POLITICAL DYNASTIES AND DEMOCRACY: CASE STUDY OF PAKISTAN’S POLITICAL SYSTEM AFTER 1970S
By
Qamar Abid Hussain Reg. No. 84-gm-310 Ph.D. in Pakistan Studies
DEPARTMENT OF PAKISTAN STUDIES BAHAUDDIN ZAKARIYA UNIVERSITY
MULTAN
i DECLARATION
I hereby declare that the research work contained in this thesis entitled “Political Dynasties and Democracy: Case Study of Pakistan’s Political System After 1970s” has been carried out under the supervision of Prof. Dr. Muhammad Ishaque Fani, Department of Pak Studies, B.Z. University, Multan. I also declare that this dissertation has not been submitted for any degree elsewhere.
------Qamar Abid Hussain Reg. No. 84-gm-310 Ph.D. Pakistan Studies
ii CERTIFICATE
It is certified that the research work contained in this thesis entitled “Political Dynasties and Democracy: Case Study of Pakistan’s Political System After 1970s” has been carried out by Qamar Abid Hussain under my supervision and is approved for submission in partial fulfillment of the requirement for the degree of Ph.D. in Pakistan Studies.
------Prof. Dr. Muhammad Ishaque Fani Supervisor / Department of Pakistan Studies, B.Z University Multan
iii
I Dedicate This Thesis
To My Late Parents
iv ABBREVIATIONS AND GLOSSARY
AD- Annie Domino ANP- Awami National Party BD – Basic Democracies COP- Combined Opposition Party DAC- Democratic Action Committee EBDO- Elective Bodies Disqualification Order FATA- Federally Administered Tribal Areas IJI- IslamiJamhooriIttehad IND- Independents JUI-F- JammiatUlama-i-Islam (Fazal-ur-Rehman) JWP- JamooriWatan Party MMA – MuttahidaMajlis-i-Amal MPA- Member of Provincial Assembly MRD- Movement for Restoration of Democracy MNA Member of National Assembly MQM- MuahjirQaumi Movement/MuttahidaQaumi Movement NAP- National Awami Party NDF- National Democratic Front NWFP- North West Frontier Province PDM- Pakistan Democratic Movement PIF- Pakistan Islamic Front PKMAP- PakhtoonKhwaMilliAwami Party PML-N- Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz) PNA- Pakistan National Alliance PPP- Pakistan Peoples’ Party PPP-SB- Pakistan Peoples’ Party (Shaheed Bhutto)
v
Glossary
Biraderi – Endogamous kin group. Fatwa--- A Fatwa( Pl.fatwa) is an Islamic Legal opinion, which is given by the Mufti (specialist for Islamic Law “Fiqh”) on a special topic. Panchayat – Village level dispute resolution and decision-making body. Patwari – Village accountant. Qanungo – Official in charge for overseeing the patwarian at a given area. Lambardar Village headman Madrassa--- Religious School Mohalla----- Residential area, closer neighborhood Pir – Religious leader often descended from or linked to a Sufi saint. SajjadaNashin – Caretaker of a Sufi shrine. Zamindar – Landowner.
vi ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
All commendations to Almighty Allah who blessed me with intellect, patience and determination with which I completed this thesis.
First and Foremost, I would like to thank my supervisor Prof Dr. Muhammad Ishaque Fani for reviewing the thesis, providing suggestions and guidance from the day one for the completion of this dissertation. A special thanks to my teachers Prof Dr. Mussarrat Abid, Dr Sajid Mahmood Awan, and Dr Javid Akhtar Salyana for their encouragement and support.
I am grateful to the staff and officials of Election Commission of Pakistan and National Assembly of Pakistan for their cooperation during attending the joint and separate session of the parliament, providing academic facilities and access to official record of the government of Pakistan.
I am indebted to Dr. Liquat Ali Waseem and Muhammad Shafique who examined the manuscript, and discussed in detail and guided me in every aspect of this research.
I am also thankful to my best friend Mr. Ahmad Nawaz who helped me in review of this research-manuscript and imparted his valuable comments for improvement content and form of this manuscript.
It is matter of honour for me to mention my all fellows and friends who had been constant source of inspiration for me to undertake and complete this dissertation.
Qamar Abid Hussain
vii ABSTRACT
Political dynasties are phenomena that exist in democratic, semi-democratic and undemocratic countries in all over the world. The reasons and factors behind this phenomenon are not the same in each country due to variety in political system. In Pakistan, culture of political dynasties exists in major political parties. The leadership of these parties often claims internal democracy; the supremacy of the parliament and constitution but reality speaks contrary to it. The primary purpose of this research is to discuss the dynastic politics in the existing political structure of Pakistan. The thematic idea of this thesis is to dwell upon the dynastic politics as well as tracing out its roots in Pakistan. This research also unearths the political dynasties of dynastic elites and their role in democratization of political context of Pakistan. The thesis also discusses smaller and unnoticed political dynasties in Pakistan which play their pivotal role in political and kingship in Pakistan. This dissertation also presents an overview of political elites that transfer their political power to next generation in the form of political dynasty. Dynastic leaders are back bone of political and governmental formulation system in Pakistan. This research asserts that political dynasties can reduce the people’s representation in parliamentary democracy. It also generally influences the performance of all institutions especially those which are directly linked with dynastic politicians and policy-making. This influence has been examined in election results from 1970 to 2013. Political leaders who have other introduction as dynastic political leaders occupy a prominent position in political map of Pakistan. There is also evidence that dynasties gradually limitted when the political system are ensured within the political parties through internal democracy. But, according to this thesis, the political system of Pakistan itself has produced dynastic politics where political leadership had been limited to only a few families. Since 1970 elections have been held almost regularly under different electoral and political systems but the true democratic culture and democracy is still a dream to be realized.
viii Table of Contents Chapter No. 1 ...... 1 Introduction ...... 1 1.1 Significance of the Study ...... 14 1.2 Research Objectives ...... 15 1.3 Theoretical Frame Work ...... 16 1.4 Research Questions ...... 18 1.4.1 Hypothesis ...... 21 1.4.2 Research Methodology ...... 21 1.4.3 Data Collection ...... 22 1.4.4 Challenges and Shortcomings ...... 24 1.4.5 Data Analysis ...... 25 1.4.6 Scheme of Study ...... 27 1.5 LITERATURE REVIEW ...... 30 1.5.1 Elites and Political Dynasties ...... 30 1.5.2 Political Parties and Democracy ...... 36 1.5.3 Political System and Elections ...... 38 1.5.4 Political Leadership and Internal Democracy ...... 39 1.5.5 Elections as a tool to get people well ...... 41 Reference ...... 48 Chapter No. 2 ...... 57 The Historical Process of Elite Formation and Dynasties in Sub-Continent ...... 57 2.1 Present Political dynasties in the Sub-continent...... 58 2.2 Elites Politics and the Political System of Colonial Legacy ...... 59 2.3 Political Elite’s and Parliamentary Democracy in Pakistan (1947-1958) ...... 59 2.4 Military-Bureaucratic Elite’s Nexus and Failure of Political Institutions (1947- 1956) 61 2.5 Landowner Elite’s and Political Parties of Early Phase ...... 63 2.6 Proportion of Landlords in First Three National Parliaments ...... 64 2.7 Electoral Politics under the Parliamentary Democratic System (1947-1958) .... 65 2.8 Ethnic and linguist Elite’s and the Politics of One Unit ...... 67 2.9 Political Crisis and the role of Military-Bureaucracy Alliance ...... 69 2.10 Military Rule and Engineering of New Political System ...... 71 2.12 Military Rule with Presidential So called Democratic System (1962-1969) ...... 72
ix 1.13 Presidential Election 1965...... 72 2.14 Basic Democracies Election and the Emergence of Bidararism ...... 73 2.15 Ban on Political Parties and Disqualification of Politicians ...... 73 2.16 Party politics under the Political Party Act 1962 ...... 74 2.17 The Politics of Indirect Election and the emergence of Opposition Parties ...... 75 2.18 Mass Movement and the Politics of Ethnicity...... 76 2.19 The End of Ayub Era ...... 77 References ...... 79 Chapter No. 3 ...... 85 Political Dynasties and Democracy in Pakistan After 1970s ...... 85 3.1 LFO and the Election 1970 ...... 85 3.2 Constitution 1973 and New Political System of Parliamentary System (1973- 1977) 89 3.3 Election 1977 and mass movement Against Bhutto ...... 90 3.4 General Zia and Emergence of Ethnic Politics ...... 92 3.5 General Election 1985 ...... 92 3.6 Election 1988 ...... 94 3.7 Election 1990 ...... 94 3.8 Election 1993 ...... 96 3.9 Election 1997 ...... 98 Source: The Election Commission of Pakistan, Islamabad, 1997...... 99 3.10 Musharraf Rule with New Political System ...... 99 3.11 Election 2002 and the Restoration of Democracy ...... 100 3.12 Election 2008 and Statistical Analysis of Political Dynasties...... 101 3.13 Military Role in Dynasties Politics ...... 102 References ...... 129 Chapter No. 4 ...... 134 Dynastic Politics of Political Parties and their Leadership ...... 134 4.1 A Brief History of Major Dynastic Parties in Pakistan ...... 135 4.1.1 Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) ...... 135 4.2 Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) ...... 137 4.3 Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) ...... 139 4.4 Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM) ...... 140 4.5 Awami National Party (ANP) ...... 141 4.6 Jamiat Ulema Islam-Fazal-ul Rehman Group (JUI-F) ...... 142
x 4.7 Jamat-i-Islami (JI)...... 143 4.8 Candidates Selection in General Elections...... 152 4.9 PPP and Leadership of Bhutto Dynasty ...... 159 4.10 Pakistan Muslim League and Leadership of Sharif Dynasty ...... 162 4.11 In Pakistani politics land is king...... 164 References ...... 166 Chapter 5 ...... 171 Data Analysis & Interpretation of Results: ...... 171 Chapter 6 ...... 296 Discussion, Conclusion and Recommendation ...... 296 6.1 Discussion ...... 296 6.2 Conclusion...... 304 6.3 Suggestions: ...... 313 6.4 General Recommendations/Direction for further Research ...... 314 References ...... 316 Bibliography ...... 344 Appendices ...... 349 Appendix A ...... 349 Appendix B ...... 351 Appendix C ...... 352 Appendix D ...... 353
xi LIST OF TABLES & FIGURES
Table 5.1 Frequency Distribution of the age of the respondents...... 171 Table 5.2 Frequency Distribution of the Types of the respondents ...... 172 Table 5.3 Frequency Distribution of the Types of the respondents ...... 173 Table 5.4 Frequency Distribution of the respondents Length of political career of the respondents ...... 174 Table 5.5 Frequency Distribution of the Gender of the respondents ...... 175 Table 5.6 Frequency Distribution of the responses of the respondents Academic Qualification ...... 176 Table 5.7 Frequency Distribution of responses of the respondents Name of the Political Parties ...... 177 Table 5.8 Frequency Distribution of responses of the respondents Nature of the Constituency ...... 178 Table 5.9 Frequency Distribution of the responses of respondents Did you go for party ticket? ...... 179 Table 5.10 Frequency Distribution of the responses of respondents Did you win the party ticket on the basis of Party affiliation? ...... 180 Table 5.11 Frequency Distribution of the responses of respondents Did you win the party ticket on the basis of personal vote bank? ...... 181 Table 5.12 Frequency Distribution of the responses of respondents Did you win the party ticket on the basis of financial position? ...... 182 Table 5.13 Frequency Distribution of the responses of respondents Did you think that your party work would play a vital role for your nomination as a candidate? ...... 183 Table 5.14 Frequency Distribution of the responses of respondents Did you win the party ticket on the basis of electable position in constituency? ...... 184 Table 5.15 Frequency Distribution of the responses of respondents Did you win the party ticket on the basis of your political profile? ...... 185 Table 5.16 Frequency Distribution of the responses of respondents Did your party nominate the candidate through democratic method? ...... 186
xii Table 5.17 Frequency Distribution of the responses of respondents Did you win the party ticket because of your Biradari has huge share of votes? ...... 187 Table 5.18 Frequency Distribution of the responses of respondents Did you win the party ticket because you depositing/donation of party funds?...... 188 Table 5.19 Frequency Distribution of the responses of respondents Did you win the party ticket because you have a support from local stakeholder? ...... 189 Table 5.20 Frequency Distribution of the responses of respondents Does your party contest internal election regularly? ...... 190 Table 5.21 Frequency Distribution of the responses of respondents Does your party discourage the selection rather than election in the matter of candidate nomination? ...... 191 Table 5.22 Frequency Distribution of the responses of respondents Does your party encourage appositive opinions? ...... 192 Table 5.23 Frequency Distribution of the responses of respondents Does your party permit the party workers a share in the top leadership? ...... 193 Table 5.24 Frequency Distribution of the responses of respondents What was the demography of your constituency? ...... 194 Table 5.25 Frequency Distribution of the responses of respondents If your father/mother were the head of the party, what would be the chance in your selection? ...... 195 Table 5.26 Frequency Distribution of the responses of respondents How much influence of your family/ brand name has in your selection? ...... 196 Table 5.27 Frequency Distribution of the responses of respondents Did you feel party manifesto/programme matter in your selection? ...... 197 Table 5.28 Frequency Distribution of the responses of respondents Did native language matter in your selection? ...... 198 Table 5.29 Frequency Distribution of the responses of respondents If your father/mother were the head of the party, what would be the chance in your selection? ...... 199 Table 5.30 Frequency Distribution of the responses of respondents How much influence of your family/ brand name has in your selection? ...... 200
xiii Table 5.32 Comparison of Level of the Respondents about the candidates centered political system towards political dynasties and democracy in the case of Pakistan...... 202 Table 5.33 Comparison of Level of the Respondents about the internal democracy in political parties towards political dynasties and democracy in the case of Pakistan...... 202 Table 5.34 Comparison of Level of the Respondents about the retain family rule towards political dynasties and democracy in the case of Pakistan ...... 203 Table 5.35 Overall Comparison of Level of the Respondents about the political dynasties and democracy in the case of Pakistan...... 203 Table 5.36 Overall Comparison of Level of the Respondents about the political dynasties and democracy in the case of Pakistan on the basis of the age groups of the respondents ...... 204 Table 5.37 Overall Comparison of Level of the Respondents about the political dynasties and democracy in the case of Pakistan on the basis of province of the respondents...... 205 Table 5.38 Overall Comparison of Level of the Respondents about the political dynasties and democracy in the case of Pakistan on the basis of profession of the respondents ...... 206 Table 5.39 Overall Comparison of Level of the Respondents about the political dynasties and democracy in the case of Pakistan on the basis of the length of political career of the respondents ...... 207 Table 5.40 Overall Comparison of Level of the Respondents about the political dynasties and democracy in the case of Pakistan on the basis of academic qualification of the respondents ...... 208 Table 5.41 Overall Comparison of Level of the Respondents about the political dynasties and democracy in the case of Pakistan on the basis of belongingness of the political parties of the respondents ...... 209 Table 5.42 Overall Comparison of Level of the Respondents about the political dynasties and democracy in the case of Pakistan on the basis of Nature of the constituency of the respondents ...... 210
xiv 5.43: Age of the respondent * Internal democracy Cross tabulation ...... 211 5.45: Age of the respondent * Internal election in the political party Cross tabulation . 212 5.46: Age of the respondent * Discouraging Candidate Selection rather than elections in the party Cross tabulation ...... 212 5.47: Age of the respondent * Encouraging opposite opinions on the nomination of political candidate Cross tabulation ...... 213 5.48: Age of the respondent * Permitting the party workers a share in the top leadership Cross tabulation...... 213 5.49: Age of the respondent * Considering Party manifesto for Candidate Nomination Cross tabulation...... 214 5.50: Age of the respondent * Open discussions for candidate nomination in the party Cross tabulation...... 214 5.51: Age of the respondent * Voter opinion or local level recommendations for candidate nomination Cross tabulation ...... 215 5.52: Age of the respondent * Role of Family or brand name in candidate nomination Cross tabulation...... 215 5.53: Age of the respondent * Father/mother head of the party Cross tabulation ...... 216 5.54: Age of the respondent * Demography of the constituency Cross tabulation ...... 216 5.55: Age of the respondent * depositing party funds for getting ticket Cross tabulation ...... 217 5.56: Age of the respondent * Getting Public Sympathy after Political Assassination in the constituency Cross tabulation ...... 217 5.57: Age of the respondent * Democratic Nomination of the Political Candidate Cross tabulation ...... 218 5.58: Age of the respondent * Role of Personal/family vote bank Cross tabulation ...... 218 5.59: Age of the respondent * Previous member in Parliament Cross tabulation ...... 219 5.60: Age of the respondent * Cabinet member in the Parliament Cross tabulation ..... 219 5.61: Age of the respondent * get ticket due to electable in the constituency Cross tabulation ...... 220 5.62: Age of the respondent * Retaining family rule in the constituency for nomination Cross tabulation...... 220
xv 5.63: Place of the respondent * Internal democracy Cross tabulation ...... 221 5.64: Place of the respondent * Family member in Politics Cross tabulation ...... 221 5.65: Place of the respondent * Internal election in the political party Cross tabulation ...... 222 66: Place of the respondent * Discouraging Candidate Selection rather than elections in the party Cross tabulation ...... 222 5.52: Place of the respondent * Encouraging opposite opinions on the nomination of political candidate Cross tabulation ...... 223 5.53: Place of the respondent * Permitting the party workers a share in the top leadership Cross tabulation...... 223 5.54: Place of the respondent * Considering Party manifesto for Candidate Nomination Cross tabulation...... 224 5.55: Place of the respondent * Open discussions for candidate nomination in the party Cross tabulation...... 224 5.56: Place of the respondent * Voter opinion or local level recommendations for candidate nomination Cross tabulation ...... 225 5.57: Place of the respondent * Role of Family or brand name in candidate nomination Cross tabulation...... 225 5.58: Place of the respondent * Father/mother head of the party Cross tabulation ...... 226 5.59: Place of the respondent * Demography of the constituency Cross tabulation ...... 226 5.60: Place of the respondent * depositing party funds for getting ticket Cross tabulation ...... 227 5.61: Place of the respondent * Getting Public Sympathy after Political Assassination in the constituency Cross tabulation ...... 227 5.62: Place of the respondent * Democratic Nomination of the Political Candidate Cross tabulation ...... 228 5.63: Place of the respondent * Role of Personal/family vote bank Cross tabulation .... 228 5.64: Place of the respondent * Previous member in Parliament Cross tabulation...... 229 5.65: Place of the respondent * Cabinet member in the Parliament Cross tabulation ... 229 5.66: Place of the respondent * get ticket due to electable in the constituency Cross tabulation ...... 230
xvi 5.67: Place of the respondent * Retaining family rule in the constituency for nomination Cross tabulation...... 230 5.68: Social position of the respondent * Internal democracy Cross tabulation ...... 231 5.69: Social position of the respondent * Family member in Politics Cross tabulation. 231 5.70: Social position of the respondent * Internal election in the political party Cross tabulation ...... 231 5.71: Social position of the respondent * Discouraging Candidate Selection rather than elections in the party Cross tabulation ...... 232 5.72: Social position of the respondent * Encouraging opposite opinions on the nomination of political candidate Cross tabulation ...... 232 5.73: Social position of the respondent * Permitting the party workers a share in the top leadership Cross tabulation ...... 232 5.74: Social position of the respondent * Considering Party manifesto for Candidate Nomination Cross tabulation ...... 233 5.75: Social position of the respondent * Open discussions for candidate nomination in the party Cross tabulation ...... 233 5.76: Social position of the respondent * Voter opinion or local level recommendations for candidate nomination Cross tabulation ...... 233 5.77: Social position of the respondent * Role of Family or brand name in candidate nomination Cross tabulation ...... 234 5.78: Social position of the respondent * Father/mother head of the party Cross tabulation ...... 234 5.79: Social position of the respondent * Demography of the constituency Cross tabulation ...... 234 5.80: Social position of the respondent * depositing party funds for getting ticket Cross tabulation ...... 235 5.81: Social position of the respondent * Getting Public Sympathy after Political Assassination in the constituency Cross tabulation ...... 235 5.82: Social position of the respondent * Democratic Nomination of the Political Candidate Cross tabulation ...... 235
xvii 5.83: Social position of the respondent * Role of Personal/family vote bank Cross tabulation ...... 236 5.84: Social position of the respondent * Previous member in Parliament Cross tabulation ...... 236 5.85: Social position of the respondent * Cabinet member in the Parliament Cross tabulation ...... 236 5.86: Social position of the respondent * get ticket due to electable in the constituency Cross tabulation...... 237 5.87: Social position of the respondent * Retaining family rule in the constituency for nomination Cross tabulation ...... 237 5.88: Social position of the respondent * Turn out Cross tabulation ...... 237 5.89: Length of political career of the respondent * Internal democracy Cross tabulation ...... 238 5.90: Length of political career of the respondent * Family member in Politics Cross tabulation ...... 238 5.91: Length of political career of the respondent * Internal election in the political party Cross tabulation...... 239 5.92: Length of political career of the respondent * Discouraging Candidate Selection rather than elections in the party Cross tabulation ...... 239 5.93: Length of political career of the respondent * Encouraging opposite opinions on the nomination of political candidate Cross tabulation ...... 240 5.94: Length of political career of the respondent * Permitting the party workers a share in the top leadership Cross tabulation ...... 240 5.95: Length of political career of the respondent * Considering Party manifesto for Candidate Nomination Cross tabulation ...... 241 5.96: Length of political career of the respondent * Open discussions for candidate nomination in the party Cross tabulation ...... 241 5.97: Length of political career of the respondent * Voter opinion or local level recommendations for candidate nomination Cross tabulation ...... 242 5.98: Length of political career of the respondent * Role of Family or brand name in candidate nomination Cross tabulation ...... 242
xviii 5.99: Length of political career of the respondent * Father/mother head of the party Cross tabulation...... 243 5.100: Length of political career of the respondent * Demography of the constituency Cross tabulation...... 243 5.101: Length of political career of the respondent * depositing party funds for getting ticket Cross tabulation ...... 244 5.102: Length of political career of the respondent * Getting Public Sympathy after Political Assassination in the constituency Cross tabulation ...... 244 5.103: Length of political career of the respondent * Democratic Nomination of the Political Candidate Cross tabulation ...... 245 5.104: Length of political career of the respondent * Role of Personal/family vote bank Cross tabulation...... 245 5.105: Length of political career of the respondent * Previous member in Parliament Cross tabulation...... 246 5.106: Length of political career of the respondent * Cabinet member in the Parliament Cross tabulation...... 246 5.107: Length of political career of the respondent * get ticket due to electable in the constituency Cross tabulation ...... 247 5.108: Length of political career of the respondent * Retaining family rule in the constituency for nomination Cross tabulation ...... 247 5.109: Gender of the respondent * Internal democracy Cross tabulation ...... 248 5.110: Gender of the respondent * Family member in Politics Cross tabulation ...... 248 5.111: Gender of the respondent * Internal election in the political party Cross tabulation ...... 248 5.112: Gender of the respondent * Discouraging Candidate Selection rather than elections in the party Cross tabulation ...... 249 5.113: Gender of the respondent * Encouraging opposite opinions on the nomination of political candidate Cross tabulation ...... 249 5.114: Gender of the respondent * Permitting the party workers a share in the top leadership Cross tabulation ...... 249
xix 5.115Gender of the respondent * Considering Party manifesto for Candidate Nomination Cross tabulation...... 250 5.116: Gender of the respondent * Open discussions for candidate nomination in the party Cross tabulation...... 250 5.117: Gender of the respondent * Voter opinion or local level recommendations for candidate nomination Cross tabulation ...... 250 5.118: Gender of the respondent * Role of Family or brand name in candidate nomination Cross tabulation...... 251 5.119: Gender of the respondent * Father/mother head of the party Cross tabulation .. 251 5.120: Gender of the respondent * Demography of the constituency Cross tabulation . 251 5.121: Gender of the respondent * depositing party funds for getting ticket Cross tabulation ...... 252 5.122: Gender of the respondent * Getting Public Sympathy after Political Assassination in the constituency Cross tabulation...... 252 5.123: Gender of the respondent * Democratic Nomination of the Political Candidate Cross tabulation...... 252 5.124: Gender of the respondent * Role of Personal/family vote bank Cross tabulation 253 5.125: Gender of the respondent * Previous member in Parliament Cross tabulation... 253 5.126: Gender of the respondent * Cabinet member in the Parliament Cross tabulation ...... 253 5.127: Gender of the respondent * get ticket due to electable in the constituency Cross tabulation ...... 254 5.128: Gender of the respondent * Retaining family rule in the constituency for nomination Cross tabulation ...... 254 5.129: Gender of the respondent * Turn out Cross tabulation ...... 254 5.130: Education of the respondent * Internal democracy Cross tabulation ...... 255 5.131: Education of the respondent * Family member in Politics Cross tabulation ...... 255 5.132: Education of the respondent * Internal election in the political party Cross tabulation ...... 256 5.133: Education of the respondent * Discouraging Candidate Selection rather than elections in the party Cross tabulation ...... 256
xx 5.134: Education of the respondent * Encouraging opposite opinions on the nomination of political candidate Cross tabulation ...... 257 5.135: Education of the respondent * Permitting the party workers a share in the top leadership Cross tabulation ...... 257 5.136: Education of the respondent * Considering Party manifesto for Candidate Nomination Cross tabulation ...... 258 5.137: Education of the respondent * Open discussions for candidate nomination in the party Cross tabulation ...... 258 5.138: Education of the respondent * Voter opinion or local level recommendations for candidate nomination Cross tabulation ...... 259 5.139: Education of the respondent * Role of Family or brand name in candidate nomination Cross tabulation ...... 259 5.140: Education of the respondent * Father/mother head of the party Cross tabulation ...... 260 5.141: Education of the respondent * Demography of the constituency Cross tabulation ...... 260 5.142: Education of the respondent * depositing party funds for getting ticket Cross tabulation ...... 261 5.143: Education of the respondent * Getting Public Sympathy after Political Assassination in the constituency Cross tabulation ...... 261 5.144: Education of the respondent * Democratic Nomination of the Political Candidate Cross tabulation...... 262 5.145: Education of the respondent * Role of Personal/family vote bank Cross tabulation ...... 262 5.146: Education of the respondent * Previous member in Parliament Cross tabulation ...... 263 5.147: Education of the respondent * Cabinet member in the Parliament Cross tabulation ...... 263 5.148: Education of the respondent * get ticket due to electable in the constituency Cross tabulation ...... 264
xxi 5.149: Education of the respondent * Retaining family rule in the constituency for nomination Cross tabulation ...... 264 5.150: Political Parties * Internal democracy Cross tabulation ...... 265 5.151: Political Parties * Family member in Politics Cross tabulation ...... 266 5.152: Political Parties * Internal election in the political party Cross tabulation ...... 267 5.153: Political Parties * Discouraging Candidate Selection rather than elections in the party Cross tabulation ...... 268 5.154: Political Parties * Encouraging opposite opinions on the nomination of political candidate Cross tabulation ...... 269 5.155: Political Parties * Permitting the party workers a share in the top leadership Cross tabulation ...... 270 5.156: Political Parties * Considering Party manifesto for Candidate Nomination Cross tabulation ...... 271 5.157: Political Parties * Open discussions for candidate nomination in the party Cross tabulation ...... 272 5.158: Political Parties * Voter opinion or local level recommendations for candidate nomination Cross tabulation ...... 273 5.159: Political Parties * Role of Family or brand name in candidate nomination Cross tabulation ...... 274 5.160: Political Parties * Father/mother head of the party Cross tabulation ...... 275 5.161: Political Parties * Demography of the constituency Cross tabulation ...... 276 5.162: Political Parties * depositing party funds for getting ticket Cross tabulation ...... 277 5.163: Political Parties * Getting Public Sympathy after Political Assassination in the constituency Cross tabulation ...... 278 5.164: Political Parties * Democratic Nomination of the Political Candidate Cross tabulation ...... 279 5.165: Political Parties * Role of Personal/family vote bank Cross tabulation ...... 280 5.166: Political Parties * Previous member in Parliament Cross tabulation ...... 281 5.167: Political Parties * Cabinet member in the Parliament Cross tabulation ...... 282 5.168: Political Parties * get ticket due to electable in the constituency Cross tabulation ...... 283
xxii 5.169: Political Parties * Retaining family rule in the constituency for nomination Cross tabulation ...... 284 5.170: Nature of the constituency of the respondent * Family member in Politics Cross tabulation ...... 285 5.171: Nature of the constituency of the respondent * Internal election in the political party Cross tabulation ...... 285 5.172: Nature of the constituency of the respondent * Discouraging Candidate Selection rather than elections in the party Cross tabulation ...... 285 5.173: Nature of the constituency of the respondent * Encouraging opposite opinions on the nomination of political candidate Cross tabulation ...... 286 5.174: Nature of the constituency of the respondent * Permitting the party workers a share in the top leadership Cross tabulation ...... 286 5.175: Nature of the constituency of the respondent * Considering Party manifesto for Candidate Nomination Cross tabulation ...... 286 5.176: Nature of the constituency of the respondent * Open discussions for candidate nomination in the party Cross tabulation ...... 287 5.177: Nature of the constituency of the respondent * Voter opinion or local level recommendations for candidate nomination Cross tabulation ...... 287 5.178: Nature of the constituency of the respondent * Role of Family or brand name in candidate nomination Cross tabulation ...... 287 5.179: Nature of the constituency of the respondent * Father/mother head of the party Cross tabulation...... 288 5.180: Nature of the constituency of the respondent * Demography of the constituency Cross tabulation...... 288 5.181: Nature of the constituency of the respondent * depositing party funds for getting ticket Cross tabulation ...... 288 5.182: Nature of the constituency of the respondent * Getting Public Sympathy after Political Assassination in the constituency Cross tabulation ...... 289 5.183: Nature of the constituency of the respondent * Democratic Nomination of the Political Candidate Cross tabulation ...... 289
xxiii 5.184: Nature of the constituency of the respondent * Role of Personal/family vote bank Cross tabulation...... 289 5.185: Nature of the constituency of the respondent * Previous member in Parliament Cross tabulation...... 290 5.186: Nature of the constituency of the respondent * Cabinet member in the Parliament Cross tabulation...... 290 5.187: Nature of the constituency of the respondent * get ticket due to electable in the constituency Cross tabulation ...... 290 5.188: Nature of the constituency of the respondent * Retaining family rule in the constituency for nomination Cross tabulation ...... 291
xxiv
xxv Chapter No. 1
Introduction
The presence of political dynasties in any civilization cannot be neglected. Approximately, in every political system, their presence can be observed; though such dynasties have largely been noticed in those countries where self-governing politics still has not been taken its roots. These dynasties fit themselves in political structure by many ways. They exert influence of ‘name-recognition’ of their respective dynasties or take undue political mileage in electoral process which cannot be blocked by the weak socio- political systems. It is due to the patronage and influence of customer’s trait that these dynasties survive.
In the recent times, political institutions are very responsible for empowering and depowering the political parties. In dictatorship, political power is generally limited to a few people or their groups that preserves their personal interests instead of public interests. On the other hand, when democracy is in its swings, political power is fairly seen to be distributed to a larger party. Principally democracy shows the rule of majority. In democratic countries or societies, politicians have nothing to do with institutions. Institutions are free in to perform their constitutional roles. It is due to these reasons that political systems of such countries are strong and cohesion is observed in their nations.
Caste which shows a group of people of the same tribe or locality is deemed to be primary or fundamental source in formulation of dynasties. Kinship networks help in building dynasties. Politicians who desire to enjoy fruits of dynasties continuously promote kinship networks to seek support based on caste. Such leaders become identity of that caste which they represent. Dynastic politics appears like the maintenance of political authority in one or more ways. The progenitor is a person who represents any group based on locality.
The political dynasties of Pakistan depict the modernity while in their family structure they are traditional. Those tribes which were part of previous governments as
1 well as of British rule are more powerful even after the creation of Pakistan. Pakistani society is a versatile society of South Asian region. Pakistani society has been trapped by more than 500 such families and tribes as they own vast lands, billions of rupees and well-known name recognition. Such tribes are socially and politically dominant. The electoral politics of Pakistan moves around the larger and smaller dynasties from the very first general election 1970 to the latest general election 2013.
Today, the third generation of these dynasties is ruling under the parliamentary democratic system of Pakistan. Pakistan experienced different political systems and under these systems political structure and electoral system has also been changed but the one thing remained constant that was the dynastic representative of the people. In Pakistan, political image is very grim and pathetic. True democracy has never been seen however Pakistani society is still struggling. Political institution has never been strengthened. Only some dynastic elites are facing the country. The political recognition of the country is related to these small groups only. The members of these small groups are in-fact relatives to each other formulating the basic structure of dynastic politics. Since its creation, these small groups are ruling in Pakistan. These groups play their role in political process and government making in Pakistan. These groups after being a part of the government are absolutely independent to form political process of their own choice. These groups also uplift their economic, social, cultural and political conditions as well as their own positions.
The political leaders who led these parties during the independence movement and after independence they emerged as the charismatic leaders not to be equaled with others in the party hierarchy. This situation laid its impact on the growth of authoritarian trends in these parties later. It is, therefore, imperative to investigate the conditions, the absence or presence of which may contribute to the growth of a political party as a democratic political institution and development of a competitive party system in the country.
Today, participatory democracy revolves around the Political parties. The developments of intra party democracy are very essential for the democratic system in
2 Pakistan. The role of political parties is the tool of democratization in Pakistan. It is a reality that political parties remained undeveloped resulting into immature Pakistani society. Most of the experts who have grasped political issues denigrate the political leaders of Pakistan for having dictatorial attitude in their parties while these leaders always pose to be the champions of democracy and democratic values. They consider their parties as their chattels to be bequeathed to their descendants alongwith their other property. This research also highlights that dynastic politics in which succession of leadership belongs to the same family, maintain power through various means and forms.
The political assassination of Ex-Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto provided the Bhutto family another chance to continue the dynasty of Bhutto family in Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) that remain one of the largest political forces for last four decades. After the political assassination of Benazir Bhutto, her son, Bilawal Zardari Bhutto at the age of 18 years was selected as the chairman with his father Asif Ali Zardari as co- chairman of the party. He also added surname Bhutto with his actual so as he may exploit established repute of Bhutto in Pakistan. The myth of dynastic rule has repeatedly been termed as a concept that causes the nation numerous adverse effects. The list seems to have no ending.
It is astonishing that the champions of democracy, heading different political parties never uttered a word about “internal party democracy” and the absence of “internal party democracy” consequently leads to the situation that politics in Pakistan mainly remains ‘personality-driven’ rather than based on issue. Thus the distinction between democracy and dictatorship become fudged as the style of governance under both remains autocratic. In Pakistan, little attention has been paid to the organizational structure through which much of the politics take place. The nature of democracy is affected by specific institutional structures and legal rules. In fact, ‘popular will’ translates into electoral mandate through the medium of these structures and rules.
3 The entrenched ground rules of political competition in Pakistan are such that ostracize challengers and fail the forces of change. There seems to be a covenant among our political elites that springs out of their vested interests in dynastic politics that they would work together to prevent easy penetration in party leadership by outsiders and commoners. The 18th Amendment (2009-10) to the present Constitution of Pakistan (1973) provided safe passage for continual of dynastic politics. They withdrew the clause under which internal elections of political parties were mandatory.
These are not the perverted political parties alone which enable individual politicians to monopolize authority but a larger structure of social values and norms that support the barriers to get entry into politics. It is appropriate to behave as a society that places higher emphasis on pedigree, clan and wealth in choosing political leaders as opposed to the integrity and facility of the individual. This dynastic control is operating at many levels. At first, the party leadership is monopolized by some families. As the leadership of Pakistan Muslim League (N) is led by the Sharifs, PPP led by the Bhuttos and Awami National Party (ANP) is led by the Khans. It is a pity that main political parties with religious agendas like Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (Fazl-ur-Rehman) JUI (F)) and Jamiat Ulema-e-Pakistan (Noorani Group) JUP (N) fall under the same category of dynastic leadership. In most of the parties, the headship automatically passes on from one generation to the next. The process least bothers to receive any objection from any corner. Apart from headship of major political parties, dynastic politics at secondary level can also be observed where renowned political families have, for decades, captured their native constituencies of national and provincial assemblies. These families regularly occupy many seats in their native districts. Many parliamentarians come from each of these families. The indirect nomination of women seats in parliaments has provided extra opportunity for these dynasties to get extra seats. At the third level (the local government level) the close relatives of these leaders and other members of these families have considerably controlled by the local governments; the third ties of government. Majority of the political dynasties belong to feudal families.
Although some steps to curtail power were taken in the form of land reforms, but those were done half-heartedly. Pakistan is a developing country and experiencing
4 democracy. History shows that Pakistan has adopted three out of four patterns of governments that are presidential-cum-parliamentary. It is very appropriate time to decide whether the political dynasties of major political parties especially that of PPP, PML (N), JUI (F), JUP(N) and ANP are suitable for the survival of democracy of Pakistan or not. Unfortunately Pakistan has already lost a lot of time in this background as well in to killing the effects of dictatorship.
Conceptual Understanding of Some Political and Social Terms
Elite
The word elite means “the pick of cop” referring to the best grapes for a vintage, in other words, the chosen. (Vilfredo Pareto,1916) was the first who clearly attempted to examine elites and said that every identifiable grouping within society produces an elite. It consists of those who had, who have had, or will have power (Tong, D. 2019).
The basic concept of political elites was introduced in modern time in the early part of the 20th century by famous Italian Gaetano Mosca and Vilfredo Pareto, both the scholars advanced the thesis that in society there was always a group that ruled and group that was ruled, and that the former is numerically smaller than the latter. Mosca called the ruling group a political class (Mosca, G., Kahn, H. D., & Livingston, A. 1939) while Pareto designated it as a governing class; distinguished it from non-governing elite (Pareto, V. 1968). The subject of elites has been treated in variety of ways and has given rise to theoretical, ideological, and methodological controversy (Mosca, G., Kahn, H. D., & Livingston, A. 1939).
Others have viewed elites as performing a particular function in social and political development. Lipset, for example, points out that one of the requisites for political development is a competent elites, motivated to modernize their society. The similar view are advanced by (Keller,1963, 4) who defined elites as minority of individuals designated to serve a society collectively in a valued way. In her views, elites performed socially a significant function, viz, the attainment of important social goals and maintenance ofcontinuity of social order. In several cases elites are uniform and
5 homogenous but are divided in term of their functions in modern society. Therefore we may have political military business, and intellectual elites who operate within limited sphere of influence. The only true law was that society would always be ruled by elites of some sort.
Elitists have concentrated their attention on decision-making which is the point at which the possession of power is made manifest. A single minority or a number of minorities have power to make the big decisions which will determine the future course of society. On the way of political system which maintains itself through the recruitment of political elites who will support it. Simply, an elite is a group of people who differ from other people on certain attributes like power, ownership of property, education, ethnicity, religious occupation or skill etc. In the elitist thesis, the tension is between the dominant political elite and any rival elite which may arise to challenge for power. The mass of the population is unorganized and it becomes politically significant when it is unified by elite.
Origin of Elite Doctrine
The origin of elite doctrines was clearly directed against Socialism and to some extent against the idea of democracy. One of the major issues that they raised concerns the relation between elites and social classes with particularly, reference to the Marxist concept of ruling class and there had been much controversy on this subject. Aron attempted a synthesis of ‘class’ sociology and ‘elite’ sociology through a careful analysis of relation between social differentiation and political hierarchy in modern societies and later suggested a more discriminating terminology in studying both classes and elites Aron, R. (1950). On the other hand Mills (1956) proposed to substitute the concept of power of elite for that of ruling class which he considered a ‘badly loaded phrase’ which he contained the assumptions and economic class rules politically. Mannheim has emphasized the ‘democratization of culture’ and the emergence of democratic elites which resulted from selection by merit and reduction of the distance between elites and masses. Since the 1950s studies of elites by political scientists, sociologists and historians multiplied. The elite groups which had received particular attention are political leaders
6 including revolutionary elites Lasswell and Lerner, the heads of business enterprises, high-ranking bureaucrats, military chiefs and intellectuals (Lasswell, H. D., & Lerner, D. (Eds.). 1965).
Nature of Elites in Pakistan
The Pakistani political elites exist and operate at the center of network of patterns and processes that constituted Pakistani political system. In order to analyze elite formation and elite relation, it is necessary to outline the general characteristics of the system of political processes within which the political elites move. The political elites persisted and exercised significant power over the behavior of large number of people and succeeded to gain access and to allocate highly prized resources in the national political system.
Political Dynasty
Dal Bó defined political dynasty in a very different way. According to him, dynasties relate to a family having one member in earlier congress (Dal Bó, E., Dal Bó, P., & Snyder, J. 2009). Ishibashi, Reed and Asako defined a political dynasty just saying it as group of some politicians who owned political offices from their family members (Ishibashi, M., & Reed, S. R. 1992). Thompson described political dynasties simply as direct and indirect political power (Thompson, M. R. 2012). Querubin described as dynasty as dominating political powers gained by families (Querubin, P. 2010). His definition was very identical to Camp (1982). Hess (1966) included a family into dynasties if it had four members in politics. Feinstein (2010) elaborateg the meaning of office from Congress to governor and senator. Querubin just limited it to holding a charge of governor or member of congress from one’s family prior to his/her taking part in election.The scope of the definition given by Dal Bó et al., Rossi, Ishibashi and Reed, Asako et al. and Thompson was limited and it was unable to cover monopolies of dynasties and effects over democracy.
Finally, Hess’s definition regarding limitation of four members of family in dynasties was confusing and produced problems. In some areas family name was not a
7 part of tradition as in Indonesia. Secondly, Hess particularized four members of the family must have been elected to various public positions. His definition was problematic because if there were three members but they showed dynastic phenomenon would not be a part of dynasty.
The Origins of Political Dynasty
Each scholar had different explanation for emergence of dynasty but there were many common phenomena as well. While Dal Bó explaining it in the context of congress argued that it was directly related to the period of holding a charge of office. Arryman in his research stayed responsible candidate’s family. He declared it as “power begets power (Kenawes, Y. C. (2015).” Feinstein also developed the same views on his American origin of dynasties. Feinstein, B. D. (2010). Crowley, Reece (2013), Kurtz (1995), a group of scholars, agreed on single point that behind these all dynasties was success earned by brand name. Crowley, G. R., & Reece, W. S. (2013).
Dynastic politicians exploited people’s emotions regarding their previous faithfulness in electing their forefathers. Dahl (1971, p. 12) discusses that mild to moderate level of inclusiveness might to be observed at every level local to national and to international level. O'Donnell (2010, p. 24) Levitsky and Way (2010, pp. 9-12) argued that it was due to uneven situations which brought about dynasties (Levitsky, S., & Way, L. A. 2010).
However, Gibson (2005, p. 9) argued that notwithstanding any reason, in the existing setup, dynasties had the ability to influence the electoral results (Gibson, E. L. 2005). However, the media was a progressive and most developed and vivid institution. But dynasties had also succeeded to make their lobbies in institutions as in the media. They indoctrinated the public in different ways and tried to change the public opinion.
Levitsky and Way (2010) discussed the success of dynasties at national level whereas this research discussed at all level of political and democratic institutions (Levitsky, S., & Way, L. A. 2010). This research also discussed manipulation of results as proposed in the study of Schedler (2002) titled as “menu of manipulations”. He
8 formulated fourteen strategies formula in this regard. It had strange effects, pros and cons of all these strategies resembled a lot those of dynastic politics. The 14 strategies of Schedler (2002) were as under (Schedler, A. 2002).
Reserved positions and domains
Exclusion and fragmentation of opposition forces
Repression and unfairness
Formal and informal disenfranchisement
Coercion and corruption
Electoral fraud and institutional bias
Tutelage and reversal.
These strategies violated seven normative premises of democracy, including: Empowerment
Freedom of supply
Freedom of demand
Inclusion
Insulation
Integrity
Irreversibility.
9 Why are Dynasties?
One cause of existing dynasties was the continuity of eclecticism. Studies showed that dynasties were more organized and were dominant. They also showed political and electoral function as well. Anyhow dynasties were able to maintain their position as discussed by Pareto-1901, Michels-1915, Mosca-1939, Mills-1956 and Putnam-1976. Michels (1915) stated that tendency to power was in the nature of political party (Pareto- 1901, Michels-1915, Mosca, G. 1939).
Michels, (1915). Dal Bó, Dal Bó, and Snyder (2009) also recorded that wealth and connectivity of people played a role in oligarchy thus produced “preachment effect” for elites on representative democracy(Michels, R. 1915). Hess (1966) recorded some attributes for dynasties. His list was as under. He called dynasties as “best butter” in American background of politics (Hess, S. 1966).
Old stock Anglo-Saxon Protestant Professional Eastern seaboard Well to do Democratic and political dynasties were taking births in Mexico, Philippines, Thailand, Latin American countries, India and Pakistan. They inherited financial and physical resources for their political structures. Politicians got huge salaries in some countries of the world. These salaries formulated substratum for future political structure for dynasties. The economic and income differences of politician to a common man were very huge in Philippines and it gave rise to inequality and paved a way to dynasties (Mendoza, etal. 2012).
Asako, Matsubayashi and Eueda’s (2012) failed to make any analysis of reasons to vote for dynasties. However, they agreed that dynasties had higher probability of success. Afterwards, Mills wrote that institutional and communication meant power was
10 better exploited by the dynasties (Asako, etal. 2012). Elections were the tool of selection for new leadership. It is just as assumption that people knew about their leaders. Casey was of the opinion that voter’s cast vote on merit.
Feinstein observed 04 percent dominance of dynastic politics over others in the political system of United State of America (USA). Diamond vowed that only reason for dynasties success was that people were not interested in politics. Greer concluded that once in old Eastern Bloc states, everyone was given right to vote only for already selected member. It gave the practice of choosing dynasties.
According to Zaller in the USA people are educated however they vote for entrenched government policy. This was the reason that Winters and Page described the United States as an oligarchy as the state produced political inequality (Zaller, J. 1998). Tocqueville said that it was due to democratic tyrannies creating ‘soft despotism’. According to him this was an ideology of complex and hidden rules for governing a country. Giddens (1984, 15) while correlating power and its after shorts like incentives and persuasion said that economic resources and their exploitation knowledge made things happening and equalize ways towards dynasties (Anthony, G. 1989).
The Oxford Dictionary highlights ‘dynasty’ as a serial of rulers from the same family. According to Hess, Whilst Bill and Hillary Clinton might be classified political family. Hence inequality of resources and powers gives rise to one-group hegemony and contrarily to it forces other groups to organize themselves and get re-alignment with small factions of the people. A state governed by dynastic political party paved an example of such power resources that offered unequal opportunities for other forces within and beyond the country.
According to Khan (2001), discretionary powers vested by the leaders were keys to favour or disfavour one political group. Such powers created ways of corruption as well as strengthened one group and weakened the other one. These discretionary steps might give rise to stigmatization and provide a substratum to dynasties (Khan, H. 2005). Flexibility in laws where candidates join other parties without resigning first, usurp
11 executive functions and give rise to nepotistic recruitment and the base of dynasties. Bahadur (1998) suggested that civil servant should approach politician for their service matters (Bahadur, K. 1998).
Political System
Political system as an empirical phenomenon denoted the total sum of the laws, customs, conventions, political institutions and political cultures of the country. It was used interchangeably with the state. Those social interactions and institutions through which a society made decisions considered bound by the most members of society most of the time. It also was representing political life of the society.
Origins of the Political System
The term, the political system was taken for granted as a way of referring to the political life of the society; this was always so. As a term with specific analytic implications it had only recently emerged, arguably entering into popular use of political science in 1953, the year in which the Political System first appeared. The term gradually spread from academe to general use, so that by the 1980s it was regularly being used in both technical and lay terminology to refer to the specifically political aspects of social life (Vernon Bogdanor, 1987, 478).
The notion of a political system represented more than just a new term: it reflects a transformation in the way in which students of politics were able to theorize about their subject matter and pursued empirical inquiries. It is not accidental that its emergence coincided with and reinforced the introduction through the so-called behavioral revolution of the religious methods for empirical research about political phenomena. But the term also reflected and contributed to the occurrence of a broader intellectual’s movement and the revolution system (Emery, 1969). Just as the ideas of mechanism and evolution were dominated thoughts and perspective in the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries, the ideas of system had become pervasive in the twentieth century.
