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Zaza D.Sc. (History), Professor, Corresponding member of the Georgian National Academy of ALEKSIDZE Sciences, head of the scientific department of the Korneli Kekelidze Institute of Manuscripts (Georgia) Mustafa AYDIN Rector of Kadir Has University (Turkey) Irina BABICH D.Sc. (History), Leading research associate of the Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology, Russian Academy of Sciences (Russia) Douglas Professor, Chair of Political Science Department, Providence College (U.S.A.) W. BLUM Svante Professor, Research Director, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, Silk Road Studies E. CORNELL Program, Johns Hopkins University-SAIS (U.S.A.) Parvin D.Sc. (History), Professor, Baku State University (Azerbaijan) DARABADI Murad D.Sc. (Political Science), Editor-in-Chief, Central Asia and the Caucasus, Journal of ESENOV Social and Political Studies (Sweden) Jannatkhan Deputy Director, Institute of Strategic Studies of the Caucasus (Azerbaijan) EYVAZOV Rauf Ph.D. (Psychology), Leading research associate of the Center for Strategic Studies under GARAGOZOV the President of the Azerbaijan Republic (Azerbaijan) Elmir Director of the Department of Geoculture, Institute of Strategic Studies of the Caucasus GULIEV (Azerbaijan) Shamsaddin D.Sc. (Economy), Professor of the Azerbaijan State Economic University HAJIEV (Azerbaijan) Stephen Professor, Russian and Eurasian Studies, Mount Holyoke College (U.S.A.) F. JONES Oleg Ph.D. (History), Associate Professor, Deputy Rector for Research, Higher School of Social KUZNETSOV and Managerial Consulting (Institute) (Russia) Akira Ph.D., History of Central Asia & the Caucasus, Program Officer, The Sasakawa MATSUNAGA Peace Foundation (Japan) Roger Senior Research Fellow, Department of Politics and International Relations, University MCDERMOTT of Kent at Canterbury (U.K.); Senior Research Fellow on Eurasian military affairs within the framework of the Eurasia Program of the Jamestown Foundation, Washington (U.S.A.) Roin D.Sc. (History), Professor, Academician of the Georgian National Academy of Sciences, METREVELI President of the National Committee of Georgian Historians (Georgia) Michael Associate professor, Near Eastern Studies Department, Princeton University (U.S.A.) A. REYNOLDS Alexander Professor, President of Georgian Foundation for Strategic and International Studies RONDELI (Georgia) Avtandil D.Sc. (Economy), Professor, Tbilisi University of International Relations, Full Member of SILAGADZE the Georgian National Academy of Sciences (Georgia) S. Frederick Professor, Chairman, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, Johns Hopkins University-SAIS STARR (U.S.A.) James Professor, Director of the International and Regional Studies Program, Washington V. WERTSCH University in St. Louis (U.S.A.) Alla D.Sc. (History), Professor, head of the Mediterranean-Black Sea Center, Institute of YAZKOVA Europe, Russian Academy of Sciences (Russia) Stanislav D.Sc. (Economy), Senior Researcher, Institute of World Economy and International ZHUKOV Relations, Russian Academy of Sciences (Russia)

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Journal of Social, Political and Economic Studies Volume 8 Issue 1-2 2014

CONTENTS

GEOPOLITICS

THE REGIONAL SECURITY SYSTEM IN THE POST-SOVIET SPACE: POLITICAL STRUCTURE, ENVIRONMENT, Jannatkhan AND TRANSITIVITY EYVAZOV 7

THE NAGORNO-KARABAKH ISSUE IN UKRAINIAN FOREIGN POLICY (1992-2012) Alexander (Part TWO) DUDNIK 33

GEO-ECONOMICS

REGIONAL RAILWAYS Vladimer IN THE CENTRAL CAUCASUS AND PAPAVA, GEORGIA’S ECONOMIC INTERESTS Vakhtang CHARAIA 58

DEVELOPMENT OF INDUSTRY UNDER TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE Gulshen (A Case Study of Azerbaijan) YUZBASHIEVA 68 Volume 8 Issue 1-2 2014 5 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION GEOCULTURE

HISTORY OF ISLAMIC INSTITUTIONS IN AZERBAIJAN Rashad (19TH-21ST CENTURIES) HUSEYNOV 78

THE CHURCH IN GEORGIA’S POLITICAL LIFE: PROBLEMS, CONTRADICTIONS, Maxim AND PROSPECTS KIRCHANOV 85

THE DUTCH GOLDEN AGE AND Givi THE CAUCASUS TAKTAKISHVILI 90

GEOHISTORY

A MEDIEVAL ARMENIAN SOURCE ON THE HISTORY OF THE CAUCASUS AS ANALYZED Rizvan BY JEAN SAINT-MARTIN HUSEYNOV 106

DEPORTATION OF THE CHECHENS: Vakhit WHAT WAS IT AND AKAEV, CAN IT BE FORGOTTEN? Abdula (ON THE 70TH ANNIVERSARY OF BUGAEV, DEPORTATION OF THE CHECHEN AND Magomed INGUSH PEOPLES) DADUEV 116

THE KHANS OF KARABAKH: THE ROOTS, SUBORDINATION TO THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE, Eldar Elkhan ogly AND LIQUIDATION OF THE KHANATE ISMAILOV 127

THE IMPORTANCE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW TREATIES IN INSTITUTIONALIZING THE POLITICAL AND LEGAL STATUS OF THE NAKHCHIVAN AUTONOMOUS REPUBLIC AS A CONSTITUENT PART OF AZERBAIJAN (ON THE 90TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE DECLARATION OF THE NAKHCHIVAN AUTONOMOUS Oleg SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLIC) KUZNETSOV 155 6 Volume 8 Issue 1-2 2014 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Contributors please use the following guidelines: — begin articles with a brief abstract of 300-500 words and keywords; — articles should be no less than 3,000 and no more than 6,000 words, including footnotes; — footnotes should be placed at the bottom of each page; if there are references to Internet resources, please give the author’s name, the name of the document, the website address, and the date it was made available, for example, available 2007-04-19; — quotations, names of authors and other information from English-language sources should be duplicated in brackets in the original language, that is, in English; — the article should be divided into sections, including an introduction and conclusion; — the author should include the following personal information: first name, last name, academic degree, place of work, position, city, country.

All articles accepted are published in Russian and English, in the Russian-language and English-language versions of the journal, respectively. The editorial board takes responsibility for translation of the articles. Volume 8 Issue 1-2 2014 7 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

GEOPOLITICS

Jannatkhan EYVAZOV

Ph.D. (Political Science), Deputy Editor-in-Chief of Central Asia and the Caucasus (Baku, Azerbaijan).

THE REGIONAL SECURITY SYSTEM IN THE POST-SOVIET SPACE: POLITICAL STRUCTURE, ENVIRONMENT, AND TRANSITIVITY

Abstract

his article is an attempt to assess the unstable. It is a negatively asymmetric RSS, extent to which the key structural spe- which stipulates for the possibility of its tran- T cifics and political environment of the sit to more stable structural conditions. At Regional Security System (RSS) in the post- the same time, its development and trans- Soviet space are responsible for its develop- formation are greatly affected by its active ment and transitivity. political environment composed of the most The author concludes that the scruti- influential powers in the contemporary nized political space is structurally highly world.

KEYWORDS: the regional security system, post-Soviet space, Post-Soviet Security Macrocomplex, political structure, structural instability, system transitivity, political environment, powers. 8 Volume 8 Issue 1-2 2014 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION Introduction

Early in the 1990s, the political space that at one time was united within the Soviet Union was transformed into an anarchically organized RSS: fifteen Soviet republics became independent states, which changed the key vectors of the security relations among them. The regional system of the post-Soviet space has a very specific political structure and environment that, together with other factors, ensure its stability/transitivity. Its evolution in the 1990s-2000s has supplied us with enough empirical material to acquire a clear understanding of the above. Polarity of the post-Soviet RSS has been determined by the power potential of the Russian Federation (RF), which is much more superior to the power potentials of the other newly independent states (NIS). Russia, in fact, has preserved the status of the only power across the post-Soviet space. At the same time, the processes that are unfolding in this space are accompanied by the increased activities of extra-regional powers, the nature of their activities speaking of the involvement of their security interests in the region. The article is an attempt to identify the extent to which the RSS, with its present political structure and environment, functioning in the post-Soviet space is tending toward transit. What are the key structural conditions that contribute to the system’s transitivity? What is the extent of structural stability/instability of the post-Soviet RSS? What are the main specifics of its political environment and how do they affect the system’s development? I will try to answer these and related questions in this article. My analysis of the post-Soviet RSS is based mainly on the theoretical and methodological instruments of the theory of regional security complexes (TRSC),1 which describes the region as a centered great power regional security complex.2 The newly independent states, which detached themselves from the former metropolitan country, formed local interstate systems, that is, regional security sub-complexes that appeared in the European part (Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Ukraine, Be- larus, and Moldova), in the Caucasus (Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia), and in Central Asia (Ka- zakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan). Even though these regional subsystems are relatively autonomous, Russia has preserved the function of a center that ties them together in a web of security interdependence of the RSS. As distinct from the early (1990s) development stages of the system of the post-Soviet space, today any assessment of its present state requires an account of the structural changes caused by the unification of the three Baltic republics (Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia) with the institutional RSC in Europe (the European Union).3 From this it follows that the present Post-Soviet Security Macrocom- plex (PSM) consists of twelve elements: RF + 11 NIS in three sub-complexes (Belarus, Moldova, and Ukraine; Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia; and Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan).

1 The TRSC is based on the works of Barry Buzan and other representatives of the Copenhagen School of Security Studies. In 1983, Buzan formulated the conception of the regional security complex in his People, States and Fear: The Na- tional Security Problem in International Relations (Harvester Wheatsheaf, Hemel Hempstead, 1983). This, as well as the second edition of the same work (B. Buzan, People, States and Fear. An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era, Second Edition, Lynne Rienner Publishers Boulder, Colorado, 1991), demonstrated a classical approach to the security complex conception. Much later, he, together with co-authors (B. Buzan, O. Wæver, J. De Wilde, Security. A New Framework for Analysis, Rienner Publishers Boulder, London, 1998; B. Buzan, O. Wæver, Regions and Powers, Cam- bridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003), made an attempt to go beyond the limits of the classical conception of the security complex. To remedy the main disparities between their present approach and the classical conception of the security complex (concentration on the military and political spheres of interstate relations and insufficient attention to the non-state actors, the conduct of which creates additional vectors of intersectoral interdependence), the authors postulated two types of security complexes—homogeneous and heterogeneous—as well as the securitization conception. 2 B. Buzan, O. Wæver, op. cit., pp. 55, 62, 343. 3 In 2004, these three former Soviet republics joined the EU and NATO, which speaks of their inclusion in the structure of the institutionalized RSC in Europe.

Volume 8 Issue 1-2 2014 9 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION Russia is the only geopolitical actor within the PSM able to sustainably project its influence on the regional scale. At the same time, it is the key security factor for the NIS in all subsystems. This means that the development of the local complexes, the dynamics of the security relations among the states involved and their contacts with external powers along with endogenous factors were formed and depended on Russia’s geopolitical activeness. However, as PSM developed, other powers became involved. In my previous work,4 I touched upon the parameters and types of power’s involvement in PSM; to remain within the limits of the present article I will merely point out that Russia, Turkey, Iran, China, the EU, and the U.S. are the power centers involved in PSM. So far, Russia remains the only power fully involved in this regional system, while all the others being partially involved form its political environment. The above points to the main specifics of PSM’s political structure and environment: it is a unipolar RSS with an active political environment; taken together these specifics greatly affect the RSS’s stability/transitivity.

Structural Factors and the System’s Transitivity: Theoretical Aspects

As the key factor of functionality of any system, stability should remain in the center of any discussion of the specific features of any RSS, the political structure of which is responsible for many of its phenomena and processes; it also determines the degree of its transitivity. Kenneth Waltz’s neorealism describes the “distribution of capabilities” as the main structural parameter of the international political system; this means that its transformations are connected with the changes in this parameter: “In a multipolar world, one great power, or two, or three in combination, can eliminate other states as great powers by defeating them in war. Reducing a multi- to a tri- or a bipolar world would change the system’s structure.”5 A war between powers as the main holders of capabilities cannot be the only means by which the system is transformed; contemplated in the framework of realistic tradition, it looks like the key indicator of structural changes. Wars are less possible in systems where the distribution of capabilities is balanced out. A war among the main actors (either aggressive or defensive) means that the balance is tipped and the system is moving toward redistribution of capabilities. Barry Buzan has offered a more detailed concept of a system’s transformation. As distinct from Waltz’s concept, his is geared at explaining the regional level—the RSC. Besides, he has not limited himself to contemplating the material aspect represented by the distribution of capabilities; he associates the possibility of changes with changed perceptions, that is, the “patterns of amity and enmity” among the actors. These two components, he writes further, constitute the “essential structure” of the RSC,6 while any changes in them lead to the RSC’s transformation. The changes in both components of the “essential structure” that lead to the system’s overall transformation are caused, first and foremost, by the impact of powers. When looking at the distribution of power, Buzan identifies two factors that cause transformations: external and internal. In the former case the matter concerns the shifted polarity of the regional system as a result of internally

4 See: J. Eyvazov, “Powers and Regional Security Systems: Parameters and Types of Involvement (Post-Soviet Space Case Study),” Central Asia and the Caucasus, Vol. 14, Issue 1, 2013, pp. 36-56. 5 K.N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, McGraw-Hill, Boston, 1979, p.199. 6 B. Buzan, People, States and Fear. An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era, p. 211.

10 Volume 8 Issue 1-2 2014 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION determined processes (disintegration of powers or shifted distribution of capabilities due to the technological progress of some of them and the technological backwardness of others)7; in the latter case, the transformations are caused by the involvement of external forces in a local conflict in the form of military assistance.8 Transformations that occur in a system under the pressure of “patterns of amity and enmity” may, in principle, be connected with activities of powers, albeit to a lesser extent than in the cases of distribution of capabilities. The amity/enmity relations among regional actors depend not only on the structural factors; this means that the political balance between them does not guarantee a consistent shift from enmity to amity. The developments in the post-Soviet space confirm that even suppressed local dynamics and very long coexistence of local actors within a single state system (the Soviet Union in our case) proved not enough to remove, for instance, the Caucasian NIS from the pre-Soviet amity/ enmity patterns. With respect to Russia, they remain one of the causes of instability in the Northern Caucasus fraught with bloodshed. The assessment of an RSS from the point of view of its transitivity presupposes that we use a much wider interpretation of the structural factors. This means that we should take into account and assess the stability/instability of the RSS political structure9 based on three components: internal weakness/strength of the states belonging to the regional system; (a)symmetry of strength and (a)symmetry of vulnerabilities; and (im)maturity of relations among them. Within the classical RSC concept, the level of sociopolitical cohesion serves as the criterion of the state’s strength/weakness. What looks like an oversimplification of the key strength/weakness criterion, as applied to the postmodern states,10 does not devalue its importance when applied to a discussion of PSM far removed from postmodernity. Applicability of this criterion to an assessment of strength/weakness of these states as the main criterion fully corresponds to the present level of their development.11 This is not the only criterion, however. When talking about the type of contemporary state, we should probably discuss its other (classical) parameters such as economic and military potential: the ability to support and defend itself cannot and should not be removed from the security agenda of the states, even those that have moved into postmodernity. The weakness of any state and its flawed ability to support and defend itself make it more aware of its vulnerability: in a weak state, the process of securitization is determined by the conceptualiza-

7 See: B. Buzan, People, States and Fear. An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era, pp. 211-212. 8 See: Ibid., p. 213. 9 In my other works I made an attempt to reveal the meaning of this parameter and demonstrate, in particular, its impact on the conflict dynamics in the post-Soviet Caucasus (see: J. Eyvazov, “Structural Factors in the Development of the Re- gional Security Systems (A Post-Soviet Central Eurasia Case Study),” Central Asia and the Caucasus, Vol. 13, Issue 1, 2012, pp. 79-102); J. Eyvazov, “The Regional Security System in the Central Caucasus: Political Structure and Conflicts,” The Caucasus & Globalization, Vol. 6, Issue 1, 2012, pp. 8-21). 10 When assessing the sociopolitical development of contemporary states, Buzan and Wæver have identified three types/ levels—premodern states (low development level of inner sociopolitical cohesion and state organization, weak governmental control over the territory and population); modern states (strong governmental control of society; limited openness, the sanctity of sovereignty and independence and its attributes, including territory and borders, placing the stakes on self-sufficiency, self-reliance, and national identity); and postmodern states with relatively moderate sanctity of sovereignty, independence and national identity, economic, political and cultural openness to the world (for more details, see: B. Buzan, O. Wæver, op. cit., pp. 23-24). 11 On the whole, the strength and weakness concepts are fairly abstract and too relative to provide a criterion of their assessment for all cases. What may be considered as a strength in one state could be felt as a weakness in another. This relativ- ity rests on the objectively different development levels of states and regional interstate systems. The types of postmodern and modern states differ greatly. For example, in a postmodern state, decentralization of power and federalization are no longer its weaknesses, but rather a condition of domestic policy which feeds dynamic and balanced economic growth and, therefore, the state’s inner strength. The same phenomena in a modern state might breed, at least in the short term, political fragmentation and separatism and, by the same token, make it weaker and more vulnerable. This means that Buzan’s criterion looks somewhat oversimplified when applied to the postmodern standards. In our case, however, the gist of these criteria is totally applicable to the internal sociopolitical, economic, and sociocultural structure of the post-Soviet states.

Volume 8 Issue 1-2 2014 11 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION tion of its vulnerabilities. Indeed, the greater their number and intensity and the more obvious their nature, the greater their impact on the way this state behaves in the security sphere; at the regional level, this stirs up negative dynamics of the security relations. This happens because, having realized its weakness, the state starts acting according to the well-known logic of neorealism: in the context of anarchy and self-reliance, the state has no choice but to exploit the vulnerabilities of its neighbors to prevent them from becoming strong enough to pose a threat to the state’s own security. This invariably invites a reaction, which usually leads to open conflicts. There is also a domestic political context: the low level of social and political cohesion in a weak state means instability between political institutions and society and, hence, the practical inability of the former to govern the latter. In these conditions, the political elite has no choice but to use the state’s objective vulnerabilities for political purposes at home to regulate, in particular, its relations with all sorts of political groups. In other words, by politicizing its vulnerabilities the elite is striving to achieve the sociopolitical cohesion the objectively weak state does not have, which, quite obviously, increases the securitization of these vulnerabilities. The aims of social and political consolidation can be achieved through identifying in the first place the external sources of threats. There is nothing new in the efforts to achieve sociopolitical consolidation by identifying external enemies and placing the responsibility for domestic problems on them. This method is normally used by internally weak states; the examples are numerous: suffice it to mention North Korea, Syria, and Cuba. In the majority of cases, such states find themselves in isolation at best, while an armed conflict with neighbors is the worst of the possible scenarios. There is a comparatively favorable option: sustained tension in the regions of weak states. This means that strong states are more inclined toward positive dynamics of security relations in the region. Their social and political stability, adequate military and economic resources, and, hence, a much lower level of anxiety about their vulnerability lead to more predictable and less conflicting relations with neighbors, which leads to cooperation in regional dynamics. The impact of strength/weakness and vulnerability/invulnerability of states on stability/instability of the RSS political structure also depends on the degree of symmetry in their distribution among the region’s states. Any RSS is based on a close interdependence of its elements; in other words, we are talking about the security interdependence of states within one region generated either objectively or subjec- tively (perceptually). In the classical conditions of an anarchic regional political system and geographic proximity of its states, strength and weakness, as well as vulnerability and invulnerability, for that matter, turn out to be the key security factors that tie them together materially and perceptually within the system we call RSS. At the same time, an assessment of these parameters in the security context is relative: any state assesses its strength and vulnerability as correlated with the corresponding degrees of its neighbors and chooses an adequate security strategy. Proceeding from the principles of system and interdependence, the neighbors respond with corresponding perceptions and conduct. This makes stability/instability of the region’s political structure mainly dependent on the extent to which the states and their strength/weakness and vulnerability/invulnerability differ from each other, that is, on the degree of asymmetry in the strength and vulnerability of the region’s states. Accordingly, the symmetry of the regional security system in these terms is responsible for stability in the relations among the states and, hence, of the regional political structure. The arguments related to the interconnection between regional strength and vulnerability asymmetry, on the one hand, and instability of the RSS structure, on the other, can be easily developed into a discussion of how perception by any state of its relative weakness and vulnerability might affect its relations with its neighbors. This situation is best described within the framework of four conventional models of regional security systems with different degrees of symmetry/asymmetry of strength and vulnerability of the comprising states: 12 Volume 8 Issue 1-2 2014 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

 First, a positively symmetrical regional security system, in which all states are more or less equally strong with almost the same mutual vulnerability level.  Second, a negatively symmetrical regional security system, in which all states are more or less equally weak with a more or less equal level of mutual vulnerability.  Third, a positively asymmetrical regional security system, in which some states are strong and others are weak, while the degree of vulnerability of the former to the latter is much lower than the degree to which the latter are vulnerable to the former. Furthermore, the stronger states predominate both numerically and qualitatively (they can maintain moderation and cooperativeness in the dynamics of regional security relations).  Fourth, a negatively asymmetric regional security system, in which some states are strong and others are weak, while the degree of vulnerability of the former to the latter is much lower than the degree to which the latter are vulnerable to the former. The weak states out- number the strong ones, while the qualitative capabilities of the strong states are not sufficient to maintain moderation and cooperation in the regional security relations dynamics. The first model can be described as the most stable regional political structure, at least because its members are less exposed to the acute securitization of their own relative weakness. A strong state implies the low level of its security vulnerabilities, hence the low capabilities for its neighbors to capitalize on them. This means that within a region such states, if they are in the majority or dominate (very much as in the positively asymmetric RSS), have less opportunity to manipulate the vulnerabilities of their neighbors: contributing to moderation and cooperation in the regional relations it stabi- lizes the region’s political structure. Even if we surmise that this region’s states have high vulnerability, the fact that these vulnerabilities are symmetrical decreases the possibility of them being exploited by the states against each other. Parallels are found in international trade, in the practices of so called trade or tariff wars or in the economic phenomenon Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye have described as “symmetrical interdependence.”12 Mutually dependent and mutually vulnerable states are less inclined to exploit vulnerabilities than the unequally (asymmetrically) dependent ones. The logic is obvious: if you exploit the weaknesses of your neighbor, it might reciprocate by doing the same to you, which makes the damage to both sides practically identical. The negatively asymmetrical regional security system is less favorable when it comes to political structure’s stability. The arguments are the same: on the one hand, the weakness of the majority of states leads to over-securitization of vulnerabilities and preventive aggressiveness; on the other, the asymmetry of vulnerability among the states tempts the stronger states to exploit the vulnerability of their weaker neighbors. The second model—the negatively symmetrical regional system— also cannot be described as conducive to political structure stability. The equal (symmetrical) dependence of states on one another for their security restrains them, however their general weakness and individual high vulnerability level prevent them from moving toward moderation and cooperation and, therefore, toward stabilizing relations inside the region. The immature relations among states is another factor of instability of a regional political structure. It basically arises from the absence of shared interests and cooperative practice in interstate relations. In the absence of cooperative practice, regional relations become highly unstable for the simple reason that the response of the opponent(s) to any of the common problems is unpredictable. This situation can be viewed through the prism of a structuralist interpretation of states’ conduct (in particular through a mechanism of security dilemma). The situation does not relate to the classical Walt-

12 The parameters of asymmetry/symmetry belong to those according to which the stabilizing effect of economic interdependence between states is assessed (see: R.O. Keohane, J. Nye, Power and Interdependence, Third edition, Longman, Boston, 2001, p. 157).

Volume 8 Issue 1-2 2014 13 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION zian formula13; it fits more to Buzan’s structuralism, which looks at the anarchical nature of a structure and its impact on states’ conduct, while anarchy develops from immature to mature one.14 Though this is an insufficient explanation at the theoretical level and calls for specification of the practice of inter-societal relations. The social-constructivist approach may supply an important specification: it concentrates on practice, which creates “social structures,” the security dilemma being one of them. According to Alexander Wendt, “processes of interaction produce and reproduce the social structures—cooperative or conflictual—that shape actors’ identities and interests.”15 Even though the maturity of interstate relations is connected with states’ strength/weakness, it remains a very specific parameter of structural (in)stability. (Im)maturity of relations is not a direct product of states’ strength or weakness; it is determined by a socially and practically confirmed bias toward exploiting (manipulating) the weaknesses (vulnerabilities) of the opponents for the sake of its own political interests.. Maturity is, therefore, a quality of state dyads (systems), in which the level of confidence is sufficient for cooperation among states, at least in the solution of common security issues. The highest degree of maturity is reached when a state is prepared to sacrifice its sovereignty for the sake of a common political entity, that is, for political integration. Mature relations are not necessarily limited to strong states. States can have different degrees of military and economic capabilities as well as sociopolitical cohesion and be at the same time close allies. Today, however, mature relations between strong states are much more frequent than between weak ones. It proceeds from the above evaluated impact of strength/weakness on vulnerability perceptions and corresponding behavior of states. The maturity level of interstate relations is determined, first and foremost, by the social affinity/ difference of states and the practice of their relations. The former is rooted in the ethnic, linguistic, and confessional specifics and shared political values (institutions and ideologies) of states. The latter is created by the states’ history—what prevails in the history of their relations—amity or enmity. In other words, confidential relations among states, the predictability of their conduct and, therefore, their cooperative relations depend on their social affinity, friendly relations, and the absence of conflicts in the past.

Structural Instability across the Post-Soviet Space

The PSM is obviously asymmetrical in terms of the strengths/weaknesses, threats and vulnerabilities; it consists mainly of weak states with inadequate cooperative experience in regulating the security dilemmas present in their relations. The numerous conflicts still broiling in this space are the best evidence of the above. The following table offers a glimpse of some of the qualitative and quantitative descriptions of the countries on which the structural specifics of PSM depend. The figures graphically illustrate the current specifics of PSM’s political structure. A glimpse into its initial period, the early 1990s, will supply us with an integral picture of its structure’s development.

13 Waltz treats the anarchic nature of the structure of the international political system (its maturity levels, in particular) as universalist, that is, he does not distinguish between the maturity levels of anarchy and the specifics of the impact of different maturity levels on the way states behave. 14 See: B. Buzan, People, States and Fear. An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era, pp. 174-181. 15 A. Wendt, “Constructing International Politics,” International Security, Summer 1995, Vol. 20, Issue 1, p. 81.

14 Volume 8 Issue 1-2 2014 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Table 14 to Sociopolitical Cohesion The Most Serious Challenges The Most Serious Challenges

Territorial claims which cause cause Territorial claims which open and latent conflicts in relations with neighbors— Azerbaijan (Nagorno-Karabakh), Turkey (Eastern Anatolia), Georgia (Javakhetia)—and the the main resultant isolation from regional economically profitable energy and transportation projects (BTC, BTE, KATB); dependence on external actors (Russia, the diaspora). with Armenia, Conflict occupation of southwestern regions and related sociopolitical and economic problems; potential threat of separatism in the areas where ethnic minorities live in compact

submarines)

Navy (warships/ Navy

—

18/–

helicopters) Air Force (aircraft/ Force Air

15/22 44/38 Guns

239 458

Vehicles Vehicles/Armored Vehicles/Armored

Infantry Fighting Fighting Infantry 10 104/136 111/575

Main Type of Military Hardware Main Battle Tanks Battle Main

110 339 Arms +/– Arms

Certain Economic, Military, Certain Economic, Military,

Strategic Offensive Offensive Strategic

8 — —

Armed Forces Armed

of Strength Numerical

7 48,850 66,950

) $m and Sociopolitical Descriptions of the PSM States as 2012 ( Budget Military

6 391.0 1,770.0

) $ ( GDP Capita Per

3,568 7,479

) % GDP Growth Rates ( Rates Growth GDP

3.9 3.9

) $b GDP ( GDP

10.6

State Armenia Azerbaijan 2

1 1 2 No. Volume 8 Issue 1-2 2014 15 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION ------14 Table (continued) communities, tension with some communities, tension with some of the neighboring powers (Iran, Russia) caused by their regional and ethnic policy; strong economic dependence on fuel exports. Inflexible (Soviet-style) regime, repressive methods of gover nance which caused internation al isolation (mainly by the U.S. and EU) pro-Russian orien considerable tation, resulting in economic dependence on Russia for export of consumer goods and energy resources. Conflict in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which Tbilisi no longer controls; forced migrants; sepa ratist threats in other places where ethnic minorities live in compact communities; continued tension with Russia and its mili tary, political, and economic re percussions (the August 2008 war; recognition of the indepen dence of Abkhazia and South Os setia by Russia; the increase and legalization of Russian military presence in these regions and the loss of Russian market for Georgian products). status of Still unregulated legal the Caspian; dependence on — 13 18/– 12 12/– 93/69 11 185 1,003 10 63/137 1,111/264 9 93 515 8 — — 7 48,000 20,650 6 547.0 391.0 5 6,035 3,457 4 4.3 6.5 3

58.2 15.8

Belarus Georgia 2 1 3 4 16 Volume 8 Issue 1-2 2014 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION 14 Table (continued) external actors (Russia) when it comes to transporting energy resources to the world markets; latent conflicts with Uzbekistan— border issues and rivalry for regional leadership. Strong economic dependence on fuel exports. Weak system of state governance, political instability inside the country responsible changes in violent regime for the 2005 and 2010; this relatively poor natural resources are responsible for the country’s poorly developed economy. Unsettled contradictions with Uzbekistan—border in the Ferghana Valley, water resources, trans-border activity of radical Islamic structures; economic dependence on China, external actors (Russia, and Kazakhstan) dependence in the security sphere (Russia). split of the country Continued because of the Transnistrian conflict; economic decline and dependence on external actors (Russia and the EU) caused by the conflict and lack of natural resources. — — 13 17/– 12 –/4 33/2 123/40+ 11 602 246 148 10 320/35 44/164 602/350 9 — 300 150 8 — — — 7 5,350 39,000 10,900 6 17.0 105.0 2,270.0 5 1,128 2,078 11,451 4 5.5 1.0 3.0 3

6.2 7.6

200.6

Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Moldova 2 5 1 6 7 Volume 8 Issue 1-2 2014 17 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

14 Table (continued) Continued instability in instability in Continued the Northern Caucasus— separatism and an increase extremism in religious accompanied by the two Russian-Chechen wars and armed activitiescontinued in Daghestan, Ingushetia, and other republics of the North Caucasian Federal District, which makes the “southern Muslim belt” of Russia vulnerable; an acute demographic crisis that has already developed into concern over the decreasing number of ethnic Russians and illegal immigration of Muslims and Chinese; material growth in the 2000s, mainly thanks to the export of energy resources, which did not encourage technological progress; this ensured Russia’s long-term dependence on world raw material prices accompanied by numerous socioeconomic problems, the acuteness of which became especially obvious in 2008, when the world economic crisis began. The situation is further worsened by consistent confrontation with the NATO countries and international isolation and 13 270/64 12 1,462/378+ 11 5,436+ 10 7,360+/5,700+ 9 2,800+ 8 + 7 845,000 6 59,900.0 5 13,683 4 3.7 3

1,950.0 Russia Russia 2 8 1 18 Volume 8 Issue 1-2 2014 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Table (continued) economic sanctions caused by the annexation of Crimea in March 2014. The still unresolved repercussions of the civil war of 1992-1997; weak state governance, political instability, economic decline; continued economic (labor migration and investments) and security dependence on Russia; weak control of the Afghan border and destructive impact of Afghan instability—radical Islamic groups and drug trafficking; continued tension with Uzbekistan caused by the unsettled border and water-use issues, trans-border activities of radical Islamic organizations. Economic and security dependence on external actors (Russia). Inflexible closed political regime; continued tension with Uzbekistan over the use of water of the Amu Darya and with the Caspian states over offshore oil and gas fields. — 13 10/– 12 –/4 94/10 11 23 564 10 23/23 942/829 9 37 680 8 — — 7 8,800 22,000

6 164.0 210.0 (2011 г.) 5 935 6,621 4 6.8 8.0 3

7.3 33.5

Tajikistan Turkmenistan 2 1 9 10 Volume 8 Issue 1-2 2014 19 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

14 Table (continued) Internal instability, Internal instability, which resulted in the Orange Revolution in 2004; continued political and religious split. At the end of 2013, a new wave of political instability that caused of a regime change; the loss the Crimea, annexed by Russia in March 2014; the rise of armed separatism in the southeastern regions (Donetsk, Lugansk); partial loss of control over these regions; wide-scale clashes with separatists; continued tension in relations with Russia, and dependence on it for fuel supplies. Inflexible closed repressive political regime which isolation found itself in political (maintained mainly by the U.S. and EU); economic problems; active radical Islamic organizations and tension with neighbors over water use, borders, radical Islamic groups, and refugees. — 13 21/1 12 135/29 221/139 11 487+ 3,351 10 399/309 3,028/1,432 9 340 1,110 8 — — 7 48,000 129,950 , The International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, 2013. , The International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, 2013.

6 2,050.0 1,420.0 (2011 г.) 5 4,017 1,818 4 3.0 7.4 The Military Balance 2013 The Military 3

51.6 180.2

Ukraine Uzbekistan 2 1 11 12 F i g u r e s f r o m: F i g u r e 20 Volume 8 Issue 1-2 2014 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION On the whole, the entire PSM was engulfed by a wave of armed conflicts among the states or within them with greater or limited outside involvement. This can be described as the starting point of an understanding of the earlier development level of this political structure and as an important indicator of its stability/instability. In the early 1990s, the vehemence of the conflicts and their dynamics differed from one post-Soviet region to another. Ethnopolitical conflicts demonstrated the highest dynamics in the Caucasus, which associates them with the internal weaknesses of the post-Soviet states that recently regained their political independence. The post-Soviet independence of the Caucasian states (1991-1994) is best described as the period of their greatest internal weakness. It was at that time that the regional security relations reached the peak of their negative intensity. Internal weakness and political instability were largely the product of objective specifics of the sociopolitical, economic, ideological, and axiological context created by the Soviet Union’s unexpectedly fast disintegration. The states still lingering at the beginning of a long road of post-Soviet development had to deal with social and economic problems created by their transfer to a market economy, considerable inequalities in the distribution of economic resources within society, the quest for national identity, exacerbation of ethnopolitical problems, inadequate legitimacy, de facto impotent central governments, and a new generation of political leaders who lacked indispensable political skills. It was at this stage of the region’s post-Soviet independence that the Armenian-Azeri war, as well as the civil war and armed ethnopolitical conflicts in Georgia (South Ossetia and Abkhazia) reached their highest intensity. In Russia, these factors stirred up political instability that culminated in two bloody Russian- Chechen wars. Armed activities remain a prominent factor in the Northern Caucasus that even today allows us to characterize Russia using Buzan’s classification as “weak as a state.”16 In the European part of PSM, only one of the conflicts, in Moldova, developed into armed clashes. The latent confrontation in Crimea (until its annexation by Russia in March 2014) and the internal weakness of Ukraine remained functionally interconnected. In the first and second cases, the conflicts reflected, among other things, the low level of sociopolitical cohesion. In both cases, there were not only endogenous political factors, but also an exogenous factor, viz. Russia’s indirect presence. Irrespective of the answer to the question of whether the conflicts in these regional sub-complexes were caused by endogenous or exogenous political factors, one thing is clear: weakness and the low level of sociopolitical cohesion of states made external geopolitical impacts effective. This is true of the entire post-Soviet space; this conclusion is amply confirmed by the comparison between the Caucasian and European sub-complexes of PSM and the Baltic states, another post-Soviet area. The three Baltic states are fairly heterogeneous in the ethnic and confessional respect, their large communities being tied, ethnically and linguistically, to Russia.17 All NIS felt the economic and sociocultural repercussions of the disintegration of the single state, while Russia’s motivations of geopolitical domination in the Baltic region were as substantiated as in Moldova or Georgia. This means that if exogenous political factors are most important, then coupled with the ethnic and confessional structure of the post-Soviet space, they should have raised the conflict level in the Baltic countries to the level observed elsewhere across the post-Soviet space. Reality, however, is different. The three Baltic states sailed through the transition period without conflicts; in 2004, they were admitted to the EU and joined NATO. All other parts of the macroregion are living under the pressure of external factors, which are actively manipulating the conflict potential of the regional states.

16 Buzan extends his strength/weakness assessments to the powers: a state can be (1) strong/weak as a state and (2) weak/ strong as a power (see: B. Buzan, People, States and Fear. An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era, p. 97). 17 In 2009, ethnic Russians in Estonia comprised about 26% of the total; in 1989, on the eve of the Soviet Union’s disintegration, 30% of the population were Russians. The figures for Latvia were about 30% in 2009 and 34% in 1989; and in Lithuania, they amounted to about 6% in 2009 and 9.4% in 1989.

Volume 8 Issue 1-2 2014 21 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION This comparison confirms that the internal strength/weakness of states in the dynamics of the security relations within corresponding RSSs plays an important role. At the same time, no matter how obvious this conclusion is, even if coupled with all other factors (ethnic, confessional, and economic), it is necessary, but not sufficient, for a complete understanding of how any RSS functions and develops. We should also take into account how these factors are arranged in any given space and the impact produced by political impulses (connected with the activity of the other PSM elements and external poles of power). High instability of a political structure is not necessarily accompanied by dominating conflict dynamics of interstate relations. This parameter greatly depends on exogenous political factors. In- deed, despite the far from simple ethnoterritorial specifics, the Baltic region can be described as a relatively stable political structure. The region’s geopolitical openness, ensured, in particular, by its closeness to the Western centers of power and their interest in the region, is balancing out the exogenous impact. This was responsible for their relatively fast, painless, and symmetrical transformation, strengthening, mature relations, and stability in the Baltic region’s political structure. In the PSM’s Central Asian sub-complex, the transfer to anarchy (caused by the fast disintegration of the U.S.S.R.) was, likewise, accompanied by the weakening of its political units. Still, its influence on the security relations and the potential conflict intensity differed greatly from what happened in two other PSM sub-complexes. The events in Uzbekistan of the late 1980s (in Ferghana) and the civil war in Tajikistan in the early 1990s were the most obvious outbursts of conflicts in post-Soviet Central Asia. At the same time, both were much more localized than the events in the Caucasus and, therefore, did not develop into permanent and open seats of interstate conflict in the region. As distinct from conflicts in two other RSM sub-complexes, they were finally settled with the active involvement of other states/powers (especially in the domestic conflict in Tajikistan). The role of neighbors and external poles took different forms (for example, Uzbekistan latently supported the northern Khujand (Leninabad) group),18 while Russia openly helped stabilize the situation by transferring power to Emomali Rakhmon.19 The situation around Tajikistan, or, to be more exact, the country’s internal weakness, threatened to undermine the stability of the developing regional political structure in Central Asia. This destabilizing effect is explained not only by Tajikistan’s internal weakness but by the republic’s geographic location of strategic importance for Russia (among other things) as the southern frontier of the so- called near abroad. The republic’s weakness, bordering on its complete collapse as a state, would have attracted stronger states striving to fill the political vacuum. The powers (or the states willing to acquire this status) looked at control over Tajikistan as a strategic advantage created by the country’s geographic location. In fact, starting in the early 1990s, this Central Asian state has been developing into an arena of rivalry between external forces seeking domination over Tajikistan, a country of huge strategic advantages. This could have destabilized the relations between the external actors. In particular, the conflict-

18 The northern part of Tajikistan (Khujand, formerly Leninabad Region) with a predominantly Uzbek population was much more advanced economically (during Soviet power) than the rest of the republic. This part of Tajikistan was ethnically and economically closer to Uzbekistan. Under Soviet power, the republic was ruled mainly by people from Khujand. In post- Soviet times, the South tried to remove people from the North from their commanding posts. Together with other regions, this contributed to the confrontation in the republic. In fact, Emomali Rakhmon’s ascent to power from Kulob meant that the Khujand groups suffered a political defeat (see: K. Martin, “Dobro pozhalovat v Leninabadskuiu Respubliku?” Tsentralnaia Azia, No. 10. 1997; Ch. Fairbanks, C.R. Nelson, S.F. Starr, K. Weisbrode, Strategic Assessment of Central Eurasia, The Atlantic Council of the United States, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, Johns Hopkins University, Washington D.C., 2001, pp. 14, 21). 19 See, for example, L. Jonson, “Russian Policy and Tajikistan,” Central Asia, No. 2 (8), 1997, available at [http://www. ca-c.org/dataeng/st_03_jonson.shtml].

22 Volume 8 Issue 1-2 2014 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION ing political interests in Tajikistan caused tension, to say the least, between Russia and Uzbekistan in the mid- and late 1990s,20 and forced the latter to seek closer relations with and support of the West. Besides, these specifics of Tajikistan’s internal development made it the main corridor between Central Asia and instability in Afghanistan. From the very beginning, the states of the Central Asian RSC looked at Afghanistan as a source of existential threats to their security. Tajikistan became the main transit territory across which drugs and religious radicalism were spreading throughout the post- Soviet space. When dealing with Tajikistan, all the external actors, Russia and Uzbekistan in particular, never lose sight of the Afghan factor. The republic’s weakness created conditions for Russia’s continued military presence in its territory,21 explained, to an equal extent, by Russia’s regional geopolitical approaches and by Tajiki- stan’s political weakness and vulnerability. If we exclude the possibility that Russia provoked confrontation inside Tajikistan for the sake of control in the near abroad, we should admit that its military presence stemmed the conflict. At the same time, the meaning of this involvement (in the context of the (un)stable political structure in the Central Asian sub-complex) was and is highly ambiguous, to say the least. On the one hand, first, Russia’s military contingent helped concentrate political power in the country, which was rapidly falling apart; second, the country became less vulnerable to the negative activity of external forces (not only neighboring states, but also all sorts of criminal and radical religious groups that used Tajikistan to move drugs across its territory and spread political Islam). This stabilized the region’s political structure, but we cannot help but wonder how long Russia’s military presence will stabilize the situation inside the country and around it? Its continued military presence does not guarantee that this model of Tajikistan’s national-state development will strengthen the country socially, politically, and economically. In fact, the opposite is true: from the very beginning Russia’s military presence protected the pro-Russian regime of President Rakhmon and, in full accordance with Realpolitik, the main function of this sort of protection is stemming all forces and processes (both inside and outside the country), which might distort the present political orientation. Since Russia’s military presence is primarily explained by Tajikistan’s internal weakness and vulnerability, we can conclude that its continued military presence is explained by the fact that the state remains weak and vulnerable. When Tajikistan becomes stronger and less vulnerable, it will no longer need external guarantors of its security; this will deprive any foreign state of convincing arguments for its military presence in Tajikistan. In other words, Russia will preserve its military contingents in Tajikistan because of its geopolitical interests in Central Asia,22 if, first, the country’s internal sociopolitical cohesion remains weak while society and the political institutions remain loosely interconnected and if its economy remains inadequate and the country remains dependent on Russia; and second, if the tension in its relations with neighbors, Uzbekistan in particular, continues. It should be said that the above fully describes the real situation. In the mid-2000s, Kyrgyzstan became an epicenter of political instability in Central Asia. Albeit there were numerous conflict-intensive factors in the republic (ethnic and confessional diver- sity, economic decline, and dependence on raw materials), the 1990s were a time of its relatively peaceful and stable existence under President Askar Akaev. The next decade saw two revolutions (in 2005 and 2010), as well as a violent regime change and bloody ethnic clashes in the south in 2010.23 It seems that along with the exacerbation of domestic social, political and economic factors

20 This was the time that Tashkent left the Collective Security Treaty and joined GUAM in 1999. 21 This brings to mind the situation in Georgia in the early 1990s. 22 In October 2004 the Russian 201st motor rifle division deployed in Tajikistan was transformed into a military base. 23 According to different sources, the clashes between Kyrgyz and Uzbeks in the Osh Region of Kyrgyzstan in June 2010 caused between 400 and 2,000 deaths.

Volume 8 Issue 1-2 2014 23 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION certain role in this situation was played by the counterterrorist operation of the United States and its allies in Afghanistan. The operation in Afghanistan transformed Kyrgyzstan, under an intergovernmental agreement, into one of the outposts of the Western coalition: in December 2001, the Manas airport was transformed into an American airbase used to move supplies to the international forces in Afghanistan. By the mid-2000s, the Russian-American thaw, based on the two powers’ shared desire to bring down the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, had ended. The relations between Washington and Moscow are going from bad to worse which adds importance to America’s continued presence in the region. The Declaration of Heads of Member States of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization adopted by the 2005 Astana Summit, which insisted that the coalition identify the final dates for stationing their military contingents in the territories of the SCO members, proved this beyond doubt.24 In other words, as distinct from the 1990s, the counterterrorist operation made Kyrgyzstan an area of American- Russian rivalry. Moreover, the new people in power, President Kurmanbek Bakiev in particular, tried to capitalize on these contradictions by frequently changing their demands when dealing with the rivals. This explains Moscow’s response to the coup of 2010, which removed Bakiev from his post. At that time both President Medvedev and Prime Minister Putin were the most scything critics of the Kyrgyz president; they supported the opposition because they were very displeased with the republic’s leaders: indeed, after acquiring a Russian loan of $1.7 billion as payment for the removal of the American base from the republic, President Bakiev never fulfilled his obligation.25 Despite the obvious power imbalance between the Russian Federation and the other NIS, the repercussions of the disintegration processes across the post-Soviet space were no less painful for Russia than for the other post-Soviet states. In the 1990s, Russia lived through acute challenges to its sociopolitical cohesion. Its semi-ruined economy and profound ideological crisis, which hit the society of this once leading world power, were further exacerbated by chaos in the political system and the obvious inability of people in power to maintain law and order in the country. President Yeltsin’s two presidencies are remembered for their weak control over the developments in the country and the absence of a clear-cut strategy for recovering from the crisis. In fact, each general election caused acute political crises. During the so-called constitutional crisis of Octo- ber 1993, the Supreme Soviet was disbanded on Yeltsin’s initiative, armed forces were moved into Moscow, the building of the Supreme Soviet (the so-called White House) was stormed, and street fighting caused a lot of bloodshed. This is the best illustration of the stormy events of the 1990s. These factors added dynamics to the centrifugal trends in the national republics of the Russian Federation. In Tatarstan26 and, especially, in the republics of the Northern Caucasus, there was a lot of talk about national sovereignty and independence from Russia. In the former case, there was no bloodshed or protracted opposition. In the Northern Caucasus, on the other hand, separatism exacerbated, by regional extremism, developed into wars and the still smoldering terrorist activities. In December 1994, in an attempt to regain control over the self-proclaimed Chechen Republic of Ichkeria (1991), Russia moved its armed forces into Grozny. This triggered a bloody armed conflict known as the first Chechen war (1994-1996). The Khasaviurt Agreements, which ended it, made the very painful defeat of the Russian authorities and independence of Chechnia a fact.

24 See, for example: Declaration of the Heads of Member States of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, Astana, 5 July, 2005, available at [http://www.mid.ru/bdomp/ns-rasia.nsf/3a0108443c964002432569e7004199c0/432569d8002198 5fc32570350038d121!OpenDocument] 25 See, for example: “Kyrgyzstan: Rossia poobeshchala kredit, novaia vlast demosntriruet prorossiyskuiu orientatsiiu,” available at [http://www.fergananews.com/news.php?id=14451&mode=snews]. 26 On 30 August, 1990, the Supreme Soviet of the Tatar A.S.S.R. adopted the Declaration on State Sovereignty of the Republic of Tatarstan; in March 1992, Kazan organized a referendum on the status of the Republic of Tatarstan; over half of the republic’s population voted for sovereignty (see: “Rezultaty referenduma Respubliki Tatarstan 21 marta 1992 goda,” available at [http://www.kcn.ru/tat_ru/politics/pan_for/wb77.htm]).

