and Congress on vir- partners may not need the full menu, but if the tually all of these types of programs, describing partner does not have a key enabler – or it has not what we provided to whom, when, and for how yet been adequately developed – the Combatant many dollars. Commander needs to provide it. But the key question is not what did we give the partner? Instead the questions are: What did providing such assets further commits U.S. policy he do with it? Could he absorb it? Make it his in support of the partner, and comes with its own? Take care of it? If so, did his capability actu- own Washington-based political baggage ally improve? If it did, why? What worked? What didn’t? How can we make it better? How can he? These are all key questions that repetitive and Other considerations may include weather detailed assessments must address. and mapping support, medical evacuation Part of this assessment process must be and general medical support, employment of determining why and how quickly the partner unmanned aerial systems, or other key capa- capability degrades upon the cessation of U.S. bilities. As with advising and assisting, these support. Such an analysis would allow us to resources need to be tailored to the partner determine a sort of “mean time between failures”
74 | Features PRISM 4, no. 2 BUILDING THE CAPACITY OF PARTNERS rate for partner capabilities. Once armed with the important question is what U.S. forces did that data, we could design follow-on programs not have to deploy to address shortfalls. This follow-on capability should be integral to the basic train and equip authority mentioned above. The concept is simi- This how they are fundamentally different lar to “booster shots” in the medical field. than traditional security assistance programs, Once the partner capability has been built, whose intent is to win friends, influence regional it will (with certainty) begin to atrophy, at var- politics, and advance U.S. foreign policy. Those ious rates, and due to various causes. To think programs should continue to be the purview of otherwise is naïve. The Geographic Combatant the State Department. But if we are developing Commanders should have the authority and partners to do missions so U.S. forces do not have resources to design a program of revisits, with to, – that should be Defense business – run with the intent of sustaining the capability, despite the Defense authorities. partner’s inability to do so by themselves. The revisit may take many forms; special- ized training, key spare parts for weapons or sup- port systems, revising tactics, adjusting enablers, replacing combat losses, adapting tactics to enemy changes, et cetera. But it must be tailored to the partner, and timely enough to preclude the capability degrading to the point of requiring a complete redo. The Bottom Line – What’s In It for Us?
These assessments will help us know how the partner is doing. That is important, for all the reasons I have described. But the most import- ant measurement is somewhat subjective, yet it goes to the core of why DoD should undertake these projects. The important question is what U.S. forces did not have to deploy, because the partner was able (enough) to address threats in his nation and region. The key measure of effectiveness and of the return on our investment is not what we did for the partner, or what he did on his own. Our key judgment must be what we did not have to do, because he was able to do it for himself, and by extension, for us. These programs are all about reducing risks to U.S. forces, achieving economies of scale, and putting our partners to the front.
PRISM 4, no. 2 Features | 75 State Department
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton providing remarks at the Word Bank, with USAID’s Deputy Administrator Don Steinberg and World Bank President Robert Zoellick looking on. The Uneasy Relationship Between Economics and Security
By Alexander Ferguson
he most publicly discussed link between economics and security is the relationship between economic performance and power. The underpinnings for this relationship come from the philosophical approach that sees political power stemming from economic power. Espoused T th 1 at least since the 17 century by English Civil War philosopher James Harrington, these ideas saw their most well known expression in the philosophy of Karl Marx, who saw economic change driving political change. If economic structures determined politics then the link with security is clear. Carl von Clausewitz’s likened war to other areas of conflict within developed societies, such as commerce and politics: “It is a conflict of great interests which is settled by bloodshed, and only in that is it different from others.”2 That economic performance can determine military power seems at first glance a given: the stron- ger the economy, the greater the military power; and the weaker the economy, the weaker the military power. Two examples from the last century illustrate the point: the U.S. defeat of Hitler’s Germany and the collapse of the Soviet Union. In the wishful thinking of Hermann Goering, Nazi Germany’s Air Marshall and war economy czar, the United States was not much of a military threat as its economy in 1941 was capable of pro- ducing little more than refrigerators and razor blades. He estimated U.S. aircraft production at only one third of what it actually produced in the first year of war.3 Goering and Adolf Hitler over-estimated Germany’s potential economic performance and under-estimated that of its opponents. The United States quickly ramped up production and became the so-called “arsenal of democracy”, arming its allies while giving its own forces an overwhelming advantage in weaponry and supplies. Ronald Reagan may have depicted an evil empire that threatened the world, but the Soviet Union was by the 1980s in deep economic trouble. Shackled by central planning, burdened by
Mr. Alexander Ferguson is Special Adviser for External Affairs at the World Bank Group.
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huge inefficiencies, suffering revenue declines biggest threat” to U.S. security and that its ene- as resource prices plumbed new depths, the mies had noticed America’s economic problems. Soviet economy was at most a third4 of the “How long can a government with a $16 trillion size of the U.S. economy and supported a big- foreign debt remain a world power?” Iranian ger population in which life expectancy was President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad asked. “The declining and child mortality rising.5 As Soviet Americans have injected their paper wealth into Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze noted, the world economy and today the aftermaths the Soviet Union could no longer afford the and negative effects of their pseudo-wealth have Cold War: “By remaining stuck in the old plagued them.”9 positions, we would never stop the arms race, But the relationship between economics which was bleeding our already anemic coun- and security is not as obvious as these state- try.”6 The Soviet economy ailed at a time of big ments imply – and that is particularly true in advances in computerization and industrial today’s economic and security context. The productivity that left the Communist world greater complexity in the relationship between behind. This threatened Soviet military power economics and security has occurred in recent because Western superiority manifested itself years as power has become more diffuse. New in the development of whole weapons systems powers have emerged since the end of the Cold that outclassed anything the Communist world War, with developing countries in recent years could produce. accounting for more than half of global eco- nomic growth. New security threats – terror net- if countries are willing to ignore the welfare of works and nuclear-armed rogue states – have their citizens, then they can pose major military emerged to replace the big power, state-on-state threats despite poor economic performance conflicts of the last century. Economic strength may afford military strength, as the example above of World War Some argue that an appreciation of the Two shows, when industrial output can bring linkage between economic performance and victory in a war of attrition between states. But power has long been fundamental for U.S. lead- military power is not totally dependent on eco- ers. Alexander Hamilton, the first U.S. Treasury nomic success. The lack of economic power can Secretary, urged President George Washington be compensated for through the willingness to to “cherish credit as a means of strength and take casualties, especially against a foe who lacks security.”7 It was this link that Republican pres- the same willingness. idential candidate Mitt Romney raised in his North Vietnam’s economy was reputedly third debate with President Barack Obama. so woefully developed that the United States “In order to be able to fulfill our role in the air force had trouble finding enough targets to world, America must be strong,” Romney said. bomb. Supplied by Russian and Chinese allies “America must lead, and for that to happen, and willing to suffer colossal casualties, North we have to strengthen our economy here at Vietnam fielded conventional forces to challenge home.”8 Romney noted that Admiral Michael U.S. and South Vietnamese troops as well as sup- Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, plying an insurgency by the southern-based Viet had described the U.S. debt burden as “the single Cong. The United States clearly had superior
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economic and military power. But the North still China may be the world’s second largest economy prevailed in overcoming the South. and is predicted to overtake the United States The relatively recent phenomena of second within the foreseeable future to become the or third rate powers acquiring nuclear weapons world’s biggest economy and the risk of sharing them with terrorists has further changed the relationship between eco- nomic and military power. If countries are willing competing as a major cause for the Communist to ignore the welfare of their citizens, then they empire’s unraveling. can pose major military threats despite poor eco- Even if U.S. dominance in security and nomic performance. North Korea has an econ- economics deterred the Soviet Union, it is no omy that has to import food to prevent starvation. guarantee against asymmetric threats. These Yet it threatens the world with a nuclear program. threats can come from actors that are militarily Iran’s economy has buckled under the weight and economically insignificant. The 9/11 attacks of sanctions. Yet it persists with a nuclear pro- on New York and Washington cost Al Qaeda gram and support of terrorism that poses a global between $400,000-$500,000 to execute,13 but threat. Pakistan was vanquished on the battlefield they cost the U.S. economy trillions of dollars by India in the 1970s but now challenges South if one includes the Afghanistan and Iraq wars as Asia’s behemoth through its possession of nuclear part of the response.14 The economic and security arms and covert support for insurgents. superiority of the United States has enabled it to Military power can persist amid economic seriously degrade Al Qaeda, deploying drones decline. The Soviet Union, despite its economic and special operations to decapitate its leader- woes, remained a military threat right up until ship. But the threat remains a significant one. its 1991 break-up. Some argue that its demise U.S. President Barack Obama’s hosting of the shows how U.S. supremacy in the military and 2010 Nuclear Security Summit in Washington, economic spheres forced the Soviet Union into D.C., focused primarily on the security of nuclear a race it could not win. The arms race of the material in an effort to counter the threat of 1980s, argued U.S. Senator Richard Lugar, drove nuclear terrorism. the Soviet Union “to the wall economically in Economic success does not bring lock-step an unsuccessful attempt to match the United dominance in security. China may be the world’s States militarily.”10 Rebutting this thesis, George second largest economy and is predicted to over- Kennan said, “no great country has that sort of take the United States within the foreseeable influence on the internal developments of any future to become the world’s biggest economy. other one.”11 Others have pointed out that Soviet But it is a long way from challenging the United defense spending was already a huge burden on States militarily. Germany and Japan are among the economy and it did not increase in response the world’s top five economies. For historical rea- to the Reagan arms build-up. Nor was defense sons, they have not pursued prominence in the spending a major factor in the Soviet econo- security field even though they have economies my’s collapse.12 It is therefore unclear whether that could support this ambition. the U.S. arms build-up was the deciding factor Germany and Japan have focused their in the fall of the Soviet Union, with bungled global influence in the so-called “soft power” reforms by Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev fields. These include trade, development, ideas,
PRISM 4, no. 2 Features | 79 FERGUSON Dod photo by Staff Sgt. Suzanne M. Jenkins, U.S. Air Force (released) Air Force U.S. Sgt. Suzanne M. Jenkins, Staff Dod photo by Staff Sgt. Samantha Yanez (center), of the 746th Expeditionary Airlift Squadron, carries a package from a U.S. Central Air Force’s C-130 as part of a humanitarian relief mission to Kerman, Iran, on December 28, 2003.
diplomacy, culture and institutions. If economic identity on the global stage if it loses its economic performance and power are assessed, then this dynamism,” said Former World Bank President is mostly in terms of hard power. But wars, and Robert B. Zoellick. “Therefore, the United States therefore the need for hard power, have been on must address the fundamentals of its economic a historic downtrend for decades and soft power strength – because that power touches every was seen in the ascendant already at the end of dimension of influence – from markets and the Cold War.15 innovation, to ideas and international politics, U.S. economic problems are seen as taking to military strength and security.”16 a toll on a broader swathe of American influ- The increasing complexity of the relation- ence than just security, including many spheres ship between economics and security means of so-called “soft power”. This is affecting the that issues of economics, finance, energy, trade, ability of the United States to project power in climate change, and security – to name but a few many dimensions. “The United States will lose its – are closely intertwined with implications for
80 | Features PRISM 4, no. 2 ECONOMICS AND SECURITY domestic politics and international relations. a general criticism of economic theories of Two examples from today’s headlines illustrate conflict is that economists forget that they are the point: the Euro crisis and the reshaping of dealing with human beings U.S. energy supplies. The Euro crisis registered barely a mention in the U.S. election campaign even though it has away from explaining conflict, there began in huge implications for major U.S. allies. The archi- the 1990s a proliferation of economic models tects of European integration had hoped that a of conflict in parallel with a wider expansion currency union would lay the foundations for of economics into the social sciences.19 A pri- political union. Yet the currency union’s strains mary example was the so-called “greed vs. griev- are causing political and social tensions that ance” work by economists Paul Collier and Anke threaten the whole edifice of European unity. Hoeffler. Investigating the causes of civil wars European initiatives in the economic-security from 1960-1999, they argued that access to pri- area have foundered amid the persistent cri- mary commodity resources and a large diaspora sis. The collapse in October 2012 of the BAE- were more significant in causing conflict than EADS defense deal, which could have formed a grievances triggered by ethnic and religious divi- European-wide arms group, is not just the fail- sions, political repression and inequality.20 A ure of yet another corporate merger. The deal specific criticism of Collier’s later work by econ- was being watched closely as a test of European omist William Easterly and others is that the data resolve to remain an actor in global defense. collected does not back up his conclusions and There are fears that its failure will cause further confuses causation with correlation.21 tensions between France, Germany, and Britain.17 A general criticism of economic theories of The prediction by the International Energy conflict is that economists forget that they are Agency that the United States can be “almost dealing with human beings, no doubt because self-sufficient in energy, in net terms, by 2035,”18 human behavior is often unpredictable and per- has wider implications than just the cost for plexing. Human nature, as theologian Reinhold Americans of heating their homes and fueling Niebuhr observed, is so complex that it supports their cars. The U.S. military footprint in the any hypothesis on man’s character and therefore Middle East is at stake. In this era of budget cuts, too on what motivates him to war and acts of there will be pressure to scale down the U.S. mil- violence.22 itary presence. At the same time, U.S. policymak- Keynes identified the problem of unpredict- ers will have to remember that oil supplies also ability when he drew the distinction between fuel the economies of Asia and that the sea-lanes measurable risk and irreducible uncertainty. to these economic powerhouses will need pro- Too much of the economic theory of conflict tecting. This could not only affect the relation- presumes to measure risks that are in fact uncer- ship with China, but also allies such as Japan tainties because they often involve choices by and South Korea. individuals. As C. Cramer states in his critique of economic models of conflict: “… I argue that Economic Blind Spots rational choice theories of conflict typically lay The discipline of economics has a patchy record waste to specificity and contingency, that they sack in strengthening security. Having generally shied the social and that even in their individualism
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they violate the complexity of individual motiva- with economic growth as the rising tide that lifts tion, razing the individual (and key groups) down all boats. This belief is reflected, for example, in to monolithic maximizing agents.”23 the sensible tenets of the so-called “Washington The complexity of human decision-mak- Consensus” of economist John Williamson,25 ing is acknowledged in the World Bank’s World and in the Growth Report led by Nobel Laureate Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security, Michael Spence.26 Yet the lesson from recent and Development. The report represented a sig- events in the Middle East and North Africa is that nificant attempt by the world’s leading devel- getting the fundamentals right is not enough. opment institution to integrate economics with In Tunisia, for example, economists praised security. World Bank President Zoellick gave the country’s economic performance. The World the impetus for the report through his belief in Bank’s 2010 country brief bemoaned high “securing development”, reflecting his concern unemployment but reported “Tunisia has made that development experts and military plan- remarkable progress on equitable growth, fight- ners must do more to work together in order ing poverty and achieving good social indica- to succeed in fragile and conflict-affected states. tors.” According to World Bank measures, Tunisia The report places people at the center of how had scored better than many other countries in to tackle repeat bouts of violence in developing the region on competitiveness even though the countries. It argues, “that strengthening legit- business environment was plagued with corrup- imate institutions and governance to provide tion.27 The report refrained from saying anything citizen security, justice, and jobs is crucial to about the repressive political system and the break cycles of violence.”24 widespread corruption that put the ruling fam- ily in charge of lucrative businesses. As Financial Tunisia had scored better than many other Times journalist Roula Khalaf noted, the brief countries in the region on competitiveness even looked surreal when read later in light of the rev- though the business environment was plagued olution that soon followed.28 with corruption The fact was that much of the progress being made by Tunisia and other countries in the region was on paper alone. Governments signed up for But the economic advice given by the World reforms yet often failed to implement them. Bank and others to developing countries has not Governments in the region ignored – and in always been effective in preventing outbreaks of Egypt, stopped circulation of – an earlier World violence. Often, governments have deliberately Bank report that pointed out the urgency of cre- ignored it because the changes recommended ating more jobs to respond to a youth bulge, and would threaten power structures. citing nepotism as a major constraint to opportu- One problem is that economic theory has nities. Egypt had a team of ministers under strong emphasized getting the fundamentals right while man Hosni Mubarak that was widely praised by the specifics of what is happening in an economy western donors. It pushed through privatization are less noticed. This is understandable. The fun- and other reforms but Egypt remained a society damentals are important. Economic growth is where university graduates became waiters unless seen as fundamental to achieving prosperous and they had the right connections. Tunisia’s national stable societies. Poverty reduction usually occurs economic progress masked large regional
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differences; with the coastal cities growing while international donors to warn of the impending the interior stagnated. consequences and to suggest strategies to cope It was in the stagnating interior of Tunisia with them where street seller Mohamed Bouazizi set him- self on fire after being harassed by police. All he wanted to do was to earn a living. Yet the police the two. This has the potential to strengthen secu- working for the corrupt regime would not even rity and promote economic activity. let him do that. His death sparked a revolution In Afghanistan, the World Bank team raised in Tunisia and across the Arab world that no one an issue in 2011 that few had given thought to had anticipated. as they prepared for the 2014 withdrawal of for- Bouazizi’s death spoke volumes about the eign troops: would the Afghan economy be able lack of opportunity in an economy once lauded to provide for the country after the foreigners by France and other western governments. left? This was no an idle question. Without a Tunisia’s economic growth may have been fine. viable economy, there would be little hope of But the numbers ignored bigger problems. This Afghanistan ever paying for its own police and economic growth was not inclusive enough. It military; little prospect of its government becom- did not give enough opportunity to people in ing legitimate in the eyes of its people through Tunisia’s interior, to the young, and to women. providing services; and little chance of providing The country’s governance problems, with the the jobs and opportunities to draw recruits away corrupt regime handing out jobs and businesses from the insurgency.29 to its family and cronies, stifled opportunity. Boosted by military spending flowing in to The crisis in the Middle East and North construction and services as well as by a strong Africa revealed a major disconnect between eco- harvest, the Afghan economy is forecast to grow nomics and security caused by a blind spot in at around 10 percent in 2012 compared to 7.3 the economics profession. According to the eco- percent the year before.30 But this progress could nomic models, the countries in the region were come undone with an abrupt withdrawal of mili- enjoying economic growth and should have been tary spending and donor support. Military spend- stable societies. But the lesson is that while econ- ing was estimated from 2010 to 2011 at more than omies grow, this growth can hide huge inequal- $100 billion, while spending on aid could have ities and marginalized communities that harbor been as high as $15.4 billion compared to an grievances waiting to explode. An older name economy worth around $16.3 billion.31 for the discipline of economics was “political Anticipating that the drawdown would hurt economy”. Ignoring the “political” in “political most in construction and services, particularly economy” has serious consequences. transportation, distribution and security, the World Bank team reached out to the military and international donors to warn of the impending Security and Development consequences and to suggest strategies to cope How can economists better contribute to under- with them. standing security issues? One area is in anticipating Their first recommendation was that mil- the problems caused by security for the economy itaries and donors should do more to increase and being aware of the interconnections between spending within Afghanistan. Much of the
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military and other aid was spent outside the investment will be needed in irrigation and country. They urged shifting more funding to across the production chain to get produce to local contractors and suppliers to bring spending domestic and foreign markets.35 to Afghanistan and to employ more Afghans. These recommendations were discussed at Even with a decline in military spending, this international meetings on Afghanistan in Bonn, could soften the effect significantly.32 Chicago and Tokyo and have become part of the A second recommendation was to channel planning for the country’s future after foreign more aid through the Afghan government. Only troops withdraw. 15 percent of aid went through the government’s They show how economics – when used to budget. Putting more aid through the budget was anticipate problems caused by security – can play another way to raise the share of contracts won by a key role in helping bolster security. The road local businesses. This was not an easy argument ahead though, for Afghanistan, is likely to be to make, given Afghanistan’s poor reputation a difficult one even if these measures are fully for governance and corruption. In arguing for implemented. this step, the World Bank also worked with the Finance Ministry to build capacity within the Conclusion Afghan government, including rigorous anti-cor- ruption safeguards.33 There is still a long way to go before economics A third recommendation was to get the is successfully integrated with security. Afghans to pay for more themselves. The World In its National Security Strategy, the Obama Bank said that reforms by the Afghan government administration has said that it focuses on “a com- could increase domestic revenue by 16 percent a mitment to renew our economy, which serves as year, growing to around 13 percent of GDP by the well-spring of American power.”36 The State 2019. These reforms included progress in cus- Department’s chief economist has said that the toms reforms, a new value-added tax in 2014 and administration has moved to fully integrate eco- collection of mining revenue.34 nomics into the national security framework.37 A final recommendation was to do more This may be happening at the State Department. to promote the private sector so that it could But it has to happen across all the pillars of gov- become a more significant provider of jobs ernment for it to have a real effect. In particular, and tax revenue. Afghanistan ranks near the lawmakers and the White House need to under- bottom in the World Bank’s Doing Business stand that confrontations over the debt ceiling report, which measures the ease of doing busi- or fiscal cliff influence U.S. power globally from ness across the globe. Apart from security and “hard” to “soft” power. corruption, businesses in Afghanistan must There is now a greater need than ever for contend with expensive and unreliable power, economists to understand how to support secu- no proper land registration system and weak rity. The global financial crisis has shown that legal structures. With private investment to help economics based on mathematical assumptions fund exploration, improve capacity and build can be a poor way to understand reality. Banks appropriate infrastructure, mining, oil and gas relied on risk models that were abruptly junked could boost the country’s economic develop- when markets collapsed. Economists have to ment. Agriculture can also be improved. More get their fingernails dirty in understanding what
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is really going on in an economy. They need 3 Overy, R.J., Goering: The Iron Man (New York, NY: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1987), 106. to understand that an economy is made up of 4 Skidelsky, Robert, The Road from Serfdom: The people making millions of individual decisions. Economic and Political Consequences of the End of Communism The economic fundamentals are important but (New York, NY: Penguin Books, 1995) 105. 5 they are not enough. Indicators of inclusiveness, Crockatt, Richard, The Fifty Years War: The United States and the Soviet Union in World Politics, 1941-1991 (New openness, transparency, and opportunity in a York, NY: Routledge, 1995), 311. society can be more important guides to stability 6 Young, John W., and Kent, John, International and security. Relations since 1945: A Global History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 580. Conflict in our era has shifted from state- 7 Zoellick, Robert B., “American Exceptionalism: Time on-state violence to intra-state conflict, much for New Thinking on Economics and Security.” Alastair of it in developing countries. It is in these states Buchan Memorial Lecture, IISS, London, July 25, 2012. 8 that understanding the interplay between eco- Whitesides, John, in foreign policy debate, “Romney and Obama get domestic,” Reuters, October 23, 2012. nomics and security can make huge differences. 9 Jerusalem Post, “Iran: How long can Debt-Laden Economists should do more to anticipate prob- U.S. Remain World Power?” October 18, 2012. lems caused by security. Military planners need 10 Lugar, Richard, “The Republican Course,” Foreign to take more account of the economic effects of Policy, No. 86, (1992), 87. 11 Kennan, George F., “The GOP Won the Cold War? their actions. More needs to be invested in bring- Ridiculous,” New York Times, October 28, 1992. ing economic and security planning together. The 12 Lebow, Richard N., and Stein, Janice Gross, “Reagan economic and security problems of fragile and and the Russians,” Atlantic Monthly, February 1994 at,
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New York Review of Books, Vol. 55, Number 19, (December 4, 2008), 8. 22 Waltz, Kenneth, Man, the State and War (New York, NY: Colombia University Press, 1959), 40. 23 Cramer, C., 2002, op. cit., 1846. 24 “WDR 2011: Conflict, Security, and Development,” World Bank, accessed at
86 | Features PRISM 4, no. 2 Three Design Concepts Introduced for Strategic and Operational Applications
By Ben Zweibelson
any discussions on design theory applications within military contexts often revolve around a small population of design practitioners using complex terms and exclusive language, contrasted by a larger population of design skeptics that routinely demand a universal, M 1 scripted, and complete examples for “doing design right.” Design, a form of conceptual planning and sense making, continues to gain traction in strategic political and military institutions, yet faces misunderstanding, disinterest, and outright rejection from military strategists and operational planners for a variety of reasons. This article aims at moving this discourse toward how several design theory concepts are valuable for strategists and decision makers, and how select design concepts might be introduced and applied in a simple language where military practitioners can traverse from strategic intent into operational applications with tangible results. As a lead planner for the Afghan Security Force reduction concept and the 2014 (NTM-A) Transition Plan, I applied design to strategic and operational level planning using these design concepts as well as others.2 This article takes three design concepts that do not exist in current military doctrine, provides a brief explanation on what they are, and how military practitioners might apply them in strategic planning and military decision-making efforts drawing from real-world applications in Afghanistan. Design theory, as a much broader discipline, spans theories and concepts well beyond the boundaries of any military design doctrine.3 I introduce these non-doctrinal concepts intentionally to foster discourse, not to provide a roadmap or checklist on how to “do design” by simply adding these to all future planning sessions. What may have worked in one planning session on reducing Afghan security forces beyond 2015 may be an incompatible design approach for influencing Mexican drug cartels this year, or appreciating yet another emergent problem in Africa. Complex, adaptive problems demand tailored and novel approaches.
Major Ben Zweibelson recently returned from Afghanistan where he served as an operational level planner for NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A) and was a lead planner on projects such as the Afghan Security Force Reduction beyond 2015 and the 2014 NTM-A Transition Plan.