12 Finally, it is implied that if systems other than the political were important consequences for each other and for all systems taken as a whole then they must had prevailed. In short, system is an image of the whole society as an over-arching system behavior composed of a variety of less extensive sub-system (such as the political, cultural and economic and demanded the mode of analysis that would permit the analyst to identify and separate out the political system for special attention.
Here two points emerged; one held that a set of behaviors or social interactions, and institutions can form a system only if they had certain natural coherence. Whatever the elements of the political system were whether they are units of power, decisions or authoritative allocations, the interactions and institutions concerned with term must hang together so that changes in one area would probably have important effects on other area.
The second school of thoughts was of the opinion that any set of elements could be designated as a system. The only question that aroused was whether it constituted an interesting system; that did something. In this view we could include within any political system at the focus of attention of all those aspects of society which was more or less directly related to making these kinds of decisions. Legislatures, courts, parties, interest groups, electorates and the like showed the kind of close relationships required by this interpretation of the nature of a system. The constituent elements of political system might therefore vary depending on which interaction and institution it seemed, in a given society, to be most closely related to making and implementing political decisions.
The differences that we could stress among the different levels of the political system with respect to electoral systems referred exclusively to the evaluation of the different electoral systems. The appreciation of the electoral systems depended on the context in which they operated, that was, on certain circumstances, conditions, objectives and demands. Therefore, the value of the electoral systems could vary according to the political system level. In fact, different choices of electoral systems at the different levels could be perfectly justifiable (Lijphart, A., & Aitkin, D. 1994).
13 Election played a central role in the creation of Pakistan. It also played an important role for the division of Pakistan in the civil war of 1971. It was also used as a tool to get the legitimacy of dictatorship. This research also pointed out how legislation was difficult due to presence of dynastic electives in National Assembly and dynastic selectees in the senate. The previous researches and theoretic were quite limited in this regards.
1.1 Significance of the Study
Electoral results reflected the measurement of political dynasties in the political parties and constituencies. It was noteworthy that the few dynasties in Pakistan played a vital role in electoral activity. This caused disequilibrium in the political system. The instant study helped to understand how the political dynasties affected institutionalization of democracy in the political parties particularly in their decision making process. It is also indicated how dynastic pillars were cemented in the Pakistani society. This research also pointed how legislation was difficult due to presence of dynastic electives in National Assembly and dynastic selectees in the senate.
This work also attempted to analyze the link between the dynastic politics and public leadership and impact of their interactions in the political sphere. The study highlights inefficiency of the electoral governments and nepotism of the bureaucracy.It failed to strengthen the democracy and faith of the people on democratic institution.
Democracy needs institutions such as viable political parties, an independent judiciary,free and responsible press, a professional civil service and an obedient army. This research also indicates that these institutions are not well developed in case of Pakistan.
This research has examined and identified crucial weaknesses in the rule of law and the administration of justice, lack of independence of the judiciary, role of elites, undemocratic character of parliamentarians, civil institution, the parliament and the role of the president.
14 This work also attempted to analyze the link between the dynastic leadership and public and the impact of their interactions in the political sphere. This work also attempted to analyze the link between the politics of political dynasties and democracy and the impact of their interaction in the political sphere. The weak segment for the nature of Pakistani politics has been argued which has been used by a dictator as a mask. Although Democracy seems very easy task to do but the political leadership failed to develop democratic norms and values in Pakistan. In Pakistan, serious issues were raised when the parliamentary democracy system returned as the major structure of the political system.
This research shows that there is a closed link among the political dynasties, democracy and the electoral system in the political history of Pakistan. It is, therefore essential that the roles and organizational natures of political parties are examined in the democratizing political system to measure the growth of democracy in a country. Pakistan had been repeatedly under military rule. Democracy requires the proof at priority which is a wide famous consensus how politics is to be carried out. When we talk about more democracy then we find also that it is in itself a consensus.
1.2 Research Objectives
This research would be helpful in the achievement of following objectives:
1- To find out the family succession mechanism and political legacies which Pakistan inherited from colonial period of British government? 2- To search out the factors which had been responsible for the failure of parliamentary democracy in political history of Pakistan? 3- To find out the factors which had led to the dominance of political dynasties in electoral politics of Pakistan after its creation? 4- To discuss the role of party workers within the political parties in which political dynasties were at top gear.
15 5- To search out the method by which a common political worker might become a meaningful part of the political process if he does not belong to a political family and does not possess excessive wealth to gatecrash a party. 6- To critically analyze whether the political leadershipswere devoted to democratic culture in their parties or their actions were responsible for the growth of political dynasties in Pakistan.
1.3 Theoretical Frame Work
Three major ideas are there on the appearance of political dynastic in Asian politics: i) The culture lists understand in the post majestic period Being a renewal of custom political principles. The customary principles confront political growth in post colonial Asian conditions. authority in the area looks like as a consequence of communication among western representations of influence and controls and customary civilization and protect by the spiritual faith. The customary beginning of authority seats more stress on the significance of the magnetic plea of head.
In the other meanings, the beauracratic civilization by hereditary from colonial administration understands authority as a unfriendly institutionalizations of pecking order. The connections among unfriendly institutionalization and chain of command have developed the inconsistency of South Asia transformation, where the customary use of authority is opposed manufactured to the tries in modernizing the states as well as its political civilization and scheme. The culturalist vision is pertinent to the notion of readiest of faith in the conversation of communal assets. citizens in the identical readiest of faith divide ordinary principles and standards to attain together individual and collection welfare. The societies can decrease deal reasons between associates inside the readiest. The readiest can be vide a fine and it can partly cover a thin readiest of faith may basket the possible for collaboration with non associates with affiliate showing presence to get merit at non associate wide. Moreover, it can be a hurdle to obtained material
16 distribution novelty and the growth of person capital. unluckily slender readiest of faith live in numerous communities and can more often than not be established in the relation . In Pakistan’s scenario, though, the state has taken on the arrangement of contemporary political scheme. It sustains the customary standards of authority kindred that are standing on the significance of persons and their individual hierarchal systems of groups to give safety. Hierarchy workers has each individual has self section in come together of prototype. clatter primordial organization, it also a particle that the readiest of faith in Pakistani communities is thin. The under mentioned this reason the foundations of assortment and endorsement provided extra main concern to instant associates of the round. chiefly in a community where authority shows rank and not a earnings to obtain ordinary purpose. as a result, when an individual imprison community work place, this way he has assess the relations rank, this relations keep the rank by choosing associates of the in office relations. ii) The Unitarian viewpoint builds the appearance of following rules only as the instrument for selected person to get and sustain their political management . It supports the selected person to set up firmly legality and reduce disagreement inside the association. political rules lok like as tool to keep away from pledge factionalism inside association with political groups , Governments and communal revolutions. The dynastical politicians are a sign to agreement rival groups powerless stakeholder to reach the broader globe association and revolutions . iii) The idea number three is expressing by Mark Thomson who settle these gizmo idea by gathering that political rules are the consequence of communication among accepted faith in the notion of take over ant charm and the leaders purpose to major his political power. He also recommended that a political rule is not essentially annoying to exacting kinds of political organization of an extent of financial growth. It can come out in establishment a self-governing organization, self-governing group, or in rising industrialize
17 states . The state of affairs develops a shared interdependence among elites at the state and limited grounds.
Political elites at the state point, hold from the confined elites who have firm confined system to gather for choosen them. In other side, elites at the restricted points require safety and assert from their complements at the nationwide points sustain their support in the areas. For instance, they could wait to accept a better financial plan share on be high- quality for nationwide growth scheme. The continuation of supporting rules have produced additional anxiety related to the excellence of democratic system and its crash on the ability to bring first-class community work places that hand out the community wellbeing. Political rules can potentially obstruct financial growth and weaken selected compositeness. The very well that areas beneath the management of rules politicians are fewer effectual in taking of financial growth to the citizens, still while the get extra financial plan share from middle administration. in addition, the continuation of political rules from ongoing for community work places , as dynastic politician has improved possibility to charming voting system. As a result, those areas will produce less -excellence politician, which in turn will influence their aptitude to run community financial support and produce financial growth. The occurrence of rules politics does not essentially associate which elevated scarcity, short principles of livelihood or person growth. The political consist of one or more political relations, but a political relation does not of necessity shape a political rules.
1.4 Research Questions
On the basis of above discussion, the following research questions were used by the researcher:
1- How did dynasties come into being within political parties?
18 2- What were the factors behind the formation of dynasties in political parties and particular constituencies? 3- Whether do or don’t the political dynasties create leadership crisis in Pakistan’s Politics? 4- To what extent hadthe political dynasties block the ways for common political workers in mainstream politics? 5- To examine whether dynastic elites emerge due to unjust power-sharing among political authorities of Pakistan:
This thesis discusses that political dynasties of major political parties and few families of political dominion of Pakistan were the result of a combination of inherent political system of colonial system and the Electoral system of Pakistan established by the different governments starting from the first general election. The research also argues that political assassination of heads of the political parties lead the political dynasties in Pakistan. There are number of factors that are responsible for the development of political dynasties in their parties in their constituencies. The three major political parties that contested all general elections and local bodies’ election were based on the political dynasties.
In Pakistan, political engineers at different time designed such institutional structures which had generally resulted dynasties politics in political development and political dynasty in political parties. This study discusses actions of politicians in their statements about democracy and their democratic perceptions about development of true democracy. It also encompasses political leaders anti-democratic policies and their way of resolution towards political conflicts or crisis.
Democracy did not take its basis in Pakistan in the earlier days. Therefore, it was important to inquire how much the intrinsic instrumental and constructive values are or are not taking roots in the political leadership of Pakistan, how the leaders and their parties make it difficult for the political system to grow with democratic norms,to what extent the political parties of Pakistan fulfill these conditions as political organizations and how much they are democratically as political organizations. What the problems are
19 in building such a dynamic political institution in a developing country andwhat role the parties play in democratization in Pakistan. It focuses on thepolitical institutions, which are essential for the political development and democratization process of a country.
20 1.4.1 Hypothesis
On the basis of the above discussion, the following general hypothesiswhich were to be tested in this study:
H1: It was more likely that majority of the political candidates were getting their nomination in the elections in order to retain their family rule in the party.
H2: Apropos to candidate’s opinion the leadership of most of the political parties would not allow their party workers to have their share in the top leadership.
H3: The political candidates from Punjab province would be more likely to share for being previous members of the parliament as compared to other provinces.
H4: It was more likely that majority of the political candidates in Pakistan would be landlords as compared to the professionals.
H5: The political candidate with lesser length of political career (young) would be more likely to encourage opposite opinion with regard to candidate’s nomination.
H6: The candidates with higher education would less likely to deposit in party funds as compared to less educated ones.
H7: The well-educated candidates would be less likely to be elected in the parliament as compared to less educated candidates.
H8: The candidates from PPP & MQM would be more likely to consider party manifesto while nominating their political candidates for elections as compared to other political parties.
1.4.2 Research Methodology
This research partwas related to research methodology, its methods, tools, sourcesused for research data collection. It also encompasses how the data was processed and how tools were exploited for collection of information and its analysis (Moyser, G.,
21 & Wagstaffe, M. 1987). This section highlights the main challenges prevailing in the research process. It also describes how these challenges were dealt. In fact, the study of politics is related to combination of evidence and its application to different forms of tests used to evaluate its validity and reliability. This research is mainly based on pragmatic research in context of political dynasties and up to date democracy in Pakistan. This study is explorative and it covers different such kinds of factors that are important for the creation of political dynasties. The political dynasties in-fact makes eccentric the will of the people in the political system of any democratic country. A method, such as analysis of content has been used for data-analysis. It has also been encompassed and characterized how political dynasties come into existence and how political parties contribute in development of system which strengthed democracy. It has also been studied how parties and their contributed effects influence in development of political system especially in the context of Pakistan. This research discusses the roles of different political parties represented in different eras. The role of these parties in segregation, combination, integration and representation for public at large has been studied. During times, formulation of parties, influence on formulation of dynastic politics, character of parties individually and character of dynastic parties in democratic process and rule as well as during the martial law has been studied evidently as well as statistically.
1.4.3 Data Collection
The researcher in this research exploited qualitative as well as quantitative techniques of data collection. As, it was a research of social sciences and basic psychology in its very nature, it is therefore, likely to admit that research design used in this research was explorative and descriptive. The responses of the respondents, infact, were not predictable as collected data were empirical and responses were in different qualitative attributes (Thomas, R. J. 1993). These responses were extracted from their sources by use of close-ended questions outraged through research Questionnaire. In such cases where predetermined concepts and variables were privileged, quantitative data were resulted. The data were collected mostly through such sources as might be listed as secondary sources as have been previously published in different materials. Such
22 materials were available in manifestoes of political parties as well as in the record of election commission of Pakistan.
Primary data were mainly gathered and extracted from Members of National Assembly (MNA) who were sitting MNAs as a result of general election-2013 and party heads. Political scientists and political analystsalso provided such information which may be enlisted as Primary Data. The plenty of information was collected through interviews focusing on to gather information about internal structures of the parties, decision-making processes of the parties within parties and beyond it in making government or crafting strategies (Berry, J. M. 2002). Questionnaires were distributed to parties having political dynasties as well as other.
In order to determine whether a candidate was dynastic, the researcher used a surname-matching approach. First the researcher collected all information about all the members of National Assembly from their nomination papers submitted to Election Commission of Pakistan like candidate’s name, party ticket certificate, and electoral district, physical asserts, previous development work and nature of constituency. The questionnaire technique had a purpose of gathering intrinsic information from any insider to provide tangible information about democracy within the dynastic party. Interviews in this context complemented remaining deficiencies for inoculation of any concept, doctrine, theory or law used for generalization. At least, three representatives were chosen for interview from each political party. These representatives represented them on any of the level in the district/provincial or central level as it was convenient for the researcher.
Purposeful technique of sampling was also used when political experts, professors, analysts, writers, columnists and critics were contacted through unstructured interviews. Their views were recorded for research speculations and hypothesis (Dexter, L. A. 2006). Published materials, previous relevant researches, newspapers, official documents, constitutional developments, bills, acts, ordinance, record of institutions all provided material for secondary data. For systematic analysis and endorsement of collected data, party as well as national documents like country constitutions, party
23 constitution, party manifestos, party strategic plan, shadow budgets, rule books and annual reports were consulted. Co-relations of the political parties, dynastic parties their contributions into law making and constitutional development and democratization had been interrogated. Different natures of intra-party election and procedures of dynastic political party as well as non-dynastic political party had also been examined. The collected information yielded in-sighted information about mutual relationship between two different compositions of politics like dynastic politics and non-dynastic politics. In- case, if any respondent of political parties was unable to respond due to any reason, the researcher consulted available record of political parties like party portfolio, record, constitution, manifesto and profile. Conclusions were drawn systematically.
1.4.4 Challenges and Shortcomings
Firstly, in this research, the researcher mostly collected data about parties through official sources and records. In this way, the data lacked objectivity at a larger scale likewise is the case with independence (Gamble, A. 2002). On the available data and collected record conclusions had been made which might create uncertainty to some extent. Greater the objectivity results into higher need of counterbalancing whereas in the case of Pakistani political parties, the official party line might not be read with ordinary party members. The official lines and pragmatic lines were apart from each other. It is due to limited scope of the research, the researcher did not bother extensively on this dilemma and it just made conclusions on the basis of available data and the data which collected from primary resources and secondary resources by the researcher.
Secondly, it was to be noticed that this research was limited to four provinces of Pakistan engaged in formulation of federal government. The sampling technique was subjective to the elitist class of the parties in Pakistan. An intensive follow up of this research in rural areas of Punjab and insurgent areas of Baluchistan and KPK would help in better conclusion but it was not possible within the scope of this research.
Thirdly, some of the respondents to the questionnaire had no access to and understanding of all the party records encompassing decades. As such, these respondents
24 were unable to comprehend and to respond the each part of the questionnaire correctly as per its fulfillment. Such sensitive materials like financial records were not available with some of the respondents. It has also been examined that some politicians were extra cautious to share their financial assets, consumption and resources due to various reasons.
1.4.5 Data Analysis
This research, in a way was based on stage sampling as well as it followed a special procedure for collection of data. Therefore, for analysis of data, researcher followed a specific procedure according to the collection of information (Hay, C. 2002). Twenty different independent as well as interdependent variables had been discussed in this research. Mainly these variables were included-: (i) Self-Parachuting (ii) Brand Name (iii) Power of land ownership (iv) Political Assassination (v) Intra-Democracy in political parties (vi) Weak Political System and (vii) Leadership/Candidate’s Selection. Then analysis was made by different conceptualizations extracted from the primary main participant variables. There was direct and logical relationship between preliminary and secondary variables. This relationship was linear as well as circular, dependent as well as independent.
This research boundsin deep knowledge on political system and developmental system in prospect of Pakistan. It also emphasized to have commanding grasp on political dynasties as well as on developing democracy within a political party among political parties of Pakistan. It was due to these very purposes that in this research explorative methodology had been opted instead of explanatory method. Moreover, by a purpose, exploratory type of research was mostly conducted into such an issue or social problem where such issues or problem had not been studied earlier. On the other hand, intensive research work had been conducted on the culture and behavior of political parties, political culture, and family politics processes in Pakistan. It was due to these reasons that arduous work had been done in this research for offing investigations. On the other hand this research was descriptive as it describes existing practice of political parties in Pakistan.
25 The politics of Pakistan has been studied in the light of various conceptual frameworks which successively occupied a pivotal position in the light of various conceptual frameworks of comparative politics. The researcher in this research critically observed the institution of politics and studied its culture in provisions of the behaviorist model survey based research. The research also follows structural approach while studying the formulation of political parties. The researcher termed the conversion of political parties into dynastic politics as civil society approach. The researcher also analyzed electoral dimensions within social context of Pakistan. The researcher also discussed the role of army in overtaking government as well as the influence of the army in party making or king making.
In this research, the factors for democratization and its breakdown were intensively considered and systematically analyzed. Since, the aim behind was concept of political dynasties and its role in democracy. Therefore, dynasties had been examined in different models. Role of political dynasties and their leadership in political context of Pakistan have been especially emphasized and analyzed. Systematically conclusions had been derived apropos to their slogans, manifestos, actions and statements.Political statements of a leader about democracy formulated his understanding and intended conceptualization about democracy. It was what which provided the very necessity and baseline to conduct this research. For a precise and accurate analysis of any of the political parties and leader, there are different methods.
Likewise other explorative researches, in this research, observation and interviews were conducted. Biographies had been repeatedly studied (Malterud, K., Siersma, V. D., & Guassora, A. D. 2016). Frequent analyses of primary and secondary information resources had been supplemented and critically examined. Mindful to the fact that there were advantages of analysis of political leadership in the light of past works about the leaders and their parties, interviews and bibliographies, the researcher also analyzed the written material already available as well as the interviews of people who were acquainted to any leader or related to him. It was due to the objective nature of the research problem that the researcher deeply examined, studied and analyzed biographies written about some political leaders by their friends. The researcher also analyzed
26 relevant journalists, pertinent newspapers and magazines of the relevant periods to gather maximum material for his research purpose. Moreover, the researcher also was capable to have access to the record of National Assembly, different standing committees, and different party processions to analyze the data in a better way to understand better and generalize his research topic.
The researcher conducted interviews with such vital people as had relevancy to some political leaders or they had physical contact with any leader. If he had no relevant person then the researcher contacted a person who was of that chronological period of which the political leader of researcher’s interest had been. This study also highlighted political gains and financial benefits of remaining in political system for a long time that paved way for probable establishment of political dynasty.
1.4.6 Scheme of Study
The first chapter of this research thesis deals with the introduction that is dedicated to studying the idea and concept of Political Dynasty, democracy and political system of Pakistan as a complex phenomenon of Political Science which occurred frequently in democratic as well as semi-democratic countries and is/wasa variable in which this problem coincided with concrete political circumstances. This made it possible to formulate a new definition of the concept of political dynasty, a definition which permitted us to study the importance and functions of political dynasties and democracy in political systems of Pakistan. It pertained to introduction, review of literature, statement of the problems, objectives, research questions and methodology. It was also focusing the theoretical aspects of the study. Theoretical part of study paves a frame work of study of the objectives to derive testable hypothesis.
The second chapter includes with a discussion of political development of Pakistan from 1947-70. The relation between political parties and their dynastic politics started from the first day of independence. The causes and factors of disintegration and fragmentation of political parties are also part of this chapter. The considering situations in which problems represented a threat to democracy and situations in which elections
27 served as a break through an authoritarian structure in non-democratic political system into dynastic political system. In this chapter the researcher also discusses the Basic Democracies System (BD system) that was introduced by General Ayub Khan as a Martial Law Administer of Pakistan in 1959. The critical discussion of Political Parties Act 1961 and the revival of political parties was the key of this chapter. At last the researcher discussed the reason for the downfall of Ayub government and the foundation of new political parties and alliances specially Pakistan People’s Party. The main theme of this research chapter was to know how political parties are transformed into personalized parties instead of the culture of internal democracy in parties.
The third chapter basically improved our understanding of the conceptual structure of the study of political system, electoral systems, electoral politics and the principles of representation in analytic terms. This chapter returned to the classic debate and laid a special emphasis on distinguishing between electoral results of last general elections from 1970 to 2008. In this chapter the researcher also critically analyzed principles of democracy and rules or formulas of decision making in major political parties of Pakistan. It also emphasized the importance of determining the political effects of principles of representation and the criteria that was useful for evaluating them. The chapter investigated how electoral politics, political dynasties and political system had interacted with each other. Electoral politics had become the only possible game towards resolving political conflicts.
This chapter bridges the gap in the literature on how parties determine candidates to select and how people vote, and on how centrality in a network affects votes and election.
In the fourth chapter the researcher discussed the dynastic leadership of the major political parties to know how this kind of leadership rise and make their influence on the general people whovote in election after election. What kind of political activity it pursued and what programme was followed, it is their influence, their interest, movements and attributes of personality which result in certain consequences. An analysis of the attitude of these groups or individuals towards political problems throw
28 light not only on personalized politics and their inherited politics but on the political system of Pakistan as well.The research want to know dynasties are formed in political parties that claim that they are leading force for the development of democracy in Pakistan.
It has been tried to explore that intra party factors as well as the extra party factors, which contribute to keep the political parties as weak and fragile political institutions in the selection of leaders to run the party leadership and the nomination of the candidate for contesting election. In second stage the researcher discusses one man party in which the personality of head of the party totally dominates in all decision of the party. This chapter mainly focuses on the introduction, internal structure and the decision making process of the political parties. This entire chapter is supported by the statically analysis of the criteria for the leadership election and the candidate selection for general elections.
Focus has been given to sections on factors such as the leadership problems or the roles of the leaders in the political parties, factional politics, and defection and institutionalization problemsin a party. The researcher will also investigate democratization process within the parties, campaign and party strategies in the democratization process and the extra party factors, for example, the military intervention in politics and so called cultural dilemma for internal democracy with respect to leadership selection and the nomination of the candidates.
The fifth chapter deals with the statically analysis with results and discussion of General election 2013 and the 13th National Assembly as a case study after filling questionnaires from Members of the National Assembly and in-depth semi-structure interview of the political leadership of the major parties. Hypothesis testing correlations among the different factors of the dynasties have also been made the part of this chapter.
In the end conclusion of all the results and its discussion is given.
29 1.5 LITERATURE REVIEW
In talking about literature on the said topic, the material which has been collected has indirect connection on with the thesis topic. The collected material has provided the basic foundation for elaborating the topic in thought provoking and convincing in detailed manner. The political dynasties enjoy their politics more than non- political dynasties. Recruitment of political workers is a model which describes the political wills of the political leaders. The political events have that will that accelerates or holds back transitions, resulted the sharing of position and standing and Influencing the constancy of the modal.
1.5.1 Elites and Political Dynasties
Gaetano Mosca (1939) concluded that in all civilizations the less urbanized is down to the most, higher and influential societies. The first category dominates authority and enjoys the compensation that control transport while the second the more many categories bound for and forbidden by the primary society. The learning of Prewitt and Czudnowski viewed that this is met on point that this is due to political socialization of the associates. Fox and Lawless called it as political socialization of the associates.
Downs, (1957); Feinstein (2010) discusses that already built reputation of parties becomes brands for the leaders and families. Built reputation is a cheaper source of conveyance of information to workers and followers. Brands help to exploit public through established reputes (Downs, A. 1957).
Werner, (1966); Kincaid, (1978) when an incumbent politician dies in office, nominating a relative in the subsequent by-election is not only a convenient way to replace the incumbent politician (and possibly earn sympathy votes). It may also be viewed as closely approximating the wishes of the electorates that had previously given a mandate to the now-deceased politician (Werner, 1966).
Miliband. R (1969) produced a similar but more critical exposure of the British elite in state in capital society.
30 Bayly (1973), Metcalf (1979) and Wash brook (1997) examined the procedure of colonization into government making.
Tariq Ali (1970) was of theopinion that the elite class had joined hands with the international power brokers, especially with that of USA and UK has a considerable influence on the ruling class of Pakistan throughout its containment policy. (Ali, T. 1971).
Asif Hussain (1979) elaborates the theme of political stratification and political elite in Pakistan. Discussing the political system of the country, the study suggests a continuity of the personalized nature of rule in the contemporary Pakistan from the medieval times, and argues that the rule of the medieval Muslim kings such as that of the Mughals was based on the personal loyalty. In fact, their political structures were indicative of patrimonial relations, non the less, the personalized rule in Pakistani polity has not been empirically substantiated in the research. The study classifies Pakistani elite into various categories such as the landowning, bureaucratic, religious, industrial, professional and military elite. Furthermore, the study investigates two kinds of relationship in the political system, which is meant for mobilization resources for exercising power or influence over other.
Huma Naz’s (1980) particularly focused on the bureaucratic elite. She also discusses the relationship between the bureaucratic elite and the political leadership. Her analysis remains confined within the framework of formal legal arrangements, and does not take cognizance of pragmatic steps using political resources by the bureaucratic elite to assert themselves via the political elite.
Zahid Hussain, (1985) also explains that the only a small number of groups have power in legislation in Pakistan since its creation. These groups usually are related to rural areas and have their own large areas of land. The political scenario after twentieth century is almost not unchanged and it is based on land lordship and its inheritances as well as things have been equally influenced by regional, spiritual and martial situations. The majority of these articles were scornful in their censure of political heads for being
31 apparently dedicated to democratic system as dealing their groups as “individual fiefdoms” or “relation heirlooms, possessions to be willing of at will through the head”
Laband and Lentz (1985-1986) and afterwards Feinstein (2010) studied relationship between relations and emergence of dynasties. They indicated two problems. Lott, (1986; 1987a & 1987b) in his papers states that long existence in government system establishes brand name. This brand name produces extra ordinary linkage and connection within its family.
Przeworski (1986) argues that it is due to non-availability of suitable and preferable substitutes that hinder to make any experience against dynasties.
J.C. Johari (1988) examined that political activities were a universal phenomenon. Politics was a continuum and versatile activity in decision making. He claimed that the similarities and difference in the inheritance and legacies were derived from British rule.
Verba, Schlozman and Brady’s (1995) study showed that participation of parents in political process leaves its lasting political effects for political offspring. Preceding authors on Pakistani politics have largely framed their analyses in terms of elite, civil- military relations and how this has contributed to regime breakdown and the obvious lack of formal democracy.
(Diamond (1999b) and Merkel (1998) explained direct relation of elites towards stability. They observed the behavior of elites in constitutional process. They also evaluated their attitude vicariously. According to them, elites existing role towards democratization is not significant. They viewed and suggested their approach to visualize democracy is very poor. It may be observed in the light of their statements and performance shown in their defense in or about democracy. This study encompasses minimum and maximum definitions of democracy.
Diamond (1999) terms dynastic politics as the cause of the failure of democracy. In this way, the democracy was mostly dependent upon the acts of elites or dynastic leaders. Their functioning was like centripetal force for the democratic culture. Stability
32 of process was also possible due to stable functioning and commitment of dynastic politicians.
Gallagher (2003) noted that many dynastic candidates in Ireland were first nominated following the sudden death of an incumbent relative. Indeed, many female legacy candidates first entered in the arena of politics whose near ones lose their lives.
Smart and Sturm (2004) argued that term limits could benefit voters (extant) by making politicians more truthful about their policy preference, as it reduces the value of occupying public office.
Ritcher and Mark R. Thompson (2004 & 2012) gave a psycho-analysis for uplift of feminine dynastic political leadership in Southern and Southern East part of Asia. After assassination of their males (fathers or husbands), these females were believed as a symbol of bravery and resistance and had advantage to seek votes and support from the people.
An organization named PATTN Development Organization prepared a report (2006) on political dynasties. In this report, the formulation and functionaries of biradries had been discussed. These biradries network contested and sought mutual supports to alter election results in their favour.
Simbulan (2007) stated that political dynasty was a succession of people from the same family that played a role in politics. It is because people in a position were those who were involved in these dynasties. The people wanted to stay in their position because they wanted power for personal gain.
Keane and Merlo (2007) contributes to this line of inquiry by pointing out that term limits would disproportionately reduce the continuation probabilities of members of majority parties.
Kristoff (2008) proposed that these were inherited riches which empowered dynastic politics and provided advantages to those who have lesser quantities of riches.
33 Ali (2008) pointed out that the tragic dilemma that those parties which were controlled by some families and ancestors were not democratic in their spirit.Khwaja (2008) argued that the dynasties for maintenance of their authoritative position in the system depended on their relations.
Taniguchi (2008) and Feinstein (2010) argued that the resources of advantages possessed by legacy candidates give them substantial electoral advantages over non legacy candidates these advantages in turn may influence party (or primary voters) decisions about who to nominate.
Marium Mufti (2009) discussed two points for existence of dynastic politics. According to her firstly, it was the wish of a monarch that his kingship should remain in his or her family after his/her death and secondly due to legacy or previously existing law.
Muhammad Ibrahim (2009) tried to analyze colonial system in consequent power formation in Lahore. He proved biradari system influencing each election result in Lahore. According to the writer, due to benefits of biradari system, the scope of caste has been multiplied instead of declining. In this research, biradari has been explained as a tool mutual safety.
Querribin (2010) pragmatically studied the birth of neo dynasties in politics in Philippines Assembly. The writer observed that those politicians who were non dynastic during last election and were winners they brought their family members in the politics in offing or next election as compared to those who were losers in the last election.
Dr. MaleehaLodhi (2011) examined feudalism and nepotism as factors which hindered the leaders to contact with people resultantly political system suffered. She also indicated favoritism and popularity that were considered for choosing leadership. The merit of a member’s selection was argued by her as his linkage and influence in his relatives.
34 Asaka ed.al, (2012) defines the position of dynastic nature in context of its performance in legislation in Japan during the period of ten years commencing from 1997. It has been proved that dynastic figures preferably better enjoy their successes and chances as compared to their correspondents and contesters in vote-game.
Smith Daniel Markham (2012) examined the political dynasties in developed countries. The researcher explained the birth of dynasties in developed countries through a model which they call recruitment model. According to the researcher in developed countries like Japan and Ireland dynasties in politics have been increased.
Ali Chemma, Hassan Javid and Muhammad Farooq (2013) in their study focused on Punjab, politics and observe dominance of dynasties in it. These dynasties tie with one another in many different ways. They marry one another. They develop mutual interests with one another. They due to their staunch and strong bondage impede in the political path of non-dynastic counter parts. In their research, it has been encompassed that 400 families affected political process over last three decades.
Shahnaz Tariq and Muhammad Alamgir (2013) in their work manifested in Pakistan Vision examined the relation power or Biradarism Caste system in the political culture in Punjab Province. They focused on Khanewal District of Punjab particularly. They minutely focused on local body Election of 2001-2005 and concluded that non- party brand General Election of 1985 in Zia Era cultivated Biradarism in Pakistan election politics.
Mendoza et al., (2013), discussed that dynasties hindered public to communicate with their own elected governments. Dynasties are viewed as hindrances towards accountability. Dynastic figures try to preserve their interests in different ways. They use their influence in state machinery as well as in future political leadership selection.
Bohlken and Chandra (2013) investigate that in India the political parties promote dynastic candidates to get more votes in elections.
35 Nabila Akhtar and Sadia Mushtaq (2014)put light on dynastic politics in democratization. This research focuses factors which are responsible for birth of the dynasties in Pakistan. This research refers only few dynasties who enjoyed government in Pakistan.The candidates who have political dynasties use their influences and money to dominate and manipulate the politics. Political staffing is the procedure in which citizens may introduce them by looking for chance or may be approached by others to become the proprietors of such candidates. Elite employment has become a significant characteristic of any political scheme. (wolport, 1999, p. 22)
Thus, Dynastic elites may be described as a continuum of leaders from the same relations or anything having common in them and afterwards retained from generation to generation, is known as dynastic. The term has also been dealt as maintaining of political authority within one’s relations or simply kinfolks. Dynastic politics inherits a high obtainable characteristic and this fact is very based due to political employment as indicated by (Dal Bó, E., Dal Bó, P., & Snyder, J. 2009).
As a whole these learning give psychoanalysis causes for emergence of dynasties. Another reason for dynastic politics appeared as a result for political murders Like Indira Gandhi, Benazir Bhutto and her father’s murders etc. But some time it does not work as it happened in caseof the murder of Liaquat Ali Khan, former Prime Minister of Pakistan. Mark Thompson alongwith Ritcher introduced a relative psychoanalysis to evaluate the emergence of feminine dynastic leadership southern parts of Asia. The authors describe that in public opinion, it denotes courage and resistance of females if they continue politics after killing of their husbands or fathers.
First relates to name recognition (Brand of Name and its advantage) whereas other relates to Campaign Advantage.
1.5.2 Political Parties and Democracy
Lucian Pye (1966) commenting on the political parties in the developing countries writes. A variety of factors such as culture, socio-economic conditions and tradition may be attributed to this situation (Pye, Lucian at al, 1966). Nevertheless, the developing
36 countries in their socio-cultural and traditional settings have attempted to implement western institutions. In many developing political societies one such political institution is a political party. Lapalombara and Weiner(2015)maintain that to become an organization a political party requires: (1) Organizational continuity, 2) local units having proper integration with the national unit, (3) efficient leaders and (4) recruitment of supporters and followers (La Palombara, J., & Weiner, M. 2015).
Keith Callard (1968) was very logical in his opinion about democracy in Pakistan. According to him Pakistanis liked democracy and idealized it but the majority did not know the way of implementation of the democracy in the country. The uncertainty in the earlier decades of creation of Pakistan, according to him was due to this very dilemma (Keith Callard. 1968).
Dahl (1971) and Higley, Gunther (1992) stressed on importance of democratic culture, loyalty to the democratic system.
Philip Althoff, (1971), Urmila Sharma and S.K. Sharma,(2001) about Pakistan concluded that important thing to deal with this dilemma is continuity in ideology of political contribution (Sharma, U., & Sharma, S. K. 2001).
Powell (1982) evaluates that collapse of democratic government by means of martial law or by executive action shows less loyalty towards democracy.
Similarly, Huntington (1991) argues on strength and weaknesses of democracies. According to him, true willingness for maintenance of democracy lies in democratic and political system whereas weakness of democracy lies in dynastic political system. He also identified that change might be resulted if political parties in government and in opposition were unanimous for any joint action.
M.Rafique Afzal’s (2001) provided a comprehensive account of developments taking in Pakistan, from 1947-71 in a historical framework. It provides a coherent mix of facets in shaping the course of history ranging from domestic political developments to foreign relations.
37 Bartolini and Mair (2001) identified five steps for true political processes of which these four are very important:- i) channelizing corporate interests, ii) electoral process, iii) legislative process iv) the meritorious formation of the executive.
K.K. Aziz (2001) in his writings about political trends in Pakistan was of the opinion that democracy had been never let to flourish rather steps having been taken to weaken the political and democratic will and spirit. These steps paved way to dictatorial ghosts.
SohialMuhmood (2001) indicated those factors which hindered Pakistan to become a democratic country. He blamed the central government system which obstructed the true political and democratic process.
1.5.3 Political System and Elections
Khalid B. Saeed (1967) analyzed that the political system of Pakistan was based on political conflicts. These conflicts hindered the way of developing proper system. According to him, conflicts were basically lingering due to military regimes and interests of military in ruling. These conflicts resulted in weak and poor political system (Khalid B. Saeed, 1967).
Linz (1978b) stresses on the point that existing system may only be replaced with other if the system under observation is quite similar or better than the currently existing one.
Louis D. Hayes (1984) studied the political system of Pakistan. He pointed out the major limitation in the basic conceptual framework of the country. According to him, there is no harmony among the pillars of the state as required by the modernization. The constitution has not been respected. The state is mostly run with the personal benefits or grudges. The elected governments were thrown out sheer on futile reasons which have never been accepted by the public at large.
38 Ayesha Jalal (1995b) interlinked political system of Pakistan with British colonial rule. According to her, roots of the colonial were rule visible during the creation of Pakistan. She compares the political systems of both daughter countries i.e. Pakistan and India. According to her, a formal democracy of India is better than that of Pakistan. The writer argues that the traces of colonial system in Pakistan are more influential as Military Coups supplemented them. The strong military influence and bureaucracy are deemed as examples of colonial system by the writer.
Merkel (1998) lights on the legitimacy impact for survival of regime within existing system. According to him, the running system is based on necessity doctrine. If running is tried to replace it may result in rejection of political system and it will cast heavily.
Andro Wilder (1999, 1992-94) argues that the politician relates to a winning political relation that is nearby powerful and previously related to obtain able support system, voters then do not vote for a group but actually for a member who is predictable to come first and thus have approach to support.
Lawrence Ziuring (2003) is very right in his research in which he held responsible the political leaders of various parties for weak political system in Pakistan. He declared that Pakistani political parties lacked the true will of developing proper and progressive political system.
Allen Hicken and Erik Martinez Kuuhonta (2011) well described parties’ importance regarding the developing world. According to them institutionalization of parties and political system in the developing is unavoidable to channelize the social requirements.
1.5.4 Political Leadership and Internal Democracy
Rustow (1970) theorized that political leaders were better tools to resolve public conflicts in the light democratic norms which signify the commitment of political actors
39 towards democracy. Contrarily, it is evident that the democratic failure is associated with lack of democratic commitment by political leaders (Rustow. W. W., 1970).
J. Roland Pennock (1979) tried to distinguish two political phenomena. These phenomena were leadership and authority. The researcher also discussed limitations of behavioral frame work. The research explained that voters while making decisions preferred leader over followers and this gives to dynastic politics.
Ahamd Shuja Pasha (1995) blames that these are Pakistani people who are responsible for electing such leaders who failed to represent their true spirits. He also declares political leadership as inefficient. The writer once again blames a person of Pakistan that they expect from one political leader who exploits them for votes and support. Pasha’s observations are supposed biased as he directly blames people and does not highlight military dictatorship that hindered people’s struggle to become democratic.
MarufKhwaja (2008) provided the history of dynastic politics of Pakistan. According to him, everybody from the public as well as from politician was aware of the fact that without the brand name of "Bhutto", the existence of Pakistan People's Party was almost impossible. It also showed that organization of PPP was not built on scientific, rational and true political standards and pillars.
Summary of literature Review of political dynasties in different States By Different Authors Authors/Researchers Year Sources and Causes of Political States and Regions Dynasties Hess 1966 trade name benefit, localassociation U.S.A Kurtz 1995, 2001 trade name benefit U.S.A Dal Bó et al. 2009 trade name benefit U.S.A Feinstein 2010 trade name benefit U.S.A Crowley and Reece 2013 trade name benefit U.S.A Rossi 2009 a,c trade name benefit Argentina Fukai and Fukui 1992 Casual way to treat,kingship & Japan individualisticStrong group Ishibashi and Reed 1992 Casual way to treat, kingship & Japan individualistic Strong group
40 Asako et al. 2 012 Casual way to treat, kingship & Japan individualistic Strong group Kurtz 2001 Casual way to treat, kingship & Japan, Mexico individualistic Strong group Camp 1976 Casual way to treat, kingship & Mexico individualistic Strong group Mendoza et al. 2012 Casual way to treat, kingship & The Philippines individualistic Strong group Harjanto 2011 Casual way to treat, kingship & Indonesia individualistic Strong group Amundsen 2013 Weak party institutionalization Bangladesh Querubin 2010 Historical legacy and institutional The Philippines Change Chibber 2013 Party System, institutionalization, India limited role of civil society, Financial
power of Federal government Kerklivet 1995 1995 Due to Federation/ government Philippines Quimpo 2007 2007 Due to Federation/ government Philippines Mc.Coy 2009 2009 Due to Federation/ government Philippines Asako 2010 Due to Federation/ government Japan Bohlken and 2013 Due to Federation/ government India Chandra Ashikur Rahman 2013 Due to Federation/ government Bangladesh Mariam Mufti 2009 Due to Federation/ government South Asia Gallagher 2013 Due to Federation/ government Ireland Source: Yoes. Kenawas, (2014), The Rise of political dynasties in democratic society and upgraded by the researcher.
1.5.5 Elections as a tool to get people well
Waseem, M. (2006) this is not shocking in view of the actuality that relatively only some elections at the local, provincial and national level were ever seized in the state, especially in the firsttwo decades. Muhammad Waseem talked about the hurdles behind the study of elections but he did not explore the voting behavior of people. It is the need of the day to know the pattern of the voting behavior of people.
Rizvi, D. H. A. (2013) elaborated in detail about the elections from 1970-2013. The story of general elections of Pakistan began in 1970 and ended in 2013. Relationship between social changes and state institutions has been thrown light upon in this article.
41 During the elections Pakistan was divided geographically and socially. Elections transformed legacy not from civilian to civilian but from civilian to military regimes.
Weinbaum, M. G. (1977) tried to throw light on elections held in 1977. He concluded that these elections produced uncertainty, disparity and demoralization among the voters. Leaders of all parties particularly big two tried to let down each other by exploiting weaknesses of each other. However, being the party in rule in the past, PPP had an edge to cash its achievements in the past. The opposition led NAP had nothing except using Islamic revitalization and mobilization. However, the author viewed that voters were conscious of the both parties and their tactics. The result was the manifest of social variables.
Likewise, Ziring (1977) emphasized on political variables directly in election 1977 of Pakistan. He discussed vividly the political parties, leaders of these parties and manifestoes. According to him, in Pakistan Political function of the parties is dependent on personalities. The author remained reluctant to conclude social factors as election determinant.
Ahmed (1982) rated regional administration and its way of working as determinant of election 1977. He encompassed it with relevancy of issues of a region and their importance among the candidates of Provincial and National assemblies. According to the author, election is the strongest tool for development of political culture in the country. Akhtar et al,(2010, 461) throw light on Ahmed’s study with result that he was unable to pinpoint the very factor of the people that led them to decision making in Election-1977.
Rais (1985) discussing on election 1985, argued that non-party election paved a way to non-social basis of electioneering process. He opined that it produced an atmosphere which addressed local issues, personality cults, biraderi and clan centric politics. Land lords were able to snatch 117 NA seats. 42 Seats were managed by the businessman and 17 seats were sheer shared by the tribal nepotisms. Non-party election
42 gave young and educated leadership as well as it laid stress on social factors important for election engineering.
Baxter (1970) made an attempt to analyze the political opinion as an outcome of Election 1970. According to him, the voters voted against biradri system and land ownership. He called it that people applied their free mind. Comparatively young legislators were elected by the people during this election.
Kennedy (1991) argued about election of 1988 and its results. His investigation was limited to the Sind Regions. According to him this was an ethnicity based election. The urban votes of Hyderabad and Karachi were inclined to MQM and Rural Vote supported PPP. It was votes between two parties on the basis of Languages i.e Sindhi and Urdu Languages. Sindhi speakers voted for PPP whereas Urdu Speakers voted for MQM.
Ziring (1993) explored the election of 1993 in Pakistan. According to Ziring, this election developed circumstances and party manifesto. He opined that voters turned away religious mobilization rather people voted for secularization.
Waseem (1994) discussedthe developing process and linked it with the developing sense of the peoples towards legitimization and delivery system. He viewed that constitutional needs were more important than the social warrants.
Wilder (1999) encompassed the developing behavior of the voters over three decades starting from 1970. His study was based on the data of the Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP). He made his study more systematic by conducting the interviews of experts, voters and politicians. Crux of his study is that the voters in Pakistan voted for personalities instead of the society and elections were the personality function instead of the political function (Wilder,A. R., 1999).
Edward Bell, Harold Jansen, Lisa Young (2007) a political leader identified caste played an important role in encouraging outcomes of policies devised by him. For a party to be successful, the leader must personify the area’s political culture.
43 Zikria narrated in his book; “Parliamentary Governments in Pakistan” that election was the pivotal characteristic of a parliamentary democratic state. It was a tool to asses and evaluates a government. He asserted that true democratic form of government could be ensured by entrusting people with (freedom of expression). The causes of delay in elections, form of electoral, i.e. separate and joint, features of political parties were also discussed.
Hamid Yousaf (1980) contended that Pakistan was a product of 20th century. Two world wars caused its establishment, weakened the power of its colonial administration, and changed its political atmosphere. The Pakistan which rose from the tragedy of 1971, however apparently failed to understand the lesson of its traumatic experiences. Citizens showed least trust in governments. They did not bear the criticism, political opposition and their threats. This book, however, does not shed lights over the political behaviors of the citizens and their sympathies with political parties.
Pandave Nayak (1990) researched about the Socio-Political culture of Pakistan. The authorer highlights challenges faced by the Pakistani government. Nayak talked about the role of Islam in Pakistani society, constitutional problems, military intervention, ethnic movements, leaderships, feudalism and external relations as well. Nayak is critical about the political leadership of Pakistan in the context of US colonialism. Moreover, he blamed the corruption and incapability of the ruling elites to have paved the way for the intervention of military and bureaucracy in the policy making process. However, his book dilates upon the influential role of feudal in society and voting pattern. There is a need to know the approach of common people towards the political system.
Rafique Afzal (2001) evaluated origin and growth of political parties in Pakistan. Muslim League and its oppositions Pakistan People’s Party, Azad People’s party and Pakistan Awami Party were also discussed. Government without political parties was also analyzed which was an undemocratic sign. Role of these parties was also been discussed however; attitude of people towards party and political system was not mentioned.
44 Iqeel Abbas Jafri analyzed the results of elections held in Pakistan since its independence. Jafri has shed light upon the party politics, Leadership change, rigging and horse trading in Pakistan. Jafri noticed the members who changed their political parties and joined other parties. He further observed that in the early stages of Pakistan Political parties were formed on the religious basis. It was a nice piece of work but there was further need to explore the mandate of people and how those politicians were elected.
Chowdury, M. (1988) narrated the political developments in Pakistan and impact of bureaucracy on the political structure and policy making process. Chowdhury did not discuss the electoral political politics in Pakistan and its rural areas. It is a need to explore the voting behavior of people on local level as the district Hafizabad. The voting attitude of the people in the domestic politics in district Hafizabad was found missing in this book.
Jaffrelot, C. (Ed.). (2002), the writer of this book pointed out an ethnic divide in the Muslims of Pakistan i.e. Punjabis (Kashmiris included), Sindhis, Pathans and Baloch. What should be noted is that according to a recent study, the starting results of the Pew Survey: 89 percent of Pakistanis say that they think of themselves as Pakistanis first, rather than a member of their ethnic group.
This book also examines the political violence and the formation of political parties on ethnic basis. But there is further need to search out the influence of these ethnic activities on the electoral politics of Pakistan and district Hafizabad as well. It is additionally required to explore and analyze the political behavior of the people in the perspective of elections held in 2008 and 2013.
Ahmad, N. (2004) a long way ahead” has talked about the constitutional and legal framework for political parties. He argues that Military quest for power has not allowed the political parties to emerge in a democratic way.
Khan, H. (2011) about the constitutional framework and political upheaval of Pakistan.The further discussion in this work about elections of 1965, local election of Ayub regime known as Basic Democrats. Political alliance, non-party based elections and
45 results of the elections of 1970s and 1985 are also collected. The fall of military and civil government is also circled. But this research does not provide grounds to analyze the pattern of voting behavior and participation of people. So it is significant to know the magnitude of participation.