24 Volume 8 Issue 1-2 2014 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION Under Putin, the disintegration of the Russian state was stemmed. Irrespective of the long-term results of his policy, it proved fairly effective at the initial stage of his activities as prime minister in 1999 and his first presidential term (2000-2004). Power in Russia was centralized under the slogans of strengthening the vertical of power and thwarting the oligarchs. The same logic was behind the second Chechen campaign initiated in 1999. The economic policy of the new Russian administration proved very fruitful. The country had finally left the 1998 crisis behind; the high world prices for energy resources filled its budget.27 No matter how successful in the short-term perspective, Russia’s policies of the early and mid- 2000s look doubtful in the long-term perspective. Vladimir Putin stemmed the seemingly inevitable disintegration of the Russian state, yet the post-Yeltsin’s administrations have failed to successfully address many problems that are growing more and more urgent in the new macro conditions. In the course of the second Chechen campaign, the federal troops established control over the entire territory of the republic, but the Northern Caucasus was not integrated into the political and economic structure of the Russian Federation. The region, which swallows huge financial sums of budget money every year, remains a source of separatism, religious extremism, and armed activities against the federal powers, especially obvious in Daghestan, Chechnia, Ingushetia, and Kabardino- Balkaria. At the very beginning of Putin’s presidency, the state established control over the influential group of oligarchs, a product of the 1990s: some of them were imprisoned (Mikhail Khodorkovskiy), others fled Russia (Boris Berezovskiy and Vladimir Gusinskiy); the larger part, however, accepted the new rules of the game. However, corruption in the higher echelons of power proved more resistant: the rule of the oligarchs was replaced with the unlimited arbitrariness of bureaucrats and new forms of merging power and business. The Rosoboronservis Case (2012) and embezzlements among those involved in the preparations for the Sochi 2014 Olympics were the prominent corruption scandals of recent times. In the mid-2000s, economic development allowed the Russian Federation to pay off its huge foreign debt and build up impressive international reserves; the country, however, remained technologically backward and dependent on energy exports. The world economic crisis of 2008 laid bare its vulnerabilities; the lower oil prices and flight of foreign capital decreased incomes and made it much harder to meet social obligations (which increased in the prosperous 2000s) and invest in other spheres, including the military-industrial complex. The Ukrainian crisis of 2014, the American and European sanctions, and the related negative macroeconomic conditions present more gloomy prospects for Russia’s economy. The social effect of the above, as well as the worsened macro conditions of the late 2000s, strongly affected the stability of the Russian political elite. Elections brought to mind the Yeltsin era. The elections to the State Duma in December 2011 and the presidential election of May 2012 brought the lowest share of votes for Edinaia Rossia as party in power (52.8%) and for Putin (63.6%). The parliamentary elections stirred up mass protests against falsifications, including huge manifestations in Moscow.28 The Table above shows that the states of the PSM are characterized by a relatively low level of social and political cohesion; there is also an obvious asymmetry in the economic and military components of strength/weakness. Russia is the only power fully involved in the PSM; this means that it should be regarded as an asymmetrical RSS. It is even more important to bear in mind that this is related to an obvious power

27 In July 2008, Russia’s gold and currency reserves amounted to $595.6 billion (see: Zolotovalyutnye rezervy RF, available at [http://capital.ru/macro/zvr.php]). 28 According to certain sources, the meeting of the opposition on Bolotnaia Square, which took place on 10 December, 2011 was the largest since the beginning of the 1990s (see: “A Russian Awakening,” The Economist, 11 December, 2011, available at [http://www.economist.com/blogs/easternapproaches/2011/12/protest-russia-0]).

Volume 8 Issue 1-2 2014 25 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION asymmetry: there is a huge gap between the key parameters of the national power of Russia and the other PSM states. The quoted figures provide an idea of how wide the gap is. The far from simple post-Soviet transit did not deprive Russia of its power status, even though exacerbated vulnerabilities do not allow us to describe it as “strong as a state.” I have already described Russia’s post-Soviet social, political, and economic problems. It is, however, less vulnerable to other PSM members, which are, on the contrary, more vulnerable to it. This means that the asymmetry of power is complemented by an asymmetry of vulnerabilities, which affects the way states perceive each other and their conduct within the system. This means that PSM is a negatively asymmetrical RSS. The same fully applies to its three sub-complexes. Belarus stands apart in the European sub-complex where social and political cohesion is concerned; the threats to its internal stability are much more subdued than in the two other states. The relatively conflict-free post-Soviet development supplies additional empirical arguments to this opinion. Ukraine and Moldova differ greatly from Belarus: social disintegration in both is very obvious as a security threat. In Moldova, the conflict in Transnistria ended with a de facto separation of the population living in about 12% of its territory. This can hardly be exhaustively explained by ethnic terms since about 30% of those living in the self-proclaimed Transnistria Moldavian Republic are ethnic Moldovans, the titular ethnicity in the Republic of Moldova. Until the events of the spring of 2014, Ukraine remained politically united. It should be said that the situation in Crimea might lead to a much more impressive split along the West-East line; this is confirmed by present armed separatism in Donetsk and Lugansk. Very much like in Moldova, the Ukrainian spilt cannot be assessed within one, say, ethnic parameter. In Ukraine it is diluted with political and Church segments. In both states, a big part of their populations wants closer ties with Russia or even integration with it. In 2005-1010, under Yushchenko when the country was clearly moving to NATO and the European Union, the protest activity of ethnic Russians as well as Ukrainians was very high. The Yushchenko presidency was dotted with practically never ending anti-government rallies. Early in 2014, when pro-Western politicians (campaigning for European integration and NATO membership) came to power in Kiev tension in the pro-Russian Southeast increased. The protracted church crisis in Ukraine caused by a split in Ukrainian Orthodoxy into supporters of the Kiev and Moscow patri- archates has acquired obvious political hues.29 In Moldova and Ukraine the unfavorable social and political context, as compared with Belarus, will extend into the near future. Despite the very specific regime of President Lukashenko in Belarus which invites internal and external pressure, the challenges to cohesion in this country are less acute than in its neighbors in the PSM’s European sub-complex. Combinations of endogenous and exogenous factors produce different effects. No destabilization of the Belorussian regime or even social and political split will be burdened by an ethnic split as in Moldova or ethnic and Church complications as in Ukraine. Moreover, the external factor will have a different effect on any developments in these countries. In view of the relatively stable pro-Russian political identity of Belarus,30 Russia will move in to help it in the event of any danger. This cannot be applied to “Russian geopolitics” in similar situations in Ukraine and Moldova, which are striving for European integration. The structural asymmetry in the PSM’s European sub-complex is reflected in the states’ different economic and military parameters of national strength. The table shows that these differences between Ukraine, on the one hand, and Belarus and Moldova, on the other, are very noticeable and

29 Kiev wants to make Ukrainian Orthodoxy autonomous; it is believed that a unified local Orthodox Church (Viktor Yushchenko spoke about it in July 2008 at the celebrations of the 1020th anniversary of the Christianization of Rus) will decrease the influence of the Russian Orthodox Church and increase the religious distance between Russia and Ukraine. 30 Throughout the post-Soviet period, Belarus was and remains the most Russia-oriented of the post-Soviet states. It participates in all the key Kremlin-initiated reintegration projects (the CIS, the CSTO, the Union State of Russia and Belarus, the EurAsEC, the Customs Union, the Common Economic Space, and the Eurasian Economic Union).

26 Volume 8 Issue 1-2 2014 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION look more favorable for Ukraine than for the two other countries. At the same time, the military-political configuration in this triad is largely generated from the outside. The TRSC’s logic of the region- ally concentrated interdependence within this RSC suggests that the main line of competition should run between Ukraine and Belarus, the strongest states in the complex. But this is true only within the RSC investigated outside the PSM system. This means that in reality the competition within the dyad is supported by the relations between each of the states and the Russian Federation. According to the integrated indices of national power, Ukraine is Russia’s most important rival in the post-Soviet space. In fact, Ukraine and Moldova have acquired a fairly strong perception of Russia as a negative factor to their security. A no less obvious structural asymmetry is present in two other PSM sub-complexes— in the Caucasus and Central Asia. In this case, too, the different levels of sociopolitical cohesion of the states complement the unstable structure of the regions with different military and economic parameters of their national strength. The three states of the PSM’s Caucasian sub-complex remain aware of the vulnerability of their sociopolitical cohesion associated with their neighbors’ purposeful activities. As a result of the armed conflicts in the early 1990s, Georgia and Azerbaijan lost control over parts of their territories populated by ethnic minorities. In Georgia, internal tension is maintained by its relations with Russia, which in August 2008 developed into military action. Georgia’s relatively weak economy is another potential source of internal conflicts. This means that its sociopolitical cohesion faces much graver challenges than that of its two neighbors. Armenia is less vulnerable socially and politically than Azerbaijan because, among other things, it is relatively more homogenous ethnically and religiously. However, the two countries are negatively interdependent regarding the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh; this and Armenia’s scanty economic potential and its dependence on external actors equalize the instability potential in the sociopolitical sphere of these states. As a result of the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh, Azerbaijan lost about one fifth of its territory (the part, which is very important in the cultural-civilizational respect). During the war of 1991- 1993, each of Armenia’s military successes plunged Azerbaijan into a grave political crisis and regime change. Today, the Nagorno-Karabakh issue remains the most important factor of the split/unity of Azerbaijani society. Armenia, which established its de facto control over this region of Azerbaijan with its predominantly Armenian population, has to spend more on the unfolding arms race with Azerbaijan very much in line with the logic of the security dilemma. Moreover, it has become much more dependent for its security on external actors (Russia); it is excluded from all the economically profitable transportation and energy trans-regional projects and is living in anticipation of renewed armed combat with its economically stronger opponent. For obvious reasons, this cannot be regarded as a positive factor in Armenia’s social and political sphere. And the presidential elections of 2008 and 2013 demonstrated the split in Armenian society.31 The Nagorno-Karabakh issue, which keeps the security spheres of both states intertwined, affects the dynamics of their military-political rivalry in the region. This phenomenon also explains the asymmetry of strength between them. Both Armenia and Azerbaijan regard this territory as a vitally important component of their national security. Azerbaijan treats it as part of its territory according to international law; its loss might

31 At the 2008 presidential election, the protest electorate voted for Western-orientated Levon Ter-Petrosian, who wanted to decrease the country’s dependence on Russia. According to the official figures, he received 21.5% of the votes, while Serzh Sargsian, who ran for the ruling party, received 52.8%. The opposition accused the government of falsifications and staged massive protest rallies across the country. Their suppression cost ten people their lives; a state of emergency was declared. At the 2013 presidential election, the ruling party represented by Sargsian received 58.6% of the votes, while the opposition candidate, R. Ovannisian, who ran with slogans of integration with the West and less dependence on Russia, received 36.7%.

Volume 8 Issue 1-2 2014 27 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION weaken its position in the regional balance of power. Given the military-strategic specifics of Azerbai- jan’s central and western parts and Armenia’s military-technical capabilities, Armenia’s continued military control of Nagorno-Karabakh (even if Azerbaijan restores its sovereignty over the valley regions of Karabakh) will threaten a large part of Azerbaijan’s territory (crisscrossed by Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipelines and Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum gas pipeline—the main sources of the republic’s income). At the same time, as most other multinational states, Azerbaijan cannot relinquish part of its territory in order to avoid a possible domino effect; other compact ethnic communities might try to detach themselves from Azerbaijan. In 1993, the country found itself on the brink of similar developments when there were attempts to set up a Talysh-Mugan Republic in the southeast of Azerbaijan. Armenia, in turn, is seeking control of Nagorno-Karabakh because of its mainly Armenian population, which fears continued Azeri sovereignty over this territory.32 There is another, structural- political explanation of Armenia’s continued occupation of the southwest of Azerbaijan. According to the aggregate indices of its national power (territory, population, and resources), Armenia is much weaker than Azerbaijan. To compensate for the imbalance and in view of the far from simple previous relations, Armenia needed military-strategic advantages in the form of control over the strategically important Nagorno-Karabakh with its predominantly Armenian population. Today, the Armenian-Azerbaijan dyad demonstrates the region’s severest security dilemma accompanied by the biggest, at the regional level, arms race. The strength asymmetry between them is most acutely felt in military and economic disparities. According to the official figures (see Table), Azerbaijan outstrips Armenia in all the indices related to armed forces. However, the real correlation calls for keeping in mind the potentials of the Armenian armed units in Nagorno-Karabakh and around it.33 This makes the situation very different: the Armenian side has many more tanks, armored vehicles, and guns; the numerical strength of the sides’ armed forces is more or less equal. The logic of geography suggests that these components are of key importance in the real military balance between these two states. Economically, Azerbaijan is much stronger. Its military budget is four times larger than Arme- nia’s; the gap will probably widen thanks to Azerbaijan’s faster economic growth. However, in the future, the reliance of Azerbaijan’s economy on the revenues from the export and transportation of energy resources might develop into a problem.34 What is more, relations within the Armenia-Azerbaijan dyad and the balance of military power among them cannot be correctly assessed without taking into account the Russian factor. It figures prominently at all stages of the conflict and not necessarily as a peaceful factor. This was true of the Russian Empire (the events of 1905), after its disintegration and the emergence of independent states in 1918, after the Soviet Union’s disintegration, and at present. In fact, the former metropolitan country took advantage of the Nagorno-Karabakh problem to keep both independent states at its side. This largely explains Azerbaijan’s military defeat in the early 1990s and remains prominent in Armenia’s huge military-technical and economic dependence on Russia, de facto payment for the security guarantees Russia provides. This side of the military-political confrontation between the two states is rarely mentioned in official political rhetoric; however, Baku must take it into account when planning military expenditures. This explains, to some extent, the huge sums Baku spends on military buildup. Burdened with economic problems, Georgia also spends a lot on military purposes; as in the states of the PSM’s European sub-complex, this is caused not so much by its neighbors in the sub-

32 See, for example: H. Tchlingirian, “Nagorno-Karabagh: Transition and the Elite,” Central Asian Survey, No. 18 (4), 1999, p. 445. 33 This assessment of Armenia’s military potential should be complemented with informal military units in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan presented as the “self-defense forces of Nagorno-Karabakh:” there are about 18 thousand people, 316 tanks, 324 armored vehicles, and 322 guns. 34 According to official statistics, in 2012 the share of the oil and gas industry in Azerbaijan’s GDP was 43.2% (see: The State Statistical Committee of the Republic of Azerbaijan, available at [http://www.stat.gov.az/source/azfigures/indexen.php]).

28 Volume 8 Issue 1-2 2014 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION region as by its relations with Russia, or, rather, the separatist regimes of South Ossetia and Abkhazia supported by the Russian Federation. At the same time, it is wrong to exclude possible complications of structural asymmetry in the other dyads in which Georgia is involved: we cannot exclude complications in the Georgia-Armenia dyad over the continued disagreement in Samtske-Javakheti with its Armenian population and, at the same time, the development of mutually advantageous economic cooperation with Azerbaijan. The Table demonstrates that Kazakhstan occupies the most favorable position in the PSM’s Central Asian sub-complex. The state’s highest ethnic and confessional heterogeneity is downplayed by the economic factor and the predominantly cooperative relations with the external powers. The unregulated legal status of the Caspian and the resultant vagueness of the marine borders between the five Caspian states (Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Turkmenistan) are the sources of the main challenges. The same can be said about its border disputes and struggle for regional leadership with Uzbekistan. The global economic crisis that began in 2008 hit Kazakhstan; if negative scenarios prevail, the country might lose the economic mechanisms that allow it to “defuse” the objective social tension; this will widen the range of real threats to the country’s social and political stability. Some of the states of the Central Asian sub-complex have their own economic mechanisms they use to deal with internal problems. Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan rely on the export of their oil and gas resources as the easiest way to defuse domestic tension.35 In both cases, the situation is complicated by their harsh and relatively isolated political regimes and the problems of fair distribution of social boons (corruption being one such problem). Both states, very much like Tajikistan, have common land borders with Afghanistan, which makes them vulnerable to Afghan instability. In this respect, Turkmenistan enjoys much better internal and external conditions.  First, in terms of the volume of extracted and exported natural gas, it, along with Russia and Uzbekistan, is one of the leaders among the post-Soviet states. Its small population is another advantage, especially in comparison with Uzbekistan: despite its energy exports, its population, the largest in Central Asia (it is five times larger than the population of Turk- menistan), makes it much harder to cope with the numerous internal problems.  Second, Turkmenistan’s foreign policy course is much more consistent: it remains loyal to its neutral status, recognized by the world community in 1995; its relations with the strongest powers are balanced and relatively stable. Uzbekistan can be described in opposite terms: throughout the short history of its independence, it has performed several U-turns: in 1999 and in 2005, it changed its foreign policy orientation from pro-Russian to pro-Western and back. Both have learned to look at Tashkent as a whimsical ally. Besides, this is the only Central Asian state that has security problems with all the region’s states. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are trailing behind the others in terms of building strong states. They have lived through the most serious civil crises. The civil war in Tajikistan and two revolutions (in 2005 and 2010) in Kyrgyzstan are the most glaring examples of the statehood crisis. There are many other internal and external factors that complicate the situation still further.  First, as distinct from Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, they have fewer potentially profitable natural resources that could be quickly exploited without big investments.36  Second, they are much more affected by radical religious trends, which, in the past, have caused armed conflicts: the civil war in Tajikistan with its prominent religious factor and the Batken events in Kyrgyzstan.

35 Turkmenistan owns 9.4% of the world’s explored reserves of natural gas, while Uzbekistan owns 0.6% (information as of the end of 2013) (see: BP Statistical Review of World Energy. June 2014, p. 20). 36 Hydropower is the main energy resource of Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, yet it is less profitable than oil and gas.

Volume 8 Issue 1-2 2014 29 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

 Third, they are easily affected by external political impacts because of the factors enumer- ated above and their economic and military dependence on external actors. The general picture of structural asymmetry within the Central Asian sub-complex is further affected by the states’ very different military and economic strength. This means that all the regional dyads demonstrate the functionality of the security dilemma to different extents. At the same time, the states are demonstrating more restraint in their conduct than the countries of the Caucasian sub- complex. One can connect this with the region’s much more homogenous ethnic, linguistic, and confessional structure, which plays down enmity in the security relations of the regional states. The Uzbekistan-Tajikistan dyad demonstrates the most obvious elements of interstate conflict potential. Tajikistan, which is inferior to Uzbekistan in terms of most of the national strength parameters, has had to move closer to or, rather, agree to accept Russia’s protection, which caused concern in Uzbekistan. The agreement of April 1999 between Russia and Tajikistan on the legal status of the Russian units stationed in Tajikistan invited accusations from President of Uzbekistan Islam Karimov, who insisted that Moscow had to coordinate this with all the other Central Asian states.37 The same year, Uzbekistan left the CST and moved closer to the West, a shift probably caused among other factors by the Russian-Tajik agreement. The moves within the Uzbekistan-Tajikistan dyad are also explained by ethnic and territorial disagreements and the transborder activity of radical Islamic organizations (the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, Hizb ut-Tahrir, and others).38 Relations between Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan are less vehement, but they are no less important for the region’s structural (in)stability. Both countries can claim the role of regional leader in terms of their aggregate indices of national strength. What Kenneth Waltz has written about “the vicious circle of security dilemma” can be applied to relations in the Kazakhstan-Uzbekistan dyad. Oil and gas have made Kazakhstan the economic leader in the region, a process accompanied by strengthening the military components of its national strength. At the early stages, Uzbekistan, the economy of which was much weaker than Kazakhstan’s, had several important advantages that allowed it to claim the role of regional leader. First, it is the only Central Asian state that borders on all the other states of the region and has no common border with any of the powers outside the region. Second, its population, the region’s largest, is the most homogenous ethnically (it is nearly twice as large as the population of Kazakhstan; the correlation between the titular and non-titular ethnicities in Uzbekistan is more favorable from the point of view of ethnopolitical stability than in Kazakhstan, where the same factor is the region’s least favorable). These advantages are causing concern, sometimes justified by Tashkent’s behavior, in its neighbors. This concern is further exacerbated by the huge number of disagreements over borders and water supplies. While Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, the region’s poorest countries, confronted with a deficit of strength in their dealings with Uzbekistan, had no choice but to accept Russia’s patronage and allow its military bases in their territories, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, the richest states, placed their stakes on a qualitative and quantitative improvement of their military potentials. The political system in the post-Soviet space has been developing in conditions that can hardly promote maturity of interstate relations. This space is a melee of ethnicities and religions crossed by the dividing line between Ortho- doxy, Western Christianity, and Islam (a clash of civilizations, to borrow the term from Huntington). Relations between the political units of PSM did not promote their political maturity: as independent national states, the political units of its subsystems cannot boast any long experience of independent existence: throughout their histories, the local ethnicities were parts of different imperial

37 See: R. Burnashev, “Regional Security in Central Asia: Military Aspects,” in: Central Asia. A Gathering Storm? ed. by Boris Rumer, M.E. Sharpe, New York, 2002, p. 157. 38 Tashkent continues to accuse Dushanbe of transborder movements of radical religious groups from Tajikistan to Uzbekistan. This is the key issue on the agenda of their bilateral relations.

30 Volume 8 Issue 1-2 2014 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION systems. As the heartland (to borrow the term from Mackinder), they were a desirable target for several powers—Russia, Turkey, Iran, China, and the West. The mechanisms they used to achieve victory—migration, shifting borders, and manipulating the relations among the local ethnicities according to the classical divide and rule pattern—did nothing to promote good-neighborly relations in the regions. The aftermaths still figure prominently in interstate relations. In addition, in the post- Soviet period, Central Eurasia remains a very attractive geopolitical aim and the local states are still targets of power projection by the strongest of the outside players. Russia, the last of the powers uniting the now independent states as parts of its imperial system, and their relations are very much affected by historical memory and corresponding practices. Since the early 1990s, the Russian Federation has been talking about the region as a “zone of its influence,” which causes apprehension in the independent states. The still unresolved conflicts in the post-Sovi- et space (Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Transnistria) and the recent events in the Crimea and the Donetsk and Lugansk regions of Ukraine are being more and more frequently associated with Russia’s geopolitics. In fact, economic factors, in particular regional energy and transportation projects, brought the PSM states closer together, although this has not helped resolve the security dilemmas so far and has not been conducive to regional cooperation on the basis of economic interdependence.

Political Environment of the Negatively Asymmetrical Regional System

Any system presupposes that there is interdependence among its elements and that it should, first, incorporate all the essential aspects of these elements and, second, be stronger than the interdependence between these elements and external actors; this makes it possible to identify a structure, a system, and its environment. I rely on the mechanism of powers’ partial involvement in RSSs to explain why ties and relations with external actors are as important for some of the RSSs as those that exist among the RSS members. This mechanism makes it easier to understand the specifics of regionalization in the globalizing and increasingly interdependent world. In the international political system, the powers, as holder of the special interests and capabilities of projection, look like key centers that tie together all sorts of regional systems into a web of global interdependence. As part of one of the RSS, a power, being partially involved in other regional systems, joins its own RSS with all others. At the same time, the concept of the system’s political environment should not be limited to the influence of partially involved powers. The border between two RSSs can be formed by components described as an “indifference zone” in the TRSC. They may be either “insulator-states” or states of the second RSS, the geographic proximity of which to the first regional system is accompanied by a considerably lower level of interdependence with actors of the second RSS rather than with each other. In other words, the political environment of RSS may be formed by partially involved powers, “insulator-states”, as well as states-participants of other RSS that are relatively indifferent to the security dynamics in the discussed regional system. The partially involved powers are the most active components of the political environment of RSS, which means that the specifics of their impact should be assessed in the first place, while considering the ties between the system and its political environment PSM is a unipolar RSS; this is the key description of structural asymmetry of the macroregion. Russia is the only power that is fully involved in PSM. But for all that, the post-Soviet space has an active political environment: there are five partially involved power centers—China, Iran, Turkey, the EU, and the U.S. The specifics of the PSM’s political structure and environment allow us to discuss its tendency to transit. Volume 8 Issue 1-2 2014 31 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION I have already written in the first section of my paper that armed conflicts are the key indicator of the system’s instability, which is responsible for its transitivity. Throughout its history, PSM has been associated with armed conflict potential spreading far and wide beyond its sub-complexes (Transnistria, Southeast Ukraine, Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Ferghana and Tajikistan) to become more or less prominent in Russia (the Northern Caucasus), the only pole in the PSM’s structure. There are other specific features (the economy, technology, and political regimes) of this macroregion, which describe it as a negatively asymmetric RSS. The history of PSM is primarily the efforts of its only pole to preserve its control over its space. In the 1990s, Russia was not strong enough to restore the old forms of relations with the NIS. It could, however, contain the desire of the new states, which were even weaker than Russia, to move closer to alternative centers of power. The CIS was set up to outline the zone of Moscow’s special interests in the new format of relations with the post-Soviet states. A new post-Soviet configuration of ties in the political space and the processes going on in it inevitably attracted other powers. For some of them security-related re-conceptualization of the post- Soviet space was based on geographic proximity and rooted in ethnoconfessional ties, historical memory, and geopolitical traditions (the history of relations with the region’s peoples, control over them, and the related Great Power traditions); others securitized the region as a source of threats created by disintegration and lack of control (proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, armed conflicts, international terrorism, and drug trafficking). Over the course of time, the PSM acquired more sustainable contacts with external powers, which started expanding their spheres of interest, thus affecting their domestic political discourse and regional activity. In the 2000s, the stronger vertical of power and greater petrol revenues stabilized the Russian Federation and made its policy in the Near Abroad more determined. To gradually reintegrate the post-Soviet space, Moscow initiated the EurAsEC in 2000, the Customs Union in 2009, and the Eur- asian Economic Union in 2014. Its newly found determination to oppose those newly independent states that sought deeper relations with the external powers increased the tension in and around the macroregion. It is very obvious that there are the links between the developing integration dialog between NATO and the EU and Georgia and Ukraine, on the one hand, and the Russian-Georgian war of 2008, as well as annexation of Crimea and the wave of separatism in the Donetsk and Lugansk regions bordering on Russia in 2014, on the other. The continued confrontation between the RF and the West is one of the results. It is absolutely clear that the independent status of the post-Soviet NIS is ensured not only by Moscow’s internal weakness and deficit of necessary resources to be used for reintegration, but also by the involvement of other powers in PSM. Nation-states emerged, first, in the space of the Russian Empire (the European part and the Caucasus) and then in the post-Soviet space (Central Asia) in the 20th century. These were periods of the regions’ relative geopolitical openness. The logic is simple: the more open and more pluralistic the geopolitical space, the more opportunities it creates for the emergence of sustainable political actors and, most importantly, of mutual contacts and relations, and, vice versa, the fewer are the chances for its unilateral monopolization. In conditions of PSM negative asymmetry, the activeness of its political environment becomes extremely important for its future. The above descriptions of the negatively asymmetric systems mean that they cannot be regarded as a long-term sustainable type of the region’s political order. These RSSs are moving toward more stable structural organization: either symmetrical or positively asymmetrical regional systems. The movement of RSSs away from negative asymmetry to a symmetrical structure cannot be smooth. It presupposes disintegration and reunification of states, which, in turn, may, and probably will, be accompanied by armed conflicts. The movement toward positive asymmetry, for instance, preserves unipolarity (in the case of PSM), yet an evolution of security relations in this direction does not exclude the use of force. 32 Volume 8 Issue 1-2 2014 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION I have already written that in a negatively asymmetric RSS, its tendency toward conflict is generated not only by asymmetry of strength, but also by internal weakness of the states involved and their acute awareness of their vulnerabilities. This is the main driving force of rivalry, war and security dilemmas being its extreme forms. In the current structural conditions, to lower its vulnerability and neutralize what looks like external threats, the system’s only pole should seek control of the system up to and including its strictly hierarchical arrangement. The history of this macroregion offers enough facts and arguments: the events of the 1920s, when Bolshevist Russia swallowed the states that emerged on the ruins of the Russian Empire, and the events of the 1990s and 2000s, when the Russian Federation tried to keep the CIS countries within its geopolitical orbit, the apogee of which was the events of August 2008 in Georgia and the spring of 2014 in Ukraine. Integrated by force, a regional system might, for a certain period of time, demonstrate a lower level of conflict potential or even stabilization. The Soviet Union stabilized the system, but this revolutionary stabilization lasted as long as the center and its coercive force remained functional. Late in the 1980s, these potentials weakened; the region returned to the predominantly negative dynamics of security relations with the usual patterns of amity/enmity and conflict potential. The European Union has demonstrated that amalgamation by force cannot be consistently stable. For many centuries, the peoples of Europe lived in different empires, but the hierarchical systems based on force did not made their relations mature or the corresponding political structure more stable. When moving toward cooperation, the sovereign European states took a path leading away from regional conflict formations to a security community. PSM’s active political environment is an important factor that makes it hard to stabilize the system by force as mentioned above.The involved powers balance out the system and help stabilize its structure, without which its evolution toward maturity, moderation and peaceful security relations among the involved states and, consequently, toward a positive RSS can hardly be possible.

Conclusion

When looking at the post-Soviet space as a regional security system, we wonder whether it is stable and, if so, to what extent. The answer will bring us closer to a correct understanding of not only its general prospects, but also of many particular problems, conflict potential dynamics being one of them. The RSS political structures and environment are the most important, but not the only factors of its stability/transitivity. Here I have limited myself to an assessment (based on the post-Soviet space case) of how these factors influence the RSS’s transitivity. The Soviet Union’s disintegration, which became increasingly obvious toward the late 1980s, ended in the early 1990s with a transfer to an anarchically organized RSS. Its political structure remained highly unstable; weak and vulnerable states, as well as the cardinal asymmetry in social, political, military, and economic components of their strength were supplemented by highly immature relations among them. The extremely wide gap between the economic and military might of the Russian Federation and the other NIS made the system unipolar. At the same time, Russia’s acute internal problems kept it close to the other socially and politically weak states. This exacerbated its awareness of vulnerability and conflict dynamics in relations within the macroregion. Therefore, the security system in the post-Soviet space can be described as a negatively asymmetric RSS. It started as such in the 1990s, and it is lingering at the same level today. The armed conflicts (Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the Northern Caucasus, Tajikistan, Transnistria, and Southeastern Ukraine) that accompanied the development of the Post- Soviet Security Macrocomplex are the most obvious indicators of its structural instability. The conflicts of the 1990s have not been resolved, while new forms of conflict have appeared: the Georgian war of 2008; the annexation of Crimea; and the current armed confrontation in Southeastern Ukraine. Volume 8 Issue 1-2 2014 33 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION PSM is an open RSS; its political environment consists of the most influential poles of power of the contemporary world. Their active involvement in the region is based on their security interests. From this it follows that the system is functioning and developing under strong external pressure. The existing structural instability in PSM brings it closer to a transit potentially accompanied by changes both in the fundamental distribution of power and in the nature of the security relations among the states involved. In the former case, the range of possibilities offers either integration with the neighboring powers (in this case, the single pole engulfs the system) or its transformation into a symmetrical RSS. The latter case presupposes gradually maturing security relations among the system’s members and preservation of power asymmetry, that is, evolution toward a positively asymmetrical RSS. Evolution toward the positive RSS types is more desirable from the point of view of long-term stability. However, the 20th-century history of this space shows that the gradual maturing of security relations in the RSS might be disrupted by its enforced amalgamation. The power imbalance is too great, while the desire of the system’s only pole to revive its Great Power status in the context of its weakness and acute awareness of its vulnerability is strong enough to initiate extraordinary, up to and including military, activity. The August war of 2008 and the events in Ukraine in 2014 (to which I have repeatedly referred above) are important not only to postulate the possibility of further similar developments, but also to point out that other powers should interfere for the purpose of containment. PSM’s active political environment, which balances out its structure, also limits the possibility of reintegration with the use of force; this provides conditions for its natural evolution toward maturity in security relations, a sine qua non of the development of positive RSSs.

Alexander DUDNIK

Ph.D. (Hist.), Senior Researcher of the Foundation of Ukrainian Presidents at the Vernadsky National Library of Ukraine (Kiev, Ukraine).

THE NAGORNO-KARABAKH ISSUE IN UKRAINIAN FOREIGN POLICY (1992-2012) Part Two

THE NAGORNO-KARABAKH ISSUE IN UKRAINIAN FOREIGN POLICY UNDER PRESIDENT VIKTOR YUSHCHENKO (2005-2009)

Viktor Yushchenko became the second president of Ukraine after Leonid Kravchuk and un- equivocally oriented the country toward European integration. Moreover, it was during his presi- 34 Volume 8 Issue 1-2 2014 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION dency that official state documents, particularly the new version of the Ukrainian military doctrine (2005), indicated for the first time that Ukrainian-NATO and Ukrainian-European Union cooperation was aimed conclusively at the country’s Euro-Atlantic integration. This meant that Ukraine officially rejected the status of a non-bloc state. In 2008, Viktor Yushchenko, along with Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili, made an attempt to sign a Membership Action Plan (MAP) with NATO, that is, obtain for Ukraine the status of associate member or accession country in the North Atlantic Alliance.

New Directions, Priorities, and Approaches in Ukrainian Foreign Policy

For the purpose of Euro-Atlantic integration under Viktor Yushchenko, Ukraine tried to act like a regional leader, primarily intensifying and stepping up its activity in subregional integration in the post-Soviet expanse in the Black Sea-Caspian Region (BCR). In the words of Viktor Yushchenko, Ukraine’s new regional policy was to become one of the key elements of the state’s European and Euro-Atlantic integration. The main focus was placed on intensifying economic cooperation and improving Ukraine’s international image, as well as on making maximum use of its potential as a reliable country in ensuring stability and security in the Black Sea-Caspian Region.1 With this in mind, GUAM was transformed into an international organization. At the founding summit of the Organization for Democracy and Economic Development-GUAM (ODED-GUAM) in May 2006 in Kiev, Viktor Yush- chenko emphasized in his speech that the organization’s new status would strengthen the position of the member states and create prerequisites for positing the organization as an integral part of international security. So one of the Organization’s primary tasks was to guarantee security and stability in the region. It was emphasized that the unsettled conflicts in the GUAM states could only be resolved by means of joint efforts. The states also confirmed their willingness to engage in active and constructive interaction in this area with the EU, OSCE, RF, and other states and international organizations.2 At the same time, Ukraine began to move out of the sphere of Russian influence in its regional policy. Whereas the previous Ukrainian leadership and country’s political elite always took the Krem- lin’s reaction into account, under Viktor Yushchenko the country began to back away from this tradition, which irritated the Russian Federation. Viktor Yushchenko’s striving to make Ukraine a regional center that could become an alternative to the CIS for other states in the post-Soviet expanse did not sit well with the Kremlin. However, Kiev tried to develop partnership, friendly, and good- neighborly relations on equal conditions with the Russian Federation.3 The peacekeeping policy aimed at looking for ways to settle the conflicts in Transnistria and the Central Caucasus, including the Nagorno-Karabakh issue, became a priority focus in Ukrainian foreign policy aimed at helping Kiev to acquire the status of leader in the CIS and, in particular, in the BCR. Since 2007, Ukraine’s position in the Nagorno-Karabakh issue has been determined by Ukraine’s National Security Strategy (approved by a presidential decree of 27 February, 2007). According to this document, the main priorities of regional cooperation in the BCR are: establishing democracy and security, expanding and intensifying cooperation within the Democratic Choice Community and ODED-GUAM, stepping up interaction with European regional organizations, participating in the implementation of multilateral projects, and forming subregional collective security systems in the

1 See: “V. Yushchenko: Achievements and Blunders,” available in Ukrainian at [www.oa.edu.ua/doc/policy/analit/ a1_07.doc]. 2 See: Ukraine in International Organizations: Textbook, ed. by Iu. Makar, PRUT Publishers, Chernovtsy, 2009, p. 571 (in Ukrainian). 3 See: “V. Yushchenko: Achievements and Blunders.”

Volume 8 Issue 1-2 2014 35 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION interests of all the states of the region. The strategy envisaged that Ukraine should remain an active participant in the settlement of the frozen conflicts in the BCR.4 The country’s leadership proceeded from the fact that the settlement of these conflicts should be based on respect for the generally accepted democratic principles: rule of law, fundamental free- doms, and the sovereignty and territorial integrity of states within the framework of peaceful negotiations. In order to ensure that peaceful settlement was open and transparent, Kiev, as before, placed priority on the extensive involvement of specialized international organizations and influential Euro- pean players, one of which it thought to be the European Union (EU).5 As a result, in February 2007, Kiev joined the Caucasian-Caspian Commission created by the EU for developing Brussels’ new approaches to policy in the BCR. Political and public figures of Azerbaijan, Russia, the U.S., Great Britain, Georgia, Armenia, Germany, Lithuania, Slovenia, Turkey, Iran, and other countries were also members of the Commission. Kiev regarded Azerbaijan as an important strategic partner with which it intended to intensify and improve existing bilateral relations. Ukraine began insisting on more active resolution of the Na- gorno-Karabakh conflict without interference by other states in the internal affairs of the opposing sides and based on the generally accepted regulations and principles of international law: respect for sovereignty, territorial integrity, inviolability of international state borders, as well as execution of the corresponding U.N. SC resolutions and OSCE decisions.6 Ukraine also stated that it considered Azerbai- jan’s position on resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict to be justified (this primarily applied to liberation of part of the occupied Azeri territory, return of refugees, and determination of the status of Nagorno-Karabakh under international guarantee and with a high degree of autonomy)7 and actively supported it within the framework of international organizations.8 This was stated in 2005-2007 by President Viktor Yushchenko, Ukrainian Foreign Minister Boris Tarasiuk, and secretaries of the Ukrai- nian National Security and Defense Council (UNSDC) Pyotr Poroshenko and Anatoli Kinakh at international forums, joint briefings, and meetings with their Azeri colleagues, and even students. Despite the fact that Ukraine refused the status of a non-bloc state, Kiev’s impartibility gave it an advantage in regulating the conflicts in the GUAM area, particularly the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Moreover, the leaders of Azerbaijan and Armenia, as well as of Georgia and Moldova, encouraged Ukraine’s mediating and peacekeeping efforts. These states wanted to see a more balanced and objective approach to conflict settlement, keeping in mind the constant accusations, including from the U.N., that Russia was interfering in the internal affairs of these states and supporting the separatist movements. At the same time, Ukraine’s successful mediation in the conflicts in the GUAM area could have raised its international authority and helped it to become a regional leader.9

Ukrainian Initiatives and Their Implementation Under Viktor Yushchenko, Ukraine put forward three initiatives for resolving the Azerbaijani- Armenian conflict. First, in view of Ukraine’s successful participation in peacekeeping missions

4 See: Decree of the Ukrainian President of 12 February, 2007, No. 105/2007 on the National Security Strategy of Ukraine, available in Ukrainian at [http://www.president.gov.ua/documents/5728.html]. 5 See: Ibidem. 6 See: Ukraine Supports the Initiative of the Azeri Side in the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict—interview with Viktor Yush- chenko, available in Ukrainian at [http://www.president.gov.ua/news/data/17_10165.html]. 7 See: “Azerbaijan is Willing to Grant Karabakh a Very High Degree of Autonomy,” available in Ukrainian at [http:// www.day.kiev.ua/141665/]. 8 See: “Ukraine Considers Azerbaijan’s Position in the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict to be Justified,” available in Ukrai- nian at [http://ua.proua.com/news/2005/05/19/132237.html]. 9 See: G. Shelest, “The Prospects for Involving Ukraine in Settlement of the Conflicts in the Caucasus,” available in Ukrainian at [www.niss.od.ua/p/205.doc].

36 Volume 8 Issue 1-2 2014 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION under the U.N. and NATO aegis, Kiev suggested sending Ukrainian peacekeepers to Nagorno-Kara- bakh. This was first announced in 2005 by Secretary of the Ukrainian National Security and Defense Council Pyotr Poroshenko. The corresponding proposal of the UNSDC was passed on to the government,10 while First Deputy Commander of the Ground Forces of the Ukrainian Army Lieuten- ant General V. Frolov said that the Defense Ministry might train and send peacekeepers to Nagorno- Karabakh within two months if the Supreme Rada (parliament) of Ukraine adopted such a decision.11 The Supreme Rada, in turn, was willing to agree to Ukrainian peacekeepers being included in GUAM’s peacekeeping contingent for participating in the Azeri-Armenian conflict settlement, but only with the approval and under the auspices of the U.N. or OSCE. On 2 February, 2006, Anatoli Kinakh, the new secretary of the UNSDC, said after discussing the Nagorno-Karabakh issue with President Ilham Aliev, Azerbaijani Foreign Minister E. Mame- diarov, and other Azeri officials: “…if the U.N. and European security structures adopt a decision about deploying peacekeeping contingents in Nagorno-Karabakh, Ukraine, which is well-versed in peacekeeping operations, might send its own peacekeepers there.” The UNSDC secretary emphasized that the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh must be examined with the participation of representatives of the OSCE, EU, and other international organizations and added that Ukraine’s position regarding the Nagorno-Karabakh issue remains unchanged—strict adherence to the principle of Azer- baijan’s territorial integrity and unconditional resolution of this conflict in a peaceful and democratic way.12 Kiev was also willing to offer its territory for holding talks on this question and to draw up its own peace plan similar to the one it offered on the Transnistrian question.13 Viktor Yushchenko talked about this in 2006 during a meeting with Armenian Foreign Minis- ter Vartan Oskanian during his official visit to Ukraine, emphasizing that Kiev was in favor of peaceful settlement of the conflict and willing to offer its territory for holding talks aimed at its resolution.14 In September of the same year, at a joint press conference with Ilham Aliev, Viktor Yush- chenko said: “We are willing to be the side that acts most constructively for the conflict participants in its settlement—Ukraine, as before, is offering all it has available for settling this conflict, and we ask the Azeri side to keep this in mind.”15 At that time, during a meeting with students and professors of Baku Slavic University, the Ukrainian president said that a necessary prerequisite for settling the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh was recognizing the integrity of Azerbaijan’s territory, withdrawing the troops from the occupied territory of Azerbaijan, and returning the refugees to their homeland. “Applying force or pressure to resolve this conflict is pointless. That will not yield results.” The question of the status of the Nagorno- Karabakh Autonomous Region, according to the then Ukrainian president, should be examined within the framework of a referendum but, unquestionably, keeping in mind Azerbaijan’s integrity.16 According to Viktor Yushchenko, the engagement of peacekeeping forces might also be an inviolable part of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict settlement. He confirmed that Ukraine was willing

10 See: “Poroshenko: Ukraine might Send Peacekeepers to Nagorno-Karabakh,” available in Ukrainian at [http:// ua.proua.com/news/2005/05/24/132925.html. – 2005. 24.05]. 11 See: “If Ukraine Decides to Send Peacekeepers to Nagorno-Karabakh, They Will Be Trained in Two Months,” available in Ukrainian at [http://ua.proua.com/news/2005/05/26/145222.html]. 12 See: “Resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict Must Be Carried Out Primarily in a Peaceful and Democratic Way—Anatoli Kinakh,” available in Ukrainian at [http://www.rnbo.gov.ua/news/384.html]. 13 See: G. Shelest, op. cit. 14 See: “The Karabakh Conflict May Be Resolved in Kiev,” available in Ukrainian at [http://www.obozrevatel.com/ news_print/2006/6/19/119409.htm]. 15 See: “The President Offers Ukraine in the Role of Peacekeeper,” Ukraine information portal, 8 September, 2006, available in Ukrainian at [http://hghltd.yandex.net/yandbtm?url=http]. 16 See: S. Mamedov, “Yushchenko podarit Alievu pamiatnik,” Nezavizimaia gazeta, 11 September, 2006.

Volume 8 Issue 1-2 2014 37 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION to send its peacekeepers to Azerbaijan in order to settle the conflict providing that all the undertakings would be carried out under the auspices of the OSCE or the U.N. Security Council.17 However, in 2005-2006, Moscow and Erevan evaluated Ukraine’s peacekeeping initiative in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict as an attempt by the U.S. to take advantage of Kiev’s forces and possibilities to advance its own interests in the Central Caucasus. Erevan, as the Kremlin’s strategic partner, said that Ukraine could not be a neutral side in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. In so doing, Armenia was against any peacekeeping mission, saying that the choice of peacekeepers could become a reason for conflict among the mediators themselves. After all, moving troops into the conflict region is a geopolitical task for superpowers called upon to increase their influence in a strategically important region. So the U.S., RF, and EU would end up competing with each other over this issue in order to ensure that the situation developed in the most beneficial way for themselves, which in itself could become a destabilizing factor. Erevan used the example of the conflicts in former Yugoslavia to show how ineffective peacekeeping could be. What is more, in order to discredit Ukraine as a possible mediator and peacekeeper, Armenia recalled and again began accusing Kiev of illegally sending weapons and mercenaries to Azerbaijan during the military stage of the conflict. In particular, Erevan pointed to the fact that as early as 1993 Kiev admitted in a report to the U.N. Register of Conventional Weapons to delivering 100 tanks and 10 fighter planes to Azerbaijan. It was confirmed that information had been received, both before and after this, that Kiev had been making even larger deliveries of ammunition, artillery, heavy vehicles, combat aviation, and spare parts. According to Armenian data, hundreds of Ukrainian mercenaries, who had been brought together under the aegis of a nationalist group, the Ukrainian National Assem- bly-Ukrainian National Self-Defense (UNA-UNSD), the so-called “Kiev Patriarchy,” fought on the side of Azerbaijan during the Karabakh war.18 Data from the military intelligence of the defense forces of the unrecognized “Nagorno-Karabakh Republic” were presented, according to which the largest group of Ukrainian mercenaries arrived in Baku in February 1994. With their help, claimed the Armenian side, Abulfaz Elchibei wanted to interrupt the course of the war.19 Such information is not hushed up in Ukraine, although it is more objective, but little known since recruiting mercenaries by foreigners in Ukrainian territory is prohibited. Such action was and is persecuted by the state security bodies, falling under Art 447 of the country’s Criminal Code on “Mercenarism.” However, in the fall of 1994, an entire network of mercenary recruitment in Ukraine was exposed, headed by someone known as Fidel. He supplied “soldiers of fortune” (as the mercenaries were called) to both sides in the Karabakh war.20 Despite such statements by Erevan, in 2006, the Armenian side believed that Kiev, which had been trying to strengthen relations with Erevan as much as possible, particularly by asking Armenia to participate in a promising project to transit Iranian gas to Ukraine and on to the EU countries, could potentially replace Russia in the arms delivery plans for the Armenian army.21 The third initiative by Ukraine on the part of Viktor Yushchenko in resolving the Nagorno- Karabakh conflict can be considered Kiev’s active lobbying of Baku’s interests on the international arena. Kiev tried to step up and expand examination of this question within the framework of international organizations, primarily the U.N., OSCE, GUAM and EU, in order for them to coordinate, develop, and adopt a unified policy and approach regarding settlement of the conflicts in the GUAM

17 See: “Yushchenko Says that Ukraine is Willing to Provide Its Peacekeepers for Settling the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict,” available in Ukrainian at [http://www.president.gov.ua/news/4001.html]. 18 See: S. Martirosian, “Vozmozhnye stsenarii mirotvorcheskoi operatsii v zone karabakhskogo konflikta,” available at [http://www.noravank.am/upload/pdf/144_ru.pdf]. 19 See: “Ukrainian Nazis Promise to Fight against the Armenians on the Side of Azerbaijan,” available in Russian at [http://karabakh-news.com/1071-ukrainskie-nacisty-obeshhajut-voevat.html. 05.2.2008]. 20 See: “Ukrainian Mercenaries,” available in Russian at [http://podrobnosti.ua/projects/arch/2005/09/13/243664.html], September 2005. 21 See: S. Martirosian, op. cit.

38 Volume 8 Issue 1-2 2014 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION area. The Ukrainian president called on the member countries of these organizations to take active and joint part in resolving the conflicts in the post-Soviet expanse. Efforts began with stepping up GUAM’s activity. In April 2005, the main issue discussed at the GUAM summit in Chisinau was settlement of regional conflicts—in Transnistria, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Nagorno-Karabakh. The participants in the meeting came to a unanimous conclusion: the format of the peace process in which Russia had been dominating since the beginning of the 1990s had to be changed by adding new participants to it from the U.S. and the European Union. Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliev also said: “The cave-dweller approach to their [the conflicts] settlement has no prospects. We must find a civilized mechanism to resolve these problems.”22 For this purpose, a declaration was drawn up at the Organization’s summit called “Protracted Conflicts in the GUAM Area and Their Implications for International Peace, Security, and Develop- ment.” The document was submitted to the U.N. to be added to the agenda for the 60th session of the U.N. General Assembly. It expressed concern about the fact that the protracted conflicts in the territory of the region’s countries—Moldova, Georgia, and Azerbaijan—had, for more than 15 years, been having unfavorable implications for their development, threatening their sovereignty and territorial integrity, having a detrimental effect on the lives of more than 16 million people, and creating a threat to international peace and security. However, the General Committee of the U.N. General Assembly, which forms the agenda for the supreme U.N. body, the General Assembly, did not support examination of this question. This was one of the reasons that GUAM became a full-fledged international organization. The GUAM countries, proceeding from the U.N.’s peacekeeping practice, believed that the U.N. would examine this question only if it came from a full-fledged international organization that had a direct interest in resolving such conflicts and then delegate its peacekeeping powers to its military contingent, reserv- ing only monitoring functions for itself. In 2006-2007, when GUAM became the ODED-GUAM, Ukraine significantly stepped up its activity in order to accelerate settlement of the conflict. For example, in the spring of 2006, at a press conference of the heads of the ODED-GUAM member states, President Viktor Yushchenko said that questions relating to international terrorism, separatism, extremism, and transnational organized crime were regarded as the main obstacles hindering democratic reforms and economic development. Ukraine and the other GUAM states were in favor of stepping up joint efforts to remove these obstacles, and also confirmed their willingness to engage in active and constructive cooperation with the EU and U.S. in this area.23 At that time, at the founding summit of the ODED-GUAM in Kiev, during Ukraine’s chairmanship, a joint declaration of the Organization’s member countries was revised and adopted again called “The Protracted Conflicts in the GUAM Area and Their Implications for International Peace, Security, and Development.” In the document, the heads of the four ODED-GUAM countries stated the need to settle the conflicts in the territory of the GUAM states exclusively on the basis of respect for territorial integrity and inviolability of internationally recognized borders of these states. They also emphasized that the territories of the states should not be a target of seizure or military occupation and emphasized the incom- patibility of the use of force, the practice of ethnic cleansing, and seizure of territory with universal and European values, principles, and ideals of peace, democracy, stability, and regional cooperation.24 The GUAM state leaders asked the Organization’s Foreign Ministry Council to implement the Declaration’s provisions. They proceeded from the fact that international mediation of the OSCE Minsk Group in resolving the conflicts in GUAM territory had not yielded any results,25 while the

22 See: “GUUAM Has Still Not Died—The People,” available in Ukrainian at [http://ukrainanato.narod.ru/organizations/ guuam.htm]. 23 See: Ukraine in International Organizations: Textbook, p. 571. 24 See: Yearbook of the United Nations, Vol. 60, 2006, p. 486. 25 See: S. Gamova, “GUAM appelliruet k OON,” Nezavisimaia gazeta, 8 September, 2006.