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Diplomats, strategists and operational planners Instead, our organization pre-configures the across our military and instruments of national information as a narrative unit, or genre, often power might use these concepts, along with other regardless of the information as it unfolds in time useful design approaches, in their efforts to fuse and space. One might quip, “Don’t let the facts conceptual and detailed planning in uncertain get in the way of the story.” This is important for conflict environments. political and military applications in that your organization may be unaware of their predilec- Narratives: A Different Way to Think about Uncertainty and Complexity tions when they seek to make sense of a situation and conceptualize strategic options. Both our military and political institutions uses White provides a series of narrative genres the term “narrative” in a literal sense within tra- that build the overarching structure or theme that ditional planning lexicon and doctrine, whereas assists in explaining them. However, every soci- design theory looks to the conceptual work by ety or institution will generate their own genres literary historians and theorists such as Hayden based on shared values and concepts. Consider White as a useful alternative.4 One definition your own organization for a moment, and think does not substitute for the other; the military’s critically about what values, concepts, and cul- tactical version is distinct from the post-modern tural aspects resonate strongly. For example, we one introduced here. We shall call these “design already construct categories for film, literature, narratives” to make the distinction clear. These and other entertainment where stories occur. design narratives are not included in any mili- “Romance”, “satire”, “tragedy”, and “comedy” tary doctrine, which helps illustrate how incom- comprise White’s narrative genres in his examples, plete our individual service efforts to encapsulate although design theory would not limit narratives design are for military planners. to merely these. The organizational culture of a White proposes that a design narrative is group or institution such as a military unit, spe- something beyond the direct control of an orga- cialized department of government, or political nization or society. We do not construct our nar- party acts as a forcing function by pre-configuring ratives as a story unfolds, nor do we often realize narrative genres before we even observe some- that we perceive reality through powerful insti- thing occurring in the environment. Our societ- tutional filters that transpose symbols, values, ies and organizations pre-configure sequences of and culture onto how we will interpret events events by attaching those genres to the informa- unfolding.5 Instead, design narratives pre-con- tion while it unfolds, thus design narratives exist figure (form in advance) how and why a series and operate prior to actions occurring in a conflict of events will form into a story.6 These stories environment. Critically, different cultures, groups, have particular and often enduring meanings and and organizations interpret the same event in pro- structure that resonate within an organization or foundly different ways.7 Being able to recognize group due to shared values and culture. While and understand the various narratives of rival the details within the narrative will contain the groups within the environment is what provides familiar specifics such as facts, information, plot value to this design concept for military planning.8 structure, and the sequence of events that unite Consider some of the narratives on the the information into a contained “story”, they Intercontinental Hotel attack on 28 June 2011, do not establish the overarching explanation. which erupted in downtown Kabul’s green zone.
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Some media covered it with an overarching tragic the widespread belief that terrorism has nothing or satirical narrative (hopeless or hapless situa- to do with Afghans but is something outsiders tions), while both coalition military and political do to Afghans…[this] denial [of] terrorism in leaders preferred the romantic narrative (opti- Afghanistan…might be a reflection of a desper- mistic story where the protagonist inevitably ate psychological need to believe in Afghanistan triumphs). Are there any narrative themes from as a good and safe homeland which owes all its articles on the attack below, and do they reflect problems to foreign interference…” institutionalisms that attempt to explain the very - Nushin Arbabzadah (Afghan reporter), same incident differently? guardian.co.uk, 30 June 2011.12
“Our muj entered the hotel,” said Zabiullah Mr. Amini said he saw police officers running, Mujahid, the Taliban spokesman for northern too, tightly gripping their own AK-47s as they and eastern Afghanistan, “and they’ve gone raced away from the gunmen. “I said, ‘Why through several stories of the building and don’t you shoot? Shoot!’ ” he recalled. “But they are breaking into each room and they they just said, ‘Get away from them.’ And we are targeting the 300 Afghans and foreign- all ran together… now we are hearing about ers who are staying.” His claims could not be a security transition to Afghan forces…if they immediately confirmed. give the security responsibility to the current - Alissa Rubin, Rod Nordland, The New government at 10:00 a.m., the government York Times, 28 June 2011. 9 will collapse around 12 noon. They cannot live without foreigners.” “As the transition draws near, the attack on - Alissa Rubin, The New York Times, the [Intercontinental] hotel has only rein- 29 June 2011.13 forced the belief of Afghans and foreigners that Afghan forces are not ready to take over “The insurgent movement sometimes issues security responsibilities.” highly exaggerated statements that reflect what - John Wendle, TIME Magazine, its commanders would consider a best-case sce- 29 June 2011.10 nario for an assault…In this case, the Taliban version included a wildly overblown death toll. “[ISAF] joins President Karzai and the - Laura King and Aimal Yaqubi, Ministry of the Interior in condemning the Los Angeles Times, 29 June 2011. 14 attack on the Intercontinental Hotel in Kabul last night…” This attack will do nothing to Narratives reflect powerful internal forces prevent the security transition process from within an institution, and this design concept moving forward,” said Rear Admiral Beck.” offers deeper explanation for an organization - ISAF Headquarters Public Affairs seeking to make sense of complexity as it occurs. Office release, 29 June 2011.11 This provides explanation through context and holistic appreciation of other perspectives than “Afghanistan’s culture is too polite and fatalistic relying on the preferred one of our organization, to take security seriously- plus Afghans are in institution, or society. Pop-culture such as, “The denial over the roots of terrorism…first, there’s Daily Show” and late-night entertainment might
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weave a comedic story with the same details on explanation and appreciation of the adaptive, the same incident, while other media outlets and complex environment. This provides deeper organizations apply different themes to match meaning and understanding to subsequent the preferred social construction of their respec- detailed planning. tive audiences.15 The same event or objective in Afghanistan might be told within a satirical, Figure 1: Dueling Narratives tragic, or romantic design narrative depending within Afghan Conceptualization As Afghanistan matures, it grows upon what organization or society produces independent of Coalition Aid and develops international relationships the story. The Taliban mirror coalition romantic without losing sovereignty.
Coalition design narratives, although they take an oppos- Narratives ing position and swap the protagonists with the Afghanistan can Non-Western Media Afghanistan cannot be become a functional Narratives “tamed.” Alexander, the antagonists. Coalition forces might downplay the and regionally relevant British, and the Soviets nation if provided the all failed…therefore the right conditions and Afghan casualties or effectiveness of the attack, while the Media Western Coalition will as well. enablers. Narratives Media Narratives Taliban exaggerate the same details. Thus, even Taliban Narratives before a spectacular attack occurs and regardless Afghanistan is ‘helpless’ without foreigners of whether it is effective or not, the Coalition constantly providing them assistance and resources. If Coalition withdraws, Afghanistan will collapse, and return to the original form that embraces the and rivals such as the Taliban as organizations old ways. pre-configure their narratives so that as the inci- dent unfolds, their narratives establish the over- White’s narratives concept applied as a arching meaning regardless of the information.16 design tool is not a “stand-alone” planning pro- Rival groups produce dueling narratives that cess, nor does it fit neatly into a militarized pro- battle to shape and influence our perceptions cedure or doctrinal step. Understanding design while comprised of the same details, actors, narratives alone is not “doing design”, nor will and plot. Only the genres and organizational adding design narratives to a step within tradi- preferences differ, which produces drastically tional military decision-making processes make different results despite containing the same existing planning “better.” A senior political or information.17 Figure 1 illustrates one way our diplomatic staff will not necessarily function bet- NTM-A operational planners attempted to frame ter by mandating narratives as step five of their the conflict environment for establishing deeper current planning process either. Design just does understanding after the hotel attack.18 As a con- not work that way. ceptual planning product, it reflected the appre- Design narratives aid political and military ciation that those planners gained when study- professionals with making sense of ill-structured ing the various narratives. Operational planners problems by developing customized staff under- incorporated narrative concepts into the NTM-A standing and explanation during planning ses- transition plan for 2014 as well as the reduction sions. As the lead planner for the NTM-A design plan for Afghan security forces beyond 2015.19 team for recommending reduction of the Afghan Although the competing narratives of rival forces Security Forces from the current 352,000 to a in military conflicts might be visualized in many planned 228,000 after 2015, we used narrative different ways, the critical reflection and holis- concepts (Figure 2) to build multiple scenarios tic perspective of narrative tensions applied in for our Joint and interagency planning team these cases did offer military planners deeper to war-game all of our courses of action.20 This
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directly led to our planning concept, which future as political, strategic, and battlefield con- senior policy makers, the Afghan government, ditions continue to evolve. and the coalition ultimately approved in April While narratives might be less applicable 2012.21 Whether this reduction continues or not in future planning, they were highly useful for is dependent upon future planning, however for these initial conceptual planning efforts where an initial conceptual planning initiative, design we needed to abandon our institutional predi- theory directly contributed to these results. lections to avoid abstraction and uncertainty. These abstract considerations are part of what Figure 2: Narratives in Action-the Future makes design theory resistant to any assimila- Afghan Scenario Planning for Proposed tion into military doctrine and practices, as each Force Reductions 2015 environment requires its own tailored approach. Quad Chart Scenario Planning Methodology for Using design tools such as design narratives Anticipated Threat Environments future the Afghanistan often provide a richer environment for military High Corruption High Corruption High Violence High Violence planners to gain deeper understanding of com- This model features a booming illicit This model features an improving plex, highly adaptive conditions, and breaks commodity with a declining legal Afghan legitimate economy with a economy. With limited resources for booming illicit commodity- violence security costs, the Afghanistan may will increase as the Afghanistan buys your team out of dangerous institutionalisms lose legitimacy and face state failure more security capabilities while without outside intervention. Criminal criminal and insurgent enterprises can and “group-think” that often compounds exist- and Insurgent growth and robust black Illicit ProsperityEconomy also purchase more lethal hardware markets may hasten this collapse. and mercenaries/influence. ing planning shortfalls.
Legitimate Economy Entropy Legitimate Economy Prosperity
This model features a declining legal This model features an improving Assemblages: How Strategic Forces and illegal economy in the Afghanistan. Afghan legal economy with a declining With less legal enterprise options and illicit economy; positive feed-back Influence Tactical Action, and Vice-Versa no rival illicit economy, the loops funnel greater security resources Afghanistan may slide into a collapsed against a diminishing rival criminal state condition where extreme poverty enterprise. Expect Afghan directed Post-modern philosophers Gilles Deleuze and occurs. Violence may be moderate due changes to Army (high tech; bi-lateral to limited illicit options. agreements, new alliances)
Illicit Entropy Economy Felix Guattari offer the next design concept for High Corruption Low Corruption military planning consideration, which they refer Moderate Violence Low Violence 22 Regional Instability due to Army projection capacity to as “assemblages.” Like design narratives, an assemblage is a design concept that does not inte- = for ANSF actors, this end of the spectrum reflects more instability/uncertainty grate into a sequenced checklist or proceduraliza- = for ANSF actors, this end of the spectrum reflects more certainty and steady-state tion within existing military doctrine. Where and when to apply them rests in the judgment and Figure 2 illustrates a quad-chart using ele- creativity of the strategist or planner. ments of scenario planning and design narra- While narratives rely on a pre-configuring tives to help planners anticipate likely threat process that later fits the facts into a collective environments expected in Afghanistan beyond theme that relates to group values and tenets, 2015. Dueling narratives and other design con- assemblages work on a grander scale using a cepts helped build various threat environments vast range of items and concepts, often from the for coalition planners to subsequently conduct micro to the macro-level. This concept relies on extensive “war-gaming” sessions in with differ- the design term “synergy” along with the com- ent combinations of Afghan Security Forces. The ponent of scale. Synergy is quite different from Afghan planning reductions represented a con- merely the sum total of the components, which ceptual planning output, which will ultimately may be, for example, a pile of automobile parts lead to further detailed planning efforts in the and liquids.23 Synergizing the parts creates a
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functional car that is more than just those com- production techniques and the micro-economic ponents–something special happens when we and social forces that drive farmers, cartel mem- assemble it completely. Yet, cars are constructed bers, and new consumers also compose the vast, for a transportation need, with significant cul- interconnected assemblage. It unifies the entire tural and social forces at work at abstract levels complex and adaptive “western narco-criminal” well beyond the nuts and bolts of the actual vehi- system into something that is greater than the cle. Explanation need not include every single mere sum of its parts.27 To illustrate this, consider detail, but it does require a synergist perspective the abstract relationships between legal and ille- to see the overarching behaviors and meanings. gal, and valued and non-valued as depicted in Assemblages work in a similar fashion, and Figure 3. scale from the extremely abstract and broad Can we take all items within the western down to the detailed nuances of sub-components hemisphere and place it somewhere on the within things we normally regard as “whole.” abstract spectrum of belongings that our collec- The relationship within an assemblage is adap- tion of societies value, and belongings that we tive, dynamic, and truly non-linear. The linkages tend not to value? Can we also do this with items between things blur, and many interrelated and that are generally legal, and items that are not? transformative components span across what Take these two abstract paradoxes arranged along the military terms “strategic level” down to min- a quadrant model, and consider Figure 3 below. ute processes at the tactical level.24 For a military Can you think of items that, at a broad level, do example, we shall use the current “drug war” in not fall into a quadrant? Also, notice how these Mexico to demonstrate an assemblage. To begin, questions guide a strategist towards abstract, con- it is useful to start with the large-scale or abstract ceptual planning instead of into reductionist, end of an assemblage. tactical considerations.28 Categorization leads Western governments recognize and define towards more details, whereas conceptualization drug activities as a component of the larger illicit leads towards explanation. commodity or illegal economy where profit- able yet illegal items traffic from a source zone Figure 3: Quadrants and Abstract (cocaine production in Colombia) through Phenomenon-building an Assemblage transit zones (Mexico, trans-ocean routes) to A Society’s Rule of Law Based on Values Legal the arrival zone (North American and European Items here are legal but of Items here are valuable and legal; little to no value. forms the basis for legal enterprise. 25 consumption). Our government and military Q1 Q2 agencies tend to break the drug organizations No Value Valuable Nothing emerges here. With no Q3 Q4 Artifacts here are both valuable down into extremely detailed components with reason to enforce Rule of Law on and illegal; criminal enterprise things without value, this emerges in any system. various cartels, corrupt officials, and the exchange quadrant is devoid. Illegal Self-Organizing Criminal Enterprise of money, power, violence, and influence across fixed geography populated by human societies.26 Figure 3 helps illustrate the highly abstract Societies pass laws, and take actions that attempt end of the forces that drive the western nar- to curb the numerous destabilizing effects of nar- co-criminal assemblage; yet why does something co-criminal enterprise at the operational level, so abstract even matter to the strategist or plan- with tactical actions occurring at the tactical level ner? Military planners should not use assem- throughout all three zones. At the local level, drug blages to focus only on the tactical details of how
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Figure 4: Using a Tornado Metaphor to Build an Assemblage Concept Why do societies seek prosperity defined by values? Why is security and central government exteriority in tension with prosperity/entropy of the population? Why are values established through Is a western security model “right” for high abstraction ideological, cultural, and geographic-based Afghanistan? Why is attrition, phenomenon over time? corruption, and nepotism high despite Coalition e orts and resources? Why do actors transition between legal and medium Is Afghanistan’s natural state a ‘nation-state’ or illegal a iliations? Why does the abstraction something else? Why does a persistent resistance insurgent support continue to endure? movement exploit ideological tensions? Why do Why does reintegration fail Afghans view security di erently, and how is it repeatedly? Does ‘nationalism’ exist as unique from western logic? an Afghan concept? Strategic What are criminal patron-networks? What is tribalism? What is the Soviet-inspired centralized Relying upon the past Operational hierarchies? What is illiteracy? How do (interiority based); we predict a significantly di erent value systems exist within future that does not surprise us. Field Organizational Assumptions Values and Tenets the Afghan security institution? What does Past corruption mean to the west, and to Afghans? Where the Afghan security Tactical forces are presently during the Afghan security under Taliban Era, planning session. Present Soviet/Marxist Era, and Shah Eras Future conveyed through western historical narratives. interiority
a drug cartel links command and control within a with assemblages.30 The concept of interiority particular section of key terrain. Instead, all of the represents how an organization bounds what tactical details that our military institution often it knows about the world, with everything finds engrossing are an interrelated part of the unknown and undiscovered remaining outside heterogeneous “soup” that composes the entire in the “exteriority.” assemblage. We cannot become so engrossed Thus, what the military says a terrorist with the details that we lose sight of the big pic- organization is motivated by exists in our inte- ture.29 This means that military professionals riority as planners, while those motives that are might explore non-linear linkages and complex unknown, rejected, ignored, or undiscovered relationships that extend from any particular tac- exist in the exteriority–a place that many are pre- tical detail, up to the abstract levels where oper- vented from traveling to due to organizational ational and strategic phenomenon influence the resistance.31 This application of an assemblage emergent state of the entire system. helped NTM-A operational planners appreciate In the reduction of Afghan Security Forces overarching tensions within the Afghan envi- planning event, NTM-A planners used assem- ronment, which later shaped the scenarios and blages in early conceptual planning using a tor- war-gaming of various options, although much nado metaphor as shown in Figure 4. The tor- of the initial conceptual work remained within nado moves along the familiar linear axis of time, small planning circles and was not briefed to with tactical and detailed elements occurring at senior decision-makers. the surface while greater levels of abstraction Drawing a tornado on a white board will not swirl upwards into the larger and transforming necessarily help anyone visualize how the con- cloud mass. Critically, the flat plane upon which cept of assemblages dynamically links the many the tornado swirls is termed the “interiority”, elements of a complex environment into a trans- which is a concept that Deleuze and Guattari use forming, adaptive phenomenon that transcends
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Figure 5: Categorization Approaches in Operational Planning for Mexican Cartel Violence Problems
Military planning doctrine directs strategists and planners to categorize complex systems into “bins”- we seek to reduce complexity through scientific approaches, reductionism, and structure. This breaks down relationships, destroys linkages across scale and time, and through over-simplification promises a false reduction of uncertainty.
U.S. Army planning doctrine only Uncertainty
Physical Political Military Economic Social Information Infrastructure Environment Time
P M E S I I P T
Rate of drug violence Safe-houses and Political environment Cocaine crop incidents over time tunnel networks
Social acceptance of Mexican road networks Chronological sequence Mexican military drug use in arrival zone for transport of select events
time and scale. Presenting such a drawing to concepts. Traditional military decision-mak- senior policymakers or military leaders will also ing procedures and military doctrine exploits result in unfortunate outcomes–these concep- the tangible things- places, events, actors, and tual products are not intended as deliverables. details. This eliminates the tornado form and the They are concepts that aid planners in gaining the swirling interrelated process where forces often understanding so that they can then build plan- unseen continue to influence an environment in ning deliverables that are the result. There are ways that we quickly describe as unpredictable, important reasons why early abstract work must chaotic, or crazy. not be confused with final products. However, Instead, consider the intangible components early abstract work must be done effectively so of the assemblage such as cultural values, eco- that later products emerge as clear, explanatory, nomics, climate change, politics, and population and holistic. changes over time, and avoid simply categorizing Consider the difference between using meta- them within traditional reductionist approaches phoric content that implies fluidity, change, and such as “political”, “social”, and “economic” complex relationships and the traditional linear categories. Categorization fractures the assem- planning approaches where simplistic “lines of blage and renders explanation meaningless for effort” or similar planning products chart out the planners seeking design explanation.32 Routine future in predictive, lockstep formats. Uncertainty categorization ignores linkages across scale and and change are two elements that we tradition- beyond narrow boundaries of groupings.33 Even ally seek to reduce or eliminate; yet these are our administrative concepts of task and purpose two essential aspects for building assemblage within an assemblage appear meaningless, where
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Figure 6: One of Many Ways to Visualize Aspects of an Assemblage ‘Narco-Criminal Assemblage’ (Large scale/abstract)
Illicit commodity cycles Human values/behaviors Economic theories Planetary changes International resources
International cocaine International economy supply/demand Regional cartel ‘De-territorializing’ balance of power ‘Territorializing’ International tension Regional resources of values/culture Regional economy Local crime and Political, legal, economic, Regional culture power structure Adaptations, improvisations, technological, and societal Local resources and growth of new knowledge changes that destroy elements of Fusion of and novel relationships that the assemblage- shatter symbols generational values Local economy build dynamic and di erent and dismantle cherished values Local weather relationships. These occur and relationships. Local values Single sales across all scales and times Cocaine crop and often relate to Individual habits Acts of violence de-territorializing destruction. Acts of corruption Criminal actor Consumer actor Victim actor Individual plants
(small scale/infinitesimal)
Constantly transforming; cannot be ‘framed’, ‘bounded’, or categorized…the assemblage moves in unexpected directions while creating novel, unseen formations...cycles of creation and destruction.