Kamran, T. (2009) has mentioned the early segments and protagonist of political parties in Pakistan. The writer also revealed the electoral politics in general sense. Electoral politics of Provincial Assemblies and Bengal have been elaborated as well. However, the writer has not examined the electoral pattern of Pakistan.
Kamran, T. (2009) identified a gradual shift in the form of government, i.e. from an autocratic set-up to a semi-democratic set-up in Pakistan. The first general elections took place in 1970, after 23 years of independence, electoral politics failed to sustain itself as the election in 1977 were alleged ‘rigged’ hence the whole political system was de-railed. In that backdrop, the politics initiated by Zia regime with reference to the elections is critically analyzed in this paper. The 1985 party less election also grave rise local, sectarian and biradari conflicts. This paper also shows that 157 seats out of 238 for National Assembly were won by the Landlords and tribal Leaders.
Mahmood, S. (2001) points out the phenomenon of reiterate military rule in Pakistan. Weak Point of Pakistan Political System is also discussed by the writer immaturity and ineligibility of political leaders are also discussed. Voting behavior of people is also needed to be studied in areas like Hafizabad.
Ahmed, M. (2012) more accurately explained that baradrism is the main component of voting behavior in Punjab, especially in District Faisalabad. After describing different types of rural voter, he showed the result of National Assembly constituencies of District Faisalabad in the election of 1977 to 2002 in which the baradries played a vital role in victory. It does not explains the voting behavior of other areas like District Hafizabad and the election of 2008 and 2013. So there is further need to find out the voting behavior in District Hafizabad in the election of 2008 and 2013.
46 Details in this paper about the elections from 1985 to 2008 have notices changes in the voting trend. The first part of this paper is historical description of elections and the second part is about the in depth analysis of electoral data. This research will be helpful to understand the historical events happened in the elections. There is further need to study the voting behavior of the people towards their political system and political leadership and parties particularly in Hafizabad where Biradari affiliation have a lot more powerful and influential roles to play than the political parties.
Syed Abida (1999) made an observation that Pakistan political system can be understood as a pendulum between civilian rule and military rule (Syed Abidi's 1999). (Social Change and the Politics of Religion in Pakistan 1999)
Dr. C. Inayatullah (1997) in his classic State and Democracy in Pakistan argued that one creates the condition for other. There is also a strong link between political dynasty and democracy, social change and economy. This link affects the distribution and articulation of power, a key idea in the notion of democratization.
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56 Chapter No. 2
The Historical Process of Elite Formation and Dynasties in Sub-Continent
Indian Recorded history started from the Indus valley civilization. The Sub- continent, comprising Pakistan, India and Bangladesh witnessed the rise and fall of many civilizations and empires. Alexander the Great in 326 BC was the first one who introduced the development of trade and communication with western Asia. After Alexander left, the Maurya dynasty (322-185 B.C.E) under emperor Ashoks united the kingdom of Northern India into single empire.
In 1206, Qutubuddin Aibak established the Slave dynasty in this area. Jalaluddin Khilji established the khilji dynasty in 1290. After this a famous Tugluqs tribe came to India and formed their dynasty in 1320. Tughluq dynasty was defeated by the Sayyids, who laid foundations of their own dynasty in 1414. The Sayyids dynasty also was defeated by the Loghi Kingdom and Lodhi dynasty was established in 1450. Behlol Lodhi was the pioneer of this dynasty (Haig, W. 1922).
The Mughal dynasty remained from early sixteen century to mid nineteen century. The rulers expanded this kingdom to include most of the Indian sub-continent and Afghanistan. Only the most recent legacies that have shaped present-day politics are reviewed here. The main interests of British were economic interest. They developed political interest when they observed gap in this department. Since 1526, the majority of sub-continent was under Mughal emperorship. Zaheeruddin Babar extended his dominion by defeating Sikhs, Hindus as well as Muslims (Haig, W. 1922).
Slowly and steadily Mughal’s power decreased upto the later part of 18th century. During the period of the later Mughals, when the central authority declined; it was only natural for Jagirdars to convert their holdings into permanent fiefdoms. So historically speaking the Mughal Empire brought India the highest stage in its feudal development. In
57 this environment, the British peeped into India through East India Company and adopted its policy of divide and rule and they succeeded to do so upto 1947. (Cohen S. P, 2004)
To get rid of British rule Sepoy Rebellion also known as Mutiny-1857. The ruling model of the British had three main components. First, the British allowed the Maharagies, traditional Indian princes, to continue to rule as many as 500 small to medium size dominions of the sub-continent throughout the colonial period. The supporters in India were given free hands in India by devolution of powers (Menon, V. P. 1955).
In South Asia new elites and new group of leaders emerged and did what they could to alter the balance of power. Throughout most of the region the early nineteenth century was an era of warfare, dynastic upheaval, population displacements and intensifying struggle for power and wealth among the bureaucrat’s merchants, landownersand nobility.
Between 1752 and 1802 three powerful new dynasties came to power on the main land. The first of three the Konbauny dynasty in Myanmar (1752-1885), made war on Siam and broke the power of the court at Ayutthhay a setting.
The British were successful with making some families powerful. It may be believed that their model of politics was family centered instead of democracy. It gave birth to strong man concept. The variety of outcomes supported the argument that colonialism was less intrusive in South Asia than many have suggested (Owen, 2005).
2.1 Present Political dynasties in the Sub-continent
Likewise other families like Bush, Macapagaland, Dualier in USA, Phillipines and Haiti respectively, sub continent also bounds in different dynasties. Gandhis, Thakur, Rajppot, Bhuttos and Syeds were famous families which rules and still are ruling.
58 2.2 Elites Politics and the Political System of Colonial Legacy
Colonialism created artificially transition on the basis of state power within national units and was involved with real democratization and framed leading elites which approximately invariably had an interest in state protection. The politics of Pakistan had very conical origin. Only elite politics had domination over national politics and political system of Pakistan since it had come to being. These affinities also allowed and sanctioned the elites within the elites to hold on resources and then transformation of them as colonial legacy to coming generation of elite’s class. Marx spoke of history as the history of class struggles (Moghadam, 1993, 106).
These early developments influenced Pakistan’s political behavior and the country never escaped the legacy of its colonial past. Democracy, not autocracy, was the tenor of the post-World War-II periodand nations justified their demand for self- determination in the firm belief that the opportunity for self-government demanded distinguishing between the power of the colonial few and the aspirations of the popular masses (Ziring, L. 1997).
These classes, being created within the framework of colonial system, were not in a fundamental contradiction with each other. These were dependent on colonial patronage and up until the end; their major concern was to seek concessions, better placements, more jobs and extension in safeguards. When the culmination of the British rule became all the more visible, they rallied around the Muslim League, which had already galvanized the popular sentiments for birth of new homeland. (Syed Jaffar Ahmed. 2003).
2.3 Political Elite’s and Parliamentary Democracy in Pakistan (1947- 1958)
The soul of British Vicergeal political system remained the same of the new political system of Pakistan. To become the representative system of the general public it took a lot of time (Sayeed, K. B. 1968). These resemblances also permitted and approved
59 the political elite’s grasp on possessions and then change of them as colonial legacy to coming productions of elite candidates. In this respect, the maintenance of the learning is that in Pakistan the political arrangement ropes the employment of dynastic elites as contrast to non-dynastic elite in Pakistan typically concerned by feudalist’s politics but equally is not like. The system of administration in Pakistan was the legacy of colonial rule; any modifications introduced were to promote the interest of existing groups already in industry.
A perception was developed that personalities who had been supporting British rule in Subcontinent. When migrated to newly create state Pakistan and India were transformed into elites and feudal. It was due to the supports of these elites like Sardars and Waderas which made British Rule effective, longer and stronger (Ansari, S. 1991). The elites of Pakistan sought much from British rule and thus these elites hindered democratic values (Akbar S. Zaidi, 2010). The new states strengthened their roots in bureaucracy. Experimentally saying, constitutional forms and reforms proved nothing but new cloak for the existing and ruling elite (Dobell, W. M. 1969).
The structure of Pakistani society, with the addition of some martial race Pathans, was replicated in khaki by the army. Its officers were the scions of landlord families and its soldiers were recruited from the homes of peasants. Political elites and political parties were considering the main factors responsible for political function in the elections. It had been an experimental result that in a country like Pakistan, the role of elite is unavoidable. Without their effective role, constitution enforcement and united political will for democracy, parliamentary democracy cannot progress.
According to Alavi, when Pakistan came into being its political system was dominated by Punjabi and Muhgir elite groups from among the multi-ethnic salaried class of undivided India. They were preponderant in the bureaucracy and the army held the key position in the state. The removal of direct colonial rule left the indigenous military and bureaucracy enormously commanding or over-developed vis-à-vis the native propertied classes in Pakistan.
60 Political elite along its hold in the variety of sectors of society looked for protection of bulk of votes of the voters at the time of vote to shape the administration. These political elites obtained power of their hold on political system because they stood for a broad diversity of welfare in a society backed by the body of persons associated with these benefits which in some cases are apt as disagreement with each other. Through a procedure of conversation that political elite settled these contradictory benefits and developed a consensus. Wide stand and well planned political elites were a power to be imagined along with strong roots in different sectors of society. The needed political culture and meeting of group devotion and group regulation among their members were developed by these groups (Hussain, 1974, p.4).
2.4 Military-Bureaucratic Elite’s Nexus and Failure of Political Institutions (1947-1956)
In Contrast to the failure of political parties and democracy, the military dictatorship delivered in better way and thy extended their rule. In early period of Pakistan’s independence political leadership was not capable for development of constitution weakening democracies to function. Afterwards, military strengthened its relation to the bureaucracy.
Since there were no political institutions which could serve as the basis of a sustained and strong political process, the politicians had to rely on the bureaucracy to the extent of dependence. Politicians and political parties always helped them to extend their unconstitutional rule. Inverse proportional relationship has been observed between institutionalism of political process and bureaucratic influence (Azam, I. 1992). By the end of 1950, a significant tie between civil and military establishment was strengthened. Civil and military regimes were seen consecutively. Political governments were collapsed (Russal Bukash.Rais, 1994).
Dr. Hussan Askari Rizvi (1987) said weak system of political institution within the parties weakened the political parties (Rizvi, 2000). Due to the weak and perforated political support, the bureaucrats connived with every ruler.
61 Immediately after dissolution of the assembly of Prime Minister Muhammad Ali Boghra, General Ayub Khan introduced military bureaucracy to strengthen their rules. These acts of merger of bureaucracy with government which marginalized politicians and did not give any space to flourish the democracy on gross root level (Shuja Nawaz, 2008).
The failure of ruling political parties in initial phase of independence to develop democracy were zero resultantly hybrid form of governments came into rule having equal composition of military and bureaucracy. (Kalim Bahadur, 1998).Political system and the state system were dominated by military-bureaucratic elite.
The military and bureaucracy therefore had not merely an overdeveloped and relatively sovereign executive and coercive arm of the state that defended and arbitrated but the interests of the indigenous and metropolitan propertied classes. The state power as a result had been wielded by a military-bureaucratic oligarchy for most of the country’s post independent history (Humza Alavi, 1983).
Ethnic Division of Military Government
Punjabi 17 35.4 Pushtuns 19 39.4 Muhajirs 11 23.0 Sindhi 0 0 Balochi 0 0 Bengali 1 2.0 Total 48 100
Source: These classes were described by Tahir Amin (1988) in his article Ethno National Movement of Pakistan.(P.82)
62 2.5 Landowner Elite’s and Political Parties of Early Phase
In Pakistan, the employment of the landowner elites in the political parties was resolutely set with patron- customer politics. That is unified with class, civilization and recognition. The recognition ethnicities such a biraderi clan, family and caste were main predictors in elections and in out inside layer broad politics.
In this respect, the maintenance of the learning was that in Pakistan the political arrangement roped the employment of dynastic elites as contrast to non-dynastic elite in Pakistan typically concerned by feudalist’s politics but equally was not like. These landowner elites stayed in the political procedure of Pakistan. It signified that modern dynastic elites in Pakistan had the feudal sources: they had but the political procedure rotates approximately the chronologically series of a small number of exact landowner elites. With the passage of time, the distinctive occurrence, feudalism had turned out to be moribund in Pakistan. Many feudal noble relations embedded by means of enormous ground assets have had cleaned out with elections, away from each other for irregular addition in concierge administrations through the forced elite (Beg. S, 2017, 1-60).
There seems no serious effort towards democratization soon after the birth of independence. A slow transition from slavery to independence was seen. (Mubarak Ali, 1992) In Punjab, 19 percent of the land area was cultivated by tenants who owned no land (Sucha Singh Gill, 1989).
One major economic measure that Ayub Khan put in place was land reforms. Feudalism was dominant in rural areas of the West Pakistan. In Punjab and NWFP about 50 percent lands whereas in Sindh nearly 80 percent lands were owned by the hundreds absentee landlords. While different governments had promised to implement land reforms, none of them had managed to do it as these absentee landowners dominated the executive and the legislative branches.
Dr. Mahbub-ul-Haque had made a statement that resources are limited to 22 families only. These families own almost 70 percent of industrial resources and 90 % assets in banks etc. (Mubarak Ali, 1992). When the British left Subcontinent the local
63 elites-Zamindars, Jagirdars, Sardars and Nawabs replaced them. These powerful elites in Pakistan could not tolerate the social and political change. They had effectively prevented the emergence of a strong middle class in country that was essential for democratic order. The land owning class had an attitude that awarded them with the idea that only they were qualified to rule over the masses (Muhammad Hussain Shaikh, 2008).
Political backbiting among different performers of the landowning class also did not permit those politicians to come into sight as a well-built and joint political power with confusion in the status of political groups. Under the Land Reforms Act, General Ayub granted 2.5 Million acres of lands to landless farmers. In the reforms- 1959, 500 irrigated acres were spaced to be allocated to one person maximum whereas such limit for un-irrigated land was 1000 acres and only 35 % of land could be cultivated (Noman, O. 1990).
With the passage of time, the distinctive occurrence, feudalism turned out to be moribund in Pakistan. Many feudal noble relations embedded by means of enormous ground assets had been cleaned out with elections, away from each other from for irregular addition in concierge administrations through the elite forces.
2.6 Proportion of Landlords in First Three National Parliaments
National Parliaments Percentage 1947-54 34.1% 1955-58 35.1% 1962-68 45.0%
Source: Mushtaq Ahmad, Government and Politics in Pakistan, Karachi: Pakistan Publishing House, 1963, second edition, pp.97, 115 and 273.
The feudal group had such grasp on every regime that no communal and financial change happened. The land improvements of Ayub Khan stayed unproductive. They stayed secure in their villages’ palaces and mud stronghold with their carrying weapons gangsters to terrify the peasantry. The management was beneath their auspices to force
64 the citizens. Their atrocious law carried on since every political group required them to come first to vote.
2.7 Electoral Politics under the Parliamentary Democratic System (1947-1958)
The function of elections is different in different condition. Parliamentary system provides powers to parliament, the cabinet or the Prime Minister. The election functions, as well as individual voting behavior, would also vary respectively in unitary and federal states and both were then affected by the political cultures, patterns of decision making and modes of conflict resolution (conflict vs. accommodation, majority vs. proportional representation) prevalent in Pakistan. After division of Indian Sub-Continent, the votes for regional Assembly were conducted in March 1951 to elect 197 legislatures in NWFP and Punjab and in November 1951 to elect 85 legislature while in Sindh election were held in 1953 for 111 seats. In March 1954 in East Bengal election were held for 309 seats. (Kamran 2009)
The experiences of the 1954 elections in East Pakistan, where the Pakistan Muslim League was wiped out, convinced the leaders in control of the dangers of holding a national election. The result of the 1954 elections in East Pakistan left no doubt as to the political sentiments of the great majority of Pakistan’s Bengali majority. PML was the only prominent party. The other parties were gathered to rule out. PML these parties gathered and formed United Front (UF) headed by Maulvi Fazl-ul-Haq with 21 points agenda programme chiefly for autonomy of provinces. 1285 candidates were in the arena for 309 seats. The UF was the topper in the results with 233 seats. The result is viewed as rigged by the bureaucracy. The seats of each party are as under.
Contrary to it, PML adverse defeat compelled Bangalis to believe that majority is not with them. The structure of Pakistani society, with the addition of some martial race Pathans, was replicated in khaki by the army. Its officers were the scions of landlord families and its soldiers were recruited from the homes of peasants. (Bin Sayeed, K. 1987)
65 The change in party alignment was not made in response to changes in public opinion. The people who were directly concerned, had no say and the President, who had to be neutral, was directly involved in machinations and intrigues. There was quick succession of governments. Between August 1956 and October 1958 there were four governments. The problems facing during this period of the country were not resolved.
Muslim League remained unsuccessful to change itself from a national movement to a political party although it struggled hard for attainment of Pakistan. In the new country, the League leaders started to mention the party with the state. There was no tolerance with political opposition. With the passage of time, the Muslim League could not expand as a well-built political organization at the same time it did not permit the opposition parties to raise in the political system of Pakistan. Ghulam Muhammad, Chowdhury Muhammad Ali and others bureaucrats took benefit of these breakdowns and the weakness of the politicians. The political leaders and their parties could not confront the authoritarian actions of the bureaucrat Governor General.
During the first ten years after freedom, it raised disparity between Western and Eastern parts of the country and the power play for sharing powers between the Governor General/President and the Prime Minister.
Political Parties No. of Seats IND 03 PML 10 UP 233 Khailfat-e-Rabbani 01 Minority Seats Seats Pakistan National Congress 24 Minority United Front 10 Ganatanridal 03 Communists 04 Schedule Cast Federation 27
66 Christian 01 Buddish 02 Caste Hindu Independent 01
The experiences of the 1954 elections in East Pakistan, where the Muslim League was wiped out, convinced the leaders in control of the dangers of holding a national election. The result of the 1954 elections in East Pakistan left no doubt as to the political sentiments of the great majority of Pakistan’s Bengali majority.The leadership of Pakistan faced two dilemmas. They not only failed to bring up any economic frame work for the Pakistan but as well as they failed to make political parties work as institution.
2.8 Ethnic and linguist Elite’s and the Politics of One Unit
The independency of Baluchistan, NWFP and Sindh was shaken in 1955 when the country was divided into two units (Mufti. M.,1995). The change in party alignment was not made in response to changes, in public opinion. The peoples who was directly concerned, had no say and the President who had to be neutral, was directly involved in machinations and intrigues.
Struggle for power among the provinces and ethnic group led to the creation of new regional identities with personal interest. There was quick succession of governments. Between August 1956 and October 1958 there were four governments. The problems facing the country were not resolved. The first Martial Law was only possible due to failure of political parties and Sikandar Mirza got its full advantage.
With the passage of time, the Muslim League could not expand as a well-built political organization at the same time it did not permit the opposition parties to raise in the political system of Pakistan. Ghulam Muhammad, Chowdhury Muhammad Ali and other bureaucrats took benefit of these breakdowns and the weakness of the politicians. The political leaders and their parties could not confront the authoritarian actions of the bureaucrat Governor General.
67 So the place of Prime Minister in Pakistan surpassed by the Governor General. Liaqat Ali Khan failed to prove himself as true antecedent of Jinnah after his demise and political assassination of Liaquat Ali Khan the competition and internecine behavior of the Muslim association leaders for individual increases and the cleavages in the bureaucracy and the military for power eventually disrupted the country from democracy.
The coup happened on October 7, 1958 with utmost secrecy and very briskly. Top leadership of the army was abreast of it. The prime minister was informed in the latter hours of the same day. The naval and air force leadership was also not on board. The political leaders and the general public only came to know about the coup in the morning papers. But it is interesting to note that Mr. James, the US ambassador was also aware of the quo before time as Mirza and Langley were close personal friends and Mirza impressed upon Langley that if Mirza did not assume all power with the support of the military, Ayub Khan would.
Within a week of after appointment of Ayub Khan as CMLA, Mirza could not accept the loss of power. While Ayub Khan was visiting East Pakistan, Mirza approached Ayub Khan to intervene and to restore his position in power. The ruling Generals however were annoyed by Mirza’s turn about. On 27 October 1958, the cabinet sworn in under the prime minister. Immediately, after assuming the presidency, Ayub Khan abolished the position of the prime minister, left his rank as Commander In Chief and on 28 October, the members of cabinets took oath again under president (Gauhar, A. 1996).
After birth of Pakistan, constitutionalism remained the slowest process due to the tug of war among the politicians. Although, efforts were continued and serious efforts were made in 1952 and 1953 for the solution of this issue. Only for the thirst of power, politicians frequently did unite and fight. Blame game was in full swings. Bureaucracy was enjoying. Worst example was seen when Mirza dismissed Hussain Shaheed Sohrwardy Government and called military for support. It is believed that between Feroz Khan Noon and Soharwardy, an agreement was framed but beauracracy was involved in breaking and making the governments according to their choices. Sikandar Mirza had not good opinion about politicians and he was civil a servant. Political instability owned a
68 great deal to him (Chander, P. 2003). Parties were disseminated into factions and therefore no national agenda could be built on the basis of factional disparities (Karl J. Newman, 1982). A weak, divided, conflicted society cannot overcome its deep-seated problems through constitution-making (Zakaria 1997).
Chaudhry Muhammad Ali will also be remembered for his efforts to bring about first constitution of the country in 1956. This was unicameral constitution of federal nature having composition of 50 percent members of each western and eastern side (S.M. Zafar, 2001). In the beginning that Pakistan operated under was the India Act 1935, right until 1956 when the state approved its own constitution. Dr. Safdar Mahmood said that these causes could be grouped together with regard to the nature as summarized in follows:
Late legislation about election. Undue interference of state heads into political affairs. Lack of political wisdom in political leadership (Mahmood, S. 1975). It took more than 9 years for Pakistan to frame its constitution only to be abrogated two years later in 1958 since then two more constitutions had been framed: Firstly, constitution was replaced by BDS and afterwards and afterwards presidential form of government was introduced.
2.9 Political Crisis and the role of Military-Bureaucracy Alliance
At the time of Liaquat Ali Khan’s assassination in 1951 not much progress had been made in writing a constitutional framework. The delay in framing a constitution on the part of Pakistan’s political leaders led to much distrust among bureaucrats towards politicians. This further empowered the bureaucracy and in quick succession, top civil servants assumed the highest offices of state. Ghulam Muhammad, the Minister of Finance became the Governor General after demise of the first Prime Minister. He had previously served in the Audit Branch of the Indian Civil Service. Similarly,
Iskandar Mirza, an Indian Army Officer trained in Sandhurst, was a close associate of Ghulam Muhammad, later became the Governor General of Pakistan.
69 Chaudhry Muhammad Ali, Secretary General to the Government, who eventually became Prime Minister, had also served in the audit branch of the Indian Civil Service. With the rise of bureaucracy in positions of power, ideals of accountability and responsiveness towards the people eroded further.
East Pakistan was the base of these middle class people because most of them were living there. Ideas had no significance in the rural and backward tribal areas because the politics of these areas rotated around the bitterness. Bureaucracy was the most well prearranged institution in recently shaped Pakistan and the large numbers of whom had drifted from the areas which were part of entire India and Pakistan’s military. This situation made it clear why democracy did not take basis in Pakistan in the earlier days and initially for only once the custom of civilian and mainly military authoritarianism had taken grasp and for that reason, it was unlikely for democracy could have later removed that grip.
The military came into sight as because constant defense in which industrialization with the support of the bureaucracy and the rising industrialists and could expand more. The most well organized institutions in newly created Pakistan were the bureaucracy in which a large numbers of officers had migrated from the regions which were part of undivided India and Pakistan’s military.
East Pakistan is the base of these middle class people because most of them were living there. Ideas had no significance in the rural and backward tribal areas because the politics of these areas rotated around the bitterness. Bureaucracy was the most well prearranged institutions in recently shaped Pakistan. This situation made it clear why democracy became dream in Pakistan. The most well organized institutions in newly created Pakistan were the bureaucracy large numbers of those who had migrated from the regions which were part of undivided India and Pakistan’s military.
The very need of change of governments within 05 years from 1953 is basically the lust of rule of oligarchy. This lust crushed basic democracies and institution of the country (Ahmad 1987). This lust also forced political leaders to give and take and to
70 affiliate into groups Hasan Muhammad, (1947 to 2012). Higher the illiteracy of politician more is the tendency and dependency to bureaucracy. (Kazi, F.H.1976) Low level of politation produced low level leadership working for democratization. In first 11 years, 07 prime ministers were exchanged. (Robert Laporte Jr., 1975).
2.10 Military Rule and Engineering of New Political System
Ayub was the inventor of basic democratic system. He took the oath on Feburary 17, 1960. He gave constitution 1962 which was rejected by the majority of Bengalis. Ayub form of government was through the bureaucrats. This constitution provided the president all powers even appointment of governors etc. Assembly was nothing. Powers were eccentric to Ayub Khan (Sayeed, 1959). On May 23, 1963 Ayub Khan announced to join the Conventional Muslim League and December 24, 1963 Ayub khan was elected chairman of the Conventional League (Lawarence Ziring, 1971). Many big landlords who supported the ruling party also occupied the key posts in the party (Dawan, Karachi, 1963). Ayub Khan wished to accomplish two things. First, he wanted to bring the indigenous leaders, mostly landlords, back into the political fold. He chose an ingenious the device for accomplishing this objective. And the second he introduced a system of local government that gave significant powers to local communities and also brought them closer to the instruments of the state.
The constitution of 1962 was thus able to indigenize the policies of West Pakistan that had been so disturbed by the arrival of millions of refugees from India. The landed aristocracy discredited earlier by its failure to enthusiastically support the Pakistan movement, walked into the political space the refugees community was forced to vacate (Shahid Javid Burki, 2006). BDS failed to give birth new leadership. (Rizvi & Gillani 2000)
71 2.12 Military Rule with Presidential So called Democratic System (1962- 1969)
The constitution-1962 cannot be termed as of what form it was. Because powers of Supreme Court were curtailed. There was no political party in the parliament. Chaudhry Muhammad Ali declared it presidential form of constitution. Misusing the powers under the powers entrusted to Ayub Khan Theough constitution and BDS, the president banned many of the members of opposition to take part in political activities till January 1, 1967.
1.13 Presidential Election 1965
On March 21, 1965 Election was held under BD System. PML (Convention) was abled to get 120 seats whereas opposition got only 16 seats. Contrary to it In Western Part PMLN Convention got 96 seats and opposition got 49 seats. Between August 1956 and October 1958 there were four governments (Mushtaq Ahmad, 1971).
Shahid Javaid Bukhari, writes on political effect of landlords. He declares shifting of the capital from Sind to Islamabad as a basic shift of mind in this regard. It also compelled Ayub khan to make his own party teemed with agriculturists land lords (Shahid Javid Burki, 1986). Ayub Khan in his writing expressed that he will support parliamentary form of government in offing constitution.
On October 27, 1959, the President broadcast the fundamental Democracies arrange as long as for the organization of a five tiered arrangement at the foundation of which were to be amalgamation committees in the villages and union committees in the urban areas. It turned obvious that Ayub Khan had formed to influence the organization of fundamentals Democracies for maintenance for his own political authority.
72 2.14 Basic Democracies Election and the Emergence of Bidararism
Basic democracy system without real powers, Ayub Khan developed a system for his strength and long period for his rule. It aroused the rural politicians and it is deemed the beginning political culture in middle class sector of the country. As a result, the political system that he introduced was a reflection of his dislike for liberal democracy and his desire to remain in power.
Ayub’s ten year rule made two things possible. Self-perpetuation in power and development of relations between bureaucracy and ruling elite (Omar Noman, 1990). Aysha Jalal points civil bureaucracies as the servants of neo elites. Consequently, the rural elites were strengthened. According to Aysha Jalal, these were the CSP Officers who nominated half of the parliamentarians. Consequently, they succeeded to make the government of their own choice. Ayub Khan’s land reform policy was unsuccessful because of inclusion of landed elite. The landed elite became more powerful. The purpose of the Basic Democracies electoral system was firstly to pick, choose and get elected astheir own persons and afterwards with their cooperation to seek indirect support for president election. The mechanism annoyed the public at large.
Democracy is in-fact related to the concept of government of the people by the people and for the people. In the Basic Democracies, the scope of this concept was very limited (H J Fridman, 1960). This only supported local agriculturists to gain their political economy (Shahid Javid Burki, 1986).
2.15 Ban on Political Parties and Disqualification of Politicians
In August 1958, Elective Bodies Disqualification Order (EBEDO) was introduced, providing certain former political leaders with the option of being tried for misconduct or disqualifying them from engaging in political activity. Under this order investigation was completed by special police establishment against former politicians and seventeen of them were convicted and debarred from politics. The objective of the Basic Democracies as Rizvi noted was to strengthen local level politics. It was chain
73 from villages to Tehsil level, from tehsil to district, from district to divisional level, from divisional level to provincial to national level.
Under EBDO proceedings were started against 98 prominent politicians of East and West Pakistan. Out of these 70 announced voluntary retirement from the politics for six years. This law eventually brought such consequences for disqualification. Hussain Suhrawardy, Mian Mumtaz Daultana, Khan Abdul Qayyum Khanand Muhammad Ayub Khuro were disqualified or EBDOed. The law, particularly its application, was severely criticized in legal and political circles throughout Pakistan.
The political Parties Act and EBDO debarred almost 6000 political workers and public office holders. After introduction of Political Parties Act, 1962, it had become difficult that Ayub khan had got register himself. Within two month of passage of the political parties act, the conventional Muslim league was organized as the official government party. Ayub Khan and Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto captured the seats of President and General Secretary respectively (Yusuf, H. 1999).
The Martial Law-1958 laid taboos on all political parties. The same was repeated on May 10, 1962. According to Ayub Khan the best form of government is bureaucratic form. (Lawarance Ziring, 2003). Under the presidential form of constitution, Ayub had no need to seek vote of confidence. (Majumdar, R. (Ed.). 1998). The Pakistani public had also become increasingly independent from traditional pressures biradaris (kinship groups) and feudal connections in making their choices. Pirs and their descendants made relations with rulers and wealthy people. These rulers and wealthy people invested on Sjaada Nashins and shrines which provided them a path to gain respect in the public as well as it produced a vote bank to the ruling class. There was undeniable influence of pirs and shrines in government making. This relationship of pirs and secular authorities had been viewed problematic for early days(Yusuf, H. 1999, 77-78).
2.16 Party politics under the Political Party Act 1962
The Ayub Khan period was one of the periods called as presidential period. As Rizvi describes it, the authoritarian period without any resemblance with democracy
74 (Rizvi, H. 2000). The constitution introduced by the President was designed to concentrate power in his own hands (Ahmad, M. 1971). To facilitate its supporters, the Ayub government introduced Political Parties Act-1962 preventing the previous orders Elective Bodies Order-1959. The politicians declared ineligible in 1959 were made eligible by this act. Ayub khan expected to control his opponents through this act but the politicians were proved to be stronger and cleverer. To increase or decrease his own discretion, Ayub Khan introduced two ordinances in April 1963. These impugned ordinances and act hindered the opposition from developing rather it made Ayub Khan more strenuous towards his ambitious tasks (Rafique Afzal, 1958-1969). Ayub Khan joined Convention League in 1963 and after seven months he took over to the presidency as told by Ghaur-1993.
2.17 The Politics of Indirect Election and the emergence of Opposition Parties
The election 1962 is called indirect election as firstly 80000 basic democratic units were directly elected. Afterwards, indirectly MNAs/MPAs were selected. The system of basic democracies was out rooted in 1968-69.
Class Composition of National Assembly, 1962
Class Total East Pakistan West Pakistan Lawyers 47 31 16 Business and Industry 42 23 19 Landlords 70 12 58 Miscellaneous 20 17 03
Source: Mushtaq Ahmad, Government and Politics in Pakistan (Karachi:Space publishers,1970), p. 236
That Basic democratic institution of General Ayub Khan BD system ultimately failed to secure political stability, legitimacy and integrity in Pakistan (Alinejad, M. 2004). Ayub era was the worst era in the context of differences of region and class. The
75 factors for true socialization were not given any importance. Although the country made advancements in economic sectors. As a bribe and to strengthen some specified people, 80 percent of lands of Sind, more or less 50 percent in Punjab and KPK lands were allotted to absentee landlords. Ayub era is also named as era of humiliation as all those five parties which supported Fatima Jinnah were called as cats. Fatima Jinnah was called as bitch. The results of Election 1964-65 were not up to the hopes of the electorates.
2.18 Mass Movement and the Politics of Ethnicity
It was a country wide protest, against the economic conditions of the people and the political system. There was a universal demand for the abrogation of the constitution and return to parliamentary government abrogated by him. A resolution was adopted on January 6, 1969 the Pakistan Democratic Movement (PDM) for direct election and restoration of fundamental laws (Ahmad, 1971, 49).
In January 1969, eight opposition parties including the newly emerged vibrant PPP joined Democratic Action Committee (DAC). By March, 1969 the round table talks had failed and political agitation and disturbance continued until Ayub khan resigned from the office of the president on March 25 1969. Ayub khan then faced with his political system collapsing like a pack of cards was not anxious to hang on to power but could not leave the field to extremists. Moreover, public riots and strikes compelled Ayub khan to resign. After Ayub, Yahya Khan imposed Martial Law and set a-side the constitution (Chowdury, 1988, 33-34).
The popular movement in 1969 ousted Ayub khan and the basic democracy institution created by him. Ayub Khan left without transfer of power to the speaker as stipulated in the constitution, he abdicated in favour of Yahya Khan, the army chief, who again imposed martial law, but faced poplar mobilization in both wings of Pakistan, General Yahya Khan quickly capitulated and agreed to hold general election. The election held in 1970, the first in 23 years, confirmed the worst fear of who opposed democracy. However, military government was able to flourish agricultural and economic sectors especially in Western Part of the country(Gardezi, 1983, 40).
76 Bloodshed Violence in Mass Movement against Ayub Khan
Killed by police firing 129 Killed by mob violence 105 Officials killed by mob 05 Total 239
Source: Muneer Ahmad, Aspects of Pakistan’s Politics and Administration, South Asian Publication, University of the Punjab, Lahore.
The entire experience gave the people, particularly the underprivileged, a sense of power that had been deliberately extinguished by colonial conditioning and which when combined with a sense of responsibility, may prove to be the surest guarantee of democracy for the future of Pakistan (Mushtaq, M. 2009, 279-294).
2.19 The End of Ayub Era
The basic reason for the downfall of Ayub was the extremely centralized and authoritarian character of the political system introduced under the Constitution 1962. The constitution did not allow the parliament any share in influencing the fate of the government nor could it exercise meaningful control over government taxation and expenditure. The protests against the government brought about chaos throughout the country. No formula for sharing power was possible. Referendum 1960, Presidential Election in 1965 and elections to Assemblies in 1962 and 1965 failed to give credibility to the system, which was introduced by Ayub Khan. The Constitution, which was given by him in 1962 and was known as his brainchild was not accepted by the intelligentsia because the army ruler had totally and overtly shelved the recommendations, which were made by the constitution commission in 1958. His basic political system of controlled democracy was completely rejected by the political parties and the general public of Pakistan. It was proved in 1965 Presidential Election and central and provincial assemblies’ elections could not bestow any kind of legitimacy on the so-called democratic institutions by Ayub Khan.
77 The period of Ayub was nothing but red amalgamation of powers. This created patron centered approach and other institution of the state on one side and the political force on the other. As Rizvi described it, the election results brought nothing except disputes. It led to control electoral political system. The collapse of the hegemonic system also brought the collapse of the Pakistan State. However, political disputes strengthened centralization of state authority (Jalal Aysha, 1995b, 40).
On November 28, 1969, General Yaha Khan announced his political timetable and time frame for holding election on October 5, 1970. Most of the PPP Candidates were feudal lord who were capitalists. Awami League, the other main contest presented its programme in the form of six points which contained the maximum provincial autonomy of the provinces. The PPP wanted to low down Bhutto’s opponents partially Pakistan Muslim League (Qayyum Group) and Muslim League (Conventional Group) and the NAP in the NWFP. No party emerged with single largest party. Two wings arose as East Wing and West Wing. Awami League won 160 seats out of 162 in Eastern Part. But no seat it could win in Western Pakistan (Ahmad, 1993, 3-4).
It was during General Yahya Khan’s rule, East Pakistan now Bangladesh was separated from West Pakistan through armed insurgency. ZA Bhutto became first president and then the prime minister of the country after 1970 election. In the elections of 1970, Bhutto’s party won bulk of National Assembly seats from West Pakistan as well as majority of seats from Sind and Punjab.
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Burki, S. J., (2006) Historical Dictionary of Pakistan, Scarecrow publisher, Toronto,.P.16.
Rizvi & Gillani (2000):119
Mushtaq Ahmad, (1971) Politics Without Social Change, Space Printers.p. 32.
Burki, S. J., (1986) Pakistan: A Nation in the Making, Westview Press, Boulder, p. 112.
For a short summery of the document, see AltafGauhar, op-cit, pp.106-108.
81 Omar Noman, (1990) Pakistan: A Political and Economic History since 1947(London and New York: Kegan Paul International). P.27.
H J Fridman, (1960) Pakistan Experiences in Basic Democracies, Pacific Affairs, Vol 33, June,
Burki, S. J., (1986) Pakistan: A Nation in the Making, West view Press, Boulder, p.54.
Yusuf, H. (1999). Pakistan: A study of political developments 1947-97. Sang-e-meel Publications..
Lawarance Ziring, (2003) Pakistan in the Twentieth Century A Political History, Oxford University Press, pp372-375.
Majumdar, R. (Ed.). (1998). Pakistan: Jinnah to the present day (Vol. 1). Anmol Publications.
Rizvi, H. (2000). Military, state and society in Pakistan.Springer.
Ahmad, M. (1971). Politics without Social Change.Space Publishers.
Rafique Afzal, (1958-1969) Political Parties in Pakistan, Vol.11, NIHCRCE Quaid Azam University Islamabad. 2000.p.66.
Alinejad, M. (2004). Mahfuzul H. Chowdhury, Democratization in South Asia: Lessons from American Institutions. Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, 42, 277- 279.
Zaidi, S. A. (2005). Issues in Pakistan's economy. OUP Catalogue.
Ahmad, M. (1971). Politics without Social Change.Space Publishers.
Choudhury, G. W. (1974). The last days of united Pakistan.Indiana University Press.
82 Rashid, H. N. G. J., & Dardezi, H. (1983). Pakistan, the roots of dictatorship: The political economy of a praetorian state. London: Zed.
Ahmad, M. (1974).Aspects of Pakistan's Politics and Administration. South Asian Institute, Panjab University, Lahore.
Ahmad, M. (1974).Aspects of Pakistan's Politics and Administration. South Asian Institute, Panjab University, Lahore.
Afzal, M. R. (2000). Political Parties in Pakistan 1958-1969, vol. ii. Islamabad: NIHCR..
Shafqat, S. (1995). Contemporary issues in Pakistan studies.Gautam publishers.
Jalal Aysha, (1995b), Democracy and Authoritarianism in South Asia: A Comparative and Historical Perspective, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Ahmad, A. (1994). In theory: Classes, nations, literatures. Verso.
Rizwan, M. (2014). The Elections 1970: From Ballot to Nowhere. Asian Journal of Social Sciences & Humanities Vol, 3, 4.
Mukhopadhyay, A. (1971). Politics and parties in West Pakistan. Economic and Political Weekly, 969-972
Oldenburg, P. (1971). " A Place Insufficiently Imagined. Language, Belief, and the Pakistan Crisis of, 711-33.
Feldman, H. (1972). The End and the Beginning: Pakistan, 1969-1972 (pp. 72-73). London: Oxford University Press.
Political Parties and their Programmes (pp. 143-212). Karachi: Ferozsons Ltd. Jang, 26 February, 1970.
83 Shah, S. W. A. (2004).“Pakistan People’s Party: The Twin Legacies of Socialism and Dynastic Rule,” In Subrata Kumar Mitra, Mike Enskat and Clemens Spiess (eds.), Political Parties in South Asia (p.160). London: Praeger.
Jalal. Ayesha. (1990), The State of Martial Rule, Constructing the State, New York: Cambridge University Press, p. 25.
84 Chapter No. 3
Political Dynasties and Democracy in Pakistan After 1970s
The study of political system provided an opportunity to study an electoral system in which political parties got the will of the people and translated it into political institution after elections. Political parties interacted with the peoples by contesting elections. The stability of these interactions should be reflected by the fluctuations in the percentage of votes received by a party over time.
The election process, the election functions and the behavior of the individual vote are determined by the number of political parties competing for parliamentary representation, their relative strength, the ideological dimensions and ideological distances existing between parties, among other factors (Nohilen, 1995: 7).
3.1 LFO and the Election 1970
After the abrogation of the constitution of 1962, General Yaha khan needed a Legal Frame Work Order (LFO) to hold elections. That was the first time that the elections were held on adult franchise. In spite of reservations, the political leaders welcomed the decision of the military government to hold general elections. The Awami League based its manifesto on the famous Mujib-ur Rehman Six Points which aimed at converting Pakistan into very loose federation. The Awami League Leaders created emotional hysteria on the crest of which they sailed to success in the election. The election campaign in West Pakistan was overshadowed by the sharp polarization of the left and the right. Pakistan People’s Party election campaign was also issue oriented. Its leadership tended to capitalize on the rich-poor gap.
On November 28, General Yaha Khan announced his political programme that the date of first General election of Pakistan was fixed as 5th October 1970. Most of the PPP Candidates were feudal lords who were capitalists. Awami League the other main party presented its programme in the form of six points which contained the maximum
85 provincial autonomy of the provinces. The PPP wanted to cow down Bhutto’s opponents partially Pakistan Muslim League (Qayyum Group) and Muslim League (Conventional Group) and the NAP in the NWFP. The Pakistani rulers understood clearly the six points by Awami League formula for the dis-integration of Pakistan but the people who had voted for it in 1970 election did not know they were voting for succession (Oldenburg, P. 1971).
The Pakistani rulers understood clearly the six points by Awami League formula for the dis-integration of Pakistan but the people who had voted for it in 1970 election did not know they were voting for succession. (Oldenburg, P. 1971)
Sheikh Mujib had ordered the East Pakistani government to take direction from him and not to central authorities government workers were directed to stay away from their jobs and member of East Pakistani judiciary refused to swear under lieutenant General Tikka Khan in as military governor. While the negotiations were taking place, the Awami League was organizing and consolidating its defacto control over province (LaPorte, R., & La Porte Jr, R. 1975).
After the elections Mujib took oath from his MNAs and MPAs to become loyal to six-point formula. On the other hand, some of the members of PPP were favor in the six- points and some were against it. Bhutto could not unite them. (M Rafique Afzal, 1971, 402-410).
Awami League and its Leaders had become the defecto ruler of East Pakistan. The Awami League’s volunteer force had taken over the duties of maintain law and order and Mujib had started ordering about the civil administration. A parallel government had come into existence in East Pakistan (Abbas, M., & Mushtaq, A. Q. 2015).
The army had moved swiftly into action, forced its way through all points of resistance and arrested most of the top leaderships of the Awami League. On hearing the news of the army crackdown, Bhutto’s comment was, Thank God Pakistan has been saved (Khan, J. D. 2001).
86 After the 1970 elections, three political groups were at work. On the one side a group of Nationalist and progressive politicians of East Pakistan who supported Mujib. Third group represented the defeated and reject politicians. A clash between these three political groups had emerged. So endorsing the decision made by people in general elections: they had tried to impede democratic process. On the other hand, there were some sorts of disagreement between the leaders of two majority parties over constitutional matters. Yahya khan got benefit of this situation and very cunningly he had tried to sow the seeds of mistrust and suspicions. On the one side he gave impression that he took certain steps which helped him to undo all the efforts done in this respect (Aman, A. 1974).
While different governments had promised to implement land reforms, none of them had managed to do it as these absentee landowners dominated the executive and legislative branches. East Pakistan was the base of these middle class people because most of them were living there. Ideas had no significance in the rural and backward tribal areas because the politics of these areas rotated around the bitterness and opposition of exacting families.
Two prominent parties came to prominence as a result of December 1970 general election. Awami League under Sheikh Mujib and PPP under Zulfikar Ali Bhutto emerged in East and West Pakistan respectively. There was no doubt that in East Pakistan the principle which won the consensus of opinion was the single basic nation of autonomy (Hussain, M., Ahmad, M. M., & Farooq, M. A. Structural Evolution of Political and Electoral System in Pakistan: A study of First Thirty Years (1947-1977).
Party Wise Candidates on Territorial Basis
Party Candidates in East Pakistan Candidates in West Pakistan Awami League 162 04 JI 69 79 PML(convention) 93 31 PLM(Qayum) 65 67
87 PPP --- 119 PML(council) 50 69 PDP 81 27 JUP 13 90 NAP (Wali Group) 36 25 NAP (Bhashani Group) 15 05 Total 584 516
Source: Herbrt Feldman, The End and the Beginning: Pakistan, 1969-1972 (London: Oxford University Press, 1972), pp.72-73.
Election Results 1970
Parties Candidates Seats
AL 162 160 PPP 160 81 PML-CON 124 02 PML-COUN 119 07 PML-Q 133 09 JI 154 04 JUP 50 07 PDP 105 01 NAP 64 06 JUI 105 07 IND 316 16 Source: Election Commission of Pakistan.
During each election, it became evident that all parties had weak gross root support. Two groups were introduced as leftists and Rightists (Feldman, 197, 72, 73).
In eastern part of the country, the provincial autonomy was an issue. That was why; Sheikh Mujeeb-ur-rehman emerged as a hero in East Pakistan. All sectors like students, peasants and laborers supported Sh. Mujeeb-ur-Rehman. On the other hand, all other factions of political parties like PML stood for common and national goals in
88 accordance with Islamic Teachings. In election, for 300 seats of MNAs 1957 candidates applied and after scrutiny, 1579 were allowed to contest. Due to separation of East Pakistan all the remaining federate units required unity under the strong federation (Raza, 2004).
Percentage of valid Votes Polled by PPP into the 1970 National Election
Punjab 41.66%
Sindh 44.95%
NWFP 14.28%
Balochistan 2.38%
Total West Pakistan 38.89%
Total Pakistan 18.63%
Source: Sherbaz Khan Marari, A Journey of Disllusioment (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1999), p.173.
It was, therefore not possible to unite two parts of the country on the agenda of the religion only. The military of Pakistan did not know the engineering of bargaining and was hesitant to share and transfer rule to the Awami League. The military consequently made its escape in crushing brutally the opponents in Eastern part of the country(Afzal, D. M. R. 1986, 402-410).
3.2 Constitution 1973 and New Political System of Parliamentary System (1973-1977)
A 25 member’s parliamentary committee was constituted on April 17, 1972 for the preparation of draft the new constitution. Both ruling parties and opposition parties approved the draft, which was unanimously passed and assented by the president on12
89 April 1973. The working and implementation stared from the Independence Day on 14 August, 1973 with the sworn of the new cabinet (Pasha, A. S. 1995: 228).
3.3 Election 1977 and mass movement Against Bhutto
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto tried to bring about changes in a feudal society by mobilizing the middle class, the working class and the peasantry. For the first time in the history of Pakistan he could organize a strong mass party (the PPP). But, he could not transform the traditional religiously oriented politics to a secular and socialistic system.
The opposition had the traditional Pakistani card, the slogan of Islam, to play against Bhutto. The self-interested and weak, politicians exploited the slogan of Islam for a long time in the history of Pakistan. General Zia-ul-Huq used the same card for eleven years of his rule. Although the Islamic Democratic Alliance was divided into several rival groups they were united only to unseat Bhutto. The restlessness of the opposition groups was coming more from their desire to unseat their political colleagues from power than to provide constructive opposition for the building of political institutions and a functional political process in the country. The budget allocation for defense, which is not questionable or cannot be discussed in the national parliament and the approval of many military projects demonstrate the fact that the civilian political leaders give the military serious consideration.