Volume 8 Issue 1-2 2014 39 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION activity of the Russian peacekeepers in Transnistria, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia was considered ineffective. So the GUAM states got the U.N. General Assembly to adopt a document that would make it binding on the OSCE to cooperate with the U.N. in resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. As a result, on 10 August, 2006, the ODED-GUAM asked U.N. Secretary General to include a point in the agenda of the 61st session of the U.N. General Assembly on “The Protracted Conflicts in the GUAM Area and Their Implications for International Peace, Security, and Development.”26 In September 2006, the foreign ministers of the GUAM member countries met in New York at the 61st session of the U.N. General Assembly and discussed the course of settlement of the frozen conflicts in the CIS. Ukrainian Foreign Minister Boris Tarasiuk said: “Ukraine rejects any attempts to draw parallels between the Kosovo problem and the unsettled conflicts in the GUAM area.” This position contradicted the opinion of the Russian leadership, which insisted that if Kosovo had been granted independence, the regional conflicts in the CIS could be resolved in a similar way.27 On 22 December, 2006, the U.N. General Assembly resolved with decision 61/552 that the item on the agenda about protracted conflicts in the GUAM area and their implications for international peace, security and development would be examined during the revived 61st session of the U.N. General Assembly in 2007.28 However, as the previous year, the General Committee of the U.N. GA 61st session did not support examination of this issue by the U.N. supreme body. Of its 28 members, Ukraine, Moldova, Great Britain, and the U.S. voted for this item to be included in the agenda of the U.N. GA, while Russia, Armenia, Angola, Myanmar, and Venezuela voted against. The other member countries of the committee abstained. The leading world countries blocked this document in the U.N. since they still did not have a unified position on the Nagorno-Karabakh issue. In contrast to the conflicts in Georgia and Moldova, which are at least formally internal, the Armenian-Azeri opposition also has a clear interstate component, which essentially determines its nature.29 Examination in the U.N. of Armenia’s occupation of part of the territory of Azerbaijan could lead to recognition of the first as an aggressor state and so threaten Erevan with international sanctions. Therefore, official Erevan and Moscow have always been against and are still against discussing this question outside the format of the OSCE Minsk Group and particularly in the U.N. However, on 7 September, 2006, a resolution was adopted (by means of consensus) at the 98th plenary session of the 61st session of the U.N. GA called On the Situation in Azerbaijan’s Occupied Territories.30 In it, the U.N. GA expressed concern about the fires occurring in the occupied territory of Azerbaijan, which were of immense environmental detriment to it. The General Assembly called on the U.N. member states to carry out an urgent environmental operation to prevent the fires and eliminate their consequences. It also approved of the willingness of the sides to cooperate in these endeavors and sent its mission of U.N. Environmental Program specialists. Talking at discussions on behalf of the GUAM states, the Ukrainian representative expressed concern regarding the fires going on in Azeri territory and called on his colleagues to adopt the proposed resolution.31 The ODED-GUAM states continued to push for examination of their joint declaration at the next U.N. GA session. In June 2007, Viktor Yushchenko emphasized again that the Armenian-Azeri conflict around Nagorno-Karabakh could be resolved only within the framework of Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity and only in one way—by granting Nagorno-Karabakh a high degree of autonomy. In his

26 See: Yearbook of the United Nations, Vol. 60, p. 486. 27 See: “GUUAM Has Still Not Died—The People.” 28 See: Yearbook of the United Nations, Vol. 60, p. 486. 29 See: Z. Rasulzade, “Mirkadyrov: mezhgosudarstvennoe sostavliaiushchee karabakhskogo konflikta iavliaetsia opre- deliaiushchim,” available at [http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/102343]. 30 This item was first brought up on Azerbaijan’s initiative at the 59th session of the U.N. GA in the fall of 2004. 31 See: Embassy of the Azerbaijan Republic, PRESS RELEASE, No. 8, 15 August, 2006, available at [www.azembassy. kz/data/file/press8.doc‎].

40 Volume 8 Issue 1-2 2014 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION words, political will had to be manifested in order to carry out such a decision. Attempts to resolve the problem in any other way were a pointless waste of time.32 Ukraine was willing to continue supporting the Azeri side, with respect to developing the agreements reached within GUAM, in order to attract the attention of the international community to the need to step up efforts in the settlement of the Na- gorno-Karabakh conflict, as well as other frozen conflicts in the territory of the GUAM member states. At the same time, the Ukrainian president said at a plenary session of the ODED-GUAM summit in Baku: “We are offering joint efforts for settling the frozen conflicts in the post-Soviet space, one of the steps in this direction being bringing the Nagorno-Karabakh issue up for discussion at the U.N. GA.”33 As a result, on 7 December, 2007, the draft of a GA resolution “Protracted Conflicts in the GUAM Area and Their Implications for International Peace, Security and Development” was distributed at the U.N. headquarters in New York as an official U.N. document. In it, the U.N. GA called on the member states, as well as international and regional organizations, to efficiently assist the settlement of these conflicts and confirmed its invariable support of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Moldova, as well as the inviolability of their internationally recognized borders.34 However, this resolution draft was not included in the agenda until the 63rd session of the U.N. GA under item 13, while item 20 was another resolution On the Situation in the Occupied Territories of Azerbaijan. The resolution on the occupied territories of Azerbaijan was examined in March 2008 at the 86th plenary meeting of the 62th session of the U.N. GA. Official Baku initiated examination of this question in the U.N. since Armenia was pursuing a policy aimed at changing the ethnic composition of the population in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan (it was settling Arme- nians in them) and their historical and cultural heritage (the destruction and desecration of religious historical monuments, ancient manuscripts, and other cultural values), as well as exploiting natural resources (gold mines in the region of Kelbajar). Ukraine, along with Georgia, Moldova, Uzbekistan, and Turkey, was among the 39 U.N. states out of 146 to vote for Resolution 62/243 on the Situation in the Occupied Territories of Azerbaijan.35 Kazakhstan was among the one hundred countries that abstained from supporting the document, while the RF and Armenia were among the seven states that voted against the resolution. Permanent Representative of the Ukraine to the U.N. Yuri Sergeev was the only one who spoke on behalf of the post-Soviet states in support of this document. He said: “…the protracted conflicts in Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Moldova are still serious obstacles hindering the democratic and economic development of these states. We are convinced that examination of these questions belongs to the competence of the General Assembly and the Security Council. It is extremely important that the international community continues to take practical steps to assist the settlement of the protracted conflicts in the countries I have mentioned, relying on unconditional recognition of the territorial integrity of these states. In our opinion, each of these conflicts has its own history and own character. So the mechanisms of their settlement might be different. But they should be firmly based on the unconditional priority of adherence to human rights. In this respect, Ukraine resolutely rejects attempts to link Kosovo with the conflicts in the territory of Azerbaijan, the Republic of Moldova, and Georgia. Ukraine consistently supports the OSCE Minsk Group in the settlement of the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh. We note that the potential of the Minsk process has not yet been exhausted. We

32 See: “Viktor Yushchenko: ‘The Karabakh Problem can be Resolved Only within the Framework of Azerbaijan’s Territorial Integrity,’” available in Russian at [http://www.day.az/news/politics/83062.html]. 33 See: “Yushchenko Suggests that GUAM Restore the Silk Road,” available in Ukrainian at [http://www.unian.net/ukr/ news/news-200238.html]. 34 See: “Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine suggest adopting the General Assembly Resolution on Protracted Conflicts in the GUAM Countries,” U.N. News Center, available in Russian at [http://www.un.org/russian/news/story. asp?NewsID=8760#.Uq4QoSdP2XY]. 35 See: “U.N. General Assembly,” available at [http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N07/478/37/PDF/ N0747837.pdf?OpenElement].

Volume 8 Issue 1-2 2014 41 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION call on Azerbaijan and Armenia to show flexibility and not undermine the opportunities to settle the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.”36 In response, Armenian representative Mr. Martirosian said that he failed to understand what relation Kosovo had to this resolution. But at the same time he said that the example of Kosovo intrigues Armenia, which is interested in it since, in his words, Kosovo showed that the principle of self-determination was already pertinent in the 21st century. However, Mr. Martirosian assured all the U.N. member states that Armenia would never use the instance of Kosovo as a precedent and would never examine the situation with Kosovo as a precedent.37 The U.S., France, and the RF chairing in the OSCE Minsk Group did not support this resolution, referring to the fact that the resolution draft selectively reproduced only a few of the elements of the balanced set of principles drawn up by the OSCE Minsk Group in 2007 in Madrid and taken as a basis by the sides for settling the conflict.38 The states that supported the draft proceeded from the fact that it was based on the principles and tasks of the U.N. Charter, the main guarantor of peace and stability on the planet, was in agreement with the corresponding previous U.N. resolutions on this question, and did not contain any elements that could be viewed as detrimental to the conflict settlement. In their view, any departure from U.N. principles should be well grounded in international law. In this case, there is no justification for such a departure from them, since Azerbaijan is a victim country.39 On 29 May, 2008, Ukrainian Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Boris Klimchuk talked during a press conference for the Azeri media of Ukraine’s unchanged position regarding settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, and called Ukraine’s support of the U.N. GA resolution on the situation in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan confirmation of this. According to the ambassador, support by the GUAM member countries of this resolution again emphasized the power and capacity of ODED-GUAM.”40 In May 2008, during Azeri President Ilham Aliev’s official visit to Ukraine, the heads of state signed a Declaration on Friendship and Strategic Partnership between Ukraine and Azerbaijan.41 At the beginning of July 2008, at the next ODED-GUAM summit in Batumi, the Ukrainian president noted that new initiatives were needed in the negotiations on settlement of the conflicts in the GUAM area. “The unsettled conflicts in Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Moldova, along with the threat factor, are also a reason for instability. Some conflicts not only do not have a settlement plan, but talks are not even being held. GUAM needs to step up its efforts to organize a dialog.”42 Ukraine and GUAM were just as active within the framework of the OSCE. In particular, in December 2005, the GUAM countries acted as a unified front at the meeting of the Council of OSCE Foreign Ministers in Ljubljana (Slovenia). They demanded that Moscow execute the decision of the OSCE Istanbul Summit in 1999 on the withdrawal of Russian troops from Moldova and Georgia, which was also important for resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh question. At that time, Ukrainian Foreign Minister Boris Tarasiuk said that the GUAM countries would continue to act jointly.43

36 See: U.N. General Assembly, 86th Plenary Session of 14 March, 2008. Sixty-Second Session of the U.N. GA. Official Reports. Item 20 on the Agenda. Resolution Draft (A/62/L.42) The Situation in the Occupied Territories of Azerbaijan, Doc. A/62/PV.86, p. 8. 37 See: Ibid., p. 11. 38 See: Ibid., p. 6. 39 See: Ibid., pp. 7-8. 40 See: “Ukrainian Embassy in the Azerbaijan Republic,” available in Ukrainian at [http://www.mfa.gov.ua/azerbaijan/ ua/news/detail/13208.htm]. 41 See: “Ukraine and Azerbaijan Sign a Set of Bilateral Documents,” available in Ukrainian at [http://www.president. gov.ua/news/10017.html]. 42 See: “Viktor Yushchenko: ‘New Initiatives are Needed in the Talks to Settle the Conflicts in the GUAM Area’,” available in Russian at [http://cpf.az/ru/xeber/187-neobkhodimy-novye-iniciativy.html]. 43 See: “GUUAM Has Still Not Died—The People.”

42 Volume 8 Issue 1-2 2014 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION In July 2007, the resolution on settlement of the conflicts in the member states was adopted in Kiev on the initiative of Ukraine at the next session of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly. It envisaged resolution of the Armenian-Azeri conflict within the framework of territorial integrity, inviolability of borders and sovereignty of Azerbaijan. The resolution also noted that the conflict should be resolved on the basis of decision adopted by the U.N., while the Kosovo model and methods of settling other conflicts could not be applied to Nagorno-Karabakh. Moreover, the OSCE PA session rejected the proposals of the Armenian delegation to exclude from the indicated resolution the amendments on inviolability of Azerbaijan’s borders and participation of the Armenian community of Nagorno- Karabakh in the talks.44

Ukraine and the Self-Proclaimed “Nagorno-Karabakh Republic”

In 2006-2007, a certain strengthening in the political regimes in the unrecognized states was seen. In particular, at the December referendum of 2006, a new Constitution was adopted in Nagorno- Karabakh, and in the summer of 2007, the next presidential election was held. As a result, during Ukraine’s chairmanship in GUAM (2006-2007), a joint statement was drawn up by the member states on deeming the constitutional referendum in Nagorno-Karabakh illegal. In the document, Kiev, Tbilisi, and Chisinau expressed concern about this national survey. They thought that the referendum, no matter how Erevan and Stepanakert justified it, only aggravated the problem of resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.45 On 20 July, 2007, Ukrainian Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to Azerbaijan Ste- pan Volkovetsky said that Ukraine did not recognize the separate presidential election held on 19 July in the “Nagorno-Karabakh Republic.” “The government of Ukraine and the Ukrainian people recognize the territorial integrity of the Azerbaijan Republic, and nothing can change this position.”46 Ukraine also joined the EU statement that said that the presidential election in NKR was having a negative effect on peaceful settlement of the Azeri-Armenian conflict. Brussels and Kiev thought that for starters the refugees from this region should have the opportunity to return home safely and with dignity in order to be able to participate in the election processes.47 On 17 August, 2007, a letter from I. Mamedov, temporary charge d’affaires for the Permanent Representative Office of the Azerbaijan Republic at the U.N., to the Secretary General named Ukraine among the states and international organizations that criticized and did not deem the 2007 presidential election in the NKR legitimate.48 In those years, the approaches and policy of Ukraine and the Russian Federation regarding the self-proclaimed states directly opposed each other. On the international arena, Kiev spoke out actively against strengthening the political regimes in the unrecognized states, particularly in Nagorno- Karabakh, while Moscow strove to establish control over them by forming efficient managerial teams

44 See: “The OSCE PA Resolution Includes Important Points on Settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict,” available in Russian at [http://www.bizspravka.ru/view_article_print.php?id=260838]. 45 See: V. Kravchenko, “Karabakhsky sindrom,” available at [http://gazeta.zn.ua/POLITICS/karabahskiy_sindrom. html]. 46 “Ukraine Does Not Recognize the Presidential Election Held in the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic,” United Nations, General Assembly, Security Council, Doc. A/61/1030–S/2007/505, 23 August, 2007, p. 15. 47 See: “Ukraine is Concerned about the Situation in the Congo and the Elections in Nagorno-Karabakh,” available in Russian at [http://korrespondent.net/ukraine/politics/199916?p=0&sort=ASC]. 48 See: Letter of the Temporary Charge D’Affaires of the Permanent Representative Office of Azerbaijan at the United Nations of 17 August, 2007 to the Secretary General, United Nations General Assembly, Security Council, Doc. A/61/1030– S/2007/505, 23 August, 2007, p. 1.

Volume 8 Issue 1-2 2014 43 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION subordinate to its interests. Russia was also thought to be trying to preserve “partial sovereignty” of the self-proclaimed states, including the NKR, in order to bring their status closer to the formulation of “partially recognized.” The practice of socioeconomic subsidizing of the unrecognized states (issuing aid in the amount of $10 million every month for social needs) and upholding the interests of the ruling elites of the unrecognized states in international institutions served this end.49

Influence of the 2008 August Events on Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict Settlement

Moscow was looking for ways to oppose the activity of ODED-GUAM and called it anti-CIS. The Kremlin was also against the new EU Eastern Partnership initiative, which included the Central Caucasus. The Russian Federation did everything it could to preserve a tense situation in the region and strengthen its presence and, correspondingly, influence in it. In particular, on 13 July, 2007, the Russian president issued a decree On Suspension by the RF of the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty and Other Related International Treaties, and on 29 November, 2007, federal law On CFE Treaty was issued. Since 12 December, 2007, Russia has stopped providing information, as well as accepting and carrying out inspections in compliance with the CFE Treaty. But most important, this made it possible for it to continue delivering weapons to Erevan, and later to Baku, thus changing the balance of forces and strengthening its military presence in the region.50 At the same time, Moscow assured that suspension of the CFE Treaty would in no way mean an arms buildup, rather the cutback in the number of conventional armed forces in particular regions of Russia at that time would be based on the real military-political situation, including both external and internal factors. Moscow assured the OSCE and NATO that it did not have any plans to carry out a mass buildup of forces, but would make its actions dependent on how willing its partners, primarily NATO, were to show restraint in the military sphere.51 We will remind you that most of the OSCE states did not ratify the Agreement on Adaptation of the CFE Treaty of 1999 in response to Moscow’s non-execution of the decision of the Istanbul OSCE summit in 1999 on the withdrawal of Russian troops from Georgia and Moldova. As a result, the existing CFE Treaty became the cornerstone of European security.52 Russia’s refusal to execute the 1999 OSCE summit decision was also one of the reasons preventing resolution of the conflicts in the GUAM area and causing another spurt in the arms race in the world. For after that, the U.S. announced revival of the ABM system and the EU states demanded that Washington set up ABM systems in their territories too. So Moscow resorted to introducing a moratorium on the CFE Treaty, which made it possible for it to quickly resolve the conflict with Georgia in August 2008 in its favor. After making sure that Ukraine and Georgia did not sign the NATO Membership Action Plan (spring 2008) and demonstrating its resolve regarding control over its sphere of influence, in the form

49 See: B. Parakhonsky, M. Gonchar, V. Kuznetsov, V. Maliarov, O. Manachinsky, O. Moskalets, Ukraine’s Strategic Interests in the Black Sea Region Countries and National Security Problems, Administration of the President of Ukraine, National Institute of Strategic Research, Foreign Policy Strategy Series, Issue 7, 2007, available in Ukrainian at [http://eu. prostir.ua/library/1545.html]. 50 See: G. Perepelitsa, “Ukraine’s Attitude toward Peacekeeping Activity and Conflict Settlement in the CIS,” in: Ukraine’s Peacekeeping Activity: Cooperation with NATO and Other European Security Structures, National Institute of Strategic Research under the Administration of the President of Ukraine, Royal Institute of International Affairs, available in Ukrainian at [http://Old.Niss.Gov.Ua/Book/Perepel/009.Htm#A1]. 51 See: “The OSCE Calls on Russia to Reexamine its Decision on the CFE Treaty,” available in Russian at [http://top. rbc.ru/politics/12/12/2007/129543.shtml]. 52 See: A. Sychev, “Dogovor ob obychnykh vooruzhennykh silakh v Evrope i perspektivy ukrepleniia evropeiskoi bezopasnoti,” available at [http://evolutio.info/content/view/1058/181].

44 Volume 8 Issue 1-2 2014 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION of the short-term war with Tbilisi (August 2008), as well as recognizing the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, Moscow tried to show its interest in resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. In order to distract the attention of the Russian and world community as quickly as possible from the political consequences of the Russian-Georgian war, as well as remove Kiev from a possible mediating role in the Azeri-Armenian opposition, in the fall of 2008, President Dmitri Medvedev initiated a new round of talks between Baku and Erevan. Although it was clear to everyone in advance that this tactical step by the Kremlin, in terms of its mediation, would end unproductively. Even some Russian diplomats and politicians recognized that the Kremlin was discrediting itself as a neutral mediator, not only in the eyes of the world community, but also of its ally—Armenia.53 In the war with Georgia, Russia, trying to show the whole world its unconditional leadership in the region, “shat- tered and humiliated a once fraternal republic.” Many people in Russia regarded the Russian-Georgian 2008 war not as small and victorious, but as “hollow,” since other Caucasian states, in their words, will never leave their backs exposed to Russia again.54 However, these statements proved to be erroneous. By trying to use hardline power in the region and demonstrating the ability to strike critically important targets of regional infrastructure that primarily serve the economic interests of Azer- baijan, Moscow’s policy balanced out Baku’s traditionally multidirectional foreign policy. In 2008- 2010, the Russian factor acquired additional clout in Azerbaijan’s strategic plans. Baku, which was concerned about how Russia’s recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia might affect the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, unlike its ODED-GUAM partners, Ukraine and Moldova, re- frained from accusing and directly criticizing Moscow.55 This not only caused confusion among the GUAM partners, but also cast aspersions on further joint efforts to resolve the conflicts in the GUAM area, as well as Kiev’s possible mediation and peacekeeping activity in the Nagorno-Karabakh issue. The Kremlin managed to affect a split in the ODED-GUAM by weakening the Organization’s authority and influence not only in the CIS, but also on the international arena as a whole. However, in so doing, it promoted a strengthening in the position and influence of the EU on the ODED-GUAM countries and, correspondingly, the European integration strivings of the latter. As a result, Russia’s recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia did not put an end to the talk about the uniqueness of the Kosovo incident, nor was it a prompt to recognize the independence of Nagorno-Karabakh, no matter how much the Kremlin and Erevan might have wanted this.56 After all, even the Kremlin’s allies in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO)—Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Arme- nia—did not recognize the independence of these regions of Georgia. Nevertheless, Moscow’s recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia’s sovereignty made Armenia hopeful, as well as rather re- lieved about Georgia’s failure to restore control over South Ossetia. The potential success of the Georgian army would undoubtedly have inspired the supporters of the hardline course in Azerbaijan and stimulated national pressure on the president to take action. Russia seemed to confirm by its actions that it was ready to defend its allies in the region.57 Moldovan researcher Stanislav Secrieru thinks that relying on Moscow’s statement that it is an honest mediator-peacekeeper in Nagorno-Karabakh Azerbaijan has decided to give the Russian Fed- eration another chance and glean its support in order to change the status quo in the conflict zone. While Turkey’s striving in 2008-2009 to normalize relations with Armenia and the U.S.’s auxiliary role, which stood behind this diplomatic initiative, prompted Baku to move closer to Moscow.58

53 See: S. Chernyavsky, Desiat let istorii Azerbaidzhana 2003-2013 gody, Flinta Publishers, Moscow, 2013, p. 223. 54 See: “Russia Today has Nothing to Offer its Neighbors,” available in Russian at [http://rabkor.ru/debate/2013/09/21/ russia?fb_action_ids=10151861869887940%2C1015186153658294021.09.2013] 55 See: S. Secrieru, “Zatiazhnye konflikty v stranakh Vostochnogo partnerstva: mezhdu predotvrashcheniem voiny i postroeniem doveriia,” available at [http://www.khas.edu.tr/cms/cies/dosyalar/files/NieghbourhoodPolicyPaper%2806%29R ussianVersion.pdf]. 56 See: V. Sizov, “Piatidnevka protivostoianiia,” available at [http://www.intertrends.ru/seventeenth/015.htm]. 57 See: S. Secrieru, op. cit. 58 See: Ibidem.

Volume 8 Issue 1-2 2014 45 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION According to Russian researcher V. Sizov, Azerbaijan might suffer indirect consequences from the conflict. But at the same time, Baku’s hope that Russia would not interfere in a possible conflict with Armenia over Karabakh essentially dissipated. He stated: “The country is wondering whether NATO can help to resolve territorial problems?”59 In our view, this claim is erroneous since Baku refused the U.S.’s initiative to create a naval group called “Caspian Guard” in the Caspian Sea for defending pipeline facilities.60 In this way, Azerbaijan supported the Kremlin’s position on preventing the presence of military contingents of third, non-regional, countries, that is non-Caspian, in the Caspian Basin. Of course, other determining factors in Baku’s rapprochement with Moscow can be named after the August events of 2008, but I would like to concentrate on one—this is Russia’s traditional use of the “stick and carrot” principle in interstate relations. Along with promising honest mediation and deliveries of new arms, the Kremlin was also putting latent political pressure on Baku. For example, at the time Kiev tried to present a resolution draft about the 1932-1933 Holodomor in Ukraine for discussion at the 63rd session of the U.N. GA.61 The Russian Federation began blackmailing President Ilham Aliev in order to force him not to recognize Holodomor as genocide of the Ukrainian people. This is shown in secret U.S. government documents published in Wikileaks, according to the words of British Prince Andrew. According to them, President Medvedev sent Ilham Aliev a document in- dicating that if Azerbaijan recognized the Bolshevik-controlled artificial holodomor in Ukraine in the U.N. as genocide, “then you can forget about Nagorno-Karabakh altogether.” Prince Andrew confirmed that other CIS presidents also received corresponding directives from Moscow.62 President Ilham Aliev’s press service, like that of several other CIS countries, called this information open provocation aimed at undermining Azerbaijan’s relations with neighboring states and creating mistrust among the heads of state.63 However, Azerbaijan was not among the nations that recognized the 1932-1933 Holodomor in Ukraine as genocide, in contrast to Georgia and Moldova.64

THE PROSPECTS FOR UKRAINE’S MEDIATION MISSION IN RESOLVING THE NAGORNO-KARABAKH CONFLICT DURING VIKTOR YANUKOVICH’S PRESIDENCY (2010-2012) Changes in Ukraine’s Foreign Policy and International Status

In 2010, when a new president, Viktor Yanukovich, came to power in Ukraine, the country’s foreign policy vector began to dramatically change. First, without rejecting European integration, in

59 See: V. Sizov, op. cit. 60 See: I. Velizade, “Azerbaidzhano-rossiiskie otnosheniia na novom etape: prioritety, aktsenty i realnaia politika,” in: Rol Rossii i Turtsii v sisteme bezopasnosti Iuzhnogo Kavkaza, Center of Strategic Studies (CSS) under the President of Azerbaijan, Baku, 2012, pp. 11-12. 61 See: “The U.N. General Assembly is to Discuss the Resolution on Holodomor in Ukraine,” available in Russian at [http://altai.regnum.ru/news/accidents/1056862.html]. 62 See: “Wikileaks: Medvedev Blackmailed Aliev over Ukrainian Holodomor,” available in Russian at [http://zn.ua/ POLITICS/wikileaks_medvedev_shantazhiroval_alieva_iz-za_ukrainskogo_golodomora.html], 14 January, 2011. 63 See: Aliev’s Government Denies that Russia Put Pressure on It over Holodomor,” available in Russian at [http://www. segodnya.ua/world/u-alieva-otritsajut-chto-roccija-davila-na-neho-iz-za-holodomora.html]. 64 See: “Countries that Recognized the 1932-1933 Holodomor of the Ukrainian People as Genocide—Thank You,” available in Russian at [http://pikabu.ru/story/stranyi_priznavshie_golodomor_193233_godov_genotsidom_ukrainskogo_ naroda__spasibo_vam_836238].

46 Volume 8 Issue 1-2 2014 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION the spring of 2010 the president signed and the parliament ratified, with violations and “scandalously,” the so-called Kharkov Agreements with Moscow,65 which aroused doubts about the priority of the European (Western) vector in the foreign policy of the country’s new leadership. In addition, the head of state said that in the near future he intended to raise the question of the expediency of Ukraine’s membership in the ODED-GUAM and that a meeting of the leaders and other high-ranking officials of the member states of this regional organization would be initiated for that purpose. Viktor Yanu- kovich said that he hoped this organization would learn to pursue a pragmatic, rather than romantic policy. He also noted that Ukraine would continue its membership in GUAM only if it gained practical benefit from this format of cooperation.66 Second, on 1 July, 2010, the president signed a new law adopted by the parliament On the Fun- damental Principles of Domestic and Foreign Policy. According to Art 11,The Fundamental Principles of Foreign Policy, the Ukrainian state would return to its non-bloc status, that is, Kiev refused to join NATO or any other military-political blocs. At the same time, the law did not exclude the country’s participation in regional (European) collective security systems or continuing its constructive partnership with NATO.67 In keeping with the policy of the country’s new leadership, the priorities of the key departments, including the defense and security structures, also changed. According to the data in the media, in June 2010, the Ukrainian Security Service changed the priorities of its counterintelligence activity. The primary focus of the counterintelligence department was defense against the undertakings of the American special services, not the Russian.68 The Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that the change in the country’s foreign policy was an adequate reaction to the changes going on in the world, a kind of reset for both subjective and objective reasons. The main objective reason was the changes going on around the country, particularly in NATO, the U.S., and the Russian Federation. According to Deputy Foreign Minister Kon- stantin Eliseev, Ukraine could not permit itself not to change and live by the laws of international relations of ten or even five years ago. However, in the Foreign Ministry, government, and parliament, the majority in Ukraine did not have a clear idea about how foreign policy should be changed.69 Con- sequently, until mid-2012, new versions of the National Security Strategy and Ukrainian Military Doctrine70 that would correspond to the new law On the Fundamental Principles of Domestic and Foreign Policy were not adopted. At the same time, in the new version of Ukraine’s National Secu- rity Strategy that appeared, Item 3.1.2. of Para 3 named the Black Sea-Caspian Region only as a dangerous regional environment around Ukraine that threatened its national security due to further escalation of the conflicts in it, the internal instability in many states of the region, as well as the uncertainty of their prospects and absence of a common vision regarding regional integration.71 Evaluating the changes in Ukraine’s foreign policy, British analyst James Sherr stated that Viktor Yanukovich had not only made a complete U-turn in Ukraine’s development, but also com-

65 According to the Kharkov Agreements of 2010, Ukraine agreed to extend the presence of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet in the Crimea until 2042, while Russia would lower the price of gas for Ukraine. 66 See: “Yanukovich Questions Ukraine’s Membership in GUAM,” available in Russian at [http://rus.ruvr. ru/2010/04/27/6974715/27]. 67 See: On the Fundamental Principles of Domestic and Foreign Policy (Vedomosti Verkhovnoi Rady Ukrainy (VVR), 2010, No. 40, p. 527), in: Ukrainian Law, available in Russian at [http://uazakon.ru/zakon/zakon-o-printsipah-vnutrenney-i- vneshney-politike.html]. 68 See: “Yanukovich Fired the Head of the USS Counterintelligence Department,” available in Russian at [http://062. ua/news/v-ukraine/yanukovich-uvolil-nachal-nika-kontrrazvedki-sbu]. 69 See: “The Foreign Ministry Explains the Reset of Foreign Policy as an Adequate Reaction to the Changes in the World,” available in Russian at [http://rus.newsru.ua/ukraine/08jun2010/poyasniv.html]. 70 See: Ukraine’s Military Doctrine, available in Russian at [http://constitutions.ru/archives/7794]. 71 Ukraine’s National Security Strategy “Ukraine in a Changing World,” available in Ukrainian at [http://zakon4.rada. gov.ua/laws/show/105/2007].

Volume 8 Issue 1-2 2014 47 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION mitted a geopolitical blunder. This was because Kiev’s concessions to Moscow had only increased its pressure on Ukraine. According to James Sherr, Viktor Yanukovich’s approach to the agreements with Russia was improvised, everything was done with incredible incompetency, belligerence, and haste.72 Without putting the entire blame on Viktor Yanukovich, E. Zherebetsky, Ukrainian expert on international security problems, evaluated Ukraine’s position after the first 100 days of Yanukovich’s presidency as follows: “In the West, we see a Europe that is cool and indifferent to us, while in the East and North we have a Russia that is aggressive and hostile toward us with indulgence toward reintegration of the Soviet Union on the part of the West. We not only have no friends today along the perimeter of the borders and in the interior of the Eurasian continent, we do not have any worthy and reliable allies either.”73

External Prerequisites for Ukraine’s Possible Mediation Mission in the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict Settlement

At the same time, the changes in Kiev’s foreign policy corresponded to the interests and expec- tations of the Russian Federation, which made use of them to advance its policy within the CIS, particularly in the Central Caucasus. After two years of essentially unsuccessful mediation in the Azeri-Armenian conflict, Moscow was ready to transfer the mediating role to Kiev. The Kremlin regarded Viktor Yanukovich as its own pro-Moscow president and even expected he would recognize the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. After all, at the end of August 2008, Viktor Yanu- kovich (the opposition leader at the time), in counterbalance to the official position of Ukrainian president Viktor Yushchenko, called on Ukraine to take Russia’s cue and recognize the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and “act without double standards.” He also drew parallels between declaration of the independence of Kosovo and, in his words,” of the “rebel” Georgian autonomies.74 That is, in 2010, the Kremlin believed that the Ukrainian president, as well as the country’s vector of foreign policy and return to a non-bloc status, best suited a mediating role in the Nagorno- Karabakh conflict. Erevan was also hoping for a change in Ukraine’s policy in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and, correspondingly, wanted to improve Ukrainian-Armenian relations. Ukraine and Arme- nia stepped up bilateral cooperation in essentially all spheres: political, economic, cultural-humanitarian, and even military-technical. But the stakes the Kremlin and Erevan placed on Kiev recognizing the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia and, correspondingly, supporting the Kosovo model for resolving all the Central Caucasian conflicts were not justified. One hundred days into his presidency, Viktor Yanukovich said that Georgia’s territorial integrity remained a priority of Ukrai- nian foreign policy.75 Like the former leaders of the country, he based his considerations on the threat of internal separatism, Ukraine’s loss of friendly and strategic relations with Baku and Tbilisi, and its prestige in international organizations and in the eyes of the world community.

72 See: “James Sherr: Yanukovich Made a Blunder When He Misunderstood Russia’s Real Intentions,” available in Ukrainian at [http://www.unian.ua/news/379501-djeyms-sherr-yanukovich-prorahuvavsya-ne-zrozumivshi-realnih-namiriv- rosiji.htmla-ne-zrozumivshi-realnih-namiriv-rosiji.html]. 73 See: E. Zherebetsky, “The Death of Classical Geopolitics,” available in Ukrainian at [http://www.ji-magazine.lviv. ua/seminary/2010/sem05-06.htm]. 74 See: V. Portnikov, “Vozvrashchenie Yanukovicha,” available at [http://politcom.ru/6768.html 27.08.2008]. 75 See: D. Tavlui, “Ukraine’s Foreign Policy Regarding Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. Or Why Does Ukraine Need the Caucasus?” available in Ukrainian at [http://real-politics.org/tavluj-dmytro-zovnishnya-polityka-ukrajiny-stosovno-hruziji-virmeniji-azerbajdzhanu-abo-navischo-ukrajini-kavkaz/].

48 Volume 8 Issue 1-2 2014 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION At the same time, the upswing observed in Ukrainian-Armenian relations in 2011-2012 had positive results. In particular, on 10-11 February, 2011, Ukrainian Foreign Minister Konstantin Grish- chenko paid an official visit to Armenia where he signed a Program of Ukrainian-Armenian Coop- eration for 2011-2012 and a Memorandum on Mutual Understanding Regarding Cooperation between the Diplomatic Academies at the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry and the Armenian Foreign Ministry. On 29-30 June, 2011, the fifth sitting of the Joint Intergovernmental Ukrainian-Armenian Com- mission on Economic Cooperation was held in Kiev. The sides expressed mutual interest in intensifying a bilateral political dialog. The importance of continuing the practice of regular contacts between the foreign ministries of the two countries was noted, as well as of holding consultations between the Ukrai- nian Foreign Ministry and the Armenian Foreign Ministry on urgent issues on the bilateral agenda and regional problems.76 The activation of Ukrainian-Armenian relations was largely promoted by another breakdown in Russian diplomacy at the Azeri-Armenian talks on Nagorno-Karabakh held on 29-30 June, 2011 in Kazan. At that time, Moscow was unable to prove its unprejudiced and equidistant attitude to the conflict. In turn, the failure of the Kremlin’s peacekeeping mission was also promoted by the large deliveries of Russian arms to Azerbaijan in 2009-2011. Azerbaijan made its first purchases of Russian weapons in 2008, and in 2010-2011 new contracts were signed.77 Whereas before 2008, Baku constantly accused the Kremlin of illegal arms deliveries to Erevan, in 2011 there were no irresolvable issues in military-technical cooperation or defense partnership between Baku and Moscow. However, due to the regional Azeri-Armenian opposition regarding Nagorno- Karabakh, this aroused an extremely negative reaction in Erevan.78 The situation on the line of contact between the conflicting sides flared up again, violations of the ceasefire regime on both sides became more frequent, and, correspondingly, the number of deaths among servicemen of both armies rose. This increased the likelihood of a new, military, stage in the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh problem. This situation was explained by the fact that around 2005 Baku and Erevan began actively engaging in an arms race and, after the Russian Federation introduced a moratorium on the CFE Treaty in 2007 and the Russian-Georgian war broke out in 2008, both sides in the conflict began making mass purchases of arms and military hardware. The well-known rule “If you want peace prepare for war” became the guide to action for both sides in the conflict. The arms race between Armenia and Azerbaijan was constantly accompanied not only by mutual accusations of exceeding the military potential quota determined by the CFE Treaty in 1999, but also by accusations of those countries exporting arms to the opposing side in the conflict. For historical and political reasons, Azerbaijan’s strategic partner in military-technical cooperation in the post-Soviet expanse was Ukraine, while Armenia’s was Russia. So Erevan did not like Moscow cooperating with Baku in this sphere. Nor did such steps by the Kremlin fit either the role of strategic ally and guarantor of Armenia’s security, or a mediating role in the conflict settlement, since they promoted aggravation of Azeri-Armenian relations and further escalation of the Nagorno- Karabakh conflict. Armenia was concerned about the possibility of a change in the correlation of military forces in the region in favor of Azerbaijan as a result of exceeding the conventional forces quota, which meant a violation of international obligations according to the CFE Treaty terms. In this respect, Erevan made inquiries of the Russian Federation at the level of legislative and executive power, and even wanted to discuss Russia’s arms sales to Azerbaijan within the framework of the Collective Security Treaty Organization. In response, Russian politicians and political scientists emphasized that arms deliveries to Azer- baijan would not affect relations between Moscow and Erevan or the breakdown in forces in the region, since Russia and Armenia were bound by the collective security treaty, to which Azerbaijan does not

76 See: “Political Cooperation between Ukraine and Armenia,” available in Russian at [http://armenia.mfa.gov.ua/ru/ ukraine-am/diplomacy]. 77 See: “Russia has Begun Sending Batches of Military Hardware to Azerbaijan,” available in Russian at [http:// newsland.com/news/detail/id/1197619]. 78 See: S. Davydov, “Bratstvo po oruzhiiu,” available at [http://kavpolit.com/bratstvo-po-oruzhiyu/?print].

Volume 8 Issue 1-2 2014 49 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION belong. Russia continues to sell arms to Armenia and they are more powerful than those being sent to Azerbaijan. The sale of weapons to Baku was called a commercial project that gave Russia’s high-tech enterprises the necessary resource, while refusing it would encourage other suppliers to come to Azer- baijan (K. Zatulin).79 Arms sales to Azerbaijan is a major achievement on Russia’s part that politically unifies, rather than separates, the states (Russia and Azerbaijan), who are strategic partners. Sales are also beneficial and necessary for Baku, keeping in mind several unresolved territorial problems both with Armenia and in the water area of the Caspian Sea (I. Shishkin and M. Khodarenok).80 Arms deliveries to Azerbaijan allow the Russian Federation to keep the country under its influence and reduce the amount of military purchases Baku makes in the international market (A. Krylov). Rus- sian expert K. Makienko even drew a parallel in this respect with the policy of the U.S. and NATO countries that are delivering large batches of weapons to antagonistic states—Egypt and Israel, Greece and Turkey. He claims that the dependence of these countries on one supplier will allow the U.S. and the West to prevent conflicts between them.81 However, the expert does not keep in mind that Turkey, Greece, and the U.S. are members of NATO. In addition, Washington does not have borders with all the said states and, correspondingly, no territorial claims against them, even at the unofficial level. While Russian political scientist and Director of the International Institute of Newly Established States (IINES) Alexei Martynov states: “Isn’t it time for Russia to claim its sovereign rights to Karabakh, Baku, and Ganja?”82 Third, in contrast to Russia, the U.S. is not acting as mediator in the peace talks in the mentioned conflicts, which significantly differ from the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in nature, time, geopolitical, and other characteristics. So the strong military-technical cooperation between Russia and Azerbaijan has helped to bring Kiev and Erevan closer together. At the same time, Ukraine, which was about to take the chair in the OSCE in 2013, wanted both conflicting sides to recognize it as one of the mediators in the Nagorno- Karabakh conflict. At the end of April 2011, Viktor Yanukovich paid an official visit to Baku. The joint statement of the presidents of Azerbaijan and Ukraine on further development of strategic partnership relations between the two countries said that Ukraine was still in favor of settling the Nagorno- Karabakh conflict on the basis of the regulations of international law, keeping in mind the principles of territorial integrity, sovereignty, and inviolability of borders. For this purpose, Baku and Kiev also came to terms about continuing to cooperate within the framework of international organizations.83 At the beginning of July 2011, after the failure of the Azeri-Armenian talks in Kazan, Erevan and Baku expressed a common interest in replacing the mediator in the negotiation process. Armenian President Serzh Sargsian went straight to Ukraine from Kazan on an official visit. At a joint press conference with him, Viktor Yanukovich said: “We have wonderful partner, friendly, and economic trade relations with both Armenia and Azerbaijan. It is in our interests, in the interests of the Ukrai- nian people that this conflict is resolved peacefully. We would really hope that our friends find these solutions within the OSCE Minsk Group. Ukraine will chair the OSCE in 2013, and we will exert maximum efforts to advance this negotiation process.”84

79 See: “Erevan is Asking Moscow to Explain its Arms Deliveries to Baku,” available in Russian at [http://izvestia.ru/ news/552627/]. 80 See: “Russian ‘Urans-E’ for Azerbaijan’s Navy,” available in Russian at [http://rus.ruvr.ru/2013_10_16/Rossijskie- Urani-JE-dlja-VMS-Azerbajdzhana-8754]. 81 See: A. Nikolsky, P. Khimshiashvili, “Rossiia vooruzhaet Azerbaidzhan,” available at [http://www.vedomosti.ru/ politics/news/13199631/v_baku_idet_smerch]. 82 See: “Nagorno-Karabakh Still Belongs to the Russian Empire—Alexei Martynov,” available in Russian at [http:// www.iarex.ru/articles/38385.html]. 83 See: “Ilham Aliev Relays Ukraine’s Position on the Karabakh Problem,” available in Russian at [http://www.memo. ru/d/76036.html]. 84 See: “The Media: Ukraine is Looking at the Possibility of Becoming a Mediator in the Talks on Nagorno-Karabakh,” available in Russian at [http://www.iines.org/node/470].

50 Volume 8 Issue 1-2 2014 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION Armenian President Serzh Sargsian noted in turn: “We are very much hoping that during its chairmanship in the OSCE, Ukraine will make its contribution to establishing peace and order in our region. The people of Nagorno-Karabakh have the internationally recognized right to self-determination. This right should be put into practice, should be fully realized. There is no other solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh problem.”85 The Armenian leader also stated that there could have been a breakthrough in settlement of the conflict at the meeting in Kazan, but that did not happen. “I think that the chance, at least one chance, was lost. This does not mean an end to the negotiation process, this does not mean that we will not continue our talks. It means that the time until the next meeting has been lost.”86 President Serzh Sargsian’s visit to Ukraine gave a boost to further development of Ukrainian- Armenian cooperation. First of all, Days of Armenian Culture were held in Ukraine for the first time in the history of the two countries. Later a meeting of the intergovernmental Ukrainian-Armenian commission was held, and a Ukrainian-Armenian business forum was organized. In 2012, Ukrainian Foreign Minister Konstantin Grishchenko and Chairman of the Supreme Rada (parliament) Vladimir Litvin paid visits to Armenia. While in March 2012, Days of Ukrainian Culture were held in Armenia. One of the squares in Spitak (in the restoration of which after the 1988 earthquake Ukrainian build- ers took active part, one of them being current head of the Ukrainian state Viktor Yanukovich) is called after Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovich.87 Russia did not view the visit by the Armenian president to Ukraine as an attempt by Erevan to dramatically change Ukraine’s policy on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. It saw it as Armenia’s striving to create a basis in advance for cooperating with Kiev on the eve of its chairmanship in the OSCE, as well as to acquire a certain diplomatic counterbalance to Baku after almost a decade of cool Ukrainian-Armenian relations.88 After that, Kiev began posing itself actively as a potential mediator by stepping up its policy in the Central Caucasus. A delegation of Ukrainian diplomats visited Baku, Erevan, and Khankendi (Stepanakert), where they clarified on the spot whether Ukraine could participate in the peacekeeping process in the region. The Ukrainian presidential administration presumed that the country’s participation in settling the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict would significantly raise its prestige not only in the post-Soviet expanse.89

Ukrainian Arms Sales to Armenia: Reality or Fantasy, Reasons and Consequences

However, at the end of the summer 2011, a political scandal arose between Kiev and Baku regarding Ukraine’s arms sales to Armenia. Guided by the regulations of international law regarding the transfer of military and dual-use hardware, Ukraine was successfully carrying out military-technical cooperation with both Azerbaijan and Armenia. This is also shown by the 2010 data Ukraine

85 See: “CIS News. Armenia is Asking Ukraine to Help Settle the Karabakh Problem,” available in Russian at [http:// umma.ua/ru/news/SNG/2011/07/01/1013]. 86 See: “The Media: Ukraine is Looking at the Possibility of Becoming a Mediator in the Talks on Nagorno-Karabakh.” 87 See: I. Kukhta, “I fell in Love with Armenia and its Wonderful People from the Very First Time I was There,” available in Russian at [http://armenpress.am/rus/news/696977/ 23.10.12]. 88 See: S. Markedonov, “Ukraine: between Azerbaijan and Armenia,” available in Russian at [http://www.kontinent. org/article_rus_4e17f1784ff19.html]. 89 See: E. Rustamov, “Will Ukraine Become a Mediator in the Nagorno-Karabakh Settlement?” available in Russian at [http://www.1news.az/politics/karabakh/20110704034407048.htmlA].

Volume 8 Issue 1-2 2014 51 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION presented to the U.N.90 However, in February 2011, when Dmitri Peregudov became the new general director at the Ukrspetseksport State Company, cooperation in this sphere between Kiev and Erevan, according to Baku, increased. This primarily concerned the amounts and types of arms Ukraine was supplying. So at the end of August 2011, during Ukrainian Foreign Minister Konstantin Grishchenko’s visit to Baku, the Azeri leadership expressed extreme concern about the increase in volume of deliveries of Ukrainian arms and military hardware to Armenia. The Azeri leadership, referring to documents of the Ukrainian state export control service that journalists became privy to, gave several examples of an increase in Ukrainian arms deliveries to Armenia. Baku called on the Ukrainian Foreign Minister to take the necessary steps to prevent such activity in the future, since this threatened to undermine the negotiations on peaceful settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, aggravate the situation, and even disrupt the status quo in the conflict zone as the result of possible revival of the hostilities between Armenia and Azerbaijan.91 That is, now Azerbaijan, as Armenia in the past, was concerned about the possibility of a change in the correlation of military forces in the region in favor of Erevan as the result of the unpredictable action of its strategic ally. Experts called the military-technical cooperation between Kiev and Erevan political shortsight- edness and irresponsibility that could lead to serious deterioration in Ukraine’s relations with Azer- baijan. They were unable to understand the logic of the steps taken by the head of Ukrspetseksport to enter contracts with Armenia, even in view of the commercial gain for the state company and the Ukrainian government. According to their assessments, the total sum of the current contracts with Azerbaijan for deliveries of arms and military hardware by the Ukrainian side amounted to around $70 million, while the sum of the deliveries of Ukrainian arms to Armenia was much less, despite their significant increase over the past year. The only and presumable explanation was “personal interest,” since the head of Ukrspetseksport was a successful businessman with long partner relations with representatives of Armenia’s arms business (which the media repeatedly reported).92 In this way, Ukraine, following Russia’s example, risked looking like an “igniter” of the “smoldering” regional conflict in the eyes of the world community. However, whereas it was economically and geopolitically advantageous for Russia and its exporters to deliver military hardware to Azerbaijan, it was not for Ukraine and Ukrspetseksport. The impression was created that Kiev was being drawn into a gamble. In August 2012, secret information appeared in the Ukrainian and Azeri media about Ukraine selling arms to Armenia. They reported that Head of the Main Intelligence Administration of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense Major General Sergei Gmyza recommended that Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovich use dummy companies in the EU and CIS for delivering arms to Armenia.93 Ukrainian military experts diverged in their opinions, which ranged from complete denial of such deliveries to actual admission. However, they were all sure that other states were interested in the appearance of the letter that compromised Ukraine. In particular, retired colonel A. Manachinsky said that Kiev and Baku had established such close partnership ties that Ukraine could not have de- ceived Azerbaijan. In his words, the purpose of the scandal was to create a negative image of Ukraine in the world community as a state that does not keep its word, as well as to resolve private issues. The expert said he thought that many countries with powerful military-industrial complexes were interested in a deterioration in Ukrainian-Azeri relations, since the arms market, “which is fought over to the last drop of blood, does not tolerate profanation.”94

90 See: D. Tavlui, op. cit. 91 See: “Ukraine is Increasing Arms Deliveries to Armenia,” available in Russian at [http://fundmarket.ua/news/ukraina- narashivayet-postavki-vooruzhyeniya-v-armyeniyu-20110902155534]. 92 See: Ibidem. 93 See: “Details are Known of a Letter from the Ukrainian Defense Ministry about Arms Deliveries to Armenia,” available in Russian at [http://www.trend.az/news/politics/2055843.html]. 94 U. Akhundova, “Mozhet li Ukraina podvesti Azerbaidzhan,” Zerkalo, 17 August, 2012, available at [http://www. zerkalo.az/2012/mozhet-li-ukraina-podvesti-azerbaydzhan/].

