Formations of Secularity in Ancient Japan? on Cultural Encounters, Critical Junctures, and Path-Dependent Processes

Journal of Religion in Japan 8 (2019) 9–45

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Formations of Secularity in Ancient Japan? On Cultural Encounters, Critical Junctures, and Path-Dependent Processes

Christoph Kleine Leipzig University, Germany [email protected]

Abstract

Starting from the premise that the diversity of forms for distinguishing between ‘the religious’ and ‘the secular’ (i.e., multiple secularities) in global modernity is the result of different cultural preconditions in the appropriation of Western normative concepts of secularism, I would like to offer a modest contribution to the understanding of the corresponding cultural preconditions in Japan. I will try to show that the specific—and at first glance, relatively unproblematic—appropriation of secularity as a regulatory principle in modern Japan is to some extent path dependent on relatively stable and durable epistemic and social structures that have emerged in the course of ‘critical junctures’ in history. In this context, I would like to put up for discussion my hypothesis that some decisions taken in the period between the sixth and eighth centuries CE regarding the organisation of the relationship between ‘the religious’ and ‘the secular’ generated path dependencies that were effective well into the nineteenth century.

Keywords ancient Japan – secularity – critical junctures – path-dependencies – cultural encounter – epistemic and social structures

1 Introduction—Basic Research Question(s)

In the light of the question raised in the general introduction about the different forms of secularity in global modernity and the cultural-historical causes for these differences, we first have to determine what might be specific to the Japanese form of secularity. At first glance, Japan appears to be a laicist model

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2019 | doi:10.1163/22118349-00801004Downloaded from Brill.com09/27/2021 05:59:14AM via free access 10 kleine state in which state and religion are more strictly separated1 than hardly any- where else in the world. The immediate cause for the strong secularist colouring of the constitution is, of course, the American occupiers’ intention after the Pacific War (Hook and McCormack 2005 [2001]) to abolish State Shintō as the ideological foundation of Japanese nationalism, imperialism and mili- tarism. Therefore, when we ask about the specifics of Japanese secularity, we must look back to the pre-war period, when the Japanese created their own constitutional order. Although critically eyed by Western powers, the Japanese still had considerable leeway to organise the relationship between the religious and the secular. It is indeed obvious that there is a tension, still not entirely resolved today, between the secularity codified in the post-war constitution and the arrangement between the religious and the non-religious originally conceived in the Meiji period. This becomes particularly apparent in the constitutional debates of recent years, which show that the boundaries between ‘the religious’ and ‘the secular’ are actually highly contested in modern Japan. I am referring here mainly to attempts by the ruling party LDP to amend Articles 20 and 89 of the Constitution to the effect that Article 20, in which “the State, local governments, and other public corporations shall refrain from education in particular religions and other religious activities,” would be qualified to except for those which “do not exceed the sphere of social festivities and folkloric activities (shakai-teki girei mata wa shūzoku-teki kōi no han’i o koenai 社会的儀礼又は習俗的行為の範囲を超えない)” (Jiminjutō Kenpō Kaisei Sui- jin Honbu 2013: 48).2 Likewise, Article 89, in which “no public money or other property shall be expended or appropriated for the use, benefit or maintenance of any religious institution or association, or for any charitable, educational or benevolent enterprises not under the control of public authority,” would be altered to permit funding when “the religious content does not exceed the level of custom or social etiquette” (Jones, July 02, 2013). Whatever the political objective behind these revisionist attempts to amend the constitution, they clearly show that the boundaries between culture, tradition and customs on the one hand and religion on the other are highly controversial (or can at least be used to mobilise revisionist sentiments). The corresponding controversies reflect, even deliberately revive, a dilemma that already occupied the Meiji reformers who wanted to create Shintō as a form of unifying tennō-centric state ideology and cult, while at the same time meeting West-

1 Note that I use the term ‘separation’ as a specific form of structural differentiation on the meso-sociological level, one which implies legal and organisational regulations aiming at the disentanglement of two structural units. 2 For a detailed analysis in English, see Jones (2 July 2013).

Journal of ReligionDownloaded in Japan from Brill.com09/27/2021 8 (2019) 9–45 05:59:14AM via free access formations of secularity in ancient japan? 11 ern demands for religious freedom—a precondition for being accepted as a modern ‘civilized’ nation-state qualified to enter into contracts with Western nations. The solution of defining the combination of Imperial Shintō (kōshitsu shintō 皇室神道) and Shrine Shintō ( jinja shintō 神社神道) as ‘non-religious’ (hi-shūkyō 非宗教)3 appeared to be a transparent political manoeuvre, but from a historical point of view, it was not entirely groundless. The Western concept of ‘religion,’ adopted with the implementation of the old Buddhist term shūkyō 宗教 as its translation (Krämer 2013, 2015; Josephson 2012; Isomae 2012; Shimazono and Tsuruoka 2004) was indeed hardly applicable to State Shintō. In contrast, it has never been particularly difficult to categorise as shūkyō the strongly institutionalised religions of the ‘voluntaristic’4 and ‘communitarian’5 type that, according to David Martin, are the product of the “Axial revolution of between two and three millennia ago,” which brought about the “ability to choose (or reject) religious affiliation” and is thus “associated … with the cre- ation of voluntary communities apart from the state and territory” (Martin 2014: 81). Buddhism, no doubt, is a religion that can be “separated from state or from territory or from ethnicity, or from all three” (Martin 2014: 81–82), and (in theory) it requires personal confession, just like Christianity. The same is true with new religious communities, for which the term Sect Shintō (kyōha shintō 教派神道) was officially introduced in 1882 (Hardacre 2018: 100). To subsume these socio-cultural formations under the category of shūkyō and to distin- guish them from ‘secular’ institutions by granting them a special legal status was rather unproblematic—in contrast to the bricolage of various cultural elements then defined as Shrine Shintō. In a few earlier essays (Kleine 2012a, 2012b, 2013a, 2013b, 2013c) I have tried to show that the medieval paradigm of “the interdependence of the nomosphere of the ruler and the nomosphere of the Buddha” (ōbō buppō sō’i 王法佛法相依), propagated by Buddhist thinkers as a warrant of social order, established a discourse of distinction and a practice of differentiation, which may—for

3 For a discussion of this matter, see Imaizumi (1926). 4 This is not to say, of course, that Buddhism entered Japan as a full-fledged voluntaristic religion. In the early days, it rather functioned as yet another technique of statecraft, which implied the application of ‘magical’ means. Nevertheless, Buddhism provided new options and choices for an ever-growing number of people and gradually turned into the voluntaristic religion it was ‘designed’ as, even though non-voluntaristic aspects were retained—as in all voluntaristic religions. 5 Note that Martin uses the term ‘communitarian’ slightly differently from Fogarty (1993) and others, as he contrasts it with ‘voluntarism,’ the latter being represented prototypically by Protestantism (Martin 2014: 96). I would argue that some religions are characterised by a form of ‘voluntary communitarianism.’

Journal of Religion in Japan 8 (2019) 9–45 Downloaded from Brill.com09/27/2021 05:59:14AM via free access 12 kleine some contestable heuristic reasons—be described as a form of premodern secularity, i.e. secularity avant la lettre. The semantics of a binary distinction and the corresponding socio-structural differentiation between ‘political’ and ‘religious’ institutions, I have argued, may have paved the way for a relatively smooth process of appropriating and implementing modern Western concepts of secularism after 1868, because the idea that Buddhist institutions represent independent social entities that are not allowed to intervene in state affairs but are to be controlled by the state, was already firmly established in the Edo period. Inasmuch as the policy of the Tokugawa regime—representing the bu 武 element of domination (whereas the emperor represented the bun 文 aspect) and leaning towards Neo-Confucianism rather than Buddhism— aimed at a complete subordination of Buddhist organisations under a ‘secular state’,6 one might even speak of a form of indigenous early modern secularism (cf. Teeuwen 2013).7 Furthermore, the early Meiji elite, with their Confucian background, had “a humanist, mostly atheist, this-worldly mindset” (Hardacre 2018: 90) and were thus well prepared for establishing a secular state. Focussing on a medieval Buddhist perspective, however, I paid scant attention to the above-mentioned controversial issues concerning the arrangement of secularity in the Meiji period and beyond. In this paper I would like to tentatively address these issues by identifying and analysing the preconditions for the specific way in which the Japanese appropriated Western normative concepts of secularism8 and thereby created

6 How ‘secular’ the Tokugawa state actually was depends on our concept and criteria, of course. What I want to emphasise here is that, by and large, state institutions were clearly separated from Buddhist institutions, which constituted administrative units in their own right, albeit under strict control by the state institutions.Things become even more complicated when we include Confucianism in the picture. Paramore (2017: 28) argues that although Buddhism was placed under strict state control, indigenised Neo-Confucianism, as a functional equivalent to Buddhism, was relatively free to unfold. “In short, through the early modern period, Japan increasingly evolved into a stable regime where Neo-Confucianism functioned as the religious element in an increasingly institutionalized stable interrelation between the religious and the political” (Paramore 2017: 33). Therefore, in his view, it would be inappropriate to claim that the Tokugawa regime suppressed religion in general. As is so often the case where Confucianism is concerned, differences in the interpretation of the historical situation arise mainly from different answers to the question of whether or not [Neo-]Confucianism should be classified as a religion. 7 In the meantime, a whole special issue on “Formations of the Secular in Japan” (Rots and Teeuwen 2017a) has been published in which various authors “trace the various genealogies of the secular in modern Japan” (Rots and Teeuwen 2017b: 8). For “a longue durée overview of Japanese history as a case study,” refer in particular to Kiri Paramore’s (2017) contribution. 8 Note that Western concepts of secularism—especially the US-American version—while aiming at a disentanglement of religion and politics, are not necessarily anti-religious. In the case