Z.A Bhutto insisted on a prompt demonstration of the PPP’s effectiveness as a political machine. He sought to impress the public with our readiness and the absence of it in the opposition. Thus on 9 January, PPP parliamentary and appellate boards were set up to consider the award of tickets. In construct most of the opposition parties then in the UDF met in Lahore only to adjourn with the announcement that they would jointly contest against the PPP. The Landlords feudal, tribal chiefs and various notables including Shaukat Hayat khan announced they were joining the PPP with their thousands of followers. The merchant industrial groups, a segmented of the landed aristocracy, the trade merchant classes and the religious elite’s class who were affected by the Bhutto regime’s socio-economic policies, formed broad coalitions which were publicly
90 manifested through PNA. From the outset, the PNA showed a determination to use elections not so much as a legitimate means toward competitive politics and peaceful succession of power, but as an opportunity to dislodge Bhutto from power.
The campaign of the PPP was equally hard hitting with ZAB describing the PNA as a gang of nine aiming to restore exploitation when he addressed a public meeting in Multan on 4 February 1977. The voter turnout in the 1977 elections as compared to 1970, was marginally higher in the Punjab at 67% as against 63% in Sindh at 62.5% as against about 60% and in the frontier there was a small increase to 47.4% from 46.8% while in Baluchistan there was a decline to 29.8% from be born in More 39% because of the PNA boycott in that province, while the percentage of votes in favor of the PPP did increase in 1977, it must suppressing to everyone was the report on 16 March that Bajwa had met the prime minister and that he had been removed as vice president of the JUP and secretary General of at the PNA for doing so without the alliance’s authorization. ZAB insisted on a prompt demonstration of the PPP’s effectiveness as a political machine. He sought to impress the public with our readiness and the absence of it in the opposition.
Not only the prime minister but five other PPP candidates in Sindh and three in Balochistan returned without contest. In all eighteen PPP candidates out of a national assembly of two hundred enjoyed similar victories because in seven more constituencies the nomination papers of their rivals were unopposed. The Bhutto ventured to evolve a new coalition (comprising a segment of feudal, urban, urban middle classes and industrial labors) and adopted a reformist position to legitimize its role. The primary objective was to established the supremacy of political elites and rehabilitate the political structures of the political system (Ali M. 1977).
Candidates Vs Seats of Political Parties in Election 1977
Political Party Candidates Seats Won Percentage
PPP 191 155 58.1%
PNA 168 36 35.4%
91 PML (Qayyum) 37 1
Independants 324 8
Minor Parties 21 0
Total 741 200
Source: Hassan Askari Rizvi, The Military and Politics in Pakistan.
3.4 General Zia and Emergence of Ethnic Politics
General Zia-ul-Haq justified his coup d’état based on the Doctrine of Necessity, which held that the wrongdoings of elected politicians necessitated a military intervention. He preserved power for the military through the development of constitutional mechanisms that gave the unelected government institutions tools for intervening and guiding Pakistan’s elected institutions. This constitutional legacy included Articles 62 and 63, which authorized the judiciary to disqualify politicians from office if they did not abide by a set of vague moral standards (honesty and sagacity). Thus, the military maintained a role as a guardian of the political system, intervening either directly or through allied unelected institutions, to guide the system in a direction that suited its interests.
The state power as a result had been wielded by a military-bureaucratic oligarchy for most of the country’s post independent history.
3.5 General Election 1985
General Zia ul-Haq promised almost 33 times to hold the general elections in Pakistan but election were not conducted. At last he decided to conduct election in February on the non-party basis. It was zia’s point of view that the political parties disturbed the political system in Pakistan. These were responsible for anarchy and instability in account of national integration. He said that there was no concept of political parties in Islam. Since theses election were held on non-party basis, the political
92 parties of MRD decided to by cot the election for the reason the demanded the party based election and the restoration of 1973 constitution were not fulfilled by Zia. . The parties which decided to not to participate in non-party base election were PPP, JUI, Pakistan Teharik Istaqlal, Pakistan Democratic Party and ANP. Over twelve hundred candidates contested election for the 207 National Assembly seat reserved for Muslim. Since political parties were excluded from the process, the election was held on the basis of personal and local issues (Hassan, (1990).
However, an interesting aspect of the election was that the most of the elected members had identifiable political affiliation with various political parties. The JI had nominated 61 candidates and the PML(Pagara) extended support to over ninety candidates. Approximately 120 candidates had been associated with the parties belonging to MRD; more then 70 of them known for their PPP background. Zia –ul-Haq nominated Muhammad Khan Junejo as the Prime Minister and he took oath on March 23, 1985. Jenejo was from Sindh and Pir Pagrara also supported him. Form the First session the Nation Assembly was divided into an independent parliamentary group consisting of about forty members and an official parliamentary group, which supported the government and were named as the Public group (Safdar Mehmood, 1990. 242).
Background of National Assembly Members, 1985
Landlords and Tribal Leaders 157
Businessmen 54
Urban Professionals 18
Religious Leaders 6
Other 3
Sources: Dawn, Jang and Herald. Cited in, Omer Noman. (Pakistan A Political and Economic History Science 1947).Pp 127.
93 3.6 Election 1988
In 1985, non-party elections at national level were conducted where these families reemerged once again. And in 1988, party based elections were conducted which gave more encouragement to these families to set up themselves because none of the political parties took chance to present candidates of lower and middle classes in opposition to them. Somewhat they strived for granting tickets to these families. Area wise prototype scrutiny of voting for National Assembly elections, the advance verified claim that biradari association is still floated on political system. Therefore the ideological quality of the political parties has been upset by political dominations of these families (Ziring, 2007. 525).
Before the election, there were reports that Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) had played a decisive role in forming an electoral alliance of pro- Zia political parties known as IJI. Thus even before the actual act of the transfer of power, the military had attempted to continue the legacy of General Zia in maintain an influence of the military over a section of political elites. The results of 1988 elections showed that group identities based on ethnic and regional loyalties had played important role in determining the outcome of elections. The success of MQM (Mohajar Quomi Movement) in Karachi, Hyderabad and Sukkur, the Baluchistan National Alliance (BNA) and Islami Jamhoori Ittehad in Punjab testified to this trend.
3.7 Election 1990
The IJI decided to nominate only one candidate against PPP in one constituency and it adopted this policy in the whole country. There are 2442 candidates who file their nomination papers against 207general seats and 10 minority seats and before the election 1095 with draw their nomination paper and 1347 candidates contest election (W.I Richter, 1993).
In October 1990 election, Tickets were distributed in quantity to these specific families’ famous figures in Punjab by the Muslim League and the PPP elections than the
94 middle classes. Even the religious parties have supported by giving tickets to well prosperous and landlords but only in some cases, it had proved. The Biradaries system always appreciated in Punjab and this system played a significant role in the succession of candidates in the cities of the Province like Lahore, Faisalabad, Gujranwala, Sialkot, Rawalpindi and Toba Tek Singh than the families.
The result of the elections PPP led electoral alliance PDA won only 46 seats and IJI led by Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif of PML won 105 seats in the National Assembly (Dawan, Karachi, 1990). The IJI’s share of national vote was about 37.4 against the last share 30.2% in 1988 elections. The PPP got 36.8 marginally lower than its 38.5 vote share in 1988 (MaleehaLodhi, 1994. 5). Although the PPP alleged that the election were stolen and had been rigged. The IJI leaders claimed that this time we were better organized to improve our seats in election results.
After victory Nawaz Sharif became the prime minister of Pakistan. He belonged to a business class (Bhardwaj, K. K. 1996). He started his business at the small scale, but developed into big industrial empire by hook or perhaps by crook (Muhammad. Waseem, 1994). He had not liked the war of attrition with his political opponents and started an arena of cooperation and dialogue (Ziring, L. 1997).
He remained impartial till the end of this bloodshed war of political forces (Robert Nichols, 1998). At the mid of the July 1993, an agreed formula was done under which the army chief decided to step done both Nawaz Sharif and Ishaq Khan and resign from the post of prime minister and president respectively (Jaffrelot, C. (Ed.). 2004). A caretaker set up was announced under the Prime Minister Moeen Quershi. He made his cabinet and gets success for held the free and fair lection 1993 (Ziring, L. 1997).
Election Result of Election 1990
Parties Sindh Punjab NWFP Balochistan FATA Total
IJI 03 91 08 02 - 105
PDA 24 14 05 02 - 45
95 MQM 15 - - - - 15
JUI-F - - 04 02 - 06
ANP - - 04 02 - 06
JUI-N - 3 - - - 03
JWP - - - 02 - 02
PNP - - - 02 - 02
PMAP - - - 01 - 01
IND 04 06 03 - 8 21
Total 46 114 26 11 8+1 206
Source: The Election Commission of Pakistan, Islamabad, 1990.
3.8 Election 1993
The Muslim League was revived by Muhammad Khan Junejo, but it went back to the masses and gains their support after a very long time through concerted efforts made by Nawaz Sharif during the election campaign conduct by him in 1993 after his resignation. The PML(N) performance in these elections was remarkable. It was not only emerged as the party of the future by sweeping the urban centers, it also bagged more votes than any other political party including PPP. Since then the PML(N) has continued to grow in stature and can boast of an identity (Party Time, 1997).
The PML-N did issue a manifesto for the 1993 election, but in Pakistan it may nevertheless be stated, elections are not won or lost on the basis of party manifesto because the manifesto does not reach the masses and is not understood by them even if it does. Voters are generally cast for personalities and the influence which they wield through the wealth or property they possess or the power of persuasion at their disposal. Since party leader as a sole arbiter, has absolute control of all matters, starting from admission to the party rank to expulsion when a member insure the displeasure the party
96 adherents are subservient to the leader, shower lavish praise and unable to question the propriety of decisions made offer implicit obedience (Party Time, 1997).
Benazir Bhutto became the prime minister for the second term and promised for the starting the process of reconciliation among the political forces (Ziring, L. 1997). (Benazir Bhutto had not an easy term with the new COAS, General Jahangir Karamat (Hamid Yousaf, (1947-1997). Apart from the absence of the election 1997 will be different in other, more significant ways as well for the first time perhaps in Pakistani politics, most of the religious parties are either out of the electorate race or are likely to be completely sidelined. JI under Qazi Hussain Ahmad has boycotted the polls, and since then has been urging voters to stay home on elections day (Zafar Abbas, 1997).
Yet the 1993 election had consolidated some of the trends evident earlier the league had emerged as a truly national party, having won significant seats on its own in all four provinces. Pakistan appeared to be moving towards a broad two party system although the social basis of the principal parties was unstable. In the absence of policy difference parties remained identified with strong leaders but strong leaders presided over weak political or organizations. This was the bane of the party system in Pakistan from the beginning. The frequent rails at the Hastings had not changed the situation much. At last the president Farooq Khan Laghari used the power of 58(2)(b) of 8thamendment of the constitution to dismiss the government of PPP (Safdar Mahmood, 1947-1999).
Politically, too, the February 3 verdict of election 1993 is far more significant than a simple numerical analysis would imply. In the Punjab, the PPP has wiped out. In 1993 elections northern Punjab was a desert for the PPP with only a single seat in Rawalpandi division. In contract, the southern division of Multan, Bahwalpur and D.G.Khan gave the PPP an impressive 26 seats. What this means is that the powerful feudal interests of southern Punjab which had so far been holding flag aloft have been finally forced into submission (Anmer Ahmad Khan, The Anatomy of Landslide) (In the number of constituencies these feudal interests have been replaced by local body’s politicians many whom will be entering the National Assembly for the first time in the political career. Elsewhere too established political families have fallen like ninepins, to
97 be replaced by middle class politicians who, only three years ago, could not have imagined ever making it to the national assembly. It the party vote holds its strength in the years to come, the Punjab may well have bit a final farewell to the highly regressive politics of families and biradaries (Anmer Ahmad Khan, 1993).
The PPP(SB) won only one seat in National assembly. Ghinwa Bhutto the widow of Murtaz Bhutto also lost both the seats of National Assembly and Sindh Assembly from the Larkana (Mazhar Abbas, 1997). She admitted that inexperience, poor organization, confusion over seat adjustment and lack of financial resources all contributed to their defeat in the election. Of course, there was also a belief among the general public that a businessman could contain inflation and run the country better (Asad Sayeed, 1997). The PML (N) managed to control the 1997 polls with uncanny accuracy.
On the other hand, the increase registered in the PML vote also showed some interesting trends. First, the PML (N) had gained votes in just about every constituency that it had lost in 1993. In this election the last election 1993 winning PPP had lost close to three million voters in all over the Pakistan (Anmer Ahmad Khan, 1993). MQM has been campaigning in a highly organized manner and is likely to make a huge setback in its strong hold of urban Sindh. The party real decision maker is still the self-exiled Altaf Hussain, who has been making election speeches courtesy long distance telephone since the start of the campaign (National Accountability Bureau, Annual Report 2003).
3.9 Election 1997
In reality, General Musharraf determined to replace Nawaz Sharif as the danger that the Prime Minister would organize a query into the Kargil issue (Ayesha Siddiqa, 2007). Stephen Cohen believed that the actual purpose behind the system was to build political favor by creating a class of local notable who owed their position and hence allegiances to the military (Stephen P. Cohen, 2004).
Imran Khan’s branding of all traditional politicians as corrupt and dishonest had, to some extent, won him support among the country’s rapidly growing middle class. But despite the party is effective campaign and timely slogan against the corruption, many
98 analysts felt that the PTI might prove to be a classic case of too much too soon (Craig Baxter and C. H. Kennedy, 2001).
Election Result of Election 1997
Parties Punjab Sindh NWFP Balochistan FATA Total PML-N 108 09 14 03 - 134 PPP - 18 - - - 18 MQM -- 12 - - - 12 ANP - - 09 03 - 09 JUI-F - - - 02 - 03 JWP - - - 02 - 02 NPP - 01 - - - 01 PPP-SB - 01 - - - 01 IND 06 05 02 01 08 22 TOTAL 114 46 26 11 08 207 Source: The Election Commission of Pakistan, Islamabad, 1997.
3.10 Musharraf Rule with New Political System
On 12th October 2000 Supreme Court gave a decision that justified the Musharf regime’s military coup on the grounds that the military had acted out of state necessity the decision gave the government three years to restore order and return power to a democratic civilian government. On 9th December 2000 the Sharif family was exiled from Pakistan in exchange for their promising not to participate in politics for the next ten years, the exile and the accompanying pardon for the reminder of their sentence was granted after Nawaz Sharif filed a petition for mercy. On 20th June 2001 General Musharaf declared himself president of Pakistan and replaced Rafiq Tarar. The new president pledged to hold elections in October 2002. On 14 August 2001 a new system of local government was installed direct elections had taken place during 2001. Indirect elections for Nazims had been immediately prior in July and August. On 30 April 2002 Musharaf won a controversial referendum endorsing his presidency. This victory would allow him to remain in power for five more years (Hamid Khan, 2009).
99 On 10 October 2002 Pakistan held elections for the National Assembly. Observers had differing claims as to the transparency and fairness of the polling. Of the 272 seats, seventy- six were won by the pro-military Pakistan Muslim League (Q); sixty-two were won by the People’s Party Parliamentarians; fifty- one were won by the Muttahida Majlis-i-Amal (MMA) electoral alliance; twenty-six were won by independents; fourteen were won by the Pakistan Muslim League (Waseem M. 2006).
3.11 Election 2002 and the Restoration of Democracy
PML(Q), a splinter group of PML(N), consisting of most of the cabinet members of Nawaz Sharif government had got support of the military government that labeled her as a king party by the political parties in ARD got majority seats in Punjab. In Sindh PPPP won majority seats followed by MQM whereas National Alliance also claimed sizeable number of seats in those provinces as well as in the center as well as in Sindh and Punjab assemblies.
The vote bank of the rightist political parties increased from four percent to eleven percent and it was a significant development the previous assemblies had less than twenty members from all religious parties. ANP in KPK was almost eliminated winning no seat in National Assembly setting new trends in the dynamic of politics. Aftab Ahmad Sherpao’s PPP had gained some ground in the province winning two seats in National Assembly and nine seats in the provincial assembly (Hussain Muhammad, 2014).
Election Result 2002
Party General Seats Women Minorities Total
PML-Q 92 22 04 118
PPPP 63 15 2 80
MMA 47 12 2 61
PML-N 15 03 1 19
MQM 13 03 01 17
100 NA 13 03 0 16
PML-F 4 1 0 5
PML-J 2 1 0 3
PPP-S 2 0 0 2
BNP 1 0 0 1
JWP 1 0 0 1
PAT 1 0 0 1
PML-Z 1 0 0 1
PTI 1 0 0 1
MQM-H 1 0 0 1
PKMAP 1 0 0 1
PSPP 1 0 0 1
FATA 12 0 0 12
IND 1 0 0 1
Total 272 60 10 342
Source: New Perspective on Pakistan: Vision for Future, edited by Saeed Shafqat, Karachi, Oxford University Press, 2007, pp.269-270.
3.12 Election 2008 and Statistical Analysis of Political Dynasties
PML (N) which had announced to boycott elections in protest against Benazir Bhutto’s assassination reversed its decision following announcement of PPP to participate in the election 2008. The general elections were held on February 22, 2008. The PPP, PML (N), PML (Q), ANP and other minor parties took part in elections. The JI and PTI boycotted the election with other political parties of All Pakistan Democratic
101 Movement (APDM) except PML (N).The PPP formed the government with the coalitions of PML(N), ANP and MQM (Hamid Khan, 2009).
The turnout in the election was 44% which was regarded quite low. However, as compared to last two election turnout like 36% in 1997 and 42% in 2002 elections respectively. Election 2008 indicated regional gaining strength in the electoral politics of Pakistan. The two major parties namely PPP and PML (N) were somewhat confined to their local support bases. Thus the national character of these parties had been undermined to the substation extent (Hussain Muhammad, 2014).
Party Position after 2008 Election
Party NA PA SA BA NWFPA
PPP 87 79 70 07 17
PML-N 67 104 0 0 5
PML-Q 39 66 10 18 5
MQM 19 0 38 0 0
ANP 9 0 2 2 31
MMA 6 2 0 7 10
PML-F 4 3 7 0 0
BNP-A 1 0 0 5 0
PPP-S 1 0 0 0 5
Source: Election Commission of Pakistan
3.13 Military Role in Dynasties Politics
Apparently political organizations could develop under Military Governance without democratic practice, political organizations could not grow. Political organizations might be urbanized by usual and timely elections but under military law,
102 elections were not pale or there were no elections at all. Now, though there was no qualitative transform in the political behaviors of the leaders and parties of Pakistan, the military leaders did not try to phase an overthrow because there was no international help to military leaders between the post-Cold War periods facing the truth, Pakistan had very strong expressions against Military interference in politics. As it was already highlighted before that Democracy meant, liberty, fairness maximizing human rights, people’s empowerment, broadmindedness and nonviolent resolution of disagreements and nonviolent change of administration through elections. So, democratization itself should be measured as a shape or growth stage such growths could occur in a civilization where even financial and technological growths are not important (Hasan Askari Rizvi, 2002).
However, in current democracies, straight contribution in governmental, administrative, legal and policy making procedure is not probable because of the dimension of people of an up to date state. Because, the difficulty of present political systems and the difficulty of the matters with which they dealt could make the supposition of straight democracy, mainly that of the national base and should make good policy option by voting in referendum, all the time more questionable. So, up to date democratic arrangements innovated the procedure of symbols by electoral techniques (Haqqani, H. 2010).
103 Major Political Dynasties of Sindh
Sindh with 110 political dynasties has the second highest numbers after Punjab. There is scarcely any rural area or constituency in the province the not in the control of one or another of these dynastic clans. Urban Sindh is different and always been so. The dynastic politics has not just remained confined to the old rural-based feudal and tribal order but has clearly permeated the urban based parties.
Arbab Ghulam Rahim
Member National Assembly-1997
Caretaker Fed. Minister Member National Assembly-1993
CM-2002
Member Province Assembly-2008
2009
Arbab Zakaullah Arbab Amir Hussain Arbab Faiz Muhammad (Nephew) (Brother) (Cousin)
Member National Assembly-2002 Member National Assembly-1988 Prov. Minister-1997
Member National Assembly-2008 Member Province Assembly-1977 Member National Assembly -1985
Member Province Assembly-1985 Member Province Assembly-1970
Arbab Zulfiqar Ali Member Province Assembly-1990 (Nephew) Member Province Assembly-2008 Member Province Assembly-1988 Arbab Haji Abdullah (Brother)
Member Province Assembly-2002 Arbab Ataullah Member Province Assembly-2008 (Cousin)
Member Province Assembly-1993
Source: Ijaz. I, Cheema.A,& Zahid. S, (2013) (Edit by Researcher)
104
Zulfiqar Ali Butto
President Prime Minister-1970
Prime Minister-1977
Asif Ali Zardari Begum Nusrat Bhutto Benazir Bhutto (Son-in-Law) (Wife) (Daughter) Member National Assembly-1990 Member National Assembly-1977 Prime Minister-1993
Caretaker Fed. Minister 1993 Member National Assembly-1997 Lead Opp. NA-1997
Senator 1997 State Minister-1988 Member National Assembly-1997
Member National Assembly-1990 Prime Minister-1988
State Minister-1993 Lead Opp. NA-1997
Mir Murtaza Bhutto (Son)
Member National Assembly-2018
Source: Ijaz. I, Cheema.A,& Zahid. S, (2013) (Edit by Researcher)
105 Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi Federal Minister-1970 Chief Minister-1977 Caretaker Prov. Minister Member National Assembly-1990 Member National Assembly-1993
Member National Assembly-1997
Lead Opp.NA-1988
Masrur Ahmad Khan Jatoi Ghulam Mutaba Jatoi Ghulam Murtaza Khan Jatoi (Brother) (Brother) (Son) Province Minister-1990 Member Province Assembly-1970 Member Province Assembly-1988
Member Province Assembly-1997 Member National Assembly-1977 Federal Minister-1990
Member Province Assembly-2008 Member Province Assembly-1997 Ghulam Rosul Khan Jatoi (Nephew) Member National Assembly-2008 Member Province Assembly-1990 Dr. Abdul Ghaffar Jatoi (Brother) Member Province Assembly-1993 Member National Assembly-2002 Asif Jatoi (Son)
Senator-2008 Senator 1991 Arif Mustafa Jatoi (Son) Caretaker F. M. 1996 Province Minister-2002 Farhad Zaman Jatoi Member National Assembly-2008 (Nephew) Member Province Assembly-2002
Tariq Khan Jatoi (Son)
Member Province Assembly-1993
Source: Ijaz. I, Cheema.A,& Zahid. S, (2013) (Edit by Researcher)
106
Sardar Ghulam M. Khan Mahar
Member National Assembly-2007
Fed. Minister 1985
Member National Assembly-1993
Caretaker Prov. Minister 1979
Haji Ali Anwar Khan Sardar Ali Khan Gohar Mahar Ali Muhammad Khan (Brother) Mahar Mahar (Brother) Member Province Assembly-1993 (Nephew) Member National Assembly-1970 Member National Assembly-1993 Member Province Assembly-1997
Member National Assembly-1977 Member National Assembly-1997
Member National Assembly-1985 Member National Assembly-2002 Ali Nawaz Khan
Member National Assembly-1990 Mahar (Nephew) Member National Assembly -2002 Chief Minister-2002
Member National Assembly-2008
Source: Ijaz. I, Cheema.A,& Zahid. S, (2013) (Edit by Researcher)
107
Arbab Ghulam Rahim
Member National Assembly-1997
Caretaker Fed. Minister Member National Assembly-1993
CM-2002
Member Province Assembly-2008
2009
Arbab Zakaullah Arbab Amir Hussain Arbab Faiz Muhammad (Nephew) (Brother) (Cousin) Member National Assembly-2002 Member National Assembly-1988 Prov. Minister-1997
Member National Assembly-2008 Member Province Assembly-1977 Member National Assembly -1985
Member Province Assembly-1985 Member Province Assembly-1970
Arbab Zulfiqar Ali Member Province Assembly-1990 (Nephew)
Member Province Assembly-2008 Member Province Assembly-1988 Arbab Haji Abdullah (Brother) Member Province Assembly-2002 Arbab Ataullah Member Province Assembly-2008 (Cousin)
Member Province Assembly-1993
Source: Ijaz. I, Cheema.A,& Zahid. S, (2013) (Edit by Researcher)
108 Pir Shah Ali Mardan Shah Rashdi Senator - 1985
Pir Syed Sadaruddin Pir Syed Gauhar Shah Pir Syed Sibghatullah Shah Rashidi Rashidi Shah Rashidi (Son) (Son) (Son) Member Province Assembly-1993 Member National AssemblyAssembly-1985 Member Province Assembly-1985
Member Province Assembly-1997 Member National Assembly -1988 Province Minister-1990
Province Minister-2002 Member National Assembly-1990 Member province Assembly-1993
Advisor 2008 Member province Assembly-1997
Pir Syed Nadir Ali Shah (Brother) Alhaj Qamarulzaman Member Province Assembly-1970 Shah Khagga (Co-Father-in-Law)
Member Province Assembly-1977
Source: Ijaz. I, Cheema.A,& Zahid. S, (2013) (Edit by Researcher)
109 Major Political Dynasties of Balochistan
Mehmood Khan Achakzi
Member Province Assembly-1973
Member National Assembly-1990
Member National Assembly-1993
Member National Assembly-2002
Abdul Hameed Khan Abdul Majeed Khan Dr. Hamid Khan Achakzi Achakzi Achakzi (Father-in-Law) (Brother-in-Law) (Brother) Member Province Assembly-1988 Member Province Assembly-2002 Member National Assembly-1993
Member Province Assembly-1990 Member Province Assembly-1997
Province Minister-1993 Abdus Samad Khan Achakzi (Father)
Member Province Assembly-1977
Source: Ijaz. I, Cheema.A,& Zahid. S, (2013) (Edit by Researcher)
110
Mir Ghous Bukhsh Khan Bazinjo
Government 1970
Mir Bizen Bazinjo Mir Hasil Khan Bazinjo (Son) (Son) Member National Assembly -1990 Member National Assembly-1970
Member National Assembly -1997
Senator - 2009
Source: Ijaz. I, Cheema.A,& Zahid. S, (2013) (Edit by Researcher)
111 Nawab M. Akbar Khan Bugti
Government 1970
Chief Minister 1988
Leader Opp. PA-1988
Federal Minster 1993
Member National Assembly-1997
Member Province Assembly-1990
Nawabzad Saieem Akbar Bugti Mir Ahmad Nawaz Khan Bugti Mir Tariq Mehmood Khetran (Brother) (Nephew) (Son) Member Province Assembly-1988 Province Minister 1970 Leader Opp. PA-1985
Member Province Assembly-1997 Member National Assembly-1993 Member National Assembly-1988
Member National Assembly-1997 Member National Assembly-1990
Ghulam Haider Bugi Caretaker Federal Minister-1993 (Nephew) Leader Opp. PA-1993
Member National Assembly-2002 Province Member -1997
Agha Shahid Hussain Bugti (Son-in-Law) Mir Juma Khan Bugi Senator - 2006 (Nephew)
Member Province Assembly-2002 Senator - 2009
Source: Ijaz. I, Cheema.A,& Zahid. S, (2013) (Edit by Researcher)
112 Mir Jam Ghulam Qadir Khan
Chief Minister 1970
Speaker PA-1977
Chief Minister 1985
Fazila Aliani Shahzada Ali Akbar Mir Jam M. Yousaf (Daughter) (Son) (Son)
Province Minister 1970 Member Province Assembly-1990 Member National Assembly-1985
Member Province Assembly-1977 Member Province Assembly-1988
Member Province Assembly-1985 Federal Minster 1990
Province Minster 1993
Member National Assembly-1997
Chief Minister - 2002
Federal Minister - 2008
Source: Ijaz. I, Cheema.A,& Zahid. S, (2013) (Edit by Researcher)
113 Mir Zafarullah Khan Jamali
Province Minister 1977
Caretaker Fed. Minister 1985
Caretaker CM 1988
MNA Caretaker CM 1993
Senator 1997
Prime Minister - 2002
Abdul Rehman Jamili Mir Faridullah Khan Jamali Mir Abdul Nabi Jamili (Brother) (Son) (Cousin)
Senator 1985 Member National Assembly-2008 Senator 1973
Senator 1988 Member National Assembly-1977
Province Minister-2002 Province Minister 1985
Province Minister 1993
Source: Ijaz. I, Cheema.A,& Zahid. S, (2013) (Edit by Researcher)
114 Mir Zulfiqar Ali Magasi
Member Province Assembly-1985
Member Province Assembly-1988
Member Province Assembly-1990
Chief Minister 1993
Member Province Assembly-1997
Government - 2002
Nawabzada Tariq Magasi Nawabzada Saifullah Magasi Mir Nadir Ali Khan Magasi (Brother) (Son) (Brother) Member Province Assembly-1977 Senator 2012 Member National Assembly-1985
State Minister-1988 PS-1988 Nawabzada M. Akbar Magasi Senator 1991 (Brother) PS-1990
Member Province Assembly 2002 Senator 2009 Province Minister 1993
Lead Opp-PA-2008 Member Province Assembly-1997 Mir Amir Ali Khan Magasi (Brother) Province Minister 2008
Senator 1991 Shama Perveen Magasi (Wife) Member National Assembly-2008
Province Minister 2002
Province Minister 2008
Source: Ijaz. I, Cheema.A,& Zahid. S, (2013) (Edit by Researcher)
115 Major Political Dynasties of Khyber Pakhtoon Khan
Ayub Khan
Umar Ayub Khan Gohar Ayub Khan Yousaf Ayub Khan (Grandson) (Son) (Grandson)
Member Province Assembly-1988 State Minister 2002 Federal Minister-1997
Member National Assembly-1985 Member Province Assembly-1993
Member National Assembly-1993 Zeb Gohar Ayub Member Province Assembly-1997 (Daughter-in-Law)
Member National Assembly-1977 Member National Assembly-2002
Speaker NA-1990
Source: Ijaz. I, Cheema.A,& Zahid. S, (2013) (Edit by Researcher)
116 Ghulam Ahmad Bilour
Member National Assembly-1988
Member National Assembly-1997
Member Province Assembly2002
Federal Minister 1990
Federal Minister 2008
Senator 1975
Bashir Ahmad Bilour Ilyas Ahmad Bilour (Brother) (Brother) Senator 1994 Member Province Assembly-2002 Senator 2003 Province Minister 1990 Senator 2006
Province Minister 1993 Senator 2012
Province Minister 1997
Province Minister 2008
Source: Ijaz. I, Cheema.A,& Zahid. S, (2013) (Edit by Researcher)
117 Khan Abdul Wali Khan
Member National Assembly-1970
Member National Assembly-1988
Begum Naseem Wali Khan Asfandyar Wali Khan (Wife) (Son)
Member National Assembly-1977 Member National Assembly-1993
Member Province Assembly-1997 Member Province Assembly-1997
Member Province Assembly-1988 Member Province Assembly-2008
Member Province Assembly-1990 Senator 2003
Member Province Assembly-1993 Member Province Assembly-1990
Source: Ijaz. I, Cheema.A,& Zahid. S, (2013) (Edit by Researcher)
118 Kulsoom Saifullah Khan
Member National Assembly-1985
Member National Assembly-1977
Member National Assembly-1988
Member Province Assembly-1970
Humayun Saifullah Khan Anwar Saifullah Khan Saleem Saifullah Khan (Son) (Son) (Son)
Member National Assembly-2008 Member National Assembly-2008 Member Province Assembly-1997
Member Province Assembly-1977 Member Province Assembly-1977 Caretaker CM 1988
Member Province Assembly-1997 Senator Federal Minister 1990 Senator 2006
Province Minister 1970 Senator Federal Minister 1991 Senator Federal Minister 1985
Province Minister 1988 Province Minister -1990
Caretaker Fed.Minister 2004
Usman Saifullah Khan (Grandson) Senator 2012
Source: Ijaz. I, Cheema.A,& Zahid. S, (2013) (Edit by Researcher)
119 Mian Gul Aurangzain
Government 1997
Member National Assembly-1990
Member National Assembly-1985
Member National Assembly-1993
Shahzada Amani Rool Mian Gul Adnan Aurangzeb Mian Gul Asfandyar Amir Zeb (Son-in-Law) (Son) (Nephew) Senator 1985 Member National Assembly-1997 Member Province Assembly-1985
Member National Assembly-1988 Member Province Assembly-1997
Mian Gul Amir Zeb (Son) Member National Assembly-1977
Source: Ijaz. I, Cheema.A,& Zahid. S, (2013) (Edit by Researcher)
120 Major Political Dynasties of Punjab A fundamental paradox of Punjab’s politics is the coexistence of competitive electoral contests with a deeply held belief among electorate that the political system extremely uncompetitive. The highest competitive nature of Punjab’s Elections can be seen from the fact that a five percentage point swing in votes against incumbent parties in the coming election, keeping all else equal, can topple as many as 30 percent of the outgoing members of the nation assembly in the province. A resolution of this paradox is proved by the claim that the political class in Punjab is heavily dominated by dynasties, held together by ties of blood and marriages, which impede the participation of non-dynastic aspirants to public office. Punjab politics appearscompetitive as members of dynastic fractions aggressively compete against each other using different party platforms, it is simultaneously uncompetitive because the dynasties and the pursuit of their interests, trump other concerns in political parties, and public policy and development related matters. It is also a fact that dynastic organizations in Punjab are together by the ties of blood and marriage.
Abdul Ghafoor Khan
Col. (R) M. Aslam Khan Abdul Hafeez Khan Nawabzada Abdul Razaq Khan (Brother-in-Law) (Son) (Son) Member Province Assembly-1970 Member Province Assembly-2008 Province Minister-1985
Member Province Assembly-1977 Member Province Assembly-2002
Abdul Rehman Khan Babli (Son) Zakia Shahnawaz Niazi Advisor 1993 (Daughter)
Member Province Assembly-1977
Member Province Assembly-1985
Source: Ijaz. I, Cheema.A,& Zahid. S, (2013) (Edit by Researcher)
121 Mian Shahabuddin Awaisi
Member Province Assembly-1985
Member Province Assembly-1988
Member Province Assembly-1990
Member Province Assembly-1993
Mian Sardar Ahmad Awaisi Mian Najeebuddin Awaisi Mian Saifullah Awaisi (Cousin) (Brother) (Brother) Member Province Assembly-1970 Member Province Assembly-1997 Member Province Assembly-2002
Member Province Assembly-1977
Source: Ijaz. I, Cheema.A,& Zahid. S, (2013) (Edit by Researcher)
122 Chaudhry Shujat Hussain
Federal Minister 1985
Member National Assembly-1993
Federal Minister Caretaker-1990
Senator 1993
Federal Minister-1997
Caretaker Prime Ministor-2002
Senator 2009
Chaudhry Pervaiz Ch. Manzoor Elahi Chaudhry Wajahat Hussain (Brother) Elahi (Uncle) Member Province Assembly-1988 Province Minister 1985 Member Province Assembly-1977
Member Province Assembly-1990 Province Minister 1988
Province Minister 1990 Chaudhry Moonis Elahi Member Province Assembly-1997 (Nephew) Member National Assembly-2002 Lead Opposition PA-1993 Member Province Assembly-2008
Member National Assembly-2008 Speaker PA-1997 Chaudhry Zahoor Ehali Chief Minister 2002 (Father) Member National Assembly-2002 Lead Opp. PA-2008 Caretaker Fed. Minister 1970
Source: Ijaz. I, Cheema.A,& Zahid. S, (2013) (Edit by Researcher)
123 Sardar Jamal Khan Leghari
Farooq Ahmad Begum Afifa Mamdot Sardar Jafar Khan Leghari (Grandson) Leghari (Daughter) (Grandson) Member Province Assembly-1988 Member Province Assembly-1985 Federal Minister 1977 Member National Assembly-1988 Federal Minister 1988 Dr. Asma Mamdot Member Province Assembly-1993 Member National Assembly-1990 (Grand Daughter)
Member Province Assembly-2008 Member Province Assembly-1997 Member National Assembly-1993
Member National Assembly-2002 Member National Assembly-2002 Meena Ehsan Leghari Member National Assembly-2008 Member National Assembly-2008 (Grand Daughter)
Member National Assembly-2002 Senator 1977 Sardar Maqsood Leghari (Grandson) Sardar Jamal Khan Leghari Federal Minister-1985 Sardar Yousaf Khan Leghari (Grandson) (Grandson) Senator-2002 Member Province Assembly-1977 Member Province Assembly-2002 Province Minister-1993
Member Province Assembly-2008 Sardar Atta Muhammad Leghari (Son) Member Province Assembly-1997
Member Province Assembly-2002 Member Province Assembly-1988 Sardar Awais Khan Leghari (Grandson) Member Province Assembly-1990 Member Province Assembly-1977 Sardar Muhammad Khan Leghari (Son) Federal Minister-2002 Member Province Assembly-1970
Member National Assembly-2008
Sardar Umer M. Khan Leghari (Grandson) Sardar Mansoor Khan Leghari (Grandson) Member Province Assembly-1988 Member Province Assembly-1990
Member National Assembly-1993 Sardar Mehmood Khan Leghari (Son) Senator-1999 Member Province Assembly-1970
Source: Ijaz. I, Cheema.A,& Zahid. S, (2013) (Edit by Researcher)
124 Syed Alamdar Gilani
Syed Abdul Qadir Gilani Syed Ahmad Mujtaba Gilani Syed Mustafa Gilani (Grandson) (Son) (Brother) Member National Assembly-2008 Member Province Assembly-2008 Member Province Assembly-1970
Member Province Assembly-2008 Member Province Assembly-1977
Syed Asad Murtaza Gilani (Grandson) Syed Hamid Raza Gillani Member National Assembly-2002 Syed Faiz Mustafa Gilani (Daughter) (Brother) Member Province Assembly-1970 Member National Assembly-1977 Syed Ali Musa Gilani Member National Assembly-1985 (Grandson) Member Province Assembly-1977 Member National Assembly-2008 Senator-1994
Syed Tanveer-ul-Hasan Gilani Syed Yousaf Raza Gilani (Nephew) (Son) Member National Assembly-1990 Federal Minister-1985
Federal Minister-1988
Member National Assembly-1990
Speaker National Assembly-1993
Prime Minister - 2008
Source: Ijaz. I, Cheema.A,& Zahid. S, (2013) (Edit by Researcher)
125 Malik Ghulam Mustafa Khar
Member National Assembly-1970
Member National Assembly-1988
Caretaker Fed. Minister Member National Assembly-1990 Federal Minister 1993
Ghulam M. Mutaba Khar Ghulam M. Murtaza Khar Malik Bilal Ahmad Khar (Brother) (Brother) (Son) Member National Assembly-1970 Member National Assembly-1985 Member Province Assembly-1993
Member Province Assembly-1985 Member Province Assembly-2008
Safina Saima Khar (Sister-in-Law) Ghulam M. Noor Rabbani Khar Member Province Assembly-2008 Hina Rabbani Khar (Brother) (Niece)
Member National Assembly-1985 State Minister 2002
Province Minister-1988 Malik Tahir Sultan Khar (Nephew) Federal Minister 2008 Member National Assembly-1990 Member Province Assembly-1993
Speaker Province Assembly-1990
Speaker National Assembly-1997
Source: Ijaz. I, Cheema.A,& Zahid. S, (2013) (Edit by Researcher)
126 Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif
Chief Minister 1985
Chief Minister 1988
Lead Opp. Federal 1993
Prime Minister 1997
Prime Minister 1990
Mina Muhammad Shahbaz Sharif Mian M. Abbas Sharif Muhammad Ishaq Dar (Brother) (Brother) (Co-Father-in-Law) Member Province Assembly-1988 Member National Assembly-1993 Member National Assembly-1993
Member National Assembly-1990 Federal Minister 1993
Opp. Leader 1993 Hamza Shahbaz Sharif Senator 2003 (Nephew) Chief Minister1997 Senator 2003 Member National Assembly-2008
Chief Minister2008 Federal Minister2012
Capt. Muhammad Safdar Senator 2012 (Son-in-Law) Member National Assembly-2008
Source: Ijaz. I, Cheema.A,& Zahid. S, (2013) (Edit by Researcher)
127 Makhdoom Muhammad Sajjad Hussain Qureshi Member National Assembly-1977
Government 1985
Senator 1985
Makhdoom Mureed Hussain Qureshi Pir Shujat Hussain Qureshi Makhdoom Shah Mehmood Qureshi (Son) (Son-in-Law) (Son) Member Province Assembly-1977 Member Province Assembly-1985 Member Province Assembly-1990
Senator -1990 Province Minister 1988 Member Province Assembly-1993 Member Province Assembly-1993 Province Minister 1990
Pir Zahoor Hussain Qureshi Member Province Assembly-1997 Federal Minister 1993 (Grandson) Member Province Assembly-2002 Senator - 1985 Member National Assembly-2002
Federal Minister 2008
Makhdoom Syed Ahsan Shah (Son-in-Law) Member Province Assembly-1985
Member Province Assembly-1990
Source: Ijaz. I, Cheema.A,& Zahid. S, (2013) (Edit by Researcher)
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133 Chapter No. 4
Dynastic Politics of Political Parties and their Leadership
In each state having developing democracy, political parties by political function and by the influence of their dynasties and clans consolidate their substrata and positions. They strengthen their dynastic influence through marriages, businesses and political accommodation etc in a particular area (Political Parties and Democracy, Annual Review of Political Science 6/199).
It has been believed that parties are unavoidable for democracy. Parties are guarantee to proper functioning of government. Opposition and Government are part and parcel for democracy. The governments are usually harsh and aggressive, opposition balance it by its role. Opposition represents the grievances of people in the assembly. Opposition plays a role of bridge between people and government (Scholte, J. A. (2006).
There are some internal dilemmas in the current political parties. These dilemmas invite such problems in the political system. The list of these dilemmas is large which include non-democracy within the parties and non-practice moral and political values resulting into increase of democratic and political sufferings (Von Beyme, K. 1985).
Theorists such as Selznick (1957) and Huntington (1968) have both posited that political parties become stronger and more adaptable to change when party supporters transition from pursing specific short term goals through the party to viewing party perpetuation as a goal itself.
Teorell Schatlsneider et al. (1999) say that political parties created democracy and democracy is not safe and understandable within the parties. No modern democratic state has been able to do without political parties.
134 4.1 A Brief History of Major Dynastic Parties in Pakistan
4.1.1 Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP)
In November, 1967, PPP was formulated by Zulifqar Ali Bhutto. He proclaimed it being composed of four slogans. Islam is our faith, Democracy is our Polity, Socialism is our Economy, and all Power to the People (Muno Bhai, 2000. 5). Bhutto was just 39 years old when he formulated this party in Lahore. J.A Rahim who was Marxist in his ideology was also accompanied by Z.A Bhutto. Bhutto challenged a dictator, Ayub Khan. Fortunately, students from college and universities supported Bhutto from the day one. This paved towards change in the power. Student’s movement was a declaration towards sickness of people from the government. The PPP exploited this change out coming from the students. Soon after, party was changed into Pakistan’s largest inclusive party. After three years, in 1970 General Elections were held and the party developed four internal groups or lobbies i.e the left lobby called as Socialist, Maoist and Marxist. Islamic Socialists also made its lobby with Quranic notions. Another group which was raised that might be named as ‘progressive’ group. This group was land lord elite group. The fourth lobby consisted of those people who might be called as moderate religionists (Tariq Ali, 1970).
The PPP rose as winners in 1970 elections on manifesto which was classified as socialist. The birth of Bangladesh forced non democratic forces to oust General Yahya Khan. Simultaneously Bhutto was empowered to formulate a government of his own choice.
It was due to after effects of PPP’s government practices that party indulged itself to the British Style of government, sharing powers among selected feudal loards that caused the party distance from its ideology. At the end of year-1976, The PPP was totally transformed from its left doctrines. The PPP in Elections 1977 campaigned along-with industrialists and landed elite and party swept in the results of elections 1977. There were nine parties which refused to accept these results and formulated nine anti-government (PPP) group. This grouped was called, the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA). They raised
135 allegation of rigging against the election commission and ruling party PPP. This alliance recorded their huge protests in the country and demanded to outthrow the government and to impose the Islamic Rule (Sharia) which they named as ‘Nizam-e-Mustafa’ (Jafri, A. B. S. (2002).
Bhutto was hanged in 1979. Soon after Bhutto’s undue sentence PPP succeeded to revive the party under the leadership of Bagam Nusrat Bhutto. The PPP enabled ten parties alliance which was called anti-Zia alliance in 1981. This alliance was aimed to out throw Zia and to restore democracy. This alliance was called the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD). During the mass movement of this alliance, thousands political workers were put behind the bars. Some were tortured while others vanished (Joshi, V. T. 1995).
In 1986, Benazir Bhutto returned from exile and began to challenge Zia’s regime. She held great welcome processions at Lahore. She also restructured the party and ousted old party leaders. She raised the slogan of socialism again. It was due to party reforms of Benazir which brought out success for party in 1988 elections. Benazir also came out as victorious in 1993 elections. But every time due to conflict with the military establishment and president house her governments were lost. Reasons for her government collapse were also related to illegal role of establishment through firstly by Mr. Ghulam Ishaq Khan and afterwards by Sardar Farooq Ahmad, the then presidents of the country (Talbot, I. 2002).
Pervez Musharraf’s Martial Law October 12, 1999 brought about another exile of Benazir Bhutto which forced her to run the party from abroad. Besides this exile, in Election 2002, the PPP showed its strength and became the second largest political party. Benazir Bhutto returned to Pakistan in 2007 with new orientations based on democratic values and to minimize its differences with other political parties to end dictatorship, extremism and terrorism.
It was cruel December 27, 2007 in which Benazir Bhutto was assassinated and Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), soon after accepted the responsibility. Asif Ali
136 Zardari, her husband self-announced the co-chairman of the party and made a way to winning 2008 elections. Asif Ali Zardari formulated a collation government along-with JUI (F), the ANP and the Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM). Syed Yusuf Raza Gilani was elected as Prime Minister whereas Asif Ali Zardari was elected as the President of the country.
4.2 Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N)
The AIML, All India Muslim League which was formulated in 1906, preserving the cultural, political and economic interests of people of India struggled hard to create a new Islamic country Pakistan on the map of the world despite staunch opposition of the Hindus and the All Indian Congress as well as Jamat-e-Islami, Majlis-e-Ahrar and Jamiat Ulema Islam Hind.
The heart beat of each Pakistani synchronized with Muslim League during 1940- 1947. Muslims of that time who supported Muslim League they believed that Muslim League is the 2nd name of Country or Pakistan. Muslim league got majority in all strata of public.
After independence All India Muslim League made a fateful decision when it split into two organization, one representing Pakistan and the other of theMuslims of India in India.In doing so, the party that had led Pakistan into new era cut its ties to its urban lifeline and allowed the organization to commandeer by persons unfamiliar with its roots Lawrence (Lawrence Ziring, 2001. P.74). Choudhry Khaliq-ul-Zaman was elected the president of the Pakistan Muslim League and Yousaf khattak, as a general secretary a Pushtuan who represented the interest of the ultra-right feudal landlord grouping inside the league’s Leadership (Yuri Ponomorve,1986. P.26). The controversial matters that were referred to the president were hardly resolved in the best interest of the party. The year 1949 witnessed the emergence of several political parties organized by former Muslim Leaguers. The weakening of PML was to be expected because of its diverse composition before independence (Safdar Mahmood 1974. P. 86-89). Liquat Ali decided to assume himself the post of president of PML and addressing the PML Council in
137 October 8, 1950 said that house meant Council of Muslim League carried more weightage than the parliament (Zarina Salmat.1985. P.5).After Jinnah’s death Muslim League became a rolling stone and divided into many groups.
It was due to non-structure of the party, soon after the independence, Muslim League was split into different parties. Out of 13 total parties 09 parties were offspring of the Muslim League (K.K Aziz, p.74).
The personal agenda of Muslim League leaders led the party dismantle. (Joaquin: 2002).This also made poor delivery of government or democratic system in the country. In March 1958, Khan Abdul Qayyum Khan, was elected the president of the party after unbearable loss of the party, democracy and the country.