52 Volume 8 Issue 1-2 2014 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION Another Ukrainian military expert, V. Badrak, offers a different interpretation: “…keeping in mind that the total volume of Ukrainian arms export in 2011 continued to rise, the economic effect from the speculative delivery of 12 old systems of volley fire and a small batch of portable anti-air missile systems to Armenia looks absurd. No one was fighting for the Armenian arms and military hardware market, in contrast to that of Azerbaijan. Arms exporters are not interested in Armenia’s potential. It is considered an insolvent customer in the arms business. But, most important, it has long been Moscow’s protégé, military-technical cooperation with which is aimed at creating joint Arme- nian-Russian enterprises of the military-technical complex for producing military materiel, as well as repairing and servicing military hardware. Between 2006 and 2011, the Russian Federation did not sell anything at all to Armenia, but delivered weapons and hardware several times free of charge. For example, in 2008, for a total of $800 million. So Erevan bought 12 old installations in order to stop or undermine the deliveries of Ukrainian arms to Azerbaijan, as well as the military-technical cooperation between Kiev and Baku.”95 V. Badrak claimed that the appearance of the “letter” of the head of the Main Intelligence Ad- ministration was of interest not only to Erevan, but also to the Russian Federation, which was irritated by Ukrainian-Azeri military-technical cooperation, particularly in terms of modernization of military hardware. For example, Azerbaijan also began taking part in modernization of the MiG-29 bombers and Mi-24 helicopters that Ukraine was sending to the republic, while the results of R&D were being used to carry out modernization of airplanes and helicopters for the Ukrainian Armed Forces. That is, the ideology of military-technical cooperation was beginning to be applied in the Ukrainian army. Moscow, on the other hand, was claiming modernization (or at least control) of all Soviet arms and military hardware, the elaborators of which just happened not to be in the Russian Federation. Moreover, Baku and Kiev were looking at the possibility of creating enterprises of light armored vehicles in Azerbaijan, which Ukraine had been successful manufacturing in recent years. It was among the five countries with which Azerbaijan had expanded military-technical cooperation. So it was advantageous primarily for Russia to stick a spoke in the wheels of Ukrainian-Azeri relations. It is no accident that the scandal provoked by publication of the “letter” happened on the eve of Russian Vice Premier Dmitri Rogozin and Head of Russia’s Federal Service for Military-Tech- nical Cooperation Alexander Fomin’s visit to Baku. The Kremlin tried to cool the attitude toward the Ukrainian leader on the eve of his fall trip to Baku and occupy not only Ukraine’s place in the Azeri market, but also that of other suppliers. It was an opportune moment since not all of the West, on the brink of a possible war with Iran, unconditionally trusted Baku and not all the Western players were interested in close military-technical cooperation between Azerbaijan and Ukraine.96 Other Ukrainian experts were of the same opinion. In particular, S. Zgurets believed that “the initiators of the information compromising Ukraine could be found in the Russian Federation, which was itself stepping up cooperation lately with Azerbaijan in detriment to the Collective Security Treaty, according to which it does not have the right to send weapons to that country. It is for this very reason that attempts are being made to switch all attention to the nonexistent deliveries of Ukrai- nian weapons to Armenia. The only problem is that Kiev was not quick enough on the uptake.”97 According to the Azerbaijani military analyst Fikret Mamedov, “…it is up to Ukraine to whom it sells its old equipment and how. Smerch systems may be all well and good, but they are already a thing of the past compared to Israel’s RSZO Extra (150 km range) and Delilah (280 km range), which are actively being purchased for the Azeri army. We hope that the Azeri Defense Ministry will draw

95 See: V. Badrak, “Eto on, eto on, Leningradsky Pochtalion…,” 17 August, 2012, available at [http://gazeta.zn.ua/ POLITICS/eto_on,_eto_on,_leningradskiy_pochtalon__o_pisme,_prizvannom_rassorit_azerbaydzhan_s_ukrainoy.html]. 96 See: Ibidem. 97 See: K. Lazorenko, “Kiev is Being Accused of Selling Arms to Armenia. In Whose Interests is This?” 15 August, 2012, available in Russian at [http://finforum.org/page/index.html/_/politics/kiev-obvinili-v-prodazhe-oruzhija-armenii-v- chih-at-r43874].

Volume 8 Issue 1-2 2014 53 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION corresponding conclusions and exclude Ukraine from all tenders and military-industrial cooperation projects for the next few years.”98 Azerbaijani experts agree with their Ukrainian colleagues. They also think that the information on Ukraine delivering weapons to Armenia in amounts exceeding the quotas is a result of the policy of the Kremlin and Erevan. The goal of this policy is to undermine Ukrainian-Azeri partnership. In particular, Mubariz Akhmedoglu thought that Armenia deliberately purchased weapons in Ukraine in order to interfere in the bilateral relations between Kiev and Baku. “Erevan was not buying weapons for defense purposes since Russia is supplying the republic’s armed forces with them. We can clearly see the political motives of this step by the Armenian side.”99 Like some Ukrainians, Azeri experts and politicians did not exclude arms sales by Ukraine to Armenia, despite the justification of Ukrainian officials. For example, I. Mamedli said that he believes that Ukraine sold its weapons to Armenia, since this is to its benefit, while Russia is simply making skillful use of the moment to undermine Ukraine’s authority again. The expert concluded that the arms business has always encountered such scandals and said it was a pity that the president and Ukrainian Defense Ministry could not make a painless recovery from this conflict that had struck a perceptible blow to their image.100 Milli Mejlis deputy and political scientist Rasim Musabekov also said: “I do not doubt Ukraine’s inclination to sell arms to foreign countries. Every state wants to earn money. But the clarity introduced by the Ukrainian embassy calmed the Azeri side down somewhat.”101 The appearance of the letter compromising Ukraine was also explained by different internal factors: the failure of Ukrainian counterintelligence, the result of an extremely negative reaction to monopolization of Ukraine’s military-industrial complex (2010) by one of the business groups removed from the arms market, the severe rivalry among groups claiming control over the country’s arms market, as well as the work of pro-Moscow general director of the Ukroboronprom state concern,102 a Russian called Dmitri Salamatin.103 According to information in the Ukrainian media, his activity was defined as “wrecking and sabotage.”104 As a result of the scandal, Ukrainian experts began claiming that in order to avoid losses from monopolization of the arms market, it was advantageous for Ukraine to cooperate with Russia in this area. As early as December 2011, the Ukrainian media reported that in the past year Ukraine had gone down a few rungs in the arms suppliers rating due to the limitation of sales. Experts also said that more changes and adjustments evidently occurred in Ukraine’s foreign policy after which the Ukrai- nian government made the decision to cooperate with the Russian Federation in arms deliveries. “It is unlikely that Ukrainian companies will be able to deliver independently to Azerbaijan and particularly to Georgia. Arms export to the region is advantageous for Ukraine economically, but not geopolitically. This shows that Ukraine, like before, greatly depends on Russia.”105

98 See: “Yanukovich is Supplying Arms for New Ethnic Cleansing in the Caucasus,” available in Russian at [http:// uainforg.livejournal.com/641626.html] (see also [http://echo.msk.ru/blog/imho1/919168-echo/]). 99 See: I. Ragimova, “So Has Ukraine Been Selling Arms to Armenia or Not?” available in Russian at [http://www.aze. az/news____80917.html]. 100 See: Ibidem. 101 Ibidem. 102 Ukrspetseksport belongs to Ukroboronprom. 103 It is not known how, but Dmitri Salamatin became a Ukrainian citizen in 2005 while continuing to live in Moscow with his family, the members of whom did not have Ukrainian citizenship. As a deputy of the Ukrainian parliament, Dmitri Salamatin was known for taking active part in the fights in the Supreme Rada. His real claim to fame came after the brutal fight in the Rada during ratification of the Kharkov agreements of 2010. At that time, in the fervor of the parliament fight he broke an opposition deputy’s nose. 104 See: K. Ivanchenko, “Ukraine’s Arms Business: Embezzlement of State Property, Disorder and Bawdy House—2,” available in Russian at [http://argumentua.com/stati/oruzheinyi-biznes-ukrainy-kaznokradstvo-bardak-i-bordel-2]. 105 See: D. Tavlui, op. cit.

54 Volume 8 Issue 1-2 2014 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION Moreover, some political scientists began claiming that there was no point in Ukraine participating in settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, or in the entire Caucasian question in general, because the Russian Federation was hindering this. “Ukraine’s interests in the Caucasus have been undergoing ‘filtration’ in Moscow for more than one year now, which makes it impossible to squeeze the most out of those opportunities Ukraine has in this region. The matter primarily concerns the sales market of domestic weapons.”106 Other experts believe that Ukraine’s mediation or peacekeeping mission in the Nagorno-Kara- bakh or any other conflict in the Caucasus that is not coordinated with Moscow will only cause problems for Ukraine. Should Azerbaijan or Armenia be supported in the war for Nagorno-Karabakh, “which, according to different evaluations, will definitely break out in 2013-2014 if it does not erupt in 2012, or should they wait for the terrorists to come? This is not very safe… Trying to strengthen the presence of Ukraine in the Caucasus is like playing on the rim of an active volcano.” Sometimes caution in international policy is better than ambition. Why look for adventures that go against common sense? For simple worldly wisdom says that “an outsider in a fight between neighbors will also suffer.”107

The Nagorno-Karabakh Issue in Ukrainian Policy on the Eve of Its Chairmanship in the OSCE

The scandal with deliveries of Ukrainian arms to Armenia did not dramatically change Ukrai- nian-Azeri relations. Ukraine’s official position in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict remained unchanged. Speaker of the Ukrainian parliament Vladimir Litvin brought this up again in April 2012 during his visit to Azerbaijan. “Official Kiev has always supported Azerbaijan’s fair position and been in favor of resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict peacefully within the framework of Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity and sovereignty.” Vladimir Litvin promised Baku that in 2013, during its chairmanship in the OSCE, Ukraine would focus maximum attention on resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. He saw the negotiation problem in the fact that the OSCE Minsk Group co-chairs engaged in its resolution were placing top priority on the political interests of their countries.108 Ukrainian Foreign Minister Konstantin Grishchenko also talked about Ukraine’s interest in resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and its priority during the country’s future chairmanship in the OSCE when he paid an official visit to Azerbaijan in June 2012. “Ukraine will do everything at the OSCE level to make progress in this issue,” he said.109 On 24 August, 2012, when congratulating Ukraine on its Independence Day, Viktor Yanukov- ich said: “Thanks to its non-bloc status, Ukraine can actively participate in settling international conflicts as a mediator.” In his words, times of transformation and change in the world are often accompanied by an increase in conflict in international relations. “Ukraine as a responsible participant in international relations must exert maximum effort to maintain peace and prevent new global op-

106 D. Tavlui, op. cit. 107 See: V. Filonov, “Ukraine’s Foreign Policy Regarding Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. Or Why does Ukraine Need the Caucasus?” available in Ukrainian at [http://real-politics.org/mykola-filonov-zovnishnya-polityka-ukrajiny-stosovno- hruziji-virmeniji-azerbajdzhanu-abo-navischo-ukrajini-kavkaz/], 7 December, 2011. 108 See: M. Aliev, “Ukraine is Exerting Maximum Effort to Resolve the Karabakh Conflict, says Rada speaker,” available in Russian at [http://www.trend.az/news/karabakh/2016409.html]. 109 See: “The Karabakh Issue Will Be a Priority of Ukraine’s Chairmanship in the OSCE, says head of the Foreign Ministry,” available in Russian at [http://newsazerbaijan.ru/politic/20120605/297420590.html 05/06/2012].

Volume 8 Issue 1-2 2014 55 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION position. The state’s non-bloc status is opening up prospects for more active participation in settling international conflicts as a mediator.”110 At the end of September 2010, when talking at the 67th session of the U.N. General Assembly, Viktor Yanukovich said that Ukraine would promote settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in every way it could during its chairmanship in the OSCE in 2013, as well as focus attention on the Geneva discussions on security and stability in the Caucasus. The Ukrainian side would do everything possible to settle this problem peacefully, or at least push for its realistic resolution. Ukraine would try to find points that would unite the efforts of the OSCE Minsk Group member states, lead to a change in the status quo, and promote the beginning of realistic talks on conflict settlement. Ukraine understood that during its chairmanship in the OSCE, it would not be able to resolve all the questions relating to the Karabakh problem, but set the goal of achieving progress in this question, primarily by stepping up efforts in the Minsk Group format. Peaceful conflict settlement and prevention will also be a starting point for Ukraine’s activity if it is elected as a non-permanent member of the U.N. Se- curity Council in 2016-2017. At the same time, the president reminded everyone that a contemporary and civilized approach to resolving interstate conflicts lay in offering and guaranteeing national minorities every civilian right, including local and autonomous self-government. In the same context, Ukraine would achieve full execution of the CFE Treaty.111 At the end of 2012, Ukraine and Azerbaijan chairing in the ODED-GUAM tried to step up the Organization’s activity in conflict settlement in its territory. On 1 December, 2012, at the 26th session of the GUAM Council of National Coordinators in Kiev, the “Protracted Conflicts in the GUAM Area and Their Implications for International Peace, Security and Development” resolution was approved again.112 However, the U.N. General Assembly never did discuss the Nagorno-Karabakh issue. At the same time, at the beginning of 2013, deputy of the Ukrainian Supreme Rada from the ruling Party of the Regions Vadim Kolesnichenko said that Ukraine essentially did not have the opportunity to participate actively in resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh problem even during its chairmanship in the OSCE. He gave the Russian Federation, as a major mediating state playing an important role in the conflict from the very beginning, a determining and decisive role in this issue. Ukraine’s role, in the deputy’s words, was “to demonstrate support of the efforts of Azerbaijan and Armenia in peaceful settlement of the conflict.” The more the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is discussed within the framework of international organizations, including in the OSCE, the more opinions will form about the need to resolve it, and politicians will exert increasing efforts in this area. But the world community is not rushing to resolve this conflict, since there are many hotspots that are considered more important.113

Conclusion

Ukraine has repeatedly supported and even initiated reexamination of the Nagorno-Karabakh issue and elimination of its consequences within the framework of international organizations. It has

110 See: K. Kokhan, “Ukraine Might Be a Mediator in Settling International Conflicts,” available in Russian at [http:// ura-inform.com/ru/politics/2012/08/24/ukraina-mozhet-byt-posrednikom-v-uregulirovanii-mezhdunarodnykh-konfliktov]. 111 See: “The President’s Speech at the Plenary Meeting of the 67th Session of the U.N. General Assembly,” available in Russian at [http://www.president.gov.ua/ru/news/25545.html]. 112 See: E. Huseinov, “A Draft of the Resolution on Protracted Conflicts in the GUAM Area Will Be Presented at the U.N.,” available in Russian at [http://www.trend.az/news/politics/2096233.html]; “The GUAM Countries are Gaining Wide Support of their Resolution in the U.N. General Assembly,” available in Russian at [http://www.contact.az/docs/2012/ Politics/120600020540ru.htm#.Uq4eVydP2XY]. 113 See: N. Huseinov, “Deputy from the Party of the Regions: ‘Ukraine Will Also Support Azerbaijan’s Territorial In- tegrity during its Chairmanship in the OSCE’,” available in Russian at [http://aze.az/news_deputat_ukraina_vo_86383.html].

56 Volume 8 Issue 1-2 2014 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION actively supported coordinating the activity of all international global and regional organizations engaged in security (the OSCE, U.N., EU, and ODED-GUAM) in settlement of this conflict. Kiev has not only supported all the resolutions of the U.N. Security Council and General Assembly on Nagorno-Karabakh, but has also actively upheld them during meetings of the highest bodies of these organizations. Support of Azerbaijan in settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict during the rule of Ukraine’s first three presidents sometimes took the form of direct and indirect upholding of the interests of a friendly country on the international arena. In the 1990s and beginning of the 2000s, no other post-Soviet state like Ukraine supported Azerbaijan, or Georgia either, within the framework of international organizations. In so doing, the Ukrainian state took advantage of its much greater diplomatic potential and work experience on the international arena compared with other former Soviet republics, since along with the Soviet Union and Belarus, it has been a member and one of the founders of the U.N. since 1945. Ukraine’s policy regarding the Nagorno-Karabakh issue since the beginning of the collapse of the Soviet Union until 2010 dramatically differed from Russia’s policy on the same problem, which is clearly seen in the activity of the Ukrainian and Russian representatives within the framework of international organizations. Nor did it in general meet Armenia’s interests, which did not promote the development of Ukrainian-Armenian relations. Beginning with President Leonid Kravchuk, Ukraine has been actively against forming and engaging a CIS peacekeeping contingent in the conflict zones in the Central Caucasus. This contradicted Russia’s plans, which was trying to preserve its military presence in this region. At the same time, Kiev has not always been claiming either a mediating mission in the negotiations on resolution of the problem, or a peacekeeping role in the conflict zone. Ukraine offered its mediating services in this issue, proceeding from its status as a non-bloc state, while the participants in the conflict viewed Kiev as one of the possible mediators in its settlement. For a short time, Ukraine was recognized by both sides in the conflict as a unbiased mediator and got ready to perform the corresponding functions. But whereas in the first case this was primarily prevented by external factors, in the second it was hindered by internal. During Leonid Kuchma’s second presidential term, Ukraine no longer intended assuming the role of one of the main mediator negotiators, but only offered its territory for holding the talks. During Leonid Kuchma’s presidency, the idea of forming a joint military contingent of three GUAM member states was first put forward for carrying out a peacekeeping mission in the Central Caucasus, as well as the demand to withdraw Russian troops from the territory of the GUAM states approved by the OSCE Istanbul summit of 1999 and arousing an extremely negative reaction in the Kremlin. Ukraine was the most active and efficient in terms of resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict during Viktor Yushchenko’s presidency until August 2008. However, Kiev and Baku were unable to achieve the main goal of engaging Ukrainian peacekeepers under the auspices of the U.N. in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict zone due to the position of Moscow and Erevan. Because of Viktor Yush- chenko, Armenia no longer considered Kiev an unbiased side regarding all the participants in the conflict, while the Russian Federation itself wanted and wants, no matter what, to send its troops, as peacekeepers, into the Azeri territories occupied by Armenia. This will allow it to achieve its main goal in this region of full control over the countries of the Central Caucasus and primarily over Azer- baijan. For this is the only territory where there are no Russian troops, which makes it possible for Baku to pursue a policy independent of Moscow. Engaging Russian peacekeepers in the Nagorno- Karabakh conflict zone will make Baku more conceding in its relations with the Kremlin. This primarily explained Moscow’s striving not only to oppose, but also split GUAM. The Kremlin also successfully used the moratorium on the CFE Treaty in 2007 for this purpose, as well as the Russian-Georgian war in August 2008. Volume 8 Issue 1-2 2014 57 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION The changes in foreign policy and international status of Ukraine in 2010-2012, which promoted Ukrainian-Russian and Ukrainian-Armenian rapprochement, as well as active military-technical cooperation between Azerbaijan and the Russian Federation and the ineffectiveness of Russian mediation in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, created conditions for Ukraine’s mediating mission. But Ukraine’s policy, which did not correspond to all the Kremlin’s plans, soon forced Moscow to look for ways to aggravate Ukrainian-Azeri relations. This search ended in the Ukrainian-Azeri scandal over Kiev’s arms sales to Erevan. Despite the fact that the scandal did not achieve the desired result, it dealt a blow to Ukraine’s image as an unbiased mediator. Moreover, real rapprochement and improvement of relations between Kiev and Erevan did nothing to preserve the traditional trust between Kiev and Baku. Despite Ukraine’s unchanged position on the Nagorno-Karabakh issue, Ukraine’s real policy during Yanukovich’s presidency became unpredictable not only for Moscow, but also for both sides in the conflict. Moreover, not only experts, but also Ukrainian government representatives began to doubt that Kiev had any real possibility of resolving the Azeri-Armenian conflict. So, against this background, neither Azerbaijan nor Armenia took any of Ukraine’s statements and assurances of its intentions to advance settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict during its chairmanship in the OSCE in 2013 seriously. Ukraine had lost their trust. The promises of Ukraine’s high-ranking officials were not in sync with their actions and began looking very much like Moscow’s policy. 58 Volume 8 Issue 1-2 2014 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

GEO-ECONOMICS

Vladimer PAPAVA

D.Sc. (Econ.), Professor, Rector of the Ivane Javakhishvili Tbilisi State University (Tbilisi, Georgia).

Vakhtang CHARAIA

Doctorate Candidate at Ivane Javakhishvili Tbilisi State University (Tbilisi, Georgia).

REGIONAL RAILWAYS IN THE CENTRAL CAUCASUS AND GEORGIA’S ECONOMIC INTERESTS

Abstract

his article examines two regional rail- The article also looks at such important way projects, one of which—Kars- aspects of both projects as construction or T Akhalkalaki-Tbilisi-Baku (KATB)—is al- restoration cost, financial and freight turn- ready reaching completion and the sec- over, profitability, direct and indirect eco- ond—restoration of the Abkhazian Section nomic benefits, and social effects. It also of the Trans-Caucasian Railway (ASTCR)— gives recommendations for improving these is still being discussed at the political level. regional railway transportation projects.

KEYWORDS: railway, regional cooperation, the Central Caucasus, conflict resolution, investments, transport corridors, KATB, ASTCR. Volume 8 Issue 1-2 2014 59 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION Introduction The Georgian economy has undergone enormous changes during the twenty years of its independence.1 Since the beginning of the 1990s, railway routes in the Central Caucasus2 have, for many, primarily political, reasons, been essentially disrupted. The conflicts that erupted at the beginning of the 1990s and continue to this day have remained an insurmountable obstacle to social and economic integration and the development of certain countries and the region as a whole.3 The prospects for restoring transport routes in the Central Caucasus are being examined not only from the commercial and social and economic angle, but primarily in the security context. The geopolitical reality that has developed today in the Central Caucasus offers certain advantages for Georgia. In particular, the other two Central Caucasian countries (Armenia and Azerbaijan) only have access to European and world markets through the Black Sea via Georgia. It is important to note that land communication between strategic partners Azerbaijan and Turkey and Russia and Armenia is also only possible via Georgia. The Kars-Akhalkalaki-Tbilisi-Baku (KATB)4 track and the Abkhazian Section of the Trans- Caucasian Railway (ASTCR), hypothetically to be restored, are of particular significance among the major international infrastructural projects in the Caucasus.

Main Technical Specifications of the Projects and Construction and Restoration Cost KATB is to go into operation in 2014 and will link the railway systems of Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey. The 178-km Akhalkalaki-Marabda section (for comparison, the ASTCR is 190 km long) must be reconstructed to implement this project, which will raise its throughput capacity to 17 million tons of freight (the ASTCR’s to 10 million tons) a year, while its speed will be increased to 140-150 km an hour (the ASTCR’s to 80 km/h). A 104-km railway section must also be built, 75 kilometers of which will run through Turkish territory, and 29 kilometers through Georgian. Based on preliminary estimates, during its first year of operation, KATB plans to transport 2-3 million tons of freight, with a gradual increase to 8 million tons a year5 (the ASTCR freight traffic would be, at most, four million tons6). It must be stressed that KATB (just like ASTCR) is intended for transporting freight, and at the current stage does not envisage the conveyance of passen- gers. If KATB can be used for passenger transport, this will make the project much more attractive.7 However, unfortunately, none of the projects are giving this question due attention.

1 See: V. Papava, Economic Reforms in Post-Communist Georgia: Twenty Years After, Nova Science Publishers, New York, 2013. 2 See: E. Ismailov, V. Papava, The Central Caucasus: Essays on Geopolitical Economy, CA&CC Press, Stockholm, 2006; Idem, “A New Concept for the Caucasus,” Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, Vol. 8, No. 3, 2008. 3 See: J. O’Loughlin, V. Kolossov, J. Radvanyi, “The Caucasus in a Time of Conflict, Demographic Transition, and Economic Change,” Eurasian Geography and Economics, Vol. 48, No. 2, 2007, pp. 135-156. 4 See: V. Papava, “Zheleznaia doroga Kars-Akhalkalaki-Tbilisi-Baku i razvitie Dzhavakheti,” in V. Papava, E. Metreveli, T. Abashidze, I. Zhvania, A. Kitiashvili, Dzhavakheti. Vyzovy i perspektivy, GFSIS, Tbilisi, 2013, p. 17, available at [http:// gfsis.org/media/download/library/articles/papava/javakheti.pdf]. 5 See: Ibidem. 6 See: N. Mirimanova, V. Amiryan, G. Bayramov, B. Baratelia, L. Zade, K. Hovsepyan, F. Rasulov, V. Charaia, Rehabilitation of the Railways in the South Caucasus, International Alert, London, 2013, p. 21, available at [www.international- alert.org/resources/publications/rehabilitation-railways-south-caucasus-vol1-en] 7 See: L. Viskushenko, “Zh/d Kars-Akhalkalaki-Tbilisi-Baku: za i protiv,” Kavkazsky uzel, 23 January, 2007, available at [http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/107100/].

60 Volume 8 Issue 1-2 2014 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION Azerbaijan extended Georgia a loan of $775 million to build the Georgian section. The first installment of $200 million was issued for 25 years at a 1% interest rate, while the second installment of $575 million was for 25 years at a 5% interest rate.8 So the total cost of KATB increased from the initial $600 million to $1.2 billion. In order to estimate the cost of the ASTCR, experts from International Alert drew up an original methodology of cost assessment. Taking the KATB and Tuapse-Adler projects as an example, they developed a method for classifying the physical state of different sections of the railway based on the data collected9:  category 1—operating at full capacity and requiring running maintenance ($0.1 million for 1 km);  category 2—operating at partial capacity and requiring both running maintenance and capital;  repairs for certain sections of track ($0.4 million);  category 3—not operating and requiring capital repairs ($1 million);  category 4—completely wrecked and requiring restoration ($1.5 million);  category 5—new construction ($2 million). The technical state of all the sections of the rail road was assessed on the basis of visual inspections, an analysis of the technical documents, and interviews with experts (see Table 1).

Table 1 Restoration Expenditure on the Psou-Inguri Section of the KATB Track

Category of Restoration Section of Track Distance, km Restoration Work Expenditure, $m

Psou-Sukhumi 102 3 102

Sukhumi- 54 4 81 Ochamchira

Ochamchira- 34 5 68 Inguri

Psou-Inguri 190 3, 4, 5 251

S o u r c e: N. Mirimanova, V. Amiryan, G. Bayramov, et al., op. cit.

It is interesting that the data collected with this approach differ significantly from the estimates of Georgian experts from AO Georgian Railway and Abkhazian (along with Russian) experts (see Table 2). The reason for this impressive difference could be the disparity both in the direct expenditures on building this facility and in the indirect expenditures (that is, the existence of corruption schemes).

8 See: A. Salaeva, “Nazvany sroki sdachi v ekspluatatsiiu zheleznodorozhnoi magistrali Baku-Tbilisi-Kars,” 1 NEWS. AZ, 13 June, 2013, available at [http://1news.az/economy/20130613115109319.html]. 9 See: N. Mirimanova, V. Amiryan, G. Bayramov, et al., p. 8.

Volume 8 Issue 1-2 2014 61 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

Table 2 Comparison of the Restoration Expenditure on Different Sections of the ASTCR

Cost Estimate, Cost Cost Estimate, Distance, Abkhazian (and Estimate, International Section of Track km Russian) Georgian Alert Experts, Experts, $m Experts, $m $m

Psou-Sukhumi 102 — — 102

Sukhumi- 54 — 18.7 81 Ochamchira

Ochamchira-Inguri 34 — 54.2 68

Psou-Inguri 190 350-400 73 251

S o u r c e: N. Mirimanova, V. Amiryan, G. Bayramov, et al., op. cit.

Transport Routes and Financial and Freight Turnover of KATB and ASTCR

If we keep in mind that laying the railway track under the Bosporus (that is, the Marmarai project), which could be joined to KATB and further via the Baku (Azerbaijan)-Aktau (Kazakhstan) rail and maritime route to China, is at the completion stage, KATB could become part of the shortest railway linking Asia and Europe.10 As for the ASTCR, it could become the shortest route for joining the western part of Russia and the north of Eastern Europe with the Central Caucasus, Turkey, and Iran. In so doing, Georgia could become a link both in the West-East (and vice versa) direction, as well as in the North-South (and vice versa) direction. It should also be noted that the ASTCR is a necessary link for building a railway around the Black Sea. According to the estimates of experts, while the trade volume between China and Europe currently amounts to $500 billion, by 2020 this volume will increase to $800 billion. In view of this trade growth between China and Europe, Kazakhstan is interested in corresponding trade flow passing through Kazakhstan and from the port of Aktau through the Caspian Sea to Baku. Kazakh grain producers are showing a particular interest in the launching of KATB since they hope to export wheat to Turkey and Europe via this railway.11 The agreement between Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan on use of the transport potential of the route linking China with Turkey through the Caucasus is also of immense importance. This particularly applies to implementation of the Navoi-Turkmenbashi-Baku-Tbilisi-Akhalkalaki-Kars transportation project.12

10 See: A. Kasianov, “Zheleznaia doroga Kars-Akhalkalaki-Tbilisi-Baku (KATB),” Lenta novostei, 13 March, 2013, available at [http://referat.forum2x2.ru/t20-topic]. 11 See: Ibidem. 12 See: Ibidem.

62 Volume 8 Issue 1-2 2014 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION Assessment of the potential sectors of the Georgian economy that will directly or indirectly participate in the trade turnover of the ASTCR and KATB must be based on the real opportunities and needs of the Georgian economy. It should be kept in mind that the contemporary Georgian economic model is based less on increasing production and more on stimulating consumption.13 Despite the slow, instable and unbalanced growth of the Georgian economy over the past two decades, clear progress is nevertheless obvious. In just the past ten years (from 2003 to 2012), Geor- gian export has increased five-fold, while import has risen even more, by seven-fold. The only decline in growth was seen in the crisis year of 2009, the year following the Russian-Georgian war (see, Table 3).

Table 3 Georgian Export and Import of 2004-2012, $bn

Year 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012

Export 0.646 0.865 0.936 1.232 1.495 1.133 1.677 2.189 2.377

Import 1.844 2.487 3.674 5.212 6.301 4.500 5.257 7.057 7.842

Total 2.490 3.352 4.610 6.444 7.796 5.633 6.934 9.246 10.219

S o u r c e: National Statistics Office of Georgia, available at [www.geostat.ge].

However, if we show Georgian export products not in millions of American dollars, but in tons of freight, we will see that the indices are not as impressive. Despite the opinion of some experts that, if restored, the ASTCR will have difficulty keeping up with the freight flow of Georgian wines and mineral water, the studies show that opening rail communication with Russia will essentially not play any particular role either for Georgian businessmen or for the ASTCR itself, for example:  wine—325 wagons (1 wagon for 40,000 bottles of wine), or 7-8 rolling stocks, would be needed to transport 10 million bottles of wine a year (this is the current maximum quota of Georgian wine to Russia)—this would load the railway for one day;  mineral water—the railway would operate for just one week when exporting 50 million liters (55,000 tons);  vegetables and fruit—exporting a volume of 200,000 tons of vegetables and fruit (almost the whole of the country’s export harvest) would require two to three weeks of railway operations.14 In other words, Georgia’s export potential is too small to support the ASTCR and KATB projects. Freight flows are drawn not because of the operating railways, but because of their profitability and the potential of the economies involved in the project. The negative social and economic consequences of implementing the ASTCR and KATB projects can be seen in maritime and automobile freight transport, the revenue from which is much higher and able to provide jobs for ten times more people. In particular, opening ASTCR and KATB

13 See: V. Papava, The Main Challenges of “Post-Rosy” Georgia’s Economic Development. Experts Opinion, No. 4, GFSIS, Tbilisi, 2013. P. 4-5, available at [http://gfsis.org/media/download/library/articles/Expert_Opinion_ENG_4.pdf]. 14 See: N. Mirimanova, V. Amiryan, G. Bayramov, B. Baratelia, L. Zade, K. Hovsepyan, F. Rasulov, V. Charaia, op. cit., p. 20.

Volume 8 Issue 1-2 2014 63 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION rail communication is not advantageous for the Georgian ports (Poti and Batumi) for the following reasons:  Most of the freight going north-south and west-east (and vice versa) that makes use of the services of the Georgian ports will no longer need them after rail communication appears that is capable of transporting freight without additional reloading (which leads to an increase in the transportation cost);  Due to the tough competition of the ASTCR and Georgian ports, the revenue and number of jobs at the port will decrease, as well as Georgia’s state budget revenue. While the advantages from the ASTCR will be much less in terms of all parameters;  KATB, the second project, will also cause a decrease in revenue and jobs at the port. Opening up railway traffic with Russia is currently not advantageous for the automobile freight transport sector for the following reasons:  it would cause job losses in the automobile freight transport sector (300–400 jobs with an average salary of $1,000 a month);  it would decrease companies’ annual revenue by approximately $5 million and then lead to local companies being pushed out by foreign companies (Turkish, Azeri and Armenian). 15 Moreover, switching from freight traffic (50,000 tons) to rail transportation would reduce Geor- gia’s budget revenue by approximately $2 million a year (railway revenue at 50,000 tons of freight amounts to less than $200,000). If these 50,000 tons of freight are transported by automobile freight transporters, the sector is capable of providing at least 300 jobs, while the railway will not create even a dozen new jobs.16 According to in-depth case studies of some of the largest industrial plants in Georgia (Rustavi Azot, Zestafoni Ferrous Alloy Plant, and HIPP-Georgia), it transpired that these plants are functioning with 100% of their production capacity using all the raw material available and cannot step up production. Let us take a closer look at these examples:17 Based on a closer look at the situation at Rustavi Azot (RA), it was concluded that the restoration of the ASTCR would not stimulate an increase in production or its reorientation to new (Russian) markets for the following reasons:  RA already has stable sales markets, including foreign, for its production;  RA is already operating at high turnovers, virtually at full capacity, and a future increase in production will be tied to huge investments that the plant is still not ready for;  Due to the high competition and keeping in mind that the business of mineral fertilizers in Russia is one of the chief sectors in the Russian chemical industry, with an annual turnover of more than US$10 billion (production volume of 18.79 million tons of fertilizers (2011), exporting RA production to Russia has little prospect. The reasons why the Russian market is not of interest to HIPP-Georgia are as follows:  95% of its products are exported and it already has stable sales markets;  there are no additional resources (Georgian fruits) to increase production;  production capacities are already at a maximum.

15 See: Ibid., p. 30. 16 See: Ibid., p. 31. 17 See: Ibid, pp. 26-31.

64 Volume 8 Issue 1-2 2014 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION The lack of interest of the Zestafoni Ferrous Alloy Plant in exporting ferrous alloy to Russia stems from the following reasons:  up to 100% of all products are exported and have stable sales markets;  production is already operating at full capacity;  it is not planned to further grow the plant to increase production.

Profitability of the ASTCR

According to Table 4, at an estimated project cost of $400 million (assessment of Russian experts), it is unlikely, to put it mildly, to give a return, since the pay-back term would be 250 years with a freight turnover of 3 million tons a year, or 26 years with a freight turnover of 10 million tons. However, the last freight scenario does not seem feasible since the profitability threshold of 10 million tons a year remains unattainable for this railway. According to some experts, under the most optimis- tic freight scenario, it does not seem feasible to ensure more than four million tons a year, and this is assuming that all the potentially interested countries are incorporated: Turkey, Iran, Armenia, Georgia, and Russia.18

Table 4 Profitability Assessment of the Psou-Inguri Railway (at an estimated restoration cost of $400 million)

Pay-back Volume of Quantity Rate of Net Profit, Period, Freight Traffic, number of Profit, Profit, % $m number of million tons containers % years

1.0 50,000 — — — —

3.0 150,000 6 1.4 0.4 250

5.0 250,000 9 3.5 0.9 111

8.0 400,000 10 6.2 1.6 63

10.0 500,000 20 15.6 3.9 26

S o u r c e: N. Mirimanova, V. Amiryan, G. Bayramov, et al., op. cit.

Table 5 shows that at an estimated cost of $251 million (assessment of International Alert experts), the Psou-Inguri project is still not attractive, since the pay-back period would be 200 years with a freight turnover of 3 million tons a year, or 16 years with a freight turnover of 10 million tons a year.19

18 See: N. Mirimanova, V. Amiryan, G. Bayramov, B. Baratelia, L. Zade, K. Hovsepyan, F. Rasulov, V. Charaia, op. cit., p. 21. 19 See: Ibid., p. 18.

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Table 5 Profitability Assessment of the Psou-Inguri Railway (at an estimated restoration cost of $251 million)

Volume of Quantity Rate of Net profit Pay-back freight traffic (number of profit (US$ Profit (%) period (number (millions of tons containers) (%) million) of years

1,0 50 000 — — — —

3,0 150 000 6 1,4 0,5 200

5,0 250 000 9 3,5 1,4 71

8,0 400 000 10 6,2 2,5 40

10,0 500 000 20 15,6 6,2 16

S o u r c e: N. Mirimanova, V. Amiryan, G. Bayramov, et al., op. cit.

After analyzing the potential of this railway and the possible interest of the various sides concerned, it can be stated that the ASTCR is economically unprofitable. At the same time, due to the low expenditures ($26.5 million) of the Georgian side taken separately (without the Abkhazian section), it can be said that this project is entirely profitable and fits the parameters of railway return (however, not one of the separate sections of the railway can function without restoration of the entire track). At the average cost for transporting one ton of freight, with corresponding coefficient rates on the Georgian section of the rail road, it can be calculated that20:  Under the most pessimistic scenario of 1 million tons of freight a year, the expenditures of the Georgian side of $26.5 million would be paid off in 8 years;  At an average load of 5 million tons in less than 20 months;  At a maximum load of 10 million tons (due to the fact that the through capacity of the Georgian railway amounts to 30 million tons a year, 20 million tons of which are already being used, the maximum freight flow on the ASTCR cannot exceed 10 million tons) in less than a year. This conclusion was made on the basis of data collected by AO Georgian Railway, from which it became clear that with an increase in freight flow of 1 million tons, the Georgian railway will earn an average of 21 million lari (18 million lari on transportation and 3 million lari on servicing the sta- tion) or 5.5 million lari ($3.3 million) net profit.

Direct and Indirect Economic and Social Effects for Armenia

From the very beginning, Armenia has had a negative attitude toward the KATB railway project, since it felt that it would be more economically feasible to relaunch the already existing Kars-Gumri

20 See: Ibid., pp. 8, 18.

66 Volume 8 Issue 1-2 2014 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION track that has been out of commission since April 1993 after Turkey closed the border with Armenia (in solidarity with Azerbaijan).21 It is widely thought that KATB will lead to Armenia’s complete isolation and that supposedly after taking a pro-Armenian position, Washington has decided that American companies will not participate in financing this project.22 To be fair, it should be stressed that KATB cannot aggravate Armenia’s isolation, since Armenia, even without KATB, did not participate and is not participating in any of the freight traffic or commodity turnover among Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey.23 Restoration of the ASTCR, on the contrary, is aimed at integrating Armenia into the regional project. The calculations presented by Armenian experts show that this project is entirely profitable for Armenia (see Table 6), providing that Armenia does not invest anything in the construction of this railway project.

Table 6 Change in Transport and Storage Component of Product Cost—Tekhut Quarry

Indicator Current Value Growth Potential

Number of workers 180 1,200 -1,300

Annual production volume 12,000 tons 95,000 -100,000 tons

Russia, Belgium, Chief export markets Belgium, Germany Germany

Sulfuric acid, mineral Accompanying production — fertilizers

State budget tax revenue, $4.8 million $40-45 million excluding income tax

S o u r c e: N. Mirimanova, V. Amiryan, G. Bayramov, et al., op. cit., pp. 34-37.

The Armenian segment of the railway is in working condition and does not require capital investment. As a result, restoration of the railway is a priori desirable for Armenian exporters and importers, who currently have to use two major ports (depending on the time of year and the destination): the seaport of Poti (Georgia) or of Bandar Abbas (Iran) along with additional railway and truck transportation services, which raises the price of the end product and lowers its competitiveness. Switching to a single transport system, that is the ASTCR, could save businessmen 20% of their transport costs, on average, and probably change the trade balance structure of Armenia. In 2012, approximately 20% of Armenian exports went to Russia, while exports to the EU countries made up 40% of total exports.24

21 See: N.Z. Mosaki, “Proekt zheleznoi dorogi Baku-Tbilisi-Kars,” Middle East Institute, available at [http://www.iimes. ru/rus/stat/2007/22-05-07a.htm]. 22 See: G. Oganesian, “Zheleznodorozhny proekt Kars-Akhalkalaki-Tbilisi-Baku v kontekste turetsko-gruzinskikh in- terestov,” 21-y Vek, No. 3 (23), 2012, p. 73. 23 See: S. Sarukhanian, “Zheleznaia doroga Kars-Akhalkalaki-Tbilisi i ee regionalnye perspektivy,” Globus, No. 4, 25 April, 2013, available at [http://www.noravank.am/rus/articles/security/detail.php?ELEMENT_ID=7041]. 24 See: N. Mirimanova, V. Amiryan, G. Bayramov, et al., op. cit., pp. 31-34.

Volume 8 Issue 1-2 2014 67 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION By avoiding high servicing tariffs in the “Kavkaz” seaport (Russia) it will be theoretically possible to increase the percentage of the Armenian-Russian and decrease the percentage of the Arme- nian-European trade turnover. Nevertheless, the increase in export or import is not always determined only by transport expenditures. Such important aspects as product quality, tariff policy, market structure, competitiveness of the export commodity, and many other factors play just as important a role in trade between the two countries.

Direct and Indirect Economic and Social Effects for Abkhazia

The Abkhaz economy is geared toward Russia and consists mainly of the export of services (tourism) to Russia. However, due to the insignificant volume of this export, freight traffic will not yield a significant economic effect, so it is not a key factor for Abkhazia. Abkhazia does not have its own freight necessitating railway transport. Road freight traffic with Russia and maritime relations with Turkey fully cover freight transport of Abkhazia. As there is no developed manufacturing of goods in Abkhazia, it would not be able to ensure the efficient and profitable operation of the Abkhazian railway. Therefore, restoring the railways could be viewed only in terms of transit traffic, which would allow the Abkhazian railway to obtain the transit duties.25

Conclusion

Building new transport routes in the Central Caucasus is prompted by the new dimensions of partnership both in the regional and global format. As a result, Georgia is gradually turning into a regional transport hub. It is another matter just how beneficial this process is for Georgia, both in the short and long term, which is the topic of an independent study. The fact that after the KATB track is launched the business potential of Georgian ports will deteriorate is an example of a short-term negative effect, while KATB will also provide direct rail freight traffic with Europe, which will give Georgia additional economic advantages in the long term. As for the second large-scale project, the ASTCR, which is still only under review, studies show that there are essentially no economic stimuli for implementing this project at the moment. It is important to note that the points of reference for Georgia in implementing a particular regional project are its own strategic, social and economic, political and other interests of Georgia. It is from this viewpoint that decisions should be made in Georgia regarding the implementation of the above-mentioned railway projects.

25 See: Ibid., p. 19.

68 Volume 8 Issue 1-2 2014 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION Gulshen YUZBASHIEVA

D.Sc. (Econ.), head of the Department of Economic Theory and History of Economic Thought at the Institute of Economics, National Academy of Sciences of Azerbaijan (Baku, Azerbaijan).

DEVELOPMENT OF INDUSTRY UNDER TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE (A Case Study of Azerbaijan)

Abstract

his article examines the development benefits of modernization in industry and of industry under technological change, argues the need for fundamental structural T analyzes the trends identified, studies changes to increase the production of high the causes of the current situation in Azer- value added products, especially high-tech baijan’s industry, and determines the fac- products, and to improve the competitive- tors contributing to its growth. The author ness of domestic products in the world mar- proposes recommendations on using the ket.

KEYWORDS: industry, structural changes, innovations, modernization, technologies, transformation, Azerbaijan.

Introduction

Under conditions of largely intensive reproduction, the problem of social production efficiency and, consequently, the problem of improving the structure of the economy come into sharper focus. It has become possible to solve major social and economic problems mainly through qualitative structural changes with emphasis on changing the existing proportions. That is why, considering the constant changes in the socioeconomic conditions of society’s development, effective development of the economy is inevitably connected with changes in its sectoral structure. From this it follows that optimal economic structure cannot be presented in the form of any kind of fixed structural relationships. Moreover, there is no “optimal” structure of the economy whose achievement would make it unnecessary to keep improving this structure in accordance with the changing conditions of reproduction because at each stage of development its main elements are in a state of constant movement, development and change. Today there is an awareness of the need for structural changes, but little attention is being paid to analyzing the factors and conditions that have contributed to the changes that have occurred and to identifying positive and negative trends in the economy. The point is that the development of the modern economy is characterized by a combination of different trends, which have a mixed effect on the dynamics of indicators traditionally used in economic analysis. Superficial mechanical monitoring Volume 8 Issue 1-2 2014 69 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION of these indicators often leads to erroneous conclusions about the development of the economy. Today, structural changes and a transition to a new technical and technological base are necessary, in the first place, to resolve certain socioeconomic problems:  to overcome emerging obstacles and adapt the economy to the new, more complex conditions of reproduction. This is particularly important because such economic development helps to improve the investment climate, stimulate business, and increase labor productivity through a modernization of production, with emphasis on sectors of importance to the country’s entire economy. Modernization should not so much ensure high rates of economic growth as serve to enhance the existing potential;  to find resource-efficient ways of economic development, increase the impact of R&D and ICT, of scientific and technological processes; to develop new forms of economic specialization and integration, etc. The experience of recent years has made significant amendments to the economic strategies of countries rich in natural resources. Practically all of them have set up reserve funds so as to be independent of external market fluctuations. Reserves have made it possible to significantly mitigate the effect of the crisis, but they also have a negative side: a slowdown in the structural modernization of industry. Oil and gas revenues balance the budget; there is moderate economic growth; paramount importance is given to social problems; and efforts are being made to build an innovative economy. In the opinion of Vladimir Mau, the best approach is one that “provides for balancing the budget at a revenue level that is historically stable and does not make the country dependent on factors beyond the control of the national government… Budget restraint is not the most popular policy but a strategically safe one.”1 The new conditions in Azerbaijan’s economic development have created totally new problems that need to be addressed.

The Current Situation in Industry

Real structural transformations promote sustainable economic development, balance the operation of various economic structures, and help to remove distortions in their development in order to achieve the set goal: to increase the competitiveness of the national economy based on faster scientific and technological development and the innovative component of the economic system. This is particularly important because the structure of the economy is not only the range of its sectors and industries, but also the proportions between them, which determine the efficiency of different areas of economic activity. Mustafa Kemal Atatürk emphasized that a nation with an underdeveloped economy can never recover from poverty and subjection, from social and political disasters. Successes in government depend on the degree of achievement in the field of the economy. There is no developed state that would not think about the economy before the army and the navy. To protect the state’s independence and make it prosper, all efforts and resources should be directed toward economic development.2 One of the ways of addressing this task in Azerbaijan is by restructuring the economy, including industry, which is distorted, high-cost, low-profit and uncoordinated, with low labor productivity. In these

1 V.V. Mau, Forbes (Russian issue), May 2011, p. 40. 2 M.K. Atatürk, “Epokha ekonomiki. Iz rechi na otkrytii ekonomicheskogo kongressa v Izmire 17 fevralia 1923” (Eco- nomic Era. From the Opening Speech at the Izmir Economic Congress on 17 February 1923), Turtsia – vchera, segodnia, zavtra, March 1991, pp. 4-5.