Journal of ReligionDownloaded in Japan from Brill.com09/27/2021 8 (2019) 9–45 05:59:14AM via free access formations of secularity in ancient japan? 13 their specific form of secularity in a broader perspective, taking into account the other traditions of Japan that resist a clear assignment to one side of the binary form, ‘secularity.’ In other words, I am trying to reconstruct a more comprehensive genealogy of conceptual resources available to the relevant actors who transformed Japan into a modern nation-state—being fully aware of the principle impossibility of accomplishing this with even approximate sufficiency in an article like this. Rather than provide a concise but suffi- cient historical explanation, I would like to put up a rather bold hypothesis for discussion and suggest some theoretical and methodological approaches that might be appropriate for the verification or falsification of my hypothesis.

2 Hypothesis

The hypothesis hopefully to be tested by more thorough future studies can be summarised as follows: The relative ease with which the Japanese in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries appropriated modern Western normative notions of secularism as instruments of governance, first and fore- most the idea that religious institutions should be separated from state institutions, results from a long sequence of path-dependent processes originating from contingent historical events and corresponding decisions taken at a number of critical junctures in history. This is, admittedly, a rather general and unspecific hypothesis. In my opinion, however, this hypothesis is significant inasmuch as it runs counter to the diffusionist implications of both classical modernisation theories and many postcolonial approaches. What is implied in my hypothesis is that the Japanese could easily resort to indigenous epistemic and social-structural resources in order to take up the challenges of Western regimes of knowledge and governance, hegemonic and ‘viral’ in the late nineteenth century. On the basis of given social and epistemic structures, Japanese reformers were ready to appropriate concepts of secularity creatively, on their own terms and driven by their own interests—to a certain extent, at least.

of Japan, secularism as a principle of governance was imposed on Japan, for instance, in order to create a free space for Christianity to develop.

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3 Theoretical Framework—Critical Junctures and Path-Dependent Processes

The problem of the formation of multiple secularities is one of historical development. Historical development takes place in alternating phases of gradual change and accelerated transformation.9 It is an interplay of continuities and breaks. But even radical changes, which take place in a relatively short time at critical junctures and are often perceived by contemporaries and histori- ans as radical breaks, do not happen completely independently of previous structures. They are thus subject to certain path dependencies—or rather path- probabilities to avoid deterministic undertones. Accordingly, I propose to apply the two interrelated theoretical concepts of critical junctures and path-dependencies. For lack of space, I cannot give a full-fledged introduction to these concepts, but I should at least mention a few crucial points. Originally established by economists, the concept of path-dependency has been further developed by sociologists and political scientists. The latter were primarily interested in institutional history but have concluded that the concept can be fruitfully applied to macro-historical analyses in general. It was the sociologist James Mahoney who emphasised the connection between critical junctures and path-dependent processes, elucidating that “once a particular option is selected [at a critical juncture], it becomes progressively more difficult to return to the initial point when multiple alternatives were still available” (Mahoney 2000: 513). In my paper I mainly refer to Capoccia and Kelemen who define critical junctures “in the context of the study of path-dependent phenomena … as relatively short periods of time during which there is a substantially heightened probability that agents’ choices will affect the outcome of interest”—in our case some form of ‘secularity.’ By ‘relatively short periods of time,’ they “mean that the duration of the juncture must be brief relative to the duration of the path-dependent process it instigates (which leads eventually to the outcome of interest).” Substantially heightened probability means “that

9 Note that Kiri Paramore (2017: 23) refers to “secularism as a recurring pattern that arises during processes of social upheaval” instead. This perspective has the obvious advantage of avoiding a linear view of historical development prone to the teleological evolutionism that haunts the interrelated master narratives of modernisation and secularisation. On the other hand, the approach entails the risk of overlooking continuities and path dependencies, which Paramore cannot be accused of as he speaks of “longue durée cycle[s]” (Paramore 2017: 24). In my opinion, both perspectives are compatible but emphasise different aspects. I would simply stress that these longue durée cycles are not isolated from each other.

Journal of ReligionDownloaded in Japan from Brill.com09/27/2021 8 (2019) 9–45 05:59:14AM via free access formations of secularity in ancient japan? 15 the probability that agents’ choices will affect the outcome of interest must be high relative to that probability before and after the juncture” (Capoccia and Kelemen 2007: 348). In short, “the minimum common denominator” of the slightly varying concepts of critical junctures “is the focus on what can be called ‘distal historical causation’: events and developments in the distant past, generally concen- trated in a relatively short period, that have a crucial impact on outcomes later in time” (Capoccia 2016: 89). Or as Decoteau puts it, stressing the contingency of the outcome of critical conjunctures: “Conjunctures describe the coming together of already existing structural (and cultural) entities at a particular moment in time, the outcome of which is unpredictable” (Decoteau 2018: 92). Choices made by relevant actors at critical junctures, usually “moments of relative structural indeterminism” (Mahoney 2010: 7) often perceived as crises, according to Lipset and Rokkan (1967) “give rise to path-dependent processes” (Capoccia 2016: 90). Critical junctures are caused by contingent factors, be they exogenous or endogenous to “the unit of analysis with respect to which the ‘juncture’ is argued to be ‘critical’” (Capoccia 2016: 91). Likewise, the outcome is contingent in that other “choices were historically available10 and not simply hypothetically possible” (Capoccia 2016: 92). While agency, choice and contingency play an important role in the analysis of critical junctures, “the importance of antecedent structural conditions— impersonal factors such as the socio-economic conditions, class and social alliances, diffuse cultural orientations, and the like—in generating the institutional outcome of interest” (Capoccia 2016: 93) must not be ignored. This means that social and epistemic structures—i.e., “recursively organized sets of rules and resources, … marked by an ‘absence of the subject’” (Giddens 1986: 25)—create path dependencies that limit the range of options for decision- making and action on the part of the relevant actors. This does not imply that their decisions are predetermined by path-dependencies. It only means that, in accordance with given structures, some options are more likely to be chosen than others while some are not available at all. Of course, it is important not to lose sight of the contingency of historical events that force decisions and actions at critical junctures to avoid any monocausal or even teleological determinism. Nevertheless, with regard to the diversity of the developmental paths to ‘secularity,’ it seems analytically helpful to elicit path-dependencies conditioned by epistemic and social structures that exist both inside and outside of

10 Evidently, for those among us who deal with ancient contexts, it is often hard or even impossible to determine the choices that were historically available. As a rule, early sources do not reflect negotiations as such but only their outcomes.

Journal of Religion in Japan 8 (2019) 9–45 Downloaded from Brill.com09/27/2021 05:59:14AM via free access 16 kleine the actors and are both rules and resources, which are culturally inherited and some of which “constrain while others enable agents’ movement and creativ- ity” (Decoteau 2018: 91). For a macro-historical analysis of critical junctures and path-dependent processes, the first challenge is to identify critical junctures. Some authors have argued “that a critical juncture framework is most appropriate for analysing sit- uations in which a ‘common exogenous shock’ affects a set of cases (typically countries), causing them to ‘diverge’ as a consequence of the combination of their pre-existing structural configurations and the common shock” (Capoccia 2016: 93).11 To be sure, critical junctures can also result from purely endogenous factors such as tensions caused by a gradually decreasing compatibility between epistemic and social structures, which usually change at different speeds— W. Ogburn (1923) refers to these phenomena as “cultural lags.” In many cases, however, critical junctures are triggered by intensive cultural encounters that challenge both sides with regard to their self-conception. As the sociologist Friedrich Tenbruck pointed out, cultural encounter is the true playground and the great driving force of all history (Tenbruck 1992: 23). In non-Western societies, such exogenous shocks were often triggered by encounters with colonial powers. In the case of Japan, the arrival of Com- modore Perry (1794–1858)12 and his “black ships” in 1852, in fulfilment of his mission to force the opening of Japanese ports to American trade, can be defined as a typical example.With respect to multiple secularities, the enforced termination of the policy of national isolation (sakoku 鎖國) and the subsequent collapse of the Tokugawa shogunate was the crucial common shock that caused a critical juncture in which relevant actors had to make far-reaching decisions, not least with regard to the problem of how to regulate the relationship between state institutions and institutions now classified as ‘religious.’13

11 In my view, it is imperative to realise, however, that a critical juncture does not have to be a crisis but can also be simply a situation in which new opportunities arise and the number of available options increases. 12 For further information see Heine (1855); Reynolds (1969); B. Taylor and Severyn (1853). 13 Note, however, that it took some time before the designation shūkyō became the standard. The more common term shūshi was still in use well into the twentieth century, and other terms such as shinkyō, kyōdan, kyōha, and shūha, referring to concrete social formations rather than abstract social systems or fields, were also used. Regardless of the usage of specific terms, in my view, it is quite evident that the Japanese already had a concept quite similar to the Western ‘religion’ way before the Meiji period. For alternative interpreta- tions, see Josephson (2012); Krämer (2010); Horii (2016).