It was all of sudden and unbelievable persons that most of the prominent said good-bye to the party. These leaders included Iftikhar-ud-Din and Feroz Khan Noon. Iftikhar-ud-Din afterwards laid foundation of Azad Kashmir party. Feroz Khan Noon tied with Suharwardy’s party Awami Muslim League. Fazal-ul-Haq formulated a party named Krishka Sramic Party. (K.K.Aziz. p.77)
In 1953, the Pakistan Muslim League Council passed the following resolution when its own government was in power: This meeting of Pakistan Muslim League Council noted with regret that in spite of six years of their independence existence and Muslim League government at the helm of affairs, no concrete steps had been taken to give practical shape to those promises made from time to time by Quaid Azam and other responsible League leaders from various league platforms for the introduction of complete reforms for Baluchistan (Pakistan Muslim League Council Resolution No.20.20 October, 1953).
Theses factions largely composed of two groups of PML in 1962. One faction was Ayub called as (PML-Convention) while other Anti Ayub called as PML-Council. Both these so called factions claimed as extension of AIML. In 1970-Election, there were three prominent factions of Muslim League namely Convention, Council and Qayum League. In 1973, there happened merger of the Council League into new name Muslim League
138 Functional (FML). This party was one of the 09 constituents parties which led to anti Bhutto electoral alliance named as PNA (Hamid Khan, 2009).
The fossils of the PML (N) might be traced out from different factions of PML in 1985. These factions merged into single party named as PML (N). These factions basically were formulated on the will of General Zia ul Haq who was in need of one civilian political part to speak in his support in National Assembly of Pakistan.
In 1985, on the direction of General Zia, Pir Pagaro merged into united front by merging all PML factions. After revamp and merger of PML, Junejo was announced as head of the party. In 1993, Nawaz Sharif parted his ways and formed a separate party with brand name, Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz). This new born party, soon after became the largest party like PPP. This party shared the power in 1990 in the form of IJI and afterwards in 1997 election as PML-N. However, after military quo of 1999, PML (N) emerged as a democratic and anti-establishment party.
The party is dominant Democratic Party in the country particularly in the Punjab, KPK-Hindko regions and in Baluchistan. The party held Central Government as well as Punjab and Baluchistan Governments as a result of General Election of 2013.
Currently the party, during the last five years, resolved issues like load shedding and terrorism in Pakistan. The party succeeded itself to line in moderate religious party. After court decision of Nawaz Sharif’s disqualification, Nawaz Sharif emerged as an antiestablishment leader. Now he is also reiterating a new narrative of judicial reform. He is also claiming Pak China Economic Corridor (C-PACC) as a new gate way to Pakistan progress. PML (N) now is to contest with Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf instead of PPP (Dawn News, 2015).
4.3 Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI)
Imran Khan formulated the PTI political party in 1996. Imran had been an excellent cricket. He was the captain of the side which won the World Cup-1992. The formation of the party has nothing to do with the political past of Pakistan. However, the
139 founder had credit of Shaukat Khanam Cancer Hospital, NAMAL College and most of the all World Cup-1992. During his cricket career (1971-92), Imran had a liberal and secular life style. He never showed any interest in the politics. General Hamid Gul after retirement established Tehrik-e-Ittihad,a political party and persuaded Imran Khan to join his party (Yousaf, S. 2016).
However, Khan did not join his party. General Hamid Gul hopes also were dwarfed when Khan married a British national named Jamima Goldsmith. Imran Khan launched its party to contest in Election 1997 and tried to challenge two major political parties, PPP and PMLN.
PTI could only win one seat of National Assembly in the election-2002. Khan decided to part his ways when Musharaf made his mind to help United States of America in War on terror in Afghanistan. During this period he succeeded to be close with Jamat- i-Islami. However, during this period Imran Khan was able to contact young students and to organize a youth wing of the Pakistan Tehrik-e-Insaf, the Insaf Student’s Federation (ISF).
Jamat i Islami and PTI both boycotted the 2008 election. Khan led a rally in late 2011 and surprised everyone as this was a massive rally. Imran Khan criticized both the wings i.e PML (N) (Right wing) and PPP (Left wing). Khan vowed in different talk shows that his party would sweep the general election 2013 (Tariq, J., Usman, A., Sajjad, A., & Amjad, A. 2016).
4.4 Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM)
MQM was a party to represent Urdu Speaking Community the then called Mohajirs. Altaf Hussain was its founder. Azeez Ahmad Tariq, the university fellow of Altaf Hussain was also co-founder of the party. The party in 1978 was named as All Pakistan Mohajir Students Organization and abbreviated as APMSO (Baig, N. 2008).
Basic reason for the formulation of MQM was economic disparity Zia regime resulted into Punjabi Monopoly in economic affairs. This produced negative sense in
140 business tycoons of Karachi like Memons and Gujratis. Resultantly an organization was formed named Maha Sindh (MS) to provide safeguard to these business tycoons (Waseem, M. 1996).
Later on, Maha Sindh financially supported encouraged APMSO which made this party strong at the grassroots level. However, its scope was limited to Karachi. Eventually, the party arrived to shape of instant MQM. The MQM kept on winning the more seats in Karachi as compared to any other party since Election-1988 besides that it underwent three military operations in 1990. Afterwards, the party leadership adopted an inclusive approach and broadened its level from Mohajir to Mutahida. Now the party new name was chosen as Mutahida Qaumi Movement since 1998. It was the beginning of getting rid of ethnicity and playing a vital role in Pakistan (Shah, M. A. 1998).
The MQM thought it conducive for their revival to support Musharraf’s Martial Law-1999. In 2008, the MQM thought it better to be ally of PPP in formation of Coalition Government. It was due to supporting Musharaf, MQM remained thoroughly victims of terrorism. Mustafa Kamal was elected as a result of Local Elections-2005 and was elevated as the Mayor of Karachi in 2006. His performance was better and most of the times hailed by the Chief Justice of Pakistan. Thus he became prominent figure.
4.5 Awami National Party (ANP)
NAP and ANP are mother and daughter in relation. NAP was established in 1957 by left wing of Pushtun, Sindhi, Bangali and Balouchi. The Marxist of Punjab and Mohajir were once its members. Before emergence of PPP, NAP was the only party to represent the leftist. NAP chiefly a party which represented Pashtun and Balouch to some extent. In Election-1970, this party succeeded in most of the seats in NWFP and Baluchistan.PPP regime dismantled the mandate of NAP in Baluchistan in 1973. Resultantly, in a protest the members of NAP resigned from coalition government in the NWFP. In 1975 NAP was banned by the Supreme Court of Pakistan (Marwat, S. U. K. 2016).
141 NAP after Martial Law-1977, was transformed into National Democratic Party (NDP). Baloch, Sindhi, Pushtun leaders revived the party and party was renamed as Awami National Party. Wali Khan wasbelieved to be its founder (Mahmood, A. (2014).
However, it was after the eve of Zia’s demise, ANP’s leaders whether they were Sindhi or Baloch leaders. All said good bye to the party resultantly the party was limited to a Pushtun nationalist party. The party witnessed havoc defeats in 1990s and 2000s. However, it restored it powers in 2008 election and got the best results in its political career. For the first time, this party won two seats of Provincial Assembly in Karachi, Sind as well(Hussain, E. 2006).
Before the election 2013 ANP conducted internal election due to the mandatory from the election commission of Pakistan. The leadership included Asfand Yar Wali, the President, Mian Mukhtiar as General Secretary and veteran Ghulam Bilour as Senior Vice President. Astonishingly, all the leadership was chosen as unopposed. But contrarily in 2013, this party only scored two seats of National Assembly in direct and by election 2013. The PTI phenomenon this time defeated ANP (Malbin, M. J. 1978).
4.6 Jamiat Ulema Islam-Fazal-ul Rehman Group (JUI-F)
JUI (F) opposed Jinnah’s AIML (All India Muslim League) and its struggle towards a separate homeland for the Muslims. Jamiat Ulema Hind along with alleged ALIML as a secular party or a party of misguided people. JUI (F) was offspring of JUH and a party of Sunni Deobands. In its beginning JUI was the party of the both the Sunni sects Brelvi and Deoband. It was a pressure group which resulted major constituent of Objective Resolution. JUI became a power in Election-1970 when it took 07 seats in National Assembly. In 1972, Mufti Mehmood was elected as Chief Minister of NWFP (Khan, Z. 2004).
The JUI showed displeasure on dismissal of their collated government with NAP in Baluchistan. Resultantly, JUI was the leading party among the other 09 parties. After toppled down Bhutto’s government by Zia’s quo, JUI was separated from Pakistan National Alliance (PNA). In 1981, Movement for Restoration of Democracy abbreviated
142 as MRD was launched. JUI also joined it. In 1982, Fazal ur Rehman, the son and descendent of Mufti Mehmood was seen sitting with Benazir and Nusrat Bhutto in 1982. It was due to agencie’s influence under the direction of General Zia, JUI was split in two groups i.e JUI –F and JUI-S. JUI-F and JUI-S represented Jamiat Ulma-e-Islam led by Fazal-ur-Rehman and Sami-ul-Haq respectively. JUI-S tied with Zia led government whereas JUI-F supported MRD (Akhtar, S. 1989).
Again another alliance was seen in 2001 during Musharaf’s rule under the presidentship of Shah Ahmad Noorani. This alliance was named as Mutahida Majlis-e- Amal and was abbreviated as MMA. JUI-F was also one of its major and integral parts of this alliance. JUI-F also supported the Musharraf dictatorship. This alliance was lasted up to 2008. However, alliance succeeded to win majority in NWFP and Baluchistan Assembly in the Election-2002(Akhtar, S. 1989).
4.7 Jamat-i-Islami (JI)
Abul Ala Maududi was known as a modern fundamentalist scholar. He laid the foundation stone of an Islamic party known as Jamat-i-Islami. To accomplish the modern Islamic ideology of Mauddi self-expletory, JI formulated its structure from grassroot level to National Level. The Amir is the leader of the JI and the supreme source of authority in the Jamat. In doctrinal issues, the shura has authority over the (Amir. Nasr 2001, p. 53). JI opposed AIML vividly. According to Madudi, the nationalism was a European concept that had no place in Islam. Maulana Madudi viewed state as an ignorant state. But afterwards he tied with Majlis-e-Ahrar in Khatme-Nobawat Movement against Ahmadis.
Maududi was sent behind the bars for religion based incitement and was sentenced to death. This sentence was afterwards overturned. The JI recruited educated urbanites to influence the bureaucracy and to influence people through print media.
The Ayub regime was the worst period for JI as it was banned in 1963. JI was viewed as the party of rightist. On the other hand PPP was deemed as leftist party. JI
143 preached that voting for PPP is against Islam. JI was the party of educated people. It also succeeded to get votes of Urdu speaking community.
The campaign brought nothing special. The party revived itself again by a vivid movement of Khatm-e-Nobowat against Ahmadis. This time it got some laurels and was successful in arousing people against Ahmadis and this time they were constitutionally they were declared as non-believers. In 1977, a PNA (National Alliance) comprising of 09 parties came into being and JI was the major party in it. This alliance did not accept the Election Results-1977 and agitated people to protest. These protests paved a way to Martial Law -1977 by General Zia. The JI also joined hands with the dictator. The JI also backed the jihadists in Afghanistan to fight against the Soviet Union. Another alliance (IJI-Islami Jamhori Itehad) was seen just before election-1988.
In 2001 MMA, Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal, under the presidentship of Shah Ahmad Noorani. JI was also one of its major and integral parts. JI also supported the Musharraf’s dictatorship and was succeeded to make its governments in NWFP and Baluchistan provinces as a result of Election-2002.
In 2013, Jamat-i-Islami was badly exposed at National Level. It got some seats in KPK and collated with PTI in making government in KPK. The party is being led by Siraj-ul-Haq. He is struggling hard for its revival.
Dynastic Leadership of Political Parties
Sr.No Name of Political Party Head Dynastic Relation with Party Party founder 1 PPP Bilwal Bhutto Dynastic Grand son Zardari 2 PML(N) Mian Muhammad Zia Legacy Himself Nawazsharif 3 PML(Q) Ch Shujat Hussain Dynastic Himself 4 MQM Altaf Hussain Non-Dynastic Himself 5 ANP Asfand yar Wali Dynastic Grand son 6 JUI-F Mulana Fazal-ur- Dynastic Son
144 Rehman 7 PML-F Pir Pagara Dynastic Son 8 BNP Akhtar Mengal Dynastic Son 9 PKMAP Mahmood Khan Dynastic Son
Source: Compile by Researcher
Internal Democracy in the Major Political Parties of Pakistan
The election winning is a science. It encompasses the candidate selection, policy setting and leadership selection democratically (Scarrow 2005).Political parties bridge the gap between citizen and government by providing avenues for citizen’s participation through effective intra-party democracy.
In this study indicator used to access the position of democracy within the political parties has been evaluated. The two indicators which include are:
1-Process of Leadership selection
2-Process of candidate Selection
1-Process of Leadership selection
Leaders are deemed as security guards of the public. (Dobel,1998). The political leaders have capacity to read and understand the potentials of their followers. (Morgan, 1998) Public participation of selection of a leader is if considered then its fruits can result into true democracy. Social change is the function of public participation. (Luthar, 1996) Economy of a country can be strengthened by democracy. (D.J.Kim-2000).The selection of appropriate leadership is the very challenge towards leadership.
Democracy warrants that there should be elected leadership at all level. It gives moral and political strength to the elected organ. (Durveger, 1954: 134). It gives floor for better decision making (Anika Gauja, 2006)
145 Political dynasties distort government, and make a sham of democratic governance. These political dynasties, public office become an exclusive family franchise.
The first line party leadership of these political dynasties is not interested to give some attention for the lower political chain and does not pay due consideration to the political socialization and contributions of the grassroots levels leaders, it demoralizes the party leaders particularly at the grassroots, because these political leaders have given their dedication and contribution in party mobilization and organization at the grassroots levels deserve priority, justice and power from the high commands or party centers. When they are deprived of this priority and power, they might usually turn back from the zeal and motivation they hold for the party. They might discard the ideals and morale they cherish long for the party and the people. The grassroots leaders think this has happened to give the unusual, fickle and incongruous behavior of the party leadership. This practice virtually contributes to misunderstanding, distrust and disconnection between party central leadership and local tiers, and also creates conflicts of interest among the party leaders. Grassroots masses are currently well aware of such undemocratic behavior and practices in the political parties. The common masses including party leaders are critical of their own party centers, particularly of the party chiefs. The grassroots party leaders put in question the good will and democratic mindset of the party chiefs (Blondel, J. 2016).
The grassroots people are found grievously pointing to the party high commands, especially to the party chiefs that they have seized democracy, and established their family legacy, which in nature is dynastic or monarchic. The grassroots identify that there is no democracy in the party centers the party chiefs are unchangeable and the surrounding leaders are blind to the unilateral decisions of the party chiefs, and moreover they are flatterers. The party workers think that the party chiefs have onus to continue in the position, because of their long experience, stamina and dedication. Dynastic leaders as they commented has learnt politics from then families, have seen many ups and downs, and have known the political culture. They would not break or loss the position in any situation. Party and family in the context of Pakistan politics have been synonymous to
146 most of the common people, even to the party workers. But the political aware and conscious sections of the society as well as the party workers assert that the next generation of the Bhutto, Wali, Moulana and Sharif families, and party decisions will reflect their opinions. The major political parties are carrying on family rule in the name of democracy. A section of leaders staying close to dynastic leadership always seek attention and mercy of the chiefs. They follow a kind of mechanism to maintain status quo in their positions with all eulogy and flattery to chiefs, as well as their next generation family members in respective cases (Burns, J. 1978).
Our dynastic leadership does not practice democracy within their parties. A key aim of the on-going process of electoral reforms is to force political leadership to practice democracy in their parties, to make political system more acceptably democratic. It is perhaps common knowledge that all our political parties have this provision in their constitutions, although they have not followed it faithfully and regularly but unfortunately this provision was removed from the present constitution after passing 18th Amendment from the parliament. And making them obey their constitutions is a necessary condition for practicing democracy within parties, but certainly not sufficient. The critical point to be noted here is that ordinary members of any democratic association are, and ought to be, directly involved with appointing the individuals who will represent them and preserve their interests. The same principle must be followed in practicing democracy in our political parties(Weber, M. 1968).
In the parliamentary form of government, ordinary members of a political party ought to be involved in two very important party functions. First, they must be directly involved in the selection of the leadership teams, from the grassroots level up to the national level. Second, they must nominate their party candidates for the national as well as local elections. When ordinary members are allowed to perform these two functions adequately, only then can a political party be said to be practicing democracy in the party. Nobody has the guts to raise hand for the positions in front of the party chiefs. This is the reason why the party head stay in the same positions without any contest. It was threatened before election that no name can be proposed or none can support any candidate for the position of secretary, and if anyone does so, he would be charged with
147 violating the party chain. So, even if some party worker was willing to contest, but none dared to be candidate. In such circumstances, the chosen person and blessed by the party head become secretary without any competition. No democratic procedures neither subject to Political Party Act nor Central Executive Committees (CEC) were followed. Thus the CEC are formed. During formation of the CEC democracy is neglected(Paige, G. D. 1977).
The leaders observe that the central committees should be examples of democratic organization and management to the local committees, and they exercise democracy accordingly. When the central committees ignore democracy, they cannot preach about democracy and against violations. Under the guidance of such committees, democracy is possible neither within the party nor in the state. During formation of central committees of the political party, performance of the leaders is overlooked and regional identity get priority. Party workers get highest posts in their parties not because of their better quality, dedication, sincerity and experiences, but because of regional dynasty, linguistic identities, or of being near to the influential party leaders. So, to be leader’s submissiveness and proximity count more and these are the reasons why significant positions are not elected during the council; rather the authority is transferred to the party chiefs who declare names. If those people having dedication and sacrifices for the party could be made leaders, some positive changes could take place on the way to strengthening party democracy. Party high commands or centers do not care for the political chain, and do not pay due attention to the political career and contributions of the grassroots leaders, it demoralizes the party leaders particularly at the grassroots, because these political leaders given their dedication and contribution in party mobilization and organization at the grassroots deserve priority, justice and power from the high commands or party centers. When they are deprived of this priority and power, they might usually turn back from the zeal and motivation they hold for the party. They might discard the ideals and morale they cherish long for the party and the people(Tucker, R. C. 1981).
The grassroots leaders think this has happened given the unusual, fickle and incongruous behavior of the party centers. This practice virtually contributes to
148 misunderstanding, distrust and disconnection between party centers and local tiers, and also creates conflicts of interest among the party leaders. Grassroots masses are currently well aware of such undemocratic behavior and practices in the political parties. The party leaders think that the party chief has onus to continue in the position, because of their long experience, stamina and dedication. The party leaders think that the chiefs’ convictions are unflinching. They would not compromise with their position and would not surrender to the external pressure. In bad time of the party, many other leaders, even the central ones, will look for opportunity or will turn back. They may not think of party chain of command and party strength. Bhutto will stay as the symbol of power for the party and behind him the party people in the coming days would rally. So, they want to serve their family members. People like us have not learnt as yet to assess candidates or leaders based on their personality, education, talent and patriotism. Local leaders understand the true democratic process as being changes in the party positions at various tiers including the party chief’s. At the same time, they perceive that the people do not support the change in chief position, though here by the people refer to the majority party leaders and activists. While the reform minded people tried to speak against the party chief and tried to restructure the center as well as gather support for it, but they did not succeed, rather they were eventually sidelined (Tucker, R. C. 1981).
This is because, as the leaders and party activists think, people have not learnt to think beyond dynastic leadership. Local level leaders are not happy in the way the parties function. A major part of the aggrieved party activists and common people observe that autocracies have been ousted from the state, but party autocracies are governing the state. They have little hope for changes with the current party leadership. Out of our excessive loyalty and submission to the powerful, we have turned into flatterers. We are also looking forward to someone new who might bring good to the party, politics and country. Even if his favored entrance in politics would disregard the democratic transition of party leadership, his absence might as well cause confusion and split in the party.” Political scientist observes that for bring democratic practices in the party; qualitative change in the central leadership is required in the first place. But here reality is that we lack replaceable leadership in the center, even at the local level. Now none in the party will
149 dare to correct or oppose the activities of the senior leaders. If replaceable leaders do not emerge, democratic system in true sense cannot be established, even cannot be expected. The party leadership acts like a dictator and handpicks the remains descendants of the party of major political parties in Pakistan. According to Political Parties Act of 2001, party chairman vests the powers of hiring and firing any candidate of his party. Accountability of party chairman is out of question in any case (Neustadt, P. P., & Power, P. D. 1980).
One particularly urgent problem is that of the choice of candidates in some circumstances where there is one party with overwhelming support in a constituency the actual election may be little more than a formality the representative of the constringency is in reality chosen when the party selects its candidate. Electoral law by the Election Commission has never concerned itself with the question of how the candidate is chosen; indeed to maintain the formal pretense that there are no political parties and that candidates are independent individuals (Khan, Z. 2004).
The role of leadership is important in building the political parties as democratic institutions. The electoral primaries and debates would lay many positive impacts on the growth of democratic culture, and political institutions in Pakistan. One direct impact of the primary system would be that candidates are to be nominated by the people not by the leaders from center who do not even care about the feelings of the constituency. It will force the candidates to work with the people at his or her electoral constituency. It wills also the people to find out the best possible candidate. The electoral debates if introduced will also have many positive impacts on the democratization process. It would force the candidates to educate themselves about the real agenda and issues of the political system. The candidates would have to give strategies and policies to encounter poverty, crime problems in education, and health care systems, in the areas of local environment pollution, development of roads, and elimination of corruption from the public offices. This way the parties will ultimately grow with many leaders growing on their own with their support bases and local strengths. We have argued that democracy can be consolidated in Pakistan to a great degree if the Pakistani politicians have firm commitments to promote it, as the political sector has a major responsibility in
150 democratic development. In this connection political leadership focused on the internal- democracy in their political parties. It is also necessary that the political leaders worked on the growth and development of political institutions because if these institutions cannot be made efficient and representative democracy could be consolidated in Pakistan. It also have argued that democratization can be termed as development because maximization of freedom, competitiveness, and peaceful resolution of conflicts and enhancement of human dignity is possible in a democratic political system more than in any other form government. Thus, a nation or a country may be economically or technology underdeveloped, but socially, culturally, morally and politically may be considered developed if there is democracy in that country. It has been noticed that one of the major problems of democratization is in the political sector, that is, in the political leaders behavior within the political parties, in the legislatures, and in the legislative systems of these countries. Various political institutions such as political parties, legislature and the nature of political leaderships altogether are to be reformed conveniently for the democratic development of the political system. The causes for this state of affairs are varied and multiple but the most common of them are the authoritarian nature of leaders, the tendency of the political leaders to monopolize power, the lack of proper institutionalization of leadership recruitment process in the parties, lack of democratization within the political parties, dysfunctional legislatures, and the traditional leadership styles and their outdated political cultures. Pakistan’s political system of democracy has taken many shapes and forms under varied circumstances and conditions. The effect of first wave of democracy in Pakistan of the post-colonial country there were attempts to use various branches such as guided democracy, basic democracy, controlled democracy and social democracy. But in almost all of these cades such labeling of democracy were obvious attempts to monopolize political power by the authoritarian regimes in the guise of democracy. Those attempts were proven to be distortions and deviations from the path of democracy and democratization, for example, basic democracy in Pakistan (Hussain, E. 2006).
The political leaders were creating a situation where the importance of the parliament was decreasing as a democratic political institution. A common citizen might
151 ask are these the only options available to the opposition parties or are there any other ways to resolve the political issues in a parliamentary democracy. If an elected member of the parliament, the leader of the opposition in the house could ask the common people to unseat the elected government by agitation one may wonder how democratic values could develop in the political culture of Pakistan. The politician’s lack of consensus on certain democratic values and norms pushed the political system into a crisis situation. This development contributed to the growth of anarchy and disregard towards democratic institutions instead of promoting democratic development in Pakistan. Election is now the part of the electoral contest, itself in term of rival candidates, ability to cost bogus votes and get away with it(Waseem, M. (1994).
4.8 Candidates Selection in General Elections.
The process of political parties to recommend one candidate to represent their party on ballot paper in any constituency during election may be termed as Candidate Selection. No democratic norms and forms are exercised during selection of a candidate (Ranney, J. W., Bruner, M. C., & Levenson, J. B. 1981).
Candidates are usually selected by a committee called parliamentary board, central election committee, central executive committee or candidate selection committee. Such committees are constituted by the top leadership. In developing countries like Pakistan party chiefs like chairpersons, presidents or general secretaries) may consider any name in any constituency. Selection and suitability criteria differ from one constituency to other, one leader to other and one party to other party. Normally, the elected candidates to the parliament are also governed by party heads personally. Parties are run like property rather than an institution. Pakistani Political Parties will have to make such institutional reforms to enable political parties to run as institution instead of public property for democratic process in political parties as well as in Pakistan (Crotty, W. J. 1977).
152 I find support for my claim that the influence of selection processes on behavior is greater under electoral system that encourage personal vote seeking behavior, than under electoral system that encourage party centered behavior (Shomer, Y. (2009).
The importance of candidate selection is not only for the candidate and their parties but also for their parents a legislature and its performance.
A candidate selection method is the predominantly non-standardized and unregimented mechanism by which political parties chose their candidate for general election (Hazan, R. Y., & Rahat, G. 2010).
I concluded that the association between electoral system and candidate selection procedure is weak and does not merit the combination of there two institutions.
Selection of the candidate is as important as or more important than what happens on Election Day. A fascinating variety of techniques has been tried at the different stages of the electoral process. Tribal cohesion minority interests administrative conservatism in regard to the necessity for preserving undivided various regional and local government units in addition to population and the size of the electorate have played a part at different times and in different setting in the delimitation of constituencies(Rahat, G., & Hazan, R. Y. 2001).
The whole purpose of appointing election commission is, of course defeated if the commissions are not free to perform their duties impartially. The Pakistan electoral reforms commission reported in 1956 that the election commission is selected and appointed by the provincial government, evidently they are at the back ad call of those who made their selection and appointment they are liable to be lured or brow hearten to do things which ordinarily they would not do if they felt free and secure (Key Jr, V. O. 1960).
The electoral reforms commission recommended that the supervision of the election machinery should be vested in an election commission headed by a chief elections commissioner who would have the same security of tenure of office as a judge
153 of the High Court. It is however difficult to foresee how it will be possible to get away for some times to come from a degree of reliance on the over-burdened district commissioner to supervise registration and poling arrangements in his own area though the growth of local government (Young, O. R. 1989).
The system of electoral administration is however in many countries based on a partnership between officialdom and the principal political parties or may be dependent almost entirely on appointment to electoral posts through political patronage on the theory that elections will be fair and free if they are the joint responsibility of committees or small groups of persons consisting partly or entirely of the appointees of various rival political parties (Pastor, R. A. 1999).
It is clear that the delimitation of constituencies is a matter of crucial political importance particularly in countries with a single member constituency system as a given political party may stand to gain or lose representation according to the way in which the precise boundaries of constituencies are drawn (La Palombara, J., & Weiner, M. 2015).
Regional allocations of seats are likely to cause most political controversy when there are marked cultural or economic differences between regions or when political parties are regional rather than national and there can be little doubt but that it is then desirable to incorporate a set formula for dealing with the problem in the constitution as has been done in Pakistan (Inch, A. 2012).
Once regional allocations have where necessary been made the problems involved in delimiting individual constituencies become those of balancing a variety of rival considerations such as the near equality of population between constituencies the inclusion of complete administrative units in constituencies’ and local community interests based on social or economic factors physical features and communications (Epstein, L. D. 1980).
The extent to which political parties should be encouraged or permitted to help in the process of getting eligible persons to register is in fact a highly controversial question it can be argued that the registration of electors should be regarded as above politics and
154 that all possible steps should be taken to ensure that registration does not take place in a tense political atmosphere that natural corollary to such an argument is to bar the parties form being represented at the registration centers or at most to permit them to send observers to the registration center who like candidates agents at polling stations would not be permitted to interfere with individuals seeking to register (Obler, J. 1973).
Pakistan’s political parties were no doubt corrupt weak and narrowly based their leaders moved more by proposal of personal gain than public good but they more than their no elected rivals were likely (at least in the mid-1990s) to open the door to wider public participation in government. In contrast the traditional oligarchy and the military which due to self-conception views itself the safe guard of the country and nation had only a national need to refer to the people. The Pakistani public had also become increasingly independent from traditional pressures biradaris (kinship groups) and feudal connections in making their choices (Bille, L. 2001).
Pakistan has a multi-party system but in central elections appeared to be moving toward a broad two party system one is in a government while other is an opposition. In the absence of policy difference parties remained identified with strong leaders but strong leaders presided over weak political party or organizations. This was the base of the party system in Pakistan from the beginning (Ahmad, M. 1971).
The tendency of Intra party conflict resolution is necessary for party building and its morale. Political parties in obliging the ones without democratic procedure create intra party conflict in their inner process. However in the constitution and the political parties Act gives privilege parties to shape procedure of their own choice (Ziring, L. 1997).
Mariam Mufti (2011) argues that candidate selection is a form of elite recruitment amongst the prominent parties in the country (PPP, PMLN, PMLQ, ANP, MQM). Mufti also argues that this process of candidate selection automatically limits the choices available to the voter before voting day, therefore directly impacting democratic choice. The allocation of the party ticket is, in some cases, a matter of substantial debate and even controversy. Depending on the party one is looking at, procedures and criteria
155 differ. It is not a transparent process, and to a great extent the decision comes down to who the party leadership, or powerful individuals within the party.
The 2002 election had been held under the BA degree rule. As we know now, many politicians faked their degrees. The implication is that candidate selection did not change significantly due to the rule. In 2008, the rule was voided by the Supreme Court in her Judgment. The election that year was held a few months after Benazir Bhutto‘s death, and the Sharifs‘ return from exile. In 2008, the PMLN had one very simple criteria have loyalty to the exiled leadership, and though it would be false to argue that the PPP won on the basis of Benazir‘s death, it would be reasonable to say that it was not as competitive an election as 2013 has been, and parties went for conventional choices as candidates with little internal debate.
In 2013, selection was particularly difficult for the parties, and especially so for parties that were in direct competition - the PMLN and the PTI. The PMLN especially took a great deal of time over its selection, at times reversing its ticket allocations either due to internal disagreements or due to decisions made by ECP officials, as will be explained below. As late as mid-April, with elections scheduled for May 2013, tickets were still being decided upon in the PPP, the PMLN, and the PTI.
There is no one reason for this situation in 2013. It could be argued that the parties were just disorganized, which is true to some extent. More organized parties like the ANP and MQM were ready with their candidates earlier. However, it must be remembered that the ANP and MQM are more localized parties, the former operating predominantly in KPK and the latter in Karachi and parts of Sindh, and don‘t attempt to put up candidates for nearly all, if not all, the constituencies. Second, the parties have always been disorganized, so it does not account for the delays in 2013, which were unprecedented.
It could be argued that the cause of the delay was the competitiveness of the election itself, or the fact that so many people applied for tickets. These are both possible answers. However, if the decision on the part of the parties had been clear cut, on the
156 conventional criteria and processes, it would not have taken that much time, regardless of the competition. Therefore we must consider other exogenous factors that caused the election candidate selection process to be especially fraught I argue that electoral mismanagement; the powerlessness of the ECP; and, the intervention of an activist Supreme Court in the run up to the election caused the parties to think not only more carefully about their criteria for selecting candidates, but also to reverse their decisions. This is not to say that they necessarily chose someone other than their first choice at the end of the day, but that making the decision was much more complex than it may otherwise have been, and thus impacted a range of other electoral decisions such as seat adjustments, alliances, and party switching.
Parties had one of two options in handing out tickets in 2013. The first was to give the ticket to a candidate who raised serious red flags on the new nomination form, and hope that the bureaucrats involved in the scrutiny could be influenced. The second option was for the party to be more careful and select people to whom there could be no objections (an unlikely choice, since such people would not be likely to have the money or the connections to be successful in an election), or opt for candidates who had successfully hidden malfeasance or escaped prosecution through deals (such as the National Reconciliation Ordinance). Initially, the major parties compromised – in a complete departure from the procedure they had followed in previous elections, they asked interested candidates to submit the paper work to the Returning Officer in their constituencies of choice, and the party would determine the recipient of the ticket later. Newspaper reports from the time suggested that the scrutiny did scare potential candidates off, with fewer people submitting papers than previous elections.
However, it was the actual scrutiny process created a range of problems that none of the parties could have foreseen, leading to utter confusion until the end of April (with the election scheduled for 11 May). Aside from the ROs intrusive questions and dubious disqualifications, the subsequent, last-second reversal of most RO disqualifications by election tribunals made the parties candidate selection decisions even more complicated.
157 Some examples will perhaps help understand the situation at this stage of the electoral process. Raja Pervez Ashraf, the PM for the last stretch of the PPP‘s term, was disqualified by the RO in his constituency, but the disqualification was overturned despite ample evidence of corruption against him in the Rental Power Projects case. At the last minute, the PPP gave him the ticket, but he lost the election. Yousaf Raza Gilani was not as lucky, his disqualification was not overturned.
Though the condition of having a BA degree had been removed in 2008 by Supreme Court ruling, formalized in an amendment in 2009, politicians were being jailed for having fraudulent degrees, and being disqualified from the 2013 election. Here too, some people were lucky enough to get away with it, though at the last minute. One was Jamshed Dasti, who contested two seats as an independent after being released on a technicality, since the parties had already distributed their tickets in his constituencies. Sheikh Waqas Akram was another whose conviction for fraud was overturned, but the decision was too late for him to contest, and his father contested instead. This last case points to another problem with the way the scrutiny process played out. In some cases, the disqualified candidate was replaced by a relative who would be the ‗face, while the actual campaign, and if they won, the seat would be run by the person who had been disqualified. This further entrenches family politics in an already weak democratic system.
Another problem arose due to the introduction of the facility that ordinary citizens were allowed to access the filled in nomination forms for all applicants in their constituency, after payment of a fee, and raise objections to the candidate. Many citizens did do so, but in a lot of cases, it was simply one party challenging the nomination of their competitor. The worst case, though, was of PTI candidate being challenged by a fellow party member who wanted the ticket. However, in some cases, valid points were raised, and in some cases, valid decisions were made by ROs – such as the original disqualification of Raja Pervez Ashraf.
Apart from the issue of fake degrees, another controversy at the time was the issue of dual nationality. The constitution states that those with other nationalities cannot
158 contest and occupy a seat, so they were being prosecuted for continuing to occupy a seat while retaining a second nationality. This became a farce and a media circus soon enough, as one after the other various politicians were accused of having dual nationalities, including Rehman Malik, the Interior Minister, and who then claimed to have renounced the second nationality. A number of tickets granted by the parties were called into question due to the nationality issue. Though technically, scrutiny and appeals were to be over by April 16th, a number of cases dragged on. From about 5th April, there was a flurry of activity as parties finally had a more or less complete list of viable candidates. The next step was numerous withdrawals as tickets were finally allocated. It was not until this point that seat adjustments and alliances could be finalized. This was also a period of peak party switching and switching to or from being an independent candidate. Because parties had hedged their bets and asked multiple candidates to file their papers, when one approved candidate was chosen, the rest sought to switch parties to see if they could still have a chance at the election.
4.9 PPP and Leadership of Bhutto Dynasty
When we talk about Bhutto, then it was really unfortunate that in his full regime, he failed to focus on party’s construction. Regular elections were not holed by him for party’s offices.Bhutto failed to conduct inter party election. Membership was expanded. Powers remained vested by Bhutto himself resulting weak organizational control. (Syed, 1992).
However, style Bhutto as a ruler restricted judiciary to work independently. It created anger in opposition parties. Bhutto assigned a limited role to the legislators. The party was ignored by him and he started to enjoy the governance which he got as the party leader. During that time, a small number of associate left the party or became uncaring to its relationships. Customary sources of authority were used by Bhutto like old feudal and even the bureaucrats. It looks also different that in the Bhutto’s rule at very last stage, many governors chosen by him were those who were faithful to the English rulers before partition.
159 It looked very astonishing for everyone that the committee which was made to rearrange people party consisted on two senior members of prime minister’s office and one disinterested member named Doctor Mubashir Hassan instead of the senior party leadership. Finally with the result of this, Bhutto and his group slowly misplaced handle with public which at one time was their foundation. This has given us the knowledge about all significant situation for the endurance and development of a parliamentary structure in Pakistan, the superiority of parliament is a fundamental rule which requires to be preserved in our constitution in no doubtful terms.
It is however pertinent to observe that Bhutto’s policy towards opposition was irrelevant. Since start, it appears, Bhutto had planned to create an independent physical force to support his authority, suppress opposition and to reduce his dependence on the army in situations of civil disturbance.
Moreover, the landlords predominated in the assemblies and in political office. It appeared that the government was obliged to compromise with the traditional rural power structure based on landowning.Although Bhutto utilized the traditional rural political leadership he did not employ the landed classes in any scheme of social and economic regeneration. The landlord classes however, became part of authoritarian scheme. The image of Bhutto as a popular leader of the masses was reinforced by a showmanship in politics which was unrivalled
On the issue of constitution marking, Bhutto kept an open mind. He declared that he would do his best to facilitate the framing of a constitution. On the consensus of all political parties, Bhutto was to frame in 1973, a constitution based represented in national assembly in the result of 1970 election. It put political system in which parliamentary democracy flourished. Under the leadership of Bhutto party move around his personality and the public liking and disliking increased himself day after day. Bhutto badly failed to convert the PPP into a proper a political institution. The PPP that emerged as a voice poor people, focusing common interests of farmers, representative of middle class and lower middle class, intelligentsia, students and labour. But Bhutto changed party slogan and
160 party first line leadership goes to political elites who dominated the decision making process of the party.
The leadership style of Bhutto was also authoritarian in nature. His attitude towards the political opposition was not a democratic either. After the 1977 parliamentary elections he declared, now there is no opposition in Pakistan. Bhutto was the first prime minister of Pakistan who had been elected democratically by the people.
The PPP that Bhutto led was not a democratically organized or managed political party. Bhutto soon realized that if he could gather support from the dynamic elements in the general population. The more entrenched political interests would soon see the necessity of doing business with him. Bhutto therefore, found the PPP a useful vehicle in the mobilization of his already considerable following. If ever a Pakistani ruler wielded absolute power, it was Zulfikar Ali Bhutto immediately following the 1971 war with India. Bhutto was willing full submissiveness from his bureaucracy and establishment. He rejected any sharing of responsibilities among would-be equals. Bhutto needed public support for sole power to crush opposition and to minimize military influence. Bhutto was not committed to the PPP. The organization was merely the vehicle of Bhutto’s success and the source of his legitimacy. Needless to stress, Bhutto considered himself above party politics, and although he was prepared to exploit its role in the post-civil war Pakistan, he allowed the party to wash aimlessly against the different shores of its composition.
PPP secretariat files which were scrutinized by Anwar Syed (1977) reveal that Bhutto had cautioned his colleagues against ambitious display of power.
Factually, Bhutto displayed little patience with those claiming to have insights that he had not himself contemplated. Therefore, Bhutto’s initial opposition developed from within his own entourage, and some time before the official opposition could question his policies or direction. The formation of Federal Security Force (F.S.F) aimed leadership protection from his comrade. The composition of party was altered when
161 Bhutto decided to include landlords in the party as well as indurtialists. Most probably this step was taken to increase party fund or to increase extention of rule.
Bhutto intolerance of opposition parties particularly his attitude towards the NAP led to the surfacing of many latent shortcomings within his personality as well as the PPP. All these factors prevented the PPP from emerging as a national party. Besides, the opposition parties had failed to present the country with a comprehensive programme and alternative Leadership.
Everything was working for Bhutto. Overwhelmed with power, Bhutto did not bother to consider on his party rather he could not ponder on his party reorganization. Few members left the parted their ways from party as well. Bhutto’s approach was conventional and he shared powers only with bureaucrats and feudal (Aftab Ahmad, 2009).
4.10 Pakistan Muslim League and Leadership of Sharif Dynasty
The main constituency of the Muslim League lay in Muslim minority provinces which remain a part of India and, in the referendum for Pakistan in 1946, the Muslim League had won the by co-option alliance with the regional parties of Muslim majority provinces. The Muslim league lack a natural constituency in Pakistan and the only way for it to remain in power was to avoid a popular election.
In fact, Punjab was the only Pakistan area in which the Muslim League did not hold office before independence.
The Muslim League was not committed to any social or economic programme, as the main objective of the freedom movement was the achievement of homeland, for which the unity of all classes was essential. The politician mostly come from upper strata, specially the feudal aristocracy, which had ruled the provinces of West Pakistan in the days of Provincial Autonomy, and in East Pakistan, the legal profession had almost the monopoly of representation in the provincial assembly.
162 In the later period after the death of Jinnah and assassination of Liaquat Ali Khan the rivalries and internecine activities of the Muslim League leaders for personal gains and the cleavages in the bureaucracy and the military for power ultimately derailed the country from democracy (Naseem 2002).
The federal assembly was therefore not distinguished by a membership interested in bringing about the social change; it’s only sake power. Nawaz Sharif not only controls the centre but his party was also in power in Punjab; he had created his own political power support, was well liked by the bureaucracy and as a Punjabi, had more support in the Army.
The normal process of making decision through discussion and consultations is not there in the Pakistani political parties. The organizational matters include introduction of primary system to select party candidate, which will decentralize the power structure within the parties, empower the local organization, and bring the party more close to the people and voters.
Democracy can be better achieved through positive leadership which value moral and political attributes like freedom, equality and justice.Likewise, public office holders who work for public create public value, political leadership is to work for political and democratic values. (Waldo 2001.p.86)
Democracy can also be termed as liberty of election to promote justices for all kinds. (Young, 2000).
Democratic leadership especially must develop the first aiding the thought of the people by identifying and analyzing problems and showing the consequences of various possible courses of action in term of popular values; and almost equally the second – enabling people to make their opinions effective.
It is deemed that peer families have bestowed leadership without true democratic system. They are fit in each situation of the country. Bhutto was for nationalization, Benazir is for the privatization. The party rank are also divided and it is not easy for
163 leadership at the lower level to maintain discipline because tussles and even brawls are known to have broken out at party meetings. But Benazir Bhutto is a gifted leader capable of restoring order which is returning fast the fact of the matter is that the Benazir is the PPP.
The League was revived by Muhammad Khan Junejo, but it went back to the masses and gains their support after a very long time through concerted efforts made by Nawaz Sharif during the election campaign conduct by him in 1993 after his resignation.
4.11 In Pakistani politics land is king.
The leader should make space for the backbencher or common members so that they can exercise their autonomy, judgment and right of freedom of speech. In the existing system if a common member or leader of a party does differ with the party boss he risks suspension or expulsion from the party. From 1947 to 1956 the Muslim League adopted such a policy and ultimately the party declined to the maximum degree during this period.
The landlords have a greater hold on politics than the foregoing analysis might suggest. Leader on the top may not have been landlord themselves, but they were dependent on landlord’s voter in central and provinces assemblies. The party needed funds and only the landed aristocracy could supply them. The party also needed followers, and again the landlord could provide this in the shape of people living and working on his land. Pir and SajjadaNashins who exploited religious feeling and easy them to gets votes, for the unsuspecting and politically unawake admirer considered it his moral duty to come to their help. In a political field these Pir always joined forces with the landlords, because both shared certain values, both were rural leaders and the Pirs were themselves small land holders. for personal political ends.
The Muslim feudal class played a very significant role in the Pakistan Movement. As their interest was to preserve their privileges, they opposed all democratic reforms and supported the demand of a separate homeland for the Muslims in order not to be ruled by the Hindu majority. The feudal system, after partition, became very strong as the majority
164 of the landlords got back their mortgaged lands after the departure of the Hindu Banyas (Businessman). In some cases the feudal lords enjoy high spiritual status being sayyids or belonging to some influential mystic order. In this case their spiritual as well as temporal hold over the peasants became very strong. The landed aristocracy has very tactfully infiltrated its members in the army, bureaucracy, and political parties. For the feudal, it is no problem which party rules or what type of government comes to power. They enjoy their privileges whether there is Martial Law or democracy.
The feudal class has such hold over ever government that no social and economic change occurred, the land reforms of Ayub Khan and Z.A. Bhutto remained ineffective. They remained safe and secure in t heir rural palaces and mud fortresses along with their armed thugs to terrorise the peasantry. The administration is under their tutelage to coerce the people. Their brutal rule continues because every political party needs them to win the election.
Feudal order in Baluchistan, the frontier, western Punjab and upper Sindh is supported and sustained by traditions of tribalism where the landowners are also hereditary chieftain of inhabitant tribes. Hereditary religious leaders, the half-educated PIRS and traditional military class the MIRS in Sindh and Jagirdars in Punjab supplement this system. Tribal system is democratic in the sense that issues are openly debated (Mian: 2004).
Democracy will of the people, rule of law, political parties are all verbal tools for hiding realities or for disclosing the needed part in the most desired form. With these caveats placed on record let us proceed to deal with the concept of a political party. If the leader is deeply motivated, energetic in pursuit of his goals and has the capability to resolve in or by his personality the multiplicity of goals of the followers, he makes the party dynamic and by that token popular (Khan, 2001).
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170 Chapter 5
Data Analysis & Interpretation of Results:
Table 5.1 Frequency Distribution of the age of the respondents Age Group (Years) Frequency (f) Percent (%) 25y-35y 6 2.3 36y-45y 21 8.1 46y-55y 53 20.4 56y-65y 172 66.2 66y-75y 8 3.1 Total 260 100
Above table 5.1 shows the distribution of age groups of the respondents as it can be easily seen that majority of the respondents 66% were between 56-65 years old only 6 respondents were between the 25-35 years.
Figure # 5.1
171 Table 5.2 Frequency Distribution of the Types of the respondents Type of the respondents Frequency (f) Percent (%) Businessman 57 21.9 Landlord 152 58.5
Professional 51 19.6
Total 260 100
Above table 5.2 represents the demographic data of social position and the results of the table indicates that 22% of the entire sample was businessmen, 59% were landlords while only 20% were professionals among all respondents.
Figure # 5.2
172 Table 5.3 Frequency Distribution of the Types of the respondents Province of the Respondents Frequency (f) Percent (%) Punjab 150 57.7 Sindh 60 23.1
KPK 35 13.5 Baluchistan 15 5.8 Total 260 100
Above table 5.3 shows that the demographic variable of living place, the table above shows that majority 60% of the respondents belonged to Punjab province of
Pakistan, 23% were from Sindh, similarly, 14% from KPK while only 6% respondents were from province of Baluchistan.
Figure # 5.3
173 Table 5.4 Frequency Distribution of the respondents Length of political career of the respondents
Length of Political Career Frequency (f) Percent (%) 5 years 19 7.3 10 years 58 22.3 15 years 83 31.9 20 years 41 15.8 25 years 32 12.3 30 years 27 10.4 Total 260 100
Above table 5.4 Regarding the length of political career of the candidates in different constituencies of Pakistan it was revealed that an average number of candidates shared that they are participating in politics from the 10-25 years only 10% candidates told that they have spent 30 years
Figure # 5.4
174 Table 5.5 Frequency Distribution of the Gender of the respondents Gender of the Respondents Frequency (f) Percent (%) Male 245 94.2 Female 15 5.8 Total 260 100
The above table represents the gender representation of the political candidates as it is shown in the table that out of 260 candidates 245 were males while only 15 candidates were elected as women/fameless. The males and female’s ratio in different constituencies of Pakistan were 94% and 6% respectively.
Figure # 5.5
175 Table 5.6 Frequency Distribution of the responses of the respondents Academic Qualification
Academic Qualification Frequency (f) Percent (%) Under matric 20 7.7 Matric 10 3.8 Intermediate 163 62.7 Bachelor 60 23.1 Master 3 1.2 Higher education 4 1.5 Total 260 100
The above table shows the qualification and education of the political candidates interviewed in this study. As the data indicates that the most of the respondents 62% were with only intermediate education, 23% were having a graduate degree while only 2% were higher qualified with post-graduation. The remaining ones were matric and under matric.