70 Volume 8 Issue 1-2 2014 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION conditions, the government gives top priority to industry. The problem of structural development should be addressed so as to ensure full use of human capital and increase its contribution to national wealth, enhanced by innovations in the area of natural resource and physical capital. The system of strategic planning should identify the basic structural imbalances in the development of industry, set the necessary proportions, and select the tools for achieving them. The planning system should provide for the implementation of the following principles: integrated approach, effectiveness, optimal and balanced structure, scientifically valid decisions and plans, and flexibility. In this connection, it makes sense to look for acceptable ways to transform the system in order to remedy its defects for maintaining and promoting growth in industry and science, which ensure, together with the resource base, an improvement in social welfare. As we know, economic reforms in Azerbaijan have led to significant changes both in the structure of the key macroeconomic indicators and in the proportions and relationships between them. The trend that is most significant for the national economy is an increase in the share of the service sector in the gross domestic product compared to the real sector. In the opinion of most economists, an increasing share of services in GDP indicates a significant level of market development and maturity of the economy. For example, the sectoral structure of gross value added changed toward an increase in the share of services (trade, finance and intermediary activity) and a decline in the share of goods. By 2000, the share of services in GDP was 38.5%, and the share of industrial products, 30.8%. The increase in the share of services in the structure of GDP was said to indicate that Azerbaijan was moving closer to the level of developed countries with a post-industrial economy. In actual fact, this structural change was caused by the country’s deindustrialization and over-expansion of trade intermediary services. Since 2005, the share of industry has tended to increase. In 2011, its share in GDP was already 53.7%, while that of services was down to 26.9%.3 But this does not mean an actual decline in the production of services. It only shows that manufacturing production has increased due to government efforts to develop the non-oil sector (to open plants and factories, modernize existing production, etc.). In 2013, GDP was 57.708 billion manats (AZN), with the non-oil sector accounting for AZN 29.982 billion (52.0% of the total). From 2005 to 2012, GDP increased from AZN 12,522.5 million to AZN 53,995.0 million, but annual growth slowed from 26.4% in 2005 to 2.2% in 2012, although compared to 2011 growth rates increased by 2,1%. The industrial production index increased from 95.0% in 2011 to 97.7% in 2012, but compared to 2005 it declined: that year, industrial production rose by 33.5%. Growth rates in the key sectors of industry declined as well. For example, the extraction of mineral resources in 2011 and 2012 decreased from the previous year by 8.4% and 4.2%, respectively, but compared to 2005 there was a sharp decline: at that time, annual growth in resource extraction was 41.5%. In manufacturing, annual growth slowed from 16.0% in 2005 to 7.1% in 2011 and 5.4% in 2012. Changes in other macroeconomic indicators show a similar trend. Investment processes give no reason to expect faster economic growth either. Gross fixed capital formation fell from 27.3% in 2011 to 18.5% in 2012, and then to 15.1% in 2013, while the investment structure deteriorated: the share of agriculture in total investment was 4.4% in 2010, 3.4% in 2011, and 4.2% in 2012; the share of industry was 43.2%, 41.9% and 39.2%, respectively. The share of manufacturing in total industrial investment was 29.8% in 2010, 25.3% in 2011, and 25.0% in 2012. Despite the downward trend in mining sector investment, the share of investment in manufacturing remains lower than in export-oriented extractive industries: 5.1% in 2010, 6.6% in 2011, and 5.6% in 2012, which points to a strengthening of the commodity-export trend in the development of industry. At the same time, export value is decreasing, although exports have always been a key factor behind recovery growth (the Azerbaijan economy is in need of such growth: although there was no sharp drop in production under the impact of the global financial crisis, growth rates for almost all macroeconomic indicators declined). In 2011, exports reached 95.1% of the previous year’s level; in 2012

3 Natsionalnye scheta. Statisticheski sbornik, Baku, 2013.

Volume 8 Issue 1-2 2014 71 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION the figure was 86.2%, and in 2013, 92.0%,4 even though there was no decline in the world price of oil, the country’s main export commodity. In the investment structure, the share of investment in the renewal of machinery and equipment by way of imports reached 45.5% in 2012, which means that dependence on imports in the field of investment goods remains steadily high. The economy is increasingly losing its own technological base for development. Consequently, economic modernization in Azerbaijan lags behind the developed countries. Growth prospects depend on the ability to create a favorable investment climate, where an important role is played by government support for real sector investment, the quality of public administration, and measures to stimulate business, promote competition and raise labor productivity by modernizing production. What the country needs is real modernization in all areas based on its own national identity, and not just transformations. Despite some growth in industry, the share of the mining sector (resource extraction) in the structure of value added has increased. In 2005, its share was 67.4%, manufacturing contributed 25.9%, and the power industry, 6.7%, whereas in 2012 the figures were 78.8%, 15.3% and 5.9%, respectively. In manufacturing, there has been a decline in the share of all industries. For example, the share of the food industry fell from 3.62% in 2005 to 2.06% in 2012; light industry shrank from 0.65% to 0.41%, chemical and petrochemical production from 2.71% to 0.81%, the forest industry from 0.37% to 0.22%, building materials from 1.6% to 1.0%, engineering and metalworking from 5.05% to 2.4%, oil refining from 9.9% to 7.3%, and metallurgy from 2.0% to 1.1%, respectively. The industrial structure at the microeconomic level is also far from optimal. In 2013, there were 712 enterprises in resource extraction (644 of them small); 5,136 enterprises in manufacturing (including 4,758 SEs); 276 enterprises in the power industry (116 SEs), and 419 enterprises in water supply (325 SEs). As a result, the slowdown in output growth has continued, although rising demand points to an untapped potential for industrial growth. Significant results have been obtained in areas where purposeful efforts are being made to modernize production. In 2013, for example, the newly created high technology park in Sumqayit presented the first results: photovoltaic panels and arrays, a new textile factory and a petrochemical plant; a household waste recycling plant has opened in Baku, and an aluminum products factory, in Ganja. Based on the cluster, it is planned to build an oil and gas processing and petrochemical complex, which will help to create a processing chain up to the production of the final product, to improve competitiveness and increase the volume and range of exports. The development of information technologies has a multiplier effect because these technologies not only produce additional GDP, but also enhance the effect of the operation of industries where they are applied. For example, modern third and fourth-generation rolling mills or machining centers are impossible without them. That is why modernization and fundamental structural changes in industry designed to meet current challenges and to increase the production of high value added products, especially high-tech products, are becoming a strategic task. But growth in the non-oil sector does not mean a reduction in the physical volume of oil and gas exports; it only implies the need to export finished products, especially high-tech and knowledge-intensive goods and services. This could include industries for whose development there are favorable conditions. To assess the potential for the development of various sectors of industry, we used a model of analysis based on identifying the dynamics of economic development. The dynamism of development determines the lines of development from the perspective of structural dynamics. The structural dynamics process serves to transform structure in terms of innovation technology (new technologies determine the formation of a new technological base), in institutional terms and in market terms within the framework of the existing technological order. Transformation alters the structure of industry and, under the impact of the structural dynamics process, changes the quality of the economic potential of industrial sectors. This is important because the key condition of qualitative structural

4 Azerbaijan v tsyfrakh. Statisticheski sbornik, Baku, 2013.

72 Volume 8 Issue 1-2 2014 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION development is a combination of positive structural changes and economic growth, which leads to a shift in structural dynamics towards innovation and technological change. As our calculations show, the overall dynamics of structural changes are positive. The growth rate is positive only in manufacturing and the power industry, although in 2009 growth in these sectors was also negative. Since 2011, growth rates have been negative for both industry in general and resource extraction in particular. The structural lead for the whole of industry and for extraction is larger than the structural lag, which shows that timely measures have been taken. But in manufacturing and the power industry the structural lag is larger than the lead, as evidenced by the negative growth for industry as a whole. The structural elasticity of output is negative for industry as a whole and for extraction, but in manufacturing and the power industry the trend is positive. The effectiveness of structural changes in employment, investment and output is positive (but less than unity), which shows that the technological component of industry is beginning to develop based on innovation in accordance with the requirements of the existing technological order. There is an increase in the production of fundamentally new goods, and higher investment and innovation activity in promising areas. The structure is gradually changing as it is modernized with an expansion of the new technological order, and this creates conditions not only for growth, but also for industrial development because investment is redirected from sunset industries to new ones. In practice, these changes have reoriented industry toward imports of technology (a characteristic feature of primary-producing periphery countries). Export-oriented natural resource industries buy an increasing part of their equipment abroad. There is no demand even for fairly competitive domestic engineering products for the fuel and energy complex (FEC) among natural resource cor- porations, which tend to buy foreign machinery because the contracts they conclude do not provide for the use of competitive domestic products, as they do in Norway. In the structure of technological innovation costs in industry, the main items in 2005 were the purchase of new technologies (95%) and the purchase of equipment and machinery associated with technological innovation (3.4%); in 2012, the figures were 58.5% for the purchase of equipment and machinery associated with technological innovation, 27.9% for research and development, 6.0% for the purchase of new technologies, and 5.7% for the development and implementation of new processes, products and services.5 This indicates a low level of efficiency in industry. Commodity specialization, low wages, small share of research funding, low education level, low-skilled labor, low scientific and technical potential, and export of capital—all of these are characteristic features of a peripheral economy. The process of production renewal based on new technology in Azerbaijan is not yet in full swing. As Sergey Glаzyev rightly notes, “the incipient recovery is mainly driven by short-term factors and is taking place on the old technological base. In technological terms, the economy is still a mixed one. It has fallen apart into a relatively prosperous export-oriented natural resource sector and a domestic sector that is shrinking under pressure from imports and is increasingly falling behind its foreign competitors.”6 This is evident, among other things, from the structure of industry in Azerbai- jan: an increase in the share of extractive industries (78.8%) and a decrease in that of manufacturing (15.3%); there are also changes in the structure of fixed capital investment: 63.9% in resource extraction and 14.2% in manufacturing (2012).7 So far, the existing investment mechanisms cannot solve this problem. Its solution is important because export-oriented sectors which earn high profits due to a favorable pricing environment have ample opportunity to invest compared to manufacturing enterprises, whose opportunities to invest are limited. That is why, now that most industries have a low profit margin because of price dispro- portions and many production enterprises continue to operate at a loss, the achievement of sustain-

5 Promyshlennost Azerbaidzhana. Statisticheski sbornik, Baku, 2013, p. 94. 6 S.Yu. Glazyev, “Gosudarstvennaia ekonomicheskaia politika Rossii v usloviyakh globalnoi konkurentsii,” Sovremen- naia konkurentsia, No. 2, 2007, p. 29. 7 Promyshlennost Azerbaidzhana. Statisticheski sbornik.

Volume 8 Issue 1-2 2014 73 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION able production growth is problematic. At the same time, it should be noted that most of the idle industrial capacity can still be brought back into operation if the financial position of enterprises improves. It is particularly important to take this into account because the potential for production growth at existing facilities is low and investment is needed for their modernization on the basis of new technology. The remaining scientific and technical potential does not yet create the conditions for restoring and maintaining expanded reproduction of some key technologies of the current and new technological orders. To remedy this situation, it is necessary to build national competitive advantages in the key development areas of the new technological order, with a proper concentration of financial, investment, information and intellectual resources available in the country, which requires the implementation of appropriate investment, structural, industrial, scientific and technological, pricing and other components of the country’s policy of sustainable development. It is important to improve the dynamics of industry so that it could act as an engine of technological progress in Azerbai- jan. The industrial structure should correspond to development that takes into account the country’s potential, serves national interests, and is in line with world economic processes. The choice of modernization as a way of development instead of development based on natural resources is somewhat overdue, and the measures being taken to resolve these problems are of little effect because we have a consumer economy and the task today is to go over to an innovation economy. But a “consumer economy” and an “innovation economy” are two fundamentally different types of economy and two different models of economic development. That is why an appropriate model here is an economy based on innovation, which makes it necessary to determine the impact of an innovative environment on the development of industry.

The Impact of an Innovative Environment on Industrial Development

As we know, Azerbaijan’s President Ilham Aliev has announced a new stage of economic transformation because the country needs an economy with a competitive industry and infrastructure based on modern technology, with a developed service sector and efficient agriculture. That is why the government of Azerbaijan has set a strategic goal: modernization of industry, the conditions for which have been created after the completion of the transition period and the achievement of stabilization. To realize this strategic goal, it is advisable to create an innovative environment, which actually serves to increase the competitiveness of industry not only in the domestic but also in the global market. A general idea of the scale and pace of development of the innovation process can be gained from data on R&D expenditure as a percentage of GDP, income from inventions, patents and copy- rights in the area of R&D, exports of high-tech products, etc. The most important indicator here is the first one because it does not depend on the size of the country, while the other indicators can be regarded as additional, considering the different national economic potentials. The structure of expenditures on technological innovation by funding source has tended to change both for industry as a whole and for manufacturing, but not dynamically. Whereas in 2005 extra-budgetary funding accounted for 3.0% of such expenditures for industry as a whole, enterprises accounted for 7.6%, the state budget for 80.8%, and other funding sources for 8.6%, in 2010 the share of enterprises was already 44.0%, and that of other sources 56.8%; in 2011, the share of enterprises was 72.8%, and that of the state budget 27.2%, and in 2012 the figures were 98.4% for enterprises and 1.6% for other sources. In manufacturing, enterprises in 2005 accounted for 27.8% of expenditures, extra-budgetary funding for 18.9%, and other sources for 53.3%; in 2010, the share of enterprises was 44.0%, and of other sources 56.0%; in 2011, the figures were 70.7% for enterprises 74 Volume 8 Issue 1-2 2014 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION and 29.3% for the state budget, and in 2012, 98.1% for enterprises and 1.9% for other sources.8 In- creasing shares of financing by enterprises indicate an improvement in their performance. This trend is confirmed by technological innovation expenditures for various implementation areas. In 2005, the pattern was as follows: 82.4% in resource extraction, 16.1% in manufacturing, and 1.5% in the power industry; by 2012, it changed to 8.3%, 86.7% and 5.0%, respectively. Whereas in industry as a whole the share of expenditures for the development and implementation of new products, services and processes was 1.6% of total technological innovation expenditures, for the purchase of machinery and equipment associated with technological innovation 0.3%, and for the purchase of new technologies and software 95.0%, in 2012 the figures were 5.7%, 58.4% and 7.8%, respectively. In resource extraction, the share of expenditures for the purchase of machinery and equipment associated with technological innovation fell from 100% in 2005 to 6.4% in 2012, losing ground to the development and implementation of new products, services and processes (0.3%) and the purchase of new technologies and software (93.0%). In manufacturing, the ratio changed from 0.5% for the development and implementation of new products, services and processes, 20.8% for the purchase of machinery and equipment associated with technological innovation, and 78.6% for the purchase of new technologies and software in 2005 to 6.5% and 61.1% for the first two items in 2012 (that year, there was no funding for the purchase of new technologies and software). In the power industry, expenditures for the development and implementation of new products and services accounted for 100% of total technological innovation expenditures in 2005, whereas in 2012, 100% of the total was spent on the purchase of machinery and equipment associated with technological innovation.9 All these tendencies have had an effect on the production of innovative products (see the table).

Table Innovative Output in Industry (%)10

New Products Improved Products

2009 2010 2011 2012 2009 2010 2011 2012

Industry 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100

Resource — — 15.7 1.7 — — 72.4 22.5 extraction

Manufacturing 100 100 84.3 98.3 100 100 27.6 77.5

Innovative Products Innovation Process

Industry 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100

Resource 16.7 0.1 2.2 13.0 0.4 — — — extraction

Manufacturing 83.3 99.9 97.8 87.0 94.4 100 100 86.1

power industry — — — — 5.2 — — 13.9

8 Promyshlennost Azerbaidzhana. Statisticheski sbornik, pp. 92-93. 9 Ibid., pp. 94-99. 10 Ibid., pp. 89-91.

Volume 8 Issue 1-2 2014 75 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION As the table shows, manufacturing had the largest share of new products: 100% of the industry total in 2009, 84.3% in 2011 and 98.3% in 2012; resource extraction had 15.7% in 2011 and 1.7% in 2012. For improved products, manufacturing had 100% in 2009, 27.6% in 2011 and 77.5% in 2012, and resource extraction had 72.4% in 2011 and 22.5% in 2012. For innovative products, resource extraction had a share of 16.7% in 2009, 2.2% in 2011 and 13.0% in 2012, and manufacturing had 83.3% in 2009, 99.9% in 2010, 97.8% in 2011, and 87.0% in 2012. For the innovation process, manufacturing accounted for 94.4% in 2009, 100% in 2011 and 86.1% in 2012. That is why it would make sense to restore industry and industrialize the country based on new technology both to meet the needs of the domestic market and to develop exports of goods. Under the current conditions, Azerbaijan should give priority to promising areas in the development of the new technological order, which will provide an opportunity for rapid real growth through faster development of key lines of production and factors of the new technological order. This will in turn promote an intel- lectualization of production in many sectors and encourage continuing education in most professions. Information and educational services enhancing the role of science and education, the basic sectors of the new technological order, will become dominant. But this does not mean that the natural resource sector will be reduced in favor of manufacturing. The FEC should turn into a significant knowledge-intensive and high technology complex helping to solve structural problems and providing a basis for economic growth designed to improve the country’s competitive position. In the long-term development of industrial production, the main task is to create a sectoral structure that would meet the current requirements of economic growth based on an innovative renewal of production and an improvement in its efficiency and competitiveness. Hence, market forecasts of technological development, the emergence of innovative products and new generations of technology and machinery are important in this context: their results will help the state to formulate its industrial, scientific and technological policy, while businesses can use them as a guide in their strategic development and long-term investment.

By Way of Conclusion

Modernization is a key priority of socioeconomic policy, and this requires structural changes within each sector because it is necessary to adapt to the radically changed general, internal and external conditions of the country’s economic development. The fuel and energy complex could be the main customer for products and services considering that today it is important to merge the value chains of complementary sectors: FEC, petroleum engineering and metallurgy. This will help to revive engineering and ensure rational development of metallurgy, to maximize capacity utilization and reduce imports of expensive foreign equipment and technologies. The chemical and petrochemical industry is another attractive destination for private capital in search of profitable investment opportunities. Chemical and petrochemical products can be of interest to oil and gas producers because they should not confine themselves to exports or primary processing of oil and gas but should branch out into areas where natural or associated gas is used as a feedstock and make more investments in refining capacity. For example, this could include the creation of chains of technologically related enterprises: “plastics” chains, “tire” chains, “fertilizer” chains, “chemical fiber” chains, etc. Ultimately, growth should be mainly generated not by metal- and energy-intensive industries, but by manufacturing industries such as engineering and metalworking, chemical and petrochemical industry, oil refining, and food and light industries, with the implementation of an energy-saving policy. Knowledge- intensive, high technology industries naturally grow out of a general economic expansion, and economic restructuring should primarily focus on industries that have always been the starting point for the development of mass markets and sustainable growth. 76 Volume 8 Issue 1-2 2014 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION Despite increasing competition and the importance of finding a definite niche for our products in the world economy, we have paid little attention to marketing research and technological innovations. In assessing the situation, we can conclude that new machinery is insufficient to accelerate labor productivity growth: the important thing here is to organize the reproduction process using the opportunities offered by more advanced information technologies. It is known that with low rates of economic growth the scientific and technical potential builds faster than it is used up. In Azerbaijan, it is currently used up faster than it builds. To accelerate industrial growth, we should exploit various opportunities (including those provided by the international division of labor) arising from the favorable environment for the development of manufacturing. Rapid labor productivity growth is possible if the natural resource potential is combined with the development of human capital and the use of new, progressive forms of doing business. Eco- nomic growth in developed countries is 70% dependent on human capital and 30% dependent on productive capital and natural resources. Innovations integrate the world economy. Economic priorities are shifting toward the creation of mechanisms that ensure the fastest possible translation of the results of basic and applied research and development into industrial products because natural resource business has little interest in developing science. The acquisition of existing technologies and equipment does not create strategic advantages for an enterprise because such technologies are basically available to its competitors. That is why it is necessary to organize in-house technology development. Today, advanced technology is the key to market success, and people are the main competitive advantage. At the same time, even following the path of innovation-driven development it is possible to sell natural resources. The question is what to sell, and this depends on the country’s technological level. In a situation where the ties between science and the economy have weakened, foresight (futures studies) helps to strengthen these ties and places science, technology and innovation at the center of national socioeconomic development. This will help to accomplish the main task of structural and investment policy: to restore engineering output, which has fallen to an unacceptable level, but in a new, consumer-oriented structure. The world economy is prone to recurrent crisis phenomena, which affect not only certain types of products, but also certain regions. This makes it necessary to minimize risk or potential losses from a decline in exports. For this purpose, we should renew and strengthen the main components of the innovation system such as the potential of small and medium enterprises developing and implementing risky scientific and technical projects; develop national engineering as the basis for innovative economic growth; retool industrial enterprises; encourage research and development by innovative small enterprises under contracts with large firms in primary processing in order to make innovation activity more flexible and dynamic; encourage enterprises to turn R&D into final products and organize their distribution; increase public funding of R&D primarily in the fields of natural science, engineering and technology, academic science and education, which promotes innovation activity in the business sector; create national innovation systems aimed at implementing the complete innovation cycle (basic research-applied research-development-production of knowledge-intensive products-commercialization of knowledge-intensive products); integrate research and innovation with the real sector of the economy, restore industry science (the system of industry research institutes and design offices); improve the basic theoretical and methodological principles of innovation-program policy and realize their effect; and ensure the maintenance and growth of the country’s economic potential as a basis for the formation of Azerbaijan’s socioeconomic policy. Under the government’s policy of implementing an innovative development model and realizing the “knowledge economy” concept, the state’s role in supporting innovation-investment structural changes is to set up research centers with mixed funding, encourage the creation of innovation clusters, ensure real economic returns on investment in R&D, award public contracts for innovative products (in implementing state energy-saving, informatization and ICT development programs), and establish a system to analyze demand for sci-tech and innovative products by stimulating the development of Volume 8 Issue 1-2 2014 77 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION public and mixed research and consulting centers requiring coordination of regional, industrial and innovation policies. The creation and development of industries based on new and high technologies are not only a means to achieve and maintain high competitiveness of the national economy in the world market, but are also important for qualitative changes in the economic structure. According to Charles Wheelan, “economics presents us with a powerful, and not necessarily complex, set of analytical tools that can be used to look back and explain why events unfolded the way they did; to look around and make sense of the world; and to look forward so that we can an- ticipate the effects of major policy changes… If we are to make the best use of these tools, we ought to think about where we are trying to go. We must decide what our priorities are, what trade-offs we are willing to make, what outcomes we are or are not willing to accept.”11 Somewhat slower growth in the economy as a whole is due to the impact not only of foreign, but also of domestic factors. In- creasing investment in sectors that enhance economic efficiency, including efficiency in industry and its key areas, will remedy the current situation and promote comprehensive modernization in accordance with the set goal and the priorities of industrial development.

11 Ch. Wheelan, Naked Economy. Undressing the Dismal Science, New York, 2002, pp. xxii, 229. 78 Volume 8 Issue 1-2 2014 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

GEOCULTURE

Rashad HUSEYNOV

Ph.D. (Political Science), Associate Professor at the International Relations and Political Science Department of Khazar University (Baku, Azerbaijan).

HISTORY OF ISLAMIC INSTITUTIONS IN AZERBAIJAN (19TH-21ST CENTURIES)

Abstract

zerbaijan went through different politi- pendence in 1991. This research paper stud- cal systems and historical develop- ies the formation and evolution of Islamic in- A ments in the 19th-21st centuries, which stitutions in Azerbaijan over the last three had a serious impact on the role and evolution centuries and conducts a comparative analy- of its government and religious institutions. sis of their roles and functions under different During this period, Azerbaijan was under the rules. The author also identifies the contem- rule of the Russian Empire, established a porary challenges faced by the major spiri- Democratic Republic (ADR) that lasted only tual body in Azerbaijan, especially in terms of 23 months, was a part of the Soviet Union for status and scope of activities, and explores 71 years, and eventually proclaimed its inde- the possible responses to them.

KEYWORDS: Azerbaijan, religious institutions, formation, evolution, Sheikh-ul-Islam, Mufti, Caucasus Muslim Board. Volume 8 Issue 1-2 2014 79 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION Introduction

The origin of the main spiritual body of Muslims in Azerbaijan—the Caucasus Muslim Board (CMB)—goes back to the 19th century. As part of the religious tolerance policy, on 5 April, 1872, Czar Alexander II approved the Provision on Establishment of Two Administrations—Shi‘ite and Sunni—of the Transcaucasian Clergy. They were first established in Tiflis (Tbilisi), Georgia, as it was the administrative center of the Russian Governor-General of the Caucasus. The headquarters moved to Baku following the establishment of the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic in 1918 and remained in the capital of Azerbaijan during Soviet times as well. During its more than 140 years of existence under different names, this institution experienced changes in its role and functions, including division of power among Shi‘ites and Sunnis, funding, appointment of leaders, and relations with state. The CMB still tries to maintain the regional center function, but political development and geopolitical changes in the region require revision of its status and mandate.

Czarist Russia’s Religious Tolerance Policy and Its Implementation in Azerbaijan

The beginning of 19th century marked the division of Azerbaijan’s lands between Russian and Persian empires, following two peace agreements signed in 1813 (the Treaty of Gulistan) and 1828 (the Treaty of Turkmanchay). Under these treaties, the territory of the present-day Azerbaijan Repub- lic fell under the control of Russia. However, part of Azerbaijan’s territory was occupied by the Rus- sian army even before the 1813 Gulistan Treaty. These developments coincided with the implementation of the religious tolerance policy in Czar- ist Russia, which was launched by Catherine the Great in 1767. In her Nakaz [Order] to the Legislative Commission, Catherine made a historical declaration on the question of minority religions, in which she underlined the importance of tolerance towards “other religions” and stated that “…not to allow them to profess different Modes of religion, would greatly endanger the Peace and Security of Citizens...”1 Implementation of the religious tolerance policy was mainly linked to the constant wars between Russia and its Muslim neighbors—the Ottoman and Persian Empires. Czarist Russia needed the support and loyalty of the Muslim population during these wars. On the other hand, this policy was aimed at ensuring efficient control over the Muslims and influencing them and their activities through the Islamic institutions, which had to be led by persons loyal to the government. The first reflection of the religious tolerance policy in Azerbaijan was the legislative act on organization of spiritual life of Muslims in the Caucasus signed by Czar Alexander I on 30 June, 1805. The main purpose of the document named Rules for the Mohammedan Clergy of the Yelizavetpol District was to strengthen the imperial position in the newly-occupied Ganja Khanate. Its center, Ganja, was renamed Yelizavetpol in honor of Czar Alexander’s wife, Elizabeth. The document was initiated and drafted by General P.D. Tsitsianov, who was Chief Commander in Georgia. According to the legislative act, residents of the Yelizavetpol district could freely worship under the leadership of eight mullahs appointed by the Russian administration. The mullahs in turn were subordinated to the Akhund—primary religious servant. All of them were appointed to the staff with annual salaries (the mullah received 100 rubles and the akhund 500). In their Friday messages, the mullahs had to promote “loyalty to His Majesty the Emperor.”2 General Tsitsianov also proposed tough punishment

1 W.F. Reddaway, Documents of Catherine the Great, Cambridge, 1931, p. 289. 2 D.Yu. Arapov, Sistema gosudartvennogo regulirovaniia islama v Rossiiskoi imperii (posledniaia tret XVIII-nachalo XX vv.), Lomonosov Moscow State University, Moscow, 2005.

80 Volume 8 Issue 1-2 2014 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION for treason cases, which could entail exile of religious figures and their families to Siberia and con- fiscation of their property. However, Alexander I deleted the proposed punishment from the final document. One of the important developments was the establishment of the position of Sheikh-ul-Islam in Tiflis, which was the administrative center of the Russian Governor-General of the Caucasus, in 1823.3 The holder of this post had to deal with the Shi‘ite community in Transcaucasia. Nine years later, in 1832, a similar position—Mufti—was established for the Sunni communities of the region. The first Sheikh-ul-Islam was Akhund Mahammadali Huseynzade, while the first Mufti was Tajuddin Musta- fin. However, we cannot interpret these developments as establishment of a religious institution because both the Sheikh-ul-Islam and the Mufti operated independently. In an effort to start the institutionalization of religious affairs in Transcaucasia, on 29 November, 1832, Russian Czar Nicholas I sent a letter to the Senate that suggested drafting Provisions on the Administration of Religious Affairs of Muslims in Transcaucasia. However, the Senate did not approve them.4 The process was also de- layed because of the Caucasian War (1817-1864) and the Crimean War (1853-1856). The first official institution dealing with the spiritual life of Muslims in Transcaucasia was established in 1872. On 5 April, 1872, Czar Alexander II approved the Provisions on Establishment of Two Administrations—Shi‘ite and Sunni—of the Transcaucasian Clergy. The same year, the Russian government decided to allocate 37,880 rubles from the state budget for the maintenance of these bodies.5 Thus, the Provisions signed by Alexander II established a three-level administration system of spiritual life in Transcaucasia. The first level included mullahs and cadies. Mullahs were in charge of running the religious ceremonies, administration of the mosques and religious schools, as well as keeping the mosque register and the list of the Muslim population. They reported to the cadies about mosques, schools, births, marriages and so on. Cadies in turn had to monitor the work of the mosque clergy and deal with family (marriage and divorce) and inheritance issues. The second level included the collegial bodies—provincial majlises (assemblies), which consisted of three members and operated in the Baku, Yelizavetpol, Tiflis, and Irevan provinces. They dealt with issues relating to the religious behavior of the Muslims, administration of religious schools, management of mosque property, and complaints about the decisions of cadies. The highest instances (third level) for Shi‘ites and Sunnis were the Sheikh-ul-Islam and the Mufti, respectively. Each of them received an annual salary of 1,600 rubles from the state budget, which was equal to the salary of a colonel in the Russian army’s infantry in 1872. Both the Sheikh-ul-Islam and the Mufti were appointed by “the Highest Command” of the Czar on the recommendation of the Governor-General. This practice continued for nine years, and in 1881 the Ministry of Internal Affairs acquired the authority to nominate candidates for these posts for the Czar’s approval. The key functions of the spiritual administrations included the following:  Considering complaints relating to the decisions of provincial assemblies;  Supervising cadies, who had to submit information about mosques, schools, and other institutions;  Drafting annual reports and educational programs for Muslim schools;  Testing the knowledge of religious figures;  Considering and discussing all issues submitted by the Highest Russian Administration.6

3 See: A. Abasov, Islam v sovremennom Azerbaidzhane: obrazy i realii, Publication of the Sakharov Museum and Public Center, Issue 4, Azerbaidzhan i Rossia: obshchestva i gosudarstva, Moscow, 2001. 4 See: “Religion,” Administrative Department of the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan, Presidential Library, p. 4, available at [http://files.preslib.az/projects/remz/pdf_en/atr_din.pdf]. 5 See: D.Yu. Arapov, op. cit. 6 D.Yu. Arapov, Islam v Rossiiskoi imperii (zakonodatelnye akty, opisaniia, statistika), Moscow, 2001, pp. 50-53.

Volume 8 Issue 1-2 2014 81 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION In accordance with the Provisions on the Administration of Spiritual Affairs of Muslims in Transcaucasia, the management of waqfs7 was run under common rules for the Shi‘ites and Sunnis. All personal property and real estate donated to the mosques, religious schools, cemeteries, and other spiritual institutions by legal means was under the jurisdiction of the local clergy and power structures above them. They could be used for maintaining the clergy, upkeep of personnel, and char- ity activities. Supreme control over waqfs was conducted by the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Governor-General in the Caucasus. The staff members of the Transcaucasian Muslim clergy also enjoyed a number of privileges:  They and their children were released from public obligations;  Children of supreme Muslim religious figures, who served for 20 years, enjoyed the same rights as individual nobleman;  Mullahs and cadies were entitled to receive travel expenditures and per diems during visits;  Muslim religious figures could also receive state pensions. Thus, a sufficiently sustainable system, which organized the spiritual life of the Muslims in Transcaucasia, survived until 1917.

The State of Islamic Institutions Following the Collapse of the Russian Empire

The political developments in the Russian Empire in 1917 had a serious impact on the political and geopolitical situation in Transcaucasia. The two revolutions in 1917 put an end to Czarist rule in Russia and established the Soviet Government, which was actively promoting atheism. The Bolshe- viks, as atheist materialists, considered religion to be the “opium of the people,” to coin Marx’s famous formulation. It was no coincidence that one of the first decrees adopted by the Bolsheviks was seizure of all church property and bank accounts. However, the Muslims received different treatment from the newly-established authorities. The appeal issued by the Council of People’s Commissars to Mus- lims on 3 December, 1917 stated: “…Your beliefs and practices, your national and cultural institutions are forever free and inviolate… Know that your rights, like those of all the peoples of Russia, are under the mighty protection of the revolution...”8 In the meantime, the sacred Islamic monuments, books, and objects confiscated during Czarist Russia were returned to the mosques: the Sacred Koran of Osman was ceremoniously handed over to a Muslim Congress in Petrograd in December of 1917.9 Friday, the day of Muslim religious celebra- tion, was declared a legal day off in the Muslim-populated areas.10 The strategic goal of the Bolsheviks was to find a common language with the Muslims and make them allies in their internal struggle against the Mensheviks. Another strategic target was export of “the world revolution” to the East. The appeal of 3 December, 1917 was part of this policy. However, all these efforts were turned down during Josef Stalin’s rule in the late 1920s. We will come back to this stage later on. Meanwhile, quite important political developments were in progress in the Transcaucasian region. In 1918, three independent states were established in this region: Azerbaijan, Georgia, and

7 A waqf is an inalienable religious endowment in Islamic law, typically donating a building or plot of land or even cash for Muslim religious or charitable purposes. 8 E. Allworth, Muslim Communities Reemerge: Historical Perspectives on Nationality, Politics, and Opposition in the Former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, Duke University Press, 1994. 9 See: A. Avtorkhanov, Imperiia Kremlia, Vilnius, 1988, p. 99. 10 See: A. Park, Bolshevism in Turkestan, 1917-1927, New York, 1957, p. 214.

82 Volume 8 Issue 1-2 2014 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION Armenia. The Azerbaijani National Council announced the establishment of the Azerbaijan Demo- cratic Republic (ADR) on 28 May, 1918, which was the first democracy in the Muslim world. The ADR was a secular state, in which religion was separate from the state. Restoring its historical name, Ganja was announced the temporary capital of the Republic, as Baku was still under the control of the Bolsheviks. In October 1918, the ADR established a new state agency dealing with religious affairs—the Ministry of Social Protection and Beliefs. Musa bey Rafiyev was the first head of this Ministry. Chair- man of the National Council Mahammad Amin Rasulzadeh also gave instructions for a common religious board of the Caucasian Muslims to be established in Baku on the basis of the religious administrations operating in Tbilisi. On 11 December, 1918, Czar-appointed Sheikh-ul-Islam Muhammad Pishnamazzadeh resigned and Minister Rafiyev appointed Agha Alizadeh as the new (eighth) Sheikh- ul-Islam and Head of the Joint Religious Board of the Caucasian Muslims. Alizadeh was quite a progressive person, who supported the work of the parliament and was against sectarian discrimina- tion. However, his position and the work of the newly-established institution were terminated after the invasion of the Bolsheviks on 27 April, 1920. Azerbaijan lost its independence following the establishment of the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic on 28 April, 1920. As mentioned above, religious life in Azerbaijan and other areas of the Soviet Union experienced difficult times during the rule of Josef Stalin. The most intensive “secularization” process occurred in 1925-1941. The Soviet government turned most of the mosques, especially in the villages, into schools or clubs. There were cases of demolition as well. For instance, the White Mosque in Tyumen was turned into a pencil factory, while the Red Mosque (in Tomsk) became an alcoholic beverage plant.11 A number of mosques and spiritual places were destroyed in Azerbaijan as well. The famous Bibi-Eybat mosque in Baku, a historical architectural monument of the 13th century, was fully destroyed by the Bolsheviks in 1936. A Union of Militant Atheists was established in 1925 and played the assault detachment role of cave atheists with the slogan “Struggle against religion—struggle for socialism.” However, some liberalization of religious policy was observed in the mid-1940s, for which there were two reasons:  The war [WWII] contributed to the consolidation of religious communities, including Mus- lim circles, which could not be ignored by the government;  Reference to religious feelings in the war years could promote “the consolidation of Soviet people.”12 This change also had a positive impact on religious affairs in Azerbaijan. In particular, the Re- ligious Board for the Transcaucasian Muslims resumed its work in 1943. Akhund Agha Alizade was elected the head of this institution at the first session of the Transcaucasian Muslims held in Baku on 25-28 May, 1944. There were two important developments during the resumption of the work of the Religious Board: Agha Alizade became the first elected Sheikh-ul-Islam (the leaders of the religious communities in Transcaucasia elected him), as previous holders of the title of Sheikh-ul-Islam were appointed by the relevant government agencies; The resumed religious body put an end to the dualism in administration. The Sheikh-ul-Islam became the only leader of the organization, while the Mufti started serving as the first deputy of the department chair and dealt with Sunni community-related affairs.13 It is noteworthy that Agha Alizade and subsequent heads of the Religious Board for the Trans- caucasian Muslims served as Sheikh-ul-Islam until their death.

11 See: T.S. Saidabaev, Islam i obshchestvo, Nauka Publishers, Moscow, 1975, p. 151. 12 Ibid., p.170. 13 See: “Religion,” Administrative Department of the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan, Presidential Library, p. 5.

Volume 8 Issue 1-2 2014 83 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION In the meantime, the Soviet government established a special state agency—the Council on Religious Rites Affairs, which had its own authorized representatives in the regions. The Council had to ensure communication between the U.S.S.R. government and heads of religious associations on issues such as the organization of religious rites and ceremonies, which required the permission of the government. In 1964, this body was transformed into the Council on Religious Affairs under the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers, which was responsible for facilitating the “patriotic and peaceful activities” of religious associations. However, later the Council and its authorized representatives became a lever of government control over the religious life of the people. Unlike Czarist Russia, the Soviet government did not fund the work of religious organizations. Akhunds and imams received their salaries based on donations and income from religious services. Most income was obtained during the Kurbanbayram (Eid al-Adha), Ramazanbayram (Eid al-Fitr), and Ashura commemorations. This income also allowed them to cover utilities. Although religion was officially separate from the state, the Soviet government interfered in religious affairs, including the organization of rites and other public ceremonies, by maintaining the authority to permit or prohibit religion-related events. Haji Allahshukur Pashazade was the last head of the Religious Board of Muslims in Transcau- casia, who was elected in 1980. The religious body survived until the collapse of the Soviet Union and emerged in a new role in independent Azerbaijan.

The Muslim Board in Independent Azerbaijan: Main Challenges and Possible Responses

On 18 October, 1991, Azerbaijan restored its independence. The Supreme Council (Parliament) of Azerbaijan adopted a Constitutional Act on the State Independence of the Republic of Azerbaijan. Four years later, on 12 November, 1995, the Azerbaijani people voted for a new Constitution, which declared Azerbaijan a secular state. In particular, Article 18 of the Constitution states that “religion in the Republic of Azerbaijan is separate from the state.” Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Religious Board of the Transcaucasian Mus- lims transformed into the Caucasian Muslim Board (CMB), which was due to the intention to cover the activities of Muslim religious communities in the Northern Caucasus as well. In fact, the CMB was mainly responsible for organizing the spiritual life of the Muslims in Azerbaijan, as well as appointing akhunds and imams of the mosques. Following the practice established during So- viet times, the Sheik-ul-Islam remained the primary position in the CBM, while the Mufti served as the first deputy. Beginning in July 2011, the CMB and other religious communities in Azerbaijan started receiving funding from the state budget. According to a presidential decree signed on 1 July, 2011, the government also started financing the work of the CMB’s representative offices in foreign countries.14 In addition, the Government supplies free gas to places of worship, including 1,956 mosques, 13 churches, and 7 synagogues. The government also sponsored construction of a number of mosques, churches, and synagogues. The decision of the Azerbaijani authorities to establish a State Committee on Work with Religious Associations (SCWRA) led to reexamining the share of religion-related duties in the

14 Official website of the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan [http://president.az/articles/2674].

84 Volume 8 Issue 1-2 2014 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION country. The Committee was established on 21 June, 2001. Its major duties included registering religious communities, ensuring the implementation of freedom of religion-related legislative acts, facilitating cooperation between the religious organizations of Azerbaijan and international religious organizations and forums, drawing up academic curricula for religious education in the country, and providing expert opinion on improving its quality, as well as participating in signing intergovernmental agreements for organizing pilgrimage to holy places abroad.15 However, the Com- mittee has neither a supervisory function nor appointment power over the CMB and other religious communities. The CMB, in turn, has the authority to issue fatwas16 on urgent religious matters, which is the responsibility of its Gazi (Confessor) Council consisting of akhunds, imams, and religious scholars. The CMB claims that its Council’s fatwas are in force throughout the Caucasus region, which remains a debated issue among local scholars and political experts. The new wave of debates was caused by a recent statement of the head of CMB’s fatwa department, who affirmed that the CMB is the only organization eligible to issue fatwas in the Caucasus region.17 This poses a reasonable question: “How can a fatwa issued by a religious community in Azerbaijan, which has NGO status, be valid in the territory of other sovereign states?” Apparently, the CMB representative refers to the mandate this organization received during Soviet times, which made the CBM a regional center. However, today, there are four independent states in the Caucasus region, including Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and the Russian Federation, and each state (except Armenia) has its own religious administration for the Muslim population with similar duties. In particular, Georgia established its own religious body few years ago,18 which is in charge of organizing the spiritual life of the Muslims living in Georgia. Most of the religious communities in the Northern Caucasus (Russian Federation) do not in fact recognize the superiority of the CMB, as they are subordinated to the centralized body in their own country. These circumstances also pose a second question concerning the name of the main spiritual body in Azerbaijan. There are suggestions that the word “Caucasus” should be dropped from the name of this organization. The local experts suggest changing the name to the Azerbaijan Muslim Board and limit its scope of activities solely to Azerbaijan. Another issue of concern is the official status of the CMB in Azerbaijan. This organization is registered by the SCWRA as an ordinary religious community, like another 587 communities in Azerbaijan,19 and has an NGO status. However, it is not clear why the CMB has superiority over other Muslim communities in the country and the authority to appoint akhunds and imams in the mosques of Azerbaijan. One way to address this issue would be to adopt a legislative act on specialized organizations, like the Caucasus Muslim Board, which would give more clarity to their institutional status. Sources of CMB financing and the transparency of expenditures continue to be problematic areas in the activity of this organization. The CMB never makes public the total amount of money it receives from donations, which mainly come from organizations and individuals in mosques and sacred places, and does not report on how the organization spends them. This behavior raises questions about the transparency of the CMB, which can be addressed by means of an open and fair policy in this field.

15 Official website of the State Committee on Work with Religious Associations of the Republic of Azerbaijan [http:// www.scwra.gov.az/pages/126/?]. 16 Fatwa is the term for legal opinion or learned interpretation by qualified persons on issues pertaining to Islamic law and events. 17 See: “CMB Issues Warning,” Lent.az web portal, 21 January, 2014, available at [http://news.lent.az/news/152867]. 18 See: “Georgia Established New Muslim Affairs Department Independent of Azerbaijan,” IslamToday portal, 13 May, 2011, available at [ http://en.islamtoday.net/artshow-229-4063.htm]. 19 According to the State Committee on Work with Religious Associations, as of February 2014, the number of registered religious communities constitutes 588, including 567 Muslim and 21 non-Muslim communities.

Volume 8 Issue 1-2 2014 85 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION Thus, the Caucasus Muslim Board needs to revise its mandate and consider carrying out structural reforms in order to make the work of this organization more practical and efficient, as well as gain the trust of believers in Azerbaijan. The latter appears to be the most important target in light of the widespread radicalization trends in Islam.

Conclusion

The major Muslim spiritual body in Azerbaijan—the Caucasus Muslim Board—has experienced a number of changes in status and roles since its establishment in 1872. For instance, the Head of the Board, i.e. the Sheikh-ul-Islam, transformed from an appointed position to an elected one; although the Sheikh-ul-Islam and the Mufti possessed equal power in the 19th century, the Soviet government put an end to dualism and gave the Sheikh-ul-Islam a superior role, while the Mufti started holding the first deputy position; during the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union, the government used the religious body as the main lever of control over believers, which is not the case since Azerbaijan proclaimed its independence. Nevertheless, as noted above, the geopolitical changes in the region and the emergence of new challenges are opening up room for new changes aimed at ensuring the efficient and tangible work of the Muslim Board in Azerbaijan.

Maxim KIRCHANOV

D.Sc. (Hist.), Associate Professor at the Chair of Regional Studies and the Economy of Foreign Countries of the International Relations Department, Voronezh State University (Voronezh, Russia).

THE CHURCH IN GEORGIA’S POLITICAL LIFE: PROBLEMS, CONTRADICTIONS, AND PROSPECTS

Abstract

his article, which is a logical continua- gree to which the Georgian Apostolic Auto- tion of the present author’s earlier cephalous Orthodox Church is involved in T publications,1 concentrates on the de- the country’s political life and its related identity established within the traditional system 1 See: M. Kirchanov, “The Media about Georgian of coordinates still important in the Georgian Nationalism: Between the Political Nation and Traditionalism,” Central Asia and the Caucasus, Vol. 14, No. 2, 2013. state and society. 86 Volume 8 Issue 1-2 2014 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

KEYWORDS: Georgia, Orthodoxy, the Georgian Apostolic Autocephalous Orthodox Church, nationalism, identity.

Introduction

The disintegration of the Soviet Union, which allowed Georgia to restore its independence, echoed in the country’s religious life. The Church consolidated its authority and became more actively involved in social, cultural, and political transformations. In fact, it regained its medieval role of an important political and economic actor that spread far and wide beyond the limits of religious functions. Amid the 1990s-2000s political turmoil, the Church consolidated its position by consistently defending the idea of Georgia’s territorial integrity and supporting the European choice of the ruling political elites.

The Church and Politics: Georgian Specifics

The Georgian Apostolic Autocephalous Orthodox Church and its related identity (as part of the traditional system of coordinates) has played and is still playing an important role in the contemporary Georgian state and society. Formally, Georgia is a secular state, however Art 9 of the Constitution of Georgia says: “The state shall declare complete freedom of belief and religion, as well as recognize the special role of the Apostle Autocephalous Orthodox Church of Georgia in the history of Georgia and its independence from the state.”2 The role the Church played and is playing in Georgia is too great and too obvious to cause any doubts: in the Middle Ages, Modern, and Recent History, it was one of the social forces that preserved the Georgian identity, the Georgian nation, and the Georgian language and promoted their development. It preserved at least part of its former consequence in Soviet times and, despite the officially proclaimed atheism, it, along with the academic institutes of the humanities, remained one of the most active and influential actors in helping the Georgians to preserve their identity and their language. President Saakashvili and other top officials have opted for the European Union as the main and universal political, economic, and cultural beacon. On the other hand, the ideas of secularization and the secular state figure prominently in many of the EU members (with the exception of several Catholic countries, recent EU members). This brings Georgia with its European ambitions and desire to preserve or even develop traditional values closer to Poland and Croatia. Few state and political (formally secular) events in Georgia do not involve the Church hierarchs and Orthodox clergy. The Church is very straightforward when it comes to political issues and subjects carrying a lot of political weight: it condemns homosexuality and actively promotes traditional values. The hierarchs are very outspoken when it comes to international developments, Georgia’s foreign policy, and its bilateral relations. In these conditions, the Georgian Church and all other religious organizations supplemented their religious and moral missions with a political role. The Georgian political elites (very much like

2 The Constitutional Agreement between State of Georgia and the Apostolic Autocephalous Orthodox Church of Geor- gia, 14 October, 2002, the Svetitskhoveli Cathedral, available at [http://www.patriarchate.ge/_en/?action=eklesia-saxelmcifo], 21 March, 2014.

Volume 8 Issue 1-2 2014 87 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION their medieval predecessors) acquired not only an important strategic ally, but also a consistent critic, the opinions of which are heard in all social strata and the importance of which is comparable today with that of political parties and analytical structures and will be even greater tomorrow.

The Church and the State: Legal Foundations of Interaction

The Georgian Apostolic Autocephalous Orthodox Church has an important role to play in the political and intellectual life of the Georgian nation. Its ideologists are involved in formulating the basic concepts of Georgian nationalism; the Church supports the Georgian identity and Georgian language; its hierarchs are developing a narrative about Georgia’s territorial integrity; the Church supports the European and Euro-Atlantic choice of the Georgian political elites. The Constitutional Agreement between the State of Georgia and the Apostolic Autocephalous Orthodox Church of Georgia signed in 2002 laid the legal foundation for the Church’s further functioning. The Preamble says, in part: “As an independent and democratic state, Georgia has re-established its historic place in the civilized world” with the Autocephalous Orthodox Church of Georgia as its inalienable part. The document outlined the spheres in which the Church and the state could cooperate; it also declared the Church “a juridical person of common law,” while the state guaranteed security of the Catholicos-Patriarch. The sate recognized the rights of the Church in primary, second- ary, and higher education and said that “the state, in compliance with the Church, shall adopt additional rules on conservation of cultural and historic values according to acting law.”3 The Church signed a Memorandum on Mutual Understanding with the Ministry of Education,4 which laid the foundation for the Church’s involvement in education.