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However, the enforced opening of Japan in the nineteenth century was by no means the only or first critical juncture triggered by cultural encounters, as we will see below. As indicated before, in accordance with the theoretical framework of critical junctures, I assume that the related path-dependent processes set in motion at this critical point in history were forged by a combination of antecedent conditions or pre-existing structural configurations and a common shock. The central research problem of the multiple secularities approach is the reconstruction of those culture-specific, pre-existing structural configurations, which account for the specificities of the Japanese way of appropriating Western secularist legal norms and institutional arrangements. Being specialised in the history of religions in ancient and medieval Japan, I seek the early origins of the relevant social and epistemic structural configurations effective in the latter half of the nineteenth century. These structural configurations, I argue, are to some extent the outcome of path-dependent processes initiated at critical junctures quite early in the history of Japan. In this article, I would like to step even further back in history than in my previous studies of the ōbō buppō paradigm and present a kind of ‘prequel’ to this story. It is obvious that the medieval ideology of the interdependence of two nomospheres did not just fall from the sky. A comparison with China shows that certain structural preconditions were needed to implement such a paradigm. These structural preconditions were met in Japan as well as in Tibet (Ruegg 1995; Roesler 2013), Mongolia (Kollmar-Paulenz 2013) and Bhutan (Schwerk 2019), but not in China. I would like to trace these preconditions here historically through a longue durée perspective, without any claim to com- pleteness and thus, of course, with limited conclusiveness. It is a daring, if not adventurous, undertaking to trace the development of epistemic and social structures over such a long period of time. This cannot be done without gen- eralisations and omissions, which (hopefully) will provoke fruitful criticism based on empirical data.

4 Critical Junctures in Japanese History

One problem with the critical junctures approach is to identify them in the first place. It should be borne in mind that a critical juncture is always only critical in relation to certain units of analysis; in our case, the relationship between the religious and the secular, or rather, between social facts that afforded themselves to be labelled either ‘religious’ or ‘secular’ under the global condition of modern times. At first sight, at least, the identification of critical junctures in Japanese history seems to be relatively easy. In contrast to imperial China, in

Journal of Religion in Japan 8 (2019) 9–45 Downloaded from Brill.com09/27/2021 05:59:14AM via free access 18 kleine which critical junctures are often indicated by dynastic change, the most obvious indicator of critical junctures in premodern Japan is the shift of the seats of government. The removals of capitals are the most obvious results of previous processes of accelerated change, sometimes triggered by an intensified contact with other cultures. But not all relocations of capitals had the same long-lasting effect on all units of analysis which interest me. According to Inoue,

Japan’s history has been deeply marked by reforms adopted during two long but widely separated periods of contact with expansive cultures. The first began around A.D.587 when Soga no Umako seized control of Japan’s central government, made an extensive use of Chinese techniques for expanding state power, and supported the introduction and spread of Chinese learning. The second came after the Meiji restoration of 1868 when new leaders moved the country toward industrialization and West- ern ways. Inoue 1993: 163

Furthermore, in the introduction to the same volume of The Cambridge History of Japan, Delmer M. Brown identifies “four great waves of change” that swept over ancient Japan namely (1) “Yayoi ferment (ca. 300B.C. to A.D.250),” (2) “The Yamato state (ca. A.D.250 to 587)”,(3) the “Century of reform (587–710),” and (4) “The Nara period” (710 to 784) (Brown 1993a). Another perspective, which I find even more promising, would focus on critical junctures caused by cultural encounters. At least five such historical phases that have had a decisive impact on the gradual formation of epistemic and social structures relevant for the configuration of the relationship between the religious and the secular in modern times can be identified, leaving aside for a moment the question of whether they fit the criteria of critical junctures: 1. Challenges posed by Sui 隨 and Tang 唐 China, as well as by the Korean kingdoms—including large scale immigration from Korea—during roughly two centuries, spanning from the sixth to the eighth century, that forced the Japanese to reorganise culture and society on a large scale; I will deal with this in more detail below. 2. Failed invasions by the Mongols in 1274 and 1281, which led to a strength- ening of national self-confidence in Japan and inspired the “Discourse on the ‘Land of Kami’ (shinkoku 神國)” (Kuroda 1996b), which in the long run led to a tennō-centric nativism (e.g., kokugaku 國學, fukko shintō 復古神道) that formed the ideological basis of the Meiji Restoration.

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3. Encounters with European missionaries in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, which set in motion a process of mutual observation and comparison between Christianity and Buddhism and required cultural translation, which led to a change in the conceptual apparatuses on both sides (Kleine 2019a, 2019b, 2018). As a result, this encounter led to a policy of iso- lationism and the strict subordination to shōgunal authority—entailing a rigid regulation of Buddhist institutions along denominational lines— which can also be interpreted as the cause of a progressive secularisation of Japan in the course of the Edo period. The denominationalism so typical for present-day Japanese Buddhism is also an indirect consequence of this cultural encounter. 4. Encounters with Western powers in the nineteenth century, which forced the Japanese to adoptWestern legal norms, social institutions, and knowledge orders, including the introduction of the Western concept of religion, for which the emic term shūkyō was used. This required a new classification of cultural elements, which sometimes led to considerable dis- tortions, as can be seen from the problem of categorising the amalgam of imperial cult, Confucian ethics, national myth, kami cult, etc., now called Shintō. 5. Japan’s defeat in the Pacific War that resulted, among other things, in the abolition of State Shintō, the relegation of Shrine Shintō to the realm of religion, and the enforced implementation of a new, extremely secularist constitution. In this paper, I will focus on the first of these potential critical junctures and the path-dependent processes they set in motion. My hypothesis is that the path- dependent process that started with the creative and selective appropriation of Chinese culture—which characterised the period between the sixth and the eighth centuries—generated structural configurations of a longue durée that strongly conditioned the inventory of options available to the Meiji reformers when they had to cope with Western ideals of a modern nation-state.

5 The Sinicisation and Buddicisation of Japan and the Disentanglement of Imperial Rites, Statecraft, and Religion

Why was the period between the sixth and eighth centuries one of the most important critical junctures in Japanese history? Most readers will be more or less familiar with the historical situation, for which reason I will touch only briefly upon some particularly important issues. From roughly the fifth century, a process of unification and centralisation of the Yamato state com-

Journal of Religion in Japan 8 (2019) 9–45 Downloaded from Brill.com09/27/2021 05:59:14AM via free access 20 kleine menced under the leadership of a clan settled in the Yamato basin, which in the Nihon shoki 日本書紀 is called “descendants of heaven” (tenson 天孫, also read amemiko, amemimago). In the sixth century, the formation of a central state took off due to intensified contact with the continent and the threat of an invasion. This development was driven partly by tensions on the Korean peninsula, where the Japanese pursued their own interests. Among other things, so at least the Nihon shoki claims, Yamato had a base called Mimana 任那 in the south of the Korean peninsula. Even if the historicity of this enclave, sometimes referred to as a Japanese colony, is controversial (McCullough 1999: 81), Yam- ato undoubtedly maintained close contacts above all with Baekje 百濟, which in turn was first in conflict with Goguryeo 高句麗, and a little later with Silla 新羅. It is assumed that the envoy from Baekje to the court of Tennō Kinmei 欽明 in 552 (or 538), which officially brought Buddhism to Japan, asked the Japanese for military support in the dispute with Goguryeo. The reunification of the Chinese Empire under Sui Wendi 隋文帝 (r. 581–604) in 589 and the military clashes between China and Goguryeo caused the Japanese to fear an attack on their insular kingdom. The diplomatic clumsiness of the first Japanese official mission to Sui China in the year 600 did not make things any better (see below). With the founding of the Tang Dynasty in 618, the situation became even more threatening. One of the first official acts of the new emperor Gaozu 高祖 (r. 618–635) was to attack Goguryeo again. In 641, together with Silla, Chinese troops attacked Baekje, which led to its extinction in 660, whereby Japan lost its closest ally on the Korean peninsula. In the course of these clashes, a Japanese fleet of 170 ships was destroyed. The significance of the Korean migration, triggered by the various wars on the continent, for Japan’s cultural development during this period can hardly be overestimated.14 In any case, the situation was more than threatening from a Japanese point of view. Political leaders therefore tried to overcome internal divisions and strengthen their own administrative and military capabilities by learning from those they feared most—a strategy also applied by the Meiji reformers in the nineteenth century.15 One crucial decision taken at this critical juncture was—rather as an unin- tended side-effect—the introduction of Buddhism, i.e., what some would

14 For more information on Japan’s entanglements with the continent in this period, see Okazaki (1993). 15 As Helen Hardacre points out, the “Japanese were acutely aware of China’s degradation and defeat in the Opium Wars, and they saw clearly that if they failed to strengthen Japan, Western powers would colonize it” (Hardacre 2018: 87).