Figure # 5.6
176 Table 5.7 Frequency Distribution of responses of the respondents Name of the Political Parties Name of Political Party Frequency (f) Percent (%) ANP 2 .8 MQM 19 7.3 JUI 7 2.7 PTI 26 10.0 PML-F 4 1.5 PPP 37 14.2
JI 5 1.9 PKMAP 2 .8 PML-N 146 56.2 PML-Q 1 .4 0ne seats party and independent 11 4.2 Total 260 100
The above table indicates the political affiliation of the candidates in different constituencies of Pakistan. It is clear and vivid that most the candidates were from
Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz group, following PPP and PTI while the rest of the political candidates were from different political parties as represented in the table.
Figure # 5.7
177 Table 5.8 Frequency Distribution of responses of the respondents Nature of the Constituency
Nature of the Frequency (f) Percent (%) Constituency Rural 106 40.8 Urban 81 31.2
Mix 73 28.1 Total 260 100
The above table indicates 106(40.8%) of the respondents were belong to rural area, 81(31.2%) belong to the urban area and 73(28.1%) were belong to the both of the area of constituency. It is clear from the data that majority 41% of the candidates were from rural constituencies, 31% from urban constituencies while 28% were from mix constituencies.
Figure # 5.8
178 Table 5.9 Frequency Distribution of the responses of respondents Did you go for party ticket?
Responses Frequency Percent Mean SD Some time 0 0 Every time 260 100 2 0 Not at all 0 0
Total 260 100
Above table shows that 0% of the respondents were responded some time, 100% of the respondents were responded every time and 0% of the respondents were responded not at all to the statement that did you go for party ticket. Mean and standard deviation for the statement is 2 and 0 respectively. Graphical representation is as under.
Figure # 5.9
179 Table 5.10 Frequency Distribution of the responses of respondents Did you win the party ticket on the basis of Party affiliation?
Responses Frequency Percent Mean SD Some time 260 100 every time 0 0 3 0 Not at all 0 0 Total 260 100
Above table shows that 100% of the respondents were responded some time, 0% of the respondents were responded every time and 0% were responded not at all to the statement that did you win the party ticket on the basis of party affiliation. Mean and standard deviation for the statement is 3 and 0 respectively. Graphical representation is as under.
Figure # 5.10
180 Table 5.11 Frequency Distribution of the responses of respondents Did you win the party ticket on the basis of personal vote bank?
Responses Frequency Percent Mean SD Some time 158 60.8 every time 102 39.2 2.60 .49 Not at all 0 0 Total 260 100
The above table shows the results of the responses towards role of personal/family vote bank in order to nominate the political candidate for the elections. 39% said that their party always consider the personal and family voter bank while majority 61% revealed that their party sometime considers it. Mean and standard deviation for the statement is 2.60 and .49 respectively. Graphical representation is as under.
Figure # 5.11
181 Table 5.12 Frequency Distribution of the responses of respondents Did you win the party ticket on the basis of financial position?
Responses Frequency Percent Mean SD Some time 30 11.5 every time 230 88.5 2.11 .32 Not at all 0 0 Total 260 100.0
Above table shows that 11.5% of the respondents were responded some time, 88.5% were responded every time and 0% were responded not at all to the statement that did you win the party ticket on the basis of financial position. Mean and standard deviation for the statement is
2.11 and .32 respectively. Graphical representation is as under.
Figure # 5.12
182 Table 5.13 Frequency Distribution of the responses of respondents Did you think that your party work would play a vital role for your nomination as a candidate?
Responses Frequency Percent Mean SD Some time 89 34.2 every time 158 60.8 2.29 .55
Not at all 13 5 Total 260 100.0
Above table shows that 34.2% of the respondents were responded some time, 60.8% of the respondents were responded every time and 5% of the respondents were responded not at all to the statement that did you think that your party work would play a vital role for your nomination as a candidate. Mean and standard deviation for the statement is 2.29 and .55 respectively. Graphical representation is as under.
Figure # 5.13
183 Table 5.14 Frequency Distribution of the responses of respondents Did you win the party ticket on the basis of electable position in constituency?
Responses Frequency Percent Mean SD Some time 30 11.5 every time 230 88.5 2.11 .32 Not at all 0 0 Total 260 100.0
Above table shows that 11.5% of the respondents were responded some time,
88.5% were responded every time and 0%of the respondents were responded not at all to the statement that did you win the party ticket on the basis of electable position in constituency. Mean and standard deviation for the statement is 2.11 and .32 respectively.
Graphical representation is as under.
Figure # 5.14
184 Table 5.15 Frequency Distribution of the responses of respondents Did you win the party ticket on the basis of your political profile?
Responses Frequency Percent Mean SD
Some time 107 41.2 every time 153 58.8 2.41 .5 Not at all 0 0 Total 260 100
Above table shows that 41.2% of the respondents were responded some time,
58.8% were responded every time and 0% were responded not at all to the statement that did you win the party ticket on the basis of your political profile. Mean and standard deviation for the statement is 2.41 and .5 respectively. Graphical representation is as under.
Figure # 5.15
185 Table 5.16 Frequency Distribution of the responses of respondents Did your party nominate the candidate through democratic method?
Responses Frequency Percent Mean SD Some Time 35 13.5 Every Time 0 0 1.26 .68 Not at All 225 86.5 Total 260 100.0
With reference to democratic nomination of the political candidate, 13% respondents revealed that some time while majority 87% told that there is no democratic nomination of the political candidates for elections. Mean and standard deviation for the statement is 1.26 and .68 respectively. Graphical representation is as under.
Figure # 5.16
186 Table 5.17 Frequency Distribution of the responses of respondents Did you win the party ticket because of your Biradari has huge share of votes?
Responses Frequency Percent Mean SD Some time 134 51.5 every time 107 41.2 2.44 .63 Not at all 19 7.3
Total 260 100
Above table shows that 51.5% of the respondents were responded some time,
41.2% were responded every time, and 19% were responded not at all to the statement that did you win the party ticket because of your baradari has huge share of votes. Mean and standard deviation for the statement is 2.44 and .63 respectively. Graphical representation is as under.
Figure # 5.17
187 Table 5.18 Frequency Distribution of the responses of respondents Did you win the party ticket because you depositing/donation of party funds?
Responses Frequency Percent Mean SD Some Time 35 13.5 Every Time 225 86.5 2.13 .34 Not at all 0 0 Total 260 100
The above table shows the responses of the political candidates with regard to depositing funds to their respective political party in order to get party ticket to contest elections. 13.5% said they sometime deposit funds, majority 86.5% revealed that they always have to deposit funds into their political party account for getting elections.
Mean and standard deviation for the statement is 2.134 and .34 respectively. Graphical representation is as under.
Figure # 5.18
188 Table 5.19 Frequency Distribution of the responses of respondents Did you win the party ticket because you have a support from local stakeholder?
Responses Frequency Percent Mean SD Some Time 138 53.1 Every Time 19 7.3 2.13 .95 Not at All 103 39.6 Total 260 100.0
The above table shows the results about the local level recommendations and the voter opinions towards candidate nomination and it was found that 53% reported it sometime, 40% revealed not at all while only 7% said that their party always consider voter opinions and local level recommendations in order to nominate their political candidate. Mean and standard deviation for the statement is 2.13 and .95 respectively.
Graphical representation is as under.
Figure # 5.19
189 Table 5.20 Frequency Distribution of the responses of respondents Does your party contest internal election regularly? Internal Election in Frequency Percent Mean SD Party Some Time 195 75 Every Time 36 13.8 2.63 .67 Not at All 29 11.2 Total 260 100
Above table shows that 195(75%) of the respondents were responded some time, 36(13.8%) of the respondents were responded every time and 29(11.2%) were responded to Not at all to the statement “Internal election in the political party”. It is concluded that political candidates revealed that they conducted internal elections sometimes, while 13.8% of the political party where the internal elections have been conducted. Mean and standard deviation for the statement is 2.63 and .67 respectively.
Graphical representation is as under.
Figure # 5.20
190 Table 5.21 Frequency Distribution of the responses of respondents Does your party discourage the selection rather than election in the matter of candidate nomination? Responses Frequency Percent Mean SD Some Time 108 41.5 Every Time 78 30 2.13 .82 Not at All 74 28.5 Total 260 100
In response to question regarding discouraging candidate selection rather than elections in the party, the majority of the respondents revealed that they sometime discourage this behavior in the political party we are representing, 30% said that they always discourage selection rather elections, while 29% revealed that they never discourage this behavior in the political party. Mean and standard deviation for the statement is 2.13 and .82 respectively. Graphical representation is as under.
Figure # 5.21
191 Table 5.22 Frequency Distribution of the responses of respondents Does your party encourage appositive opinions?
Responses Frequency Percent Mean SD Some time 165 63.5 every time 81 31.2 2.58 .59 Not at all 14 5.4 Total 260 100
Above table shows that 63.5% of the respondents were responded some time,
31.2% of the responded every time and 5.4% of the respondents were responded to not at all to the statement that does your party encourage appositive opinion. Mean and standard deviation for the statement is 2.58 and .59 respectively. Graphical representation is as under.
Figure # 5.22
192 Table 5.23 Frequency Distribution of the responses of respondents Does your party permit the party workers a share in the top leadership? Responses Frequency Percent Mean SD Some Time 56 21.5 Every Time 5 1.9 1.45 .82 Not at All 199 76.5 Total 260 100.0
The above table represents the data regarding the responses of the respondents towards obtaining share in the party leadership. The most of the candidates interviewed revealed that they are not allowed to take any share in the top leadership.
22% told that they sometime party leadership give them share while only 2% reported that their party always gives share to its political candidates. Mean and standard deviation for the statement is 1.45 and .82 respectively. Graphical representation is as under.
Figure # 5.23
193 Table 5.24 Frequency Distribution of the responses of respondents What was the demography of your constituency?
Responses Frequency Percent Mean SD Some Time 127 48.8 Every Time 60 23.1 2.20 .85 Not at All 73 28.1 Total 260 100
With regard to demography of the constituency the most of the respondents 49% said that some times, 23% indicated every time while 28% said that demography of the constituency cannot influence the political candidature of their party. Mean and standard deviation for the statement is 2.20 and .85 respectively. Graphical representation is as under.
Figure # 5.24
194 Table 5.25 Frequency Distribution of the responses of respondents If your father/mother were the head of the party, what would be the chance in your selection?
Responses Frequency Percent Mean SD Some time 113 43.5 Every time 102 39.2 2.26 .73 Not at All 45 17.3 Total 260 100
The above table indicates the responses of the political candidates with regard to their father mother as a head of the party. It was found that 43% revealed that if father/mother is a head of political party he may influence the nomination of the political candidate. Mean and standard deviation for the statement is 2.26 and .73 respectively.
Graphical representation is as under.
Figure # 5.25
195 Table 5.26 Frequency Distribution of the responses of respondents How much influence of your family/ brand name has in your selection? Responses Frequency Percent Mean SD Some Time 134 51.5 Every Time 107 41.2 2.44 .63 Not at All 19 7.3 Total 260 100
The above table shows the results of the responses of the political candidates with regard to role of family or brand name in candidate nomination in their respective political parties. It was found that 51% were considering it sometimes, 41% said they every time consider the role of family while only 7% reported that their party never consider the brand name of their family while nominating the political candidate. Mean and standard deviation for the statement is 2.44 and .63 respectively. Graphical representation is as under.
Figure # 5.26
196 Table 5.27 Frequency Distribution of the responses of respondents Did you feel party manifesto/programme matter in your selection?
Responses Frequency Percent Mean SD Some Time 167 64.2 Every Time 93 35.8 2.64 .47 Not at all 0 0 Total 260 100.0
In response to the question regarding consideration of party manifesto for nominating a political candidate for granting election ticket, the most of the respondents
64% said that they sometime consider it while 36% told that their political party always consider the party manifesto while nominating the political candidate for the elections.
Mean and standard deviation for the statement is 2.64 and .47 respectively. Graphical representation is as under.
Figure # 5.27
197 Table 5.28 Frequency Distribution of the responses of respondents Did native language matter in your selection? Responses Frequency Percent Mean SD Some time 138 53.1 every time 19 7.3 2.13 .95 Not at all 103 39.6
Total 260 100
Above table shows that 53.1% of the respondents were responded some time,
7.3% were responded every time, and 39.6% were responded not at all to the statement that did native language matter in your selection. Mean and standard deviation for the statement is 2.13 and .95 respectively. Graphical representation is as under.
Figure # 5.25
198 Table 5.29 Frequency Distribution of the responses of respondents If your father/mother were the head of the party, what would be the chance in your selection?
Responses Frequency Percent Mean SD Some time 113 43.5 Every time 102 39.2 2.26 .73 Not at All 45 17.3 Total 260 100
The above table indicates the responses of the political candidates with regard to their father mother as a head of the party. It was found that 43% revealed that if father/mother is a head of political party he may influence the nomination of the political candidate. Mean and standard deviation for the statement is 2.26 and .73 respectively.
Graphical representation is as under.
Figure # 5.29
199 Table 5.30 Frequency Distribution of the responses of respondents How much influence of your family/ brand name has in your selection?
Family members in Frequency Percent Mean SD Politics to some extent 183 70.4 to large extent 77 29.6 2.70 .46 Not at all 0 0 Total 260 100.0
The above table indicates the response of the respondents/political candidates regarding their family member already in politics. The results revealed that 70% of the respondents told that they have their family member(s) in politics to some extent while
30% indicated that they have their family members in politics to large extent. Mean and standard deviation for the statement is 2.70 and .46 respectively. Graphical representation is as under.
Figure # 5.9
200 Table 5.31 Frequency Distribution of responses of the respondents They never discourage this behavior in the political party.
Responses Frequency Percent Mean SD Some Time 108 41.5 Every Time 78 30.0 2.13 .82 Not at All 74 28.5 Total 260 100.0
In response to question regarding discouraging candidate selection rather than elections in the party, the majority of the respondents revealed that they sometime discourage this behavior in the political party we are representing, 30% said that they always discourage selection rather elections, while 29% revealed that they never discourage this behavior in the political party. Mean and standard deviation for the statement is 2.13 and .82 respectively. Graphical representation is as under.
Figure # 5.31
201 Candidates Centered Political System
Table 5.32 Comparison of Level of the Respondents about the candidates centered political system towards political dynasties and democracy in the case of Pakistan Gender N Mean Df t Sig
Male 245 7.99 258 1.423 .156 Female 15 8.42 17.09 *P < .05 Level of Significance
Table 5.32 shows that there is no significant difference in the perception of the male and the female candidate about the candidate centered political system towards political dynasties and democracy in case of the Pakistan political culture.
Internal Democracy in Political Parties
Table 5.33 Comparison of Level of the Respondents about the internal democracy in political parties towards political dynasties and democracy in the case of Pakistan Gender N Mean Df t Sig
Male 245 2.15 258 2.623 .111 Female 15 1.30 15.06 *P < .05 Level of Significance
Table 5.33 shows that there is no significant difference in in the perception of the male and the female candidate about the internal democracy in the political parties towards the political dynasties and the democracy in the case of Pakistan political culture.
202 Retain Family Rule
Table 5.34 Comparison of Level of the Respondents about the retain family rule towards political dynasties and democracy in the case of Pakistan Gender N Mean Df t Sig
Male 245 2.71 258 1.423 .126 Female 15 1.59 17.26 *P < .05 Level of Significance
Table 5.34 shows that there is no significant difference in the perception of the male and the female respondents towards the retain of the family rule towards the political dynasties and the democracy in case of Pakistan. It can be concluded that there is no difference in the perception about the retain family rule on the basis of gender.
Political Dynasties and Democracy
Table 5.35 Overall Comparison of Level of the Respondents about the political dynasties and democracy in the case of Pakistan Gender N Mean Df t Sig
Male 245 5.56 258 -.668 .505 Female 15 5.86 17.16 *P < .05 Level of Significance
Table 5.35 shows that there is no significant difference in the opinion of the respondents regarding the political dynasties and the democracy on the basis of gender. It can be concluded that there is no difference in the matter of reasons and causes of the political dynasties in the democratic system and the culture of Pakistan.
203 Comparison of respondents on Political Dynasties and Democracy on the basis of different age groups
Table 5.36 Overall Comparison of Level of the Respondents about the political dynasties and democracy in the case of Pakistan on the basis of the age groups of the respondents Age of the N Mean Df F Sig Respondents 25 -35 Years 6 39.5 4 3.316 .01 36-45 Years 21 40 255
46-55 Years 53 40.6
56-65 Years 172 40.6
66-75 Years 8 35.8 *P < .05 Level of Significance
Table 5.36 shows that there is significant difference in the opinion of the respondents regarding the political dynasties and the democracy on the basis of the different age groups. It can be concluded that there is difference in the matter of reasons and causes of the political dynasties in the democratic system and the culture of Pakistan in the different groups.
204 Comparison of respondents on Political Dynasties and Democracy on the basis of
Profession
Table 5.37 Overall Comparison of Level of the Respondents about the political dynasties and democracy in the case of Pakistan on the basis of province of the respondents Age of the N Mean Df F Sig Respondents Punjab 150 40.44 3 58.6 .000 Sindh 60 43.5 256 KPK 35 35.2 Balochistan 39 39.8 *P < .05 Level of Significance
Table 5.37 shows that there is significant difference in the opinion of the respondents regarding the political dynasties and the democracy on the basis of the provinces of the respondents. It can be concluded that there is difference in the matter of reasons and causes of the political dynasties in the democratic system and the culture of Pakistan in the different provinces of the respondents.
205 Comparison of respondents on Political Dynasties and Democracy on the basis of profession
Table 5.38 Overall Comparison of Level of the Respondents about the political dynasties and democracy in the case of Pakistan on the basis of profession of the respondents
Profession N Mean Df F Sig Businessman 57 39.4 2 3.23 .041
Landlord 152 40.5 257
Professional 51 41.1 *P < .05 Level of Significance
Table 5.38 shows that there is significant difference in the opinion of the respondents regarding the political dynasties and the democracy on the basis of the profession of the respondents. It can be concluded that there is significant difference in the matter of reasons and causes of the political dynasties in the democratic system and the culture of Pakistan on the basis of profession of the respondents.
206 Comparison of respondents on Political Dynasties and Democracy on the basis of length of Political career
Table 5.39 Overall Comparison of Level of the Respondents about the political dynasties and democracy in the case of Pakistan on the basis of the length of political career of the respondents Length of N Mean Df F Sig Political Career 5 Years 19 39 5 1.9 .094 10 Years 58 40.5 14.33 15 Years 83 41.1 20 Years 41 39.8 25 Years 32 41 30 Years 27 39.3 *P < .05 Level of Significance
Table 5.39 shows that there is no significant difference in the opinion of the respondents regarding the political dynasties and the democracy on the basis of the political career of the respondents. It can be concluded that there is no significant difference in the matter of reasons and causes of the political dynasties in the democratic system and the culture of Pakistan on the basis of length of political career of the respondents.
207 Comparison of respondents on Political Dynasties and Democracy on the basis of
Academic Qualification
Table 5.40 Overall Comparison of Level of the Respondents about the political dynasties and democracy in the case of Pakistan on the basis of academic qualification of the respondents Length of Political N Mean Df F Sig Career Under Matric 20 40.25 5 4.2 .001 Matric 10 39.6 254 Intermediate 163 41.08 Bachelor 60 39 Master 3 34 Higher Education 4 41 *P < .05 Level of Significance
Table 5.40 shows that there is significant difference in the opinion of the respondents regarding the political dynasties and the democracy on the basis of the academic qualification of the respondents. It can be concluded that there is difference in the matter of reasons and causes of the political dynasties in the democratic system and the culture of Pakistan on the basis of academic qualification of the respondents.
208 Comparison of respondents on Political Dynasties and Democracy on the basis of the belongingness of political parties
Table 5.41 Overall Comparison of Level of the Respondents about the political dynasties and democracy in the case of Pakistan on the basis of belongingness of the political parties of the respondents Length of Political N Mean Df F Sig Career ANP 2 34 10 12.8 .000 MQM 19 46.21 249 JUI 7 38.28 PTI 26 37.7 PML-F 4 44 PPP 37 42.08 JI 5 35 PKMAP 2 42 PML-N 146 40.05 PML-Q 1 43 One Seat Party and 11 39.45 Independent *P < .05 Level of Significance
Table 5.41 shows that there is significant difference in the opinion of the respondents regarding the political dynasties and the democracy on the basis of the belongingness of the political parties of the respondents. It can be concluded that there is difference in the matter of reasons and causes of the political dynasties in the democratic system and the culture of Pakistan on the basis of political parties of the respondents.
209 Comparison of respondents on Political Dynasties and Democracy on the basis of nature of constituency
Table 5.42 Overall Comparison of Level of the Respondents about the political dynasties and democracy in the case of Pakistan on the basis of Nature of the constituency of the respondents Length of Political N Mean Df F Sig Career Rural 106 40.58 2 .781 .459 Urban 81 40.65 257 Mix 73 39.95 *P < .05 Level of Significance
Table 5.42 shows that there is no significant difference in the opinion of the respondents regarding the political dynasties and the democracy on the basis of the nature of the constituency of the respondents. It can be concluded that there is no significant difference in the matter of reasons and causes of the political dynasties in the democratic system and the culture of Pakistan on the basis of the nature of the constituency of the respondents.
210 Crosstabs
5.43: Age of the respondent * Internal democracy Cross tabulation Age of the respondent Internal democracy Total to some extent 6 6 25y-35y 100.0% 100.0% 21 21 36y-45y 100.0% 100.0% 53 53 46y-55y 100.0% 100.0% 172 172 56y-65y 100.0% 100.0% 8 8 66y-75y 100.0% 100.0% 260 260 Total 100.0% 100.0%
5.44: Age of the respondent * Family member in Politics Cross tabulation Family member in Politics Total to some to large extent extent 3 3 6 25y-35y 50.0% 50.0% 100.0% 13 8 21 36y-45y 61.9% 38.1% 100.0% 39 14 53 46y-55y 73.6% 26.4% 100.0% 122 50 172 56y-65y 70.9% 29.1% 100.0% 6 2 8 66y-75y 75.0% 25.0% 100.0% 183 77 260 Total 70.4% 29.6% 100.0%
211 5.45: Age of the respondent * Internal election in the political party Cross tabulation Internal election in the political Total party Some Every Not at All Time Time 4 1 1 6 25y-35y 66.7% 16.7% 16.7% 100.0% 16 4 1 21 36y-45y 76.2% 19.0% 4.8% 100.0% 32 7 14 53 46y-55y 60.4% 13.2% 26.4% 100.0% 138 21 13 172 56y-65y 80.2% 12.2% 7.6% 100.0% 5 3 0 8 66y-75y 62.5% 37.5% 0.0% 100.0% 195 36 29 260 Total 75.0% 13.8% 11.2% 100.0%
5.46: Age of the respondent * Discouraging Candidate Selection rather than elections in the party Cross tabulation Age of the respondent Discouraging Candidate Selection rather than elections in the party Some Time Every Time Not at All Total 2 2 2 6 25y-35y 33.3% 33.3% 33.3% 100.0% 9 9 3 21 36y-45y 42.9% 42.9% 14.3% 100.0% 22 14 17 53 46y-55y 41.5% 26.4% 32.1% 100.0% 70 51 51 172 56y-65y 40.7% 29.7% 29.7% 100.0% 5 2 1 8 66y-75y 62.5% 25.0% 12.5% 100.0% 108 78 74 260 Total 41.5% 30.0% 28.5% 100.0%
212 5.47: Age of the respondent * Encouraging opposite opinions on the nomination of political candidate Cross tabulation Age of the respondent Encouraging opposite opinions on the Total nomination of political candidate Some Time Every Time Not at All 25y- 3 1 2 6 35y 50.0% 16.7% 33.3% 100.0% 36y- 12 6 3 21 45y 57.1% 28.6% 14.3% 100.0% 46y- 27 21 5 53
55y 50.9% 39.6% 9.4% 100.0% 56y- 117 52 3 172 65y 68.0% 30.2% 1.7% 100.0% 66y- 6 1 1 8 75y 75.0% 12.5% 12.5% 100.0% 165 81 14 260 Total 63.5% 31.2% 5.4% 100.0%
5.48: Age of the respondent * Permitting the party workers a share in the top leadership Cross tabulation Age of the respondent Permitting the party workers a share in Total the top leadership Some Time Every Time Not At All 3 0 3 6 25y-35y 50.0% 0.0% 50.0% 100.0% 7 0 14 21 36y-45y 33.3% 0.0% 66.7% 100.0% 12 2 39 53 46y-55y 22.6% 3.8% 73.6% 100.0% 30 2 140 172 56y-65y 17.4% 1.2% 81.4% 100.0% 4 1 3 8 66y-75y 50.0% 12.5% 37.5% 100.0% 56 5 199 260 Total 21.5% 1.9% 76.5% 100.0%
213
5.49: Age of the respondent * Considering Party manifesto for Candidate Nomination Cross tabulation Age of the respondent Considering Party manifesto Total for Candidate Nomination Some Time Every Time 4 2 6 25y-35y 66.7% 33.3% 100.0% 9 12 21 36y-45y 42.9% 57.1% 100.0% 27 26 53 46y-55y 50.9% 49.1% 100.0% 122 50 172 56y-65y 70.9% 29.1% 100.0% 5 3 8 66y-75y 62.5% 37.5% 100.0% 167 93 260 Total 64.2% 35.8% 100.0%
5.50: Age of the respondent * Open discussions for candidate nomination in the party Cross tabulation Age of the respondent Open discussions for candidate Total nomination in the party Some Time Every Time Not at All 25y- 2 2 2 6 35y 33.3% 33.3% 33.3% 100.0% 36y- 7 13 1 21 45y 33.3% 61.9% 4.8% 100.0% 46y- 14 27 12 53
55y 26.4% 50.9% 22.6% 100.0% 77 47 48 172 56y-65y 44.8% 27.3% 27.9% 100.0% 66y- 4 4 0 8 75y 50.0% 50.0% 0.0% 100.0% 104 93 63 260 Total 40.0% 35.8% 24.2% 100.0%
214 5.51: Age of the respondent * Voter opinion or local level recommendations for candidate nomination Cross tabulation Age of the respondent Voter opinion or local level Total recommendations for candidate nomination Some Time Every Time Not at All 4 1 1 6 25y-35y 66.7% 16.7% 16.7% 100.0% 9 0 12 21 36y-45y 42.9% 0.0% 57.1% 100.0% 24 6 23 53 46y-55y 45.3% 11.3% 43.4% 100.0% 96 12 64 172 56y-65y 55.8% 7.0% 37.2% 100.0% 5 0 3 8 66y-75y 62.5% 0.0% 37.5% 100.0% 138 19 103 260 Total 53.1% 7.3% 39.6% 100.0%
5.52: Age of the respondent * Role of Family or brand name in candidate nomination Cross tabulation Age of the respondent Role of Family or brand name in Total candidate nomination Some Time Every Time Not at All 4 2 0 6 25y-35y 66.7% 33.3% 0.0% 100.0% 14 3 4 21 36y-45y 66.7% 14.3% 19.0% 100.0% 21 25 7 53 46y-55y 39.6% 47.2% 13.2% 100.0% 87 77 8 172 56y-65y 50.6% 44.8% 4.7% 100.0% 8 0 0 8 66y-75y 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 134 107 19 260 Total 51.5% 41.2% 7.3% 100.0%
215 5.53: Age of the respondent * Father/mother head of the party Cross tabulation Age of the respondent Father/mother head of the party Total Some Every Not at time time All 1 2 3 6 25y-35y 16.7% 33.3% 50.0% 100.0% 8 3 10 21 36y-45y 38.1% 14.3% 47.6% 100.0% 24 15 14 53 46y-55y 45.3% 28.3% 26.4% 100.0% 74 82 16 172 56y-65y 43.0% 47.7% 9.3% 100.0% 6 0 2 8 66y-75y 75.0% 0.0% 25.0% 100.0% 113 102 45 260 Total 43.5% 39.2% 17.3% 100.0%
5.54: Age of the respondent * Demography of the constituency Cross tabulation Age of the respondent Demography of the constituency Total Some Every Not at All Time Time 5 0 1 6 25y-35y 83.3% 0.0% 16.7% 100.0% 14 6 1 21 36y-45y 66.7% 28.6% 4.8% 100.0% 33 11 9 53 46y-55y 62.3% 20.8% 17.0% 100.0% 73 40 59 172 56y-65y 42.4% 23.3% 34.3% 100.0% 2 3 3 8 66y-75y 25.0% 37.5% 37.5% 100.0% 127 60 73 260 Total 48.8% 23.1% 28.1% 100.0%
216 5.55: Age of the respondent * depositing party funds for getting ticket Cross tabulation Age of the respondent depositing party funds for Total getting ticket Some Time Every Time 3 3 6 25y-35y 50.0% 50.0% 100.0% 7 14 21 36y-45y 33.3% 66.7% 100.0% 9 44 53 46y-55y 17.0% 83.0% 100.0% 12 160 172 56y-65y 7.0% 93.0% 100.0% 4 4 8 66y-75y 50.0% 50.0% 100.0% 35 225 260 Total 13.5% 86.5% 100.0%
5.56: Age of the respondent * Getting Public Sympathy after Political Assassination in the constituency Cross tabulation Age of the respondent Getting Public Sympathy Total after Political Assassination in the constituency Some Time Every Time 0 6 6 25y-35y 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 0 21 21 36y-45y 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 0 53 53 46y-55y 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 0 172 172 56y-65y 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 2 6 8 66y-75y 25.0% 75.0% 100.0% 2 258 260 Total 0.8% 99.2% 100.0%
217
5.57: Age of the respondent * Democratic Nomination of the Political Candidate Cross tabulation Age of the respondent Democratic Nomination of Total the Political Candidate Some Time Not at All 3 3 6 25y-35y 50.0% 50.0% 100.0% 7 14 21 36y-45y 33.3% 66.7% 100.0% 9 44 53 46y-55y 17.0% 83.0% 100.0% 12 160 172 56y-65y 7.0% 93.0% 100.0% 4 4 8 66y-75y 50.0% 50.0% 100.0% 35 225 260 Total 13.5% 86.5% 100.0%
5.58: Age of the respondent * Role of Personal/family vote bank Cross tabulation Age of the respondent Role of Personal/family vote Total bank some time every time 2 4 6 25y-35y 33.3% 66.7% 100.0% 9 12 21 36y-45y 42.9% 57.1% 100.0% 33 20 53 46y-55y 62.3% 37.7% 100.0% 109 63 172 56y-65y 63.4% 36.6% 100.0% 5 3 8 66y-75y 62.5% 37.5% 100.0% 158 102 260 Total 60.8% 39.2% 100.0%
218
5.59: Age of the respondent * Previous member in Parliament Cross tabulation Age of the respondent Previous member in Total Parliament some time every time 3 3 6 25y-35y 50.0% 50.0% 100.0% 10 11 21 36y-45y 47.6% 52.4% 100.0% 31 22 53 46y-55y 58.5% 41.5% 100.0% 110 62 172 56y-65y 64.0% 36.0% 100.0% 5 3 8 66y-75y 62.5% 37.5% 100.0% 159 101 260 Total 61.2% 38.8% 100.0%
5.60: Age of the respondent * Cabinet member in the Parliament Cross tabulation Age of the respondent Cabinet member in the Total Parliament some time every time 0 6 6 25y-35y 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 7 14 21 36y-45y 33.3% 66.7% 100.0% 26 27 53 46y-55y 49.1% 50.9% 100.0% 70 102 172 56y-65y 40.7% 59.3% 100.0% 4 4 8 66y-75y 50.0% 50.0% 100.0% 107 153 260 Total 41.2% 58.8% 100.0%
219 5.61: Age of the respondent * get ticket due to electable in the constituency Cross tabulation Age of the respondent get ticket due to electable in Total the constituency some time every time 0 6 6 25y-35y 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 0 21 21 36y-45y 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 10 43 53 46y-55y 18.9% 81.1% 100.0% 18 154 172 56y-65y 10.5% 89.5% 100.0% 2 6 8 66y-75y 25.0% 75.0% 100.0% 30 230 260 Total 11.5% 88.5% 100.0%
5.62: Age of the respondent * Retaining family rule in the constituency for nomination Cross tabulation Age of the respondent Retaining family rule in the Total constituency for nomination to some to large extent extent 2 4 6 25y-35y 33.3% 66.7% 100.0% 9 12 21 36y-45y 42.9% 57.1% 100.0% Age of the 36 17 53 46y-55y respondent 67.9% 32.1% 100.0% 114 58 172 56y-65y 66.3% 33.7% 100.0% 6 2 8 66y-75y 75.0% 25.0% 100.0% 167 93 260 Total 64.2% 35.8% 100.0%
220 5.63: Place of the respondent * Internal democracy Cross tabulation Internal Total democracy to some extent 150 150 Punjab 100.0% 100.0% 60 60 Sindh Place of the 100.0% 100.0% respondent 35 35 KPK 100.0% 100.0% 15 15 Baluchistan 100.0% 100.0% 260 260 Total 100.0% 100.0%
5.64: Place of the respondent * Family member in Politics Cross tabulation Family member in Politics Total to some to large extent extent 91 59 150 Punjab 60.7% 39.3% 100.0% 60 0 60 Sindh Place of the 100.0% 0.0% 100.0% respondent 17 18 35 KPK 48.6% 51.4% 100.0% 15 0 15 Baluchistan 100.0% 0.0% 100.0% 183 77 260 Total 70.4% 29.6% 100.0%
221 5.65: Place of the respondent * Internal election in the political party Cross tabulation Internal election in the political Total party Some Every Not at All Time Time 144 6 0 150 Punjab 96.0% 4.0% 0.0% 100.0% 42 2 16 60 Sindh Place of the 70.0% 3.3% 26.7% 100.0% respondent 5 21 9 35 KPK 14.3% 60.0% 25.7% 100.0% 4 7 4 15 Baluchistan 26.7% 46.7% 26.7% 100.0% 195 36 29 260 Total 75.0% 13.8% 11.2% 100.0%
66: Place of the respondent * Discouraging Candidate Selection rather than elections in the party Cross tabulation Discouraging Candidate Selection rather than elections in the party Some Time Every Time Not at All 26 56 Punjab 17.3% 37.3% 29 12 Sindh Place of the 48.3% 20.0% respondent 21 2 KPK 60.0% 5.7% 2 4 Baluchistan 13.3% 26.7% 78 74 Total 30.0% 28.5%
222 5.52: Place of the respondent * Encouraging opposite opinions on the nomination of political candidate Cross tabulation Encouraging opposite opinions on the nomination of political candidate Some Time Every Time Not at All 0 3 Punjab 0.0% 2.0% 59 1 Sindh Place of the 98.3% 1.7% respondent 7 10 KPK 20.0% 28.6% 15 0 Baluchistan 100.0% 0.0% 81 14 Total 31.2% 5.4%
5.53: Place of the respondent * Permitting the party workers a share in the top leadership Cross tabulation Permitting the party workers a share in the top leadership Some Time Every Time Not At All 26 0 124 Punjab 17.3% 0.0% 82.7% 0 0 60 Sindh Place of the 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% respondent 30 5 0 KPK 85.7% 14.3% 0.0% 0 0 15 Baluchistan 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 56 5 199 Total 21.5% 1.9% 76.5%
223 5.54: Place of the respondent * Considering Party manifesto for Candidate Nomination Cross tabulation Considering Party Total manifesto for Candidate Nomination Some Time Every Time 150 0 150 Punjab 100.0% 0.0% 100.0% 6 54 60 Sindh Place of the 10.0% 90.0% 100.0% respondent 8 27 35 KPK 22.9% 77.1% 100.0% 3 12 15 Baluchistan 20.0% 80.0% 100.0% 167 93 260 Total 64.2% 35.8% 100.0%
5.55: Place of the respondent * Open discussions for candidate nomination in the party Cross tabulation Open discussions for candidate nomination in the party Some Time Every Time Not at All 88 0 62 Punjab 58.7% 0.0% 41.3% 0 59 1 Sindh Place of the 0.0% 98.3% 1.7% respondent 2 33 0 KPK 5.7% 94.3% 0.0% 14 1 0 Baluchistan 93.3% 6.7% 0.0% 104 93 63 Total 40.0% 35.8% 24.2%
224
5.56: Place of the respondent * Voter opinion or local level recommendations for candidate nomination Cross tabulation Voter opinion or local level recommendations for candidate nomination Some Time Every Time Not at All 99 2 49 Punjab 66.0% 1.3% 32.7% 3 17 40 Sindh Place of the 5.0% 28.3% 66.7% respondent 35 0 0 KPK 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 1 0 14 Baluchistan 6.7% 0.0% 93.3% 138 19 103 Total 53.1% 7.3% 39.6%
5.57: Place of the respondent * Role of Family or brand name in candidate nomination Cross tabulation Role of Family or brand name in candidate nomination Some Time Every Time Not at All 99 51 0 Punjab 66.0% 34.0% 0.0% 0 41 19 Sindh Place of the 0.0% 68.3% 31.7% respondent 35 0 0 KPK 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0 15 0 Baluchistan 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 134 107 19 Total 51.5% 41.2% 7.3%
225 5.58: Place of the respondent * Father/mother head of the party Cross tabulation Father/mother head of the party Total Some Every Not at time time All 57 92 1 150 Punjab 38.0% 61.3% 0.7% 100.0% 39 2 19 60 Sindh Place of the 65.0% 3.3% 31.7% 100.0% respondent 2 8 25 35 KPK 5.7% 22.9% 71.4% 100.0% Baluchista 15 0 0 15 n 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 113 102 45 260 Total 43.5% 39.2% 17.3% 100.0%
5.59: Place of the respondent * Demography of the constituency Cross tabulation Demography of the constituency Total Some Every Not at All Time Time 67 32 51 150 Punjab 44.7% 21.3% 34.0% 100.0% 24 21 15 60 Sindh Place of the 40.0% 35.0% 25.0% 100.0% respondent 30 5 0 35 KPK 85.7% 14.3% 0.0% 100.0% 6 2 7 15 Baluchistan 40.0% 13.3% 46.7% 100.0% 127 60 73 260 Total 48.8% 23.1% 28.1% 100.0%
226
5.60: Place of the respondent * depositing party funds for getting ticket Cross tabulation depositing party funds for Total getting ticket Some Time Every Time 0 150 150 Punjab 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 0 60 60 Sindh Place of the 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% respondent 35 0 35 KPK 100.0% 0.0% 100.0% 0 15 15 Baluchistan 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 35 225 260 Total 13.5% 86.5% 100.0%
5.61: Place of the respondent * Getting Public Sympathy after Political Assassination in the constituency Cross tabulation Getting Public Sympathy Total after Political Assassination in the constituency Some Time Every Time 0 150 150 Punjab 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 0 60 60 Sindh Place of the 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% respondent 2 33 35 KPK 5.7% 94.3% 100.0% 0 15 15 Baluchistan 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 2 258 260 Total 0.8% 99.2% 100.0%
227
5.62: Place of the respondent * Democratic Nomination of the Political Candidate Cross tabulation Democratic Nomination of Total the Political Candidate Some Time Not at All 0 150 150 Punjab 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 0 60 60 Sindh Place of the 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% respondent 35 0 35 KPK 100.0% 0.0% 100.0% 0 15 15 Baluchistan 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 35 225 260 Total 13.5% 86.5% 100.0%
5.63: Place of the respondent * Role of Personal/family vote bank Cross tabulation Role of Personal/family Total vote bank some time every time 92 58 150 Punjab 61.3% 38.7% 100.0% 45 15 60 Sindh Place of the 75.0% 25.0% 100.0% respondent 9 26 35 KPK 25.7% 74.3% 100.0% 12 3 15 Baluchistan 80.0% 20.0% 100.0% 158 102 260 Total 60.8% 39.2% 100.0%
228
5.64: Place of the respondent * Previous member in Parliament Cross tabulation Previous member in Total Parliament some time every time 88 62 150 Punjab 58.7% 41.3% 100.0% 43 17 60 Sindh Place of the 71.7% 28.3% 100.0% respondent 22 13 35 KPK 62.9% 37.1% 100.0% 6 9 15 Baluchistan 40.0% 60.0% 100.0% 159 101 260 Total 61.2% 38.8% 100.0%
The political candidates from Punjab province would be more likely to share for being previous members of the parliament as compared to other provinces.