Ideology of the Georgian Orthodox Church: The Religious and the National

Unlike many other churches, the Moscow Patriarchate of the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) in particular, the Georgian Orthodox Church is very consistent in its interpretation of the Soviet period in Georgia’s history. While the hierarchs and theologians of Moscow Orthodoxy try to exonerate the Soviet period in tune with the current political sentiments, the Georgian Church sides with the Georgian political elites, which prefer to stress the narrative about the “Soviet totalitarian regime”5 and its negative role in the history of Georgia. Georgian Orthodoxy treats the Soviet period as a national tragedy and a time of “persecution, destruction of churches, and murders.”6

3 Ibidem. 4 See: Memorandum on Mutual Understanding and Joint Commission of the Ministry of Education and Science and the Orthodox Church, available at [http://www.patriarchate.ge/?action=text/samartali09], 21 March, 2014 (here and elsewhere all quotes are in Georgian unless otherwise stated). 5 From a Statement by the Georgian Patriarch, 27 January, 2014, available at [http://www.patriarchate.ge/?action=news_ show&mode=news&id=789], 21 March, 2014. 6 Sunday Sermon of Catholicos-Patriarch of All Georgia, His Holiness and Beatitude Ilia II, Sioni Cathedral, 24 De- cember, 2004, available at [http://www.patriarchate.ge/?action=qadageba_show&id=132], 21 March, 2014

88 Volume 8 Issue 1-2 2014 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION The Church figures actively involved in political life are not only concerned about national interests, but also about Christian and Orthodox values and never fail to point out that the Russian, Ukrainian, Constantinople, East Syrian, Greek and Georgian churches belong to a single Orthodox community.7 This is closely connected with the efforts of the Georgian Church to inform the Georgians and the world about its position on the 2013-2014 events in Ukraine. On 22 January, 2014, the Patri- arch deemed it necessary to point out in his statement that Ukraine “was living through hard times and that tension might reach a critical point.”8 On 19 February, 2014, the Patriarch of the Georgian Church clarified the official position of the Georgian Church by pointing out that “peace in the world lost its former stability” and that “due to very special relations between Georgia and Ukraine the Church is especially concerned about what is going on there.”9 Nationalist narratives figure prominently in the Church’s political picture; in fact, despite its religious status, the Church is developing a secular version of nationalism by expounding narratives relating to Georgia’s ancient and glorious history, the need for the country’s political and civil consolidation, which will restore Georgia’s “greatness of the times of David the Builder,”10 as well as its understanding of the external threats: “God gave us a beautiful land, but our enemies are numerous.”11 Church theologians do not deny that they have political ambitions and point out that “proceeding from its historic tradition, the Orthodox Church of Georgia became one of the main pillars and driving forces for the construction of the new Georgian state. This has been revealed not only in the religious and ecclesiastical activities, but in all spheres of social, political and cultural life of the country as well.”12 This sheds light not only on the Church’s intellectual impact on social life, but also on the objective contradiction between the secular modernist pro-Western and the traditionalist trends in Georgian nationalism. These statements reveal the latent ambitions of the Church hierarchs to claim the honor of preserving identity and building the state. This is especially important against the background of the secular elites’ moral responsibility for the loss of Georgian territories and the fact that they are more compromised than the Church, which sticks to its traditional role of peacekeeper and intermediary. Narratives relating to the idea of Georgia’s unity occupy a special place in the political ideas of Georgian Orthodoxy. The Georgian hierarchs say from time to time that “some people say we have lost Abkhazia. No one should repeat this under any circumstances. Abkhazia was, is, and will remain part of Georgia … we have temporarily lost control of these lands. By Divine Grace the day of reunification will come … the same applies to Tskhinvali … we were present there and will remain there.”13 In this respect, the Church sides with the secular political elites, which refuse to recognize separation of the Tskhinvali Region and Abkhazia from Georgia and treat their regimes, which depend on Rus- sia, as illegitimate. By developing these narratives, the Church is contributing to the concept of Georgia as a political fatherland and a distinctive political community that has temporarily lost some of its territory.

7 From a Statement by the Georgian Patriarch, 24 February, 2014, available at [http://www.patriarchate.ge/?action=news_ show&mode=news&id=793], 21 March, 2014. 8 From a Statement by the Catholicos-Patriarch, 22 January, 2014, available at [http://www.patriarchate.ge/?action=news_ show&mode=news&id=790], 21 March, 2014 9 From a Statement by the Georgian Patriarch, 19 February, 2014, available at [[http://www.patriarchate.ge/?action=news_ show&mode=news&id=792], 21 March, 2014. 10 Sunday Sermon of Catholicos-Patriarch of All Georgia, His Holiness and Beatitude Ilia II on the Holy Virgin Feast. Cathedral of Gori, 21 September, 2004, available at [http://www.patriarchate.ge/?action=qadageba_show&id=122], 21 March, 2014. 11 Sunday Sermon of Catholicos-Patriarch of All Georgia, His Holiness and Beatitude Ilia II on the Holy Virgin Feast, 24 July 2004, available at [http://www.patriarchate.ge/?action=qadageba_show&id=119], 21 March, 2014. 12 “About Us,” available at [http://patriarch.eng/about-us/], 21 March, 2014 (in English). 13 Sunday Sermon of Catholicos-Patriarch of All Georgia, His Holiness and Beatitude Ilia II, 16 July, 2004, available at [http://www.patriarchate.ge/?action=qadageba_show&id=118], 21 March 2014.

Volume 8 Issue 1-2 2014 89 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION The Church and Traditionalism

The Church is not afraid of talking about the problems that interfere with its mission. In particular, the International Charitable Foundation of Catholicos-Patriarch of All Georgia Ilia II stated, in particular: “In the 21st century, Georgia moved to a qualitatively new stage of its development. Owing to numerous objective, as well as subjective reasons, many obstacles emerged on its way to building an independent state. These found their reflection both in the domestic, as well as foreign life of the country.” The Church, therefore, is working hard to preserve the Georgian identity and deems it necessary to stress that “at a time of universal globalization, political and economic bound- aries of countries lose their former significance and the difficult process of assimilation of various nations and cultures is ongoing. Under the circumstances, the cultural domain remains a chief factor to define the national identity. This is especially so for a small country like Georgia.”14 This brings the Church ideology closer to ethnic nationalism, that is, the striving to unite the country not into an abstract community of citizens who share democratic values, but to relate it to more archaic values of a common language, origins, and ethnic solidarity in the face of external threats and challenges. Despite their very critical attitude toward the contemporary world and globalization trends, the Church hierarchs, who consistently protect traditional values (the Church resolutely condemns abor- tions15), admit that the Church is living “in the far from simple conditions of integration and globalization”16 and support the country’s European and, wider, Atlantic choice. In April 2004, the Georgian patriarchs thanked the United States which “helped Georgia at the most critical period of its history.”17 The hierarchs have become convinced that “today, when integration and globalization have become irreversible, the Church should shoulder much more responsibility than before;” this means that relations with European partners, among them Poland as a “country of ancient culture” comparable to that of Georgia, have acquired special importance.18

Conclusion

The above suggests that the current political significance of the Orthodox Church in Georgia is not a temporary or chance phenomenon. Its political authority is rooted in the country’s early history, which means that its present role in social life can be described as a religious renaissance and a revival of the high status it enjoyed throughout the history of independent Georgia, from adoption of Christianity to the loss of independence. What makes the Georgian Apostolic Autocephalous Orthodox Church an active and influential actor of the country’s social and political life? The answer to this question should be sought in the ups and downs of Georgia’s recent social and political history. Political, social, and economic modernization in Georgia began later than elsewhere in Europe and has been unfolding at a much slower pace. This means that the contemporary Georgian nation was invented and institutionalized by Geor- gian intellectuals much later than in the other European nations because of much slower modernization and the ongoing existence of an incomplete social structure and archaic institutions.

14 “About Us.” 15 See: “On Criminalization of Abortions,” Blagodat, February-March 2004, available at [http://www.patriarchate. ge/?action=text/samartali14], 21 March 2014. 16 Sunday Sermon of Catholicos-Patriarch of All Georgia, His Holiness and Beatitude Ilia II, Sioni Cathedral, 2 August, 2004, available at [http://www.patriarchate.ge/?action=qadageba_show&id=121], 21 March, 2014. 17 Sunday Sermon of Catholicos-Patriarch of All Georgia, His Holiness and Beatitude Ilia II, 18 April, 2004 [http:// www.patriarchate.ge/?action=qadageba_show&id=104], 21 March, 2014. 18 Sunday Sermon of Catholicos-Patriarch of All Georgia, His Holiness and Beatitude Ilia II, 2 May, 2004, the Sve- titskhoveli Cathedral, available at [http://www.patriarchate.ge/?action=qadageba_show&id=105], 21 March, 2014.

90 Volume 8 Issue 1-2 2014 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION In other words, in the West, traditional agrarian and urban communities were transformed into political civil nations through secularization, capitalist development, and mounting secular political ideologies born by the European Enlightenment and bourgeois revolutions. In Georgia, on the other hand, similar processes unfolded while the Church increased its political involvement. It did not protect the traditional and archaic institutions (as happened in the West), but led the anti-imperialist political struggle designed to restore its status in the Russian Empire and later to protect religion as an axiological system and the very roots of the Georgian nation as the cornerstone of the Georgian S.S.R. This explains the Georgian Church’s political impact, which is comparable to that of several other countries (Poland, Croatia, and Lithuania) where the Church played one of the main roles in the national movements. This makes the Georgian Orthodox Church not merely a religious organization, but one of the key political institutions of contemporary Georgia. An analysis of the Church’s role and activity in the context of all sorts of institutional theories looks promising; indeed, as a political institution the Church demonstrates new dimensions and new features. They look alien in the contemporary world, but they were prominent and absolutely natural in medieval Europe: the Church not only prays for salvation, but actively contributes to the country’s state and political construction. The current political and social dynamics in Georgia suggest the following: the Church will retain its authority and consequence in the foreseeable future; it will remain a social integrator and stabilizer, the political component of which will be further developed. In this context, its role and status share many common features with the role and status of political parties. This analogy is based, among other things, on the fact that there are several Chris- tian nationalist parties in Georgia. Their ideologies and activities, as well as intellectual preferences of the Georgian Church as a whole, are worth making them a subject of more detailed inter- disciplinary study.

Givi TAKTAKISHVILI

D.Sc. (Econ.), Researcher at Caucasus Interconnect (Amsterdam, the Netherlands).

THE DUTCH GOLDEN AGE AND THE CAUCASUS

Abstract

n this article, the author analyzes the erlands. He goes on to describe the history, reasons for the interest of Dutch scien- culture, and economic and political condi- I tists and travelers in the Caucasus in tions of the peoples living in the Caucasian general and in Georgia in particular in the region, as well as the location, natural condi- 17th century—the Golden Age of the Neth- tions, and climate of their countries as pre- Volume 8 Issue 1-2 2014 91 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION sented in the works of Dutch scientists and works. The author emphasizes the impor- travelers. The author relates the trade poten- tance of their works about the Caucasus, tial of the Caucasian countries based on the especially for further research of the history accounts of Dutch scholars and travelers, of the Caucasus in general and of Georgia surveys the sources of the works of Dutch in particular.11 1 scholars, and tries to find out whether or not these Dutch scholars and travelers actually 1 In this article, I often mention “the Caucasus in gen- went to the Caucasus, particularly Georgia, eral and Georgia in particular” because the Dutch scholars and travelers1 placed special emphasis on the Georgians and Geor- and whether their visual impressions of their gia when describing the Caucasian peoples and countries in travels were an important source of their their works.

KEYWORDS: Dutch Golden Age, Dutch travelers Nicolaas Witsen, Olfert Dapper, Jan Struys, the Caucasus, Georgia, (Caucasian) Albania, Abkhazians, Circassians, Armenians.

Instead of an Introduction Europe in Search of New Trade Routes

During the Dutch Golden Age (around the 17th century), trade, science, art, and the military underwent rapid development in the Netherlands. In addition, Dutch sailors and travelers studied the different corners of the world, looking for and researching new trade markets and trade routes. As a result, more and more merchant vessels navigated from the Netherlands to the Indian, Chinese, and Indonesian islands and other coasts. But there was fierce competition among the Dutch, Spanish, Portuguese, and British sailors. Also, the route from Europe to Southeast Asia was long, dangerous, and costly. Moreover, after the collapse of the Mongol Empire, the Turks took the areas around the Black Sea under their control, so the ancient caravan route from China to Europe was closed. There- fore, European merchants and navigators began searching for a new sea route from Europe to South- east Asia via the Arctic Ocean. Dutch navigators and explorers were in the vanguard of the seekers of this new sea route. Despite an unsuccessful expedition led by Dutch navigators and explorers Willem Barentsz and Jacob van Heemskerck in 1596, the Dutch navigators and explorers tried to repeat this expedition in 1664. They vainly submitted their request to the States General of the Neth- erlands for assistance for their expedition. Twelve years later, on King of England Charles II’s initiative, a sea expedition was organized once again in this direction, which also ended in failure. The attempt of European, including Dutch, navigators and explorers to reach Southeast Asia via the Arctic Ocean was unsuccessful.2 Throughout the 17th century, the Netherlands also had intensive trade relations with Persia, where Dutch traders bought local raw silk and sold the products of the Dutch textile industry. While trade relations with south Iran were carried out by sea (from Africa), trade relations with northern

2 It should be noted that today the importance of a trade navigation route from Europe to Asia (and vice versa) through the Arctic Ocean is growing. Whereas in 2010 only four vessels passed this way, in 2011, 34 vessels, and in 2012, 46 vessels traveled this route, although this is much less than the number of ships sailing via the Suez Canal from Europe to Asia and vice versa. But in the future, the importance of the North Sea trade route will continue to grow. On 5 September, 2013, the first Chinese cargo ship traveled through the Arctic Ocean from the Chinese port of Dalian to Rotterdam. It took this vessel 35 days to complete the journey, instead of the 46 days it normally took through the Suez Canal.

92 Volume 8 Issue 1-2 2014 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION Persia were pursued through Russia (via Arkhangelsk, the Volga, and the Caspian Sea) and the Le- vantine countries. But there was also strong competition (especially after the middle of the 17th century) between the English and Armenian (who mainly operated in the interests of Russia) merchants, on the one hand, and the Dutch merchants, on the other. These circumstances prompted the Dutch merchants to launch a new trade route through Germany and on via the Danube, the Black Sea, and the Caucasus to Persia.3 For the reasons given above, a possible trade route from Europe to the East Asian countries through the Caucasus and mainly through Georgia was of particular interest to the Europeans. There- fore, in the 17th and 18th centuries, many European and especially Dutch scholars and travelers were interested in the Caucasus in general and in Georgia in particular. They traveled to Georgia on their own or at the request of European businessmen. For example, German Adam Olearius (1603 –1671) traveled at the request of Frederick III, Duke of Holstein-Gottorp, for economic purposes; Frenchman Jean Chardin (1643-1713) was a member of the British East India Company; and Dutchman Nicolaas Witsen (1641-1717) was a member of the board and cartographer of the United East India Company— VOC, etc. There was probably another circumstance that contributed to the Dutch scholars and travelers’ interest in the Caucasus and Georgia. Indeed, after Iranian Shah Abbas (1587-1629) expelled the Portuguese from Hormuz Island in the Persian Gulf (1622) with the help of British troops, the Shah established control over the Strait of Hormuz. Then Shah Abbas strengthened state monopoly on silk trade and decided to replace the silk trade caravan route that went from Iran via Turkey to Europe with a shipping route from the port of Bandar Abbas (on the south coast of Iran, on the Persian Gulf) around Africa to Europe. The export of silk from Hormuz would provide the Shah with more revenue than export via Turkey, because Iran paid Turkey high custom duties. In exchange for their help, the English merchants received permission to establish a Trade Factory. It should be noted that later Dutch traders also established their Trade Factory in Bandar Abbas, and in 1645 they received the right to buy silk all over Iran. There was intense competition between the English and Dutch merchants in the trade of Iranian silk. Later, the Shah gave the same silk trade rights to French merchants, but he limited the rights of Dutch merchants to engage in silk trade in Iran. In my opinion, the Dutch scholars and travelers who journeyed to the Caucasus in the 17th and 18th centuries were mainly interested in expanding the silk market and searching for a new trade route. The Dutch scholars and travelers also had close ties with other European colleagues interested in the Caucasus, and they often exchanged information. For example, Nicolaas Witsen had close relations with French merchant and voyager Jean Chardin, who traveled to the Caucasus and Persia on behalf of the British business community. They also had the same goals: to investigate the capacity of the Caucasian economic market and the possibility of restoring the trade route through the Caucasus to Persia. For example, during his second trip, the French merchant and voyager traveled in 1671-1679 from Europe to Persia via the Caucasus and particularly via Georgia. He had close ties first with French and later with English trade circles. It seems that Jean Chardin had a conversation with King of Kar- tli (eastern Georgia) Vakhtang V (1618-1675) about restoring the historical trade-transit route from Europe to Asia through Georgia, which is indicated in a letter from King Vakhtang V to Jean Chardin. He wrote: “For Europeans who wish to go to India via my country, this is a better way to travel than other ways. I’m sure that having gone this way once, they will never wish to travel another way in the future.”4

3 See: J. Gommans, “Nederlandse textiel in het achttiende-eeuwse Perzië,” BMGN (Bijdragen en mededelingen betref- fende de geschiedenis der Nederlanden), 109 (1994) afl. 3, p. 430; E. Baasch, Holländische Wirtschaftsgeschichte, Jena, 1927, p. 291. 4 The Voyage of Jean Chardin to Persia and Other Eastern Countries (information about Georgia), Transl. from the French, research and comments by Mzia Mgaloblishvili, Metsniereba, Tbilisi, 1975, p. 34 (in Georgian).

Volume 8 Issue 1-2 2014 93 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION Thus, in the 17th-18th centuries, the European countries were extremely interested in the Cau- casus. During this period, in addition to the above-mentioned travelers, the following people also traveled there: Germans Adam Olearius mentioned above and Engelbert Kaempfer (1651-1716), Italians Pietro Della Valle (1586-1652) and Teramo Cristoforo Castelli (1597-1659), and others. It should be noted that the main target of the Italian travelers in the Caucasus and in Georgia in particular was the Catholic missionary, but their writings about the Caucasus, including about Georgia, are also very interesting. It is worth noting that many of these works were immediately translated into English, French, Dutch, etc. The Dutch scholars were very familiar with the works of these and other European travelers and used them as sources for their compositions. Of course, these scholars and travelers tried to seek as multifaceted and comprehensive information as possible about the countries situated in the new markets and on the new trade routes. Their interest was versatile and included the territory, borders, landscape, geographical characteristics, history, culture, religion, customs, traditions, system of governance, as well as the demographic, social, economic, and political conditions of the peoples living there. After being processed, a large part of this information was reflected in their works and publications. In this regard, we are interested in the works of Dutch scholars and travelers about the Caucasus in general and Georgia in particular. Since the Dutch scholars and travelers placed the emphasis on the Georgians and Georgia when describing the Caucasian peoples and countries in their works, we will first take a look at what they write about Georgia and the Georgians.

Dutch Scientists and Travelers about Georgia and the Georgians

Dutch scholars and travelers Nicolaas Witsen, Olfert Dapper, and Jan Struys placed special emphasis on the Caucasus in general and Georgia in particular in their research, works, and publications about different countries of the world. Nicolaas Witsen was in close contact with Jean Chardin, Olfert Dapper, Jan Struys, and other scholars and travelers. Nicolaas Witsen used the publications of his colleagues—scholars and travelers (also works of Olfert Dapper and Jan Struys)—and expanded and deepened his knowledge about the Caucasus in general and Georgia in particular. Olfert Dapper (1636-1689) was the first Dutch scholar who published descriptions of some of the Caucasian peoples, namely the Georgians, Abkhazians, Circassians, and Albanians, in his works. He also described Kurdistan. In general, he described the origin of these peoples’ names, their countries’ borders, customs, and habits, as well as the population, cities, system of governance, religion, flora and fauna, etc. His book Asia, or an Accurate Description of the Great Mogul Empire, and a Large Part of the Indies, All of Persia, Georgia, Mingrelia, etc.5 was published in Amsterdam in 1672. The title of this book shows that the author, after describing Great Mogul Empire, India, and Persia, gives a description of Georgia, Samegrelo, and other neighboring provinces. Here he described the origins of their names, borders, cities, flora and fauna, customs, traditions, system of governance, religion, etc. For us the interesting part of this book begins with the descriptions of the whole of Georgia. At the beginning of his book, Olfert Dapper notes that Ancient Colchis and Iberia were olden-day Geor- gia and that the Georgians were descendants of the ancient Moschi. Later he described the borders of Georgia and noted that in the east Georgia borders on Albania, which is situated on the Caspian Sea

5 See: O. Dapper, Asia, of naukeurige beschryving van het rijk des Grooten Mogols, en een groot gedeelte van Indiën: ... beneffens een volkome beschryving van geheel Persie, Georgie, Mengrelie en andere gebuur-geweste..., available at [http:// search.library.wisc.edu/catalog/citation?id=ocm07457261].

94 Volume 8 Issue 1-2 2014 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION and is now part of Persia and where the cities of Baku and Demirkapi or Derbent are located. In the south, it bordered almost right on Shirvan, in the west, on the Black Sea, and in the north on the Caspian Mountains, the branch of the Caucasian Mountain Range, which stretch from the Caspian to the Black Sea and protect Georgia from cold and looming clouds from the north. In the south, Georgia also borders on part of Armenia as far as Media, as well as on a small part of West Trabzon and a small part of Cappadocia. He goes on to tell of how the country’s name changed: first it was Kolkheti, then Iberia, and finally Gurjistan and Georgia, as it is still called today. According to Olfert Dapper, the name comes from Saint George. The Greeks called it “Georgia,” which in Greek means farmer. Even the Georgians called their country “Saqartvelo.” He goes on to note that Geor- gia is divided into provinces: Imereti (of bashiachuk), Kakheti, Kardeli or Kardueli (Kartli), Gurieli (Guria), and Mingrelia (Samegrelo). He also described the Georgian provinces separately: Imereti (Bashiachuk), Kartli, Kakheti, Guria, and Samegrelo, as well as their landscapes, their natural conditions, their rivers, their cities (Tbilisi, Imereti (Kutaisi), Gori, Dzegani, Gremi, etc.), etc. He found Georgia to be a country with beautiful landscape and many mountains, forests, and rivers, as well as fertile soil.6 In this book, Olfert Dapper wrote that the inhabitants of the whole country speak Georgian, but they used two alphabets: Khutsuri in churches and for spiritual books and Mkhedruli for social life. He noted that the Georgian alphabet was very different from the Chaldean, Armenian, and Hebrew alphabets. Then he also noted that the Georgians were Christians and in the churches liturgy was held in Georgian and not in Greek. The Georgians were Christians at the time of Emperor Constantine (272-337), who held his court in Constantinople. Although the Georgians recognized the Patriarch of Constantinople, they did not submit to him. The Georgians had their own metropolitan. It is also interesting for us to know what he thought of the Georgians. He wrote that the Georgians were not wild or ignorant people, but very virtuous despite their manners, which were very different from those of Europe. They were respectful toward their neighbors and not arrogant, they did not kick up any riots, but were diligent and sensible. However, Olfert Dapper said that the Georgians drank a lot, because they made their own wine. They brandished long swords and were engaged in a long struggle against the infidels or Mohammedans. Olfert Dapper found that the Georgian women were more friendly, more civilized, and more beautiful than Asian women. He described the men and women in Georgia as tall with black-brown eyes and ruddy complexions, which was due to the high wine consumption.7 After describing the historical problems and the difficult political situation in the country, he told of how the Turks and Persians tried to conquer the land and how the Georgians tried to defend themselves against the invaders in vain, as well as how Georgia was divided into small states and principalities, the problems of unity in Georgia (Georgia was united until 1507) and their causes. Olfert Dapper took pity on the plight of Georgia. What should the Georgians do to restore the country’s unity? Olfert Dapper said that if they united their country and appointed a decent government, the problems would melt like snow in the sun. In keeping with the title of his book, Olfert Dapper described in detail the Georgian provinces and in particular the provinces of Imereti (Bashiachuk), Kartli, Kakheti, Guria, and Samegrelo and their landscapes, natural conditions, and uniqueness (for example, it should be noted that when describing Samegrelo’s (ancient Colchis) animal and bird world, he said that it was from there that the Argonauts brought pheasants to Greece). He also noted that the country had the best honey in the world and indicated the variety, which was especially true of a very white, firm and delicious honey, just like sugar. This honey could not be taken to Constantinople to be sold, because it was collected in the winter when navigation on the Black Sea was limited. He also spoke about another type of

6 See: O. Dapper, op. cit., pp. 696, 700. 7 See: Ibid., p. 697.

Volume 8 Issue 1-2 2014 95 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION honey collected by the mountain dwellers of Samegrelo when the laurel was in bloom. This honey was used for curative purposes in the absence of medicine. He went on to give a description of their rivers, cities (Tbilisi, Imereti (Kutaisi), Gori, Dzegani, Gremi, etc.), history, political situation, the struggle against Persian and Turkish invaders, etc.8 In the Georgian part of his book, after describing the Georgian provinces, Olfert Dapper wrote about the Lazica. He also described the Lazi people, who lived at that time and still live to this day in the southwestern Caucasus. Now the area inhabited by these people is part of Turkey. He wrote that the country of the Lazi or Qarti bordered on Georgia and that their land extended to Trebizond (Tra- bzon). Their country was mountainous and woody and located along the eastern coast of the Black Sea. The Lazi engaged in cattle-breeding and viticulture. This land was overgrown with trees that were covered in vines. In his book, Olfert Dapper wrote: “The Lazi, who are otherwise known as Kurti.”9 We believe it is wrong to identify these two names. Historically, the Lazi were Mingrelians and even now Mingrelian is spoken. In the olden days, the Kardus or Kardukhs were called Colchis, who were the ancestors of the Lazi (or Kurten) and Mingrelains.10 In the last section of the Georgian part of his book, Olfert Dapper described the Black Sea and first reviewed what the Greek and Latin scholars and travelers called this sea, for example: Herodo- tus—Cimmerians Sea; Plutarch and Ptolemy—Pontus Sea; Pliny—Pontus Axenus, which means Inhospitable Sea; generally referred to as the Black Sea, in Latin it is Pontus Euxinus (Hospitable Sea).11 Then he gave a brief description of the Black Sea coast, in the words of Ammianus Marcel- linus, and noted that there were shores, ports, and cities; there were beautiful houses, but most of them were damaged or falling down. There were also many unoccupied areas. The Black Sea was very stormy and thundery, especially in the winter; the north wind blew across it, and the sky over the sea was covered with clouds and darkness. He thought that this was what gave the sea its name and not the color of the sand or earth. There were no islands, but there were small cliffs close to the coast. He also noted that the Cossacks came to this sea from Poland to rob the Turks, playing the role of master and settling at the mouth of the river Dnieper, above the Black Sea.12 Whereas Olfert Dapper was a scholar, Jan Struys was a sail maker, and he often traveled to different countries and was hired by different companies as a mariner. He described his travels in his book The Voyages and Travels of John Struys through Italy, Greece, Muscovy, Tartary, Media, Per- sia, East-India, Japan, and Other Countries in Europe, Africa, and Asia (London, 1684).13 Jan Struys’ third trip is the most interesting for us. When relating his impressions of his travels, Jan Struys described Daghestan, Daghestan’s peoples, the Georgians, and other Caucasians. In 1668, he heard that an agent of the Russian czar was hiring men to sail across the Caspian Sea. He was taken on as a sail maker. In the Moscow kingdom, he traveled from the northern city of Novgorod to Astrakhan on the northern coast of the Caspian Sea and witnessed the revolt of Stepan Razin. During this trip, he was almost murdered by some Cossacks, but managed to escape, along with other sailors sentenced to death, by boat across the Caspian Sea. In Daghestan, they were enslaved. Jan Struys was released by Polish Ambassador of Georgian descent Bogdan Gurdziecki (16?? -1700) in the town of Shemakha in 1671. Jan Struys finally paid his boss a lump sum and went to Persia. Via Isfahan, he arrived in the port of Gombroon (Bandar Abbas) and then traveled to Batavia, where he began working for VOC (the United East India Company). He returned to the Netherlands in 1673.

8 See: Ibid., p. 731. 9 Ibidem. 10 See: Metropolitan Anania, Chapter XIII, “Tribes Living Historically in the Dioceses Lazica,” Scientific-Historical Journal Svetitskhoveli, No. 2, 2011, pp. 197-248, and also see [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kurdish_people]. 11 For more details, see: [http://www.bible-history.com/maps/romanempire/Pontus-Euxinus.html]. 12 See: O. Dapper, op. cit., pp. 731-732. 13 See the Dutch edition of this book: J. Struys, Aanmerkelijke en seer rampspoedige reysen door Italien, Turkijen, Persien, Tartarijen, Oost-Indien, Moscovien, enz, Amsterdam, 1676, and also the Russian edition: J. Struys, Tree puteshest- viia, Alexandria Publishers, Riazan, 2006.

96 Volume 8 Issue 1-2 2014 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION Different sources describe Bogdan Gurdziecki in different ways. According to Polish, Persian, and Georgian sources, he was previously ambassador to King of Kartli Rostom (1632-1658) in Poland, where he stayed on to live. Later, he became the greatest authority on all things Persian, Russian, and Caucasian and envoy to Polish kings John II Casimir Vasa (1648-1668) and John III Sobieski (1674- 1696) in Persia. He was dispatched to Isfahan as the head of a Polish diplomatic mission, also part of the joint Russo-Polish diplomatic and economic efforts in Persia aimed at bringing the Safavid Persian government into an anti-Ottoman alliance. Henceforth, Gurdziecki played a role in diplomacy between Poland and Persia, as well as in some Russian-Georgian interaction.14 He always had friendly relations with Georgian kings Vakhtang V (1658—1675) and Georgi XII (1676-1688, 1703-1709), and during his journey to Persia and return, he always visited them. Jan Struys wrote in his book that Bogdan Gurdziecki sent a Polish doctor to work for King Vakhtang V. Also Bogdan Gurdziecki had his own estate both in Poland and in Georgia. Jan Struys described Bogdan Gurdziecki as a strict and brutal man.15 Jan Struys was delighted not only with the beauty of the Georgian women, but also with the capital of Georgia—“well-known Tbilisi.” He knew that more than 150,000 Georgians were exiled from their villages and towns to Persia in 1616-1617 by an order of the Persian Shah. Some Georgians lived in Hasanabad, a district of the former Persian capital of Isfahan. Many of them were excellent merchants, just as there were many excellent Armenian merchants. The Shah appreciated them and respected them for their calm and obedient life and for their significant and large estimated income from trade, so they were allowed to live in a district near the Mahdi Sheik-Sabane mosque. But they wanted to live in the suburb of Isfahan, because they enjoyed living together.16 Jan Struys’s book has been translated into English, French, German, Spanish, Russian, etc., but has not yet been translated into Georgian. Nicolaas Witsen was in close contact with Olfert Dapper and Jan Struys, as well as with Jean Chardin; their books were an important information source for Nicolaas Witsen’s work—Behelzende eene beschryving van verscheidene Tartersche en nabuuurige gewesten, in de Nooerer en oostelykste deelen van Azi, which was published in 1690 and in 1705 (a revised and expanded edition). This book was translated into Russian and published in 2010 in Amsterdam under the name Severnaia i Vostoch- naia Tartaria17 (Noord en Oost Tartarye). At that time, the Europeans mentioned Siberia “Tartarye.” The work contains a lot of information about the history, geography, political situation, etc. of Russia and other neighboring countries. Both Olfert Dapper and Nicolaas Witsen dedicated part of their book to Georgia, and Nicolaas Witsen gave a brief account of the history of Georgia from ancient times until the 17th century and of the 17th century in detail. He also wrote that Georgia (in ancient times Iveria or Iberia) consists of five provinces: Mingrelia (in ancient times Colchis), Guria, Imereti, Kartli, and Kakheti. Then he wrote that Christian Georgia was surrounded by Muslim countries that had quite a significant influence on Georgia. He went on to describe the Georgian opposition to the Ottoman and Persian invaders, which often ended in heavy defeat for Georgia. Under the Treaty of Amasiah (1555), the Ottoman Empire acquired West Georgia and Persia took East Georgia. When the Georgian resistance against the Turks and the Persians grew, they took revenge on the people by making them pay extra tribute. Also the Persians and the Turks instigated the Muslim peoples living in the Northern Caucasus against Georgia, whereby looting and destruction of this country went on not only in the border areas, but often in the interior too, said Nicolaas Witsen. Many Georgians were exiled to Persia; some sources say that more than 20,000 were driven from their villages and towns. Nicolaas Witsen was surprised that the Georgian cavalrymen, who fought valiantly for the Persian Shah against the Afghans in Af-

14 [http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/Gurdziecki]. 15 See: J. Struys, op. cit. 16 See: Ibidem. 17 N. Witsen, Severnaia i Vostochnaia Tartaria, Vol. II, Pegasus, Amsterdam, 2010.

Volume 8 Issue 1-2 2014 97 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION ghanistan and against the Indians in India, were given the opportunity for peace in their own country (Georgia). But that did not solve Georgia’s problems.18 In his book, Nicolaas Witsen describes the landscape and the climate of Georgia, as well as the capital of the country and the capitals of the Georgian provinces. When describing the Caucasian Mountains, he used quotes from the book by Jean Chardin, The Travels of Sir John Chardin into Persia and the East Indies,19 and said that the mountains of the Caucasus were very high and it was very difficult to reach their peaks, since they were always covered with snow. The mountains were mostly covered with pine trees. These mountains were fertile and abundant in honey, fruit, wild boars, etc. all the way up to their peaks. The water in the rivers was clean. The Caucasian mountains, which lay between the Black Sea and Caspian Sea, protected Georgia from the cold winds from the north, so the climate in the country was good, temperate, and dry. Nicolaas Witsen’s opinion about the Georgians is very interesting. Unlike some European writ- ers, he found the Georgians very civilized. According to him, the Georgians were friendly, polite, and honest. The Georgians continuously waged war against the Muslims to defend their Christian faith. Nicolaas Witsen also thought that the Georgians were not stubborn and arrogant, but sociable and gullible. He said that the Georgians were naturally very inquisitive, but unfortunately had no opportunity to develop properly because they did not have good schools. Also Nicolaas Witsen stressed that the Georgians were the best and brightest people in East Asia and perhaps in the world. He also praised the tolerance of Georgians because many Armenians, Greeks, Jews, Turks, Persians, Indians, Tatars, Russians, and Europeans lived in Georgia and they were able to keep their own traditions and confess their faith. Their character, behavior, and qualities caused them much suffering at the hands of the occupants.20 Nicolaas Witsen went on to write that Georgia was a particularly fertile land. After irrigation, the land yielded a rich harvest. Life there was good and cheap. There were many types of good- tasting bread and fruit. The rivers were rich in various kinds of fish. The Georgian peasants had many cows, sheep, chickens, pigs, etc. The Georgian farmers produced excellent wines that they enjoyed drinking themselves and exported to other countries, such as Armenia, Persia, etc., just as silk was exported to neighboring countries (the Ottoman Empire, Persia, etc.). The author also described the defects of the Georgian character. He found that Georgians were inclined to drink too much and were not very devoted to their faith. In his book, Nicolaas Witsen published portraits of Georgian kings Archil II and Irakli I. These portraits are important for Georgian history because there are no others available. So nowadays Georgians know these ancestors from the portraits in Nicolaas Witsen’s book. His book is also interesting and valuable for Georgian and Dutch scientists since it contains a Dutch- Georgian dictionary. Nicolaas Witsen compiled the dictionary with the cooperation of Georgian Prince Alexander Bagrationi. Nicolaas Witsen’s book is also very interesting for Georgians since it has maps the author drew himself. These are some of the oldest maps of Georgia.

Dutch Scientists and Travelers about Other Caucasian Peoples

After describing Georgia and the Georgians, Olfert Dapper and Nicolaas Witsen went on to describe other Caucasian peoples in their above-mentioned books. Jan Struys also devoted part of his book to the Caucasian peoples.

18 See: Ibid., pp. 639-643. 19 See: The Travels of Sir John Chardin into Persia and the East Indies, London, 1686. 20 See: N. Witsen, op. cit., pp. 672-673.

98 Volume 8 Issue 1-2 2014 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION In addition, Olfert Dapper offered a description of the Lezghians, Abkhazians, Alans, Circas- sians, Adighe, Karachays, Albanians, and other peoples who lived in the Caucasus. Here we will look at the characteristics of some of the Caucasian peoples offered by Olfert Dap- per. For example, he notes that peoples lived in the north of the Caucasus (sic!) who were Turks called Abazians or Abkhazians. Their main activities were cattle-breeding and bird-catching. They owned large herds of cattle. They had many falcons and hawks and caught birds, which was their primary activity. They sold the birds in Georgia, Iran, and Constantinople. In the areas where the Abkhazians lived, the natural environment was healthy, beautiful, fertile, mountainous, and hilly. They did not live in towns, castles, or fortresses, but lived in communities of 15-20 families in family houses. Their houses and huts were situated on the top of hills and these settlements were fortified by surrounding moats and pillars. Here on the Black Sea was a port called Eschisumuni (Sukhumi), which operated all year round and to which ships came from Constantinople, Trebizond (Trabzon), Lazistan (modern Rize and Artvin provinces), Kaffa (currently known as Theodosia or Feodosia), etc. It is interesting that, as Olfert Dapper noted, the Abkhazians did not use sugar or salt and they often laughed at the Mingrelians, who had more delicious foods than Abkhazians themselves. Olfert Dapper also noted that the Abkhazians often fought with the Mingrelians and Circassians. Their wealth and merchandise consisted of skins, tissues, honey, and slaves. There was a natural exchange of commodities, because no currency yet circulated among them.21 Olfert Dapper went on to describe the opinions of the ancient Greeks and Roman historians about the Circassians, their origin, the location their country, and the country’s borders. He noted that the Circassians lived in the Northern Caucasus from the mouth of the River Don, which used to be called Tanais, and along the coast of the Black Sea to the Abkhazian areas. In the east, the country’s border turned northeast, passing through Daghestan and extending to Astrakhan. In the north, the Circassians lived in five mountainous areas. The author noted that, according to Adam Olearius, the capital of the Circassians was Terki. But the czar of Moskovia subdued these peoples with his martial power. The surrounding settlements were occupied by Russians and they allowed the Circassians to live in other places and villages, or in other special cities further upstream. Although they were under the subordination of princes or lords, these princes or lords themselves were vassals (loan-men) of the Russian czar and were subordinate to the Russian czar. They paid tribute to the czar, although only the bare minimum. The author described how the city was a stronghold of the Russian government, Russian troops, etc. After the author described the landscape around the capital, he wrote that the surroundings were woody but very low and ran under water. The countryside mainly consisted of streams that ran into the marshes of the Don and Kopa rivers, along with several other large and small streams, and was overgrown with cane and Calamus root.22 The author went on to note that, according Johan de Luca, the Circassians were the most beautiful people in the world. The men were strong of body and had broad faces. They had long coal-black hair. The women were also strong and could endure much, they had lovely faces, white skin, and rosy cheeks. They wore their hair, coal-black, in two long braided locks that hung down on either side of their face and they walked around with their heads uncovered. The Circassians were Muslims and Christians, but Muslims dominated. He wrote that the Circassians spoke in Circassian and Turkish. They had the same languages as other Tartars. But most Circassians could speak Russian. They did not have a special alphabet. They lived in wooden and cane houses and engaged in cattle-breeding and agriculture. The Circassians often had to fight the Tatars who lived nearby in order to repel their attacks, but they also often carried out armed attacks themselves for the purpose of robbery. The Circassians engaged in slave trade, as well as in the sale of deer, ox, tiger, and bear skins, of which there were plenty in the woods. It was considered unbecoming for nobles to engage in commerce and

21 See: O. Dapper, op. cit., p. 730. 22 See: Ibid., pp. 732-734.

Volume 8 Issue 1-2 2014 99 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION sell their prey. Their job was to govern the people and protect them, and also assist them in hunting and warfare.23 After writing about the Circassians, Olfert Dapper described Albania. He wrote that to the east of Georgia came Albania, so called on behalf of the River Albanus. This country bordered in the east on the Caspian Sea, in the west on Georgia, in the north on part of the Asian Sarmatians, near the Caucasian mountains, and in the south on part of Armenia. The land was located between very high and almost inaccessible mountains through which one difficult road ran from Tartarye to Persia. The towns of Al- bania were Cipicche, Tarrakosie, Sobai, Chabarei, and Abacuas. Here the author noted that, according to Anania Shirakatsi, the city of Derbent was located in this region, which included the ancient city of Alexandria and was near the iron gates, or Demirkapi in Turkish. However, Ptolemy mentioned the ports of Albania, although they were not so well equipped as the other ports on the Caspian Sea. Olfert Dapper proved that some scholars (Zwart, Anania, Olearius, etc.) noted that the towns of Derbent and Shemakha belonged to Shirvan. Then the author said that, according to Theuet, the town of Zitracha was a wealthy trade city, although not for long. Theuet also suggested that the capital city of Albania was Bambanoch. Olfert Dapper went on to describe the climate and landscape of Albania and said that the air of this country was very healthy and tempering. The country near Armenia toward the south was partly flat and partly mountainous. The River Kur and several other rivers made this area very fertile and always green. According to Theuet, this land belonged to the Tartars. The inhabitants were Christians, but schismatics (Orthodox Christians) who, like the Georgians, followed the Greek rites.24 Thus Olfert Dapper described some of the nations of the Caucasus. In contrast to Olfert Dapper, Nicolaas Witsen paid more attention to the Caucasian nations in his major work Noord en Oost Tar- tarye, such as the Abkhazians, Circassians, Kumyks, the peoples of Daghestan, etc. For example, according to Nicolaas Witsen, the country of Abazians, Abkhazians, or Abasians bordered on Same- grelo in the east and extended in the west to the river Kuban. The Abkhazians mainly lived in the mountains and they almost had the same lifestyle as the Circassians. They spoke a particular language, but did not have an alphabet. They were Christians, but their faith was full of immorality and supersti- tion. So, actually they were idol-worshippers. In addition to agriculture and cattle-breeding, their main activity was stealing boys and girls. They were daring pirates and sometimes hindered navigation on the Black Sea from Constantinople to Kaffa. They did not use money in their country; they exchanged slaves, wax, and furs for clothes, bullets, and other things. They had a good port in Sukhumi. They did not engage in fishing, although there was a lot of fish in the sea. They were often at war with the Circassians and Mingrelians.25 Then Nicolaas Witsen described the Circassians and their country. According to Nicolaas Wit- sen, the Circassians’ country was located near the Caspian Sea, along the Caucasian Mountains and extended to the Black Sea. Their neighbors in the north were the Nogais of Astrakhan, in the south the Tatars of Daghestan and Tarki, and in the west the Abasians and Mingrelians. In the olden days, when the Circassian people were united, they were very strong and successfully repelled hostile attacks with their joined forces. But when their union was dissolved, they were soon conquered by the Russians, Turks, and others. Their country was very nice, beautiful, and charming. The population’s main asset was sheep, although they also had cattle, horses, and chickens. The Circassians lived in rural areas and freely, but they had a special leader. Both the Circassians and the Georgians were considered the world’s most beautiful people. They were hospitable and were good riders. Thieving was not considered a crime and was very rarely strictly punished. They were not inclined to hard drinking.26

23 See: Ibid., pp. 736-737. 24 See: Ibid., pp.739—740. 25 See: N. Witsen, op. cit., pp. 685, 688. 26 See: Ibid., p. 879.

100 Volume 8 Issue 1-2 2014 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION In his book, Nicolaas Witsen noted that the town of Baku was the town of Shirvan. He wrote that this city was located on the Caspian Sea and belonged to Persia. It had reserves of black and white oil. It prospered from two hot springs and its rich soil, which provided the Persian Shah with significant profit. He often pointed out in his book that Shirvan was the main crossroads for merchants from Russia, Persia, India, Georgia, etc. Jan Struys also wrote about Baku and its surroundings. He noted that the soil from this town to the Bay of Gilan was sandy and all along the coast were many fine rivers, arbors, and ducts; some of them were so deep that large ships could enter and anchor there. The sea was rich in fish, and the Shah of Persia received immense profit from fishing. Jan Struys also wrote about oil and said it came out of the mountain of Barmach, near the city of Baku, gushing from the ground and running through the rocks. Here were about forty wells from which oil could be drawn, but there were only three main oil sources in full swing. After describing the route from Derbent to Shirvan, he described the ancient town. In the olden days, the city was much stronger, but declined during the war waged by Shah Abas against the Turks. In the city, the streets were very narrow, both in the south and in the north. The houses were low and built of earth, clay, boards, and planks. He noted that there were often earthquakes and the earthquake in 1667 was the strongest from time immemorial. It continued for three months and during this terrible destruction undoubtedly more than 80 thousand men died who are capable of bearing arms, not counting women, children, and slaves. This disaster struck not only Shemakha, but also its surroundings.27 It should be noted that Jan Struys saw the results of the devastating earthquake in Shemakha for himself a few years after it happened. Olfert Dapper, Jan Struys, and Nicolaas Witsen also briefly described the Alans, Avars, Kumyks, and others in the above-mentioned publications. But here we will go on to give a brief review of the description of some of the Caucasian peoples and countries that the following authors present in their publications.

Dutch Scholars and Travelers about Some Economic Aspects of the Life of the Caucasian Peoples

At the beginning of this article, we mentioned that the main interest of the Dutch scholars and travelers in the Caucasus in general and Georgia in particular was to collect and analyze information about the economic situation there. Of the Dutch scholars and travelers, only Olfert Dapper gives a description and comparison of several routes connecting Europe to Georgia. He described the three main access routes to Georgia: 1. The shortest was through Constantinople; caravans took this route overland from Eastern Europe to Constantinople, then across the Bosporus and through Trabzon to Georgia, either overland or through the Black Sea. This route was easier and shorter, and the trip took from five to eight days; 2. Through Persia; caravans took this route from Persia directly to Kartli (East Georgia); 3. From Poland via the Black Sea; according to Olfert Dapper, this route was easier and shorter. It is remarkable that Olfert Dapper did not consider the route from Europe through Russia to Georgia important, although at that time, European scholars and travelers mainly went to Georgia

27 See: J. Struys, op. cit.

Volume 8 Issue 1-2 2014 101 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION from Russia. At that time, most people traveled from Russia to Georgia via the Volga and Caspian Sea and then overland to Georgia.28 At that time, i.e. in the 17th century, the Caucasus was under the control of Turkey (western part) and Persia (eastern part). Accordingly, western Georgia was under the control of Turkey, and eastern Georgia was under Persian control. Therefore, penetrating the Caucasian market, or exploring the trade route via the Caucasus without the consent of Turkey and Iran was naturally impossible. At that time, Turkey and Persia were in opposition to each other, both politically and economically. Also there were additional difficulties posed by the fact that Georgia, the central country in the Caucasus, was divided into several tiny principalities. All of this was complicated by European merchants starting operations in this region. Therefore, according to Olfert Dapper, trade with the Georgian provinces on the Black Sea coast, and particularly with Samegrelo, was mainly carried out by Turkish merchants. They sold carpets, bed linen, chairs, bows and arrows, canvas, iron, copper, wool, salt, cotton clothing, etc. In exchange, they received honey, rice, yarn, bovine teeth, hides, beaver furs, slaves, palm tree timber, etc. The Turkish merchants greatly benefited from trade in palm tree timber: they exchanged four hundred gold krone-worth of salt for five thousand gold krone-worth of palm tree timber. Since, according to Olfert Dapper, the Turkish merchants mainly traded with the Georgian provinces on the coast of the Black Sea, and particularly with Samegrelo, this indicated that the Turks had mo- nopolized trade in the Black Sea and that the Europeans needed to exert immense efforts to penetrate into western Georgia.29 Olfert Dapper wrote that Georgia produced a lot of silk. There were multitudes of mulberry trees that provided food for silk worms. Therefore, Georgia sold a lot of silk to Persia. Olfert Dapper also indicated that Samegrelo and Imereti (western Georgia) were rich in gold, silver, iron and antimony. The governor of Samegrelo and King of Imereti operated mines. The governor of Samegrelo sent samples of gold and silver to Constantinople unbeknown to the Turks to trade in the future.30 Like Olfert Dapper, Nicolaas Witsen also described the state of trade in Georgia and noted that the capital city, Tbilisi, which was large and well built, was known for its silk merchants and brisk silk trade. Merchants transported a large amount of Georgian wine from Tbilisi to Armenia, Media, and Isfahan for consumption of the king. A cart of wine weighing 300 pounds31 cost only eight Guilders,32 which was the price of the best wine, while ordinary wine cost half the price of the best wine. All other food cost approximately the same price as this wine. Georgia produced a large amount of silk, but no more than half the amount the travelers wrote about. The people of this country did not treat their silk very well. They exported it to Erzurum in Turkey and the surrounding countryside where merchants mostly engaged in lead trade. Then Nicolaas Witsen recalled the words of Jean Chardin and noted that the Georgian customs and traditions were a mixture of the customs and traditions of most of the peoples who lived around them. According to Jean Chardin (and also Nicolaas Witsen), this was due to the trade they carried on with many nations and to the freedom to live according to their customs, abandoning them or protecting them, which everyone was used to in Georgia.33 Nicolaas Witsen was also interested in searching for minerals throughout the world: in Russia, Greenland, Norway, Sumatra, America, as well as in the Caucasus in general and in Georgia in particular. As researcher of Nicolaas Witsen’s activity Mrs. Marion Peters wrote in her book The Wise

28 See: O. Dapper, op. cit., p. 698. 29 See: Ibid., p. 717. 30 See: Ibid., pp. 696, 716. 31 The traditional Dutch pounds weighed about 480 grams. 32 The Dutch guilder was the currency of the Netherlands from the 17th century until 2002, when it was replaced by the euro. 33 See: N. Witsen, op. cit., pp. 627, 673, 674.