Journal of ReligionDownloaded in Japan from Brill.com09/27/2021 8 (2019) 9–45 05:59:14AM via free access formations of secularity in ancient japan? 21 deem a prototypical ‘axial religion’ (e.g., Eisenstadt 1982; cf. Kleine 2018). Bud- dhism as a vehicle of continental culture in general accelerated the concomi- tant sinicisation of the Yamato state by the Taika reform—which almost cul- minated in a Buddhocracy—and the resultant new policy of Kanmu 桓武 (r. 781–806) with respect to Buddhist institutions. The introduction of Buddhism and its eventual elevation from a clan- centred cult to a state cult had an enormous and long-lasting impact on many levels. First of all, the introduction of a system of beliefs and practices that provided cognitive and normative orientation based on a radical duality of immanence and transcendence16 gave rise to a form of basic societal differentiation into a ‘secularised’17 rule of state institutions, symbolically headed by the emperor, responsible for mundane (seken 世間) affairs on the one hand, and a socio-cultural formation responsible for supra-mundane (shusseken 出世間) affairs, namely Buddhism, on the other. This eventually resulted in a constellation that Lamberg-Karlovsky has described as “the universal tension between temple and palace” (Árnason 2005: 29) and which, as Max Weber put it, notoriously lead to a “struggle between military and temple nobility,” a struggle that “not always lead to an open con-

16 Note that one can also find in the Buddhist discourse of medieval Japan statements, which suggest a “ground bass … of this-worldly affirmativeness,” i.e. an unwillingness to adopt the Buddhist notion of a strict distinction between immanence and transcendence fully to Japanese culture. Cf. Bellah (1991 [1970]: 119.) For a discussion, cf. Kleine (2018). Tamura (2000) also stresses the this-worldly affirmativeness of Japanese Buddhism as a char- acteristic feature. We actually find various positions and perspectives among Buddhist authors. Pure Land Buddhism, for instance, maintained the sharp distinction between mundane and supra-mundane affairs, whereas others emphasised non-duality—which is, however, simply another way of dealing with an existing dualism. What is more, premodern discourses tend to be ambiguous, inconsistent, and—most importantly—strategic and purpose-specific. In the ‘religio-political’ discourse of medieval Japan, which primarily served the organisation and legitimation of the relationship between Buddhist institutions and the state, the duality of nomospheres is clearly emphasised and linked to the binary transcendence/immanence. 17 It is crucial to note at this point that the anachronistic use of ‘secular[ised],’ ‘religious,’ etc., neither implies that these or similar terms were used by contemporary actors nor that I presuppose some fixed definition of these terms, which would allow me to identify something ‘secular’ or ‘religious’ in the historical contexts in question. My argument is rather that in these contexts, epistemic and social structures emerged, which paved the way for a social situation at the beginning of modernity, in which the classification of certain mat- ters as religious or secular was relatively easy. In the case addressed here, this concerns the assignment of Buddhism, Christianity and ‘Sect Shintō’ to the religious sphere and the assignment of ritual elements of governance to the secular sphere of politics.

Journal of Religion in Japan 8 (2019) 9–45 Downloaded from Brill.com09/27/2021 05:59:14AM via free access 22 kleine flict” (Weber, Roth, and Wittich 1978: 1160),18 but has always played a decisive role in the formation of states and societies. This is definitely true for ancient Japan. The introduction and establishment of Buddhism in Japan, however, repre- sents only one crucial development in this historical phase. The most important measure taken at this critical juncture, in order to cope with the challenges posed by the events on the continent, was the so-called Taika reform—in which, by the way, Buddhist priests as ‘China experts’ were heavily involved (Inoue 1993: 193). The Taika reform concluded a “revolutionary process by which the old clan order was gradually but surely transformed into a monar- chical state administered by officials appointed by, and responsible to, the emperor” (Inoue 1993: 198).The process had started in 646 after a coupd’état led by Prince Naka no Ōe 中大江, the later Tenji Tennō 天智天皇 (r. 661–672) and Nakatomi no Kamatari 中富鎌足 (614–669), who seized control of the court from the Soga clan. I cannot go into any details here, but I would like to high- light a few selected developments and related decisions made in this period, which had an extremely long-lasting effect on the formation of state, culture, and society. First of all, during the Nara period, the adoption of Chinese culture reached its peak with the establishment of the statutory (ritsuryō 律令) state and its legal system.19 Buddhism served as the major vehicle for the transmission of Chinese culture to Japan, and therefore the establishment of the ritsuryō state cannot be separated from the rise of Buddhism to both a state cult and a state institution. Let me mention just a few institutional developments that proved most relevant for the subsequent formations of secularity and served as models and conceptual resources for the Meiji reformers. Although the “statutory (ritsuryō) system” (McCullough 1999: 24) followed the model of the Tang state, it showed some remarkable deviations. The most obvious was the establishment of the Jingikan 神祇官 (Office of [Affairs Rela- ted to] the Gods), an office not known in China, that was formally on an equal footing with the Daijōkan 太政官 (Grand Council of State). Whereas the latter served as the central administrative organ in the ritsuryō state—divided into (1) a policy-making section, (2) an administrative section, and (3) the emperor’s secretariat—the Jingikan was in charge of major state rituals connected with

18 For the German original, cf. Weber (1985: 690). Note that the English translation is rather free and vague. 19 The first fully implemented code, the Taihō Code, was put into effect in 702, the second and last complete ritsuryō, the Yōrō Code, was drafted around 718 but put into effect only in 757. For further information see Steenstrup (1991: 30ff.)

Journal of ReligionDownloaded in Japan from Brill.com09/27/2021 8 (2019) 9–45 05:59:14AM via free access formations of secularity in ancient japan? 23 the imperial household, such as the Great Tasting of the Fruits Ceremony (dai- jōsai 大嘗祭) and the Great Purification Rite (ōharae 大祓). Although nominally equal to the Daijōkan, in reality, the Jingikan was administered by the policy-making section of the Daijōkan. Notwithstanding this organisational situation, we see here an institutional differentiation between administration and governance on the one hand and state rituals on the other. The two traditional functions ascribed to the emperor—rule (sei 政) and ritual (sai 祭)—were thus institutionally and symbolically separated, the latter being subordinated to the former. In contrast to the ideological interpretation of the Meiji reformers who reinstalled the Jingikan in 1868 and claimed the “unity of ritual and government” (saisei itchi 祭政一致; also “the unity of government and doctrine,” seikyō itchi 政教一致; cf. Fis- cher 2001), I believe that the adoption of Chinese bureaucracy and legal codes actually paved the way for a disentanglement of ritual and governance. In the course of that process, the Tennō’s actual political power (kenryoku 權力) was gradually transformed into some kind of symbolic authority or charisma (ken’i 權威). Nevertheless, it would be anachronistic to say that the “Nara state” was “headed by an emperor whose authority was both secular and religious” (Brown 1993b: 227). The system resembled that of imperial China inasmuch as even the rituals performed by the Chinese emperor—first of all the feng 封 and the shan 禪 sacrifices (Herzer 1995: 38–44)—lack most of what would have been interpreted as religious according to the prevalent definitions formed in the nineteenth century.20 They can be imagined as acts of the symbolic representation of legitimate rule through ritual procedures. I think the same applies to the rituals of the Japanese imperial family. This is the very nature of the sai aspect of imperial rule, whereas the sei aspect stands for the enforcement of legitimate rule through administration and coercion. Furthermore, the growing influence of Buddhism and the gradual monopo- lisation of major parts of the ritual system by Buddhist institutions—e.g., the three state rituals Misai’e 御齊會 (performed in the imperial palace), Yuima’e

20 Obviously, in Confucian circles, it was repeatedly disputed whether rituals are a form of communication with relatively transcendent forces or merely cultural or social acts by human beings for human beings. One statement in the Lunyu (3,12) attributed to Confu- cius himself is famous in this context: “‘Sacrificing as if present’ means sacrificing to the spirits as if they were present. Confucius said, ‘If I do not personally offer the sacrifice, it is the same as not having sacrificed at all’” [祭如在、祭神如神在。子曰。吾不與祭、如不祭] (Muller 2018). Paramore argues that for “over two thousand years, people in East Asia have thought about religious ritual in these ‘as if’ terms,” and conclusively charac- terises this attitude as a “reflective, relativizing consideration of the sociality of core ritual practices” (Paramore 2017: 21).