the task to type a key has the purpose to form a assemblage where tactical components connect, word, which links to forming a sentence, and so disconnect, and establish new relationships on. Typing is linked in a long series of tasks and within a non-linear web of operational and purposes up to an abstract level of influencing a strategic developments.35 While there are many society on an anti-drug policy; yet our traditional ways to illustrate an assemblage such as previous reductionist approach in military planning wants Figure 4, Figure 6 continues with the narco-crim- us to shatter the linkages and reduce complex- inal example to offer yet another way to help ity.34 The next figure illustrates the traditional, planners visualize this useful design concept. categorizing approach that military doctrine Skeptics may take the assemblage concept prescribes for making sense of uncertain envi- and say, “that may be interesting for conceptual ronments. planning, but what good does the assemblage Instead of categorizing, strategists and oper- concept bring to military decision making or ational planners that apply the design theory diplomacy?” Design planning with assemblages “assemblage” concept may avoid the pitfalls helps draw your staff out of the standard over-tac- of breaking dynamic linkages, or ignoring the tical emphasis where we immediately seek to importance of scale, time, and transforma- reduce and categorize a problem into more man- tion within an uncertain and volatile system. ageable “chunks” whether at the strategic or oper- All of these tangible and intangible actors and ational level.36 In the NTM-A transition-planning forces interrelate in the dynamic and adaptive group for 2014, our planning team was tasked to
PRISM 4, no. 2 Features | 95 ZWEIBELSOn design a unified plan to transition all bases and to avoid their predecessor’s demise. Why does facilities over to the Afghan security forces by our society glamorize drug use? Why do farm- 2014. Using assemblage concepts in the initial ers plant drug crops over legal ones? Why is a conceptual planning phase, our team determined secured border so symbolic in political realms? that the institutionalisms of our own military Why do cartels adapt ahead of legitimate gov- organizations as well as those of the Afghan secu- ernment action? Where is the next illegal and rity forces were far more significant than they profitable commodity going to emerge from, and appeared. Although the final deliverable was a why? These are inquires that help make sense of highly detailed plan for military action over time, an assemblage, and prevents over-simplification the initial conceptual planning avoided simply of uncertainty. building a large checklist for transitioning facil- Problematization: Actual Critical ities over to the Afghans. Instead, due to assem- Thinking Threatens Institutionalism blage constructs highlighting the myriad tensions between ISAF military forces, the NATO forces, In order to encourage comprehensive assem- and the various Afghan ministries and differ- blages that include our own military organiza- ent security forces that occurred across different tion, strategists and planners may find a third scales, times, and processes, our planning team design theory concept called “problematization” sought solutions to deeper problems. useful for its critical reflection on how we think, Instead of treating symptoms, design and how we think about thinking. This concept approaches help identify and influence the permeates all major design actions and was a cor- underlying and often pervasive problems. Or, nerstone in my own design efforts in Afghanistan it hardly matters to hand an instillation over to as an operational planner linking strategic guid- Afghan control based on a calculated date if we ance to tactical applications. fail to appreciate the tensions preventing higher This third design concept comes from the elements in the Afghan ministries from transfer- work of philosopher Michel Foucault.38 Foucault ring resources. If our own advisors in the ministry uses the term “problematization” to explain the do not appreciate what advisors on the ground unique interrelationship between an organiza- in a sister organization or agency are also doing, tion and a person within the organization that how can another associated element execute if risks thinking critically and creatively. Risk is a no one gains a holistic picture and identifies the key element of Foucault’s concept because the key tensions? “problematizer” often confronts his own orga- Assemblage thinking not only channels your nization with painful truths and “destructively staff to “seek the big picture” but helps drive creative” approaches to improving how the orga- explanation by seeking WHY-centric inquires nization functions. instead of WHAT-centric behaviors.37 Returning To problematize is not just another cum- to the cartel example, leaders can encourage bersome design term, but also a critical concept abstract and non-linear conceptualization on that has neither synonym nor equivalent in what motivates a cartel, and whether eliminat- existing planning doctrine or military lexicon. ing any particular drug cartel will “end” the drug One does not only critically reflect and ques- problem, or merely influence a different adap- tion, for the problematizer fuses creativity and tation where future drug cartels emerge able novel approaches to appreciate complexity and
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deliver explanation that generates substantial ■■ Should Mexican military and law enforce- change. Of course, he that dares to tell the king ment pursue criminals into American territory? that he is naked does risk the sword. More impor- ■■ Should we value American casualties over tantly, a problematizer threatens the institutional Mexican ones? tenets by not only revealing to the king that his ■■ Should our nation legalize the drug in is currently nude, but also delivers explanation question? Should other nations do this? on why the king was unable to see this before ■■ Should we increase drug penalties and now, why his staff feared to disagree, and how he expand our penal infrastructure? might improve his organization to prevent such ■■ Should we consider censorship of drug reoccurrences. Critical reflection coupled with glamorization in order to reduce use? explanation and novel discovery becomes key in ■■ Should we coordinate with one Cartel in problematizing. order to eliminate the others? Problematizers risk alienation, marginal- ■■ Should we encourage more Cartels, in ization, or elimination when the organization order to weaken existing ones? rejects their novel perspective, regardless of ■■ Should we allow the local territory to fall whether they are correct. Many visionary thinkers under Cartel control so that they become cen- and military pioneers challenged the tenets and tralized and easier to target? rigid concepts within their own institutions, only ■■ Should our police gain greater military to be vindicated later when a military paradigm capabilities and resources? shift validates their original advice and under- ■■ Should our military assume a police role standing. Consider the following questions that and modify the rules of engagement as such? an interagency or military organization might consider with significant narco-violence spill- Many of the above questions trigger strong ing over the southern border between America reactions, depending upon which institution, and Mexico. Which of these would be readily branch of government, or society the reader asso- accepted by some organizations, but quickly ciates with most. Also, with every answer a ques- rejected by others? Which are “off limits” due tion generates, the problematizer must follow up to institutionalisms or cultural tenets, and thus with asking why this is. It is the “why” that helps would not even be explored in any conceptual explain our institutionalisms, and aids a planner planning efforts? in reaching a holistic picture that breaks through internal barriers, biases, and other institutional- ■■ Should a military operation led by the isms that bound the interiority of an organiza- Army secure the border? tion’s knowledge. ■■ Should a military operation led by the Consider that all of the questions will gener- Navy secure the border? ate healthy discourse during conceptual planning ■■ Should the military work under Federal sessions, yet our own organizations might inhibit Law Enforcement at the border? contemplation due to our own institutionalisms. ■■ Should religious organizations such as the As a modern military organization in the 21st Catholic Church be engaged to assist? century, we need to encourage problematiza- ■■ Should American military and state assets tion within our organizations, and realize when work under Mexican control? our own institutionalisms are blinding us as the
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world changes around us. The more that con- proposals had to include an Afghan Air Force, flict adapts, the stronger the desire for military all of the fielded systems provided to the Afghan services to return to historic and traditionally forces, and retain relative structures that the defining behaviors and actions–we seek to fight Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Defense were tomorrow’s conflict with last year’s successful accustomed to in terms of command and control. action, particularly if it enhances institutional Since NTM-A had a large Air Force element that self-relevance.39 No military force remains the built and integrated into the Afghan Air Force, our same, yet once we symbolize an item or behavior, own institution was not going to entertain ques- we attach values and assumptions about our- tions on whether Afghanistan even needed an Air selves to them that inoculate them as resistant Force after 2015 at that time. Similar questions to critical inquiry or adjustment.40 Non-military on whether the Afghans required special police government organizations should also value this tactics teams, special forces assets, or armored concept, as it aids in confronting problematic vehicles all were dismantled due to existing insti- actions by military services. tutional tenets within ISAF and NTM-A where Organizational theorist Mary Jo Hatch pro- eliminating a major program represented the poses that we cycle through these actions grad- “defeat” of values or concepts that an organiza- ually over time, assigning symbols within our tion defined self-relevance with. Additionally, our organizations. 41 Only through a gradual rejection planners were unable to question the overarch- of our original assumptions, often over periods ing ISAF Campaign Plan with respect to whether that exceed traditionally constructed military the enemy’s strategic center of gravity remained campaigns, do we de-symbolize structures, items valid.43 Such engagements with superior staff behaviors. Often, our military holds onto behav- met with a quick dismissal, because changing iors, techniques, and systems that we consider centers of gravity requires extensive revisiting of “traditional”, “self-defining”, or “universal in the entire overarching counterinsurgency plan. combat” despite their irrelevance in the current When practicing design, one must rise above conflict.42 If we symbolize military tools and tech- one’s own institutionalisms, appreciate them, niques and therefore require greater periods to and seek abstract, holistic contemplation of com- de-symbolize them, then the military problema- plex environments in order to better understand tizer must foster change and adaptation against why they are adapting as they are. these institutional forces while often battling Instead of reaching back into traditional, their own institution in the process. familiar processes and concepts, problematiza- However, “naked kings” in your organi- tion is destructively creative to an organization zation usually seek to kill any truth-tellers that because we question whether a future conflict come offering insight because transformation of or operation requires the very things and con- the institution might promote greater uncertainty cepts that our organization symbolizes and seeks than sticking with reliable, although ineffective self-relevance with currently. The Air Force might approaches and behaviors. For example, the resist discussing eliminating the Afghan Air Force, original NTM-A planning guidance for our team while Military Intelligence might resist elimi- to tackle the 2015 Afghan Security Force reduc- nating information collection systems. Special tion featured several requirements that largely Operations ties the local militia forces to their reflected our own institutionalisms. Our final self-relevance with respect to foreign internal
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defense, thus the Afghan Local Police should not theory for military organizations and strategists just be except from reductions, but expanded. 44 dealing with senior policy makers! It is hard It is in the best interests of the organization to enough to grapple with military professionals silence a member that promotes contrary ideas, that use a wide lexicon of terms and concepts which identifies the primary danger of becoming unique to military organizations without also a problematizer. The problematizer is one that requiring the even more abstract concepts, terms, both belongs to the organization, and critically and approaches that design offers. Most military considers beyond these symbols to focus on what professionals remain confused on design the- is healthy within the institution and what poten- ory, so how can we expect interagency and other tially is not. national-level members to engage in real design Destructive creativity reinforces the earlier discussions? Part of this relates to how there is no concept of assemblage and the constantly adap- overarching planning approach or shared con- tive heterogeneous conflict environments labeled cepts across all of the military services that could complex or “ill-structured.”45 Nothing is sacred be called “design” without encountering rival or off-limits, yet if a problematizer threatens his institutional interpretations. organization by seeking to destroy a cherished value or core tenet, Foucault, as well as scien- adaptive concepts, language, and approaches tific philosopher Thomas Kuhn warn that the resist codification into handy executive self-interests within an institution will strike out summaries or PowerPoint presentations at those that usher in revolutionary change, even at the expense of clinging to an outdated or infe- rior concept.46 RAND analyst Carl Builder also While major military organizations con- echoes the dangers of military problematization tinue to produce their own versions of design in ‘The Masks of War’ by arguing that military with a variety of monikers, self-relevant logic and services may jeopardize the security of the nation shared values, we cannot expect to find any final in pursuit of self-interests and continued mili- or complete “design” answer for military plan- tary relevance. A problematizer on your staff will ning within a service doctrine or school course. challenge your organization, and break a staff This frustrates policy makers as well as our mil- out of “group-think” and other institutionalisms itary practitioners. Adaptive concepts, language, that often obscure our understanding of the true and approaches resist codification into handy nature of an ill-structured problem whether stra- executive summaries or PowerPoint presenta- tegic or operational in form. tions for mass consumption. Our professional military education system should not conduct a Conclusions: Design Theory cannot be Caged; It Remains a quixotic quest for a better design doctrine chap- Useful Free-Range Animal ter or improved planning checklist, nor should policy makers and strategists shy away from Design theory remains its own assemblage of design due to these uncertainties. At a minimum, sorts, continuously transforming and ushering we might seek “social knowledge production” in new combinations and fusions of different methods such as a Wikipedia-style process to disciplines, concepts, vocabulary, and ideas. This share and discuss design theory–yet this does is perhaps the most frustrating aspect of design not marginalize the need for discourse on novel
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design approaches such as the three examples which is something that makes military hier- in this article.47 Perhaps a shared understanding archical organizations rather uncomfortable. of design theory across all service branches and Despite our inherent resistance to improvisa- major federal departments might produce a flex- tional and unorthodox approaches, modern mil- ible and adaptive body of concepts and terms itary operations demand a fusion of conceptual where it is less important where you come from and detailed planning to forge tactical applica- but why you are seeking explanation of a com- tions from usually indistinct strategic guidance. plex environment. Additionally, the further we Strategists and operational planners struggle with get away from internal languages, acronyms, and precisely how to accomplish this. ‘military-jargon’ that break down and eliminate Assemblages, narratives, and problema- inter-agency and inter-governmental commu- tization come from different disciplines and nication, the better we can achieve true “shared fields that are often not associated directly with understanding” of these complex, adaptive envi- military planning considerations. Just because ronments that demand foreign policy decisions. something comes from a completely non-mil- itary discipline or field, we should not dismiss transformation will occur whether we lead in it as quickly as we often do. While we cannot that change or our rivals drag us there through waste time and resources aimlessly wandering competition or defeat in an intellectual journey without a destination, we also cannot expect the narrow gaze of institu- tional doctrine and our desire to retain all of our Codifying one narrow interpretation of traditional behaviors and concepts prevent us “how to do design” into doctrine produces a from transforming into the next military form. similar output where planners are expected to This transformation will occur whether we lead innovate and be creative, but still have to “follow in that change or our rivals drag us there through the rules” as established by the individual service. competition or defeat. This is a terrible contradiction, and likely fosters Some opponents of design argue that until much of the current confusion and frustration the military regain proficiency on traditional with fusing design with military decision-making planning and best practices for full-spectrum today between rival services, policy makers, and operations, we should not “waste time on other governmental appendages. design.” This sounds of naked kings demand- Instead of attempting to domesticate design ing that their attendants find better mirrors or theory into doctrine or “paint-by-numbers” pro- glasses so that they can join him in admiring cedures, this article takes several useful design his imaginary garments. Design theory is not an theory concepts that do not appear in military intellectual boogie man, but it may provide the doctrine and demonstrates their utility in strate- holistic vision for your organization to visualize gic and operational planning. All three of these the real monsters lurking in the fog and friction concepts were successfully applied in design of war-particularly the ones that most threaten deliverables for planning Afghan security reduc- the relevance of cherished traditions, techniques, tions beyond 2015 as well as the 2014 transition and favored systems.49 These three design con- of security missions from NATO to the Afghans. 48 cepts demonstrate the utility of a methodology Design theory features a higher degree of artistry, that operates beyond existing military doctrine
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and sequential planning procedures that attempt over time are institutionalized into vast, complex, and expanding bureaucracies. to reduce uncertainty through reduction and 6 Hayden White, Tropics of Discourse; Essays in Cultural 50 categorization. Leaders, whether military or Criticism, (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, political, that promote critical and creative think- 1978), 6. “Rational or scientific knowledge was little more ing through various design theory approaches than the truth yielded by reflection in the prefigurative modes raised to the level of abstract concepts and submitted may guide their organizations more effectively to criticism for logical consistency, coherency, and so on.” through the inevitable transformations that 7 Berger, Luckmann, op. cit., 138-147. “There are the military institution must undergo as time also the more directly threatening competing definitions of reality that may be encountered socially.” Berger and marches on. Luckmann discuss how societies construct their own social constructs complete with different role-specific vocabu- laries, institutionalisms, and symbols that are perpetually Notes maintained, modified, and defended against rival social constructs of reality. 8 Hayden White, Metahistory: The Historical 1 This article uses “Design Theory” to avoid insti- Imagination in Nineteenth-Century Europe (Baltimore and tutional pitfalls of service-unique terms such as “Army London: John Hopkins University Press, 1973), 7. “The Design Methodology” or “Systemic Operational Design.” arrangement of selected events of the chronicle into a story See: United States Army Training and Doctrine Command, raises the kinds of questions the historian must anticipate Field Manual 5-0; The Operations Process (Headquarters, and answer in the course of constructing his narrative.” Department of the Army, 2010), Chapter 3, “Design”. White explains in Metahistory the construction of narratives See also: United States Army Training and Doctrine so that humans relay information through conceptual con- Command, Field Manual-Interim 5-2; Design (Draft) (draft structs that relate to language, society, period, and intent. under development-Headquarters, Department of the See also: Paul Ricoeur (translated by Kathleen Blamey and Army, 2009) for examples of U.S Army design doctrinal David Pellauer), Time and Narrative, Volume 3, (Chicago: approaches. University of Chicago Press, 1985), 107. 2 Ben Zweibelson, “Military Design in Practice: A 9 Alissa Rubin, Rod Nordland, “Raid by Afghan Case from NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan in 2012,” Forces and NATO Ends Attack on Hotel in Kabul,” nytimes. Small Wars Journal, (June 4, 2012), available at
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14 Laura King and Aimal Yaqubi, “Afghan Taliban 21 Thom Shanker, Alissa Rubin, “Afghan Force Will Sends Message with Hotel Attack,” Los Angeles Times, Be Cut After Taking Lead Role,” The New York Times, April June 29, 2011, available at
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“Reduction is but one approach to understanding, one time (PMESII-PT). See also “Army Doctrine Reference among many. As soon as we stop trying to examine one Publication” (ADRP) 3-0, Unified Land Operations (May tiny portion of the world more closely and apply some 2012) for additional information. close observation to science itself, we find that reduction- 33 Gary Jason, Critical Thinking: Developing an ism is an ideal never achieved in practice.” Effective System logic, (San Diego State University: 27 Huba Wass de Czege, “Thinking and Acting Like Wadsworth Thomson Learning, 2001), 337. “People an Early Explorer: Operational Art is Not a Level of War,” tend to compartmentalize: they divide aspects of their Small Wars Journal, March 14, 2011, available at
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survival, evoking “golden eras” of past wars, and the con- in old methods. Over time, these practitioners will self-ex- tinued idolization of self-defining behaviors, traditions, ile due to loss of relevance in the new paradigm. and structures. 47 Paris Tech Review Editors, “It’s a Wiki Wiki World, 40 Mats Alvesson, Jorgen Sandberg, “Generating Wikipedia and the Rise of a New Mode of Production,” Research Questions Through Problematization,” Academy Paris Tech Review, February 18, 2011, available at
104 | Features PRISM 4, no. 2 Sri Lanka’s Rehabilitation Program: A New Frontier in Counter Terrorism and Counter Insurgency
By Malkanthi Hettiarachchi
he Liberation Tigers of Tamil Ealam (LTTE), sometimes referred to as the Tamil Tigers, or simply the Tigers, was a separatist militant organization based in northern Sri Lanka. It was founded T in May 1976 by Prabhakaran and waged a violent secessionist and nationalist campaign to create an independent state in the north and east of Sri Lanka for the Tamil people. This campaign evolved into the Sri Lankan Civil War.1 The Tigers were considered one of the most ruthless insurgent and terrorist organisations in the world.2 They were vanquished by the Sri Lankan armed forces in May 2009.3 In order to rehabilitate the 11,6644 Tigers who had surrendered or been taken captive, Sri Lanka developed a multifaceted program to engage and transform the violent attitudes and behaviours of the Tiger leaders, members and collaborators.5 Since the end of the LTTE’s three-decade campaign of insurgency and terrorism, there has not been a single act of terrorism in the country. Many attribute Sri Lanka’s post-conflict stability to the success of the insurgent and terrorist rehabilitation program. Globally, rehabilitation and community engagement is a new frontier in the fight against ideo- logical extremism and its violent manifestations – terrorism and insurgency.6 Following a period of captivity or imprisonment, insurgents and terrorists are released back into society. Without their disengagement and de-radicalization, they will pose a continuing security threat. The recidivist will carry out attacks and politicize, radicalize, and militarize the next generation of fighters. Furthermore, they will become a part of the insurgent and terrorist iconography. To break the cycle of violence, governments of countries that suffer from terrorism must build partnerships with communities and other stakeholders in maintaining peace and stability. Working with communities, the media, academic circles, and the private sector, governments should invest time and energy into mainstreaming the thinking of those who have deviated into ideological extremism and violence.
Malkanthi Hettiarachchi is a Clinical Psychologist who works in psychosocial skills training and rehabilitation within secure and community settings.
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Sri Lankan Rehabilitation Program in recommended by Singapore to visiting Sri Lankan Context: Global Rehabilitation Programs officials, who adopted it and subsequently shared As every conflict differs, there is no common it with Pakistani counterparts. 9 template applicable to all rehabilitation pro- In the process of creating a program that grams. Nevertheless, there are some common was applicable to Sri Lanka, existing global pro- principles of rehabilitation. Rehabilitation is grams in Asia, Africa, and Latin America were about changing the thinking and behaviour of reviewed. Through emphasizing national owner- offenders. Prior to the reintegration of former ship, the rehabilitation staff and advisors helped terrorists into mainstream society, offenders must to indigenise the best practices of other programs. move away from violent extremist thinking. If the Singapore’s rehabilitation model, considered one of the best global programs with its large number rather than adopting the classic retributive of psychologists and religious counsellors, was justice model, Sri Lanka embraced the particularly instructive. The six modes of reha- restorative justice model bilitation developed in the Singapore rehabili- tation program were indigenized, adapted, and developed to a high standard in Sri Lanka. The mindset is locked into an ideology of intolerance founders of the Sri Lankan rehabilitation pro- and violence against another ethnic or religious gram named it the “6+1 model.” It consists of community, strategies must focus on changing the following modes of rehabilitation and com- their thinking patterns. In order to facilitate a munity engagement:10 shift within the offender, to a non-violent life- 1.Educational style, the violence justifying thought patterns 2.Vocational must be identified, as well as the mechanisms 3.Psychosocial and creative therapies that introduced, nurtured, and reinforced these 4.Social, cultural, and family thought patterns. To facilitate this transformation 5.Spiritual and religious of thinking, genuine and continuous engagement 6.Recreational is required in both the custodial rehabilitation +1: Community rehabilitation and community rehabilitation phases.7 Global rehabilitation programs can be char- Rehabilitation Program in Sri Lanka acterized as developed, developing, and defunct The Sri Lankan spirit itself was conducive for programs. The most developed programs are embracing rehabilitation. Rather than adopting operating in Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Malaysia the classic retributive justice model, Sri Lanka and Sri Lanka. The developing programs are in embraced the restorative justice model.11 The then Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Colombia, while Attorney General Mohan Peiris crafted the legal defunct programs are in Egypt, Yemen, and Libya.8 framework for rehabilitation. Sri Lanka drew from Although publicizing their model as uniquely Sri its own rich heritage of moderation, toleration, Lankan, the program benefited from drawing prac- and coexistence – communities in Sri Lanka have tical lessons and applicable concepts from existing lived side by side for centuries.12 Sri Lanka also rehabilitation programs. For example, the concept has a history of rehabilitating violent youth after and term “beneficiary,” used in Saudi Arabia to the insurrections in the south in 1971 and 1987- refer to terrorists undergoing rehabilitation, was 1989. Sri Lanka’s first experience in rehabilitation
106 | From the field PRISM 4, no. 2 SRI LANKA’S REHABILITATION PROGRAM Photo by Indi Samarajiva on Flickr Indi Samarajiva Photo by 53 former LTTE cadres were married in Vavuniya. They are being moved to family houses, but still kept in the rehabilitation program. was after security forces defeated the Peoples rehabilitation and reintegration program fol- Liberation Front (Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna), lowing the defeat of LTTE in 2009. Even before a vicious Marxist-Leninist group that adopted the fighting ended in May 2009, the BCGR man- Maoist tactics, in 1971. Although the programs aged rehabilitation centers in Ambepussa in were not as robust as the contemporary program, the south, and Thelippale in the north for Tiger there was hardly any recidivism among the partic- captives.14 These centers were named Protective ipants.13 After a period of incarceration, the state Accommodation and Rehabilitation Centers did not oppose and at times facilitated the re-entry (PARCs), accommodating nearly 11,500 cadres of some of the key players of Janatha Vimukthi that either surrendered or where identified while Peramuna into the political mainstream. masquerading as Internally Displaced Persons The Bureau of the Commissioner General (IDPs) at the end of the conflict. of Rehabilitation (BCGR) was founded as Approximately 254 staff15 work within Sri the special state authority responsible for the Lankan rehabilitation centers, attending to the
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welfare requirements of the beneficiaries as well for rehabilitation. As of November 2012, the as facilitating the rehabilitative input provided BCGR remains responsible for the rehabilitation by several agencies. This figure does not include of approximately 800 remaining beneficiaries. security staff dedicated to perimeter security. The government faced many challenges. The Sri Lankan Government has spent USD Although the public in the south, which had 9,136,37016 to manage rehabilitation centers. been targeted and suffered from LTTE terrorism, The amount spent annually fluctuates based on supported rehabilitation, northerners shunned the number of beneficiaries within the system, the return of the rehabilitated terrorists into and does not include the costs associated with their midst. In the North, the LTTE had forcibly complementary efforts of individual “specialist recruited children, extorted funds, and induced programs,” charities, national non-governmental untold suffering on civilian populations, which organizations, international and local non-gov- earned the resentment and anger of northern ernmental organizations, government institu- families. In the last phases of the fight, the LTTE tions, ministries and well-wishers. left their village bases and took nearly 300,000 The rehabilitation process was aimed at Tamil civilians as hostage. They were the sons reintegrating the former LTTE leaders, members, and daughters of the northern Tamil community and collaborators into the community. During and this suffering made the northerners reject the the process, beneficiaries within the PARCs were former LTTE cadres and their separatist ideology. supported to engage in a range of activities and The BCGR encouraged contact with the com- through these activities reconnect to all aspects of munity through visits, letters, and phone contact, individual and communal life, including familial, among other means. Furthermore, the reintegra- social, cultural, and religious. The beneficiaries tion ceremonies – the transfer of the beneficiary were supported to shift their thinking away from back to their families and communities – were the narrow hate-filled ideology targeted towards conducted publicly with community participa- the Sinhalese, Muslims, and national and inter- tion. After organizing a mass marriage ceremony national figures that opposed the LTTE agenda. of fifty-three former LTTE cadres, the BCGR orga- Upon reflection on their actions and experiences, nized for the couples to live within a specially the former terrorists and insurgents found new built peace village.20 Responsibility for guiding, meaning in their lives. They were transformed mentoring, and mainstreaming former cadres was into champions of peace with values of modera- gradually transferred to their local communities. tion, toleration, and co-existence replacing hate, As the state itself lacked sufficient funds, the anger, and the mono-ethnic single narrative.17 Sri Lankan private sector played a role in support- The majority of the beneficiaries were rein- ing both custodial rehabilitation and community tegrated within the 24-month mandated period reintegration. Sri Lankan blue chip companies21 and as of November 2012 approximately 11,04418 supported vocational training to build skills and beneficiaries had been reintegrated. 594 child later employ former LTTE cadres. A number of beneficiaries19 were reintegrated within the stip- international organizations and non-govern- ulated one-year rehabilitation period for chil- mental organizations, notably the International dren. The reintegration of students, the disabled, Organization of Migrants (IOM), which had and the aged were prioritised, and the BCGR access to the rehabilitation centers, also assisted engaged the community to enlist their support and advised the government.22
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Categorization of the Detainees Modes of Rehabilitation
The rehabilitation phase was aimed at working Six modes of rehabilitation were utilized at the towards the successful reintegration of the bene- PARCs: educational, vocational, spiritual, recre- ficiaries through reconciliation and resettlement. ational, psychosocial, and familiar, social, and The first step in the process was to categorize the cultural. surrendered and apprehended insurgents and terrorists. Utilizing interviews and background ■■ Educational rehabilitation: The Tamil information, law enforcement authorities and Tigers recruited from a cross section of society, intelligence agencies categorized former insur- but mostly from poor and under-aged groups. gents based on their depth of involvement, Many of the terrorist cadres had either not period of involvement, and activities conducted completed their education or failed to achieve during involvement. They were labeled as high, the country’s national standard of completing medium, or low risk, and allocated to detention the General Certificate of Education, Ordinary and PARCs accordingly. Assessing the risk level of Level Examination (requiring ten years of the detainees enabled the state to categorize them study). Given that one of the main aims of into A, B, C, D, E, and F groups.23 the rehabilitation program is education, the Serious insurgents were categorized into BCGR focused on promoting academic edu- the A and B groups. They were frontline leaders cation. Between ten to twenty-five percent of and members. These prisoners were allocated the beneficiaries needed help with reading to detention and not rehabilitation, and forced and writing in the Tamil language, and the to go through a judicial process. Following the majority spoke neither the national language findings of the investigation and assessments of of Sri Lanka, Sinhalese, nor the link language, the detainees’ levels of cooperation, and based English.25 The rehabilitation program created a on those findings, the detainees were offered the space for providing formal education to those option of joining the rehabilitation process or the beneficiaries less than eighteen years of age judicial process. The moderate group (category within a residential school environment. Adult C and D) were assessed and allocated to either supplementary education was provided for detention or to one of the twenty-four PARCs. adults in need of literacy and numeracy skills. The low risk group (category E and F) was allo- Informal education also took place in groups cated to the PARCs. within each rehabilitation centre. Beneficiaries A baseline survey was conducted to assess identified as having teaching skills conducted the changing attitudes and opinions of the informal classes to facilitate learning to read beneficiaries. To determine their degree of rad- and write Tamil, as well as to learn English, icalization, the survey results were assessed Sinhala, and math. by University of Maryland psychologists Arie ■■ Vocational rehabilitation: According to Kruglanski and Michele Gelfand. There was a survey results, almost every ex-cadre was keen significant decline in the levels of radicalization to be employed. Follow-up surveys indicated following the beginning of rehabilitation inter- that beneficiaries’ desire for vocational train- ventions and the way in which the staff inter- ing and employment gradually increased as acted with the beneficiaries.24 their period in rehabilitation progressed.26 The
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BCGR therefore facilitated vocational training. worlds. The Goenka Vipassana program from Based on the beneficiaries’ interests, their fam- India provided, “mindfulness training.” This ilies’ traditional vocations and businesses, and training involves developing self-awareness of regional vocational opportunities, the benefi- emotions and thoughts.29 Those beneficiaries ciaries were divided into centers for agriculture, trained in mindfulness supported their peers to carpentry, masonry, motor mechanics, beau- practice this method of meditation. Different ty-culture, and the garment industry, among religious organizations, including leaders from others. Members of the different industries’ the Hindu, Satya Sai, and Christian traditions, business communities were also involved in also conducted religious ceremonies, rites, and the program and eventually pledged training rituals based on each person’s faith. Finally, and jobs in their factories to the cadres in reha- praying and chanting constituted a large part bilitation. Forty-two vocational training pro- of spiritual rehabilitation with each PARC con- grams were conducted within rehabilitation structing Hindu temples or kovils for prayer and centers and externally by Non-Governmental faith practice. Organizations (NGOs), International NGOs ■■ Recreational rehabilitation: Most LTTE (INGOs), private businesses, state ministries, cadres put on weight during their period of and volunteer organizations.27 The different rehabilitation. It was therefore vital that all the business communities provided residential beneficiaries exercised both their minds and facilities for the beneficiaries to engage in bodies. Cricket, volleyball, traditional sports, vocational training programs on-site with and other sports activities were conducted at mainstream populations. The beneficiaries every centre on a daily basis. Specific sports received all company benefits accessed by the programs conducted included “Cricket for mainstream interns. The vocational training Change,” regional athletic meets, inter-center also helped to gradually develop beneficiary cricket and netball matches, sports meets, and confidence in using their own skills to carve New Year Festival activities. Board games such out a livelihood instead of following orders. as carom were also popular. Gardening was also The beneficiaries were motivated to engage conducted in small plots within the centers. in vocational training that would help them ■■ Psychosocial rehabilitation: Enhanced secure future financial stability and dignity by interpersonal interaction contributed to ben- engaging in a vocation that would help them- eficiaries expanding their skills in relating and selves, their families, their communities, and engaging with people at a social and commu- their country.28 nity level. Beneficiaries were observed to have ■■ Spiritual rehabilitation: Throughout the undergone a significant transformation in their course of rehabilitation, many beneficiaries attitudes and behavior towards the Sinhalese, were faced with the realities of their actions. Muslims, and security forces personnel over They felt the need to spiritually reconcile with the course of the first seven months of rehabil- their past and look forward to the future. The itation. This cognitive transformation appears Brahma Kumari spiritual group from India to have taken place through informal interper- conducted yoga and meditation for benefi- sonal engagement with the center staff. The ciaries that relaxes the mind and nurtures a beneficiaries built an excellent rapport with healthy balance between inner and outer the staff and engaged in meaningful discussion
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related to the future and desire to build peace. art therapy. The Sri Lanka Girl Guides and Boy The thinking espoused was that there are no Scouts conducted Girl Guide and Boy Scout winners and losers in war but tragic loss of life programs.31 These programs were aimed at on every side. Beneficiaries focused on how building a sense of social responsibility and they can now build a life for themselves. comradeship among young people in reha- Having the opportunity to share their bilitation. Creative therapy rehabilitation pro- thoughts with the staff, the interpersonal vided effective ways for participants to express interactional initiatives were a large part of the their inner thoughts and feelings through rehabilitation program because they allowed indirect means. Creative therapies can have beneficiaries to engage in discussions cultivat- a healing effect on large groups of people. ing their thinking in terms of family, future, Examples of creative therapy conducted in the and peace building. Less time was spent with centers included theatre, drama, and music thoughts of violence and hatred. Engaging in programs designed to helped beneficiaries discussion related to society, social responsi- communicate and transform their audiences bility, and contributing towards the economy (who were also beneficiaries). helped to cultivate a sense of citizenship. The BCGR conducted training sessions the thinking espoused was that there are no for their center staff on counseling and winners and losers in war but tragic loss of life advanced psychosocial skills training. Staff on every side training sessions were conducted by a clini- cal psychologist, a counseling psychologist, counselors, therapists, a community mental Art work and art therapy provided a health worker and a psychology lecturer in the medium for expression and assessment. different PARCs to build in-house capability The beneficiaries engaged in artwork to give for counseling. expression to issues close to their hearts. They The ongoing mentorship programs are expressed their desires for family life, freedom, essential to shift beneficiary thinking away peace, and unity. Creative writing exercises from violence and separatism. A group of suc- included poetry, short stories, and booklets cessful and well-respected persons in the Tamil related to the themes of freedom, loss, appre- community acted as mentors, reflecting a sense ciation of rehabilitation, new thinking, future of responsibility and of a future that is achiev- plans, and development. able through unity rather than divisions. They Anoja Weerasinghe and her team trained motivated the beneficiaries to work hard and those beneficiaries that expressed an interest to build a successful future.30 These business in dance and music.32 The performing arts people, film stars, and athletes were testimony included not only music and dance but also to the ability of people from the region to drama. Drama therapy included productions make a successful life with the opportunities of plays that reflect unity. The beneficiaries had available in Sri Lanka. access to short stories, articles, and historical Other psychosocial rehabilitation pro- words of wisdom that promote peace and grams included Girl Guide and Boy Scout unity. Narrative and Bibliotherapy involved programs, creativity therapy programs, and the recitation and reading of historical and
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contemporary texts that promoted reflection. were encouraged and staff engaged with family Beneficiaries engaged in making jewelry, soap members if required to facilitate the family carvings, cards, knitting caps, and baby clothes. engagement process. The LTTE functioned as Opportunities to make handicrafts, especially a pseudo-family, with the terrorist cadre com- ornaments using coconut shells, were espe- mitment and loyalty to the group instead of cially appreciated. Some were purchased by responsibility towards family. Often young visitors to the centers and exhibited at popular people joined the terrorist group against the community events that gave pride and recog- wishes of their family. There was reluctance nition to the work. to face the families some of the beneficiaries ■■ Social, Cultural and Family had defied and left behind in order to join the Rehabilitation: Social and educational tours LTTE. Therefore the restoration of fragmented were conducted for beneficiaries to provide family bonds was an essential part of the reha- experience of seeing the different parts of Sri bilitation process to ensure the individual nur- Lanka, hitherto having had no access due to tures family relationships instead of idolizing the Tamil Tiger control of the north and east the terrorist group.33 of the country. The majority of beneficiaries Although the beneficiaries had no access (estimates are as high as 99 percent) have not to personal phones, they had the opportunity travelled in their lifetime out of the conflict to call their families. The beneficiaries also area of the northeast to witness social and cul- could write and receive letters. The beneficia- tural life in the rest of the country. The Tamil ries also had opportunities to visit their home Tigers had fought a war based on the propa- in the event of a celebration, illness or a death. ganda, without ever having met their “enemy” Social, cultural and family rehabilitation the Sinhalese that they targeted for thirty years. brought the beneficiaries close to their family The beneficiaries who were ready to receive and prepared the LTTE cadres for reintegration this exposure witnessed a part of their own into society. country developed, that was not held by the Effectiveness of Rehabilitation grip of terrorism. It was vital for them to see all ethnic communities living together in The assessment phase involved four pillars to the rest of the country, the inter-marriages, obtain a broad understanding of the individ- working together, studying in university, in ual. First, interviews with the beneficiary; sec- schools, partaking in sports and all walks of ond, reviewing past records; third, observations life. The beneficiaries realize that it is possible noted by the staff working day to day within the to develop and grow in strength in the absence PARCs documenting beneficiary response to a of violence and terrorism. range of activities and programs; and fourth, A welcoming, relaxed and warm atmo- formal assessment using psychometrics where sphere enabled family or next of kin to visit the possible. This assessment method ensures a beneficiaries. The relatively relaxed atmosphere comprehensive process to overcome deception. prevailing within the PARCs enabled the rede- Assessment should be conducted in a safe and velopment of family bonds. The level of perim- secure environment where the beneficiaries are eter security was low as the beneficiaries were free to engage in discussion and express their engaged well within the PARCs. Family visits thoughts openly without fear of reprisal.