102 Volume 8 Issue 1-2 2014 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION Merchant (De wijze koopman in Dutch), Nicolaas Witsen did not give information in his book about finding a large copper deposit in Georgia. Nicolaas Witsen wrote about this information in his letter on 1 June, 1716 to his friend Gijsbert Cupper.34 He was also interested in Baku’s naphtha sources and in the asphalt layers of the Caspian Sea,35 etc. The opinions of Jan Struys about trade in the Caucasus and via the Caucasus from Europe to Asia are very interesting. In his above-mentioned book, he wrote: after being liberated from slavery, he planned to start trading and went to the Caspian Sea with a Dutch merchant. He talked to some Armenian silk merchants about trading activities in the future. They gave recommendations about which goods would be beneficial to export from the Netherlands to the Caucasus and Persia, as well as other countries of Asia. According to these merchants, tin, zinc, mercury, satin cloth, and other Dutch goods and products could be imported from Holland, which could be transported through the Caspian Sea and sold profitably in Derbent, Shemakha, and Ardabil. They thought that all the silk trade should be conducted in the Netherlands and that it would also be much better and more conve- nient to ship products to the Netherlands via the Caspian Sea, through the Volga to Arkhangelsk. They thought that it would be much cheaper and safer than a long journey entailing a large and expensive convoy or security, first overland to Smyrna (now Izmir), where the Turks demanded huge customs taxes, and then through the Mediterranean Sea suffering the losses caused by Berber robbers. They hoped that the Russian czar would demand less customs duty in order to develop and direct this profitable trade in his country. According to these merchants from Gilan, Shirvan, and other localities in the coastal areas, more than 30 thousand bales of silk could be exported every year. Moreover, the eastern shores of the Caspian Sea produced lovely chagrin skin, rhubarb, oil, saffron, salt, and many other goods.36 In addition, Jan Struys noted that merchants used to come from Europe and Asia, particularly from India, Persia, Holland, England, France, Italy, Russia, the Northern Caucasus, and Central Asia, etc. to the towns of Shemakha, Baku, Gilan, Ardebil, Tbilisi, and Isfahan for trading purposes. Further- more, there was intense trade between the Caucasian and Iranian merchant of these cities.37 As we can see, in the 17th century, the Caucasus still had quite a large trade potential, while local and foreign merchants carried out intensified trade through their market towns. At that time, there was still a new trade route from the Caucasus to the Caspian Sea, the Volga, and then overland to Archangelsk, and finally by sea to Europe, so merchants were able to utilize this road. This road was less dangerous, less time was needed, and it was cheaper than the old road through Turkey and the Mediterranean Sea, or from Persia through the Indian and then the Atlantic Ocean to bypass Africa. At that time, there was stiff competition on the merchants’ sea routes among Spanish, Portuguese, and Dutch merchants. The tough competition on the trade routes forced European merchants to seek new markets and trade routes. As mentioned above, the routes through Turkey and the Mediterranean Sea were very expensive and dangerous. As for the new trade route through Russia, from the beginning there was stiff competition with British merchants and especially with Armenian merchants, who had been granted special privileges by the Russian czar. This was why the European business circles began looking for a new trade route through the Caucasus and through Shirvan and Georgia in particular, then through Black Sea to Poland. Therefore, the European scholars and travelers began intensively studying the Caucasian countries. However, for various reasons, this goal did not materialize. The main reason was the political situation in the Caucasus. Persia controlled the eastern part of the Caucasus. Georgia was divided into small states and principalities; eastern Georgia was under the control of Persia, while western Georgia was under

34 See: M. Greshoff, Nicolaas Witsen als maecenas, Uitgeverij H.D.Tjeenk&Zoon, Haarlem, 1909, p. 21. 35 See: M. Peters, De wijze koopman, Uitgeverij Bert Bakker, Amsterdam, 2010, p. 139. 36 See: J. Struys, op. cit. 37 See: Ibid., pp. 340, 363-364; The Voyage of Jean Chardin in Persia and other Eastern Countries (information about Georgia), pp. 322, 325.

Volume 8 Issue 1-2 2014 103 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION the control of Turkey. After describing Georgia’s problems, Olfert Dapper offered the Georgians a way to resolve the main problem of restoring the country’s national unity: if they united their country and appointed a decent government, their problems would melt like snow in the sun.38 Unfortunately, Olfert Dapper’s advice to the Georgians remained only advice, and the political situation not only in Georgia, but in the whole of the Caucasus did not improve. On the contrary, the situation became even more complicated in the next century, because its northern neighbor, Russia, became involved in the fight to redivide the Caucasus. So the restoration of the trade road from Europe to Asia through the region and the international involvement of this region in intense trade were postponed to the distant future. It should be noted that in the 17th century the activity of the Euro- pean scholars and travelers, and of the Dutch scholars and travelers in particular, in the Caucasus did not achieve economic results (the conquest of the economic markets of the Caucasian countries and the restoration of ancient silk route from Europe to Asia through the Caucasus), but their activities were very useful from both the social and cultural viewpoint. It is known that these works of Dutch scholars and travelers were translated into many European languages, and these publications helped to better acquaint Europeans with the Caucasus and Caucasians, as well as with their history, culture, and political situation, etc. Also their publications contain a lot of interesting information about the Caucasus and Caucasian people. Their works have not yet been fully investigated and will help to shed light on the history of the Caucasian nations.

About the Sources of Works of Dutch Scientists and Travelers

It is very interesting to see what sources Olfert Dapper, Jan Struys, and Nicolaas Witsen used in their works to describe the Caucasian region, the countries located in the region, and their people, history, culture, political and economic situation, etc. It should be noted that Olfert Dapper never traveled to the exotic destinations he wrote about in his books.39 Olfert Dapper used more works of ancient Greeks, Latin, as well as Armenian, British, Dutch, German, Italian (also works of the Catholic missionaries), French, Portuguese, Spanish, and other historians, and the works of Catholic missionaries, in the Caucasian part of his book. He obtained material from his colleagues Isaac Vossius and Samuel Blommaert, who often traveled around the world. Olfert Dapper used ancient Greek and Roman sources to describe the geographic area and origin of the Caucasian countries, as well as late mediaeval and modern research works to describe the political and economic situation. From the ancient Greek sources, Olfert Dapper used the works of Aristotle, Arrian of Nicomedia, Claudius Ptolemaeus, Elianus Claudius, Herodotus, Plutarch, and Strabo. From among the ancient Roman authors, Olfert Dapper used the works of Gaius Plinius Se- cundus, Jordanes, also written Jordanis, and Procopius of Caesarea. The author also used the works of Armenian geographer Anania Shirakatsi. He used the work of British Geoffrey of Monmouth. From the Dutch scholars and travelers, he used the works of Clüver Philipp, Johan van Kootwijk, Zwart, also he received information from Isaac Vossius and Samuel Blommaert. From German authors he used the works of Georgius Agricola and Adam Olearius. He also used the works of French oriental- ist De A. Theuet. It is interesting that Olfert Dapper used not only Italian traveler (Pietro della Valle, Soranzo Lazaro, Georg Interiano, Paolo Giovio etc.), but also Italian missionary writings (Arcangelo Lamberti and others). They lived a long time in the Caucasus, mostly in Georgia in particular. He also

38 See: O. Dapper, op. cit., p. 703. 39 [http://nl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Olfert_Dapper].

104 Volume 8 Issue 1-2 2014 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION referred to the works of Portuguese merchant Pedro Teixeira, Spanish Cristóbal Suárez de Figueroa, and others. The above-mentioned publication of Olfert Dapper was an important source for Nicolaas Wit- sen’s work Noord en Oost Tartarye. In addition to the above-mentioned sources, Nicolaas Witsen also used other sources for the Caucasian part (including Georgian part) of his book, namely, works by French scholar Jean Chardin, as well as works by Robbe Jacques, Nicolas Sanson, and Jean- Baptiste Tavernier, often quoted by Nicolaas Witsen and Jean Chardin. He also used the works of Flemish scholars: Andreas Masius, Abraham Ortelius, and William of Rubruck, Portuguese Antoine de Gouveia, Englishman Sir Paul Rycaut, Arab Abu Ali al-Hasan ibn al-Haytham, and an Italian merchant traveler Marco Polo. Researchers still doubt whether he had ever been to the Caucasus. Nicolaas Witsen’s biographer, Johan Fredrik Gebhard, claims in his book The Life of Mr. Cornelisz Nicolaas40 that Nicolaas Witsen was never in Russia or the regions of the country a second time. Nicolaas Witsen was only in Russia in 1664—1665. However, he also presents an extract from a book by Jacobus Scheltema (Russia and the Netherlands), 41 where he notes that Nicolaas Witsen stayed in Russia during his first trip until 1667 (and not until 1665, as Johan Fredrik Gebhard wrote). The first time he traveled to the eastern and northern provinces of Russia and then to the Caspian Sea. In the above-mentioned book, Johan Fredrik Gebhard gives another opinion: namely, according to Johannes Bodel Nijenhuis, Nicolaas Witsen traveled for the second time to Russia in 1667. By the way, Jacobus Scheltema thought that the long and “frequent” travels of Nicolaas Witsen to Russia and to the East were quite natural, because Nicolaas Witsen’s family was engaged in lively trade with Russia and Persia throughout most of the 17th century. In addition, Nicolaas Witsen’s brother Cornelius was busy in active trade in Persia, and he was also the first consul in Aleppo. Besides the family relations between the brothers, they also had close business ties. In addition to the trade in Persia, Cornelius Witsen had trading relations with other countries in the East. As a result, it was possible that the brothers frequently traveled to Russia and the Eastern countries. However, the considerations of Jacobus Scheltema and Bodel Nijenhuis about a long and “frequent” travels are not shared by Johan Fredrik Gebhard. Because, according to Johan Fredrik Gebhard, Jacobus Scheltema and Bodel Nijenhuis did not give any specific arguments to confirm their opinions in their works, they only gave private considerations. Johan Fredrik Gebhard noted that Nicolaas Witsen acquired a lot of information about Russia and other regions from his many correspondents. Also Georgian writer M. Kekelidze wrote in his book Seekers of Bright Stars42 that Nicolaas Witsen had been in Georgia in 1661, on his return from Persia to Russia via Georgia. He stayed in Tbilisi for two weeks. Also Ossetian historians M. Isaev and V. Abaev noted in their work Some Problems of the Old History of Ossetia43 that Nicolaas Witsen traveled at the end of the 17th century in the Caucasus. In addition, a scientist from Israel, Irena Vladimirsky, wrote in her work General Overview. Countries: Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan44 that Nicolaas Witsen traveled in the Cau- casus in 1690. Indeed, Georgian historian and ethnographer J. Wateishvili wrote in his fundamental work Georgia and European Countries45 that Olfert Dapper had been in Georgia. As we can see, the reality about the travels of the Dutch scholars in 17th-18th centuries in the Caucasus and Georgia is still controversial. To confirm the impressions gained from his journey, Jan Struys often referred to

40 See: J.F. Gebhard, Het leven Mr. Nicolaas Cornelisz Witsen (1641-1717), Utrecht, 1881, pp. 43-45. 41 See: J. Scheltema, Rusland en de Nederlanden, Amsterdam, 1817, I deel, p. 76; II deel, pp. 67-68. 42 See: M. Kekelidze, Seekers of Bright Stars, Tbilisi, 1962, pp. 261-266 (in Georgian). 43 See: M. Isaev, V. Abaev. “Some of the Problems of the Old History of Ossetia,” available at [http://kvkz.ru/history]. 44 See: I. Vladimirsky, “General Overview. Countries: Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan,” available at [http://www. achva.ac.il/]. 45 See: J. Wateishvili, Georgia and European Countries. Essays on the History Interrelation. 12th-19th Centuries, Vol. I, Book 2, Moscow, 2003, p. 341 (in Russian).

Volume 8 Issue 1-2 2014 105 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION the work of Adam Olearius. The positive aspect of his work is that he himself traveled to the Cauca- sus and the Caspian countries in particular.

Conclusion

So, as we can see, Dutch economic development in the Golden Age (the 17th century), the intense competition of the world sea-trade routes, and the unsuccessful attempt to explore the sea route from Europe to Southeast Asia via the Arctic Ocean contributed to the interest of Dutch scholars in researching the possibility of restoring the oldest trade-transit route through the Caucasus in general and Georgia in particular. This required physical and geographical research of this region, as well as of the history, culture, and economic and political situation. Olfert Dapper, Nicolaas Witsen, and Jan Struys did much to promote this. Their publications contain a lot of interesting information about the Caucasus and Caucasian people in general and about Georgia and the Georgians in particular. Despite the attempts by Europeans researchers, including Dutch scholars and travelers, it has been impossible to restore the ancient trade route from Europe to Asia through the Caucasus. The confrontation between Turkey and Persia aimed at conquering the countries of this region thwarted this endeavor. In addition, the Caucasian states, including Georgia, were fragmented into small king- doms and principalities and were economically and politically too weak. Later, Russia was also involved in this battle between Turkey and Persia, so this goal had to be postponed until the distant future. Another important goal of the European, including Dutch, scholars and travelers was to investigate and then exploit the Caucasian countries’ market-trade potential (especially regarding silk). However, this goal was not fully implemented, although local Armenian, Azeri, and Georgian merchants made the effort to ensure that Caucasian silk still reached the European market. With the help of their activity and trade links, Baku, Tbilisi, and Shemakha became important trading cities, which also attracted foreign merchants. Thus, despite the political difficulties in the region, in the 17th century, the Caucasian countries tried to participate in international trade. The works of Dutch scholars and travelers have not yet been fully investigated. The continuation and expansion of this research will help to shed more light on the history of the Caucasus in general and Georgia in particular, as well as on the history of the relations between the Caucasian countries and the Netherlands.

106 Volume 8 Issue 1-2 2014 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

GEOHISTORY

Rizvan HUSEYNOV

Researcher at the Human Rights Institute, National Academy of Sciences of Azerbaijan (Baku, Azerbaijan).

A MEDIEVAL ARMENIAN SOURCE ON THE HISTORY OF THE CAUCASUS AS ANALYZED BY JEAN SAINT-MARTIN

Abstract

his article is an attempt to clarify some certain medieval Armenian manuscripts that of the remaining riddles in the history of found their way to Europe, at least some of T the Christian peoples of the Central them cannot be treated as reliable historical Caucasus using scholarly publications of Eu- sources. Today, much of what the European ropean students of the Caucasus of the 18th historians wrote at one time has been forgot- and 19th centuries as the starting point. The ten, giving way to numerous articles and author concentrates on the Christian princely books on the history of the Caucasus that cite families and the ruling Turkic dynasties that historical sources of dubious provenance figured prominently in medieval Azerbaijan without taking the trouble to critically analyze and Armenia; he relies on the very critical them. The author attempts to remind the aca- comments of European historians of ancient demic community of what European students Armenian sources on the history of the Cau- of the Caucasus wrote some 200 or even 300 casus. According to European students of years ago regarding the extremely unreliable the Caucasus who spent much time studying Armenian manuscripts. Volume 8 Issue 1-2 2014 107 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

KEYWORDS: Christianity, Turks, the Caucasus, Azerbaijan, Armenia, historical sources.

Introduction

The Center for the History of the Caucasus at the Institute of Social and Political Studies AZER- GLOBE has produced a Russian translation of the second volume of Mémoires historiques et géographiques sur l’Arménie, suivis du texte Arménien de l’histoire des princes Orpélians written by prominent French historian Antoine-Jean Saint-Martin and published in Paris in 1819.1 Jean Saint-Martin (1791-1832), who wrote extensively on the history of the Caucasus, Eastern Christianity, and medieval Armenian manuscripts, is a reliable and frequently quoted source. My care- ful studies of the two volumes of his Mémoires historiques revealed huge gaps between what the original said about the Armenian manuscripts and how Armenian authors interpret this today. The heritage of Christian Turks of the Central Caucasus is an exceptionally interesting yet little studied subject.

Lost Pages of the History of the Turkic Christian Clans of the Central Caucasus

Today, European, Russian, to say nothing of Armenian scholars, are using all sorts of tricks to pass over in silence the Turkic roots of many medieval clans and families. This is true of the princely house of Orbeliani-Orbelianovs, the roots of which are commonly traced back to “China, from where they moved to Georgia.” The authors normally forget to say that “China” was Altai, the homeland of the Turks and an area populated by the tribes of Kara-Kitays (Kidan), rulers of the medieval powers in Central Asia. The history of the Christian Turks (Nestorians, Paulicians, Gregorians, and others), their spiritual and historical heritage, and the huge role they played in the history of Eurasia from China to Europe, from India and Iran to Egypt, and from Asia Minor and the Caucasus to Russia remains little studied. Today, the heritage of the Christian Turks in the Caucasus and Asia Minor has been Armenian- ized for the simple reason that most of the cathedrals and monasteries, along with valuable manuscripts, holy texts, and monuments, were appropriated by the Armenian Church. The History of the Princes of Orpélian makes it absolutely clear that the princes and the local people in general long followed Monothelitism rooted in Byzantium. It differed from Roman and Or- thodox Christianity, Gregorian Monophysitism, and other confessions.2 Himself an active Monothelite, Étienne Orpélian, as the Archbishop of Siounie, strengthened his influence, thus fanning opposition of the Armenian top clergy members who disapproved of Monothelitism. In an effort to overcome their opposition, the Archbishop turned to Argun Khan, a powerful emperor of Mongolia and Persia for a

1 See: J. Saint-Martin, Mémoires historiques et géographiques sur l’Arménie, suivis du texte Arménien de l’histoire des princes Orpélians, Vol. 2, Imprimerie Royale, Paris, 1819. 2 Monothelitism (from Greek μόνος—the only one and θέλημα, meaning will) is a Christological doctrine which formulated in the 7th century in Byzantium to unite, on a common faith, the parties of Miaphysites (anti-Chalcedonites) and Dyothelites (Chalcedonites) which opposed each other in the Universal Church. Monothelitism professed one will and two natures in the person of Jesus. Emperor of Byzantium Heraclius invited the Armenian Apostolic Church to embrace Monothe- litism which it did in 633.

108 Volume 8 Issue 1-2 2014 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION document confirming his status in the Church; the emperor complied.3 This confrontation is explained by the fact that most of Armenian clergy em- braced the postulates of the Roman Catholic Church, which was at dag- gers drawn with Byzantium, inclined toward Monothelitism.4 Aggrieved, Étienne Orpélian wrote: “The Fall from grace that hit Armenia limited its contacts with the faith of their fathers.”5 We know nothing about his life, however we know that “he died in 753 of the Armenian era or 1304 A.D. He was succeeded by his nephew Jean, son of Libarid, whom he also raised.”6 Étienne Orpélian wrote about the Ildighizes of Azerbaijan who lived in the “land of fires” (“pays aux flames”) and ruled vast territories in the Caucasus and Asia Minor, including Armenia. He referred, in particular, to the time of atabek of Azerbaijan Schams-eddin Ildighiz.7 Saint-Martin pointed to an interesting detail—some of the Armenians objected to or even rejected the works of Étienne Orpélian and other Armenian authors. Their texts, adjusted to Armenian preferences, were published in Madras (India) in 1775 on the initiative of Catholicos of All Armenians Patriarch Simeon in the print shop of a rich merchant, Jacques Shamiryan, who was born in New Julfa not far from Isfahan. Earlier, in 1772, he published a small book by Armenian authors and called on them to join forces to publish a concise history and geography of Armenia. Real scholars preferred to ignore these “works” and never trusted those who had written them: it turned out that many events, facts, and life stories of prominent people were stolen from the history of Georgia and the Tatars (Azeris). In other words, Catholicos Simeon and his sponsor Shamiryan, as well as those who invented the history of Armenia and decorated it with bits and pieces of the history of Georgia and the Turks, were nothing but frauds in the eyes of true scholars. Jean Saint-Martin pointed out that “despite their efforts, this edition is brimming with gaps and errors, which we correct (“cette édition contient un grand nombre de fautes que nous avons corri- gées”) before appraising its value or plausibility… We cannot see the manuscript in order to remove the blemishes (“les taches”) of the Madras edition.”8 The French historian believed that a copy of the History of Orpélian could be found in a library in Germany; at least one of them was found in 1717 in the cell of Jean Acoluthus, a professor from Breslau. He knew a little Armenian, which allowed him to collect several Armenian books, the History of Orpélian among them. “Its parts were later

3 See: J. Saint-Martin, op. cit., p. 5. 4 See:Ibidem. 5 Ibid., p. 6. 6 Ibid., p. 8. 7 See:Ibid., p. 10. 8 Ibid., p. 12.

Volume 8 Issue 1-2 2014 109 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION translated into Latin by a certain M.V. de La Croze and published with other bits from the same book related to the Tatars.”9 In 1810, Excerpta ex libro Stephani, Synenis archiepiscopi, scripto sub finem saculi XIII, cui titules est: Badmuthiun Orbeleanzz, Historia Satraparum Orbelensium, inmajore Armenia, a patchwork of the Latin version was published in St. Petersburg.10 The first and unique handbook (cahier) contained a certain amount of information related to the Orient, which M. Jules de Klaproth suggested to be published under the title Archiv für asiatische Litteratur, geschichte und sprachkunde.11 This means that in the 1770s, Catholicos Simeon and merchant Shamiryan, when publishing works about Armenia, deliberately left out the chapters on the History of Orpélian translated by de La Croze and Théophile Bayer, which, according to Saint-Martin, “tied the narration together and were therefore of great importance for the publication of the History of Orpélian.”12 In this way, at the turn of the 19th century, the Armenians falsified the history of other nations to knock together “ancient Armenian” historical sources that today Armenian, European, and Russian authors consider authentic, which is highly regrettable.

On the Works of Movses Khorenatsi, “Father of Armenian History”

In his Mémoires historiques et géographiques sur l’Arménie, Jean Saint-Martin paid special attention to the personality and the works ascribed to “father of Armenian history” Movses Khore- natsi (Moyse de Khoren), who lived in the 5th century; Saint-Martin translated them and supplied commentaries. None of the Armenian translators gave a correct rendition, to say the least: they deliberately mistranslated his works and even their titles; his Patmutyun Hayots (History of the Hayots) was offered to the reader as History of the Armenians. This was done to conceal the true history of the Armenians and their true self-name: indeed, even historians, to say nothing of trusting readers, are aware of how the Armenians differ from the Hayots. The self-name of the contemporary Armenians is Hayot and their country is Hayastan, which has nothing in common with ancient Armenian culture, history, or geography. This explains why for many years Armenian authors have been skillfully falsifying and appropriating the cultural and historical heritage of various ancient (now extinct) peoples completely unrelated to the Hayots who, driven by historical circumstances, moved from the Balkans to Asia Minor and further on to the Caucasus. The second volume of Mémoires historiques reveals a huge number of distortions, discrepancies, and falsifications in the works ascribed to Movses Khorenatsi. Here I have in mind his geographical composition called Ashkharatsuyts (Աշխարհացույց), literally translated from the Armenian as “Pic- ture of the World.” Its French translation can be found in the second volume of Saint-Martin’s Mé- moires historiques.13 In his introductory article (“Mémoire sur l’époque de la composition De la Géographie attribuée à Moyse de Khoren”), Jean Saint-Martin demonstrated that Movses Khorenatsi’s Geography14 contained a vast body of information, geographical names, and words that could not be

9 “Thesaurus epistolicus Lacrozianus,” Vol. III, pp. 5, 6 and 11-14,” in: J. Saint-Martin, op. cit., p. 13. 10 See: Excerpta ex libro Stephani, Synenis archiepiscopi, scripto sub finem saculi XIII, cui titules est: Badmuthiun Orbeleanzz, Historia Satraparum Orbelensium, in majore Armenia; a M.V. LACROZIO, BAERO Transmissa, Archiv für asiatische Litteratur, geschichte und sprachkunde, erster band, in-4°, 1810, pp. 114-119 (Bavarian State Library). 11 See: Ibid., pp. 114-118. 12 J. Saint-Martin, op. cit., p. 13. 13 See: Ibid., pp. 301-394. 14 See: Ibidem.

110 Volume 8 Issue 1-2 2014 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION known to someone who lived and worked before the 10th century, which means that the book could not have been written in the 5th century. The above suggests that the book allegedly written by Movses Khorenatsi was a joint product of several generations of Armenian hoaxers15; the Mechitarists (the members of an order founded by Abbot Mekhitar of Sebaste in 1701; in 1717 they migrated to Venice and the island of San Lazzaro; at a later date, the order split into two parts, one of them moving to Vienna where it still functions today) made their contribution to the common effort. The order, engaged in publishing, never hesi- tated to distort historical facts to create a history of Armenia out of numerous compilations, falsifications, and quotations from authors of antiquity adjusted to look like old Armenian compositions. They served the Vatican and helped to promote its influence in the Near East.16 The Mechitarists retreated under the pressure of Jean Saint-Martin’s revelations. In 1843, they issued another version of Movses Khorenatsi’s Geography free from a larger part of previous falsifications. This book, however, still left much room for doubts about its authenticity: the author, who lived in the 5th century, could not have referred to Cosmas Indicopleustes, who lived in the 6th century, and could not have mentioned events that took place even later. The arguments supplied by Jean Saint-Martin were accepted (partially) by Armenian researcher Kerope Patkanov in the Introduction to his translation of Ashkharatsuyts.17 Patkanov agreed with the French scholar on many points; from that time on the works of Movses Khorenatsi were no longer regarded as a serious historical source. To become finally convinced that those who used his name to write Patmutyun Hayots distorted the initial version, it is enough to read the first Russian translation of Movses Khorenatsi’s work by Armenian Archdeacon Iosif Ioannes in 1809.18 Here is what Saint-Martin wrote in the second volume of his Mémoires historiques about the personalities and works of Armenian public figures and chroniclers, including Movses Khorenatsi. He insisted, in particular, that after studying Khorenatsi’s work in detail he concluded that it had appeared much later than the 5th century.19 In fact, the French historian ascribed the work to a translator from the Armenian (le translateur Arménien); he doubted that it had been written by Movses Khore- natsi himself because he discovered in his book several chapters borrowed from different ancient books: much was taken from Ptolemy’s Geography.20 What is more, they were borrowed not from the original, but from other sources that merely referred to them. Jean Saint-Martin presupposed that the work ascribed to Movses Khorenatsi had been written by an Armenian translator born in Gaul, who was a local Frank. “The Armenian translator placed the Franks with the Gaulles. If we presuppose that the translator was Movses Khorenatsi himself we can say that he wrote about Franks as living in Gaulle while the Gaulles had not been powerful enough to be known in Armenia in 460” (“Le traducteur Arménier place les Francs dans les Gaules. En sup- posant que ce traducteur soit Moyse de Khoren, il se pourroit à la rigueur qu’il eût parle des Francs comme habitans de la Gaule, quoiqu’ils n’y fussent pas encore bien puissans en l’an 460; ce qui rend difficile de croire qu’on ait pu les connoître alors en Arménie”).21

15 See: “Supplement to the Home Setting of A. Arzumanian on the history of Erevan, Armenia, and Christianity in the Southern Caucasus,” Regnum.ru, 31 December, 2011, available in Russian at [www.regnum.ru/news/fd-abroad/azeri/analit- ics/1485569.html]. 16 See: Sovetskaia istoricheskaia entsiklopedia, ed. by E.M. Zhukov, Sovetskaia entsiklopedia, Moscow, 1973-1982. 17 See: Armianskaia geografia VII veka po R.Ch. (Pripisyvavshayasia Moiseiu Khorenskomu), Transl. by K.P. Patkanov, Print shop of the Imperial Academy of Sciences, V.O., St. Petersburg, 9 sheets, No. 12, 1877. 18 See: Armenskaia istoria, sochinennaia Moiseem Khorenskim s kratkim geograficheskim opisaniem drevney Armenii, perevedennaia na russkiy iazyk arkhidiakonom Iosifom Ioannesom, St. Petersburg, 1809. 19 See: J. Saint-Martin, op. cit., p. 302. 20 See: Ibid., pp. 304-305. 21 Ibid., p. 305.

Volume 8 Issue 1-2 2014 111 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION The French historian pointed out that Movses Khorenatsi, who lived in the 5th century, could have hardly known a lot about Gaul (the old name of western and southern part of Europe) and the Franks who lived there. In the same way, the later translator (or author of Khorenatsi’s work) could have hardly known anything about far-away Armenia (“un pays très-eloigné de la Gaule”). This brought Saint-Martin to the inevitable conclusion that this had been added later to the work ascribed to Movses Khorenatsi—one more confirmation that this book (at least, all of it) is neither authentic, nor ancient. The term “Russians” used in the book stirred up even more doubts about the authorship and authenticity. There were no Russians in the 5th century. And living in the 5th century Movses Khorenatsi could not have known either Franks or Russians. Medieval sources wrote about the Rus. The term “Rus” (but not “Russian”) first appeared in the 10th century in the stories about their attacks on Constantinople, the Black Sea and Caspian coasts, and the Caucasus. For obvious reasons, Movses Khorenatsi could not have written about something that took place five centuries after his death. The fact that Movses Khorenatsi used fragments from the works of medieval Arab historians who lived some five to seven centuries later is even more baffling. The French author pointed out that Khore- natsi borrowed Arab quotes together with (misspelt) names of rivers and settlements; this means that Khorenatsi knew Turkic toponyms which appeared, according to Saint Martin, many years after his death. “I think,” wrote Saint-Martin, “that this geographic name could have been used by the indigenous population of the south of Russia and could have been borrowed by the Tatars. Nothing suggests, however, that it was not used by the Rus at the time when the Geography, of which I write here, had been already written” (Je crois donc que ce nom peut avoir été autrefois en usage chez les indigènes de la Russie méridionale, qui l’auront peut-être reçu des Tartares. Rien ne s’oppose reaisonnablement à ce qu’il fût en usage chez le Russes au temps où la géographie qui nous occupé a été composée).22 Indeed, Movses Khorenatsi called Tauric Chersonese “Khrim” or Crimea (Crimée), a geographic name unknown in the 5th century. “There is no doubt that this name, derived from ancient Cimmeria, was borrowed at a later period.”23 The French researcher pointed to another later addition to the work ascribed to Movses Khore- natsi: he wrote about the Christians converted by Rome in Sarmatia (the ancient name of Eastern Europe and the Black Sea coastal area). Jean Saint-Martin pointed out that during Movses Khore- natsi’s lifetime neither Sarmatia nor Taurida (as its part) belonged to the Roman Empire. “This makes their conversion to Christianity doubtful,” wrote the French author, “this could have happened later… The Russians had not converted to Christianity by 986: before that date Taurida was the only Christian region in the north. This means that the book was written in 950.”24 Even this date cannot be accepted since by the 10th century there was no Gaulle. Movses Khorenatsi wrote about the peoples of Asian Sarmatia and mentioned Shirvan when writing about those who lived in the Caucasian mountains. Jean Saint-Martin found it strange that when writing about Shirvan, the author, who allegedly lived in the 5th century, supplied information that appeared much later: “The name Shirvan, currently applied to ancient Albania, came into use only at the time of Persian King Khosrau Anushirvan, that is, in the mid-6th century.” Saint-Martin further wrote that “so-called Moyse de Khoren” had lost his bearings in geographical names and used those unknown in the 5th century. Jean Saint-Martin pointed to one more blunder of the Armenian author: when writing about the locality in Armenia (today not far from Erzincan in Turkey), he had called it Sadakkh (in Armenian territory). In fact, there was no Armenia there in the 5th century, while the locality was called Ardsh- kkh (Artash). According to the History of Daron by Jean, Bishop of Mamigoneans,25 this place got its

22 Ibid., p. 308. 23 Ibid., p. 309. 24 Ibid., p. 310 (here and hereafter italics in the quotations are mine.—R.H.). 25 Jean, évêque des Mamigonéans, Historie de Daron, Ch. VII, pag. 10, suppl. édition de Constantinopole, 1719 (see: J. Saint-Martin, op. cit., p. 311, footnote).

112 Volume 8 Issue 1-2 2014 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION name several centuries later. Born in Daron (Taron), Movses Khorenatsi should have had known better what his homeland was called. When writing about the locality named Arabic Petreya (it called itself Hijjaz: the environs of Mecca, Medina, and other Arabian areas), the Armenian author said that it was the place where the Prophet Abraham (Ibrahim) had lived and even cited certain facts. Jean Saint-Martin commented, with good reason, that in the 5th century or even much later, the peoples living nearby (let alone the Christian world) knew nothing about the life and deeds of the Prophet Abraham. This all became known only when the local peoples acquired the Koran in the 7th century. Before that, only the local people knew about the Prophet Abraham living in Mecca and its environs. The Christian world learned about this much later, when the Koran was translated into other languages. This means that those Armenian authors who wrote under the name of Movses Khorenatsi had borrowed facts related to the Prophet Abraham from medieval Muslim authors and ascribed them to Movses Khorenatsi, who lived several centuries before Islam. The French author detected another absurdity: “When writing about Babylon, so-called Movses Khorenatsi mentioned Basra (a city in Iraq.—R.H.), which could not have appeared before Islam.”26 This means that Movses Khorenatsi wrote about Basra two hundred years before the city was set up when Islam spread far and wide and the Arabian Caliphate appeared. “M. de Sainte-Croix (another French author.—R.H.) detected the same fault and pointed out that the fact that Basra was mentioned in this ‘Geography of Armenia’ suggested that it was not written by Movses Khorenatsi. Neither Sainte-Croix, nor any other author pointed out that the same paragraph mentioned another city also founded when the Muslim faith appeared. This was Kufa built after the capture of Madain, the capital of the Persian Empire in 17 AH (A.D. 638).”27 This means that Movses Khorenatsi mentioned Basra and Kufa, both founded at the time of the Arabian Caliphate, that is, several centuries after his death.

Irevan and Azerbaijan in the Works of Movses Khorenatsi

Much of what the Armenian geographer wrote in his book did not happen or appear on the map of the world until at least the 10th or 11th centuries, which means that he could not have known about them and, therefore, could not have written the book. In fact, Jean Saint-Martin doubted even this later date because the Geography mentions events and geographical names related to an even later period. For example, Movses Khorenatsi, who lived in the 5th century, described the city of Revan (Rhovan) built by Azeri potentates in the 16th century. Amazed by this obvious blunder, the French researcher wrote: “I have also noted in Khorenatsi’s Geography that he mentioned Rhovan, one of the regions of Azerbaijan, which was probably Revan. This is the Muslim name of that part of Armenia of which Erivan was the capital and which, at all times, was part of Azerbaijan ruled by Muslims.”28 This means that Jean Saint-Martin and his con- temporaries knew that the fortress-city of Revan (Irevan) had been built by Muslim Turks and that “at all times, it was part of Azerbaijan” (“fit toujours partie de l’Aderbaïdjan”). These authors never mentioned the old Armenian city of Erebuni-Erevan for the simple reason that it belongs to an Arme- nian myth invented in the mid-20th century. In the Middle Ages, the territory of what is now Armenia was called Chukhursaad, one of the four dominions of the Safavides, an Azeri dynasty. In 1504, Shah Ismail I ordered his military leader

26 J. Saint-Martin, op. cit., p. 312. 27 Journal des Savans, 1789, Avril, pag. 217 eisuiv (see: J. Saint-Martin, op. cit., p. 313). 28 J. Saint-Martin, op. cit., pp. 314-315 (footnote).

Volume 8 Issue 1-2 2014 113 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION Revangulu Khan to build a fortress in this territory. Seven years later, the fortress built on the high rocky bank in the southeast part of the Zanga River (which the Armenians now call Hrazdan) was named Revan in honor of Revangulu Khan; after a while the pronunciation slipped to Irevan (due to the phonetic specifics of the Turkic languages, which often use the vowel “i” before the consonant “r”). In the course of time, the fortress became widely known across the Orient as a city of minarets: there were 8 mosques in the city and 800 houses; its population was exclusively Azeri. The Erivan fortress was the administrative and political center of the Erivan Khanate and a symbol of its power for 300 years until czarist Russia started moving into the Caucasus; this triggered several bloody wars between the Russian, Ottoman, and Persian empires, each seeking domination in the region. For twenty-three years, Russian troops tried in vain to capture the strategically important Erivan fortress on the border of the Ottoman and Persian empires. In October 1827, it took several bloody battles for a 12-thousand-strong Russian army under General Paskevich to capture the fortress, but they did not destroy it. Even after the khanate was abolished, the fortress remained the heart and main attraction of the Armenian Region and, later, of the Erivan Gubernia, and was partly damaged by the earthquake of 1864. In the 1920s, the Armenian authorities, resolved to demolish what remained after the earthquake, removed the sardar palace, mosques, bathhouses, and everything that testified to the city’s Muslim past. The walls, which looked very much like the walls of the Baku Fortress, were gradually razed to the ground, the cemeteries disappeared, and the names of the city’s quarters were changed. The Ar- menian Soviet Socialist Republic set up on Azeri lands completed the destruction of the fortress and the monuments of medieval Azeri architecture. In 1936, when the last traces of the city’s Muslim past had been removed, the city acquired its new name, Erevan. This destroyed the memory of those who had built the city and who lived in this jewel of Azeri and Muslim culture. The Armenians did not think twice about removing the unique and amazingly beautiful palace of the Erivan khans (sardars) where, in 1827, the exiled Decembrists first performed Gore ot Uma (Woe from Wit), a play written by Alexander Griboyedov (Russian Ambassador to Persia), before the author.29 It was in the 1960s, when the last traces of the Erivan Fortress had finally disappeared, that the Armenians put the myth of Erebuni-Erevan allegedly founded in 782 B.C. into circulation. The idea was born in the 1950s when Soviet archeologists discovered (at a more or less great distance from Erevan) remnants of an Urartu fortress and a clay tablet with a cuneiform inscription deciphered as RBN. Enthusiastic Armenians went even further: RBN was interpreted as Erebuni (Erevan), which invited a lot of criticism from prominent Soviet and foreign historians, including those who had taken part in the diggings. In 1968, the leaders of the Armenian S.S.R., having pushed aside all the objections and the fact that until the early 16th century the Erivan Fortress was not mentioned in historical and archival sources, celebrated the 2750th anniversary of Erevan.30 The fortress and the buildings inside it looked very much like Icheri Shekher in Baku, the khan palaces in Sheki and Shusha (now occupied by the Armenians, who have practically destroyed the Shusha palace). These and a multitude of other architectural monuments, including the Erivan Fortress, bear witness to the territorial scope of the Azeri Medieval culture, something which the Armenians cannot accept. This explains why they completely destroyed the historical center of their capital. Today, unlike many other ancient cities that have preserved their architectural heritage and are justly proud of it (Moscow, Tbilisi, and Baku can serve as pertinent examples), Erevan has nothing to show off. Jean Saint-Martin rightly noted that the world learned about Movses Khorenatsi and his works as late as the 17th century, when bits and pieces of his writings appeared in Armenian in Livre de Géographie et de Fables, ou Livre du Renard published in 1683 in Marseille (France).31

29 See: “Rizvan Huseynov: V pomoshch stroiteliam Erevana,” IA Regnum, 20 February, 2012. 30 See: “V Azerbaidzhane ubezhdeny, chto Erevan osnovan azerbaidzhanskimi khanami—FOTO,” Regnum.ru, 24 De- cember, 2011. 31 See: Livre de Géographie et de Fables, ou Livre du Renard (see: J. Saint-Martin, op. cit., pp. 315-316).

114 Volume 8 Issue 1-2 2014 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION This means that the work allegedly written in the 5th century became widely known in the 17th century, a fact that raises doubts about its date and authenticity. It seems that the scholarly community of Europe did not have much trust in Khorenatsi’s information—otherwise it would not have appeared in the “livre de fables” (collection of myths). It was much later that so-called Armenian scholars distorted and twisted Movses Khorenatsi’s original texts to raise them to the rank of “reliable historical sources” and elevate the author to the rank of “father of Armenian history.” Jean Saint-Martin had the following to say about the Marseille edition: “The translation was very careless and based on a bad manuscript; it abounds in misspelt geographical names. In 1736, the Whiston brothers reprinted the book in London together with its Latin version to complement the ‘History’ of Movses Khorenatsi. It was abridged and largely followed the Marseille version without corrections (“sans y fair le moindre correction”). It is very hard to understand, especially at the beginning where the Armenian language could not clarify the astronomical and mathematical details: it seems that the Armenian translator himself was very vague about them ... the errors are numerous and gross (nombreuses et grossières) so there is not much sense in trying to correct them… (“que se seroit perdre son temps que de les remarquer”). We know nothing about the manuscript except the fact that it was written by an Armenian” (“Nous n’en connoissons aucun manuscript: seulment, dans le manuscript Arménien”).32 From this it follows that the manuscript ascribed to Movses Khorenatsi was not an original. It was either an illiterate fake or a later translation from the Armenian done by who knows who and who knows when. Jean Saint-Martin wrote further: “The Geography ascribed to Movses Khorenatsi published in Marseille (pp. 61-71) contains information about the routes to Tovin (Dvin.—R.H.)... It seems that the work ascribed to Movses Khorenatsi was compiled in the 9th or 10th century when Tovin was the capital of Armenia. These fragments are even more careless and are brimming with errors.”33

Movses Khorenatsi on the Localization of Azerbaijan and “Geographic Armenias”

Movses Khorenatsi outlined the geographical area of Azerbaijan and localized several Armenian provinces, including Greater Armenia. Here is what the author wrote about the geographic location of Armenia. He divided it into several parts: “The third Armenia is found to the east of Cilicia close to the Taurus Mountain; there are three mountains and four rivers there and two passes to Syria. “The first Armenia is found to the east of the first Cappadocia and next to the third Armenia; it is bound by the Euphrates in the east; Mount Argeus, the River Halys, and several small rivulets are also found here. “The second Armenia is situated to the east of Cappadocia and stretches to the Euphrates; there are two other rivers and many (more than twenty-two) very high mountains.”34 Movses Khorenatsi continued his narration with a description of so-called Greater Armenia, which during its very short life (several decades in the 1st century B.C.) captured bits and pieces of Caucasian territory before being routed by the Roman Empire. It continued as a vassal of its own neighbors and disappeared from the stage. In this context the author mentioned Azerbaijan: “Greater Armenia is found to the east of Cap- padocia and Lesser Armenia on the banks of the Euphrates, next to the Taurus Mountain, which di- vides Mesopotamia. It borders on Assyria in the south and stretches from Aderbadagan toward Media,

32 J. Saint-Martin, op. cit., p. 316. 33 Ibid., p. 317. 34 Ibid., p. 355.

Volume 8 Issue 1-2 2014 115 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION reaching the place where the Arax flows into the Caspian. In the north it is bound by Albania, Iberian, and Colchis, or Eger, up to the place where the Euphrates turns to the south.”35 When writing about the lands captured by Greater Armenia, Khorenatsi mentioned Azerbaijan situated to the north of Media, that is, in the CAUCASUS, which means that the “father of Armenian history” (who lived in the 5th century), or an unknown author registered that Azerbaijan was situated in the Caucasus in the Early Middle Ages or even later. He further confirmed this date by placing Vasbouragan “to the east of Persian Armenia and close to Gordjaikh in Georgia” and mentioned Aderbadouni (Azerbaijan) as situated in the Caucasus.36 The name Aderbadagan reappears in the story about ancient Paytakaran (Beylagan) in the Azerbaijan Republic: “Paidagaran to the east of Oudia near the Arax: it consists of twelve provinces which belong to contemporary Aderbadagan.” When writing about the lands of Budins, the author localized them as follows: “Oudia close to the Arax, between Artsakh and the Kura River, consists of seven provinces ruled by the Albanians.” When writing about Artsakh, Movses Khorenatsi pointed out that these lands were populated by the Caucasian Albanis and that the Kara-Koyunlu also lived there: “Artsakh, which borders on Siounie, consists of twelve provinces ruled by Albanians and others—Khapant, Vaguni, Pertadzor, greater Iran, greater Govan, Hardjlan, Mukan (Mugan), Bian, Baydzgan, Sisagan, Kerdag, Kasdim, Farnes, and Gokt populated by kara-koyuns.”37 The “father of Armenian history” who, according to Armenian academics lived in the 5th century, wrote about the Azeri tribe of Kara-Koyunlu, which became known in the 13th-14th centuries. When Movses Khorenatsi mentioned Azerbaijan as one of the Median provinces, he also wrote about Rovan-Irevan: “Media, also known as Kusdi Kabgokh, neighbors on Armenia and the Caspian. It includes the provinces of Aderbadagan, Rey, Kilan, Mugan, Tilum, Ahmadan, Tampvar, Sbarasdan, Aml, Kshosh, and Rovan (Irevan.—R.H.).”38 In his Geography, the same author wrote about the Turks who lived in a huge territory stretching from the European part of Russia to China: “Scythia is populated by Abakdars (Bactrians.—R.H.), who call themselves Turks. Their country stretches from the River Itil (Volga) to Mount Imaus (in Altai.—R.H.) and Djenasdan (China.—R.H.).”39 This means that Movses Khorenatsi, who allegedly lived in the 5th century, knew about Azer- baijan in the Caucasus, about the Turks, their territories, and their occupations. This undermines the position of the present ideologists of Armenian nationalism who insist that “all Turks are nomads” and Azerbaijan has nothing to do with ancient history and the Caucasus.

Conclusion

The above allows us to conclude that, in the 17th and 18th centuries, the Armenians acquired the habit of falsifying and appropriating historical facts and even whole periods in the histories of other peoples. This was when the European powers and the Roman Catholic Church became resolved to conquer Asia Minor and the Caucasus. Later, the flow of lies took on mass proportions: in the 19th and 20th centuries, Armenian historical works inundated the world. By that time, Armenian authors had learned to refer to “ancient primary sources” similar to the works written by the “father of Arme- nian history” that had suddenly resurfaced in Europe some 100-150 years earlier. Prominent and respected scholars reminded the world that the Armenian sources could not be trusted.

35 Ibid., pp. 359-361. 36 Ibid., pp. 363-364. 37 Ibid., p. 365. 38 Ibid., p. 371. 39 Ibid., p. 373.

116 Volume 8 Issue 1-2 2014 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

The works of Movses Khorenatsi, the “father of Armenian history,” used by Armenian and partly world historical science as one of the main historical sources, are nothing more than a patchwork of borrowed facts or fake information. It should be said in all justice, however, that many of the borrowed facts are genuine; they found their way into his works from ancient sources and supply detailed information about the geographic location and geographic names of places in medieval Azerbaijan, as well as about the local peoples.

Vakhit AKAEV

D.Sc. (Philos.), Professor, Chief Researcher, Kh. Ibragimov Integrated Scientific Research Institute (KNII), Russian Academy of Sciences (Grozny, Russia).

Abdula BUGAEV

Ph.D. (Hist.), Assistant Professor, Head of the Department of Humanitarian Studies, Kh. Ibragimov KNII, Russian Academy of Sciences (Grozny, Russia).

Magomed DADUEV

Ph.D. (Political Science), Senior Research Associate, Kh. Ibragimov KNII, Russian Academy of Sciences (Grozny, Russia).

DEPORTATION OF THE CHECHENS: WHAT WAS IT AND CAN IT BE FORGOTTEN? (ON THE 70TH ANNIVERSARY OF DEPORTATION OF THE CHECHEN AND INGUSH PEOPLES)

Abstract

he authors look back at what happened suing their own aims. Today, Khrushchev’s seventy years ago when the Chechens denunciations of Stalin’s personality cult, its T were deported from their historical anti-popular nature, and the tragic conse- homeland; they have convincingly proved quences are as topical as they were in the that their people were falsely accused by the 1960s. The same applies to the rehabilitation Stalinist regime and that those authors who of the victims of the political repressions, in- justify the injustices of Stalin’s time are pur- cluding the deported peoples. Volume 8 Issue 1-2 2014 117 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

The authors criticize the efforts of those ples’ collective memory. National harmony in who justify the deportation of several Soviet the multinational Russian state should rely, peoples carried out on the orders of Stalin among other things, on historical truth as and Beria and point out that this does noth- one of the pillars of the multinational consent ing to help the consistent attempts to remove indispensable for the state’s sustainable de- the memory of the trauma from these peo- velopment.

KEYWORDS: deportation, the Chechen people, the Stalinist-Beria regime, lawlessness, denunciation of the personality cult, rehabilitation of the repressed peoples, repatriation, falsifications of the truth, ethnic memory.

Introduction

Seventy years have passed since the Stalin-Beria regime deported several peoples living in the south of Russia in 1943-1944 on false accusations of collaborationism, desertion, resistance to the Soviet authorities, and hostility toward the Red Army. Until the 20th Congress of the C.P.S.U. held in February 1956 and for some time after it, many people in the Soviet Union believed the false accusations; even today, certain researchers and publicists have not yet abandoned the attempts to justify the deportations and punitive measures in their superficial compositions. In some cases, the efforts to shed light on the tragic pages of the history of the multinational Soviet people look very biased, subjective, and openly speculative. I. Pykhalov, M. Poltoranin, A. Martirosian, and others of their ilk are still lauding the totalitarian regime and its crimes, up to and including the deportations. They hunt through the archives for suitable documents to exonerate those guilty of the crimes in order to mislead those who read their works today. Any objective historian and publicist writer should analyze all the relevant documents and facts. In our case, this primarily refers to the aims and tasks of the domestic and foreign policy of Stalin and his cronies at the final stage of the war against Hitler and his satellites. So far, a very much needed comprehensive study has not been written. The authors born in Kazakhstan, where their parents were deported, who grew up and were educated under Soviet power, have posed themselves the task of comprehending the meaning of what happened seventy years ago to offer their own arguments and suggest practical measures in order to overcome the “ethnopolitical stereotypes” and all sorts of phobias very much alive in people’s minds. This should be done to maintain multinational harmony in the polyethnic space of the Russian Federation.