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維摩會 (Kōfukuji), and Saishō’e 最勝會 (Yakushiji)—eventually deprived even the emperor of his central position in the ritual sphere. He was largely degraded to a symbolic representation of national unity. Even though the Tennō was, ideally, not only a descendent of the gods but a god-like figure in his own right, according to the hegemonic Buddhist ideology of ancient and medieval Japan “the Emperor had his post and his privileges because of good acts in previous existences,” and “even the Gods, and much more so the mortal Emperor, were under the laws of Karma, and would have to suffer in the beyond, and/or in future incarnations, for abuse of their powers” (Steenstrup 1991: 38). Furthermore, although the emperors and princes “were formally above the law, … they were in fact prisoners of precedent and ritual” (Steenstrup 1991: 38). Thus, their “officials, notably the Fujiwara [藤原], actually ruled in their place, quite officially so from 866 onwards” (Steenstrup 1991: 38). “In the last century of the Ritsuryō period, emperors would typically retire to be free from ritual and precedent, and rule from the honoured position of ‘emperor in religious retirement’ (hōō [法皇]), while a child formally ascended the Throne” (Steen- strup 1991: 39). In some sense, we may speak of a gradual secularisation of the administration starting with the Taika reform and the subsequent sinicisation and Buddhicisation of Japan. Equally relevant is another legal and institutional differentiation represented by two sets of rules and regulations, namely the “regulations of [affairs related to] the gods” ( jingiryō 神祇令) and the “regulations for [Buddhist] monks and nuns” (sōniryō 僧尼令). The jingiryō (chapter six of the Yōrō Code) does the following: lists the official annual rites by month and name and defines their main features (1–9); outlines the protocols for the enthronement ceremony (sokui girei 即位儀礼), the associated periods of abstinence (kessai 潔斎) and taboos to be observed in these periods (10–14); establishes provisions for the administration and execu- tion of rites (15–17); establishes the guidelines for conducting the Great Purifi- cation Rite (18–19); and discusses various tax issues (20). The sōniryō, on the other hand, aimed at the regulation of the lives and conduct of monks and nuns beyond the monastic rules codified in the vinaya. Many of the 27 articles make it very clear that monks and nuns were seen as a potentially dangerous group that needed to be checked and controlled. In any case, with the promulgation of the sōniryō and its specific regulations for monks and nuns, these figures were defined as a distinct social group, easily identifiable by their habitus, lifestyle, clothing, etc. This set them apart from Confucian officials, who were an integral part of the administration that they served and represented. The ‘embeddedness’ of Confucianism in the Chi- nese state bureaucracy may also account for the fact that despite its impact

Journal of ReligionDownloaded in Japan from Brill.com09/27/2021 8 (2019) 9–45 05:59:14AM via free access formations of secularity in ancient japan? 25 on Japanese culture, Confucianism in general never managed to institutionalise in Japan. Buddhists, on the other hand, had their own distinctive forms of organisation and networks largely independent from the state institutions and could therefore establish themselves as a specific socio-cultural formation, even while supervised and strictly controlled by the state, more precisely by the Ministry of Civil Affairs (Jibushō 治部省). Even before the Taika reform, the Buddhist order was incorporated into an administrative structure by the “Bureau of Monks” (sōgō 僧綱), officially established under that name in 701, an office in charge of ordinations and granting proper ranks. Whether or not it is appropriate or anachronistic to speak of “Secular control over monastic life and the alignment of monasteries with the state bureaucracy” (Kodansha 1999: “monasticism—僧院制度 sōin seido”), need not be decided here. The situation was clearly ambiguous. Buddhist monastics in the Asuka and Nara periods were treated as a functional unit of the state, governed and employed by the state institutions, and yet clearly distinguished from them. Monastic ranks were different from ranks within the state bureaucracy, and it was deemed inappropriate to be at the same time emperor and cleric. The notorious move of the ordained Shōtoku 稱德 (764–770) to become empress without returning to lay status, to appoint Buddhist monks to the highest offices, and to bestow the newly invented title of “dharma king” (hōō 法王) on her counsellor, the Hossō monk Dōkyō 道鏡, met with harsh resistance and resulted in an even stricter separation of the imperial household and its ritual centre, the Ise Shrine,21 on the one hand and Buddhism on the other.22 To be clear: to interpret this separation as a separation of Shintō and Buddhism (something like an early shinbutsu bunri 神佛分離) would clearly be anachronistic. In view of Dōkyō’s attempt at establishing a Buddhocracy and the very real danger of Buddhist priests seizing power, the opponents of this buddicisation conjured up an oracle of the mighty deity Hachiman, who once and for all stated that “the Sun dynasty must always keep the succession within the imperial line” (Teeuwen and Breen 2018: 34).23 Despite such measures, the

21 For a discussion of the reasons for adopting Amaterasu as the tutelary deity of the imperial house and choosing Ise as the ritual centre, see Matsumae (1993: 341–351); Teeuwen and Breen (2018: 9–30). 22 “This policy,” say Teeuwen and Breen, “set Ise apart from all other shrines in the country, and would, much later, inspire the notion that shrines represent an indigenous, non- Buddhist tradition called Shinto” (Teeuwen and Breen 2018: 32). For a detailed account of Dōkyō’s attempts to ‘buddhicise’ Ise and the counter-measures taken after his fall from power in 770 see Teeuwen and Breen (2018: 31–53). 23 The original Chinese in the Shoku nihongi 續日本紀 (卷三十, 稱德紀五) reads: 天之日嗣, 必立皇緒. Previously there had been another oracle of the deity to which Dōkyō

Journal of Religion in Japan 8 (2019) 9–45 Downloaded from Brill.com09/27/2021 05:59:14AM via free access 26 kleine entanglements between the state and Buddhist institutions were so strong that Emperor Kanmu decided to further disentangle ‘religion and politics’ after the removal of the capital from Nara to Nagaoka (784) and finally to Kyōto (794). I will come back to this presently. In any case, the radical reorganisation of state and society during the late Asuka and the Nara periods opened up a wide window of options, oscillat- ing between the preservation of indigenous customs, laws, cults, etc., on the one side and a complete sinicisation on the other. Moreover, as “Buddhism lay at the center of the sinified cultural mixture known as the Asuka enlighten- ment” (Inoue 1993: 171) and Buddhist priests played such an important role as transmitters of Chinese culture, sinicisation could easily have meant a complete Buddhicisation of Japan. It should not be forgotten in this context that, around 700, Tang China had a strong Buddhist colouring itself, not least due to Empress Wu Zetian’s 武則天 (r. 690–705) ostensive identification with, and her utilisation and patron- age of, Buddhism (Chen 2002; Deeg 2001). Apparently, Shōmu Tennō 聖武 (r. 724–749) was very much inspired by Wu Zetian (Bowring 2005; 81)—as was, probably even more so, his wife Kōmyō 光明 (701–760) (Mikoshiba 2002)— presented himself as a Buddhist ruler and declared himself to be the “slave of the three treasures” (sanbōyakko 三寶乃奴) in front of the gigantic statue of the principle Buddha [Bi]rushana [毘]盧舍那 (Skt. Mahāvairocana) in the Tōdaiji of Nara,24 erected on his order between 747 and 752 as the centre of a Buddhist nation. In retrospect, it appears that the roughly four decades between Shōmu’s enthronement in 724 and the death of his daughter, who ruled twice as tennō under the names Kōken 孝謙 (749–758) and Shōtoku, marked a critical juncture at which Japan had several options for its further development (Bowring 2005: 94–97; Bender 1979). The so-called Dōkyō affair of the late Nara period, when “Buddhist forces … nearly succeeded in usurping imperial authority” (McCullough 1999: 20), may be seen as a point of culmination of the sinicisation and Buddhicisation of Japan.25 Whether or not it is appropriate to interpret this affair as a manifesta-

referred. It said: “I order Dōkyō to take the rank of emperor, and peace will reign all over the world 令道鏡即皇位, 天下太平.” 24 According to the Shoku Nihongi (tenpyō shōhō 1/4/14; 4.5.749): 天皇幸東大寺。御盧舍那仏像前殿。北面対像。皇后太子並侍焉。群臣百寮及士庶分頭、行列殿後。勅、遣左大臣橘宿禰諸兄、白仏。三宝乃奴止仕奉流天皇羅我命盧舍那仏像能大前仁奏賜部止奏久. 25 For more information on this power struggle, which certainly cannot be simply reduced to a struggle between military and temple nobility, see Hayami (1986: 141–144) and Naoki (1993: 262–266).