112 | From the field PRISM 4, no. 2 SRI LANKA’S REHABILITATION PROGRAM EU 2012 - EC/ECHO Arjun Claire - EC/ECHO EU 2012 A young girl in Kurunjipadi camp, Tamil Nadu Engaging the Beneficiaries Interviews with former LTTE cadres gathered as the fighting ended in May 2009, reflected uncer- Engagement is the key to understanding the indi- tainty and fear of reprisal. Assessment therefore vidual mindset. Thought patterns are intangi- should be an ongoing process, to capture benefi- ble. Whilst thought patterns can be accessed by ciary attitudes and opinions as they change. The using interviews, paper and pencil tests, one must de-radicalization profiling in December 2009, consider aspects such as deception and social when compared with initial profiling soon after desirability. Particularly in the case of the LTTE, the cadres gave themselves up, indicated some both ruthlessness and deception were a part of inconsistencies. However, with greater confi- the training. Considered masters at deception,35 dence in the process the beneficiaries provided a few in the terrorist cadres that entered rehabil- more accurate and detailed information. Some itation did not disclose the full extent of their surrendering LTTE cadres who had heard of the involvement. Similar examples are found in Iraq Thelippale rehabilitation center – which was oper- and Afghanistan, where former terrorists of the Al ational well before the end of the war – remarked, Qaeda movement worked with the US military “we knew the government will treat us well.”34 and other agencies but without revealing their These cadres encouraged others to surrender. true intentions. In the Sri Lankan case, there were Therefore timely and ongoing assessment was an only a few that attempted such deception because important part of the program. the conflict had come to an end.
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Over time beneficiaries understood the the investigation and rehabilitation processes rehabilitation process. They became less anxious separate to ensure effective engagement. and more confident about the process. As the The military personnel that engaged the ben- beneficiaries reflected on their past, they rejected eficiaries developed an attitude different from violence and embraced peace. They voluntarily other military personnel. These service personnel provided more accurate and more detailed infor- engaged with beneficiaries by looking into their mation. There were few instances of information welfare and supporting the rehabilitation ser- contaminated with peer opinions and theories or vice providers to deliver an effective service. The information doctored to gain early reintegration. military personnel responsible for the security There was evidence of deception in the creation of the perimeter did not interact with the benefi- of a phantom individual and projecting one’s role ciaries. Officers in charge had a clear understand- onto another individual and/or denial of own ing of what was required at each level. Effective actions. At the same time the beneficiaries who engagement requires staff training, guidance disclosed their own information accurately, also and discipline. Although some staff were natu- informed the interviewers of those that hid their rally oriented towards engagement and did not involvement within the terrorist movement.36 require training, staff guidance and discipline was considered imperative. effective engagement requires staff training, Investigation guidance and discipline Within the Sri Lankan context, the role of the investigating arm of the state and the rehabil- Some senior members of the terrorist move- itative role of the BCGR were separated. The ment within the PARCs attempted to maintain information shared by the beneficiaries within a senior position.37 Without mingling, they rehabilitation did not have a negative impact on attempted to get the junior members to do their the beneficiaries. This ethos helped to minimize chores.38 Another aspect noted was that with resistance and deception, as it is important to time, the beneficiaries were more open to speak- engage the beneficiary genuinely and consistently. ing about their activities when working with the Investigation and reinvestigation have terrorist group.39 These changes occurred within occurred when new information is received the PARC atmosphere that was relaxed with no on those who have not disclosed their actual fear of reprisals. These disclosures were taken as in-depth involvement in LTTE activities. In some part of the healing process. However those ben- cases, those living in the community disclosed eficiaries who lied at the assessment or withheld greater depth of involvement of identified Tamil information were detained for further investi- Tigers and those that had not entered rehabili- gation.40 Deception and resistance would occur tation. The Tamil community living in the vil- when one believed that the information provided lages expressed their anger towards the former by the beneficiary would result in negative con- cadres who held them hostage and persecuted sequences and/or when the beneficiary does not them through a rule of law unto themselves. wish to transform. Therefore it is vital that the The anger towards the LTTE was reflected among staff engaging the beneficiary not function in an the displaced Tamil population within inter- investigative capacity. It was necessary to keep nally displaced persons (IDP) centers.41 IDPs
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temporarily remained within these centers, until the ethos was to treat the ex-combatants with the terrorist cadres were identified and villages care and respect, and help them return to society were cleared of mines to enable resettlement. 42 Tamil civilians suffered much at the hands of the LTTE. A civilian remarked that during the final to mark America’s Independence Day, the U.S. stages of the war “they knew they were going to Ambassador to Sri Lanka Patricia Butenis, said, lose, so why keep us as a shield for them to be “The government has also made great progress protected? They did not care about us; it was all with the rehabilitation of ex-combatants.”47 about what they wanted.”43 Several LTTE cadres today are championing peace Staff working within the PARCs engaged in initiatives.48 Some have returned to the rehabil- a caring and supportive role and assessed risk. itation centers following reintegration to reside Deception and resistance would occur when and follow courses. LEADS, a National NGO beneficiaries believed their revelations would be facilitated “pre-school training” for a group of used against them – that concern often resulted reintegrated beneficiaries who opted to return to in unwillingness to shed the violent extremist the Vavuniya PARC. Most beneficiaries moved on attitude. Therefore, it is vital that the staff engag- to employment and self-employment in sectors ing the beneficiary do not function in an inves- ranging from the garment industry to the film tigative capacity. making industry, or worked with NGOs, INGO’s and with government.49 Ethos of Rehabilitation Effective Management and Engagement The ethos of the center staff reflected profession- alism, compassion, and discipline. Security con- The Sri Lankan military managed the centers but cerns related to rioting or running away were civilians staffed the rehabilitation intervention virtually absent, with a relatively small number of programs. The Sri Lankan military was trained security personnel guarding the perimeter both in a way that they would acquire skills required in June 2009 and December 2009. There were to manage a vast number of former LTTE cadres. isolated incidents reported where beneficiaries The Sri Lankan state including the Army com- requested to go to hospital and then ran away. menced the process of rehabilitation with lim- The ethos was to treat the ex-combatants with ited knowledge of how to rehabilitate. Neither care and respect, and help them return to society. political leaders nor military officials in charge The approach within the centers was one of care of rehabilitation had any previous relevant expe- and respect. With these guiding principles the rience. They had limited access to literature on beneficiaries settled quickly and began to appre- rehabilitation and exposure to rehabilitation pro- ciate the rehabilitation initiative and admired the grams conducted overseas. For example, Minister military that conducted the rehabilitation. This Milinda Moragoda, the Minister of Justice and is evident in the positive ratings reported by the Law Reform, who was in charge of the rehabili- ex-combatants of the rehabilitation center staff tation program was keen to learn and he received (96.43%),44 the rehabilitation center (70.14%)45 briefings from the specialist staff engaged in reha- and the rehabilitation center guards (94.57%).46 bilitation at Singapore’s International Centre The rehabilitation centers’ treatment of ben- for Political Violence and Terrorism Research eficiaries has been commended. In a message (ICPVTR). Similarly, General Daya Ratnayake, the
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General Daya Ratnayaka managed to steer the programs without compromising safety or secu- rehabilitation process chartering new territory rity. Managing staff and beneficiaries of multiple with sound leadership centers was no easy task. His commitment to staff training was high and his ability to work with a range of INGOs, NGOs, volunteer professionals, Commissioner General of Rehabilitation (CGR) corporate sector entities, and Ministries to imple- visited Singapore and Colombia and received ment rehabilitation interventions received praise. guidance on the modes of rehabilitation. They It was observed that the military training quickly embraced the idea of rehabilitation, following clear guidance helped the staff at drew from the key concepts, and practical les- the ground level to effectively engage with the sons. Although formal knowledge on how to ex-combatants. An officer conducting rehabili- rehabilitate terrorist cadres was useful, the Sri tation Captain Aluthwala stated, “When we give Lankan rehabilitation program developed largely 100% to the beneficiaries it is a combination of through a commonsense approach. Sri Lankan 50% from our head and 50% from our heart.” military personnel acquired many of the qualities He elaborated further to say that they would be essential to engage communities during their mindful, alert and also compassionate. Other training and service. They also learned how to officers described, “the importance of under- approach and work with beneficiaries at the reha- standing the person from within their context, bilitation centers. to be able to help them adjust to a new reality.”50 Still others said that though they are all injured Rehabilitation Staff and the injuries were sustained during the bat- In many ways, the CGR established a stan- tle with the terrorist cadres, that, “I don’t want dard through his own conduct towards bene- my children to grow up with terrorism,” and, “I ficiaries. The first Commissioner General of don’t want to leave terrorism to be faced by the Rehabilitation, General Daya Ratnayaka, over- next generation.”51 came several challenges from funding to a legal The rehabilitation personnel received their framework. He managed to steer the rehabilita- guidance and supervision from within the hier- tion process chartering new territory with sound archical structure and from among their peer leadership. Following the end of the Sri Lankan group. Formal trainings arranged for staff were conflict, Colonel Manjula Gunasinghe was the few and far between. The staff learned from prac- Coordinator for Rehabilitation in Vavuniya since tice and applied commonsense to situations, and the inception of rehabilitation. He worked with the compassion instilled within the culture and four consecutive Commissioner Generals of religion was extended to the beneficiaries. A reha- Rehabilitation; General Daya Ratnayake, General bilitation staff member, who had lost 7 of his Sudantha Ranasinghe, General Chandana family members in the civil war, expressed his Rajaguru and Brigadier Dharshana Hettiarachchi. perspective on working with the former LTTE He provided the highest quality of leadership and cadres in rehabilitation. He stated that, “I don’t managed 24 PARCs that housed male, female want my children to see another war;” pointing and child beneficiaries without a single incident. to a beneficiary he added, “I want my children He harnessed his staff and provided the required to be able to play with his children and in that care and facilitated rehabilitation intervention way we won’t have another war.”52 His words
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captured the essence of the motivation of the tales of heroism were concocted to motivate security forces personnel working tirelessly cadres and recruit by generating anger, hatred within the rehabilitation centers. Sri Lanka’s reha- and lust for revenge bilitation program does not have the luxuries of the Saudi Rehabilitation Program, the facilities of the Singapore model, nor the funding of the LTTE. Detainees were both injured and non-in- Pakistani program, but it is rich in commitment, jured, and battlefield (insurgent) and off the compassion and genuine in its effort.53 battlefield (terrorist) fighters. An ethno political Almost every citizen in the country has lost conflict radicalized and militarized a generation someone in the thirty-year war. The Tamil Tiger of youth in Sri Lanka during the thirty years of cadres inflicted many casualties and indeed initially sporadic and later sustained violence. most staff conducting rehabilitation had been The impact of radicalization and the impor- wounded, and carried embedded shell pieces; tance of rehabilitation in the transformation of others were aware first hand of the LTTE terrorism thinking were articulated by a 16-year-old child having seen massacred border villagers, and still soldier groomed by the Tamil Tigers; others have had their friends die in battle. Most stated that they did not know how they could “As vultures that eat dead bodies and hands work with the former insurgents, but gradually that stretch out to beg they realized the importance of guiding them Terrorism destroys communities and destroyed onto a peaceful path. Most stated that the LTTE our wellbeing until the end. cadres were made to believe in a different reality. Loosing and separating mother and child, Communities bore the tears of the people, De-Radicalization They trapped us by giving false hopes saying The individual has to de-radicalize to be able to even death can become life, the tombstone disengage from violence and re-engage in har- an Epic.”55 monious living.54 Rehabilitation is the method to achieve this end. The LTTE leadership devel- She refers to terrorism preying upon and oped the mastery of indoctrinating the masses, thriving on the dead, and on the unsuspecting especially the youth. LTTE leaders groomed and poor. The LTTE used powerful narratives of those motivated their members to sacrifice themselves that died while conducting acts of terror. Tales of in suicide attacks and to sacrifice the wellbeing heroism were concocted to motivate cadres and of one’s own kith and kin in the pursuit of a recruit by generating anger, hatred and lust for violent radical ideology. Radicalization was the revenge. LTTE leaders also exploited the vulner- tool used to engage and sustain its membership. able poor who were more easily recruited and Therefore a multifaceted rehabilitation program given significance, power and a means of liveli- was necessary to engage the surrendered and hood to ensure unquestioning loyalty. apprehended detainees’ hearts and minds to The impact of terrorism on communities has facilitate de-radicalization. been devastating; splitting the family unit, the Those detained for rehabilitation includes male loss of the child groomed into death. The LTTE and female adults, adolescents and children who policy of recruiting one member of each house- were members, helpers and supporters of the hold led families to give their under age children
PRISM 4, no. 2 From the field | 117 HETTIARACHCHI whilst the rehabilitation program is considered Conclusion a success, the state has not been able to market its success effectively Sri Lanka succeeded in rehabilitating the bulk of the leaders and members of one of the world’s most dangerous terrorist and insurgent groups, in marriage to older men for protection, or got the LTTE. When communities are radicalized them pregnant to prevent recruitment. Children into violence, individuals are transformed from were also turned against their family members to within and the mindset is locked into a violence demonstrate their loyalty to the insurgency. The justifying ideology. The radicalizing ideology indoctrination of cadres with the perception that becomes a vehicle and the person wishes to live through suicide terrorism one achieves continued by it, promote it and die for it. Sri Lanka’s reha- life as martyrs was prevalent. LTTE leaders pro- bilitation efforts centered on reaching the hearts moted suicide terror by justifying and glorifying and minds of the beneficiaries through several the act of mass murder by suicide attacks. activities that are transformative. Within rehabil- itation, the radicalization process is reversed and Challenges of the Rehabilitation Program the beneficiary is transformed from within by Sri Lanka’s rehabilitation program faced many engaging in a range of salutary activities. The ben- challenges. First, the personnel assigned to eficiary re-engages with self, family and society, staff the program had to be both formally and and the need for violence is delegitimized. The informally trained. While most of the staff was beneficiaries are supported to move away from committed to the idea of rehabilitation, some violence towards peaceful co-existence. needed convincing that this was the way forward. Some of the essential components identi- Second, the program lacked resources from its fied in the success of Sri Lanka’s rehabilitation inception. This led to the Commissioner General program are the political will and the confidence of Rehabilitation having to work with a range of of the leadership that rehabilitation was the state and private sector partners. These funding right way forward. The Presidential Amnesty57 challenges however led to building a low cost provided the hope and opportunity for bene- program with greater participation from the com- ficiaries to engage in the civilian process. The munity. Third, the criticisms aimed against the Presidential message was to “treat them as your state initiatives were largely due to the restriction own children.”58 of international agency participation or access It was essential that parallel to the process of particularly to the ICRC, with the exception of rehabilitation, a clear message be given that ter- IOM. This led to heavy criticism and undue sus- rorism is a grave offence and punishable by law. picion by the international community. Fourth, This was demonstrated through the indictments had Sri Lankan diplomats improved their com- and required prosecutions of the most criminally munication with the international community culpable LTTE cadres. that would likely have led to greater understand- Sound leadership provided at every level is ing, reduced negativity56 and improved funding vital to maintaining standards and the security for the programs. Finally, whilst the rehabilita- of each facility. The ethos of the rehabilitation tion program is considered a success, the state centers was similar to a residential training cen- has not been able to market its success effectively. ter where individuals engage in a series of life
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skills to develop self and promote peace and har- 4 Commissioner General for Rehabilitation, “Defense Seminar,” April 2011 and August 2012, and “Workshop at mony. The beneficiary gradually begins to see the Lakshman Kadiragamar Center,” July 2012. the “other” as non-threatening, observing in the 5 Rohan Gunaratna, “The Battlefield of The Mind,” “other” behavior and values to emulate, thereby UNISCI Discussion Papers, 21 (October 2009). Professor invalidating the distorted images propagated and Rohan Gunaratna is from the International Center for Political Violence and Terrorism Research and is the advi- maintained of the “other” by the propaganda. sor for global terrorism programs including Sri Lanka’s Rehabilitation and community engagement rehabilitation program. is a counter-terrorism strategy that is long lasting 6 A.W. Kruglanski, M.J. Gelfand, and R. Gunaratna, Aspects of De-radicalization, in “Terrorist Rehabilitation,” and sustainable. Former combatants who are ed. L. Rubin and R. Gunaratna (New York: Routledge, rehabilitated and have returned to their home 2012). A.W. Kruglanski, M.J. Gelfand, and R. Gunaratna, communities remain vulnerable to recidivism. Terrorism as Means to an End: How Political Violence Bestows The community is the base from which terrorists Significance, in “Meaning, Mortality and Choice,” ed. P.R. Shaver and M. Mikulincer (Washington, D.C.: American are recruited. Therefore rehabilitation and the Psychological Association, 2012). de-radicalization of former terrorists is an ongo- 7 Rehabilitation that occurs within a Custodial or ing process. It is essential to continuously assess secure setting and within the community setting, upon rehabilitation programs and the progress made reintegration. 8 Mohamed Feisal Bin Mohamed Hassan (Associate by the former combatants. The aftercare process Research Fellow, International Centre for Political Violence of the reintegrated beneficiary is a vital aspect and Terrorism Research), interview by author, July 21, to ensure smooth transition into community 2012. 9 “1st Strategic Workshop on Rehabilitation & life. While within rehabilitation the beneficiaries De-radicalization of Militants and Extremists,” FATA are supported to de-radicalize and re-engage in Secretariat, (FATA Capacity Building Project, May 18-19, community, it is essential to conduct ongoing 2012). 10 Community Engagement Programs59 to prevent Brigadier Dharshana Hettiarachchi, Terrorist Rehabilitation in Sri Lanka, (National Workshop on re-radicalization of the reintegrated beneficia- Terrorist Rehabilitation, Lakshman Kadirgamar Institute ries, as well as to build community resilience for International Relations and Strategic Studies, as a counter terrorism and counter insurgency July 21, 2012). Brigadier Dharshana Hettierachchi is strategy. Commissioner General of Rehabilitation. 11 The retributive justice model involves punishment by sentencing. The restorative justice model promotes repentance and transformation. Notes 12 “The LTTE is responsible for forcibly removing, or ethnic cleansing of Sinhalese and Muslim inhabitants from areas under its control, and using violence against 1 “Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam,” Wikipedia, avail- those who refuse to leave. The eviction of Muslim residents able at
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in Colombo and the Sinhala and Tamil medium classes self-employment. KAC Karunarathna, Transformation in are testimony to this fact. Thinking on Aspirations for Employment (report, June 22, 13 There was no recorded evidence of those who 2012). participated in the rehabilitation program returning to 27 General Sudanatha Ranasinghe, “Defence Seminar violence. 2012: Towards Lasting Peace and Stability,” Bureau of 14 The author visited Ambepussa in June 2009 and Commissioner General Of Rehabilitation, August 8, 2012 interviewed staff and beneficiaries of the rehabilitation Available at
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44 “Rehabilitation of the Tamil tigers,” assessment conducted by Prof. A. Kruglanski. This study is ongoing since 2009. Perception of being treated fairly, with dignity, staff level of helpfulness, staff level of understanding of their problems and ability to trust staff. 45 Perception of whether rehabilitation is helpful, if they feel there is an improvement in their situation, and rating on the conditions of the center. 46 Perception of whether guards are respectful and treat beneficiaries with dignity. 47 “Remarks for the July 4th Celebration by Ambassador Butenis,” United States Embassy in Sri Lanka and Maldives, July 4, 2012, available at
PRISM 4, no. 2 From the field | 121 In October 2011, General Martin Dempsey, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, issued a call to “make sure we actually learn the lessons from the last decade of war.”1 In response, the Joint and Coalition Oper- ational Analysis (JCOA) division of the Joint Staff J7 undertook its Decade of War study, reviewing the 46 lessons learned studies it had conducted from its inception in 2003 through early 2012. More than a “decade of war,” the 46 JCOA studies covered a wide variety of military operations—including major combat operations in Iraq, counterinsurgen- cy in Afghanistan and the Philippines, and humanitarian assistance in the United States, Pakistan, and Haiti—as well as studies of emerging regional and global threats. The synthesis of these studies’ 400 findings, observations, and best practices yielded 11 strategic themes or catego- ries of enduring joint lessons. JCOA’s analysis was further refined by subject matter experts from across the Department of Defense during a weeklong Joint Staff–spon- sored Decade of War Working Group in May 2012. The final Decade of War study represents the culmination of those efforts, and while significant, is only the initial step in turning these critical observations into “learned lessons.” The work of integrating the findings and recom- mendations into a continuous joint force development cycle will serve to build a more responsive, versatile, and affordable force. Lieutenant General George Flynn, Director for Joint Force Develop- ment, Joint Staff J7, for release and dissemination without caveat. Lieu- tenant General Flynn has also endorsed the summary of this important effort for the readers of PRISM.