5.65: Place of the respondent * Cabinet member in the Parliament Cross tabulation Cabinet member in the Total Parliament some time every time 40 110 150 Punjab 26.7% 73.3% 100.0% 44 16 60 Sindh Place of the 73.3% 26.7% 100.0% respondent 16 19 35 KPK 45.7% 54.3% 100.0% 7 8 15 Baluchistan 46.7% 53.3% 100.0% 107 153 260 Total 41.2% 58.8% 100.0%
229
5.66: Place of the respondent * get ticket due to electable in the constituency Cross tabulation get ticket due to electable in Total the constituency some time every time 23 127 150 Punjab 15.3% 84.7% 100.0% 5 55 60 Sindh Place of the 8.3% 91.7% 100.0% respondent 1 34 35 KPK 2.9% 97.1% 100.0% 1 14 15 Baluchistan 6.7% 93.3% 100.0% 30 230 260 Total 11.5% 88.5% 100.0%
5.67: Place of the respondent * Retaining family rule in the constituency for nomination Cross tabulation Retaining family rule in the Total constituency for nomination to some to large extent extent 100 50 150 Punjab 66.7% 33.3% 100.0% 42 18 60 Sindh Place of the 70.0% 30.0% 100.0% respondent 16 19 35 KPK 45.7% 54.3% 100.0% 9 6 15 Baluchistan 60.0% 40.0% 100.0% 167 93 260 Total 64.2% 35.8% 100.0%
230 5.68: Social position of the respondent * Internal democracy Cross tabulation Internal Total democracy to some extent 57 57 Businessman 100.0% 100.0% Social position of 152 152 Landlord the respondent 100.0% 100.0% 51 51 Professional 100.0% 100.0% 260 260 Total 100.0% 100.0%
5.69: Social position of the respondent * Family member in Politics Cross tabulation Family member in Politics Total to some to large extent extent 38 19 57 Businessman 66.7% 33.3% 100.0% Social position 105 47 152 of the Landlord respondent 69.1% 30.9% 100.0% 40 11 51 Professional 78.4% 21.6% 100.0% 183 77 260 Total 70.4% 29.6% 100.0%
5.70: Social position of the respondent * Internal election in the political party Cross tabulation Internal election in the political Total party Some Every Not at All Time Time 42 10 5 57 Businessman 73.7% 17.5% 8.8% 100.0% Social position 129 13 10 152 of the Landlord respondent 84.9% 8.6% 6.6% 100.0% 24 13 14 51 Professional 47.1% 25.5% 27.5% 100.0% 195 36 29 260 Total 75.0% 13.8% 11.2% 100.0%
231 5.71: Social position of the respondent * Discouraging Candidate Selection rather than elections in the party Cross tabulation Discouraging Candidate Selection rather than elections in the party Some Time Every Time Not at All 32 14 11 Businessman 56.1% 24.6% 19.3% Social position 61 34 57 of the Landlord respondent 40.1% 22.4% 37.5% 15 30 6 Professional 29.4% 58.8% 11.8% 108 78 74 Total 41.5% 30.0% 28.5%
5.72: Social position of the respondent * Encouraging opposite opinions on the nomination of political candidate Cross tabulation Encouraging opposite opinions on the nomination of political candidate Some Time Every Time Not at All 42 12 3 Businessman 73.7% 21.1% 5.3% Social position 106 40 6 of the Landlord respondent 69.7% 26.3% 3.9% 17 29 5 Professional 33.3% 56.9% 9.8% 165 81 14 Total 63.5% 31.2% 5.4%
5.73: Social position of the respondent * Permitting the party workers a share in the top leadership Cross tabulation Permitting the party workers a share in the top leadership Some Time Every Time Not At All 11 2 44 Businessman 19.3% 3.5% 77.2% Social position 31 1 120 of the Landlord respondent 20.4% 0.7% 78.9% 14 2 35 Professional 27.5% 3.9% 68.6% 56 5 199 Total 21.5% 1.9% 76.5%
232 5.74: Social position of the respondent * Considering Party manifesto for Candidate Nomination Cross tabulation Considering Party Total manifesto for Candidate Nomination Some Time Every Time 44 13 57 Businessman 77.2% 22.8% 100.0% Social position 109 43 152 of the Landlord respondent 71.7% 28.3% 100.0% 14 37 51 Professional 27.5% 72.5% 100.0% 167 93 260 Total 64.2% 35.8% 100.0%
5.75: Social position of the respondent * Open discussions for candidate nomination in the party Cross tabulation Open discussions for candidate nomination in the party Some Time Every Time Not at All 34 13 10 Businessman 59.6% 22.8% 17.5% Social position 54 47 51 of the Landlord respondent 35.5% 30.9% 33.6% 16 33 2 Professional 31.4% 64.7% 3.9% 104 93 63 Total 40.0% 35.8% 24.2%
5.76: Social position of the respondent * Voter opinion or local level recommendations for candidate nomination Cross tabulation Voter opinion or local level recommendations for candidate nomination Some Time Every Time Not at All 27 3 27 Businessman 47.4% 5.3% 47.4% Social position 88 15 49 of the Landlord respondent 57.9% 9.9% 32.2% 23 1 27 Professional 45.1% 2.0% 52.9% 138 19 103 Total 53.1% 7.3% 39.6%
233 5.77: Social position of the respondent * Role of Family or brand name in candidate nomination Cross tabulation Role of Family or brand name in candidate nomination Some Time Every Time Not at All 41 13 3 Businessman 71.9% 22.8% 5.3% Social position 68 83 1 of the Landlord respondent 44.7% 54.6% 0.7% 25 11 15 Professional 49.0% 21.6% 29.4% 134 107 19 Total 51.5% 41.2% 7.3%
5.78: Social position of the respondent * Father/mother head of the party Cross tabulation Father/mother head of the party Total Some Every Not al time time All 30 19 8 57 Businessman 52.6% 33.3% 14.0% 100.0% Social position 69 74 9 152 of the Landlord respondent 45.4% 48.7% 5.9% 100.0% 14 9 28 51 Professional 27.5% 17.6% 54.9% 100.0% 113 102 45 260 Total 43.5% 39.2% 17.3% 100.0%
5.79: Social position of the respondent * Demography of the constituency Cross tabulation Demography of the constituency Total Some Every Not at All Time Time Businessma 20 22 15 57 n 35.1% 38.6% 26.3% 100.0% Social position 88 15 49 152 of the Landlord respondent 57.9% 9.9% 32.2% 100.0% 19 23 9 51 Professional 37.3% 45.1% 17.6% 100.0% 127 60 73 260 Total 48.8% 23.1% 28.1% 100.0%
234 5.80: Social position of the respondent * depositing party funds for getting ticket Cross tabulation depositing party funds for Total getting ticket Some Time Every Time Businessma 8 49 57 n 14.0% 86.0% 100.0% Social position 13 139 152 of the Landlord respondent 8.6% 91.4% 100.0% 14 37 51 Professional 27.5% 72.5% 100.0% 35 225 260 Total 13.5% 86.5% 100.0%
5.81: Social position of the respondent * Getting Public Sympathy after Political Assassination in the constituency Cross tabulation Getting Public Sympathy Total after Political Assassination in the constituency Some Time Every Time 1 56 57 Businessman 1.8% 98.2% 100.0% Social position 1 151 152 of the Landlord respondent 0.7% 99.3% 100.0% 0 51 51 Professional 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 2 258 260 Total 0.8% 99.2% 100.0%
5.82: Social position of the respondent * Democratic Nomination of the Political Candidate Cross tabulation Democratic Nomination of Total the Political Candidate Some Time Not at All 8 49 57 Businessman 14.0% 86.0% 100.0% Social position 13 139 152 of the Landlord respondent 8.6% 91.4% 100.0% 14 37 51 Professional 27.5% 72.5% 100.0% 35 225 260 Total 13.5% 86.5% 100.0%
235 5.83: Social position of the respondent * Role of Personal/family vote bank Cross tabulation Role of Personal/family Total vote bank some time every time 28 29 57 Businessman 49.1% 50.9% 100.0% Social position 104 48 152 of the Landlord respondent 68.4% 31.6% 100.0% 26 25 51 Professional 51.0% 49.0% 100.0% 158 102 260 Total 60.8% 39.2% 100.0%
5.84: Social position of the respondent * Previous member in Parliament Cross tabulation Previous member in Total Parliament some time every time 32 25 57 Businessman 56.1% 43.9% 100.0% Social position 93 59 152 of the Landlord respondent 61.2% 38.8% 100.0% 34 17 51 Professional 66.7% 33.3% 100.0% 159 101 260 Total 61.2% 38.8% 100.0%
5.85: Social position of the respondent * Cabinet member in the Parliament Cross tabulation Cabinet member in the Total Parliament some time every time 24 33 57 Businessman 42.1% 57.9% 100.0% Social position 53 99 152 of the Landlord respondent 34.9% 65.1% 100.0% 30 21 51 Professional 58.8% 41.2% 100.0% 107 153 260 Total 41.2% 58.8% 100.0%
236 5.86: Social position of the respondent * get ticket due to electable in the constituency Cross tabulation get ticket due to electable Total in the constituency some time every time 8 49 57 Businessman 14.0% 86.0% 100.0% Social position 22 130 152 of the Landlord respondent 14.5% 85.5% 100.0% 0 51 51 Professional 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 30 230 260 Total 11.5% 88.5% 100.0%
5.87: Social position of the respondent * Retaining family rule in the constituency for nomination Cross tabulation Retaining family rule in the Total constituency for nomination to some to large extent extent Businessma 35 22 57 n 61.4% 38.6% 100.0% Social position 111 41 152 of the Landlord respondent 73.0% 27.0% 100.0% 21 30 51 Professional 41.2% 58.8% 100.0% 167 93 260 Total 64.2% 35.8% 100.0%
5.88: Social position of the respondent * Turn out Cross tabulation Turn out 35% to40% 40%to45% 45%to50% Businessma 4 2 3 n 7.0% 3.5% 5.3% Social position 3 3 7 of the Landlord respondent 2.0% 2.0% 4.6% 5 2 6 Professional 9.8% 3.9% 11.8% 12 7 16 Total 4.6% 2.7% 6.2%
237 5.89: Length of political career of the respondent * Internal democracy Cross tabulation Internal Total democracy to some extend 19 19 5 years 100.0% 100.0% 58 58 10 years 100.0% 100.0% 83 83 15 years Length of political 100.0% 100.0% career of the 41 41 respondent 20 years 100.0% 100.0% 32 32 25 years 100.0% 100.0% 27 27 30 years 100.0% 100.0% 260 260 Total 100.0% 100.0%
5.90: Length of political career of the respondent * Family member in Politics Cross tabulation Family member in Politics Total to some to large extend extend 8 11 19 5 years 42.1% 57.9% 100.0% 30 28 58 10 years 51.7% 48.3% 100.0% 64 19 83 Length of 15 years political career 77.1% 22.9% 100.0% of the 27 14 41 20 years respondent 65.9% 34.1% 100.0% 28 4 32 25 years 87.5% 12.5% 100.0% 26 1 27 30 years 96.3% 3.7% 100.0% 183 77 260 Total 70.4% 29.6% 100.0%
238 5.91: Length of political career of the respondent * Internal election in the political party Cross tabulation Internal election in the political Total party Some Every Not at All Time Time 13 5 1 19 5 years 68.4% 26.3% 5.3% 100.0% 41 9 8 58 10 years 70.7% 15.5% 13.8% 100.0% 57 14 12 83 Length of 15 years political career 68.7% 16.9% 14.5% 100.0% of the 34 4 3 41 20 years respondent 82.9% 9.8% 7.3% 100.0% 25 3 4 32 25 years 78.1% 9.4% 12.5% 100.0% 25 1 1 27 30 years 92.6% 3.7% 3.7% 100.0% 195 36 29 260 Total 75.0% 13.8% 11.2% 100.0% 5.92: Length of political career of the respondent * Discouraging Candidate Selection rather than elections in the party Cross tabulation Discouraging Candidate Selection rather Total than elections in the party Some Time Every Time Not at All 12 5 2 19 5 years 63.2% 26.3% 10.5% 100.0% 29 16 13 58 10 years 50.0% 27.6% 22.4% 100.0% 32 26 25 83 Length of 15 years political career 38.6% 31.3% 30.1% 100.0% of the 15 16 10 41 20 years respondent 36.6% 39.0% 24.4% 100.0% 8 8 16 32 25 years 25.0% 25.0% 50.0% 100.0% 12 7 8 27 30 years 44.4% 25.9% 29.6% 100.0% 108 78 74 260 Total 41.5% 30.0% 28.5% 100.0%
239 5.93: Length of political career of the respondent * Encouraging opposite opinions on the nomination of political candidate Cross tabulation Encouraging opposite opinions on the Total nomination of political candidate Some Time Every Time Not at All 15 4 0 19 5 years 78.9% 21.1% 0.0% 100.0% 10 37 14 7 58 years 63.8% 24.1% 12.1% 100.0% Length of 15 49 31 3 83 political years 59.0% 37.3% 3.6% 100.0% career of the 20 27 11 3 41 respondent years 65.9% 26.8% 7.3% 100.0% 25 19 12 1 32 years 59.4% 37.5% 3.1% 100.0% 30 18 9 0 27 years 66.7% 33.3% 0.0% 100.0% 165 81 14 260 Total 63.5% 31.2% 5.4% 100.0%
5.94: Length of political career of the respondent * Permitting the party workers a share in the top leadership Cross tabulation Permitting the party workers a share in Total the top leadership Some Time Every Time Not At All 7 0 12 19 5 years 36.8% 0.0% 63.2% 100.0% 10 19 2 37 58 years 32.8% 3.4% 63.8% 100.0% Length of 15 14 1 68 83 political years 16.9% 1.2% 81.9% 100.0% career of the 20 9 1 31 41 respondent years 22.0% 2.4% 75.6% 100.0% 25 5 0 27 32 years 15.6% 0.0% 84.4% 100.0% 30 2 1 24 27 years 7.4% 3.7% 88.9% 100.0% 56 5 199 260 Total 21.5% 1.9% 76.5% 100.0%
240 5.95: Length of political career of the respondent * Considering Party manifesto for Candidate Nomination Cross tabulation Considering Party Total manifesto for Candidate Nomination Some Time Every Time 9 10 19 5 years 47.4% 52.6% 100.0% 37 21 58 10 years 63.8% 36.2% 100.0% 53 30 83 Length of 15 years political career 63.9% 36.1% 100.0% of the 29 12 41 20 years respondent 70.7% 29.3% 100.0% 19 13 32 25 years 59.4% 40.6% 100.0% 20 7 27 30 years 74.1% 25.9% 100.0% 167 93 260 Total 64.2% 35.8% 100.0% 5.96: Length of political career of the respondent * Open discussions for candidate nomination in the party Cross tabulation Open discussions for candidate Total nomination in the party Some Time Every Time Not at All 11 8 0 19 5 years 57.9% 42.1% 0.0% 100.0% 26 21 11 58 10 years 44.8% 36.2% 19.0% 100.0% 28 30 25 83 Length of 15 years political career 33.7% 36.1% 30.1% 100.0% of the 20 13 8 41 20 years respondent 48.8% 31.7% 19.5% 100.0% 9 12 11 32 25 years 28.1% 37.5% 34.4% 100.0% 10 9 8 27 30 years 37.0% 33.3% 29.6% 100.0% 104 93 63 260 Total 40.0% 35.8% 24.2% 100.0%
241 5.97: Length of political career of the respondent * Voter opinion or local level recommendations for candidate nomination Cross tabulation Voter opinion or local level Total recommendations for candidate nomination Some Time Every Time Not at All 10 0 9 19 5 years 52.6% 0.0% 47.4% 100.0% 10 29 2 27 58 years 50.0% 3.4% 46.6% 100.0% Length of 15 41 10 32 83 political years 49.4% 12.0% 38.6% 100.0% career of the 20 26 2 13 41 respondent years 63.4% 4.9% 31.7% 100.0% 25 17 1 14 32 years 53.1% 3.1% 43.8% 100.0% 30 15 4 8 27 years 55.6% 14.8% 29.6% 100.0% 138 19 103 260 Total 53.1% 7.3% 39.6% 100.0% 5.98: Length of political career of the respondent * Role of Family or brand name in candidate nomination Cross tabulation Role of Family or brand name in Total candidate nomination Some Time Every Time Not at All 16 1 2 19 5 years 84.2% 5.3% 10.5% 100.0% 37 16 5 58 10 years 63.8% 27.6% 8.6% 100.0% 37 37 9 83 Length of 15 years political career 44.6% 44.6% 10.8% 100.0% of the 23 16 2 41 20 years respondent 56.1% 39.0% 4.9% 100.0% 10 22 0 32 25 years 31.2% 68.8% 0.0% 100.0% 11 15 1 27 30 years 40.7% 55.6% 3.7% 100.0% 134 107 19 260 Total 51.5% 41.2% 7.3% 100.0%
242 5.99: Length of political career of the respondent * Father/mother head of the party Cross tabulation Father/mother head of the party Total Some time Every Not at time All 8 2 9 19 5 years 42.1% 10.5% 47.4% 100.0% 26 17 15 58 10 years 44.8% 29.3% 25.9% 100.0% 35 34 14 83 Length of 15 years political career 42.2% 41.0% 16.9% 100.0% of the 16 19 6 41 20 years respondent 39.0% 46.3% 14.6% 100.0% 14 18 0 32 25 years 43.8% 56.2% 0.0% 100.0% 14 12 1 27 30 years 51.9% 44.4% 3.7% 100.0% 113 102 45 260 Total 43.5% 39.2% 17.3% 100.0%
5.100: Length of political career of the respondent * Demography of the constituency Cross tabulation Demography of the constituency Total Some Every Not at Time Time All 13 2 4 19 5 years 68.4% 10.5% 21.1% 100.0% 34 10 14 58 10 years 58.6% 17.2% 24.1% 100.0% 38 22 23 83 Length of 15 years political career 45.8% 26.5% 27.7% 100.0% of the 15 15 11 41 20 years respondent 36.6% 36.6% 26.8% 100.0% 17 2 13 32 25 years 53.1% 6.2% 40.6% 100.0% 10 9 8 27 30 years 37.0% 33.3% 29.6% 100.0% 127 60 73 260 Total 48.8% 23.1% 28.1% 100.0%
243 5.101: Length of political career of the respondent * depositing party funds for getting ticket Cross tabulation depositing party funds for Total getting ticket Some Time Every Time 7 12 19 5 years 36.8% 63.2% 100.0% 12 46 58 10 years 20.7% 79.3% 100.0% 7 76 83 Length of 15 years political career 8.4% 91.6% 100.0% of the 5 36 41 20 years respondent 12.2% 87.8% 100.0% 2 30 32 25 years 6.2% 93.8% 100.0% 2 25 27 30 years 7.4% 92.6% 100.0% 35 225 260 Total 13.5% 86.5% 100.0% 5.102: Length of political career of the respondent * Getting Public Sympathy after Political Assassination in the constituency Cross tabulation Getting Public Sympathy Total after Political Assassination in the constituency Some Time Every Time 0 19 19 5 years 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 0 58 58 10 years 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 0 83 83 Length of 15 years political career 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% of the 0 41 41 20 years respondent 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 0 32 32 25 years 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 2 25 27 30 years 7.4% 92.6% 100.0% 2 258 260 Total 0.8% 99.2% 100.0%
244 5.103: Length of political career of the respondent * Democratic Nomination of the Political Candidate Cross tabulation Democratic Nomination of Total the Political Candidate Some Time Not at All 7 12 19 5 years 36.8% 63.2% 100.0% 12 46 58 10 years 20.7% 79.3% 100.0% 7 76 83 Length of 15 years political career 8.4% 91.6% 100.0% of the 5 36 41 20 years respondent 12.2% 87.8% 100.0% 2 30 32 25 years 6.2% 93.8% 100.0% 2 25 27 30 years 7.4% 92.6% 100.0% 35 225 260 Total 13.5% 86.5% 100.0%
5.104: Length of political career of the respondent * Role of Personal/family vote bank Cross tabulation Role of Personal/family Total vote bank some time every time 11 8 19 5 years 57.9% 42.1% 100.0% 33 25 58 10 years 56.9% 43.1% 100.0% 44 39 83 Length of 15 years political career 53.0% 47.0% 100.0% of the 21 20 41 20 years respondent 51.2% 48.8% 100.0% 27 5 32 25 years 84.4% 15.6% 100.0% 22 5 27 30 years 81.5% 18.5% 100.0% 158 102 260 Total 60.8% 39.2% 100.0%
245 5.105: Length of political career of the respondent * Previous member in Parliament Cross tabulation Previous member in Total Parliament some time every time 5 14 19 5 years 26.3% 73.7% 100.0% 25 33 58 10 years 43.1% 56.9% 100.0% 54 29 83 Length of 15 years political career 65.1% 34.9% 100.0% of the 27 14 41 20 years respondent 65.9% 34.1% 100.0% 28 4 32 25 years 87.5% 12.5% 100.0% 20 7 27 30 years 74.1% 25.9% 100.0% 159 101 260 Total 61.2% 38.8% 100.0%
5.106: Length of political career of the respondent * Cabinet member in the Parliament Cross tabulation Cabinet member in the Total Parliament some time every time 5 14 19 5 years 26.3% 73.7% 100.0% 10 48 58 10 years 17.2% 82.8% 100.0% 34 49 83 Length of 15 years political career 41.0% 59.0% 100.0% of the 23 18 41 20 years respondent 56.1% 43.9% 100.0% 20 12 32 25 years 62.5% 37.5% 100.0% 15 12 27 30 years 55.6% 44.4% 100.0% 107 153 260 Total 41.2% 58.8% 100.0%
246 5.107: Length of political career of the respondent * get ticket due to electable in the constituency Cross tabulation get ticket due to electable Total in the constituency some time every time 1 18 19 5 years 5.3% 94.7% 100.0% 6 52 58 10 years 10.3% 89.7% 100.0% 14 69 83 Length of 15 years political career 16.9% 83.1% 100.0% of the 1 40 41 20 years respondent 2.4% 97.6% 100.0% 3 29 32 25 years 9.4% 90.6% 100.0% 5 22 27 30 years 18.5% 81.5% 100.0% 30 230 260 Total 11.5% 88.5% 100.0% 5.108: Length of political career of the respondent * Retaining family rule in the constituency for nomination Cross tabulation Retaining family rule in the Total constituency for nomination to some to large extend extend 6 13 19 5 years 31.6% 68.4% 100.0% 33 25 58 10 years 56.9% 43.1% 100.0% 47 36 83 Length of 15 years political career 56.6% 43.4% 100.0% of the 28 13 41 20 years respondent 68.3% 31.7% 100.0% 28 4 32 25 years 87.5% 12.5% 100.0% 25 2 27 30 years 92.6% 7.4% 100.0% 167 93 260 Total 64.2% 35.8% 100.0%
247 5.109: Gender of the respondent * Internal democracy Cross tabulation Internal Total democracy to some extent 245 245 Male Gender of the 100.0% 100.0% respondent 15 15 Female 100.0% 100.0% 260 260 Total 100.0% 100.0%
5.110: Gender of the respondent * Family member in Politics Cross tabulation Family member in Politics Total to some to large extent extent 170 75 245 Male Gender of the 69.4% 30.6% 100.0% respondent 13 2 15 Female 86.7% 13.3% 100.0% 183 77 260 Total 70.4% 29.6% 100.0%
5.111: Gender of the respondent * Internal election in the political party Cross tabulation Internal election in the political Total party Some Every Not at All Time Time 180 36 29 245 Male Gender of the 73.5% 14.7% 11.8% 100.0% respondent 15 0 0 15 Female 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 195 36 29 260 Total 75.0% 13.8% 11.2% 100.0%
248 5.112: Gender of the respondent * Discouraging Candidate Selection rather than elections in the party Cross tabulation Discouraging Candidate Selection rather Total than elections in the party Some Time Every Time Not at All 104 74 67 245 Male Gender of the 42.4% 30.2% 27.3% 100.0% respondent 4 4 7 15 Female 26.7% 26.7% 46.7% 100.0% 108 78 74 260 Total 41.5% 30.0% 28.5% 100.0%
5.113: Gender of the respondent * Encouraging opposite opinions on the nomination of political candidate Cross tabulation Encouraging opposite opinions on the Total nomination of political candidate Some Time Every Time Not at All 162 71 12 245 Male Gender of the 66.1% 29.0% 4.9% 100.0% respondent 3 10 2 15 Female 20.0% 66.7% 13.3% 100.0% 165 81 14 260 Total 63.5% 31.2% 5.4% 100.0%
5.114: Gender of the respondent * Permitting the party workers a share in the top leadership Cross tabulation Permitting the party workers a share in Total the top leadership Some Time Every Time Not At All 55 5 185 245 Male Gender of the 22.4% 2.0% 75.5% 100.0% respondent 1 0 14 15 Female 6.7% 0.0% 93.3% 100.0% 56 5 199 260 Total 21.5% 1.9% 76.5% 100.0%
249 5.115Gender of the respondent * Considering Party manifesto for Candidate Nomination Cross tabulation Considering Party manifesto Total for Candidate Nomination Some Time Every Time 159 86 245 Male Gender of the 64.9% 35.1% 100.0% respondent 8 7 15 Female 53.3% 46.7% 100.0% 167 93 260 Total 64.2% 35.8% 100.0%
5.116: Gender of the respondent * Open discussions for candidate nomination in the party Cross tabulation Open discussions for candidate Total nomination in the party Some Time Every Time Not at All 101 83 61 245 Male Gender of the 41.2% 33.9% 24.9% 100.0% respondent 3 10 2 15 Female 20.0% 66.7% 13.3% 100.0% 104 93 63 260 Total 40.0% 35.8% 24.2% 100.0%
5.117: Gender of the respondent * Voter opinion or local level recommendations for candidate nomination Cross tabulation Voter opinion or local level Total recommendations for candidate nomination Some Time Every Time Not at All 136 13 96 245 Male Gender of the 55.5% 5.3% 39.2% 100.0% respondent 2 6 7 15 Female 13.3% 40.0% 46.7% 100.0% 138 19 103 260 Total 53.1% 7.3% 39.6% 100.0%
250 5.118: Gender of the respondent * Role of Family or brand name in candidate nomination Cross tabulation Role of Family or brand name in Total candidate nomination Some Time Every Time Not at All 131 97 17 245 Male Gender of the 53.5% 39.6% 6.9% 100.0% respondent 3 10 2 15 Female 20.0% 66.7% 13.3% 100.0% 134 107 19 260 Total 51.5% 41.2% 7.3% 100.0%
5.119: Gender of the respondent * Father/mother head of the party Cross tabulation Father/mother head of the party Total Some time Every Not al All time 104 98 43 245 Male Gender of the 42.4% 40.0% 17.6% 100.0% respondent 9 4 2 15 Female 60.0% 26.7% 13.3% 100.0% 113 102 45 260 Total 43.5% 39.2% 17.3% 100.0%
5.120: Gender of the respondent * Demography of the constituency Cross tabulation Demography of the constituency Total Some Every Not at All Time Time 120 58 67 245 Male Gender of the 49.0% 23.7% 27.3% 100.0% respondent 7 2 6 15 Female 46.7% 13.3% 40.0% 100.0% 127 60 73 260 Total 48.8% 23.1% 28.1% 100.0%
251 5.121: Gender of the respondent * depositing party funds for getting ticket Cross tabulation depositing party funds for Total getting ticket Some Time Every Time 35 210 245 Male Gender of the 14.3% 85.7% 100.0% respondent 0 15 15 Female 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 35 225 260 Total 13.5% 86.5% 100.0%
5.122: Gender of the respondent * Getting Public Sympathy after Political Assassination in the constituency Cross tabulation Getting Public Sympathy after Total Political Assassination in the constituency Some Time Every Time 2 243 245 Male Gender of the 0.8% 99.2% 100.0% respondent 0 15 15 Female 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 2 258 260 Total 0.8% 99.2% 100.0%
5.123: Gender of the respondent * Democratic Nomination of the Political Candidate Cross tabulation Democratic Nomination of Total the Political Candidate Some Time Not at All 35 210 245 Male Gender of the 14.3% 85.7% 100.0% respondent 0 15 15 Female 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 35 225 260 Total 13.5% 86.5% 100.0%
252 5.124: Gender of the respondent * Role of Personal/family vote bank Cross tabulation Role of Personal/family vote Total bank some time every time 145 100 245 Male Gender of the 59.2% 40.8% 100.0% respondent 13 2 15 Female 86.7% 13.3% 100.0% 158 102 260 Total 60.8% 39.2% 100.0%
5.125: Gender of the respondent * Previous member in Parliament Cross tabulation Previous member in Total Parliament some time every time 148 97 245 Male Gender of the 60.4% 39.6% 100.0% respondent 11 4 15 Female 73.3% 26.7% 100.0% 159 101 260 Total 61.2% 38.8% 100.0%
5.126: Gender of the respondent * Cabinet member in the Parliament Cross tabulation Cabinet member in the Total Parliament some time every time 99 146 245 Male Gender of the 40.4% 59.6% 100.0% respondent 8 7 15 Female 53.3% 46.7% 100.0% 107 153 260 Total 41.2% 58.8% 100.0%
253 5.127: Gender of the respondent * get ticket due to electable in the constituency Cross tabulation get ticket due to electable Total in the constituency some time every time 30 215 245 Male Gender of the 12.2% 87.8% 100.0% respondent 0 15 15 Female 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 30 230 260 Total 11.5% 88.5% 100.0%
5.128: Gender of the respondent * Retaining family rule in the constituency for nomination Cross tabulation Retaining family rule in the Total constituency for nomination to some to large extent extent 155 90 245 Male Gender of the 63.3% 36.7% 100.0% respondent 12 3 15 Female 80.0% 20.0% 100.0% 167 93 260 Total 64.2% 35.8% 100.0%
5.129: Gender of the respondent * Turn out Cross tabulation Turn out 35% to40% 40%to45% 45%to50% 50%to55% 12 6 16 19 Male Gender of the 4.9% 2.4% 6.5% 7.8% respondent 0 1 0 0 Female 0.0% 6.7% 0.0% 0.0% 12 7 16 19 Total 4.6% 2.7% 6.2% 7.3%
254 5.130: Education of the respondent * Internal democracy Cross tabulation Internal Total democracy to some extent 20 20 Under matric 100.0% 100.0% 10 10 Matric 100.0% 100.0% 163 163 Intermediate Education of the 100.0% 100.0% respondent 60 60 Bachelor 100.0% 100.0% 3 3 Master 100.0% 100.0% 4 4 Higher education 100.0% 100.0% 260 260 Total 100.0% 100.0%
5.131: Education of the respondent * Family member in Politics Cross tabulation Family member in Politics Total to some to large extent extent 15 5 20 Under matric 75.0% 25.0% 100.0% 8 2 10 Matric 80.0% 20.0% 100.0% 117 46 163 Intermediate Education of 71.8% 28.2% 100.0% the respondent 39 21 60 Bachelor 65.0% 35.0% 100.0% 1 2 3 Master 33.3% 66.7% 100.0% 3 1 4 Higher education 75.0% 25.0% 100.0% 183 77 260 Total 70.4% 29.6% 100.0%
255 5.132: Education of the respondent * Internal election in the political party Cross tabulation Internal election in the political Total party Some Every Not at All Time Time 18 1 1 20 Under matric 90.0% 5.0% 5.0% 100.0% 7 2 1 10 Matric 70.0% 20.0% 10.0% 100.0% 134 11 18 163 Intermediate Education of 82.2% 6.7% 11.0% 100.0% the respondent 32 20 8 60 Bachelor 53.3% 33.3% 13.3% 100.0% 0 2 1 3 Master 0.0% 66.7% 33.3% 100.0% 4 0 0 4 Higher education 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 195 36 29 260 Total 75.0% 13.8% 11.2% 100.0%
5.133: Education of the respondent * Discouraging Candidate Selection rather than elections in the party Cross tabulation Discouraging Candidate Selection rather than elections in the party Some Time Every Time Not at All 7 4 9 Under matric 35.0% 20.0% 45.0% 4 3 3 Matric 40.0% 30.0% 30.0% 72 41 50 Intermediate Education of 44.2% 25.2% 30.7% the respondent 22 28 10 Bachelor 36.7% 46.7% 16.7% 2 1 0 Master 66.7% 33.3% 0.0% Higher 1 1 2 education 25.0% 25.0% 50.0% 108 78 74 Total 41.5% 30.0% 28.5%
256 5.134: Education of the respondent * Encouraging opposite opinions on the nomination of political candidate Cross tabulation Encouraging opposite opinions on the nomination of political candidate Some Time Every Time Not at All 15 4 1 Under matric 75.0% 20.0% 5.0% 5 4 1 Matric 50.0% 40.0% 10.0% 106 52 5 Intermediate Education of 65.0% 31.9% 3.1% the respondent 33 21 6 Bachelor 55.0% 35.0% 10.0% 2 0 1 Master 66.7% 0.0% 33.3% Higher 4 0 0 education 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 165 81 14 Total 63.5% 31.2% 5.4%
5.135: Education of the respondent * Permitting the party workers a share in the top leadership Cross tabulation Permitting the party workers a share in the top leadership Some Time Every Time Not At All 6 0 14 Under matric 30.0% 0.0% 70.0% 3 0 7 Matric 30.0% 0.0% 70.0% 23 0 140 Intermediate Education of 14.1% 0.0% 85.9% the respondent 20 5 35 Bachelor 33.3% 8.3% 58.3% 3 0 0 Master 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% Higher 1 0 3 education 25.0% 0.0% 75.0% 56 5 199 Total 21.5% 1.9% 76.5%
257 5.136: Education of the respondent * Considering Party manifesto for Candidate Nomination Cross tabulation Considering Party Total manifesto for Candidate Nomination Some Time Every Time 16 4 20 Under matric 80.0% 20.0% 100.0% 8 2 10 Matric 80.0% 20.0% 100.0% 114 49 163 Intermediate Education of 69.9% 30.1% 100.0% the respondent 24 36 60 Bachelor 40.0% 60.0% 100.0% 1 2 3 Master 33.3% 66.7% 100.0% Higher 4 0 4 education 100.0% 0.0% 100.0% 167 93 260 Total 64.2% 35.8% 100.0%
5.137: Education of the respondent * Open discussions for candidate nomination in the party Cross tabulation Open discussions for candidate nomination in the party Some Time Every Time Not at All 8 6 6 Under matric 40.0% 30.0% 30.0% 6 3 1 Matric 60.0% 30.0% 10.0% 68 47 48 Intermediate Education of 41.7% 28.8% 29.4% the respondent 20 34 6 Bachelor 33.3% 56.7% 10.0% 0 3 0 Master 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% Higher 2 0 2 education 50.0% 0.0% 50.0% 104 93 63 Total 40.0% 35.8% 24.2%
258 5.138: Education of the respondent * Voter opinion or local level recommendations for candidate nomination Cross tabulation Voter opinion or local level recommendations for candidate nomination Some Time Every Time Not at All 9 2 9 Under matric 45.0% 10.0% 45.0% 3 1 6 Matric 30.0% 10.0% 60.0% 82 14 67 Intermediate Education of 50.3% 8.6% 41.1% the respondent 38 2 20 Bachelor 63.3% 3.3% 33.3% 3 0 0 Master 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% Higher 3 0 1 education 75.0% 0.0% 25.0% 138 19 103 Total 53.1% 7.3% 39.6%
5.139: Education of the respondent * Role of Family or brand name in candidate nomination Cross tabulation Role of Family or brand name in candidate nomination Some Time Every Time Not at All 10 9 1 Under matric 50.0% 45.0% 5.0% 5 5 0 Matric 50.0% 50.0% 0.0% 75 74 14 Intermediate Education of 46.0% 45.4% 8.6% the respondent 39 17 4 Bachelor 65.0% 28.3% 6.7% 3 0 0 Master 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% Higher 2 2 0 education 50.0% 50.0% 0.0% 134 107 19 Total 51.5% 41.2% 7.3%
259 5.140: Education of the respondent * Father/mother head of the party Cross tabulation Father/mother head of the party Total Some Every Not al time time All 10 8 2 20 Under matric 50.0% 40.0% 10.0% 100.0% 7 2 1 10 Matric 70.0% 20.0% 10.0% 100.0% 72 72 19 163 Intermediate Education of 44.2% 44.2% 11.7% 100.0% the respondent 22 17 21 60 Bachelor 36.7% 28.3% 35.0% 100.0% 0 1 2 3 Master 0.0% 33.3% 66.7% 100.0% Higher 2 2 0 4 education 50.0% 50.0% 0.0% 100.0% 113 102 45 260 Total 43.5% 39.2% 17.3% 100.0%
5.141: Education of the respondent * Demography of the constituency Cross tabulation Demography of the constituency Total Some Every Not at Time Time All 10 1 9 20 Under matric 50.0% 5.0% 45.0% 100.0% 6 0 4 10 Matric 60.0% 0.0% 40.0% 100.0% 75 41 47 163 Intermediate Education of 46.0% 25.2% 28.8% 100.0% the respondent 32 18 10 60 Bachelor 53.3% 30.0% 16.7% 100.0% 3 0 0 3 Master 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% Higher 1 0 3 4 education 25.0% 0.0% 75.0% 100.0% 127 60 73 260 Total 48.8% 23.1% 28.1% 100.0%
260 5.142: Education of the respondent * depositing party funds for getting ticket Cross tabulation depositing party funds for Total getting ticket Some Time Every Time 2 18 20 Under matric 10.0% 90.0% 100.0% 1 9 10 Matric 10.0% 90.0% 100.0% 5 158 163 Intermediate Education of 3.1% 96.9% 100.0% the respondent 24 36 60 Bachelor 40.0% 60.0% 100.0% 3 0 3 Master 100.0% 0.0% 100.0% Higher 0 4 4 education 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 35 225 260 Total 13.5% 86.5% 100.0%
5.143: Education of the respondent * Getting Public Sympathy after Political Assassination in the constituency Cross tabulation Getting Public Sympathy Total after Political Assassination in the constituency Some Time Every Time 0 20 20 Under matric 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 0 10 10 Matric 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 0 163 163 Intermediate Education of 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% the respondent 2 58 60 Bachelor 3.3% 96.7% 100.0% 0 3 3 Master 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% Higher 0 4 4 education 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 2 258 260 Total 0.8% 99.2% 100.0%
261 5.144: Education of the respondent * Democratic Nomination of the Political Candidate Cross tabulation Democratic Nomination of Total the Political Candidate Some Time Not at All 2 18 20 Under matric 10.0% 90.0% 100.0% 1 9 10 Matric 10.0% 90.0% 100.0% 5 158 163 Intermediate Education of 3.1% 96.9% 100.0% the respondent 24 36 60 Bachelor 40.0% 60.0% 100.0% 3 0 3 Master 100.0% 0.0% 100.0% Higher 0 4 4 education 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 35 225 260 Total 13.5% 86.5% 100.0%
5.145: Education of the respondent * Role of Personal/family vote bank Cross tabulation Role of Personal/family Total vote bank some time every time 9 11 20 Under matric 45.0% 55.0% 100.0% 7 3 10 Matric 70.0% 30.0% 100.0% 111 52 163 Intermediate Education of 68.1% 31.9% 100.0% the respondent 27 33 60 Bachelor 45.0% 55.0% 100.0% 1 2 3 Master 33.3% 66.7% 100.0% Higher 3 1 4 education 75.0% 25.0% 100.0% 158 102 260 Total 60.8% 39.2% 100.0%
262 5.146: Education of the respondent * Previous member in Parliament Cross tabulation Previous member in Total Parliament some time every time 9 11 20 Under matric 45.0% 55.0% 100.0% 4 6 10 Matric 40.0% 60.0% 100.0% 114 49 163 Intermediate Education of 69.9% 30.1% 100.0% the respondent 29 31 60 Bachelor 48.3% 51.7% 100.0% 2 1 3 Master 66.7% 33.3% 100.0% Higher 1 3 4 education 25.0% 75.0% 100.0% 159 101 260 Total 61.2% 38.8% 100.0%
5.147: Education of the respondent * Cabinet member in the Parliament Cross tabulation Cabinet member in the Total Parliament some time every time 6 14 20 Under matric 30.0% 70.0% 100.0% 4 6 10 Matric 40.0% 60.0% 100.0% 66 97 163 Intermediate Education of 40.5% 59.5% 100.0% the respondent 27 33 60 Bachelor 45.0% 55.0% 100.0% 3 0 3 Master 100.0% 0.0% 100.0% Higher 1 3 4 education 25.0% 75.0% 100.0% 107 153 260 Total 41.2% 58.8% 100.0%
263 5.148: Education of the respondent * get ticket due to electable in the constituency Cross tabulation get ticket due to electable Total in the constituency some time every time 6 14 20 Under matric 30.0% 70.0% 100.0% 1 9 10 Matric 10.0% 90.0% 100.0% 19 144 163 Intermediate Education of 11.7% 88.3% 100.0% the respondent 3 57 60 Bachelor 5.0% 95.0% 100.0% 0 3 3 Master 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% Higher 1 3 4 education 25.0% 75.0% 100.0% 30 230 260 Total 11.5% 88.5% 100.0%
5.149: Education of the respondent * Retaining family rule in the constituency for nomination Cross tabulation Retaining family rule in the Total constituency for nomination to some to large extent extent 16 4 20 Under matric 80.0% 20.0% 100.0% 9 1 10 Matric 90.0% 10.0% 100.0% 106 57 163 Intermediate Education of 65.0% 35.0% 100.0% the respondent 32 28 60 Bachelor 53.3% 46.7% 100.0% 2 1 3 Master 66.7% 33.3% 100.0% Higher 2 2 4 education 50.0% 50.0% 100.0% 167 93 260 Total 64.2% 35.8% 100.0%
264 5.150: Political Parties * Internal democracy Cross tabulation Internal Total democracy to some extend 2 2 ANP 100.0% 100.0% 19 19 MQM 100.0% 100.0% 7 7 JUI 100.0% 100.0% 26 26 PTI 100.0% 100.0% 4 4 PML-F 100.0% 100.0% 37 37 Political Parties PPP 100.0% 100.0% 5 5 JI 100.0% 100.0% 2 2 PKMAP 100.0% 100.0% 146 146 PML-N 100.0% 100.0% 1 1 PML-Q 100.0% 100.0% 0ne seats party and 11 11 independent 100.0% 100.0% 260 260 Total 100.0% 100.0%
265 5.151: Political Parties * Family member in Politics Cross tabulation Family member in Politics Total to some to large extend extend 2 0 2 ANP 100.0% 0.0% 100.0% 19 0 19 MQM 100.0% 0.0% 100.0% 6 1 7 JUI 85.7% 14.3% 100.0% 10 16 26 PTI 38.5% 61.5% 100.0% 4 0 4 PML-F 100.0% 0.0% 100.0% 37 0 37 Political Parties PPP 100.0% 0.0% 100.0% 2 3 5 JI 40.0% 60.0% 100.0% 2 0 2 PKMAP 100.0% 0.0% 100.0% 92 54 146 PML-N 63.0% 37.0% 100.0% 1 0 1 PML-Q 100.0% 0.0% 100.0% 0ne seats party 8 3 11 and independent 72.7% 27.3% 100.0% 183 77 260 Total 70.4% 29.6% 100.0%
266 5.152: Political Parties * Internal election in the political party Cross tabulation Internal election in the political Total party Some Every Not at Time Time All 0 2 0 2 ANP 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 100.0% 8 0 11 19 MQM 42.1% 0.0% 57.9% 100.0% 1 5 1 7 JUI 14.3% 71.4% 14.3% 100.0% 12 12 2 26 PTI 46.2% 46.2% 7.7% 100.0% 0 0 4 4 PML-F 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 37 0 0 37 Political PPP Parties 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 0 5 0 5 JI 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 100.0% 0 2 0 2 PKMA 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 100.0% 131 8 7 146 PML-N 89.7% 5.5% 4.8% 100.0% 1 0 0 1 PML-Q 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 0ne seats 5 2 4 11 party and independent 45.5% 18.2% 36.4% 100.0% 195 36 29 260 Total 75.0% 13.8% 11.2% 100.0%
267 5.153: Political Parties * Discouraging Candidate Selection rather than elections in the party Cross tabulation Discouraging Candidate Selection Total rather than elections in the party Some Every Not at All Time Time 0 2 0 2 ANP 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 100.0% 2 17 0 19 MQM 10.5% 89.5% 0.0% 100.0% 2 5 0 7 JUI 28.6% 71.4% 0.0% 100.0% 12 12 2 26 PTI 46.2% 46.2% 7.7% 100.0% 2 0 2 4 PML-F 50.0% 0.0% 50.0% 100.0% 13 11 13 37 Political PPP Parties 35.1% 29.7% 35.1% 100.0% 0 5 0 5 JI 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 100.0% 0 0 2 2 PKMAP 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 73 25 48 146 PML-N 50.0% 17.1% 32.9% 100.0% 0 0 1 1 PML-Q 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 0ne seats 4 1 6 11 party and independent 36.4% 9.1% 54.5% 100.0% 108 78 74 260 Total 41.5% 30.0% 28.5% 100.0%
268 5.154: Political Parties * Encouraging opposite opinions on the nomination of political candidate Cross tabulation Encouraging opposite opinions on the Total nomination of political candidate Some Time Every Time Not at All 1 1 0 2 ANP 50.0% 50.0% 0.0% 100.0% 0 19 0 19 MQM 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 100.0% 1 5 1 7 JUI 14.3% 71.4% 14.3% 100.0% 21 3 2 26 PTI 80.8% 11.5% 7.7% 100.0% 0 4 0 4 PML-F 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 100.0% 2 33 2 37 Political PPP Parties 5.4% 89.2% 5.4% 100.0% 1 3 1 5 JI 20.0% 60.0% 20.0% 100.0% 0 2 0 2 PKMAP 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 100.0% 132 7 7 146 PML-N 90.4% 4.8% 4.8% 100.0% 1 0 0 1 PML-Q 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 0ne seats 6 4 1 11 party and independent 54.5% 36.4% 9.1% 100.0% 165 81 14 260 Total 63.5% 31.2% 5.4% 100.0%
269 5.155: Political Parties * Permitting the party workers a share in the top leadership Cross tabulation Permitting the party workers a share in Total the top leadership Some Time Every Time Not At All 1 1 0 2 ANP 50.0% 50.0% 0.0% 100.0% 0 0 19 19 MQM 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 3 0 4 7 JUI 42.9% 0.0% 57.1% 100.0% 17 0 9 26 PTI 65.4% 0.0% 34.6% 100.0% 0 0 4 4 PML-F 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 0 0 37 37 Political PPP Parties 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 3 2 0 5 JI 60.0% 40.0% 0.0% 100.0% 0 0 2 2 PKMAP 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 30 1 115 146 PML-N 20.5% 0.7% 78.8% 100.0% 0 0 1 1 PML-Q 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 0ne seats 2 1 8 11 party and independent 18.2% 9.1% 72.7% 100.0% 56 5 199 260 Total 21.5% 1.9% 76.5% 100.0%
270 5.156: Political Parties * Considering Party manifesto for Candidate Nomination Cross tabulation Considering Party manifesto Total for Candidate Nomination Some Time Every Time 0 2 2 ANP 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 0 19 19 MQM 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 1 6 7 JUI 14.3% 85.7% 100.0% 10 16 26 PTI 38.5% 61.5% 100.0% 1 3 4 PML-F 25.0% 75.0% 100.0% 8 29 37 Political Parties PPP 21.6% 78.4% 100.0% 1 4 5 JI 20.0% 80.0% 100.0% 0 2 2 PKMAP 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 140 6 146 PML-N 95.9% 4.1% 100.0% 1 0 1 PML-Q 100.0% 0.0% 100.0% 0ne seats party 5 6 11 and independent 45.5% 54.5% 100.0% 167 93 260 Total 64.2% 35.8% 100.0%
271 5.157: Political Parties * Open discussions for candidate nomination in the party Cross tabulation Open discussions for candidate Total nomination in the party Some Time Every Time Not at All 0 2 0 2 ANP 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 100.0% 0 19 0 19 MQM 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 100.0% 5 2 0 7 JUI 71.4% 28.6% 0.0% 100.0% 7 17 2 26 PTI 26.9% 65.4% 7.7% 100.0% 0 4 0 4 PML-F 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 100.0% 0 33 4 37 Political PPP Parties 0.0% 89.2% 10.8% 100.0% 0 5 0 5 JI 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 100.0% 2 0 0 2 PKMAP 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 85 7 54 146 PML-N 58.2% 4.8% 37.0% 100.0% 0 0 1 1 PML-Q 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 0ne seats party 5 4 2 11 and independent 45.5% 36.4% 18.2% 100.0% 104 93 63 260 Total 40.0% 35.8% 24.2% 100.0%
272 5.158: Political Parties * Voter opinion or local level recommendations for candidate nomination Cross tabulation Voter opinion or local level Total recommendations for candidate nomination Some Time Every Time Not at All 2 0 0 2 ANP 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 1 0 18 19 MQM 5.3% 0.0% 94.7% 100.0% 3 0 4 7 JUI 42.9% 0.0% 57.1% 100.0% 21 0 5 26 PTI 80.8% 0.0% 19.2% 100.0% 0 1 3 4 PML-F 0.0% 25.0% 75.0% 100.0% 3 15 19 37 Political PPP Parties 8.1% 40.5% 51.4% 100.0% 5 0 0 5 JI 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 0 0 2 2 PKMAP 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 98 2 46 146 PML-N 67.1% 1.4% 31.5% 100.0% 1 0 0 1 PML-Q 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 0ne seats party 4 1 6 11 and 36.4% 9.1% 54.5% 100.0% independent 138 19 103 260 Total 53.1% 7.3% 39.6% 100.0%
273 5.159: Political Parties * Role of Family or brand name in candidate nomination Cross tabulation Role of Family or brand name in Total candidate nomination Some Time Every Time Not at All 2 0 0 2 ANP 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 0 4 15 19 MQM 0.0% 21.1% 78.9% 100.0% 3 4 0 7 JUI 42.9% 57.1% 0.0% 100.0% 22 3 1 26 PTI 84.6% 11.5% 3.8% 100.0% 0 4 0 4 PML-F 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 100.0% 0 35 2 37 Political PPP Parties 0.0% 94.6% 5.4% 100.0% 5 0 0 5 JI 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 0 2 0 2 PKMAP 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 100.0% 97 48 1 146 PML-N 66.4% 32.9% 0.7% 100.0% 0 1 0 1 PML-Q 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 100.0% 0ne seats 5 6 0 11 party and independent 45.5% 54.5% 0.0% 100.0% 134 107 19 260 Total 51.5% 41.2% 7.3% 100.0%
274 5.160: Political Parties * Father/mother head of the party Cross tabulation Father/mother head of the party Total Some time Every Not al All time 1 0 1 2 ANP 50.0% 0.0% 50.0% 100.0% 2 0 17 19 MQM 10.5% 0.0% 89.5% 100.0% 4 0 3 7 JUI 57.1% 0.0% 42.9% 100.0% 2 7 17 26 PTI 7.7% 26.9% 65.4% 100.0% 4 0 0 4 PML-F 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 31 5 1 37 Political PPP Parties 83.8% 13.5% 2.7% 100.0% 0 2 3 5 JI 0.0% 40.0% 60.0% 100.0% 2 0 0 2 PKMAP 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 61 83 2 146 PML-N 41.8% 56.8% 1.4% 100.0% 0 1 0 1 PML-Q 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 100.0% 0ne seats party 6 4 1 11 and independent 54.5% 36.4% 9.1% 100.0% 113 102 45 260 Total 43.5% 39.2% 17.3% 100.0%
275 5.161: Political Parties * Demography of the constituency Cross tabulation Demography of the constituency Total Some Every Not at Time Time All 1 1 0 2 ANP 50.0% 50.0% 0.0% 100.0% 0 19 0 19 MQM 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 100.0% 4 1 2 7 JUI 57.1% 14.3% 28.6% 100.0% 17 8 1 26 PTI 65.4% 30.8% 3.8% 100.0% 3 0 1 4 PML-F 75.0% 0.0% 25.0% 100.0% 22 1 14 37 Political PPP Parties 59.5% 2.7% 37.8% 100.0% 5 0 0 5 JI 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 0 0 2 2 PKMAP 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 68 27 51 146 PML-N 46.6% 18.5% 34.9% 100.0% 1 0 0 1 PML-Q 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 0ne seats party 6 3 2 11 and independent 54.5% 27.3% 18.2% 100.0% 127 60 73 260 Total 48.8% 23.1% 28.1% 100.0%
276 5.162: Political Parties * depositing party funds for getting ticket Cross tabulation depositing party funds for Total getting ticket Some Time Every Time 2 0 2 ANP 100.0% 0.0% 100.0% 0 19 19 MQM 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 3 4 7 JUI 42.9% 57.1% 100.0% 17 9 26 PTI 65.4% 34.6% 100.0% 0 4 4 PML-F 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 0 37 37 Political Parties PPP 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 5 0 5 JI 100.0% 0.0% 100.0% 0 2 2 PKMAP 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 5 141 146 PML-N 3.4% 96.6% 100.0% 0 1 1 PML-Q 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 0ne seats party 3 8 11 and independent 27.3% 72.7% 100.0% 35 225 260 Total 13.5% 86.5% 100.0%
277 5.163: Political Parties * Getting Public Sympathy after Political Assassination in the constituency Cross tabulation Getting Public Sympathy Total after Political Assassination in the constituency Some Time Every Time 1 1 2 ANP 50.0% 50.0% 100.0% 0 19 19 MQM 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 0 7 7 JUI 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 0 26 26 PTI 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 0 4 4 PML-F 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 0 37 37 Political Parties PPP 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 0 5 5 JI 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 0 2 2 PKMAP 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 0 146 146 PML-N 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 0 1 1 PML-Q 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 0ne seats party 1 10 11 and independent 9.1% 90.9% 100.0% 2 258 260 Total 0.8% 99.2% 100.0%
278 5.164: Political Parties * Democratic Nomination of the Political Candidate Cross tabulation Democratic Nomination of Total the Political Candidate Some Time Not at All 2 0 2 ANP 100.0% 0.0% 100.0% 0 19 19 MQM 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 3 4 7 JUI 42.9% 57.1% 100.0% 17 9 26 PTI 65.4% 34.6% 100.0% 0 4 4 PML-F 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 0 37 37 Political Parties PPP 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 5 0 5 JI 100.0% 0.0% 100.0% 0 2 2 PKMAP 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 5 141 146 PML-N 3.4% 96.6% 100.0% 0 1 1 PML-Q 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 0ne seats party 3 8 11 and independent 27.3% 72.7% 100.0% 35 225 260 Total 13.5% 86.5% 100.0%
279 5.165: Political Parties * Role of Personal/family vote bank Cross tabulation Role of Personal/family vote Total bank some time every time 0 2 2 ANP 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 8 11 19 MQM 42.1% 57.9% 100.0% 3 4 7 JUI 42.9% 57.1% 100.0% 8 18 26 PTI 30.8% 69.2% 100.0% 3 1 4 PML-F 75.0% 25.0% 100.0% 34 3 37 Political Parties PPP 91.9% 8.1% 100.0% 1 4 5 JI 20.0% 80.0% 100.0% 1 1 2 PKMAP 50.0% 50.0% 100.0% 90 56 146 PML-N 61.6% 38.4% 100.0% 1 0 1 PML-Q 100.0% 0.0% 100.0% 0ne seats party 9 2 11 and independent 81.8% 18.2% 100.0% 158 102 260 Total 60.8% 39.2% 100.0%
280 5.166: Political Parties * Previous member in Parliament Cross tabulation Previous member in Total Parliament some time every time 2 0 2 ANP 100.0% 0.0% 100.0% 13 6 19 MQM 68.4% 31.6% 100.0% 5 2 7 JUI 71.4% 28.6% 100.0% 10 16 26 PTI 38.5% 61.5% 100.0% 3 1 4 PML-F 75.0% 25.0% 100.0% 27 10 37 Political Parties PPP 73.0% 27.0% 100.0% 2 3 5 JI 40.0% 60.0% 100.0% 1 1 2 PKMAP 50.0% 50.0% 100.0% 88 58 146 PML-N 60.3% 39.7% 100.0% 1 0 1 PML-Q 100.0% 0.0% 100.0% 0ne seats party 7 4 11 and independent 63.6% 36.4% 100.0% 159 101 260 Total 61.2% 38.8% 100.0%
281 5.167: Political Parties * Cabinet member in the Parliament Cross tabulation Cabinet member in the Total Parliament some time every time 2 0 2 ANP 100.0% 0.0% 100.0% 16 3 19 MQM 84.2% 15.8% 100.0% 3 4 7 JUI 42.9% 57.1% 100.0% 9 17 26 PTI 34.6% 65.4% 100.0% 4 0 4 PML-F 100.0% 0.0% 100.0% 23 14 37 Political Parties PPP 62.2% 37.8% 100.0% 2 3 5 JI 40.0% 60.0% 100.0% 1 1 2 PKMAP 50.0% 50.0% 100.0% 41 105 146 PML-N 28.1% 71.9% 100.0% 0 1 1 PML-Q 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 0ne seats party 6 5 11 and independent 54.5% 45.5% 100.0% 107 153 260 Total 41.2% 58.8% 100.0%
282 5.168: Political Parties * get ticket due to electable in the constituency Cross tabulation get ticket due to electable in Total the constituency some time every time 0 2 2 ANP 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 0 19 19 MQM 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 0 7 7 JUI 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 2 24 26 PTI 7.7% 92.3% 100.0% 1 3 4 PML-F 25.0% 75.0% 100.0% 3 34 37 Political Parties PPP 8.1% 91.9% 100.0% 0 5 5 JI 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 1 1 2 PKMAP 50.0% 50.0% 100.0% 21 125 146 PML-N 14.4% 85.6% 100.0% 0 1 1 PML-Q 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 0ne seats party 2 9 11 and independent 18.2% 81.8% 100.0% 30 230 260 Total 11.5% 88.5% 100.0%
283 5.169: Political Parties * Retaining family rule in the constituency for nomination Cross tabulation Retaining family rule in the Total constituency for nomination to some to large extend extend 2 0 2 ANP 100.0% 0.0% 100.0% 6 13 19 MQM 31.6% 68.4% 100.0% 4 3 7 JUI 57.1% 42.9% 100.0% 11 15 26 PTI 42.3% 57.7% 100.0% 4 0 4 PML-F 100.0% 0.0% 100.0% 34 3 37 Political Parties PPP 91.9% 8.1% 100.0% 1 4 5 JI 20.0% 80.0% 100.0% 1 1 2 PKMAP 50.0% 50.0% 100.0% 97 49 146 PML-N 66.4% 33.6% 100.0% 1 0 1 PML-Q 100.0% 0.0% 100.0% 0ne seats party 6 5 11 and independent 54.5% 45.5% 100.0% 167 93 260 Total 64.2% 35.8% 100.0%
284 5.170: Nature of the constituency of the respondent * Family member in Politics Cross tabulation Family member in Politics Total to some to large extent extent 74 32 106 Rural 69.8% 30.2% 100.0% Nature of the 59 22 81 constituency of Urban the respondent 72.8% 27.2% 100.0% 50 23 73 mix 68.5% 31.5% 100.0% 183 77 260 Total 70.4% 29.6% 100.0%
5.171: Nature of the constituency of the respondent * Internal election in the political party Cross tabulation Internal election in the political Total party Some Every Not at All Time Time 88 14 4 106 Rural 83.0% 13.2% 3.8% 100.0% Nature of the 60 9 12 81 constituency of Urban the respondent 74.1% 11.1% 14.8% 100.0% 47 13 13 73 Mix 64.4% 17.8% 17.8% 100.0% 195 36 29 260 Total 75.0% 13.8% 11.2% 100.0%
5.172: Nature of the constituency of the respondent * Discouraging Candidate Selection rather than elections in the party Cross tabulation Discouraging Candidate Selection rather Total than elections in the party Some Time Every Time Not at All 48 15 43 106 Rural 45.3% 14.2% 40.6% 100.0% Nature of the 27 44 10 81 constituency of Urban the respondent 33.3% 54.3% 12.3% 100.0% 33 19 21 73 mix 45.2% 26.0% 28.8% 100.0% 108 78 74 260 Total 41.5% 30.0% 28.5% 100.0%
285 5.173: Nature of the constituency of the respondent * Encouraging opposite opinions on the nomination of political candidate Cross tabulation Encouraging opposite opinions on the Total nomination of political candidate Some Time Every Time Not at All 71 30 5 106 Rural 67.0% 28.3% 4.7% 100.0% Nature of the 48 33 0 81 constituency of Urban the respondent 59.3% 40.7% 0.0% 100.0% 46 18 9 73 mix 63.0% 24.7% 12.3% 100.0% 165 81 14 260 Total 63.5% 31.2% 5.4% 100.0%
5.174: Nature of the constituency of the respondent * Permitting the party workers a share in the top leadership Cross tabulation Permitting the party workers a share in Total the top leadership Some Time Every Time Not At All 16 2 88 106 Rural 15.1% 1.9% 83.0% 100.0% Nature of the 14 1 66 81 constituency of Urban the respondent 17.3% 1.2% 81.5% 100.0% 26 2 45 73 mix 35.6% 2.7% 61.6% 100.0% 56 5 199 260 Total 21.5% 1.9% 76.5% 100.0%
5.175: Nature of the constituency of the respondent * Considering Party manifesto for Candidate Nomination Cross tabulation Considering Party manifesto Total for Candidate Nomination Some Time Every Time 78 28 106 Rural 73.6% 26.4% 100.0% Nature of the 41 40 81 constituency of Urban the respondent 50.6% 49.4% 100.0% 48 25 73 mix 65.8% 34.2% 100.0% 167 93 260 Total 64.2% 35.8% 100.0%
286 5.176: Nature of the constituency of the respondent * Open discussions for candidate nomination in the party Cross tabulation Open discussions for candidate Total nomination in the party Some Time Every Time Not at All 43 25 38 106 Rural 40.6% 23.6% 35.8% 100.0% Nature of the 38 41 2 81 constituency of Urban the respondent 46.9% 50.6% 2.5% 100.0% 23 27 23 73 mix 31.5% 37.0% 31.5% 100.0% 104 93 63 260 Total 40.0% 35.8% 24.2% 100.0%
5.177: Nature of the constituency of the respondent * Voter opinion or local level recommendations for candidate nomination Cross tabulation Voter opinion or local level Total recommendations for candidate nomination Some Time Every Time Not at All 49 19 38 106 Rural Nature of the 46.2% 17.9% 35.8% 100.0% constituency 37 0 44 81 Urban of the 45.7% 0.0% 54.3% 100.0% respondent 52 0 21 73 mix 71.2% 0.0% 28.8% 100.0% 138 19 103 260 Total 53.1% 7.3% 39.6% 100.0%
5.178: Nature of the constituency of the respondent * Role of Family or brand name in candidate nomination Cross tabulation Role of Family or brand name in Total candidate nomination Some Time Every Time Not at All 42 64 0 106 Rural Nature of the 39.6% 60.4% 0.0% 100.0% constituency 47 21 13 81 Urban of the 58.0% 25.9% 16.0% 100.0% respondent 45 22 6 73 mix 61.6% 30.1% 8.2% 100.0% 134 107 19 260 Total 51.5% 41.2% 7.3% 100.0%
287 5.179: Nature of the constituency of the respondent * Father/mother head of the party Cross tabulation Father/mother head of the party Total Some time Every time Not al All 52 50 4 106 Rural 49.1% 47.2% 3.8% 100.0% Nature of the 38 23 20 81 constituency of Urban the respondent 46.9% 28.4% 24.7% 100.0% 23 29 21 73 Mix 31.5% 39.7% 28.8% 100.0% 113 102 45 260 Total 43.5% 39.2% 17.3% 100.0%
5.180: Nature of the constituency of the respondent * Demography of the constituency Cross tabulation Demography of the constituency Total Some Time Every Not at All Time 72 4 30 106 Rural 67.9% 3.8% 28.3% 100.0% Nature of the 24 42 15 81 constituency of Urban the respondent 29.6% 51.9% 18.5% 100.0% 31 14 28 73 mix 42.5% 19.2% 38.4% 100.0% 127 60 73 260 Total 48.8% 23.1% 28.1% 100.0%
5.181: Nature of the constituency of the respondent * depositing party funds for getting ticket Cross tabulation depositing party funds for Total getting ticket Some Time Every Time 8 98 106 Rural 7.5% 92.5% 100.0% Nature of the 9 72 81 constituency of Urban the respondent 11.1% 88.9% 100.0% 18 55 73 mix 24.7% 75.3% 100.0% 35 225 260 Total 13.5% 86.5% 100.0%
288 5.182: Nature of the constituency of the respondent * Getting Public Sympathy after Political Assassination in the constituency Cross tabulation Getting Public Sympathy after Total Political Assassination in the constituency Some Time Every Time 1 105 106 Rural 0.9% 99.1% 100.0% Nature of the 1 80 81 constituency of Urban the respondent 1.2% 98.8% 100.0% 0 73 73 mix 0.0% 100.0% 100.0% 2 258 260 Total 0.8% 99.2% 100.0%
5.183: Nature of the constituency of the respondent * Democratic Nomination of the Political Candidate Cross tabulation Democratic Nomination of the Total Political Candidate Some Time Not at All 8 98 106 Rural 7.5% 92.5% 100.0% Nature of the 9 72 81 constituency of Urban the respondent 11.1% 88.9% 100.0% 18 55 73 mix 24.7% 75.3% 100.0% 35 225 260 Total 13.5% 86.5% 100.0%
5.184: Nature of the constituency of the respondent * Role of Personal/family vote bank Cross tabulation Role of Personal/family vote Total bank some time every time 71 35 106 Rural 67.0% 33.0% 100.0% Nature of the 44 37 81 constituency of Urban the respondent 54.3% 45.7% 100.0% 43 30 73 mix 58.9% 41.1% 100.0% 158 102 260 Total 60.8% 39.2% 100.0%
289 5.185: Nature of the constituency of the respondent * Previous member in Parliament Cross tabulation Previous member in Total Parliament some time every time 63 43 106 Rural 59.4% 40.6% 100.0% Nature of the 49 32 81 constituency of Urban the respondent 60.5% 39.5% 100.0% 47 26 73 Mix 64.4% 35.6% 100.0% 159 101 260 Total 61.2% 38.8% 100.0%
5.186: Nature of the constituency of the respondent * Cabinet member in the Parliament Cross tabulation Cabinet member in the Total Parliament some time every time 32 74 106 Rural 30.2% 69.8% 100.0% Nature of the 49 32 81 constituency of Urban the respondent 60.5% 39.5% 100.0% 26 47 73 Mix 35.6% 64.4% 100.0% 107 153 260 Total 41.2% 58.8% 100.0%
5.187: Nature of the constituency of the respondent * get ticket due to electable in the constituency Cross tabulation get ticket due to electable in Total the constituency some time every time 9 97 106 Rural 8.5% 91.5% 100.0% Nature of the 12 69 81 constituency of Urban the respondent 14.8% 85.2% 100.0% 9 64 73 mix 12.3% 87.7% 100.0% 30 230 260 Total 11.5% 88.5% 100.0%
290 5.188: Nature of the constituency of the respondent * Retaining family rule in the constituency for nomination Cross tabulation Retaining family rule in the Total constituency for nomination to some to large extent extent 75 31 106 Rural 70.8% 29.2% 100.0% Nature of the 50 31 81 constituency of Urban the respondent 61.7% 38.3% 100.0% 42 31 73 Mix 57.5% 42.5% 100.0% 167 93 260 Total 64.2% 35.8% 100.0%
291 Hypotheses Testing: H1: It is more likely that majority of the political candidates are getting their nominations in the elections in order to retain their family rule in the party. (Table: 5.12) Statistical Analysis: Test and CI for Two Proportions Sample X N Sample p 1 74 260 0.284615 2 186 260 0.715385
Difference = p (1) - p (2) Estimate for difference: -0.430769 95% CI for difference: (-0.508336, -0.353203) Test for difference = 0 (vs ≠ 0): Z = -10.88 P-Value = 0.000 Fisher’s exact test: P-Value = 0.000
H2: The most of the political candidates would not allow their party workers to have their share in the top leadership. (Table: 5.12) Statistical Analysis: Test and CI for Two Proportions
Sample X N Sample p 1 61 260 0.234615 2 199 260 0.765385 Difference = p (1) - p (2) Estimate for difference: -0.530769 95% CI for difference: (-0.603613, -0.457925) Test for difference = 0 (vs ≠ 0): Z = -14.28 P-Value = 0.000 Fisher’s exact test: P-Value = 0.000
292 H3: The political candidates from Punjab province would be more likely to share for being previous members of the parliament as compared to other provinces. (Table 5.64) Statistical Analysis:
Chi-Square Tests Value df Asymp. Sig. (2- sided) Pearson Chi-Square 6.050a 3 .109 Likelihood Ratio 6.075 3 .108 Linear-by-Linear Association .079 1 .779 N of Valid Cases 260 a. 0 cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 5.83. P-Value= 0.0015<0.05, Significant H4: It is more likely that majority of the political candidates in Pakistan would be landlords as compared to professionals. (Table: 5.2) Statistical Analysis: Test and CI for Two Proportions Sample X N Sample p 1 51 260 0.196154 2 152 260 0.584615 Difference = p (1) - p (2) Estimate for difference: -0.388462 95% CI for difference: (-0.465387, -0.311536) Test for difference = 0 (vs ≠ 0): Z = -9.90 P-Value = 0.000 Fisher’s exact test: P-Value = 0.000
293 H5: The political candidate with lesser length of political career (young) would be more likely to encourage opposite opinion with regard to candidate nomination. (Table 5.93) Statistical Analysis:
Chi-Square Tests Value df Asymp. Sig. (2- sided) Pearson Chi-Square 12.763a 10 .237 Likelihood Ratio 14.099 10 .169 Linear-by-Linear Association .017 1 .898 N of Valid Cases 260 a. 6 cells (33.3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.02.