Journal of ReligionDownloaded in Japan from Brill.com09/27/2021 8 (2019) 9–45 05:59:14AM via free access formations of secularity in ancient japan? 27 tion of a struggle between military and temple nobility, or simply as a struggle between competing political parties in which the priest Dōkyō was involved more or less by coincidence, need not bother us here. The crucial point is that Dōkyō, against his own intentions, fostered the strict separation of Buddhist and imperial institutions, symbolised by the exclusion of everything Buddhist from the Grand Shrine of Ise, the centre of the imperial cult (Bowring 2005: 97; Teeuwen and Breen 2018: 31–53). The separation of the imperial cult and Bud- dhism26 made it almost impossible to establish some kind of caesaropapism in Japan. Moreover, the involvement of Buddhist priests in political affairs towards the end of the Nara period was arguably a determining factor in Kanmu Tennō’s 桓武天皇 (r. 781–806) “Buddhism reform” (bukkyō kaikaku 佛教改革) (Inoue 1971: 85) i.e. his decision to keep Buddhist institutions at a healthy distance when he removed the capital to Heiankyō or Kyōto27 in order to keep Temmu’s descendants from occupying the throne (Naoki 1993: 266–267). As part of the same process, Kanmu continued to transform “Ise into a non-Buddhist site of imperial ritual” (Teeuwen and Breen 2018: 52). This does not mean that the Confu- cian trained Kanmu, formerly head of the state academy (daigakuryō 大學寮), was generally hostile towards Buddhism. But he evidently deplored the degen- eration and politicisation of Buddhist priests and institutions and wanted to keep them away from political power. Thus, his reforms can be seen as counter- measures against the “secularisation of Buddhism” (bukkyō no sezokuka 仏教の世俗化) (Inoue 1971: 85). At the same time, however, the new policy towards

26 Note, however, that this separation did not mean that Buddhist priests and rituals were absent from the imperial court. To give only a few examples, Emperor Ninmyō 仁明 (r. 833–850) granted Kūkais’s request and provided him with a temporary temple in the palace grounds for the performance of his ritual called Go shichinichi no mishuhō 後七日御修法 (ritual of the second week [of the NewYear]).Shortly after Kūkais’s death, north of the Daigokuden—the palace hall in which, for example, the enthronement ceremony was held—a temple was set up to carry out the Mishuhō ritual. This temple received the name “Shingon’in 真言院.” (Abe 1999: 58; cf. Hayami 1986: 170–174; and Yamada and Kuriyama 1997: 546).The Mishuhō ritual was performed in the Imperial Palace until 1871, but with the persecution of Buddhism and the attempt to enforce a State Shintō early in the course of the Meiji Restoration (1868–1912), it was banished from the palace. In 1883 the ritual practice was resumed, but now in Kanjō’in of Tōji. (Yoritomi and Yoritomi Motohiro Hakushi Kanreki Kinen Ronbunshū Kankōkai 2005: 150). 27 This does not mean that Kanmu’s decision to move the capital north was motivated by his wish to distance himself from the Buddhist institutions of Nara. It seems more likely that he, being a member of the Tenji line of the imperial family, wished to “distance the monar- chy from the Tenmu line, which was so clearly identified with Nara and had its home and its sacred spaces in Yamato” (Bowring 2005: 98). For a more detailed discussion of the reasons for leaving Heijōkyō (Nara) and founding Heiankyō (Kyōto) see Toby (1985).

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Buddhism opened up new opportunities for those priests who were themselves critical to the tendency of Buddhist institutions to mingle with politics (Inoue 1971: 85). Thereby, especially by his support for the Buddhist masters Saichō 最澄 (767–822) and Kūkai 空海 (774–835) and their newly established monastic orders Enryakuji, Onjōji (Tendai),Tōji, Kongōbuji (Shingon), etc., Kanmu paved the way for a much greater independence of Buddhist monastic institutions ( jike 寺家). Arguably, the most significant event symbolising and accelerating the growing autonomy of Buddhist institutions was Saichō’s declaration that for Tendai 天台 adepts, full ordination in accordance with the regulations both of the vinaya and the sōgō was unnecessary. This was a revolution whose consequences for the further development of Japanese Buddhism can hardly be overestimated. Accordingly, the monk officials of the sōgō under the direction of the Daisōzu 大僧都 (Grand Administrator of the Buddhist Order) Gomyō 護命 (750–834) in the year 819 firmly rejected Saichō’s application for the establishment of an independent ordination platform on Mount Hiei (Groner 2000: 278). As a result, Saichō himself did not experience the construction of aTendai ordination platform (kaidan 戒壇) while still alive. It was not until three years after his death that Enryakuji received the approval and financial support for the project. Strictly speaking, the ordination autonomy of the Sanmon wing 山門派 of Tendai not only caused a schism within the Japanese saṇgha; but also, and what is more, the Tendaishū escaped the control of state authority over monastic affairs and thereby contributed considerably to the increasing independence of Buddhist institutions from the state. Eventually, over the course of the Heian period, the Buddhist institutions developed into one of three power blocks or kenmon 權門 (Kuroda 1996a),28 the other two being the court nobility (kuge 公家) and the emerging military aristocracy (buke 武家).29 This gain in autonomy was further supported by economic changes such as the expansion of the shōen 莊園 system of private landownership (Ōyama 1988–1999; Naga- hara 1960; Steenstrup 1991: 66–70) during the Heian period (794–1185), which transformed Buddhist institutions into powerful, militarised30 landowners.

28 For a concise summary of Kuroda’s theory, see Adolphson (2000: 10–20). Kuroda’s notion of the kenmitu taisei and his theory of the three power blocks has been criticised by Taira (1996). I am not entirely convinced by Taira’s critique, however. 29 In reality, the situation was even more complicated and power more fragmented, as Kawata Koh has indicated in his contribution to this volume. 30 For the militarisation of the Buddhist order by the establishment of monastic armies, see Adolphson (2000), Akamatsu (1976), Demiéville (1957), Hioki (1934), Katsuno (1965), Kleine (2002, 2003, 2006), Mass (1997); Renondeau (1957).

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6 The Rejection of Chinese Meritocratic Principles of Legitimate Rule and the Disentanglement of Legitimisation, Confucianism, and Buddhism

As pointed out before, an important aspect to be taken into consideration within the theoretical framework of critical junctures are options that were actually available but were, for reasons to be analysed, not chosen. For our topic, the single most important among such options is the Chinese meritocratic principle of rule by “the mandate of heaven” (tianming 天命).31 In that regard, we should remind ourselves that Japan constructed its legitimising ideology in a period when even in China, Confucianism had long lost its monopoly as a state doctrine. From the Sui dynasty on, Chinese emperors repeatedly relied on Buddhist or Daoist strategies of legitimising their rule (Jülch 2016: 7–14; 21–24). The founder of the Sui dynasty Wendi, for instance, staged himself as a Bud- dhist Cakravartin and mainly utilised Buddhist ideas and symbols to legitimise his rule (Jülch 2016: 11–12). Accordingly, he was revered as a Buddhist saviour, “a pillar of the three jewels, … bearing the burden [for the sentient beings of] the four kinds of birth 棟梁三寶。荷負四生” (Jülch 2016: 51), as Falin 法琳 (572– 640) in his Bianzheng lun 辯正論 puts it (T52, no. 2110, p. 508, c13). In the same vein, Wu Zetian based her rule on Buddhist legitimation strategies and even aimed at being identified with the future Buddha Maitreya (Jülch 2016: 13). This must be kept in mind if we are to understand the historical situation in which the Japanese established their Tang style statutory system. I assume that the rejection of the meritocratic principle of rule by the mandate of heaven and the institutional weakness of Confucianism in ancient Japan represent two sides of the same coin. When Tenmu 天武 (r. 672–686) successfully rebelled against Tenji and became Tennō in 673, he felt the need to secure his position as ruler and establish a legitimate dynasty.32 In order to achieve these goals, Tenmu launched a mythological and historiographical project, which resulted in the eventual posthumous production of two national chronicles, the Kojiki 古事記 (712) and

31 The Chinese principle of rule by the mandate of heaven even became a symbol of Chi- nese inferiority in nationalistic discourses. Motoori Norinaga 本居宣長 (1730–1801), for instance, ridiculed the tianming concept as a way to legitimise any rebellion retrospec- tively once it had succeeded. Cf. Stolte (1939). 32 He was not entirely successful in securing power for his own line, since after the death of empress Shōtoku, “the succession switched back to descendants not of Tenmu but of Tenji” (Bowring 2005: 97).

Journal of Religion in Japan 8 (2019) 9–45 Downloaded from Brill.com09/27/2021 05:59:14AM via free access 30 kleine the Nihon shoki 日本書紀 (720).33 The latter became the official historiography that “sought to legitimate the hegemonic rule of the state founded on the imperial system” (Isomae 2009: 19) by making the explicit claim that the emperor’s clan was entitled by the gods to rule over Japan for eternity (Naumann 1996: 6–8). The replacement of the meritocratic Confucian principle of legitimate domination by a home-grown mythological legitimation stressing the ‘heredi- tary charisma’ of divine rulers yielded a number of evident benefits. First of all, as demonstrated repeatedly in Chinese historiography, the heavenly mandate could be withdrawn if the ruler proved to be unworthy or incom- petent. On this basis, every successful rebel could stage himself as the executor of the heavenly will and claim the mandate of heaven for himself. The obvious consequence was that in Chinese history, dynastic change was the rule rather than the exception. The Japanese mythological principle of legitimation by divine descent precluded the possibility of a legitimate replacement of the ruling family. In later centuries, the Japanese never tired of emphasising the inferiority of the Chinese principle of legitimation. Besides this, Tenmu and his successors may also have abstained from adopting the Chinese model of legitimate rule for diplomatic reasons. According to Confucian orthodoxy, there could only be one “child of heaven” (tianzi 天子), or as we read in Mengzi 孟子 (ch. Wangzhang 萬章I.4): “Master Kong said: ‘In the sky there is only one sun and above the people there is only one emperor”’ (cf. Wesson 1967: 41).34 If the ruler of a tributary empire like Yamato had claimed the mandate of heaven, this would have been an outrageous presumption in the eyes of the Chinese. When Suiko’s legation to the Sui Court in 600 handed over a letter in which the empress designated herself as heavenly ruler (tennō), this was perceived as extremely presumptuous on the Chinese side (Inoue 1993: 168; McCullough 1999: 83). Moreover, when the Japanese sent another envoy in 607, “Ono no Omi submitted a memorial containing this sentence: ‘The Child of Heaven (tenshi) in the land where the sun rises addresses the Son of Heaven (tenshi) in the land where the sun sets.’” Whether or not the Japanese side intentionally offended the Chinese, Emperor Yangdi 煬帝 (r. 604–618) was not amused at all. He gave the following order to his foreign minister: “If memorials from barbarian states are written by persons who lack propriety, don’t accept them” (Inoue 1993: 182).35