—Lieutenant General George Flynn, USMC Joint Staff J7 Director for Joint Force Development
1 General Martin E. Dempsey, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to Lieutenant General George Flynn, “Chairman Direction to J7,” official letter, October 6, 2011. Decade of War: Enduring Lessons from a Decade of Operations1
summarized By Elizabeth Young
he year 2001 began with the inauguration of a U.S. President deliberately aiming to shift the use of the military away from the numerous humanitarian and peacekeeping interventions T of the 1990s toward responding to and defeating conventional threats from nation-states. The mood was optimistic, with the new U.S. National Security Strategy, recently put in place by the departing Clinton administration, citing widespread financial prosperity and conveying no sense of an imminent threat to the homeland.2 But this situation proved fragile: the events of a single day, September 11, 2001, altered the trajectory of the United States and the way it used its military over the next decade. A nation focused on countering conventional threats was now confronted by an enemy that attacked the homeland with low-tech means in asymmetric and unexpected ways—individuals armed with box-cutters using hijacked civilian aircraft. In the decade following 9/11, it became evident that the Cold War model that had guided foreign policy for the previous 50 years no longer fit the emerging global environment. Key changes included:
■■ A shift from U.S. hegemony toward national pluralism ■■ The erosion of sovereignty and the impact of weak states ■■ The empowerment of small groups or individuals ■■ An increasing need to fight and win in the information domain.
In the midst of these changes, the United States employed its military in a wide range of operations to address perceived threats from both nation-state and terrorist groups; to strengthen partner nation
Elizabeth Young has been a CNA field representative to JCOA since 2005. She served as an analyst and product manager for the majority of the JCOA studies that served as the foundation of the Decade of War effort.
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militaries; to conduct humanitarian assistance government undertaking different approaches. In operations; and to provide defense support of addition, a nuanced understanding of the envi- civil authorities in catastrophic incidents such as ronment was often hindered by an intelligence Hurricane Katrina. This wide range of operations apparatus focused on traditional adversaries aimed to promote and protect national interests rather than the host nation population. in the changing global environment. There were a number of examples where separate elements of the U.S. Government the U.S. approach often did not reflect the undertook different approaches based on their actual operational environment views of the nature of the conflict and opera- tional environment. In Iraq in 2003, military plans included assumptions regarding the rapid In general, operations during the first half of reconstitution of Iraqi institutions based on the the decade were marked by numerous missteps understanding that national capabilities had to and challenges as the U.S. Government and mil- be rebuilt to promote governance and stabil- itary applied a strategy and force best suited for a ity. Yet the first two orders issued by the civilian different threat and environment. Operations in Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) unexpect- the second half of the decade often featured suc- edly removed both host nation security forces cessful adaptations to overcome these challenges. and midlevel government bureaucrats, crippling From our study of this “decade of war,” we identi- Iraqi governance capacity and providing fuel for fied 11 overarching, enduring themes that present the insurgency.4 These actions created a “security opportunities for the nation to continue to learn gap” that lasted for years and widened over time, and improve. In this article, we briefly summarize reducing the effectiveness of the reconstruction each of these themes. effort, causing the population to lose trust in the coalition and Iraqi government, and allowing Lesson 1: Understanding the Environment terrorist and criminal elements to thrive. Two years later, civilian- and military-led reconstruc- In operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and else- tion and development efforts still had different where, a failure to recognize, acknowledge, and missions and perceived end states, which led to accurately define the operational environment large expenditures with limited return, as well as led to a mismatch between forces, capabilities, missed opportunities for synergy. missions, and goals. The operational environ- A complete understanding of the opera- ment encompassed not only the threat but also tional environment was often hindered by U.S. the physical, informational, social, cultural, reli- intelligence-gathering that focused on traditional gious, and economic elements of the environ- adversary information, neglecting “white” infor- ment; each of these elements was important to mation about the population that was necessary understanding the root causes of conflicts, devel- for success in population-centric campaigns such oping an appropriate approach, and anticipating as counterinsurgency (COIN) operations. Local second-order effects. 3 Despite the importance of commanders needed information about ethnic the operational environment, the U.S. approach and tribal identities, religion, culture, politics, often did not reflect the actual operational envi- and economics; however, intelligence products ronment, with different components of the primarily provided information about enemy
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actions. This problem was exacerbated by short- In the latter part of the decade, forces learned ages of human intelligence personnel and inter- to overcome challenges, gradually developing preters needed to capture critical information innovative, nontraditional means and organiza- from the population, as well as a lack of fusion tions to develop a more nuanced understanding of this intelligence with other sources of informa- of the operational environment. These means tion. Furthermore, there were no pre-established included direct interaction with the local pop- priority intelligence requirements or other check- ulation through patrols, shuras, and key leader lists or templates that could serve as first-order engagements; the creation of fusion cells that approximations for what units needed to know coupled operations and intelligence informa- for COIN. As a result, processes for obtaining tion; the expanded use of liaison officers to facil- information on population-centric issues tended itate communication and coordination; and the to be based on discovery learning and were not practice of all-source network nodal analysis to consistently passed to follow-on units. guide actions and engagements. These efforts Other intelligence capabilities and plat- were supported by senior leaders and organiza- forms proved valuable to understanding the tions that assumed risk to fully share information environments in Iraq and Afghanistan but were among U.S. forces, interagency partners, host in short supply—eventually, their numbers nation forces, nongovernmental organizations surged in both countries as their value was rec- (NGOs), industry, and academia. Senior leaders ognized. For example, manned expeditionary came to rely upon these nontraditional sources intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance of information to increase their understanding of (ISR) platforms were developed and fielded (for the operational environment and glean insights example, Task Force Odin and Project Liberty) as to what approaches were successful. in response to growing recognition of an unmet Forward presence helped the United requirement.5 States achieve an accurate understanding of Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief the environment. In areas where U.S. forces (HA/DR) operations similarly required an were not based in significant numbers, even understanding of the operational environment a modest forward presence enhanced situa- for success. Timely initial assessments were crit- tional awareness and deepened relationships. ical for an effective response. These assessments For example, when U.S. Southern Command were used to determine command and control (USSOUTHCOM) moved from its Panama requirements, estimate damage (including the headquarters and robust presence in the region status of critical infrastructure), gauge the size to Miami and a more modest presence in the and type of required military response units, region, it worked to maintain forward locations and establish deployment priorities. In natural and basing arrangements to sustain U.S. pres- disasters, these assessments were often difficult to ence and access. Similarly, U.S. forward presence achieve due to limited availability of assets. While in the Philippines proved useful well beyond the U.S. military had significant capability for the narrow U.S. counterterrorism (CT) focus of performing these assessments, the assets used for its post-9/11 mission. Resultant relationships these assessments (usually air) were typically in with host nation forces at multiple echelons high demand for delivering aid and performing provided for improved exchange of information search and rescue missions. and strengthened understanding.
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Lesson 2: Conventional At the same time, the use of force continued Warfare Paradigm to be a critical tool in operations. Moreover, the use of precision engagements and avoiding col- Major combat operations in Afghanistan in 2001 lateral damage, especially noncombatant civil- and Iraq in 2003 confirmed the ability of the ian casualties, became paramount in preserving United States to conduct such operations rapidly necessary freedom of action. Efforts to be precise and surgically.6 While it is critical that the United and discriminatory in engagements were aided States retain this capability, conventional warfare by increasing availability of precision air- and approaches often were ineffective when applied to ground-based weapons. In addition, units had operations other than major combat, forcing leaders increasing quantities of ISR support to determine to realign the ways and means of achieving effects. positive identification and screen for potential The conventional warfare paradigm is exem- collateral damage. Finally, leaders pressed units plified by fighting in World War II, Korea, and to take additional steps to avoid civilian casualties Operation Desert Storm; it is characterized by the beyond those required by international law, such use of direct force against adversaries, with cen- as tactical patience and looking for tactical alterna- tralized command and control to support the tives (for example, employing a sniper instead of massing of resources against the enemy center of using an airstrike against enemy taking refuge in gravity—that is, a nation-state’s uniformed mili- civilian homes). Forces in Afghanistan discovered tary forces.7 However, the past decade saw many that there were win-win scenarios for the use of operations other than conventional warfare and force and limiting collateral damage: forces could major combat, such as COIN, stability, CT, HA/ maintain or increase mission effectiveness while DR, antipiracy, and counternarcotics operations. also reducing civilian casualties. Conversely, U.S. In addition to Iraq and Afghanistan, past oper- forces found that insurgent groups were strength- ations conducted in locations such as Panama, ened and U.S. freedom of action was curtailed Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo, Somalia, Colombia, when its forces caused civilian casualties.8 the Philippines, Sudan, Chechnya, Sri Lanka, Conventional warfare features a hierarchi- South Sudan, and Yemen, suggest that operations cal top-down command structure to manage other than conventional warfare will represent forces and support the massing of major military the prevalent form of warfare in the future. elements against the center of gravity of enemy In conventional warfare, forces employ a forces. Information and intelligence gained by direct approach, using force against an enemy mil- tactical forces are fed back to the top where adjust- itary to achieve objectives. Over the past decade, ments are made to the overall scheme of maneu- in contrast, forces learned to combine both direct ver. In contrast, for other kinds of operations in and indirect approaches for generating effects. the past decade, especially those featuring fleeting The combination of these approaches leveraged targets and population-centric campaigns, forces a broad set of tools including the use of precise found this arrangement ineffective. Rather, flexi- force, money as a weapons system, information bility and empowerment at the lowest appropriate operations, and key leader engagements to address level promoted success in these kinds of opera- threats both directly and indirectly. In particular, tions. Leaders deliberately decentralized authority the indirect approach was able to focus on the and capabilities; they provided intent and then underlying root causes of terror and/or insurgency. allowed subordinates the freedom to innovate
126 | LESSOns learned PRISM 4, no. 2 Decade Of War and explore tactical alternatives within given left influencingperceptions on a local or global scale, and right limits. they could also achieve victories. The United Unlike conventional warfare, success in States and its allies had an interest in shaping many of the operations over the past decade perceptions, and this resulted in a competition depended on building local capacity and sus- in the information domain. We call this effort taining gains that were made during operations. to influence perceptions “the battle for the nar- This focus on capacity-building taxed the military rative.”9 Over the past decade, the United States and the U.S. Government overall, as they were was slow to recognize the importance of the battle often not prepared for these tasks, especially on for the narrative in achieving objectives at all levels; the scale demanded in Iraq and Afghanistan. For it was often ineffective in applying and aligning the example, the task of creating Iraqi military and narrative to goals and desired end states. police forces, along with their accompanying In major combat operations, the United institutions, created a severe burden on both U.S. States was successful in employing military power; military and civilian organizations. This burden however, other instruments of national power was magnified by the initial lack of preparation (diplomatic, information, and economic) became for this mission and compounded by the semi- to more important as operations shifted away from non-permissive security environment in which major combat. In particular, the U.S. Government civilian agencies and departments could not typ- was challenged with providing accurate and timely ically operate. information to proactively win the battle for the Conventional warfare and operations other narrative, partially because of a lack of necessary than major combat had different means (“the resources and leadership emphasis on this aspect use of force” versus “broader effects combining of operations. direct and indirect approach”) and ends (“capit- The proliferation of the Internet, social ulation of a military force” versus “sustainability media, and personal electronic devices caused and capacity-building”). Because of these dif- the paradigm of communication to shift. It was ferences, operations other than major combat no longer possible (or desirable) for the military required a broader response than the military to attempt to tightly control most information. alone was prepared to provide, necessitating an While the military was slow to adapt to these effort that combined the strengths and capabil- developments, the enemy was not, developing ities of multiple U.S. departments and agencies, considerable skill in using these new means of as well as coalition partners and, in some cases, communication to their own ends. In addition, NGOs. Best practices and challenges regarding the enemy was frequently unconstrained by the interagency unity of effort are discussed below in need to tell the truth; for example, they could feed Lesson Seven, Interagency Coordination, and for false information to the media through the use coalition operations in Lesson Eight, Coalition of news stringers on fast-dial from an insurgent/ Operations. terrorist cell phone. This allowed the enemy to make the first impression, an impression that Lesson 3: Battle for the Narrative could be difficult or impossible to overcome, even Over the past decade, U.S. adversaries real- when false. For example, advances in communi- ized that victory on the battlefield was not the cation technology had a direct impact on Israel only way to meet their overall objectives: by during and after the 2006 Lebanon War. Initially,
PRISM 4, no. 2 lessons learned | 127 Young U.S. Army photo by Lt. Col. Daniel Bohmer/Released photo by Army U.S. Mine resistant ambush protected vehicles are lined along Highway 1 near Haji Sultan, Zabul province, Afghanistan, Feb. 16, 2012.
the Israeli military response to Hezbollah rocket media to understand trends and issues, an effort attacks was widely seen as justified. However, that was emphasized and supported by senior as time progressed and Hezbollah successfully leaders. Similarly in Afghanistan, the Presidential manipulated print, broadcast, and online media, Information Coordination Cell was established the world increasingly saw images of civilian to manage communication and information casualties (both doctored and real) and the tide between the International Security Assistance of public opinion turned. There was widespread Force (ISAF) and Afghan government. The coordi- negative international sentiment regarding Israel’s nation cell was often successful in resolving poten- “disproportionate response,” and Israel was not tially negative issues before they became public. successful in turning this tide. Finally, while managing information was The United States eventually recognized critical in the battle for the narrative, the past the need to be more proactive in the battle for decade showed that words alone were not suf- the narrative and developed innovative means ficient; they had to be consistent with deeds. to do so. For example, Multi-National Force– The image of the United States was frequently Iraq (MNF-I) created a communications cell tarnished by tactical actions that contradicted that monitored both national and international American values or strategy. The Abu Ghraib
128 | LESSOns learned PRISM 4, no. 2 Decade Of War scandal in Iraq, for instance, documented in pho- combat operations were meticulously planned tographs that were widely disseminated, under- and trained extensively, Phase IV post–major mined the mission and significantly marred the combat operations were not. In addition, pre-de- image of the United States. Years later, terrorists ployment training focused on major combat in Iraq and Afghanistan cited the Abu Ghraib tactics and maneuver of large-sized forces, not incident as their motivation for striking the contingency or stability operations. Noncombat United States. Similarly in Afghanistan, the burn- skills, to include civil affairs, were not adequately ing of Korans in spring 2012 created significant rehearsed alongside combat, war-winning skills backlash. In that case, U.S. personnel were taking until late in the campaign. actions to remove a variety of documents, includ- In addition, the post–major combat plan ing some religious texts, which had been altered for Iraq was reliant upon civilian elements of by detainees. The context—that Korans had the U.S. Government and based on assumptions been cut up and written in by detainees in part of a stable security environment and a capable to convey messages—was not communicated Iraqi government and security force. Despite the clearly, and U.S. actions were rougly perceived significant role that U.S. civilian elements had as religious persecution rather than countering to play, they were not significantly involved in insurgent efforts. early planning efforts. This contributed to major disconnects between planning assumptions used Lesson 4: Transitions in military- and civilian-led efforts; as previously All operations in the past decade featured described, these disconnects were exacerbated important transitions, such as the transition by Coalition Provisional Authority actions in the from Phase III to Phase IV in Iraq, the transfer summer of 2003, as well as divergent military to Iraqi sovereignty (performed in two steps and civilian reconstruction approaches over the in 2004 and 2005), the transition to North following several years. Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) leader- Similarly, during the transition to NATO lead- ship in Afghanistan in 2006, and the transition ership in Afghanistan in 2006, military planning to host-nation responsibility during numerous assumed that the chief duties of ISAF would be HA/DR events (for example, the Pakistan earth- reconstruction and the provision of humanitarian quake of 2005).10 Transitions between phases aid. This faulty assumption caused a mismatch of operations offered opportunities for advanc- between ISAF policies and actual, on-the-ground ing U.S. strategic interests if they were managed mission requirements. well; alternately, they were opportunities for Often, planning assumptions were based the enemy or for the failure of our intended largely on U.S. expectations that were inconso- objectives if they were not. In the first half of nant with those of the host nation. For example, the decade, failure to adequately plan and resource the planned end state for Afghanistan was envi- strategic and operational transitions endangered sioned to be a strong central government, despite accomplishment of the overall mission. no record of such a government in Afghan his- Transitions were often poorly planned tory and lack of broad popular support for that and trained; in particular, plans for transitions system of governance. Another was the lack of did not include well-developed branch plans anticipation of operations shifting from a mili- for contingencies. In Iraq, while Phase III tary Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) framework
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to a warrant-based law enforcement framework Iraq in summer 2003 repeated a lesson seen as host-nation sovereignty increased. from previous operations over the history of the These faulty assumptions led to mismatches United States: premature transition to civilian in approaches that were later overcome by adap- agencies.12 Similar challenges were observed in tation; for example, the approach that envisioned the handover of sovereignty to Iraq in June 2004 a strong central government in Afghanistan was when the two senior U.S. leaders were replaced later combined with efforts to develop local gov- simultaneously: General George Casey, USA, ernance and security (for example, Village Stability succeeded Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez, Operations/Afghan Local Police), while the tran- USA, and Ambassador John Negroponte suc- sition from a LOAC framework was addressed ceeded Ambassador L. Paul Bremer. Several through ad hoc approaches to requirements for critical organizations were also created during warrants and evidentiary support. this time, including MNF-I, Multi-National Security Transition Command–Iraq, and the humanitarian assistance and disaster relief U.S. Embassy. These changes in key leaders and operations operations also demonstrated organizations during the transition added to the importance of unity of effort to the challenges. successful transitions Politically–driven transition timelines exac- erbated the lack of resources. For example, in Iraq in 2004, civilian and military organizations Transitions tended to be poorly resourced had only just sorted out their respective respon- and lacked adequate numbers of personnel with sibilities for training, equipping, and supporting sufficient expertise or training. For example, the Iraqi security forces when the United States shortly after the end of major combat operations executed the transition to Iraqi sovereignty. The in Iraq in 2003, the V Corps commander arrived transition pushed the Iraqi security forces into a in theater to assume command of Combined role for which they were not yet ready, degrading Joint Task Force (CJTF) 7, having trained for divi- security and further challenging the effort to sion-level combat operations and not as a joint build these forces. task force that would lead a national reconstruc- Many of the transition challenges described tion and stabilization effort. His staff was not above were remedied during important tran- manned, equipped, or resourced to accept these sitions in the latter half of the decade. Leaders responsibilities. Additionally, civilian manning learned critical lessons and worked to understand for the Coalition Provisional Authority remained the operational environment; they designed low throughout 2003. Over the next few years, transitions to be more conditions-based to Embassy and Provincial Reconstruction Team reflect this understanding. Likewise, an aware- (PRT) partners gradually increased in number, ness of specific weaknesses of host-nation mil- but they often lacked the necessary expertise and itaries and governments facilitated the use of experience. tailored enablers to prop up host-nation capa- Lack of unity of effort between civilian bilities and promote success during key transi- and military organizations tended to be a key tions. Transitions were planned and resourced component of transition challenges.11 The rapid appropriately, with key staff retained through transfer from military to civilian leadership in the critical transition periods.