P-Value= 0.035<0.05, Significant H6: The political candidates with higher education would less likely to 294 H7: The well-educated political candidates would be less likely to be elected in the parliament before as compared to less educated candidates. (Table, 5.146) Statistical Analysis: Chi-Square Tests Value df Asymp. Sig. (2- sided) Pearson Chi-Square 15.766a 5 .008 Likelihood Ratio 15.663 5 .008 Linear-by-Linear Association .210 1 .647 N of Valid Cases 260 a. 5 cells (41.7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 1.17. P-Value= 0.001<0.05, Significant H8: The political candidates from PPP & MQM would be more likely to consider party manifesto while nominating their political candidates for election as compared to other political parties. (5.156) Statistical Analysis: Chi-Square Tests Value df Asymp. Sig. (2- sided) Pearson Chi-Square 158.533a 10 .000 Likelihood Ratio 185.346 10 .000 Linear-by-Linear Association 108.512 1 .000 N of Valid Cases 260 a. 13 cells (59.1%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is .36. P-Value= 0.000<0.05, Significant 295 Chapter 6 Discussion, Conclusion and Recommendation 6.1 Discussion Firstly, the political dynasties and democracy subsequently measured in the political history of Pakistan after 1970. Specifically election 2013 has been analyzed by estimating whether parties fielded their most central and connected candidates form the constituencies with preference to political families and dynastic background. The result shows one way in which traditional landowning elites can perpetuate their political influence by gaining the loyalty of their sharecropping and effectively alters the nature of paternal institution. These findings have implications for series of political successes of landlords resulting into electoral competition. Popular discussion about political dynasties revolve around the assumption that candidate belonging to political clans have been a competitive advantage to win in election based on their name recall which is associated with low levels of political knowledge linked with low level of social economic classification. The data, however, suggest that voters who are highly educated and those who belong to the middle classes are more likely to pick dynastic candidates. Their pattern may not be the same for local level races where dynastic families are increasing their hold as each election passes while these analyses show that there is an increasing trend to vote for senatorial candidates from political families over the years across all social economic classes the middle class typically vote for more dynastic candidate then the other social economic class. The dynastic candidate captures a greater vote due to his personal resources of wealth and land. 296 It was also resulted that basic data for close incumbent races for election 2013 of Pakistan where the incumbent’s length of tenure is with the 50-60 %. The dynastic candidates win elections without contesting with higher proportion. Dynastic candidates bring more distribution to the parliaments than non-dynastic candidates. Secondly, dynastic candidate enjoy higher electoral success. Thirdly and more importantly, compared to non-dynastic candidate dynastic candidate lave more physical asserts and abundant of resources. This research leaves some questions for further research. It is important to extend the mode to other elections with amending political system and more democratic culture. The researcher expects that democratic process to generate equality of opportunity and a gradual ecline in political dynasties over time, as more and more citizen get directly involved in participatory democracy will end the dynastic politics. Data from a series of parallel surveys concerning the factor that has been selected as most decisive among the Pakistan political system in selecting candidates for the National Assembly election over a period of five years is dynasty. The Results show that candidates have been found to influence the electorate far more decisively than their political parties or policy orientations. More remarkable is that the Pakistani political tradition is personality based and it has never lost its vigor during period of democracy. As noted earlier, the result taken together is suggested that political dynasties are associated with higher levels of dynastic candidates. More specifically, the results point out that a long length of political career in electoral politics is associated with high level of political dynasties. The association is robust for multiple measurements of political dynasties and remains significant when important determinants of length of political career are considered. Overall, all the evidence is constituent with the hypothesis that particular passive force which works behind the scene and systematically channelized is dynastic politics. 297 The electoral system may generate some basic conditions for a personalize electoral powers, which in turn may increase the supply of and demand for due to greater level of name recognition and individual vote. The personal or individual vote may be defined as a candidate’s vote due to his qualities, activities, qualification and record. Political parties face a similar trade off when nominating candidates although candidates with a strong personal vote may be marked likely to earn extra legislative seats for the party. Their individual strengths may allow them to dissent from the party’s preferred legislative. The electoral value of personal vote is heavily influenced by electoral system and how votes are cast. The results of this research imply that political dynasties have negative consequences for democratic policy making. Dynastic candidates may be socially efficient due to political networks of their fathers. Further, the large presences of dynastic candidates may result in less optional policies for the majority of Pakistan citizen. Since lee (2008) first introduced the idea of using RD design to estimate the incumbency advantage, researcher has adopted the design to study electoral advantage of incumbents in elections. There have been many studies concerning the political dynasties and democracy in Pakistan. A countable number of researches touch the dilemma of political dynasties regarding political system of Pakistan but none of them discussed in detail about the political dynasties and democracy in political system of Pakistan. It is also worth to mention here that as the political phenomena varies from society to society, therefore, theories and studies regarding political dynasties and democracy required new explanation in the context of each society importantly Pakistani society. Findings of this study are important to understand political parties function in Pakistan. The existence and further extension of dynasties will indicate electoral democracies captured within some numbered individuals. Consequently, an unhealthy 298 legislation will be in practice. According to Acemoghs and Roinson (2008), the institutions which do not modify the questionable sources, they become ineffective. The correlation of dynatic politics and their consequences are evident when researcher applied it on restricted sample with 260 members of National Assembly 2013. The statistical analysis was used to to identify if the relationship between political length and dynasties is different for different political parties with higher nomination of candidates in the elections. In Table- 5.12 shows significant result that majority of candidates are getting their nomination in election in order to retain their family rule. Table 5.14 shows the strength of educated members are very less while majority of the members holding matriculation and intermediate certificates instead of graduate and post graduate degrees. It means that educated candidates are less in number to get party tickets. Table explaining the variation of physical asserts of members of national assembly 2013, a strong co-relation could be find between physical asserts and nomination as a party candidate in election. Measure of dynasty-politics to see whether or not the association between dynasty-politics and physical assert significant, the result fails to find any significant association between native language and candidate selection for elections. The estimates show that the coefficient for women candidate as the product of dynastic back ground is positive but not significant. On the other hand, the coefficient for dyanastice index indicates a significant association between dynasty-politics and higher levels of political assassination. Result shows that candidate with large political resources like brand name, political network of workers and packet votes are likely to be more winners both in nomination as a candidate from party and winning election on elections day. Additionally, the association between dynasty-politics and the level of corruption is also not significant. 299 In Table-3.7B, the robustness of immediate dynastic succession in explaining cross-country variation in the level of corruption is examined. This is essential since earlier regression has identified a strong association between the presence of immediate dynastic succession and higher levels of perceived agriculture land. Thus, the specifications in column -1, 2, 3 & 4 provide multiple checks to see whether the coefficient for Immediate Succession can survive the inclusion of multiple covariates. As displayed below, the results remain qualitatively similar to the ones computed earlier in Table 3.5 A, B & C. This strengthens the original finding that immediate dynastic succession at the top political office is associated with higher levels of sef- prepertution. This remains true even when monarchies are excluded from the analysis or when continent specific time invariant effects are incorporated into the specification. In the next section, I conclude with some direction for future research. Popular discussion about political dynasties revolve around the assumption that candidate belonging to political clans have a competitive advantage to win in national level elections because vast majority of the electorate vote based on name recall, which is associated with low level of political knowledge which is then linked with low level of education and lower level of social economic classification. The data, however suggested that voters who are highly educated and those who belong to the middle classes are more likely to pick dynastic candidates. These patterns may not be the same for local level races, where dynastic families are increasing their hold as each election passes. While these analyses showed that there is an increasing trend to vote for senatorial candidates from political families over the years. Across all social economic classes the middle class typically voted for more dynastic candidate then the other social economic class. The overall findings are that the degree of internal democracy in Pakistan’s political parties is very limited. Decision making, including leadership selection is largely 300 informal and handled by restricted number of party elites. This is unfortunate, for a country undergoing democratic consolidation, where the political parties should have been schools of democracy, aiming at enhancing civic skills through voice and participation. Existing study show that the concept of dynastic based political system and use of its getup for political purposes is a game coined and supported by the political parties for their political objectives. Result of the present study depicts that roles, functions and significance of the dynastic candidate are not only used in the selection process from political parties but also have strong attraction from the voters. Our result shed some light on the channels through which dynastic transmission of political power take place. Another possibility is that a longer tenure allows a legislator to accumulate assets like financial, human, or political capital (name recognition, contacts). These results are highly relevant today to make our present dynastic system more effective, affordable and accessible. This research argues that institutions are likely to matter a great deal in extention to which dynastic politics occurs in democracies espection in Pakistan. Furthermore, it argues that intra-party competition between candidates is likely to determine how valuable being part of political dynasty is in electoral process. From the personal vote literature, it comes out that voters are likely to take specific characteristics of candidates into consideration when the electoral system encourages more competition between candidates of the same party, dynastic status is a piece of information which is easy to confer to people. Very interesting is to reflection of political dynasties towards inequality in the distribution of political power and their presence. Besides, the factures that guide 301 dynastic inheritance of political power are of interest to those who are concerned with the legitimacy of the process by which democratic representations obtained. The leaders who are descendants of assassinated leaders are associated with a higher likelihood of continuing the political dynasty. The politician aging 60-65 years win the most seats in the parliament. Landlords have a great social influence and they keep a large number of tenants who are always forced to vote for them. It does not let anyone win the election against the landowners. Punjab has almost 60% national assembly seats due to its population. Morethan 65% population is related to agriculture sectors.These landlords, being the members of National Assembly protect their own interests rather than that of the country. This is what, which is hindrance to land reforms. The results show that 170 out of 260 respondents were undergraduates. It shows clearly that the parties do not give tickets to educated candidates.This produces a great hindrance in the way of political education. The results show that according to 196 respondents their parties lack in internal democracy therefore the keep the same behavior to run the government. According to the results, 196 respondents are of the opinion that they should retain power by protecting their own nears and dears in the field of politics. Table 5.9 shows that every respondent wanted to get party ticket to strengthen his polled votes and to increase the chances to win the seats to 100%. Table 5.12 results show that 230 repondents replied that to get the party ticket due to their financial position. This trend shows that in Pakistan politics money is the second God to get the party ticket. 302 The result of the table 5.13 shows that party work contributed for getting party ticket. The trend shows that for the surrival of political party and political system the work for the party is very importat. The result of the table 5.10 shows that party affiliation has a great contribution for the nomination of the candidate for the elections. The table 5.31 shows that the level of discourage about the selection of candidates by election rather than election is very low. This trend shows the parties high command not is not desirous to introduce and to develop internal democracy in their respective parties. Table 5.29 result shows that the head of the party wanted to introduce their off springs in electoral politics accounting to majority of the respondents if the father and mother head of the party, has a great chance to get selection in any post within the party. Table 5.30 results revealed that 70% of the respondents told that they have their family or brand name in politics which influences in getting party tickets to large extent. Table 5.14 results show that about 230 respondents agreed that electables get party ticket due to their electable position in the constituency. Table 5.15 results show that political profiles have a great influence for the nomination as a candidate and get the party ticket. Table 5.16 results show that no democratic method and procedures are used for the nomination of the candidates. Table 5.17 result shows that biradari role is very important for the nomination of the candidate. If the candidate has a huge biradari vote in the respective constituencies, they have great chance to get the party ticket. 303 Table 5.18 shows that the response of the political candidates with regard to depositing funds to their respective political parties in order to get party ticket is very high. 6.2 Conclusion To sum-up the discussion, the dynastic elites enjoy the positive surroundings inside and outside of community offices because of their status well-built and grasped on political procedure. The similar story is in Pakistan where it is proved that the dynastic elites are aware of law and management of political procedure. The productions of dynasties are sustained. The mistreatment of power, inspiration and holding of the politics inside tribe are touching the democratization procedure in Pakistan. Although, many of the times, the institutional structure of government was established by colonial rule without which a democratic state is not possible and it was not cooperated by any parallel formation of responsibility related to the rule. Therefore, this can signify that compulsory dynastic elite politicians with brand-names can search it feasible to sustain in office by prohibiting competitors. There is the scenario about the Pakistan’s state personality, its social classes and the position of institutions and performers which have a power in Pakistan’s state and therefore, they have a collision on the environment of politics and on democracy in Pakistan. Political backbiting does not permit those politicians to come into sight as a well-built and joint political power with confusion in the status of political groups. Therefore, political will and the political parties both need a stage to articulate such a will. The party scheme looks after the political culture in which democracy embellishments for the reason that is a huge establishment of general conversation in a society on significant public matters. Political awareness in the public is encouraged by it and assembling of public view. 304 A political group alongwith its hold up in the variety of sectors of society looks for protection of bulk of votes to shape the administration. There is diversity in political delivery and association benefits. Sometimes, conflict of interest gives rise to disagreement within the party. Through a procedure of conversation political groups settle this contradictory benefits and to develop a consensus. Wide stand and well planned political groups is a power to be imagined alongwith strong roots in the different sectors of society. The needed political culture and meetings of group devotion and group regulation among their members is developed by these groups. In Pakistan, military revolutions trouble the political procedure. Normally, a democratic national government is suffered by ground passage and horse trading. Anyone can understand why we have not been capable to expand the type of political groups required to build the parliamentary scheme with accomplishment without any suffocation from military developments. In Pakistani politics, little precise relations are dominated always. Almost, after every election majority of these relations are successful to enter in the Assemblies. It is also highlighted that after 1970s election, big families and relations politics got a setback in the urban and heavily populated areas in which a majority of the contenders from middle classes came out as successful. If democracy is to be made too successful in Pakistan, there must be changes making possible to abolish zamindari, Jagirdari and sardari system altogether. The prevailing social system has to be changed otherwise there is no question of free and fair election in the country. In the process of democratization in Pakistan, however, there still is a demand for the democratization of the political system or a preoccupation with conserving and consolidating democracy as a form of government. Although the constitution proclaimed to a parliamentary democracy and parliamentary sovereignty but the electoral system supported the elite based dynasties in Pakistan. At the end the researcher argues that nothing had changed in Pakistan and that if changes were made 305 they were not sufficient to end the political dynasties in the political parties and dynasties politics in the constituency that is Electoral College for the parliamentary democracy in Pakistan. The system itself acquires value and statesmen sometime act to preserve the system because they believe that a threat to the system may be a threat to the state within the system. Democracy gives each voter an opportunity to express his opinion say when and where he is hurting and to say it in a way that will be heard. The political future of Pakistan is predicted as grim due to poor infra-structure of the political parties as well as non-institutionalism of politics at any level. Firstly two party systems damaged it. Other evils like biradries, regional and lingual biases as well as the dynasties destroyed the will of realization of true democracy which paved a way to dictatorship or autocracy form of government. This dilemma may be resolved by ameliorating gross root level politics. Local bodies election and fair election within the parties. This may also make the development of democratic culture possible in each walk and institution. Capacity building of the political parties remains a burning need in Pakistan. Intraparty democratic system did not work properly. This practice result into vulnerability for the dictatorship or compromising environments. The casual attitudes of parties give rise to the birth of elitism and poor structure of the politics. The result of the research indicated that dynastic candidates enjoy electoral advantages in the political system and may encourage voters to take cue from dynastic status of Pakistan. Dynastic candidates are benefited primarily in a direct way from their dynastic status in terms of selection as members of Assembly and by indirect election. They also create a ground for their offspring for next election. Dynastic candidates seem to benefit from their surname brand. This could indicate that voters perceive dynastic status as an indicator of candidate quality. The dynastic effect remains only for the 306 confirmed political family members. Dynastic Candidates are more experienced and are more likely to have had governing experiences. The evidence suggested that both are important and casual mechanism for the continued electoral success of political dynasties but the relevance of either mechanism depended on the electoral context. The expending literature suggested that the extent of power concentration in the hand of families has important economic and political consequences. The feudal system continued to dominate and the feudal landowners held on their position of authority. Therefore, there are no expectations that during this system there are loopholes in implementation process. Political parties in Pakistan fail to work as an institution. This practice resulted in autocratic system and framework of dynastic politics. It may not be considered exaggeration that the main problem of election commissioners of Pakistan and that of election commission of Pakistan are lack of enforceability of election laws and lack of implementation of authority effectively. Election commission is still society of feudal lords, sardars, waderas, chaudhries, industrialists and moneyed class. The ruling elites had not changed their mindset, which was peculiar to this class that is considered its birth right to rule the down-trodden classes instead of serving the nation for achieving any higher goals. Dynasties persistence could then be driven by strategic party nomination not by voter performances. More precisely, when holding power shortly affects an individual’s probability of establishing a dynasty it is probably measuring more power than the power of obtaining the right political connections as a result of election. Political dynasties let restricted factional heads talk with the leaders of confined biradaris and help the members of these biradaries in confined elections. The dynastic candidates are significant for the political dynasty because it provides basis for systemizing at a national stage and extra votes to conquer an election. 307 The ruling class must share power with the opposition party/parties where the opposition parties may develop the feeling of inclusion rather than exclusion from the system. Primary unit should be established in political parties in nominating electoral candidates for public offices. This would reduce the authoritarian power of the party leaders and will give autonomy to the regional and local structure of the political parties. Such a system will help to develop the growth of leaders from grassroots level. The introduction of debates among the democratic process by making the candidates for elected position more accountable and familiar with the electorate is very productive. These processes may create scope for the political orientation and socialization of the emerging leaderships and workers of the political parties. Such debates may expose their ideas and let the nation know about their policy prescriptions to national problems. The public or the electorate and the media people would be able to judge the leadership quality, examine the candidates’ policy position through their views and perceptionson various national, regional and local matters through their useful electoral debates. This will make the opposition psychologically more responsible and will inspire them to play a constructive and positive role in the democratization process of the political system. The committee system will make the legislature effective in a democratic country. This legislative system helps in building democratic institution in various means and system. The parliament is supposed to be the superior body to all institutions of the political system. The ineffectiveness of the parliament is not just for itself or for intra-institutional reasons. This state of the parliament is in fact a part of the ineffectiveness of our total government system. The real voters and the people will select, as their nominee, a person who they trust and respect. A candidate must always have contract with the people instead of forgetting them once the elections were over. This will also encourage an elected person to maintain an office at his/her constituency. This will genuinely generate power at the grassroots level. The leaders are not accommodative and there is an absence of democracy within the parties. In Pakistan there are more than 175 308 political parties, but most of them are fractions of some other parties or just one person- centered party. They normally are the splinter groups of some other parties where there is no scope for dissent and one faction or other has to quit forming another party. The holding of regular elections within democratic framework will eliminate the proliferation of parties in the real political scene. If the opposition parties are given more opportunities to speak on the floor, they will not take to the streets for demonstration and strike instead of participation in legislative and policy making process. Political leader out of office has a good reason to advocate democracy. The impact of charisma and family tradition actually hinder the democratic process of recruiting new leaders in these countries. This undemocratic process within the organizational structure of a political party has its impact on the overall democratization process of the political system. After independence the role of Pakistan Muslim League is not positive towards democratic development. Political powerful individuals appeared to have been much more like to become landowners and to have increased the volume of their lands substantially. It is expected that democratic process is guarantee towards generating equality of opportunities and gradual decline in political dynasties. The legacy politics is more prominent part of candidate recruitment in democracies when there were clashes among the state units. Reforms did not alter the underling distribution of political parties because elites and dynasties succeed in substantively changing the political equilibrium because incumbents adopt and remain powerful under the new set of institutions. The connection of political power in the hand of few is likely to lead the economic inequality and political unrest. There is very long experience of military law, political authoritarianism and concise democratic governments which Pakistan has from 1947 till now. Democracy is better than any other political scheme as its principles are worldwide. Democracy also handles human beings regularly and it isdeemed considerably and officially better. 309 This is also a reality that the leadership is slowly inspired from broadminded democracy to dictatorship and from controlling system to dictatorial system. The personalization of politics was the main attention of both of them instead of the institutionalization of it. The political leadership was unsuccessful to make balance practices of that authority after obtaining political authority. Therefore, it is, significant to examine whether the political leaders or politicians are dedicated to democratic alteration or their events are accountable for the worsening of situation friendly for democratic growth. The difficulty of present political systems and the difficulty of the matters with which they deal can make the supposition of straight democracy. So, up to date democratic arrangements have innovated the procedure of symbols by electoral technique. The ruling leaders in Pakistan take support from the idea of authoritarianism and take no notice of the difficulties of democracy. The political leadership is creating the situation where the importance of the parliament is decreasing as a democratic political institution. The politicallack of interest towards consensus on certain democratic norms and values push the political system into a crisis situation. These contribute to the growth of anarchy and disregard the democratic institutions instead of promoting democratic development in Pakistan. It was quite encouraging that the people are very democratically oriented when they vote for the political parties. Democratization needs a competitive party system. The party system is not evolving as a mechanism of peaceful getting to power and the leadership of major political parties did not emerge through democratic processes. The leaders may create space for the backbencher or common member so that they could exercise their autonomy, judgment and right of freedom speech. In the existing system if a common member or a leader of a party differs to the party boss he/she is on risk of suspension or expulsion from the party. The authoritarian attitude within a party harms the democratic growth of a party. 310 The intense personality conflicts, lack of tolerance of dissenting opinion within a party and collaboration of political leaders with the military establishment cause harms to party politics and democratization process in Pakistan. To ensure fair election it is essential that appropriate measures to be taken so that all voters may cast their vote freely and each vote be counted with equal weight. That brings us to the all-important condition for the survival and growth of a parliamentary system in Pakistan: the supremacy of parliament a cardinal principal which needs to be enshrined in our constitution in no uncertain terms. The National Assembly is a directly elected sovereign body, and an indirectly elected President should not have the power to dissolve it without the consent of the Assembly itself. The result of every elections show that once again the majorities of such families come out with success and get way to the Assemblies. It has been observed that rich and brand name families met upsets in 1970 and afterwards. But these results mostly were related to Urban Areas or populated areas. In such areas due to many factors, candidates from middle class families were announced as victorious. Such results were mostly seen in East Pakistan most probably due to better literacy rates and political sense of the people of those areas. The electoral results of the rural areas, tribal areas and back ward areas are blatantly different from urban areas and populated areas. The enmity and rivalry among the village areas provide the centric or eccentric forces for a political candidate. Ideology and manifestoes influence little to the inhabitant voters of such areas. These factors i.e enmity and rivalry influence them to fix or to change their political commitments and attachments. A struggle was made to decrease family power or brotherly power during the decade commencing from 1970. But Zia’s regime strengthened it again. 1985 was the election of families instead of the parties. Some victorious families became stronger while the losers were also forced to rethink their bondage. The winner families emerged on national level as this was a non-party election. Afterwards, when party based 311 elections-1988 were held the parties instead granting ticket to middle class sector, they granted to the head of biratheries to make sure their success. This experience also brought fruit but on the other hand such families became stronger. These biratheries and families are political function and culture of Pakistan and they have minimized the ideological character of the political parties (Siddique, Q. M. 2002). To ensure fair elections following measures are suggested. i. It is essential that appropriate measures should be taken so that each voter can cast his/her vote freely. ii. Each vote is counted with equal weight. iii. Law and enforcement agencies protect the voters from any kind of threat and explotation. iv. Political activites should stop fortnight before holding an election to avoid voters from exploitation. v. Watch be observed on activities of candidates. vi. Electronic surveillance be imposed on candidates on their contacts and moves fortnight before held of election. vii. All sorts of scrutiny be observed before acceptance of nomination. viii. Impartial staff may be engaged to conduct electoral process on the day of lection. ix. It is also essential that after electing the representatives or voting for a particular issue/agenda each vote is given weight in running the government or making a policy. The loophole in the law which allows the political dynasty to continue up to the present day. Political Parties Act is the consensus of all stakeholders which bound the parties hold their inter-party election on all key posts on regular basis. A new political system with social effect was the guarantee of the democracy in Pakistan. The right to serve does not belong to one family alone. Ordinary people who deserve to empower 312 should be given the opportunity to serve the community. It is quite obvious that during election, state is responsible to provide equal opportunities Naturally, the structures of power even today represent elitist in nature. The political parties of Pakistan still need changes or patience so as political parties may rectify themselves. When total realization of democracy delivers its fruits, the system itself will ameliorate its evils. 6.3 Suggestions: The major suggestions of the present study are as under. 1. Land Reforms: There should be land reforms which will help democratization in Pakistan. These reforms include: i. Limit of Land: The maximum land of any citizen may be limited to 100 acres. Excess to it should be nationalized. ii. Tax on lands: There may be healthy tax on production through lands more than 12 acres. 2. Electoral/Institutional Reforms: i. Local Government System may be introduced. Number of local constituencies may be increased. Financial and Administrational powers should be devolved to these local governments/institutes. ii. Institution may be made more and more sovereign. iii. Accountability Bureau may be made sovereign as like Supreme Court. iv. Judicial Process may be made speedy, transparent and productive. v. Intra Party Election may be discrete and step by step initializing from local constituencies. vi. Tenure of Government may be decreased to three years. vii. Term for each post may be fixed for once only for any type of post (in the party or in Government) 313 viii. Political legislation may be introduced for fixing and imposing ban to contest election only for three times for the whole life. ix. Reserved Seats for women should be discontinued and direct election system may be introduced. x. Electoral system may be reformed that a candidate may be already registered as a voter in a constituency in which he is standing as a candidate is situated. xi. To ensure the stability of democracy and democratic system, it may be mandatory the presence of freely competing political parties, the recognized supremacy of representative institutions, the protection of civil basic rights and liberties, and the observance of constitutional norms. 6.4 General Recommendations/Direction for further Research The above findings of the present study and discussion of the result show that certain areas of political dynasties and democracy need extensive and forecasting research. Therefore, certain guidelines for further research can be proposed as given below. 1. Legislative changes are very necessary to reshape the civic structure and democratic norms. 2. Open elections for leadership be held giving birth to whole democracy. 3. Democracy in Pakistan as elsewhere, need a responsive party system to flourish. 4. Separate and allocated roles for the pillars of state Executive, Legislature and Judiciary be specified. 5. To avoid the temptation of new democracies, the will of the people is the basis of authority of government. Limit on the power of the government and provided guarantees for individual rights. Without the right and institution those are equally important aspects of a functioning democratic system. 6. Political culture may be reintroduced in order to unveil the mystery surrounding the slow growth of a democratic political party system. 314 7. Institutions of democracy require the sustenance of democratic commitment by the people. But improvements in legislature performance do evoke support for the democratic reform of the legislature. Thus, the prospect exist that continuing performance of legislature tasks in Nation. 8. It is also important that the parliamentarians or the legislators may be provided with staffs, office space, and appropriate training facilities so that they can perform their tasks efficiently. 9. 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Hussain, Z. 2012. ‘Dynastic Politics’.Dawn, 24th July, retrieved from http://dawn.com/2012/07/24/dynastic-politics-2/ accessed on 30/09/2012 Bari, S. and Khan, B. 2001.Local government Election 2001 Islamabad: PATTAN. 348 Appendices Appendix A Questionnaire for Candidates Political Dynasties and Democracy: Case Study of Pakistan Political System after 1970s Name: ______Age: _____ Region/Place: ______Social position:______Length of political Career: ______Gender:______Education______Party position:______Address:______Constituency:______ Please Mark (√) on given options for Answer: Sr Questions/Statements 1 Did you go for party ticket? V1 Some Every Not at time time all 2 Did you win the party ticket on the basis of V2 Some Every Not at time time all Party affiliation 3 Did you win the party ticket on the basis of V3 Some Every Not at time time all personal vote bank 4 Did you win the party ticket on the basis of V4 Some Every Not at time time all financial position 5 Did you think that your party work would play a V5 Some Every Not at time time all vital role for your nomination as a candidate? 6 Did you win the party ticket on the basis of V6 Some Every Not at time time all electable position in constituency 7 Did you win the party ticket on the basis of your V7 Some Every Not at time time all political profile 8 Did your party nominate the candidate through V8 Some Every Not at time time all democratic method? 9 Did you win the party ticket because of your V9 Some Every Not at time time all Biradari has huge share of votes 349 10 Did you win the party ticket because you V10 Some Every Not at time time all depositing/donation of party funds 11 Did you win the party ticket because you have V11 Some Every Not at time time all a support from local stakeholder 12 Does your party contest internal election V12 Some Every Not at time time all regularly 13 Does your party discourage the selection rather V13 Some Every Not at time time all than election in the matter of candidate nomination 14 Does your party encourage appositive opinions V14 Some Every Not at time time all 15 Does your party permits the party workers a V15 Some Every Not at time time all share in the top leadership 16 What was the demography of your constituency? V16 rural urban Mix 17 If your father/mother were the head of the V17 Some Every Not at time time all party, what would be the chance in your selection? 18 How much influence of your family/ brand V18 Some Every Not at time time all name has in your selection? 19 Did you feel party manifesto/programme V19 Some Every Not at time time all matter in your selection? 20 Did native language matter in your selection? V20 Some Every Not at time time all If your father/mother were the head of the V21 Some Every Not at time time all 21 party, what would be the chance in your selection? How much influence of your family/ brand name V22 Some Every Not at time time all 22 has in your selection? 350 Appendix B List of Political Leader In-depth Interview Sr. No. Political Party Name of the interviewer Party Position 1. PPP Syed Yousaf Raza Gillani Senior Vice Chairman 2. Jahangir Badar Secretary General 3. PML(N) Ahsan Iqbal Deputy Information Secretary 4. Javaid Hashmi Senior Vice President 5. PTI Shah Mehmood Qureshi Senior Vice Chairman 6. Jahangir Tareen Secretary General 7. JUI(F) Abdul Ghafoor Haideri Secretary General 8. Allama Zubair Siddiqi Deputy Secretary of Punjab 9. JI Dr. Waseem Akhtar Naib Ameer of Punjab 351 Appendix C GROUPS MADE IN PAKISTAN MUSLIM LEAGUE IN DIFFERENT PERIOD 1. 1947 – 1958 i. Muslim League Progressive group ii. Muslim League Progress Front iii. Muslim League Jinnah group iv. Zamindar Muslim League v. Muslim League Khaliphat Pakistan Group vi. Awami Muslim League 2. 1962 – 1970 i. Muslim League Convention ii. Muslim League Council iii. All Muslim League (Quyyum Group) 3. 1977 – 1988 i. Muslim League (Pir Paghara Group) ii. Muslim League (Khawaja Khair-ud-Din Group/Chatta) iii. Muslim League (Quyyum) iv. Muslim League Quyyum (Niazi, Taj Muhammad) v. Muslim League (Sheikh Liaquat Hussain) vi. Muslim League Council (Fatima Jinnah Group) vii. United Muslim League (Dr. A. R. Awan Group) viii. All Pakistan Muslim League (Muslim Khan Yousif Group) ix. Muslim League Farward 4. 1988 – 1997 i. Pakistan Muslim League (Junejo Group) ii. Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz Group) iii. Pakistan Muslim League (Jinnah Group) iv. Pakistan Muslim League (Chatta Group) v. Pakistan Muslim League (Zia Group) vi. United Muslim League 352 Appendix D Voters Turnout in Elections, 1970 – 2002 1970 1985 1988 1990 1993 1997 2002 % % % % % % % No. of voters NWFP 48.09 40.63 33.92 35.7 34.59 27.8 34.85 3,087,448 EATA NA 73.25 77.75 59.7 61.8 33.7 25.53 327,772 Islamabad NA 65.35 57.91 57.3 57.51 46.1 51.28 196,698 Punjab 68.63 60.14 46.49 49.6 47.07 39.8 46.14 19,035,539 Sindh 60.08 44.38 42.38 43.3 28.23 31.3 38.22 6,177,787 Baluchistan 40.56 36.33 25.69 29.2 24.96 23.2 29.42 1,004,219 Total 63.42 53.69 43.07 45.5 40.28 35.4 41.8 29,829,463 Non-party based Local and National Elections No. Years Elections 1 1959-60 LOCAL Government Elections (Basic Democrats) 2 1962 National and West Pakistan Assembly Elections 3 1964 Local Government (Basic Democrats) 4 1979 Local Government (Local Bodies) 5 1983 Local Government (Local Bodies) 6 1985 National and Provincial Assemblies 7 1987 Local Government (Local Bodies) 8 1991 Local Government (Local Bodies) 9 2001 Local Government 353 Sr. No. Name of Party head Dynastic Relation with political party party founder 1 PPP Bilawal Bhutto Zardari Dynastic Grand son 2 PML(N) Mian Muhammad Zia legacy Himself Nawaz Sharif 3 PML(Q) Ch. Shujat Hussain Dynastic Himself 4 MQM Altaf Hussain Non-dynastic Himself 5 ANP Asfand Yar Wali Dynastic Grand Son 6 JUI-F Mulana Fazal-ur-Rehman Dynastic Son 7 PML-F Pir Pagara Dynastic Son 8 BNP Akhtar Mengal Dynastic Son 9 PKMAP Mahmood Khan Achakzai Son Voter turnout (1988-2002) by percentage Province Years 2002 1997 1993 1990 1988 Sindh 38.17 31.3 28.23 43.3 42.38 Punjab 46.03 39.8 47.07 49.6 46.47 Baluchistan 29.67 23.2 24.96 29.2 25.69 NWFP 35.09 27.8 34.59 35.7 33.92 Islamabad 51.28 46.1 57.51 57.3 57.91 FATA 25.48 33.7 61.8 59.7 77.5 Total 41.68 35.4 40.28 45.5 43.07 354 Characteristics of Political System Characteristic Totalitarian Authoritarian Democratic Role of ideology Central Nonexistent Limited Type of change Revolutionary Non-incremental Incremental Participation Broad mobilized None or very Broad Autonomous limited Elections Ritualistic non- Nonexistent or non- Effective, competitive, competitive competitive, frequent frequent Parties One strong None or one but Two or more weak Freedom of speech, Nonexistent Severely restricted Extensive press and assembly Government control Extensive to total Limited Limited to moderate of economy 355 COMPOSITION OF NATIONAL ASSEMBLY Area / General Women Non Muslim Total Seats Province 1997 2002 1997 2002 1997 2002 1997 2002 Federal 1 2 - - 1 2 capital Punjab 115 148 - 35 115 183 Sindh 46 61 - 14 46 75 10 10 NWFP 26 35 - 8 26 43 FATAs 8 12 - - 8 12 Balochistan 11 14 - 3 11 17 Total 207 272 - 60 10 10 207+10=217 332+10=342 356 345 346 347 348 349 350 351 352 353 354 355 356 357 358 359