33 For details concerning the production of these two texts, see Sakamoto and Brownlee (1991). 34 Original Chinese: 孔子曰：『天無二日，民無二王。』. 35 Original text in Suishu 81: 書曰日出處天子致書日没處天子無恙云云帝覽之不悅 … 曰蠻夷書有無禮者勿復. Moreover, according to the History of the Sui Dynasty (Suishu

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Of course, we do not know whether the relevant actors were fully aware of the consequences of their decisions. We are more interested in these consequences themselves, and in historical retrospect, we can see that the decision to construct a legitimatory myth from indigenous sources instead of adopting the principle of the heavenly mandate was a wise one, both in foreign and domestic policy terms. In this way, externally, diplomatic entanglements with China were avoided; internally, a still precarious dynasty was stabilised. One may ask, then, why the architects of the Taika reform did not follow the example of Wendi or Wu Zetian and legitimise their rule through Buddhism. I suspect the reason was that Buddhism was not yet sufficiently anchored in the empire, which was still strongly characterised by clan structures, to fulfil this function. Thus, the legitimation of power had to be based on mythological patterns and narrative components familiar to the powerful clans: the “heavenly ruler” was thus defined as the highest ujigami 氏神, as it were. As a result, the Japanese neither resorted to Confucian nor to Buddhist legitimation strategies but constructed their own by creating a unified state mythology, written down in the Kojiki and Nihon shoki, which “became the repositories of national memory” (Isomae 2009: 18). With a view to the problem of path- dependent processes in the subsequent shaping of the relationship between religion and the secular, these decisions had far-reaching consequences. The institution of the imperial house maintained a considerable degree of independence from the continent’s two most important traditions of thought, Confu- cianism and Buddhism, and was at the same time intertwined with the myths centring on the indigenous deities, which spurred the later development of a tennō-centric nativism under the name Shintō. The effect of this deliberate decision—not to adopt the Chinese concept of rule by heavenly mandate—cannot be overestimated in light of Japanese history up to the present day.The concept of an eternal dynasty of divine descent36 shaped the Japanese self-conception and national identity perhaps more than any other episteme. Especially after the successful Mongol invasion of China and Korea and the failed attempts of the Yuan dynasty to conquer Japan (Con- lan 2001; Adams 2012; Turnbull 2010; Conlan 2009, 2001), the self-conception as a “divine nation” (Kuroda 1996b) became part of the collective political con-

隨書, 81), the “envoy said that the rulers of Yamato regard heaven as their elder brother, the sun as their younger brother 使者言倭王以天為兄以日為弟.” 36 As a matter of fact, the lineage of Yamato rulers was not quite as eternal and unbroken since the first Tennō Jinmu 神武 founded the earthly rule of the tenson 天孫 as the chronicles claim. The last change of dynasty in the royal house of Yamato took place at the beginning of the sixth century (Naumann 1996: 3).

Journal of Religion in Japan 8 (2019) 9–45 Downloaded from Brill.com09/27/2021 05:59:14AM via free access 32 kleine sciousness, as it were. Or, as Kitabatake Chikafusa 北畠親房 (1293–1354)37 put it in his Jinnō shōtōki 神皇正統記 (drafted in 1339; revised in 1343):

Great Japan is the divine land. The heavenly progenitor founded it, and the sun goddess bequeathed it to her descendants to rule eternally. Only in our country is this true; there are no similar examples in other countries. This is why our country is called the divine land.38

Paradoxically, the apotheosis of the Tennō as a sacred or even divine figure may have been one factor in the political disempowerment of the imperial institution. Already during the Heian period, actual power had shifted from the imperial court to the Fujiwara clan, members of which acted as regents (sesshō 攝政) and chancellors (kanpaku 關白). As early as immediately after Kanmu’s reign, “the limelight of central political history shifted steadily and rapidly away from the person of the sovereign toward erstwhile holders of nominally subordinate court posts, roles men whose growing power at length confined their suzerains to largely ritualistic and ceremonial functions” (McCullough 1999: 25). The institution of cloister government (insei 院政) that prevailed between the abdication of Emperor Shirakawa 白川 in 1087 and the establishment of warrior government (bakufu 幕府) in Kamakura in 1192 can be seen as an attempt to escape the limitations entailed in charismatic rule, to free the imperial house from domination by the Fujiwara regents and to compete more effectively for economic and political resources (Hurst 1999). The establishment of military rule in the Kamakura period (1185–1333), against which Ex-Emperor Go-Toba 後鳥羽 (r. 1183–1198) rebelled to no avail, accelerated the disempowerment of the Tennō. “After the Ōnin civil war of 1467–1477,” says Steenstrup, “the Emperor’s power [was reduced] to zero” (Steenstrup 1991: 70). Actual power had shifted to the ‘secular’39 buke 武家—arguably another critical juncture—and the emperor had become a mere symbolic representation of the mundane nomosphere of “the ruler’s law” (ōbō 王法).40

37 For more information on Kitabatake Chikafusa’s role for the Japanese perception of history, see Conlan (2011: 52ff.). 38 Kitabatake, Varley, and Vare (1980: 49). The original reads: 大日本者神國他。天祖ハジメテ基ヲヒラキ、日神ナガク統ヲ傳給フ。我國ノミ此事アリ。異朝ニハ其タグヒナシ。此故ニ神国ト云フ也。 (Kitabatake and Masamune 1934: 1). 39 Again, one can argue about the appropriateness of using ‘secular’ here. What is meant above all is that the ‘military nobility’ (Weber) by ‘job description’ pursues inner-worldly (seken) goals by inner-worldly means. This is not to suggest that ‘seken’ equals ‘secular’ and ‘shusseken’ ‘religious’! 40 The Tennō had become, as Max Weber put it, a powerless “‘insulated’ monarch,” while

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The decision not to rely on Buddhism for the legitimation of power allowed Buddhist institutions to develop more freely, as if they had entered into an indissoluble ‘community of destiny’ with the imperial house. By the end of the Heian period, Buddhist institutions had become as powerful as landowners, often enjoying tax exemption and immunity so that they felt entitled and impelled to ideologically formulate and propagate their autonomy vis-à-vis state institutions. They propagated the ideology of dual rule by the ruler’s law (ōbō) and the Buddha dharma (buppō 佛法), two interdependent nomospheres (ideally) responsible for mundane (seken, sezoku 世俗) and supra-mundane (shusseken) affairs respectively (Kleine 2013b, 2013a, 2001; Kuroda 1996c, 1983; Satō 1985). With its strong notion of transcendence and its devaluation of immanence, its claim for exclusive or at least privileged access to transcendence, and so forth, Buddhism laid the ideological foundations for a basic kind of binary functional differentiation between a ‘religious’ and a ‘political’ sphere. I assume that the institutional autonomy gained by the powerful Buddhist monasteries and temples during the Heian period generated social structures that called for legitimisation and the establishment of corresponding epistemic structures, namely the ideological framework of the “interdependence of the ruler’s law and the Buddha dharma” (ōbō buppō sō’i 王法佛法相依). The paradigm of the two interdependent nomospheres reflected to some extent institutional realities—i.e., the autonomy of Buddhist institutions vis- à-vis the ‘secular’ power blocks of the buke and kuge—and functioned as an emic ideal type that was widely accepted as a guiding concept of legitimate and beneficial governance. In other words, the discourse over the interdependence of the two nomospheres generated an epistemic structure that legitimised an emerging social structure, thereby functioning as a durable “plausibility structure” (Berger and Luckmann 1967: 110–122). The concrete arrangements of this dual rule, however, were highly flexible and situational.41 In general, the kuge and the buke as power blocks were seen as institutional representa- tives of the ruler’s nomosphere and the jike as curators of the Buddha dharma. The actual institutional arrangements and coalitions, however, changed over time and were multi-faceted. The powerful institutions established during the

“a family that is not encumbered with the monarch’s charismatic obligations and hence can provide the real ruler (maior domus, shogun)” seized power (Weber, Roth, and Wittich 1978: 1158); German original, Weber (1985: 688). 41 Also note that the attitude of Buddhist institutions was ambiguous. On the one hand, the autonomy and equivalence of the nomosphere of the Buddha with that of the ruler was emphasised—e.g., when it came to the appointment of abbots—but as soon as problems arose within the order—e.g., with heterodox groups—that could not be solved internally, the state institutions were called on for help.