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Humanitarian assistance disaster relief the challenge of inadequate preparation operations operations also demonstrated the was matched by widespread and often importance of unity of effort to successful tran- successful adaptation sitions. For example, in Haiti peacekeeping operations in 2004, USSOUTHCOM benefited from preexisting relationships with interagency Equipment suited for conventional war was not partners that helped overcome the challenges always suited for COIN or stability operations, arising from the ad hoc nature and wide vari- resulting in many urgent operational needs voiced ety of participants in the operation. Within in theater for required capabilities. days of the deployment of U.S. troops to Haiti, Fortunately, the challenge of inadequate USSOUTHCOM leveraged its joint interagency preparation was matched by widespread and coordination group to provide a forum for dis- often successful adaptation at all levels. Forces on course between the various U.S. Government the ground learned from challenges and adapted elements involved in the region. Again, after the their approaches to compensate, developing new Haiti earthquake of 2010, the robust integration organizations and tactics, techniques, and pro- of interagency representation at USSOUTHCOM cedures (TTP), rapid fielding initiatives, adaptive gave the command an enhanced ability to gain leadership approaches, and agile workarounds situational awareness and provide focused aid, for the passing of and acting upon lessons. While which promoted successful transition of respon- these adaptations were generally successful, they sibilities to a variety of civilian agencies and were costly in terms of time and resources. international organizations working on behalf Since forces were primarily organized for of the Haitian government. major combat operations, there was a necessity to develop new types of organizations at all eche- Lesson 5: Adaptation lons to address the changed environment. In Iraq, Adaptation is an essential part of the military these organizations included the Force Strategic profession and of military operations. At the Engagement Cell that worked at the strategic level same time, adaptation must be balanced with to reconcile insurgents, the PRTs that worked at the requirement to appropriately train and equip the regional level to extend governance capacity, forces for current operations. During the first and the Human Terrain Teams that worked at the half of the decade following 9/11, Department local level to understand human factors. In addi- of Defense (DOD) policies, doctrine, training, and tion, forces developed in-theater initiatives such equipment were revealed to be poorly suited to oper- as the COIN Academy, which provided near-term, ations other than major combat, forcing widespread tailored training to fill identified gaps while the and costly adaptation. schoolhouses adjusted their curricula to better During the early years of the decade, doctrine match the operational missions. At the same time, voids were exposed, as evidenced by the amount advisor and lessons learned organizations were of important doctrine that was created in the sec- used to identify and overcome tactical and oper- ond half of the decade to compensate.13 Similarly, ational shortfalls across a broad set of missions. forces were trained to win against another nation’s Forces also adapted their TTP to promote armed forces, and were not prepared to combat success. One example was the “find, fix, finish, adaptive insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan. exploit, analyze, and disseminate” (F3EAD)
PRISM 4, no. 2 lessons learned | 131 Young targeting approach. Special operations forces Leaders acknowledged successful adapta- (SOF) used the F3EAD approach in their target- tion by tactical forces to modify their overall ing of insurgents, and over time this TTP was approaches. One example was the reconcilia- increasingly used by conventional forces in their tion initiatives in Al Anbar Province, Iraq. After targeting operations as well. As host-nation then–Lieutenant General Raymond Odierno, judicial systems matured, forces again adapted USA, heard of the successes that coalition forces their targeting approach toward a warrant-based were having in Al Anbar, he broadened and approach in order to reinforce rule of law and adapted reconciliation efforts into an Iraq-wide model law enforcement for the host nation. Yet movement. Underlying this expansion was the another new organizational structure, fusion recognition that success required a change in cells, provided a means by which TTP could be focus from understanding the threat to under- shared and learned. Other tailored and adap- standing the environment. tive TTP in Iraq and Afghanistan included key Sometimes, adaptation led to the dis- leader engagements, sensitive site exploitation, covery that the old model was preferable. For and civilian casualty battle damage assessments example, USSOUTHCOM adapted a func- (geared toward identifying the presence and tional organizational model that departed scope of civilian harm). from the Napoleonic “J-code” structure. This new model was not successful in responding success required a change in focus to the crisis of the Haiti earthquake in 2010, from understanding the threat to so USSOUTHCOM quickly reverted back to its understanding the environment original J-code organization, confirming the value of this organizational construct. While units learned and adapted to their The fielding of new equipment aided the operating environments, their experiences, best innovative TTP described above. For example, practices, and lessons were not always shared, as new ISR assets were fielded in increasing either within theater or with larger DOD institu- numbers, they could then be provided to lower tions. Although there were many Service lessons echelons to better find and fix terrorists/insur- learned organizations with active data collection gents, minimize civilian harm during engage- efforts operating in Iraq and Afghanistan, their ments, engage with the population, and pursue efforts tended to stay in their respective stovepipes reconciliation efforts. Other equipment was and were rarely integrated across the joint force. fielded to provide enhanced force protection Service lessons learned efforts generally supported against asymmetric threats (for example, Mine adaptation at the Service tactical level, which was Resistant Ambush Protected [MRAP] Vehicles and their chartered mission, but joint tactical-, oper- electronic countermeasures). While providing ational-, and strategic-level lessons were often needed capability rapidly, challenges with accel- unaddressed unless specifically requested by erated development and rapid fielding included commanders. The smaller, more agile, and bet- forces not being able to train on these capabilities ter-resourced SOF lessons learned organizations prior to deployment, as well as the possibility tended to be more focused, and their processes that vulnerabilities, interoperability problems, were designed for a quick turnaround to forces and maintenance issues were not identified. in theater. A number of ad hoc mechanisms were
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established to improve the effectiveness and time- and GPF capacities. An early example of this inte- liness of the lessons learned process, including gration was among Task Force Freedom and SOF the Army’s Operation Enduring Freedom Lessons operating in Mosul, Iraq, in 2005. These elements Learned Forum and the Joint Staff CIVCAS combined assets and target lists to create an inte- (Civilian Casualties) Working Group. These grated force to combat the enemy. This approach mechanisms helped provide focus and sharing of was later expanded into other areas of Iraq and lessons for key operational challenges. institutionalized into Intelligence Fusion Cells. These cells allowed expansion of the total set of Lesson 6: SOF-GPF Integration actionable targets—a set that was too large to be In Iraq and Afghanistan, multiple, simultaneous, handled by a single force—as well as a synergistic large-scale operations executed in dynamic environ- approach to those targets. By the end of 2008, ments required the integration of SOF and general dramatic progress in security had been made: purpose forces (GPF), creating a force-multiplying attack levels were the lowest since the summer effect for both.14 Initially SOF and GPF experienced of 2003. The integrated targeting effort between friction operating together, but through effort and SOF and GPF was a significant component of experience, they developed means of effective inte- this success. gration that enhanced the collective mission sets In Afghanistan, SOF and GPF integration of both. improved considerably from 2009 to 2010. SOF In post-2003 Iraq, SOF were not always were better coordinated with BSOs and conse- well coordinated with GPF. This led to situ- quence management efforts were mutually rein- ations where GPF, as the battlespace owners forcing. At the same time, communication about (BSOs), were left managing the second-order targeting increased, and SOF focused more on effects of special targeting operations. GPF com- targets that hindered BSO freedom of maneuver. plained about not receiving notice of impend- In 2011, SOF began conducting pre-deployment ing operations, not receiving intelligence that training with GPF to accelerate integration when came from SOF, and significant disruption of in theater. their battlespace in the aftermath of those oper- SOF and GPF also contributed to devel- ations. Similar complaints were made by GPF oping host-nation security forces in Iraq and in Afghanistan through 2008. For Combined Afghanistan. All forces moved to a partnered Joint Special Operations Task Forces (CJSOTF) approach to operations, collectively boosting in Iraq and Afghanistan, one factor in this poor host-nation security force capability. GPF focused coordination was the Theater Special Operations on the regular army and police forces, while SOF Command being unable to provide effective focused on host-nation SOF and army and police representation at senior levels. This was later CT units. Collectively, SOF and GPF combined addressed in Afghanistan through creation of an to address training and partnering requirements in-theater, flag-level command, Combined Forces that were beyond the scope of what was manage- Special Operations Component Command– able by either force independently. Afghanistan, to better integrate SOF activities While an early example of progress, oper- into an overall strategic campaign. ations in Mosul in 2005 were accomplished Over time, SOF and GPF elements worked to through cooperation at the working level, and integrate and take advantage of SOF capabilities many of the later improvements were driven
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U.S. military and civilian staffs learned to U.S. military and civilian staffs learned to leverage each other’s strengths leverage each other’s strengths and communicate more effectively over time, lessening the need for leadership to be a forcing function for collabora- by SOF senior leaders as they emphasized the tion. Nevertheless, these efforts still had to over- importance of integration with GPF. The creation come institutional barriers to cooperation such of fusion cells in Iraq involved a commitment of as disparate organizational authorities, roles, mis- SOF personnel and ISR resources; in both Iraq sions, and cultures; different levels of resources; and Afghanistan, SOF also used their resources an absence of interagency “doctrine”; security to create a network of liaison officers to provide concerns; and varying levels of training and edu- a direct conduit to improve communication and cation. Despite these challenges, an increasingly collaboration. expeditionary and collaborative mindset has become resident in a number of U.S. organiza- Lesson 7: Interagency Coordination tions. This progress may be temporary, however, Across the wide range of operations conducted since it is based on experiences and personalities over the last decade, interagency coordination was and not on any institutional imperative for inte- uneven due to inconsistent participation in planning, gration derived from current law or policy. training, and operations; policy gaps; resources; and For some specific missions such as counterter- differences in organizational culture. Similarly, the rorism and countering weapons of mass destruc- military was challenged by the need to work tion, the United States created action plans that with NGOs, a type of organization that inter- described roles and missions for specific elements acted frequently with some elements of the U.S. of the government. While these were useful for Government, but less commonly with the military. laying out how different departments and agen- Initially in Iraq and Afghanistan, interagency cies interacted in general, they lacked specificity. unity of effort was a resounding failure.15 During Overall, there was a lack of interagency “doctrine.” the first half of the decade, the United States Joint Interagency Task Force–South (JIATF-S) pro- consistently failed to harness the strengths and vided a model for how such interagency guidance resources of its departments and agencies. Of could be created: JIATF-S brought together a group note, several Joint Center for Operational Analysis of personnel from different U.S. departments and studies reported that the biggest lesson for the agencies, each accustomed to its own terminology United States from the first five years of war in and approach. JIATF-S then created a standard Iraq was “the inability to apply and focus the full operating procedure (SOP) for the organization resources and capabilities of the [United States] that established common terminology and TTP to in a concerted and coherent way.”16 Despite the be used by all interagency team members.17 This criticality of unity of effort, it was slow to develop SOP also clearly delineated authorities, rules of and was largely personality dependent. In fact, the engagement, and restrictions on roles during oper- notable unity of effort that was finally achieved in ations. Similar efforts for the interagency commu- Iraq was largely due to the initial, deliberate, and nity could provide a foundation for unified effort personal efforts of General David Petraeus, USA, in future operations.18 Ambassador Ryan Crocker, and their immediate The U.S. military was also challenged by the staffs in late 2007. need to work more closely with NGOs over the
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past decade. While some elements of the U.S. Different nations had differing interests that Government routinely work with NGOs, the mil- affected the missions they chose to conduct, as itary often lacked experience working with those well as how they conducted them. For example, organizations, further complicating DOD coor- France had financial interests in Iraq that were a dination efforts. While coordination between the disincentive for its involvement in major combat U.S. military and NGOs was generally beneficial operations in 2003. Similarly, Japan and Norway to American efforts, these relationships were hin- chose roles in Afghanistan that focused on recon- dered by a mutual lack of understanding, the struction instead of the larger COIN mission military’s tendency to try to direct NGO activities, because of their national interests. and the desire of some NGOs to retain a per- ception of neutrality to maintain humanitarian national caveats were a significant challenge space to conduct their operations. in all of the major coalition operations of the A common challenge in working with inter- past decade agency partners and NGOs was information exchange, where unity of effort was often hin- dered by limited or no access to DOD commu- In addition to national interests, participat- nications networks. The use of a non-DOD net- ing nations had cultural differences that influ- work to facilitate needed information exchange enced both the roles they would play and the way helped to overcome this. One example was the that they would conduct their given missions. In use of All Partners Access Network (APAN), a Afghanistan, individual nations valued different collaborative network established on a non-DOD elements of the overall campaign strategy. The net domain used by organizations contributing to effect was the conduct of differing sub-campaigns the 2004 tsunami disaster relief effort. Similarly, in different geographic areas, limiting complete USSOUTHCOM employed APAN during disaster implementation of the theater strategy. In addi- relief operations in Haiti in 2010. These IT solu- tion, some nations were more willing than others tions fostered information exchange and collabo- to conduct offensive operations. Since offensive ration between the U.S. Government (including, targeting was an integral element of the cam- but not limited to, DOD) and other nations and paign plans for Iraq and Afghanistan, this uneven organizations that did not have access to DOD approach within the coalition impacted the con- systems and networks. duct of these campaigns. National caveats were a significant chal- Lesson 8: Coalition Operations lenge in all of the major coalition operations While the United States was involved in a num- of the past decade. Participating nations limited ber of coalition operations in the past decade, their potential actions and missions based on establishing and sustaining coalition unity of effort policy decisions in the form of national caveats. was a challenge due to competing national interests, Collectively, these caveats became a patchwork cultures, policies, and resources. In addition, the of rules that both confused forces and limited enduring challenge of information sharing impeded overall unity of effort. coalition effectiveness. Some operational restrictions were for- Coalition operations were influenced by mal policy caveats, while others were effective the national interests of participating nations. differences in how a nation operated, but not
PRISM 4, no. 2 lessons learned | 135 Young captured formally as a caveat. One illustration available capabilities. For example, digital data of this was the U.S. self-defense criteria in the links in Iraq did not consistently exchange standing rules of engagement in Afghanistan. information between coalition nations, leading This policy effectively served as a national to incomplete operating pictures, reduced bat- caveat since it was a departure from ISAF rules tlespace awareness and, increased risk to forces. of engagement, but it was not reflected in com- Friendly fire was observed to result in cases where pilations of national caveats. data on friendly force location were available but Disparate resources also complicated coali- not presented to operators due to lack of interop- tion operations. Different nations brought dif- erable systems. ferent and uneven levels of capabilities, often as Information-sharing policies and systems part of intentional alliance decisions about the hindered effective and efficient coalition oper- development of complementary, not duplica- ations. Non-U.S. members of coalitions fre- tive, military capabilities. For example, in Libya quently cited restrictions that limited (or even operations, the United States had the majority precluded) their inclusion in planning and exe- of certain valuable types of ISR assets as well as cution of operations. Classification issues and precise, low-collateral damage weapons. The lack lack of coalition-wide secure information systems of these assets in other coalition countries lim- limited the ability to share needed information ited the scope of their contributions. Similarly and intelligence. Over-classification and slow for- in Afghanistan, some partner nations lacked ISR eign disclosure processes also contributed to these capabilities and airpower, which limited both challenges. their mobility and responsiveness to threats. Eventually, the United States learned to oper- Another challenge to coalition opera- ate more effectively within coalitions, accruing tions was differing training and TTP. Coalition multiple benefits that included: forces often used their own unique TTPs and approaches, so that coalitions did not interface ■■ enhanced force levels and resources with host-nation militaries or populations uni- ■■ political credibility and legitimacy formly. For example, in Afghanistan, different ■■ different sets of ideas on how to confront nations employed differing escalation of force problems and the ability to leverage the respec- TTP, which could lead to civilian casualties. tive strengths of different nations19 Afghan civilians, accustomed to TTP from one ■■ increased experience and proficiencies of ISAF nation’s forces, would travel to a differ- national partners.20 ent area of Afghanistan where another nation employed different TTP and the Afghans were These benefits provide compelling reasons often confused and uncertain how to respond. to suggest that the United States will continue to Compensation policies for civilian harm were operate in a coalition environment in the majority also different for different nations, resulting in of future operations. nonstandard treatment and frustration among Lesson 9: Host-nation Partnering the population. Interoperability was another challenge of In many of the operations over the past decade, operating within a coalition. Use of different and partnering was a key enabler and force multiplier and non-interoperable systems limited the utility of aided in host-nation capacity building. However, it
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was not always approached effectively and was not one challenge was a propensity for the U.S. adequately prioritized or resourced. Government to shape host-nation institutions Partnering between the United States and after its own image host nations was essential for achieving strate- gic goals and promoting a number of key objec- tives. First, partnering enabled the host nation to and challenges. Host-nation forces tended to develop a sustainable capacity to provide security have an increased awareness of cultural cues and counter threats. This provided an exit strat- that helped them to discriminate between threats egy for the United States and offered an alter- and noncombatants and to communicate more native to sustaining a large American footprint effectively with the local population, who tended on the ground. Second, partnering enhanced to be more responsive to host-nation forces. the legitimacy of U.S. operations and freedom However, challenges encountered in partnering of action. Finally, partnering built connections with host-nation forces in Afghanistan included between the United States and host-nation secu- a lack of proficiency and experience, as well as rity forces, increasing opportunities for influence corruption, infiltration, lack of accountability both within respective militaries and with other to international norms for the use of force, and sectors of government and society. Partnering resource constraints. offered the United States a way to advance its The United States faced further challenges objectives through influence rather than through that complicated partnering. One challenge was direct action. a propensity for the U.S. Government to shape While security force assistance (SFA), foreign host-nation institutions after its own image, rather internal defense, and building partner capacity than allowing the host nation to make such deci- were essential to strategic goals and offered alter- sions consistent with its own history, culture, and natives to a large U.S. footprint, these activities traditions. Another was a lack of strategic patience, were not adequately planned, prioritized, or where a desire for quick results at times drove the resourced. Partnering was an inherently inter- United States to lead the partnering relation- agency activity, but there was an overall lack ship, rather than operating by, with, and through of unity in these efforts. In Iraq, the scope and host-nation forces to build long-term capacity. mission of SFA needed in light of the Coalition Last, forces did not always respond positively to Provisional Authority decision to disband the cultural differences of the host nation, leading to Iraqi security forces were not anticipated in plan- poor partnering and advisory relationships. ning. Sufficient institutions to address the SFA Partnering relationships tended to change requirements were not established until the fol- over time as host-nation capabilities matured. lowing year, and resources were slow to arrive, For example, partnering in Iraq and Afghanistan both in terms of trainers and needed equipment. transitioned from U.S.-led operations, with Iraqi For example, weapons for the Iraqi forces were or Afghan forces being mentored during those difficult to procure because of U.S. export leg- operations, to partnered operations where islation that did not consider large-scale urgent host-nation forces participated in planning SFA requirements. and execution alongside American forces. This Working with host-nation security forces on then transitioned to host nation–led operations partnered operations brought both advantages where the United States or coalition countries
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provided key enablers that the host nation did develop host-nation security forces that could sus- not possess, such as air support, logistics, or ISR tain security in the absence of U.S. and coalition capabilities. Similarly, in the Philippines, early forces. In other countries such as the Philippines, U.S. partnering focused on tactical operations small investments of U.S. SOF served as enablers and later transitioned to operational-level sup- to enhance host-nation effectiveness. port as Philippine security forces became more Lesson 10: State Use of tactically proficient. Surrogates and Proxies Resourcing for foreign internal defense and SFA was complicated by a number of different After the United States demonstrated its ability and partially overlapping authorities and funding to quickly and effectively conduct major com- streams. In Iraq and Afghanistan, diverse elements bat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, other of building partner capacity were conducted by states sponsored and exploited surrogates and proxies different organizations with distinct missions and to generate asymmetric challenges through a variety little integration of their efforts. of means. Surrogates and proxies gave nation-states in Operation Enduring Freedom–Philippines, options for indirectly opposing U.S. interests and the mission was limited to targeting terrorist objectives. For example, one nation funded and organizations that were affiliated with al Qaeda supplied insurgent groups in Iraq with technical capabilities beyond their original reach, challeng- ing the coalition and causing greater U.S. casual- In some case, narrowly defined missions ties. Similarly, in order to oppose Israel, a nation limited the utility of U.S. partnering efforts. supplied Hezbollah with advanced weapons For example, in Operation Enduring Freedom– capabilities, including a missile inventory that Philippines, the mission was limited to targeting rivaled that of many nation-states. In Afghanistan, terrorist organizations that were affiliated with al other nations similarly opposed ISAF by providing Qaeda (for example, Jemaah Islamiyah and Abu resources and support to terrorist and insurgent Sayyaf). U.S. support did not extend to Philippine groups operating there.22 efforts to address the foremost threat to the Throughout the decade, the overlap of crime, Philippine government, the Communist Party of terror, and nonstate actors continued to increase. the Philippines New People’s Army, because they The movement of money and contraband, a spe- were not affiliated with al Qaeda. This restric- cialty of criminal elements, also benefited terror tion created friction between Philippine and U.S. groups acting as proxies, and the latter could forces and also limited the ability of the United leverage these criminal elements for a price. To States to promote host-nation capacity to achieve counter this, the overlap had to be addressed: long-term security.21 for example, JIATF-S focused on countering nar- Despite these challenges, U.S. partnering cotics-trafficking, but it also included counter- efforts improved the host nation’s ability to pro- ing terrorist activities because of the significant vide security and advance American objectives. In overlap between drug and terrorist networks and Iraq and Afghanistan, these efforts were essential finances.23 However, despite the global impor- both to provide near-term security in order to set tance of law enforcement and nonmilitary orga- the conditions for longer term stability and to nizations in combating proxies and surrogates,
138 | LESSOns learned PRISM 4, no. 2 Decade Of War the military lacked authorities to train or pro- groups—for example, DNA sequencing equip- vide information to these nonmilitary entities. In ment to create lethal viruses such as smallpox addition, a regional focus on these issues—espe- or the influenza strain that resulted in the 1918 cially when different departments and agencies pandemic. Critically, the cost of these technolo- used differing geographic boundaries—created gies has decreased by orders of magnitude over gaps and seams that the enemy could exploit. time, and access to these technologies is much Because of U.S. overmatch in military capa- easier. Coupled with transnational criminal net- bility, the enemy tended to shift to the use of works, these technologies could enable individ- inexpensive, low-technology approaches and/or uals or small groups to generate mass casualties TTP (often provided by sponsor nations) to foil and disruption.25 high-technology U.S. capabilities that had been As discussed, the risk is compounded by designed to counter conventional peer-on-peer external sponsors, either national sponsors or threats. One example was the wide use of impro- other terror groups that provide advanced tech- vised explosive devices (IEDs) against coalition nologies and capabilities to insurgent groups and forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. While coalition terrorist organizations. One national sponsor armored vehicles were designed to resist signifi- provided advanced IED technology to terrorist cant damage even when fired upon by similarly organizations in Iraq and Afghanistan, allowing designed vehicles, they were vulnerable to IEDs them to penetrate armored vehicles and cause exploding underneath the vehicle; with simple casualties beyond their original capabilities. tools and at a low cost, insurgents and terrorists Hezbollah also benefited from support from a could cause significant casualties and damage to national sponsor, thus approaching the disruptive U.S. vehicles. capabilities of a nation-state. Similarly, Abu Sayyaf In some cases, the United States successfully in the Philippines benefited from members of worked with partner nations to develop their capa- Jemaah Islamiyah who provided material support bilities to counter internal and regional threats. In for terrorist attacks. effect, this amounted to the creation of U.S. prox- Rapidly advancing communication tech- ies. Through training, provision of key enablers, nologies also had significant impact, adding to and additional measures such as the Rewards for the super-empowerment of nonstate entities. Justice Program, partner nations were increasingly These groups excelled at rapidly transmitting effective at countering threats to U.S. objectives.24 images to the media as well as their own forums, creating the first impression on the world stage. Lesson 11: Super-empowered Threats At the same time, these groups were largely Terrorism has long been characterized by indi- unconstrained by the truth and could adapt the viduals or small groups exerting disproportionate facts to further their cause. In fact, some groups influence through their actions. However, in the manufactured evidence or doctored images past decade individuals and small groups increas- (“fauxtography”) to further their own objec- ingly exploited globalized technology and information tives. For example, during the 2006 Lebanon to expand their influence and approach state-like dis- War, Hezbollah used a single corpse at multiple ruptive capacity. Israeli strike locations to provide “evidence” of Commercial technologies made weapons Lebanese civilian casualties and a disproportion- of mass effect achievable by small individuals or ate response by Israel.26
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The Internet served as a further enabler for determine whether we made the best use of this super-empowerment, facilitating recruiting, window and if we actually learned the lessons training, financing, and command and control taught by the last decade. for terrorist individuals and groups. Insurgent web sites offered propaganda, training mate- rials, and guidance to direct and encourage Notes other attacks. Financing was accomplished both through Internet sites and other nontraditional 1 This article is a summary of the “Decade of War” banking mechanisms. study undertook by the Joint and Coalition Operational Analysis (JCOA) division of the Joint Staff J7. The full Conclusion report can be accessed at: http://blogs.defensenews.com/ saxotech-access/pdfs/decade-of-war-lessons-learned.pdf. Over the last decade, many tactical lessons were 2 A National Security Strategy for a Global Age institutionalized at the Service level through the (Washington, DC: The White House, December 2000). 3 The operational environment is defined in detail in work of the Center for Army Lessons Learned and Joint Publication (JP) 2-01.3, Joint Intelligence Preparation the Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned, of the Operational Environment (Washington, DC: The Joint among others. As a complement to those efforts, Staff, June 16, 2009). 4 Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) Order the Decade of War study sought to identify over- 1, issued May 16, 2003, removed all Iraqi government arching joint, strategic lessons. As important as employees associated with the Ba’ath Party from current it was to identify and understand these enduring and future employment with the Iraqi government. CPA lessons, the goal remains for these lessons to be Order 2, issued May 23, 2003, dissolved the Iraqi army and associated elements. institutionalized in the joint force. 5 Task Force Odin was established in 2006 as an expe- If the solution to any of these problems was ditionary aviation battalion for providing intelligence, purely a materiel one, the process would be rela- surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR). Project Liberty tively straightforward. featured modified C-12 aircraft with ISR capabilities. These aircraft were first fielded in 2009. Instead, institutionalizing these lessons 6 Initial operations in Afghanistan could be regarded requires changing education, training, doctrine, as a hybrid of major conventional war (because of the leadership development, and other nonmaterial high intensity) and irregular operations (because of the low density of ground forces, many of them host-nation areas. Developing these nonmaterial solutions guerilla-type forces). falls to the Joint Staff J7, the directorate for Joint 7 Martin van Creveld, “Modern Conventional Force Development. The process of institution- Warfare: An Overview,” National Intelligence Council alizing these joint lessons—prioritizing which Workshop, May 25, 2004. 8 These events could create anger within the popu- lessons must be addressed immediately, deter- lation, fueling insurgent or terror elements either directly mining which organizations will spearhead the by taking up arms or indirectly through the provision of effort and which will support, and developing shelter or money. 9 actionable solutions—is neither easy nor quick. Under this definition, the battle for the narrative encompasses strategic communication and its key ele- The scope of the lessons identified in this report ments: public affairs, public diplomacy, and information is broad, and many of the ideas are difficult to operations. translate into concrete action. Yet we now have a 10 Phase III refers to major combat operations, while Phase IV refers to post–major combat operations. window of opportunity to think about and act on 11 Hindrances to unity of effort included unequal issues that can define and prepare a more adapt- tour lengths of civilian and military personnel lack able and agile joint force. Future generations will of comprehensive, preparatory wargaming for the
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whole-of-government team; institutional barriers; and lack 20 For example, the Georgian military gained consider- of understanding of counterpart cultures and bureaucratic able combat experience from its deployments in support of processes. This issue is discussed in more detail in Lesson the International Security Assistance Force. Seven, Interagency Coordination. 21 This friction was mitigated through personal rela- 12 Defense Secretary Henry L. Stimson, “If there is tionships and multiple training events. See David Maxwell, one outstanding lesson to be gained from prior American “Foreign Internal Defense: An Indirect Approach to Counter- experiences in military government, it is the unwisdom of Insurgency/Counter Terrorism, Lessons from ‘Operation permitting any premature interference by civilian agencies Enduring Freedom–Philippines’ (OEF-P) for dealing with with the Army’s basic task of civil administration in occu- Non-Existential Threats to the United States,” December pied areas. . . . [I]n those important American experiences 6, 2011. in military government (Civil War, Philippine War, and 22 For example, “Extremist organizations serving as WWI) where civilian influence was permitted to be exer- proxies of the government of Pakistan are attacking Afghan cised, the results were, respectively, demoralizing, costly, troops and civilians as well as US soldiers.” Statement and ludicrous.” See Harry L. Coles and Albert K. Weinberg, of Admiral Michael Mullen, Chairman Joint Chiefs of Civil Affairs: Soldiers Become Governors (Washington, DC: Staff, before the Senate Armed Services Committee on Center of Military History, 1992). Afghanistan and Iraq, September 22, 2011. 13 For example, JP 3-24, Counterinsurgency 23 “JIATF-S focuses on the planning and execution of (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, October 5, 2009); JP operations to interdict narcotics smuggling and human 3-07, Stability Operations (Washington, DC: The Joint trafficking as well as terrorist-related activities.” Emphasis Staff, September 29, 2011); and JP 3-26, Counterterrorism added. “JINSA Group Visits U.S. Southern Command (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, November 13, 2009). and the Joint Interagency Task Force South,” September Each of these doctrinal publications had significant 3, 2008, available at
PRISM 4, no. 2 lessons learned | 141 Photo by Graig Collier
Lion’s Square in Rusafa Interagency Rebuilding Efforts in Iraq: A Case Study of the Rusafa Political District
By Stuart W. Bowen, Jr., and Craig Collier
rom 2004-2012, the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) conducted 387 inspections and audits of U.S.-funded projects and programs that supported stabilization and Freconstruction operations in Iraq. Most of SIGIR’s reviews focused on large-scale projects or programs. In a recent special report, SIGIR accomplished a novel study examining a particular part of the rebuilding effort. That report reviewed the remarkably diverse spectrum of programs and projects executed in a crucial geographic area in Iraq, the Rusafa Political District, delving into who built what and at what cost. The nature of this new report opens the door to deeper perspectives on what was actually achieved – and how it was achieved–by various U.S. government agencies operating during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). SIGIR elicited seven lessons-learned from the study, which conclude this article.1 The primary source for our information on Rusafa’s programs and projects came from the Iraq Reconstruction Management System (IRMS). As noted in previous SIGIR reports, the IRMS database, although the best available informational record on Iraq rebuilding, is gravely incomplete. IRMS contains but 70 percent of the programs and projects carried out by the United States in Iraq. To remediate this gap, SIGIR ferreted out additional data from the U.S. Army Center for Military History, the U.S. Agency for International Development’s (USAID) implementing partners, the Embedded Provincial Reconstruction Teams’ (ePRT) weekly reports, and personal records provided by individuals. Further, we interviewed Army brigade and battalion commanders who served in Rusafa, Army staff officers tasked with managing projects within the district, and civil affairs officers and ePRT members who served in the area. This gallimaufry of operator insights provided us with a useful bounty of primary-source testimonial evidence on Rusafa’s rebuilding outcomes. Finally, we travelled to Iraq to interview two Iraqis who served on the Rusafa District Advisory Council. They provided a crucial con- tinuity of insight that was missing from the U.S. side, given that U.S. personnel rarely served for much
Mr. Stuart Bowen is the Special Inspector General for Iraqi Reconstruction. COL (Ret.) Craig Collier works for the office of the Special Inspector General for Iraqi Reconstruction (SIGIR).