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Heian period, such as Tōji and Enryakuji, were closely affiliated with the court nobility, whereas the Rinzai Zen institutions founded in the thirteenth century were associated with the Hōjō and the Kamakura bakufu. In any case, both the kuge and the buke needed the jike as advisors, spiritual guides, and ritual ser- vice providers.42 The respective conceptual distinction and the corresponding social differentiation between state and monastic institutions, mundane and supra-mundane “nexuses of social activities” (Stowers 2008: 442), purposes, value spheres, and so forth, resulted in a path dependent process of a longue durée that was still in effect at the critical juncture triggered by the enforced opening of Japan in the mid-nineteenth century. In short, the social and epistemic structures that functioned as antecedent conditions relevant for the reac- tions of the Japanese to the common shock of the encounter with imperialist Western powers, were the consequences of decisions taken at critical junctures much earlier in history.

7 Concluding Remarks

In conclusion, the question remains whether the specificity of the configuration of secularity in modern Japan can be persuasively explained by the existence of epistemic and social structures that have emerged in the distant past. Furthermore, the question must be raised as to whether the theoretical approach of critical junctures and path-dependencies is helpful in identifying the decisive historical moments at which these structures were established (or transformed) by far-reaching decisions of relevant actors, and whether or to what extent these structures affected structurally relevant decisions at later historical junctures—especially in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. As a reminder: in my view, the specificity of Japanese secularity under the global condition can be observed in the legal disputes about the categorisation of certain festivals, ritual acts, places and other cultural elements, which are regularly classified as ‘religious’ by scholars and assigned to Shintō as a religion. With regard to the ideal type of secularity as a form with two sides, constructed for heuristic purposes, there is an interesting deviation here, insofar as cultural elements elude an unambiguous assignment to either side, the religious

42 The relationship between rulers and Buddhist advisors reflects the old Buddhist paradigm of the interdependence of the ‘ruler-donor’ (Tib. yon bdag) and his religious ‘counsellor- donée’ (Tib. mchod gnas) which was particularly institutionalised in Tibet, Mongolia and Bhutan (cf. Ruegg 1995; Schwerk 2019).

Journal of ReligionDownloaded in Japan from Brill.com09/27/2021 8 (2019) 9–45 05:59:14AM via free access formations of secularity in ancient japan? 35 or the secular. In fact, this peculiarity should come as no surprise. In contrast to the European situation, which inevitably provides the prototype of secularity, in Japan, we are dealing with a historical diversity of cultural elements stem- ming from different systems of cognitive and normative orientation as well as cults and customs of different provenances. While modern European nation- states only had to organise their relationship to the established major Christian churches, the Meiji reformers faced the task of unravelling and reconfiguring a complex web of interwoven traditions. Put very simply, the challenge was to bring Buddhist, Daoist, Confucian, indigenous and (to some extent) Christian cultural elements into an order which, in the eyes of the Western powers, made Japan a legitimate, modern nation-state. This challenge spurred social and economic development, facilitated the adoption of the elements needed for such development, and at the same time, secured national unity, cultural identity and stable governance. For this to succeed, radical changes had to be made in some places, but in others, available plausibility structures and conceptual resources had to be relied upon in order to postulate a historical continuity necessary for the legitimation of power. A certain path dependency was thus given by precisely those social and epistemic structures and with regard to the specific arrangement of secularity; in particular, through the institutionalisation or embedding of the diverse ritual, symbolic and orientation systems, etc. It was quite easy to deal with Buddhism and Christianity, two strongly institutionalised socio- cultural formations with sophisticated systems of cognitive and normative orientation, ideally demanding a voluntary confession based on personal faith and thus forming discrete social units within a given society. In the case of Buddhism, especially within the Pure Land and Hokke traditions, the trend towards a confessionalisation that started in the Kamakura period had certainly contributed to Buddhism ‘becoming a religion’ in terms of a system of transcendence-oriented beliefs and practices to believe in and belong to.43 The functional equivalence of the two shūshi 宗旨 of Buddhism and Christian- ity had already been presupposed in the sixteenth century, and both traditions were discussed in the first modern Chinese style encyclopaedia Koji rui’en

43 For lack of space, I could not address this topic in any detail. I suspect, however, that the confessionalisation referred to here is at least partly to be interpreted as a consequence of the critical juncture at the end of the Heian period. The combination of a much lamented secularisation of the Buddhist institutions that had advanced to feudal lords and the shock of the destruction of Tōdaiji during the Genpei War nourished the belief in the end of the Dharma and caused the soteriological component of Buddhism as a redemptive religion of the individual to become more prominent.

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古事類苑 under the “religion section” (shūkyōbu 宗教部) (Jingū Shichō 1914: 17)—a headword that was unknown in earlier encyclopaedias and dictionar- ies. As we have seen, there are traceable historical causes for the establishment of Buddhism as a relatively autonomous institution with its own organisational structures, roles and communities, habitus and lifestyle, symbols, teach- ing system, ritual system, buildings, etc. The categorisation of Buddhism as shūkyō thus follows an established pattern and is therefore, so to speak, path- dependent. Another remarkable feature of the Koji rui’en is the fact that the “Deity Sec- tion” ( jingibu 神祇部) remained a separate category and was not subsumed under ‘religion,’ which of course corresponded to the religious policy of the time and the Edict for the Separation of Kamis and Buddhas (shinbutsu bunri no rei 神佛分離の令) of 1868. This brings us to the ambivalent status of Shintō, which in my opinion results from the fact that in the Meiji period, it was designed as a new bricolage of heterogeneous components of a longue durée. The combination of imperial ritual, mythological legitimation of power, local cults, a (partly) indigenous kami worship and elements of a “primal religion” (Pye 1996), Chinese cosmology, Confucian ethics, Buddhist and Daoist ritual elements, etc. makes modern Shintō a hybrid construct, which—according to modern taxonomy—can partially be assigned to the systems of politics and religion, but partly also to the areas of popular culture, traditional social festivities, general custom, or cultural heritage.44 As innovative as modern Shintō may be as a hybrid construct, its design follows structures that were established in the distant past and which could only be partially addressed here: the close linkage of the state ritual to the imperial house and its deliberate separation from Buddhism; the decision to legitimise imperial rule via a state mythology constructed from clan myths; the inability of Confucianism to institutionalise itself in the course of the Taika reform; the prevention of the establishment of Daoism by Buddhist actors, etc. The lack of institutionalisation of Confucian ethics (which were nonetheless assimilated and sub- liminally effective), Daoist rituals (predominantly handed down in esoteric Buddhism and in Shugendō) and general Chinese cosmology provided a reper- toire of cultural elements that were not clearly allocated to any religious system and could therefore be used as a toolkit in the course of the construction of Shintō. Finally, I would like to briefly evaluate the theoretical framework of critical junctures and path-dependencies. Due to space limitations, this cannot

44 Cf. Aike Rots’ contribution to this volume.

Journal of ReligionDownloaded in Japan from Brill.com09/27/2021 8 (2019) 9–45 05:59:14AM via free access formations of secularity in ancient japan? 37 amount to any comprehensive epistemological critique. For the time being, my only concern is the heuristic value of the approach for exploring historical dynamics in general and the formation of secularities in particular. Obviously, the approach entails a number of theoretical and methodological problems, which must be borne in mind when applying it. Apart from a sometimes deplored “inherent conservatism” (Beyer 2005), a certain tendency to determinism, etc., the termination of the beginning and end of a critical juncture, the assessment of the durability or changeability of structures, and thus the degree of dependence of structurally relevant decisions on paths once taken, etc., may cause considerable problems. How do you measure contingency and agency? The danger of judging historical development processes à posteriori as path-dependent in the sense of a lack of any alternatives and of losing sight of historically possible alternative trajectories that have not been embarked on is high. On the other hand, the focus on critical junctures and path-dependencies can help to identify historically relevant factors, which either have a structure-altering effect and whose accumulation leads to critical junctures, or have a structure-preserving effect and thus create path dependencies. If one takes the programmatics of the approach seriously, one will focus precisely on the question of available options at critical junctures and try to identify the factors that ultimately led to the decision in favour of an option (or its realisation, for that matter, in order not to restrict oneself too much to con- scious decisions of intentional actors). In this respect, I consider the approach to be quite fruitful. In the context of the concrete historical case study, of course, some of the problems addressed remain unsolved. For example, can the time span that roughly begins with the introduction of Buddhism and ends with the relocation of the capital to Kyōto still be considered a critical juncture? Or should we rather define a relevant event within this period (e.g., the collapse of Baekje and the ensuing Taika reform) as a critical juncture? Can the failed invasion of the Mongols be designated a critical juncture when it ultimately only led to a hardening of existing epistemic structures (self- exaltation as a divine nation under the leadership of an eternally ruling divine dynasty)? I think that answering these questions is of secondary interest for the time being. Decisive for the heuristic value of a theoretical approach is whether it opens up new perspectives, stimulates the right questions, orients one’s cognitive interest and provokes scholars to present new empirical data or reconsider others—be it to support or refute the theses proposed here. In this respect, I find the search for critical junctures and path-dependent processes most rewarding.

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