PRISM 4, no. 2 lessons learned | 143 Bowen And Collier more than a year in Iraq. The varied assemblage PRTs, their success commonly depended upon of interviews we obtained collectively amplified the quality of the team leader. Each ePRT and added to the IRMS database’s conspicuously operating in Rusafa included a Department of weak project information. State (DoS) team leader and a USAID deputy. Additional DoS and USAID support for the The Rusafa Political District district came directly from the U.S. Embassy in Located in the heart of Iraq’s enormous capital Baghdad or from the Provincial Reconstruction city, the Rusafa Political District is one of eleven Team/Baghdad. The U.S. Army Corps of of the metropolis’s political districts. With a pop- Engineers (USACE) maintained an office at FOB ulation of approximately 435,000, the district is Loyalty, providing contract oversight for the dis- almost as populous as Atlanta, Georgia. Most of trict’s numerous projects. Rusafa’s residents are Shia Muslims. Indeed, Shia Analytical Limits comprise a majority of the residents in 40 of the district’s 44 neighborhoods, with Sunni Muslims SIGIR’s research identified at least 1,303 projects amounting to a majority in the other 4. The few executed in Rusafa during the seven-plus years of Christians residing in Rusafa are clustered in iso- OIF, amounting to a total value in excess of $153 lated enclaves across the district. million. This number most assuredly is low, in Rusafa houses ten Government of Iraq min- part because of IRMS’s inherent shortfalls and in istries, including the Ministry of Defense, and part because of missing project records. Of con- two major universities. It is also home to several siderable note, we found that projects executed large markets, most notably the sprawling Shorja during the initial stages of OIF were very poorly Market, Baghdad’s largest. The area is diversely documented, if at all. Moreover, the 1,303 figure marked by light industry, warehouses, slums, parks, does not include 228 projects valued at $93 mil- ethnic ghettos, busy boulevards, dozens of Sunni lion that were Baghdad-wide, embracing Rusafa and Shia mosques, and several Christian churches. as well as other political districts. We recognize that analyzing relief and U.S. Government Entities that Operated in Rusafa reconstruction outcomes from the Iraq program is dauntingly difficult due to the inconsistent From April 2003 until Operation Iraqi Freedom IRMS database, the incredible range of projects ended in September 2010, at least ten different accomplished, the burdensome lack of common Army battalions operated in Rusafa. Some were project definitions among U.S. agencies, and present for as few as 5 months, while a few served the paucity of information on project results. for nearly 15. The first ePRT in Rusafa opened at Notwithstanding these manifold obstacles, we Forward Operating Base (FOB) Loyalty (located carried out this special project to explore the just outside the borders of Rusafa in an area effects of the Iraq program’s ad hoc interagency called “New Baghdad”) in May 2007, and the management structure as revealed in one notably last one closed in March 2010. important locale. To simplify our analysis, we “ePRTs” were an Iraq-unique innovation divided the projects into two types: construc- developed to improve interagency coordination tion and non-construction; and we charted them on rebuilding programs. They generally were according to the ten reconstruction categories considered effective, but, as with the standard established by the Congress.2
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Table 1. Total Number of Projects and Amounts by Agency in Rusafa, April, 2003-September, 2010 Army USACE USAID State Unknown Total # of Dollars # of Dollars # of Dollars # of Dollars # of Dollars # of Dollars Projects Spent* Projects Spent* Projects Spent* Projects Spent* Projects Spent* Projects Spent* Construction 86 $49.5 43 $67.6 60 $4.3 – $0.0 – $0.0 189 $120.4 Non- 266 $16.4 2 $0.2 825 $12.7 20 $0.6 1 $3.3 1,114 $33.2 Construction Total 352 $65.9 45 $67.8 885 $17.0 20 $0.6 1 $3.3 1,303 $153.6 *: Million US
Who Built What at What Cost? USACE spent over $67 million on 43 con- Of the 1,303 projects carried out by U.S. govern- struction projects, with 28 projects falling into ment agencies in Rusafa, the Army accounted three sectors (education, refugees, human rights for 352 (27%), USACE accounted for 45 (3%), and governance; electricity; and justice, public USAID accounted for 884 (68%), and DoS had safety, infrastructure and civil society). These proj- 20 (2%). (See Table 1) ects accounted for 56% of USACE construction Regarding money expended in the district, expenditures or $38.4 million. Although USACE the Army spent almost $66 million (43%), supervised a much smaller number of projects USACE spent $67.8 million (44%), USAID spent than either the Army or USAID, USACE projects $17 million (11%), and DoS spent $638,000 generally cost more. The single most expensive (0.4%). Regarding categories of projects in USACE project was the Wathba Water Treatment Rusafa, 187 or 14% were construction projects Plant, built at a cost of $21,813,851.16. The most that collectively cost over $120 million. The widely known project in Rusafa was also a USACE other 1,114 projects or 86% were non-construc- project: the Rusafa Central Courthouse, which cost tion projects that collectively cost over $33 mil- $10,593,716.43. Prime Minister Maliki formally lion. Although construction projects amounted opened the courthouse in September 2008. to 14% of the total number of projects, they USAID spent over $4.2 million on 60 con- accounted for 78% of the money spent in Rusafa. struction projects in Rusafa. More than 60% of the projects (38), amounting to $2.5 million in Construction Projects. SIGIR’s analysis found expenditures, were for school repair or refurbish- that 86 of the 352 projects executed by the ment. The Department of State did not directly Army were construction projects, built at a cost fund any construction projects in Rusafa. of over $49 million (See Table 2). The largest number of projects (17) fell into the water Non-Construction Projects. The Army spent $14.6 resources and sanitation sector; but by far the million on 122 non-construction projects (See most costly set of projects was in the security Table 3). 85% of Army non-construction proj- and law enforcement sector ($27.3 million). ects and 90% of Army spending on non-con- The most expensive single project constructed struction projects ($13.2 million) fell into four by the Army was “Commando Site 4,” a project sectors: education, refugees, human rights and completed for the Iraqi police in 2006 at a cost governance; private sector development; security of $14.8 million.3 and law enforcement; and water resources and
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Table 2—Construction Projects and Amounts by Agency and Sector in Rusafa, April, 2003-September, 2010 Army USACE USAID State Total # of Dollars # of Dollars # of Dollars # of Dollars # of Dollars Projects Spent* Projects Spent* Projects Spent* Projects Spent* Projects Spent* Education, Refugees, Human Rights, and 12 $3.10 8 $15.92 38 $2.51 - - 58 $21.54 Governance Electricity 13 $3.52 9 $9.05 2 $0.16 - - 24 $12.73 Health Care 5 $1.80 5 $1.86 4 $0.20 - - 14 $3.86 Justice, Public Safety Infrastructure, and 8 $6.56 11 $13.42 2 $0.29 - - 21 $20.26 Civil Society Oil Infrastructure ------Private Sector 9 $1.75 - - 1 $0.00 - - 10 $1.75 Development Roads, Bridges, and 8 $3.96 - - 11 $1.04 - - 19 $5.00 Construction Security and Law 14 $27.30 5 $4.86 - - - - 19 $32.16 Enforcement Transportation and - - 2 $0.21 - - - - 2 $0.21 Telecommunications Water Resources and 17 $1.52 3 $22.28 2 $0.07 - - 22 $24.33 Sanitation Total 86 $49.51 43 $67.60 60 $4.27 - - 189 $121.38 *: Million US$
sanitation. USACE managed just two non-con- USAID often provides money to “imple- struction projects, both for security guards at menting partners” and non-governmental organi- USACE-constructed projects. zations to execute projects. In Iraq, these included USAID spent more than $10 million on peace-promotion camps and Iraqi soccer tour- 824 non-construction projects in Rusafa. The naments. The most expensive projects were majority of USAID non-construction projects three “awareness campaigns” run by the USAID (709) were in private sector development. These implementing partner International Relief and included USAID micro-loans designed to provide Development. Each campaign cost $195,000 and small business owners with cash to grow their covered three Rusafa neighborhoods. businesses. Another 78 projects worth $2.8 mil- The Department of State spent $639,787 on lion fell into the education sector. Most of these 20 non-construction projects in three categories, projects funded classes for students at various the largest being private sector development. colleges and universities in Rusafa. USAID also Sector Concentrations of Rusafa Projects spent more than $2.9 million on 18 projects in the water resources and sanitation sector. Most of Security and Law Enforcement. The United States these projects were for area clean-up programs. expended the largest share of taxpayer dollars
146 | lessons learned PRISM 4, no. 2 Interagency Rebuilding Efforts In Iraq
Table 3—Non-Construction Projects and Amounts by Agency and Sector in Rusafa, April, 2003-September, 2010 Army USACE USAID State Total # of Dollars # of Dollars # of Dollars # of Dollars # of Dollars Projects Spent* Projects Spent* Projects Spent* Projects Spent* Projects Spent* Education, Refugees, Human Rights, and 18 $0.56 - - 78 $2.81 5 $0.10 101 $3.46 Governance Electricity 3 $0.53 ------3 $0.53 Health Care 7 $0.23 - - 14 $0.83 1 $0.00 22 $1.05 Justice, Public Safety Infrastructure, and 5 $0.18 - - 4 $0.06 11 $0.10 20 $0.34 Civil Society Oil Infrastructure - - - - 1 $0.12 - - 1 $0.12 Private Sector 32 $1.74 - - 709 $3.92 3 $0.45 744 $6.11 Development Roads, Bridges, and 3 $0.25 ------3 $0.25 Construction Security and Law 29 $8.79 2 $0.16 - - - - 31 $8.96 Enforcement Transportation and ------Telecommunications Water Resources 25 $2.38 - - 18 $2.94 - - 43 $5.33 and Sanitation Total 122 $14.66 2 $0.16 824 $10.69 20 $0.64 968 $26.15 *: Million US$
spent in Rusafa on the security and law enforce- was security they were concerned about. Security ment sector. The Army and USACE expended first, services second.” $41 million (27%): $32 million on 19 construc- tion projects and $9 million on 31 non-con- Trash Clean-Up (Water Resources and Sanitation struction projects. This sector accounted for Sector). Trash cleanup was an early priority in some of the most expensive projects, including Rusafa and, somewhat ironically, one of the last training facilities and bases for Iraqi Security set of projects completed before American units Forces and “T-wall” barriers to protect critical departed the area. From April 2004 to January infrastructure. All of the non-construction proj- 2010, the U.S spent at least $4,281,579 on 33 proj- ects were for security guards or the “Sons of Iraq” ects for trash removal, paid for by either Army units program. (19 projects) or USAID (14 projects). Although In general, interviewees perceived security many officers and civilians initially believed that and law enforcement projects as effective. As one the Iraqis should fund and execute their own trash battalion effects officer commented: “I think that clean-up programs, they came to understand that the [Sons of Iraq] had, in some locations, a pos- these projects were a force protection issue, because itive effect…[where] they provide security, vio- trash piled along the sides of roads was commonly lence is down. If you asked people on the street, it used to hide improvised explosive devices.
PRISM 4, no. 2 lessons learned | 147 Bowen And Collier
Education Projects (Education, Refugees, Human USAID spent at least $3,567,319 on 668 Rights, and Governance Sector). The U.S. spent micro-loans in Rusafa, chiefly for small busi- $8,421,160 on 80 education projects in Rusafa nesses, such as cart sellers, operating in the (19 Army, 57 USAID, 3 USACE, and 1 DoS), sprawling Shorja/Mutanabi/Sadria market com- mostly involving school repair or new school con- plex. IRMS indicated 38 USAID micro-loan struction. This sector was prone to waste. Based entries for which no amount was noted. on data review and the interviews, it appears that The Army-funded micro-grant and USAID- most of the schools in Rusafa were refurbished funded micro-loan programs drew significant at least twice. We found two secondary schools criticism from several interviewees. One bat- that the Army or USAID refurbished at least three talion effects officer’s comment was typical: times. When asked whether the same project “I think the micro-grants were…like a drip of water in an ocean. What actual improvement the interviewees addressed poor interagency does it have…for the country? I am fully confi- coordination, and fraud, waste, and abuse dent that there were some guys who spent $100 and pocketed $4,900 dollars [of the $5,000 we gave them].” was accomplished multiple times, the Iraqis we Perceptions of the Rusafa interviewed from the Rusafa District Advisory Rebuilding Effort Council responded: “Of course, by the Army and [International Relief and Development].” SIGIR conducted formal interviews with 23 The cost for school refurbishment dra- U.S military and civilian personnel as well as matically increased over time, from as little as two Iraqis who had worked extensively with $8,960 in March 2005 to as much as $407,455 Americans while serving on the Rusafa District in September 2008, although it was not possible Advisory Council. The interviewees provided dis- to determine from the available data the scope cursively insightful descriptions on the nature of work of each school refurbishment project. and effects for the Rusafa rebuilding efforts. Among other things, they addressed poor inter- Micro Grants and Micro-Finance Loans (Private agency coordination, what worked and what did Sector Development Sector). The majority of proj- not, and fraud, waste, and abuse. ects in the Private Sector Development category Here is a sampling from their observations: constituted micro-grants or micro-loans awarded to individual businesspeople for economic expan- There was nothing systematic about assess- sion. We found it difficult to determine the total ments or results reporting – it was more anec- amount spent on micro-grants, because units dotal since we didn’t really have the capacity often drew from “bulk funds” to dole them out. or resources to do rigorous assessments. I, at IRMS identified a total of 15 projects, including least, tried to report both good and bad results, bulk funds, specifically for micro grants, with total though the process tended to highlight good expenditures from them amounting to $102,800. news, rather than bad. (ePRT leader) Moreover, individual records we obtained reveal To some extent, one of the challenges was that substantially more was spent on micro-grants not going too fast...the first month I was at than indicated in the IRMS database. [the ePRT], I think $30 million was obligated
148 | lessons learned PRISM 4, no. 2 Interagency Rebuilding Efforts In Iraq
in thirty days and that was just across the three Army micro-grants, in turn, commonly conflicted districts [in the brigade’s operational environ- with USAID’s micro-loan program ment] and that was a remarkable amount of money, and it was like money was bullets so shoot some more, and that’s not necessarily Securing reliable information about what [good]. had been built was difficult for incoming (USAID deputy on ePRT) battalions in Rusafa. Except for the unit that immediately preceded them they usually did You walk into a neighborhood and ask ‘Do you not know what previous units assigned to their want food? Do you want water?’ They would operational environment had accomplished. say ‘We want electricity.’ And my higher-ups This weak system led to redundant rebuilding said they’re working on this grid thing and it efforts and the consequent waste of resources. will be ready in 8 years and you’re like great… Further, it caused USAID repeatedly to dupli- so you spend $50,000 and buy a generator cate projects that the Army had funded. Army and the next time you go into the neighbor- micro-grants, in turn, commonly conflicted with hood you’re a rock star. People have electricity, USAID’s micro-loan program. All of these fail- they can cook. Big bang, little buck. ures stemmed from the lack of an accurate and (Army battalion commander) effective project database. The Embedded Provincial Reconstruction Some projects, they would finish it, but it Team (ePRT) initiative improved the coordina- wouldn’t work. It would be complete but they tion of interagency stabilization and reconstruc- would have no use for it. It was as it if never tion efforts, which reduced waste. happened. Army commanders and staff officers, civil (Rusafa DAC member) affairs officers, ePRT leaders, and USAID repre- sentatives all praised the ePRT concept, because Seven Lessons Learned it reduced the duplication of effort and cut down Based on our interviews and analysis, SIGIR iden- on waste. One brigade commander’s comments tified seven lessons for consideration. were typical: “Once [the] ePRT got plugged in Successful projects in stabilization and we finally had transparency on projects – also reconstruction settings depend upon properly showed us we had lots of fratricide between identifying local need, securing local government CERP, USAID and even USACE.” support, ensuring continuity of execution, and Using the speed of money spent as a metric administering meaningful oversight. for progress in a stabilization and reconstruction As a rule, successful projects in Rusafa were operation is fundamentally counterproductive. completed by the unit that started them. Further, Interviewees described an environment, the Iraqis needed these projects, and the Iraqi especially in the later stages in OIF, wherein government supported them. Ultimately, effec- reconstruction managers felt pressured to spend tive oversight was crucial to project success. as much as possible, as quickly as possible, on Effective information management systems any reconstruction project. This led to fraud, supporting reconstruction and stabilization oper- waste, and abuse. As one battalion effects officer ations will reduce waste. put it: “…it becomes a race to spend as much
PRISM 4, no. 2 lessons learned | 149 Bowen And Collier
money as possible. There’s no investment to get Stabilization and reconstruction projects the maximum return for the government.” should only be undertaken if a unit or agency The Department of Defense should judi- has the capacity to monitor and measure them. ciously limit the regulations governing the use A consistent theme raised by those involved of CERP for small-scale rapid-response projects. in managing stabilization and reconstruction projects in Rusafa was that they often could not Battalion commanders, effects officers, and or did not monitor a project nor could they ascer- civil affairs officers all complained about the tain whether the project achieved its intended bureaucratic requirements required for CERP use outcome. Starting too many projects at once in an insecure environment created this problem. Micro-grants and micro-loans, in particular, were Battalion commanders, effects officers, and repeatedly cited as being too difficult to monitor civil affairs officers all complained about the both for measures of performance and measures bureaucratic requirements required for CERP of effectiveness. use. They felt it defeated CERP’s purpose as an Conclusion emergency, non-lethal funding tool that com- manders could use for “quick wins.” A battal- SIGIR’s Rusafa case study provides encapsulated ion effects officer said to us: “There was a time insights for future leaders interested in learning [where] you could turn a project around from from the U.S. rebuilding experience in Iraq. As concept to approval in a couple days. Near the one ePRT leader commented, “Soon enough [the end you couldn’t turn a project around in two lessons] are forgotten. I wish somehow I’d had weeks.” DoD should consider modifying restric- the smarts back then to think I might want an tions on low-cost rapid-return projects that could archive of this in one place.” be executed quickly to address immediate local needs or establish relationships. Involve the host nation in planning and exe- Notes cuting stabilization and reconstruction projects from the beginning. 1 The full report, along with a graphic series showing Units performing stabilization and recon- project locations and costs by agency over time, is available at http://www.sigir.mil/publications/specialReports.html. struction missions should ensure that the host 2 Congress passed the “Emergency Supplemental nation is involved in project selection, supervi- Appropriations Act for Defense and for the Reconstruction sion, and sustainment from program inception. of Iraq and Afghanistan for Fiscal Year 2004.” In it, This would help manage expectations, would Congress allocated $18.4 billion to the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRFF 2) and divided the money ensure that all projects are “needed” projects, among ten sectors. and would promote project sustainability. As 3 The Rusafa report lists all of the 1,301 projects in one Rusafa DAC member opined: “Americans appendices at the end, by agency and date of completion. don’t know how things work in Iraq. I imagine that 50% was lost to corruption. We never got to audit or inspect the projects. Americans in the beginning gave projects to anyone at any price… [it was] the main reason corruption spread.“
150 | lessons learned PRISM 4, no. 2 An Interview with Maria Otero
As the senior State Department executive responsible for civilian security and human rights, what are the biggest challenges you face?
Otero: We face a variety of challenges. Some are external to the State Department, while some are internal. Before I describe some of these, though, let me put them in context. Essentially, part of Secretary Clinton’s vision for 21st century statecraft consists of bringing together all of the bureaus in the State Department that in one way or another address the question of civilian security, or how we help governments and other elements of a democratic society strengthen insti- tutions and legal frameworks that ultimately pro- tect citizens from a range of modern threats. This includes bureaus that address the hard security issues of counterterrorism and war crimes, to those that handle what are considered soft security issues: human rights, democracy, rule of law, and humanitarian assistance. If we look at the Department as a whole, there are five bureaus and three offices that in some way respond to civilian security. These eight bureaus and offices handle a total of about 4.5 billion dollars in resources, and manage hundreds of employees around the world. So the vision that Secretary Clinton had for creating a balance between civilian security and military security and for designing a civilian response to situations of conflict is expansive. It there- fore brought with it several challenges. One internal challenge is to ensure that all of these diverse bureaus and offices that have previously worked independently now see that what they’re doing is part of the larger whole with a coherent purpose and a set of objectives that extend beyond their respective mandates. This means getting these bureaus to collaborate, to join forces and to proceed with a collective response to a situation or country, be it Burma, Syria, Kenya, or Honduras. This
Ms. Maria Otero is the former Under Secretary for Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human Rights, at the U.S. Department of State.
PRISM 4, no. 2 interview | 151 Otero challenge is typical in any bureaucracy where three offices each with a different lineage. Are bureaus or offices operate in a vertical rather there mechanisms in place for coordination and than horizontal fashion. collaboration within the “J family?” Perhaps the biggest external challenge is to ensure that we communicate effectively with Otero: We have done a few things in that other U.S. government agencies to show them regard, because you are absolutely right, that is the advantages and benefits of coordinating and the first and most important challenge. Some of collaborating with the newly established “J fam- the things that I’ve put in place to increase coor- ily” of bureaus and offices. This challenge extends dination have been, from the very beginning, to from one of the key directives of the Quadrennial develop a broader strategic mission statement Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR) with the assistant secretaries of the J bureaus so which calls for a whole of government response they can see what they are each doing as part of to preventing and responding to crisis, conflict a larger whole. Second, I meet with my assis- and instability. And then, of course, we face the tant secretaries once a week and give them an challenge of how to most effectively draw on opportunity to talk about the things they are the varied toolkits available within our range of focusing on, but also give them the opportu- bureaus and offices to design and define the most nity to interact with each other on various issues robust policy response suited to each crisis situa- that emerge where they might not otherwise see tion we encounter. And when I say we, I mean the connections immediately. Sometimes at these Bureaus of Conflict and Stabilization Operations meetings we focus on a specific country or a (CSO) led by Assistant Secretary Frederick “Rick” given issue so we can discuss what each bureau Barton; Democracy, Human Rights and Labor is doing in those areas. A third element of this (DRL) led by Assistant Secretary Michael Posner; coordination takes place at the staff level. My International Narcotics and Law Enforcement staff regularly convenes all bureaus at various (INL) headed by Assistant Secretary William working levels to discuss and better understand Brownfield; Population, Refugees and Migration how each element of the “J family” is playing (PRM) led by Assistant Secretary Anne Richard; out in a given country or crisis situation. For and Counterterrorism (CT) led by Coordinator example, yesterday we held one such meeting on Daniel Benjamin; as well as the Office to the transition in Afghanistan. I want all of the “J” Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons bureaus to understand what the others are doing (TIP) headed by Ambassador Luis CdeBaca; the to ensure that they plan accordingly and eventu- Office of Global Criminal Justice (GCJ) led by ally develop a more coherent policy. One other Ambassador-at-Large Stephen Rapp; and the way in which we’re trying to improve bureau Office of Global Youth Issues (GYI) headed by collaboration is by developing an inter-bu- the Secretary’s Special Adviser for Global Youth reau detailee mechanism within the “J family,” Issues, Zeenat Rahman. enabling mid-level staff from each bureau or office to move to another bureau for six months. If we might parse some of those challenges By fostering inter-bureau collaboration, we are a bit further, let’s talk first about the internal strengthening our approaches and developing challenges within the State Department. You strong linkages that can only help enhance the have within the “J family” five bureaus and “J family” performance on the ground.
152 | Interview PRISM 4, no. 2 Otero
Sounds like the Goldwater-Nichols inter- experiences the efficiencies resulting from well-se- service requirement for the military. quenced and leveraged functions of the “J family” bureaus and offices. To use Syria as an example, Otero: That’s right, and certainly the J bureaus and offices have worked closely with Department of Defense (DoD) has done some very the regional bureau and Syria desk. DRL (Bureau interesting things in their efforts to change struc- of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor), CSO ture in support of improving process. This is what (Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations), these bureaus and offices – collectively known and PRM (Bureau of Population, Refugees and as J – have been doing since J’s formation earlier Migration), as well as the Office of War Crimes, this year. Working closely with the Foreign Service now the Office of Global Criminal Justice (GCJ), Institute (FSI), we created a three-day course on have all brought their specialized expertise to bear “civilian security tradecraft” – the first of its kind for in Syria. From humanitarian issues, to human the Department. It was J bureaus and offices that rights and accountability efforts, to support for the provided content and case studies for the course, opposition, “J family” bureaus and offices support and J acted as convener and facilitator of the col- the efforts of the regional bureaus at State. Our laborative effort. Our “J family” team has done a colleagues from the Near Eastern Affairs regional terrific job, and FSI has commended us for it. The bureau recently praised the critically important 3-day training was developed and conducted in work of the “J family” in Syria by saying our con- mid-October this year. Many attendees came from tribution makes it easier for them to do their work. the J bureaus and offices and most of them echoed Of course, this does not mean that everything is the sentiments of one colleague who declared perfect, and that everybody always works together every member of a J bureau/office should take the in a coordinated way. But that is why we now have course. The next step, of course, is to engage the a full range of bureaus and offices reporting to regional bureaus and assist them in discovering an Under Secretary who has the wherewithal to the benefits of better understanding the work of make sure she can help set everyone on the proper their J colleagues. This effort of collaboration is path when inter-bureau/office problems arise. I not an end in itself; it is a means by which this can also provide similar support and guidance family of diverse bureaus and offices can support as our bureaus and offices engage other agencies the regional bureaus and the Department, broadly, (such as USAID or DoD), international partners or more effectively, and hand-in-hand to achieve the foreign governments. The fact that we have these Secretary’s goals for U.S. foreign policy. functional bureaus and offices working together strengthens our own voice and our overall effect. Do you have additional mechanisms in place to improve coordination between the “J family” Let’s go back to one of the individual bureaus and offices and the regional bureaus? bureaus, in particular what used to be the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Otero: Yes. Perhaps the most obvious is that, Stabilization; does the realignment of that office, as we increase our collaboration among the “J now reporting to an Undersecretary–you–as family” and with the regional bureaus, the regional opposed to directly to the Secretary, indicate a bureaus see more clearly the benefits to them of reevaluation within the State Department of the working with us. In this way, a regional bureau importance of reconstruction and stabilization?
PRISM 4, no. 2 interview | 153 Otero
Otero: The answer to that is yes, and the Otero: The first thing I must refer to is major difference is the greater emphasis on stabi- resources. As you know, the resources made avail- lization and preventing conflict rather than recon- able for this bureau now are more limited than struction. You will note that reconstruction is no we would have liked; but that’s just the reality of longer in the bureau’s name; it is the Bureau of the world in which we’re operating. The second Conflict and Stabilization Operations (CSO). The thing is that in creating the bureau, we really had fact that the organization is now an independent to evaluate everything that was being done to bureau rather than an office is a statement of how determine whether there was a more effective central conflict prevention is to the Department. and cost efficient way to achieve it. The reduction It demonstrates the Department’s understand- in size of the Civilian Response Corps is not a ing that mitigating conflicts, addressing them decrease in the bureau’s ability to do its work, before they hit us between the eyes, has become but a redirection of resources to enable doing it a core objective of the State Department. More in a more agile way. I think that is really the key and more we see countries affected by crises that issue. Because the question of civilian response span all sectors, as in Syria, and nothing could be is not only important but very central to what more serious or difficult to deal with than that the State Department does, we took resources type of situation. Kenya, for example, recently devoted to Washington activities and pushed experienced violent ethnic conflict following a them into the field. disputed election. A possible role for the “J fam- ily” might be to engage in such a situation well in But you believe you have within the “J advance of the vote to help mitigate some of the family” of bureaus sufficient civilian resources to potential and emerging conflict, using a range of meet those needs? local-level resources and tools. The “J family” pro- vides the ground support that backs up the Chief Otero: Remember, some of the resources of Mission and helps create a new way of doing come from the “J family” of bureaus and offices what’s needed. The new CSO bureau smartly iden- but we can draw from other parts of the gov- tified a relatively small group of priority countries ernment as well. The more important reality – Syria, Kenya, Burma and Honduras – in which is that even if you you had a civilian response to do this initially to establish its credibility, if you capacity that could focus on many countries at will, as a key resource for the regional bureaus. As once, you would still require a comprehensive a result, we’re seeing CSO’s re-conceptualization and strategic approach. If you look right now receive many positive receptions, including from how many countries have some kind of crisis Secretary Clinton, who has recognized its work or conflict in them, you’re easily looking at 50 publicly and ensured its importance. – 55 countries around the world. We certainly lack the resources to reach all of them. In truth, There seems to have been a very substantial we would not want to spread our diplomatic reevaluation of the value of what we five years resources so thinly. And so we have made deci- ago called the civilian response capability; the sions that, with the resources we do have in the civilian reserve corps has been abandoned, and “J family,” we will ensure we are linked to and the active and stand-by response corps seem to be supporting some of the key priorities of the refocused. What can you tell us about that? Department and the Administration.
154 | Interview PRISM 4, no. 2 Otero
One of the things that DoD does well is from past experience, for example, we’ve worked identify, articulate and disseminate the lessons well with USAID. The ability to capture these learned through experience. Are there any formal lessons, to understand how things happened, procedures or plans in the State Department for to understand whether we have the right mech- identifying, articulating, disseminating, and anisms in place to succeed in the future and to institutionalizing the lessons its people have share it among “J family” bureaus and offices and learned from the diplomatic element of national the Department, that piece is part of the process power over the last ten years that would be which we’re trying to create. equivalent to the Chairman Martin Dempsey’s Decade of War project? In this process, are you trying to develop skill sets that are appropriate for preventing and Otero: Knowledge management, lessons responding to conflict, as opposed to the more learned, is a most crucial component of the traditional State Department skills sets like “J family” collaboration on civilian security. observing, reporting, negotiating? Formalizing and institutionalizing this is a pro- cess that has begun and is under consideration. Otero: Absolutely, and the toolkit available We will put in place a mechanism to achieve this. for conflict prevention is fairly large and well It will necessitate a Department-wide knowledge developed. We do, of course, expect to develop management effort to accomplish what you’re additional skills and tools, especially given the suggesting. The new CSO bureau documents and new technologies available to us now. For the most shares input and lessons from work being done part, though, if we decide to address a given crisis throughout the Department on conflict and this situation, we already have an array of methodol- work is already sharpening the way we engage, for ogies we can choose from to carry out our work. example through interagency exercises that help These include engaging religious actors to encour- test our capacities. age them to be proactive in preventing conflict, working with local organizations to strengthen Wouldn’t there be some value to creating community relationships, and many others. For such a learning and dissemination capacity example, we’re working to expand government within the “J family” of bureaus all dedicated to capacity in Honduras, where investigation of civilian security? crimes, identification of suspects, and carrying through with prosecutions are weak, resulting in Otero: Yes indeed, that’s in the works but a big gap in civilian security. To help close this gap, that’s all I’m going to tell you. You’re hitting J bureaus and offices are drawing on the skills of on something we believe is very important and experienced law enforcement officials from places we are developing something that will help us like Philadelphia and Houston to mentor local achieve this. We have taken the important steps Honduran police. We are tapping into the expertise of consolidating these bureaus, of facilitating of local-level, Spanish-speaking officials to provide their ability to collaborate and we are developing the kind of agile response I mentioned earlier. a new way of interacting among them that is not Burma is another interesting case. In Burma, the fully mature, but it’s quite advanced. In Syria, “J family” of bureaus and offices is collaborating we have really collaborated very well; learning with our regional bureau to implement de-mining
PRISM 4, no. 2 interview | 155 Otero programs as a basis for encouraging local efforts at better provide local government, particularly in reconciliation and advancing peace. areas where the Assad regime now has only lim- ited influence. We will continue to carry out this Turning back to Syria, does the United kind of work, but our limited access to the coun- States have a responsibility to protect civilians try constrains our ability to expand the scope of in Syria from the brutality of the regime and the our efforts. conflict that’s going on, and if you believe we do have a responsibility to protect, how do we How does the State Department plan with exercise that responsibility? other agencies to prevent conflict? I’m always troubled by the “proving a negative” paradox. Otero: Syria poses a very challenging situ- ation because it’s hard to get resources into the Otero: You’re right, it often seems that no one country. One thing is clear, however – we have recognizes when a conflict has been prevented. made a concrete commitment to support Syrians’ I like to use the example of elections. The only aspirations for a free and democratic Syria that time you hear about elections is when people protects the rights, the dignity, and the aspirations have been killed, when riots and fires break out, of all Syrians and all communities. One way the “J when things are an absolute mess. Few, on the family” contributes to that is by providing non-le- other hand, hear about elections when they go thal aid to the opposition and training them to well. Take the last elections in Nigeria, for exam- use it through a variety of means. We’ve found ple. Not much has been said about them because that communication technologies are extremely they were credible, transparent, and recognized as helpful, especially as the opposition is working being far better than previous elections. It took to create a protective environment. Along with an enormous amount of work for all involved our humanitarian assistance to those affected by to achieve that, though, and it took conflict pre- the crisis provided through PRM – which reached vention work. It’s been very difficult to claim 72 million dollars over the past 15 months – we the recognition of that success, however, and to are also providing medical assistance to those acknowledge it publicly. As for us, the “J family” in need and are working to get that into areas – especially CSO – works on conflict prevention that are under the control of the opposition. In directly with the regional bureaus helping to iden- total, PRM and USAID, working together, have tify potential indicators of conflict and deciding put almost 210 million dollars towards human- which crisis situations we should address and itarian assistance for Syrian refugees. This is an what responses are most appropriate. excellent example of two U.S.government orga- nizations working together in a crisis situation. In In your opinion, is interagency planning for addition, we are providing robust support to the conflict stabilization and prevention, sufficient or opposition’s efforts to document and investigate do we need to improve interagency planning and atrocities so that, in the future, they can make if so, how? sound decisions concerning accountability and reconciliation. We are also conducting “Planning Otero: Part of the QDDR vision involves a and Civil Administration Training” with local strong focus on whole-of-government responses civilian leaders from inside Syria so that they can to challenges around the world and so this concept
156 | Interview PRISM 4, no. 2 Otero of interagency collaboration is a very important in Colombia, for example. We are also addressing one. Clearly, we have the interagency mecha- these issues in Central America and Mexico, where nisms in place to assess difficult situations and to we still need to do a lot more. A major part of our address them together. In some cases, though, we effort is enhancing the capacity of governments may need additional mechanisms to be able to and civil society in these countries to address provide the quality of coordination required. In these issues themselves. We do this by providing these cases, a lot of different government agencies resources and training. This is essential. may be involved. We tend to coordinate most One other piece that is essential – and this often with USAID, Defense, and, Justice. I think comes in to play more with trafficking in per- we’ve come a long way towards enhancing our sons, for example – is to demand from countries coordination. For example, I just came back from a more affirmative and resolved response. We visiting two Combatant Commands. I have met do that through our annual trafficking in per- with almost all of the Combatant Commands in sons report, our ranking of countries in tiers, and order to help them understand what we’re doing by providing assistance in developing national in the “J family,” and to understand where there plans of action to address trafficking. We’ve made are potential synergies so that we can develop a quite a bit a progress on that front. In fact, you robust relationship. In addition, I have a Colonel hear about the issue a lot more than you did two on my staff who maintains and enhances those years ago. Part of this is due to the enormous connections. With USAID, I hold a monthly meet- effort Secretary Clinton has personally made to ing with Deputy Administrator Donald Steinberg highlight the issue, including raising awareness to review the areas in which we’re collaborating, through the participation of high-profile figures where we’re working together well, and where we and celebrities. You know that when you run into are not working together as well. This allows us someone like Will Smith at an event on foreign to intentionally strengthen or shift our emphasis. affairs and trafficking that the Secretary’s efforts are having an effect. That said, we still have a great A lot of the world’s contemporary conflict deal of work to do on combating this scourge. is spurred by actions of transnational illicit The Secretary created the new Bureau of organizations and networks. Some people talk Counterterrorism (CT) recognizing that fighting about the convergence of transnational organized terrorism, especially in some parts of the world, crime, terrorism, insurgencies, etc. How can the is a primary objective of the U.S. government. diplomatic element of U.S. national power best CT is also part of the” J family.” A lot of our work be deployed against that particular national on counterterrorism involves helping countries security threat? develop their own capacity to combat terrorism, allocate their own resources toward it and col- Otero: That’s a tough one, especially when laborate with each other more effectively. We you start combining transnational criminal orga- have created the Global Counterterrorism Forum nizations with terrorism. We need to recognize (GCTF), which brings more than 30 countries the enormous importance of being able to apply together, precisely to do this. And we’ve created, resources to address this challenge. When it comes or are in the process of creating, several other to countering narco-trafficking, we have a strong robust institutions to help certain countries fight record and we’ve already achieved some success terrorism on their soil.
PRISM 4, no. 2 interview | 157 Otero
One of the regions of the world most QDDDR (Quadrennial Diplomacy, Defense, and troubled by the challenges you just described is Development Review) in the future? Latin America. In January the President released, “Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership; Priorities for Otero: It’s conceivable that such collabora- 21 st Century Defense,” which describes a pivot, tion might be possible, but it would have to stem a geographical pivot towards Asia, and the Far from the QDR and QDDR. It is imperative to be East. Do you detect anything similar taking place able to ensure collaboration across the govern- within the State Department? ment with a larger number of agencies/depart- ments, and that is clearly the objective of the Otero: Absolutely. Secretary Clinton gave a National Security Council. These components of major speech late last fall – “America’s Pacific government, though, are complex and any effort Century” speech–on the importance of our pres- to bring them closer together would be challeng- ence and interaction with the countries of the ing. For its part, the QDDR provides a vision of Pacific, published an article in Foreign Policy and the U.S. government, with its many agencies, subsequently discussed it with key interlocutors operating as a unit around the world. The pres- in many countries she visited thereafter. I specify ence of our government in other countries is con- the Pacific because it’s not just Asia. You have centrated in our embassies, which function under many countries that border the Pacific as does the the President’s representatives – i.e., the Chiefs of U.S. So it includes Peru, Chile, and other coun- Mission, our Ambassadors. Our Ambassadors are tries that make it a broader effort. Clearly, these responsible for carrying out all of our combined countries are of enormous importance in the initiatives in countries around the world, and are work that we’re doing, and harnessing the growth the sole representative of the President in a given and dynamism in the Asia-Pacific region stands country. It is the Ambassador’s responsibility to central to U.S. economic and strategic interests. ensure that all the pieces of the U.S. government Indeed, our strategic “rebalance” reflects a desire operating in a given country are collaborating to strengthen long-standing security, economic, and coordinating under her oversight. This is and people-to-people ties. That said, the pivot to something that Secretary Clinton has made very Asia will not come at the expense of U.S. national clear, something that the President also has made security interests in other regions. Other regions very clear. But it increasingly is an enormous task. remain vitally important, and we will continue In big embassies, there are sometimes 30 differ- to coordinate closely with like-minded countries ent agencies in a country that are all reporting to and institutions from all regions to welcome an the Ambassador. Therefore, the effort you’re sug- Asia capable of upholding a rules-based inter- gesting, of whole-of-government, is something national order and helping to solve global chal- that has to happen at the embassy level first and lenges that impact U.S. national interests. foremost.
You’ve mentioned “whole-of-government approaches” several times. Others refer to this as the comprehensive approach and the Secretary called it the 3D approach (Diplomacy, Defense, Development). Is there any prospect for a
158 | Interview PRISM 4, no. 2 decisions and the motivations that drive the peo- Book Reviews ples of the region. Much Western commentary on Central Asia is framed by our own political and societal experience: specifically the historic movement from a faith-based social order to a In the Whirlwind of Jihad secular one and from monarchies to democra- cies. Much writing on political life in Central Asia By Martha Brill Olcott focuses on the region’s struggle toward an open Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and democratic society and seeks to explain the 2012 300 pp., $19.95 absence of progress. ISBN-13: 978-0870032592 The significant issue of the emergence of Islam in Central Asia is at times presented as an adjunct to this question. The growing influence REVIEWED BY JOHN HERBST of Islam in especially Uzbekistan and Tajikistan is often presented as a consequence of the harsh authoritarian rule in Tashkent and its weaker vari- nderstanding the underlying dynamics ant in Dushanbe. By this interpretation, the crack- of political and social life is not easy in down on the secular opposition in Uzbekistan is Uany society and particularly in author- the decisive reason – or at least the one we harp itarian ones. The challenge is even greater when on – for the growth of political Islam, because the the society in question is remote and has been mosque provides the most effective channel for isolated for decades as Central Asia was under dissent. The fact that this analysis is also applied Soviet rule. Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, in the Arab world gives reason to pause and ask Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan emerged as reluc- if this analysis is more about a paradigm in the tant independent states in 1991 when the Soviet mind of the analyst than the reality of the diverse Union dissolved. regions being studied. We knew very little about these countries For this reason, any study that moves at that time. Our knowledge of Central Asia has beyond our own paradigm in examining Central certainly increased since. This is evident in the Asian society is valuable; and any study that gets large number of books and articles authored each a handle on the internal dynamics of the region year on the region; and also in the multiplication is critical. Martha Brill Olcott’s In the Whirlwind of Central Asian centers at universities across the of Jihad, a study of Islam in Uzbekistan, is the rare Western world. Despite this, we still have only a book that does that. In a career that began in the rough idea of the factors that produce political late 1970’s, Olcott has established herself as the dean of American scholars on Central Asia. In the Whirlwind of Jihad takes the reader on John E. Herbst is the Director of the Center a tour of the development of Islam in Central for Complex Operations at National Defense Asia and especially Uzbekistan. She starts with University. Previously at the Department of State, he served as the Coordinator the Islamic conquest of Central Asia early in the for Reconstruction and Stabilization, 8th century in order to underscore the point that as U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine, U.S. Central Asia has been a critical part of the Islamic and Ambassador to Uzbekistan.
PRISM 4, no. 2 book reviews | 159 Herbst
world and a center of Islamic learning from of the Academy of Sciences, preached in a local nearly the beginning. Many luminaries of Islamic mosque and gave illegal religious instruction in thought hailed from Central Asia including had- hujra’s (classes) outside of the mosque. Through ith scholar Imam Bukhari, and the philosophers these hujra’s he became a major influence on Al Farabi and Avicenna. Olcott notes that the the imams prominent in Uzbekistan at inde- relatively liberal Hanafi school of jurisprudence pendence. Interestingly, the Soviet period wit- has predominated in Central Asia and Sufism has nessed the introduction of salafi influences in the exerted a profound influence. In short, a tolerant region with the settling in Tashkent of Shami Al version of Islam took root in the region. Of par- Tarabulsi in 1919, a religious thinker educated ticular relevance to our subject, the Hanafi school at Al Azhar in Cairo and who had spent much accepted the idea that Muslims could be ruled of his life in Xianjiang. Under his tutelage, the by non-believers or infidels so long as Muslims groups Ahl-i-Hadith and Ahl-i-Quran emerged, could maintain their faith unhindered and had opposed to Hanfai teachings and Sufi practices access to sharia (Islamic law). and calling for a return to Islam based on hadith This line of thinking made it easier for the and the Quran. Muslims of Central Asia to accept Russian rule Not all of Hindustani’s students remained in the 19th century, as it left the Islamic commu- members of the Hanafi school. Influenced by nity free to practice its faith. The establishment Salafi thinkers Sayid Abul Ala Maududi and Sayid of Soviet rule in the 20th century was a different Qutb, Rahmatulla-alloma and Abduvali Qori matter because of its suppression of traditional preached that certain Central Asian religious religion. Indeed the Soviet period exerted a crit- practices – venerating “saints,” reciting certain ical influence on the Islam that has emerged in verses from the Quran at funerals, or paying for post-Soviet Uzbekistan. The repression of religious recitation of the Quran – were “un-Islamic.” In practice had several important consequences: it addition, they pushed for a return to the hijab drove practicing Muslims underground and a (head covering for Muslim women). It is worth small but influential community of Uzbeks out of noting that these developments took place before the country, some of whom settled in Saudi Arabia the Soviet Union fell. and prospered; it isolated Muslims in Central The importance of these developments was Asia from the wider Islamic world; it secularized evident when the Central Asian states became Central Asian society at least in the major cities. independent. Abduvali Qori’s influence was Olcott ‘s work is particularly strong describ- strongest in the Ferghana cities of Andijan and ing the development of Islamic thought during Namangan, where his followers took over local the Soviet and Independence periods. While mosques. In Namangan, Islamic militias appeared anti-religious Soviet policy drove much reli- – Islom Adolat and Islom lashkarlari – who gious life underground, Islam did not disappear. openly challenged secular authorities by seeking Islamic preachers remained active, at least after to establish a Sharia-based society. As part of this Stalin’s death. The Hanafi school maintained effort, they forced merchants to stop selling alco- its leading position in the region in part thanks hol and to close their shops during the Islamic to the work of Muhammadjon Hindustani, call to prayer. By 1990, Tohir Yuldoshev and Juma who, after his release from jail following Stalin’s Namangani – the future leaders of the Islamic death, worked at Dushanbe’s Oriental Institute Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)– had emerged
160 | book reviews PRISM 4, no. 2 Herbst as key players in Islom Adolat. In short, an ener- on radical Islam. Government sweeps against getic and radical Islam appeared in Central Asia at Islamists were not limited to the IMU. They were independence because of developments in Islamic directed also against Hizb It Tahrir – a radical thought in the region – partly reflecting imports group that, while eschewing violence at this stage from elsewhere in the Islamic world. of historical development, wants to re-establish Olcott also pays significant attention to the a caliphate to rule the Islamic world – and other policies toward Islam of the Uzbek President groups that pursued Salafi goals. Islom Karimov. She notes Karimov’s recognition Olcott demonstrates that despite the strong- that, as a major element of Uzbek culture and arm tactics of the Uzbek government, there tradition, Islam would play an important role in remains a “marketplace of ideas “ in Uzbekistan post-Soviet Uzbekistan, and how he agreed to the where traditional Hanafi beliefs compete with opening of many mosques. She provides a good their Salafi rivals, and the government must account of Karimov’s reaction to the challenge of adjust its policies to the realities of an evolving radical Islam in the Ferghana Valley and a descrip- situation. This is evident in the government’s tion of his famous meeting with Yuldoshev and treatment of Uzbekistan’s most prominent cleric, other Islamic leaders in Namangan in December, Muhammad Sodiq Muhammad Yusef, who 1991. These developments heightened his already headed the Muslim Spiritual Admininstration of well developed sense that Islam must play a major Uzbekistan at the time of independence. Karimov role in independent Uzbekistan, but also that it removed Muhammad Sodiq in 1993 for not con- must be contained. Individual preachers or activ- taining Islamic radicals and he went into exile. ists could not be permitted in the name of Islam Yet Muhammad Sodiq returned from exile in to challenge the authority of the state. To deal with 2000 because the Karimov government thought this challenge, Karimov launched a crackdown that his presence might be useful in containing on Islom Adolat and the mosques advocating the the growth of radical Islam. establishment of a shariah-based society. Olcott’s discussion of controversial devel- Karimov’s policy toward Islam was also influ- opments is fact-based and nuanced. In treat- enced by the outbreak of civil war in neighboring ing the violence in Andijon in 2005 concern- Tajjikistan with the prominent role of the Islamic ing the Akromiyya movement, she notes that Renaissance Party in the opposition. Following Uzbek authorities believed that the attack on the Karimov’s repression of radical Islam in the armory and the prison break proved their point Ferghana Valley, Namangani and other Uzbek that radical Islamic thought promotes terrorism. Islamists went to Tajikistan to fight with the oppo- Even while Uzbek officials may have privately sition. With the ceasefire in Tajikistan, Yuldoshev, agreed that their harsh response -- the indiscrim- Namangani and their followers were ready to inate shooting of protestors -- went too far, they return home, newly organized in the IMU, dedi- could not understand why the United States cated to the overthrow of the Karimov government and other Western powers condemned only the and the establishment of a shariah-based society. Uzbek response and not the initial violence of This set the stage for a decade of IMU- the protestors. organized or inspired terrorist attacks – starting Olcott has produced a serious work on a with the February, 1999 assassination attempt major topic that is all too often simplified in pub- on Karimov – and government crackdowns lic discussion of Uzbekistan.
PRISM 4, no. 2 book reviews | 161 Herbst
Great Game, Local Rules and the New by the U.S. to establish bases in Central Asia Great Power Context in Central Asia because it also is interested in containing, if not defeating the Taliban in Afghanistan. By Alexander Cooley Cooley’s second point is a corollary to the Oxford University Press, USA, 2012 first. Even as competition among the three in 272 pp., $29.95 ISBN-13: 978-0199929825 Central Asia has intensified in the past decade, it has not become a zero sum game. Given the dif- fering objectives of the parties, the great powers REVIEWED BY JOHN HERBST have not seen a need to try to expel one another from the region. Cooley’s third point is one that international n Great Game, Local Rules the New Great Power relations scholars long ago spotted in relations Contest in Central Asia, Alexander Cooley between great and small states. With the three Idevelops an excellent analytical framework powers vying for influence in Central Asia, the for looking at the activities of China, Russia and local states can pick and choose among them, the United States in Central Asia. Cooley offers accepting what meets their needs, rejecting what three broad arguments. First, he observes that the they do not want. This means increased leverage three big powers have pursued different goals in for the locals. Central Asia, which has meant that their interests Politics of the American bases in Uzbekistan do not necessarily conflict. China’s main objec- and Kyrgyzstan provide good examples of local tive has been to stabilize Xinjiang by ensuring leverage. President Karimov was delighted to pro- cooperative relationships on Xinjiang’s border. vide the U.S. a base at Karshi Khanabad in 2001 This prompted Beijing to resolve border disputes to help conduct its operations in Afghanistan. with Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Kazakhstan on But tensions in the bilateral relationship over favorable terms for its Central Asian neighbors. such issues as human rights and internal reform The U.S. has sought to stabilize Afghanistan by came to a head in 2005, following Washington’s establishing supply and base arrangements in criticism of Uzbekistan’s crackdown in Andijon Central Asia. Despite the ups and downs with and the “Colored Revolution” in Kyrgyzstan Tashkent which led to the closing of the U.S. which overthrew President Akayev. Turning to base at Karshi Khanabad in 2005, Washington the Russians at that time, Karimov kicked the has largely achieved its objectives in the region. United States out of Karshi Khanabad. Yet a few Russia has sought to remain the major power or years later, loathe to get too close to the Russians, hegemon in the region. Despite this ambitious Karimov was ready to partner with the United goal, Moscow has been willing to accept efforts States in delivering supplies to Afghanistan through the Northern Distribution Network. Cooley also provides a thorough account John E. Herbst is the Director of the Center of Russian, Kyrgyz and American maneuverings for Complex Operations at National Defense surrounding the 2009 renewal of the agree- University. Previously at the Department of State, he served as the Coordinator ment for the U.S. to use Manas airbase to sup- for Reconstruction and Stabilization, ply Afghanistan. In brief, Moscow offered then as U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine, U.S. Kyrgyz President Bakiyev various economic and Ambassador to Uzbekistan.
162 | book reviews PRISM 4, no. 2 Herbst
incentives to close Manas to American use. course, Rudyard Kipling. It also had an interesting Bakiyev used this offer to negotiate more gener- story to tell and an exotic locale. But the great ous terms for using Manas. Considering them- game of nations was played elsewhere in the 19th selves betrayed, Russia used its media presence in century. What was true in the 19th century is no Kyrgyzstan to weaken Bakiyev, who was driven less true today. Central Asia is a fascinating region from power in yet another “Colored Revolution” where major powers have legitimate interests. In in 2010. pursuit of those interests they interact and even An important theme that emerges from find points of friction. But Central Asia is the not Cooley’s analysis is the rise of China in Central the primary place of their interaction. The current Asia. He points out that by 2008 China had debate in Washington is whether it was prema- surpassed Russia as Central Asia’s leading eco- ture for the Obama Administration to move its nomic partner. China may have initially turned strategic focus from the Middle East (and Europe) to Central Asia in order to help pacify Xinjiang, to East Asia. The issues that dominate the inter- but its economic dynamism and focus on long national agenda today are not in Central Asia. term interests are making it the major outside This is not to say that Central Asia was never the player in the region. Of particular importance central arena in international affairs. From the is China’s investment in oil and gas pipelines 6th century establishment of the Turkic Khanates, from Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan through the establishment by Ghengis Khan of to China. In addition to helping China secure a Pax Mongolica to the emergence of Tamerlane hydrocarbons for its growing economy, these in the 1th century, Central Asia was often the investments have been decisive in breaking greatest game. Russia’s near monopoly control over the mar- keting of Central Asian energy. I have one bone to pick with the author or, more likely, the publisher of this excellent book. That is, the title, or more precisely the use of the phrase the “great game.” In point of fact, the original “great game” – the shadow war between Britain and Russia in the 19th century -- was not so great. It was a geopolitical backwater, as the major arena of international diplomacy was in Europe and then, with the emergence of Japan in the late 19th century, also the Far East. When Russia and Great Britain faced a major geopolit- ical challenge – the rise of Germany – they rec- onciled their “great game” differences with the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907. Living in an age of public relations, we can understand how the Great Game came by its reputation. It had excellent publicists – British military officers who knew how to write and, of
PRISM 4, no. 2 book reviews | 163 Available now from the Center for Complex Operations (CCO) at National Defense University. Email request to [email protected], with the subject; convergence. Limited Quantities.
“Throughout my years in government combating illicit networks of all kinds, including terrorist groups, groups that traffic in women and weapons of mass destruction precursors, organized cyber-criminal cartels, and narcotics syndicates, I was struck by how often different networks overlapped, a phenomenon that has only increased with time. The converged threats that pose the greatest danger to national security today require integrated responses that bring together disparate elements of government both domestically and internationally. Convergence provides research-driven insight and concrete and practical recommendations for how governments can best confront these emerging threats.”
—Richard A. Clarke Chairman, Good Harbor Security Risk Management Former U.S. National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection, and Counterterrorism
“There are regrettably few studies that take a holistic look at the overlapping scourge of illicit networks. There are even fewer that examine the national security threats they represent. Convergence is an excellent contribution aimed at filling these twin gaps. Miklaucic and Brewer have brought together an insightful, engaging collection of articles written by those on the frontlines of cutting- edge research. They are to be applauded for avoiding the typical siloed approach to targeting the challenge and making concrete recommendations for how the international community, led by the United States, should fight back.”
—Scott Carpenter Deputy Director, Google Ideas Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
“In one eye-popping example after another, Convergence shows how shadowy, illicit networks have exploited globalization to commandeer the world economy and subvert state sovereignty around the globe. By adapting the latest information technology, infiltrating global supply chains and banking systems, and exploiting the world’s conflict zones, transnational criminal groups have become the first-tier threat to international order and U.S. national security. Combating this scourge, the authors of this invaluable volume suggest, will require creating a parallel ‘licit’ network of national authorities and multilateral institutions that can map illicit trafficking networks and crack down on the facilitators, money launderers, and logistical hubs on which they rely.”
—Stewart Patrick Senior Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations CENTER FOR COMPLEX OPERATIONS (CCO) CCO WAS ESTABLISHED TO:
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