Deportation: How and Why

On 23 February, 1944, the Chechens and Ingush were exiled (deported) to Kazakhstan and Kirghizia on a decision of the Soviet leaders. In so doing, the Stalin-Beria regime deprived these peoples of their homeland for thirteen years and placed them under the strict surveillance and control of the special services. This was planned and legally substantiated well in advance. Ruslan Khazbulatov has written: “A classified Decision of the Council of Peoples’ Commissars of the U.S.S.R. on deportation of the 118 Volume 8 Issue 1-2 2014 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION Chechens, Ingush, Kalmyks, and Karachays was passed on 17 October, 1943.”1 As far as we know, this document has not yet been recovered and, therefore, remains outside academic circulation. When found, it should be carefully analyzed and published to complete the picture of deportation of the Vaynakh peoples (as the Chechens and Ingush call themselves) and specify the aim and tasks of what was done. We all know that the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. on Liquida- tion of the Chechen-Ingush A.S.S.R. and Administrative Organization of Its Territory was signed on 7 March, 1944 when Operation Chechevitsa (deportation of the Chechens and Ingush) was completed. Two years later, this decision became a law. On 25 June, 1946, the Supreme Soviet of the R.S.F.S.R. passed a Law on Liquidation of the Chechen-Ingush A.S.S.R. and on Transformation of the Crimean A.S.S.R. into the Crimean Region, a post factum justification of violence. These acts are legally impaired and anti-constitutional. According to Art 127 of the Constitution of the U.S.S.R. of 1936, “Citizens of the U.S.S.R. are guaranteed personal immunity,” while Art 128 said: “The inviolability of the homes of citizens and privacy of correspondence are protected by law.” The state, which violated its own Constitution and the seemingly unshakable constitutional norms recognized by international legal practice, showed that it was not alien to lawlessness and arbitrariness and revealed its tyrannical nature. The peoples who were deported during the years of severe tests for the multinational country and the new generations want to know why Stalin exiled them from their native lands. The state acts register the official motive of what was done, but this formally punitive measure was prompted by absolutely different considerations. The logic of Stalin’s postwar geopolitical strategy, and its aims and tasks become much clearer when analyzed within his foreign policy priorities, the main vector of which the Soviet leaders outlined at the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers of the U.K., the U.S.S.R., and the United States in October 1943 and at the Tehran Conference of the leaders of these states in November-December 1943. It suggests that the North Caucasian peoples (Chechens included) were part of the far-reaching postwar world order plans. Stalin was obviously very skeptical about Turkey as an international actor and never concealed his intention to “try to force it to yield control of the Dardanelles Straits.”2 It seems that the Karachays, Chechens, Ingush, Balkars, Meskheti Turks, and Crimean Tatars were deported from their native lands to reduce the risks in case relations with Turkey became exacerbated. The official accusations were nothing but a smokescreen. What did the Stalinist regime accuse the Chechens of? The preamble to the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. on Liquidation of the Chechen-Ingush A.S.S.R. looked like a verdict of guilty. The Chechens and Ingush were accused of high treason, collaborating with fascist occupants, performing acts of diversion and reconnaissance, setting up armed groups on German orders to fight Soviet power, avoiding labor duties, carrying out bandit attacks on collective farms in neighboring regions, and robbing and murdering Soviet people. The Law passed by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. on 25 June, 1946 registered that many Chechens and Crimean Tatars were fighting the Red Army. Lumped together, the monstrous lies concocted under Beria’s supervision were passed as accusations of the worst crimes.

 The first state accusation said that “many Chechens betrayed their Motherland and sided with the fascist occupants.” This suggests a question: “How many is many? Ten, one hundred, one thousand, thousands, tens of thousands, etc.? How many Chechen traitors were

1 R. Khazbulatov, Chuzhie (Istoriko-politicheskiy ocherk o chechentsakh i ikh gosudartvennosti). Kreml i rossiisko- chechenskaia voyna, Graal Publishing House, Moscow, 2003, p. 422. 2 H. Feis, Churchill-Roosevelt-Stalin. The War They Waged. The Peace They Sought, Princeton University Press, 1957, p. 228; A.M. Bugaev, “Pochemu Stalin vyselial narody? (postanovka problem),” Izvestia vysshikh uchebnykh zavedeniy. Severo-Kavkazskiy region. Obshchestvennye nauki, No. 3A (151A), 2009, ll. 88-91; Kh.-M.A. Sabanchiev, “Deportatsiia narodov Severnogo Kavkaza v 40-kh gg. XX v.,” Voprosy istorii, No. 11, 2013, pp. 104-112.

Volume 8 Issue 1-2 2014 119 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION needed to deport the Chechen people? We all know that the territory of the Chechen-Ingush A.S.S.R was never occupied, with the exception of Malgobek, a small town of oil workers where the Germans remained for three short months. This is a small area in the republic’s northwestern corner, about one hundred kilometers from Grozny on the border (at that time) with the Stavropol Territory. The question is: How could Chechens and Ingush actively cooperate with fascist aggressors if the aggressors never reached the territory of the compact Vaynakh settlement?”  The second accusation: the Chechens were engaged in diversion and reconnaissance and set up armed bands to fight Soviet power. Today, this part of the guilty verdict remains unproved. There are enough reasons to doubt the scope of banditry, desertion, and avoidance of military service or labor duties. It should be admitted that the unprovoked fascist attack on the Soviet Union stirred up anti-Soviet elements in many republics. The Chechen-Ingush A.S.S.R. was no exception. These were people with negative experience of “de-kulakization,” as well as criminals, thieves, and robbers. The situation in the Shatoy, Itum Kale, Galanchozh, and Cheberloy districts was far from peaceful, while banditry was registered in the Vedeno and Sharoy districts. According to the information that the Department for the Struggle against Banditry of the Com- missariat for Internal Affairs (NKVD) of the U.S.S.R. cited in its report on the struggle against banditry and desertion between 1 July, 1941 and 1 July, 1944, during the first three years of the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945, the NKVD structures liquidated in Soviet territory:  Groups of bandits ...... 7,161  Members ...... 54,130 In the process:  Killed bandits ...... 4,076  Arrested ...... 42,529  Legalized ...... 7,525 In the territory of Western Ukraine, 34,878 UPA and OUN members were liquidated, including:  Killed ...... 16,338  Imprisoned ...... 15,991  Gave themselves up ...... 2,549  Liquidated bandits, total ...... 89,0083 In the Soviet Union arrested (in the same period):  Deserters from the Red Army ...... 1,210,224  Draft avoiders ...... 456,667 Including in the Northern Caucasus:  Deserters from the Red Army ...... 49,362  Draft avoiders ...... 13,389 Including in the Chechen-Ingush A.S.S.R.:  Deserters from the Red Army ...... 4,441  Draft avoiders ...... 8564

3 State Archives of the Russian Federation (GARF), rec. gr. Р-9478 (classified), inv. 1, f. 63, sheet 5. 4 Ibid., sheet 177.

120 Volume 8 Issue 1-2 2014 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION In the reported period, there were 11,851 bandit attacks in the Soviet Union, 9,774 of them were exposed.5 These bandit attacks killed:  Soviet and Party functionaries ...... 342  Officials of NKVD and NKGB ...... 187  Officers and rank-and-files of the Red Army and NKVD ...... 392  Other citizens ...... 2,013  Total ...... 2,934 When the Great Patriotic War began, seven old and 14 recently formed bands (96 members in all) had been operating in Checheno-Ingushetia.6 The following figures describe the criminal situation in the Soviet Union by the beginning of the Great Patriotic War: In April, May, and June 1941, the NKVD liquidated  Groups of bandits ...... 56  Members ...... 665 By 1 July, 1941, the criminal situation in the country was described by the following figures of registered bandit groups and their members: Bands Members  In the U.S.S.R...... 196 ...... 971 From them:  In Ukraine ...... 94 ...... 476  In Byelorussia ...... 17 ...... 90  In the Northern Caucasus and Transcaucasus ...... 65 ...... 285  The rest of the country ...... 20 ...... 1207 The report specified: “Bandits and insurgents became much more active when the war began. In expectation of the Germans, the former anti-Soviet insurgents, members of liquidated rioting and counterrevolutionary organizations, former White Cossacks, kulaks (rich peasants.—Ed.), bandits, members of religious sects, etc. closed ranks. “They became engaged in anti-Soviet defeatist propaganda among the people and encouraged desertion and evasion of military service to undermine the military might of the Soviet Union, thus helping the German fascists. They drew bandits, deserters, those who avoided military service, and other illegal elements into bandit rioting groups, or even units to carry out armed actions in the rear of the Red Army. “They stepped up their activities as German troops moved deeper into Soviet territory. By October 1941, in certain rear regions of the Soviet Union the number of bandit groups was considerable. “By the latter half of 1941, local bodies of the NKVD of the U.S.S.R. had liquidated (in the country as a whole):

5 State Archives of the Russian Federation (GARF), rec. gr. Р-9478 (classified), inv. 1, f. 63, sheet 6. 6 Ibid., sheet 8. 7 Ibid., sheet 11.

Volume 8 Issue 1-2 2014 121 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION

 Groups of bandits ...... 178  Members ...... 1,6048 Arrested:  Deserters from the Red Army ...... 710,755  Avoiders ...... 71,541 “In the latter half of 1941, 21 of the registered 50 bandit actions were exposed.”9 According to the NKVD of the U.S.S.R., in the first three years of the Great Patriotic War (between 1 July, 1941 and 1 July, 1944), 185 bands with a total number of members of 4,368 were destroyed in Checheno-Ingushetia.10

 The third accusation against the Chechens was raids of collective farms of the neighboring regions, robbery and murders of Soviet people. This was partly true: in some districts of Checheno-Ingushetia crimes did take place; they were perpetrated by individuals or small groups, not by the entire nation.  Fourth, it was alleged that many Chechens were fighting the Red Army. This accusation appeared when the Chechens had been already living in deportation for two years and five months. It would be interesting to know how many Chechens were fighting the Red Army units and where. So far, no convincing information about that has been offered (and no convincing information will be found); it is a fact that tens of thousands of Chechens and Ingush were fighting in the ranks of the Red Army. Official substantiation of the deportation stands on clay feet; accusations were heaped together to accuse the Chechens of hideous crimes. The deported Chechens lived through indescribable suffering and endured the stress of the first years of exile and the thirteen years they spent in Kazakhstan and Kirghizia. All the deportees were deprived of elemental legal and social rights; they faced the far-from-friendly local authorities and, frequently, far-from-friendly local people. The NKVD went even further: it spread rumors about cannibalism among the Chechens. Stalin’s death on 5 March, 1953 alleviated the harsh regime of exile.

Deportation: Khrushchev’s Criticism of the Personality Cult and Repatriation of the Deported Peoples

In 1956, speaking at the 20th Congress of the C.P.S.U., Nikita Khrushchev denounced Stalin’s personality cult: “The Soviet Union is justly considered a model multinational state because we have assured in practice the equality and friendship of all [of the] peoples living in our great fatherland. All the more monstrous are those acts whose initiator was Stalin and which were rude violations of the basic Leninist principles [behind our] Soviet state’s nationalities policies. We refer to the mass deportations of entire nations from their places of origin, together with all Communists and Komso-

8 Ibid., sheet 8. 9 Ibid., sheet 14. 10 Ibid., sheet 174.

122 Volume 8 Issue 1-2 2014 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION mols without any exception. This deportation was not dictated by any military considerations. Thus, at the end of 1943, when there had already been a permanent change of fortune at the front in favor of the Soviet Union, a decision concerning the deportation of all the Karachays from the lands on which they lived was taken and executed. “In the same period, at the end of December 1943, the same lot befell the Kalmyks of the Kalmyk Autonomous Republic. In March (in February.—Authors) 1944, all the Chechens and Ingush were deported and the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Republic was liquidated. In April (in March.—Authors) 1944, all the Balkars were deported from the territory of the Kabardino-Balkarian Autonomous Re- public to faraway places and their republic itself was renamed the Autonomous Kabardian Republic. Ukrainians avoided meeting this fate only because there were too many of them and there was no place to which to deport them. Otherwise, [Stalin] would have deported them also. No Marxist-Le- ninist, no man of common sense can grasp how it is possible to make whole nations responsible for inimical activity, including women, children, old people, Communists and Komsomols, to use mass repression against them, and to expose them to misery and suffering for the hostile acts of individual persons or groups of persons.”11 Khrushchev accused Stalin of flagrant violations of the Leninist principles of the Soviet Union’s nationalities policy in the form of deportations of peoples and liquidation of their national- state units.

Deportation: Political and Legal Rehabilitation Begins

The 20th Congress marked a turning point in the Soviet Union’s treatment of the repressed peoples. Nearly all of them were returned to their homelands, where their national-state units were restored. They were offered conditions conducive to their social, economic, and cultural rehabilitation and development, even if it was not easy to find dwelling and suitable jobs because of certain preju- dices in personnel policy, etc. On 26 April, 1991, forty-six years after the deportation, the R.S.F.S.R. adopted a Law on Re- habilitation of the Repressed People, the Preamble to which pointed out, for the first time in Soviet legislative practice, that the peoples had been subjected to “genocide and slanderous attacks.” Article 1 of the Law stated that “the acts of repressions against these peoples are denounced as illegal and criminal.”12 The Law was of an immense political, legal, material, and moral importance. As a vitally important legal act it restored historical justice and played the key role in complete rehabilitation of the illegally punished peoples. Recently, President Putin issued a Decree on Measures on Rehabilitation of the Armenian, Bulgarian, Greek, Crimean Tatar, and German Peoples and State Support of Their Renaissance and Development13; this can be described as another historically important step toward rehabilitation of these peoples. At the same time, it is important to analyze at the state level the results of execution of the Law of the R.S.F.S.R. on Rehabilitation of the Repressed Peoples and, in particular, practical rehabilitation of the Chechens.

11 [http://www.theguardian.com/theguardian/2007/apr/26/greatspeeches5]. 12 [http://cis-legislation.com/document.fwx?rgn=1452]. 13 See: Rossiyskaia gazeta, 21 April, 2014.

Volume 8 Issue 1-2 2014 123 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION Deportation: Falsifications and the Need for Profound Critical Studies

Nikolay Bugay is one of the most active Russian students of the problems of deportation of all peoples, the Chechens included; he has discovered a vast body of documentary sources, however his personal treatment of the causes of the deportations perfectly fits the Stalinist logic, even though, from his point of view, these were preventive measures to be implemented in wartime against “unreliable ethnicities.”14 One cannot help but wonder what the reliability/unreliability criteria applied to ethnicities in the past and today were. Why were they applied to certain peoples when there were no obvious war-related reasons? In any case, no gradation of nations by the highly doubtful reliable/ unreliable features can be accepted as tenable. Well, perhaps N. Bugay did discover reasonable qual- ification in the classified documents of the NKVD (to which he alone had access). If the unreliability of the Chechens was based on lies and slander, it cannot be accepted as the starting point of analysis; subjectivism in politics and science leads nowhere. At the same time, Bugay believes that “the Union state, on the eve and especially during the war, committed numerous and serious errors in its nationalities policy. It was through deportation that the Government of the U.S.S.R. stabilized the situation in places where ethnopolitical tension was the highest.”15 According to the author, “the situation was taking shape in such a way that the authorities found it much more suitable to deport ethnicities than to painstakingly stabilize the situation.”16 And on the next two pages: “The decision of the Government of the Union of S.S.R. to recall those members of the deported peoples who were heroically fighting on the fronts of the Great Patriotic War can be described as extremely anti-human.”17 This is one of his pet-subjects; he quoted the figures: in 1944-1945, 156,843 members of the deported peoples were demobilized from the Red Army while it was fighting fascist Germany. According to the figures quoted in 1949, there were 209,545 of them. Nikolay Bugay concluded: “They were treated as enemies of the people; there were 8,894 Chechens and 4,248 Ingush among them.”18 According to information Nikolay Bugay supplied in some of his publications, 17 units of the Red Army had been formed in Checheno-Ingushetia; over 50 thousand had been mobilized, including 30 thousand Chechens. He is convinced that “the policy of deportation of ethnicities caused unbearable suffering; it cannot be positively assessed. It should be condemned and rejected.”19 Igor Pykhalov has offered an explanation: “During the war, Chechens and Ingush committed crimes much more serious than the story of the notorious white horse Chechen elders allegedly presented to Hitler.”20 He repeats these doubtful accusations in an effort to justify the awful crimes of the Stalinist regime, that is, deportation of peoples despite the fact that the Soviet and Russian laws have already denounced them as anti-constitutional and criminal. This neo-Stalinist academic refers to archival documents to justify deportations. It seems, however, that he never tried too hard to locate

14 N.F. Bugay, “Deportatsia narodov—repressivnaia mera gosudarstvennoy politiki v sfere natsionalnykh otnosheniy. 20-40-e gody,” in: Kraynosti istorii i kraynosti istorikov, Moscow, 1997, p. 173. 15 N.F. Bugay, “Repressirovannye grazhdane na zashchite Otechestva,” in: N.A. Aralovets, E.N. Bikeykin, N.F. Bugay, O.M. Verbitskaya et al., Narod i voyna: ocherki istorii Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyny 1941-1945, ed. by A.N. Sakahrov, A.S. Senyavsky, Grif and Co, Moscow, 2010, p. 273. 16 Ibid., pp. 273-274. 17 Ibid., pp. 274-275. 18 Ibidem. 19 Ibid., p. 287. 20 I. Pykhalov, “Kavkazskie orly tretyego reikha,” Otechestvo, No. 4, 2002; idem, Za chto Stalin vyselial narody? Sta- linskie deportatsii—prestupny proizvol ili spravedlivoe vozmezdie? Yauza-press, Moscow, 2008, p. 266.

124 Volume 8 Issue 1-2 2014 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION suitable documentary evidence. He prefers lies to well-established truths, including the myth of the white horse. We have enough documentary evidence to say that none of the deported peoples ever presented either a white or a black horse to Hitler. V. Loginov, A. Martirosian, M. Poltoranin, and I. Pykhalov rely on falsifications to arrive at dubious conclusions about the mass banditry in the Checheno-Ingush A.S.S.R. at the turn of the 1940s, desertion, and cooperation with fascists. Arsen Martirosian, the author of an apologetic work about Lavrentiy Beria, insists that many of the members of the deported peoples, including Chechens and Ingush, encouraged and approved by the majority of these peoples, committed numerous villainous crimes during the Great Patriotic War.21 He further writes: “If the Defense Committee of the U.S.S.R. and personally Supreme Commander Joseph Stalin decided to treat these scoundrels and criminals in full accordance with the criminal law of the time and the specifics of wartime, practically all the men of these peoples should have been executed by shooting.” The so-called humane Soviet leaders opted for deportation, which the author describes as a milder punishment far removed from genocide.22 Arsen Martirosian describes the deported peoples as scoundrels and criminals and their deportation as just punishment, not genocide. An inveterate cynic and falsifier of historical events, he writes that in exile the deported peoples “continued multiplying.” These words could have been said either by those directly involved in the cruelties against the deported peoples or their descendants trying to exonerate those who committed these crimes. The Law of the R.S.F.S.R. on Rehabilitation of the Repressed Peoples says that the repressed peoples were victims of genocide and slander.23 It seems that Martirosian either does not know or is deliberately ignoring the laws of the RF. In both cases, he demonstrates not only legal ignorance, but also hurls slanderous accusations at the deported peoples and insults their national feelings. It seems that this work should be analyzed by experts to decide whether it can be called extremist. It is important to say that the neo-Stalinists and neo-Beria-ists of our days remain devoted to old thinking and completely ignore the laws of Russia that contain objective and moral-humanitarian assessments of the repression of millions of people and many ethnicities. So far, we have not received clear answers to many questions related to the prerequisites, causes of deportation, and return of the Chechens. There are no answers in the second volume of Istoria Chechni s drevneyshikh vremen do nashikh dney (History of Chechnia from Ancient Times to Our Days) published in 2008. It seems that the authors should have paid much more attention to the very complicated and contradictory situation that predated the deportation, to the economic activities of the authorities and their efforts to preserve political stability, efficiently oppose criminal elements, rehabilitate the Chechen-Ingush A.S.S.R., and also to what was done by those who prevented this, as well as the events of 1958-1959. Mikhail Poltoranin, one of the closest associates of President Yeltsin, has offered the following tale-telling comment on what the political beau monde thought about the return of the Chechens and Ingush to their homeland: “The Vaynakhs are a hole in the country’s strategic defenses. This means that they should not be returned to their homeland, while their lands should be occupied forever by Cossack villages, Russian settlements, and Avar auls as reliable allies of Russia in the Northern Cau- casus. The region itself will no longer be a deep and very painful thorn in the country’s hindquarters,”24 eloquent evidence of how President Yeltsin’s closest circle, responsible for the military conflicts of the 1990s in Chechnia, distrusted the Vaynakhs. What is more, Mikhail Poltoranin brings together the real facts of Stalin’s time and the far from polite emotions about the country’s “hindquarters.” This speaks volumes about this gentleman’s ideas

21 See: A. Martirosian, Sto mifov o Berii. Ot slavy k prokliatiyam. 1941-1953 gg., Veche, Moscow, 2010, p. 217. 22 See: Ibid., p. 218. 23 [http://cis-legislation.com/document.fwx?rgn=1452]. 24 M.N. Poltoranin, Vlast v trotilovom ekvivalente. Nasledie tsaria Borisa, Eksmo, Algoritm, Moscow, 2011, p. 211.

Volume 8 Issue 1-2 2014 125 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION about life in general and his lifestyle. A researcher should sift the grain from the chaff. No one doubts that the Chechens would have never been returned to their homeland during Stalin’s life. We all know that their lands were immediately occupied by others; what one of the cronies of “Tsar Boris” (who betrayed his idol and friend) says about “a hole in the country’s strategic defenses” is a lie. The 58th volume of the Rossiiskaia entsiklopedia (Russian Encyclopedia) published by Terra Publishers was convincingly criticized by academics of Grozny and Moscow; they applied to court to denounce this volume as extremist, which ruled that its copies should be removed from bookshops and libraries and banned its quoting. It justifies deportation; it treats the restoration of the Checheno- Ingush A.S.S.R. as nothing short of a mistake by the people in power and says that, after their return, Chechens persecuted Russians and removed them from their dwellings. It is difficult to imagine how reasonable people could slide so deep into the abyss of ignorance and lies and could spare no effort to slander the Chechens. Today, heaps of Checheno-phobic fiction, publicist writings, and what passes for academic works are being published; these authors falsify the past and present. Some of the Internet resources shape negative attitudes toward peoples, including the Chechens. This should be denounced as deliberate misinformation and opposition to multinational consent in the Russian state. There are laws that envisage criminal punishment for slander, xenophobia, fanning ethnic strife, insults of religious feelings and extremist literature. The people in power spare no efforts to prevent or cut short everything that may cause ethnic tension. Problems, however, persist; the science of history, which relies on the truth as its main criterion, should play an important role in the process. In 2011, a fundamental work appeared based on a vast body of archival documents called Vaynakhi i imperskaia vlast: problema Chechni i Ingushetii vo vnutrenney politike Rossii i SSSR (nachalo XIX- seredina XX v.) (Vaynakhs and Imperial Power: The Problem of Chechnia and Ingushetia in the Domes- tic Policy of Russia and the U.S.S.R. (early 19th-mid-20th cent.), which supplies a new explanation: “The decision on deportation of the Chechens and Ingush provoked and justified by specific circumstances was nothing but an extreme attempt to cope with a problem that appeared not before World War II, but before the Bolsheviks came to power: the high internal stability of the ethnicity, its refusal to adjust, its ability to stand opposed to imperial assimilation and ‘absorption,’ as well as to the Soviet atomization of social and ethnic entities, the high level of open confrontation, and the willingness to use force to exacerbate the conflict.”25 The authors of the above V. Kozlov and M. Kozlova reflect the anti-popular nature of the tyrannical regime that punished certain peoples who were component parts of the so-called new historical community of people, the Soviet people. Study of the problems of deportation and rehabilitation of the repressed peoples has not yet been completed. We should find and bring into academic circulation new archival documents and analyze them in detail.

Deportation: Ethnic Memory

Exile, violence, and lawlessness bruise the historic memory of any ethnicity; they breed resent- ment and a negative attitude toward the relations between different nations and ethnicities within the state and its nationalities policy. This much is invariably said by members of ethnic elites and academics of the deported nations at all sorts of scientific-practical forums held at the regional and federal levels. The international

25 Vaynakhi i imperskaia vlast: problema Chechni i Ingushetii vo vnutrenney politike Rossii i SSSR (nachalo XIX-seredina XX v., ROSSPEN, Moscow, 2011, p. 681.

126 Volume 8 Issue 1-2 2014 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION scientific-practical conference on the problems of deportation and rehabilitation of repressed peoples held in Elista (Kalmykia) in the fall of 1913 to mark the 70th anniversary of deportation of the Kalmyks and liquidation of their national autonomy was no exception. On 8 March, 2014, at a memorial meeting held in Nalchik on the occasion of the 70th anniversary of deportation, Vice Premier of Kabardino-Balkaria Ruslan Firov said that the memory of the tragic pages in the history of deportation of the Balkars “unite all the people living in the republic in the firm conviction that this should not happen again.”26 Acting head of Kabardino-Balkaria Yury Kokov deemed it necessary to point out at the same meeting that “seventy years ago the government made a big mistake by deporting the Balkars; this was a criminal decision.”27 Compassion for the deported peoples by dealing, among other things, with the problems created by deportation is an important condition for overcoming the negative stereotypes, ensuring multinational harmony, and creating the firm conviction that similar tragedies will never happen again.

Conclusion

The problems of deportation and rehabilitation should be further studied, which means that the academic community should become even more active when dealing with the subject; it should learn to use new approaches and deal with specific practical problems in order to protect these peoples against possible repetitions. This means that we should learn the whole truth about deportation and its repercussions. Federal and regional power structures, public organizations, and academics should pool forces to achieve sustainable agreement, unity between peoples, and religious and cultural tolerance, as well as insist on deeper civil and democratic changes very much needed by the national communities. It should be said that today positive socioeconomic, spiritual, and cultural processes are going on in the Chechen Republic, in the Northern Caucasus, and across the country that strengthen the foundations of multinational and multicultural development of the peoples of Russia. This process will be even more successful if the state and society closely cooperate in: (1) resolute condemnation of all statements made at any level that might trigger ethnic tension or even enmity and undermine the unity of the family of Russian nations; (2) profound and objective studies of the so-called white spots of history, including its regional aspects; (3) regular analysis of publications dealing with multinational relations; (4) holding campaigns at the federal and local level to extend material and moral support to the deported peoples; (5) setting up memorial complexes in the capitals of republics from which peoples were deported.

26 L. Maratova, “V Nalchike proshel miting, posviashchenny 70-letiiu deportatsii balkartsev,” available at [http://www. kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/239202/]. 27 Ibidem.

Volume 8 Issue 1-2 2014 127 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION Eldar Elkhan ogly ISMAILOV

Corresponding Member, International Academy for Genealogy (France); Member, Russian Historical Genealogical Society (Moscow, the Russian Federation).

THE KHANS OF KARABAKH: THE ROOTS, SUBORDINATION TO THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE, AND LIQUIDATION OF THE KHANATE

Abstract

1 he author analyzes the political history 1 and genealogy of the Javanshirs (Ca- The Karabakh Khanate—a feudal state that existed in Northern Azerbaijan from 1747 to 1822, a fragment of the T vanşirs), one of the khan families of vast empire of Nadir Shah Afshar that existed from 1736 to Azerbaijan, their relations with the Russian 1747; in 1805 the khans became vassals of the Russian Em- Empire, and the liquidation of the Karabakh pire, which in November 1822 made the khanate one of its Khanate.1 territories ruled from St. Petersburg.

KEYWORDS: Karabakh Khanate, Shusha, the Javanshir clan, Panah Ali Khan, Ibrahim Khalil Khan, Mekhti Quli Khan, Jafar Quli Agha, transfer to Russia, liquidation of the khanate, Prince Tsitsianov, Major Lisanevich, General Yermolov, General Madatov.

Introduction

The vast number of historical works and documentary collections that have appeared in the last few years related to the history of the Karabakh Khanate and the genealogy of the descendants of the Karabakh khans makes it unnecessary to supply details about the khanate’s past and the rule of its khans. Here I will concentrate on the clan of Javanshir (Cavanşir), the accession of their khanate to the Russian Empire, the death of the second Karabakh khan, the liquidation of the khanate, and the introduction of direct rule from St. Petersburg.

The Origins of the Khans of Karabakh

The roots of the Javanshir family go back to the early 17th century when the shahs of the Safa- vid dynasty (1501-1736) divided the Azeri lands into vilayets (beglyarbekstvo [princedom]): the 128 Volume 8 Issue 1-2 2014 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION Shirvan Vilayet with its center in Shemakha; the Karabakh Vilayet (Ganja), which occupied the space between the Kura and Arax rivers; and the Tebriz Vilayet, which occupied the larger part of southern Azerbaijan and the Nakhchivan Territory. Later, in the 17th century, the Nakhchivan Territory became part of the Chukhur-Saad Vilayet with its center in Erivan. The Ardabil District of Azerbaijan was part of the shah’s personal dominions.2 The vilayets were ruled by beglyarbeks who, when appointed, acquired the title of khan. In the 16th century, this post became inherited, which made the beglyarbeks feudal landlords.3 In the 1540s, Tahmasib Shah (1524-1576) appointed Emir Shahverdi Khan Ziyad-ogly Qajar (?-1568) the beglyarbek of Karabakh and the head of the Azeri tribe of Qajar. His descendants ruled Karabakh (with short intervals) until 1737 when Nadir Shah Afshar seized the larger part of their dominions. They preserved small patches of land around Ganja, which they ruled until 1804.4 The vilayets were divided into districts (magals), the rulers of which (khakims) frequently inherited their posts from their fathers. Starting in the mid-16th century, the rulers of the vilayet to the south of Barda forced the Azeri nomad tribes living in Karabakh to unite into magals (later the Otuziki magal, that is, 32 tribes, and Igirmi dyerd magal, 24 tribes). The Javanshir tribe was the largest and strongest among them, the hereditary rulers of which governed the Otuziki District from the early 17th century.5 Different authors trace the Javanshir family to different sources. Mirza Jamal Javanshir of Kara- bakh (c. 1773-1853), the last vizier of the Karabakh Khanate (1797-1822) and the author of Istoria Karabakha (The History of Karabakh), wrote that “the family of the late Panah Khan (founder of the Karabakh Khanate.—E.I.) originated from Javanshir of Dizak from the Saryjally oymak,6 one of the branches of the Bakhmanly tribe that came in ancient times from Turkestan. His ancestors were well known in the Javanshir tribe as noble, rich, and beneficial people.”7 Ahmed-bek Javanshir,8 author of a political history of the Karabakh Khanate traced his clan back to the descendants of Argun Khan (1284-1291), the ruler of the Ilkhanate Empire. According to the legend to which the author referred in his book, an ancestor of the Javanshirs was a descendant of Argun Khan called Mamed Khan, “who lived in the Alagark stow on the shores of the Arax close to the village of Bakhmanly. According to a purchase deed written on a piece of parchment made of gazelle skin, he bought the whole of Karabakh, about 200 versts along and the same length across between the Kurakchay, Kura, Arax, and Alynjachay rivers and Lake Gokcha. He was the only owner, but during his lifetime he divided his dominions between his three sons.”9 Historical sources, however, do not confirm the above. Some of those who studied the history of the Javanshirs refer to the book Rovzat-us-Safa by Rza Quli Khan Idayat, who wrote that “the Ja-

2 See: I.P. Petrushevskiy, “Azerbaidzhan v XV-XVII vv.,” in: Sbornik statey po istorii Azerbaidzhana, Issue 1, Baku, 1949, p. 247. 3 See: Ibidem. 4 See: Mohammed Masum ibn Hojagi-i Isfaghani, Khusalat as-Siyar (Biographies and Lifestories: Why and How), Chapter “Shamma az zikr-i Ziyad-ugli va ausaf-i Ganja” (A Short History of the Ziyad-ogly Family and Description of Ganja), Transl. from the Farsi into Azeri and commented by M. Nagisoylu, Izvestia istoriko-rodoslovnogo obshchestva, Issue 3, Baku, 2001, pp. 109-132; I.L. Pavlova, “Ocherk istorii karabagskikh praviteley Ziyad-ogly po materailam Khusalat as-Siyar,” in: Khoronika vremen Sefevidov, Moscow, 1993, pp. 58-62; I.P. Petrushevskiy, op. cit., p. 250. 5 See: A.-B. Javanshir, O politicheskom sushchestvovanii Karabakhskogo khanstva (s 1747 po 1805), Baku, 1961, p. 99; I.P. Petrushevskiy, op. cit., p. 248. 6 Oymak—a term applied to each of the clans that make up a tribe and also to their territory. 7 Mirza Jamal Javanshir of Karabakh, Istoria Karabakha, Baku, 1959, p. 66. 8 Ahmed-bek Javanshir (1828-1903), grandson of Mohammed-bek Javanshir, graduated from the Paul Cadet Corps in 1848, and was enrolled in the Hussar Regiment of Konstantin Nikolaevich. In 1853, fought in the Crimean War, promoted to the rank of second captain of cavalry for his courage. Wounded in a duel, he had to retire in 1854 (see: A.-B. Javanshir, op. cit., p. 62). He went back to his estate in the village of Kekhrizli, where he occupied himself with translations into Azeri of works by Pushkin, Lermontov, Zhukovsky, and other authors. In 1883, he wrote in Russian Politicheskaia istoriia Karabakhs- kogo khanstva (Political History of the Karabakh Khanate) published in Tiflis in 1884, in Shusha in 1901, and in 1961 in Baku. 9 A.-B. Javanshir, op. cit., pp. 69-70.

Volume 8 Issue 1-2 2014 129 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION vanshir elat came from Turkestan and belonged to the tribe of Oshir Khan, who was son of Ildyz Khan, the fourth son of Uguz Khan.10 The Javanshir tribe joined the 120-thousand-strong army of Hulagu khan.11 Under Emir Timur,12 they came back from Rûm13 for the second time and spread across Turke- stan, Kandahar, Kabul, and Iran. One of its branches led by Ibrahim Khalil Agha, who served Shah Abbas I,14 remained in Karabakh.”15 A large part of Azerbaijan had been occupied by Ottoman Turks after the war of 1578-1590; it was liberated after the war of 1603-1607. In 1606, Shah Abbas I restored Muhammad Khan Ziyad- ogly Qajar16 to the post of beglyarbek of Karabakh (1585-1588 and 1606-1616). It was probably at the same time, in 1606-1629, that Shah Abbas I made Ibrahim Khalil Agha, head of the Javanshir tribe from the oymak of Saryjally, head of the Karabakh magal Otuziki. From that time on, head of the Javanshir clan became the hereditary head of the Otuziki magal.17 From what Abbas-Quli-agha Bakikhanov wrote in his book, it might be presumed that Ibrahim Khalil Agha became hereditary head of Otuziki before 1018 Hegira (A.D. 1609) when Shah Abbas I spent the winter in Karabakh.18 Bakikhanov wrote: “When Shah Abbas had settled everything in Shirvan and Daghestan, he entrusted Ali-bek Javanshir with the task of building a pontoon bridge across the Kura in Javad to move the troops to Ardabil.”19 It seems that Ibrahim Khalil Agha Javanshir and Ali-bek Javanshir were one and the same person, or that Ali-bek (Panah Ali-bek?) was a son or brother of Ibrahim Khalil Agha Javanshir, the first head of Otuziki. The name of another head of Otuziki is mentioned in the history of Shah Abbas I Tarikh-i alem aray-i’Abbasi (The History of Beautifying the World of Abbas) written by outstanding Safavid court historiographer Iskender-bek Munshi; it contains lists of the emirs of the Qizilbash state for 1576 and 1628: “About the Famous Emirs from among the Khans and Sultans, Some of Whom Were at the High Court, While Some Others, in Regions” and “The Names of All Emirs from among the Khans and Sultans,” respectively. In both lists, the names of the emirs are organized according to their tribes. The list of 1628, which contained the names of emirs from different Turkic tribes that did not belong to Qizilbash, mentions “Otar-sultan, head of the tribe (mir-i il) Javanshir and the Otuziki tribes, descendant of the Karabakh emirs.”20 The following deserves mention.  First, the spelling of the name of the head of the Javanshir clan. Unable to check it against the original of Tarikh-i alem aray-i’Abbasi, we cannot be sure that the name Otar-sultan (unusual among the Azeris) was spelled correctly. The question is: was it a mistranslation or misprint, or was it spelled in this way in the list of Iskender-bek Munshi?

10 For more information about Oguz Khan (Uguz Khan) and his descendants, see: Rashid ad-Din, Oguz-name, Transl. from the Persian into Russian, introduction, commentaries, notes, and indexes by R.M. Shukiurova), Baku, 1987; R.M. Shuki- urova, “Genealogia Oguzov i sviazannye s ney sobytia v Oguz-name,” Izvestia AN Azerbaidzhanskoy SSR. Seria istorii, filosofii i prava, No. 1, Baku, 1986, pp. 72-79; idem, “Oguz—obshchiy praroditel tiurkskikh dinastiy,” Izvestia AN Azerbaidzhan- skoy SSR. Seria istorii, filosofii i prava, No. 1, 1987, pp. 78-81. 11 Hulagu (1217-1265), Mongol ruler, grandson of Genghis khan; founder of Hulagu’s dynasty. 12 Tamerlane, Timur (1336-1405), Central Asian conqueror; founder of the Timurid dynasty (1370). 13 Asia Minor, which is now Turkey. 14 Abbas I the Great (1571-1629), Shah of Persia since 1587, member of the Safavid dynasty, prominent military leader. 15 See: Rovzat-us-Safa, Part IX, “Zikr halati emir Ibrahim Khan Javanshir,” Tehran, 1270 (quoted from: A.-B. Javanshir, op. cit., footnote by E.B. Shukiurzade on p. 99). 16 See: A.-Q. Bakikhanov, Giulistan-i Iram, Editor, commentator and author of notes and indexes Z.M. Buniatov, Baku, 1991, p. 245. 17 See: A.-B. Javanshir, op. cit., footnote by E.B. Shukiurzade on p. 99; I.P. Petrushevskiy, op. cit, p. 248. 18 See: A.-Q. Bakikhanov, op. cit., p. 119. 19 Ibid., p. 118. 20 I.P. Petrushevskiy, Ocherki po istorii feodalnykh otnosheniy v Azerbaidzhane i Armenii v XVI-nachale XIX v., Len- ingrad, 1949, pp. 71, 90-92, 99-102, 109.

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 Second, a combination of the name of the head of the Javanshir tribe and the Otuziki magal and the title sultan, which was normally conferred on members of military nomadic nobility together with the title of emir or an emirate, confirms, albeit indirectly, that Otar-sultan became head of Otuziki under a decree of the shah. Under the Safavids, sultan and khan were life, not inherited titles, at least officially. However, more often than not, sons acquired the titles of their fathers from the shah, especially if he inherited his father’s region or magal. In the latter half of the 16th century, it was accepted that the title of khan was superior to that of sultan.21 This is obvious in our case: the head of the Javanshir tribe and the Otuziki magal, who was a sultan, obeyed, in administrative respects, the Karabakh beglyarbek, who was a khan. Mit Mekhti Khazani (c. 1819-1894), the author of a history of Karabakh, mentioned Ibrahim- sultan Budagh-sultan ogly Javanshir, head of the Javanshir tribe and Otuziki magal, who was a sultan. According to the firman of 1083 Hegira (1672/73), the Persian shah made him commander of a 730-strong cavalry unit with a salary of 700 toumans and 7,000 Tabriz altuns. Mekhti Quli Khan, the last of the Karabakh khans, kept the document at home. In his book, Mir Mekhti Khazani described Ibrahim-sultan as the grandfather or ancestor of Panah Ali Khan Javanshir (c. 1693-1759), who founded the Karabakh Khanate (İbrahim Sultan Budaq Sultan oğlu Cavanşir … Pənah xanın cəddi imiş).22 The above proves that both Ibrahim-sultan and his father Budagh-sultan (Otar-sultan?) received their titles from the Safavids when appointed heads of the Otuziki emirate. Prominent Azeri historian of the 20th century E. Shukiur-zade mentioned the names of the descendants of Ibrahim Khalil Agha, who remained hereditary rulers of the Javanshir tribe and Otuziki magal until the first half of the 18th century. The historian referred to Rza Quli Khan Idayat’s Rovzat- us-Safa to write that Panah Ali Agha I replaced his father (Ibrahim Khalil Agha) as head of the tribe; his son Ibrahim Khalil Agha II came after him; Panah Ali Khan Javanshir, who founded the Karabakh Khanate, was described as the son of Ibrahim Khalil Agha II.23 The same names appeared in the genealogy of the khans of Karabakh based on information that Major Lisanevich gathered in 1804; it starts with the name of Panah Ali-bek (Panah Ali Agha I) and lacks the name of his father Ibrahim Khalil Agha.24 The table compiled by E. Shukiur-zade lacks the names of Otar-sultan, who headed the Javanshir tribe and Otuziki magal in 1628, and Ibrahim-sultan Budagh-sultan ogly, who headed the tribe and the magal in 1672/73. Captain on Russian service Mirza Adigezal-bek (c. 1780-1848) likewise did not mention these names in his Karabakh-name. His information differs from the initial information Shukiur-zade used for his genealogical table. Mirza Adigezal-bek wrote: “Panah Ali-bek, great grandfather of Panah Khan (that is, Panah Ali Khan.—E.I.) was born in Saryjallu. At that time, the khans of Karabakh (that is, the beglyarbeks of Karabakh with its capital in Ganja.—E.I.) were prospering. At that same time, he went to Ganja and started working for these khans. His proud nature rebelled against this humiliation since he was convinced that he was much superior to those whose orders he had to obey. He went to the Javanshir oymak of the Karabakh region … where he grew very rich and then married.” There his son Sarija Ali-bek was born. “According to Mirza Adigezal-bek, he was very rich and influential. Those who passed his estate—shepherds, hired hands, servants, sheep-breeders, horse-herds—gathered around him. Their number was growing all the time and, finally, both nomad camps became an oba (nomads’ camp), known as Saryjallu.” Ibrahim Khalil Agha (II), son of Sarija Ali-bek “had a myulk (Arabic

21 See: I.P. Petrushevskiy, op. cit., pp. 98-100. 22 See: Mir Mehdi Xəzani, “Kitabi-Tarixi Qarabağ,” in: Qarabağnamələr (Annuls of Karabakh), Book II, Baku, 2006. 23 See: E.B. Shukiurzade, “Genealogicheskaia tablitsa Karabakhskikh khanov,” in: Doklady AN Azerbaidzhanskoy SSR, Vol. XXXVI, No. 7, Baku, 1981, pp. 83-85. 24 See: Akty, sobrannye Kavkazskoy arkheograficheskoy kommissiey (further AKAK), Vol. II, Tiflis, 1868, pp. 695-696, Document No. 1415.

Volume 8 Issue 1-2 2014 131 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION for estate) and an orchard in Aghdam. He also had an estate in Arasbar, on the shores of the Arax, as well as pastures and enclosures. He also had a palace called Ibrahim Khalil kalasy in yaylag (Azeri for summer pastures). This confirmed Ibrahim Khalil Agha’s greatness and glory.”25 The three sources I used to compile an ascending genealogy of the family of the khans of Kara- bakh—Mirza Adigezal-bek’s Karabakh-name, “Rodoslovnaia Ibrahim-khana i ego detey” (Genealogy of Ibrahim Khan and His Children) are published in Vol. II of Akty kavkazskoy arkheograficheskoy komissii (Acts of the Caucasian Archeographic Commission) and E. Shukiur-zade’s Genealogicheskaia tablitsa Karabakhskikh khanov (Genealogical Table of the Karabakh Khans). They do not fully coincide, but the name of the father of the first of the Karabakh khans is the same in all of them. This suggested a comparative analysis of the three versions of the ascending genealogies of Panah Ali Khan and my own version based on primary sources (the 1628 list of the emirs compiled by Iskender-bek Munshi and the firman of 1672/73 quoted by Mir Mekhti Khazani).

Versions of the Ascending Genealogy of the Karabakh Khans

According According According According to Information to Reconstruction to Mirza to E. Shukiur- Published Based on Primary Adigezal-bek zade’s Table in AKAK, Vol. II Sources

Ibrahim Khalil Otar-sultan (Budagh- Panah Ali-bek Agha I sultan?) Head of Head of the Head of the Javanshir the Javanshir Javanshir tribe and tribe and Otuziki magal tribe Otuziki magal, early in 1628 17th cent.

Ibrahim-sultan Panah Ali Agha I Sarija Ali-bek Panah Ali-bek Budagh-sultan ogly Head of the Head of the From the Javanshir Head of the Javanshir Javanshir tribe and Javanshir tribe tribe tribe and Otuziki magal Otuziki magal in 1672

Ibrahim Khalil Ibrahim Khalil Ibrahim Khalil Agha Agha II Agha Ibrahim Khalil Head of the Javanshir Head of the Head of the Agha tribe and Otuziki Javanshir tribe and Javanshir tribe magal, early 18th cent. Otuziki magal

Panah Ali Khan Panah Ali Khan Panah Ali Khan Panah Ali Khan (c. 1693-1759) (c. 1693-1759) (c. 1693-1759) (c. 1693-1759) Khan of Khan of Karabakh Khan of Karabakh Khan of Karabakh Karabakh in 1747-1759 in 1747-1759 in 1747-1759 in 1747-1759

25 Mirza Adigezal-bek, Karabakh-name, Baku, 1950, pp. 49-50.

132 Volume 8 Issue 1-2 2014 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION The Independent Karabakh Khanate and Panah Ali Khan

Fazl Ali-bek (?-1738) and Panah Ali-bek (c. 1693-1759), the sons of Ibrahim Khalil Agha (II), were enrolled in the army of Nadir-Quli Khan Afshar, chief commander since 1726 of Shah Tahmasib II26; in 1736, he displaced the Safavid dynasty and ascended the Persian throne as Nadir Shah (1736-1747). The new shah moved into the magals of the Karabakh beglyarbeks Ziyad-ogly Qajars south of Ganja to undermine their power; they were left with the Ganja District and the title of beglyarbeks of Ganja.27 The political situation in Karabakh and even in the whole of Azerbaijan changed. The central and southern magals formerly ruled by the Karabakh beglyarbeks (including the Otuziki and Khamse magals, that is, Varand, Dizag, Talysh, Khachyn and Chilaberd ruled by meliks)28 were placed under the direct rule of Tabriz and remained under its power until the death of Nadir Shah and formation of an independent Karabakh Khanate in 1747.29 The Javanshirs, who refused to side with the self-appointed shah in 1736, were later resettled from Karabakh to Horasan. Fazl Ali-bek, the elder of the two brothers and Nadir Shah’s adjutant (eshikagasi), was murdered; Panah Ali-bek, the younger brother, and his retinue fled to Karabakh in 1738. According to Mirza Adigezal-bek, Nadir Shah replaced murdered Fazl Ali-bek with his younger brother, “handed him the chomak (staff), clad him in the clothes of an eshik-agasy, and conferred on him the rights of his dead elder brother;” after several days in his new post “the searching and menacing glances that Nadir Shah cast on him and his deliberate malice” forced Panah Ali-bek to flee; Mirza Adigezal-bek believed that Panah Ali-bek found it undignified to “carry the chomak, bow to Nadir Shah, and talk to his osauls.”30 The shah tried, but failed, to capture Panah Ali-bek and bring him back: the runaway spent some time at the yaylag of Kara Murtuz-bek, a feudal lord in Zangezur, where he rallied his retinue into a band to raid Ganja, Nakhchivan, Sheki, and other places.31 In 1747, assassination of Nadir Shah weakened central power to the extent that Panah Ali-bek submitted the larger part of the former dominions of the Karabakh beglyarbeks (to the south of Ganja) to his power. According to Mirza Jamal Javanshir of Karabakh, “when Nadir Shah was assas- sinated in the year 1160 (1747), above-mentioned Panah Ali-bek appeared among what remained of the Karabakh population; he selected the most suitable young men and started plundering the regions of Ganja, Nakhchivan, etc. He distributed wealth, clothes, horses, and other property among all the young men, especially in his closest circle. At that time, it became known that the ilats of Javanshir and other tribes which the shah had pushed to Horasan were moving back … exhausted, plundered, and poor. Panah Khan rallied the bravest young men from among his relatives and from the ilats to plunder the Shirvan, Sheki, Ganja, and Karabakh vilayets. He made all the young men independent and rich; other people loved him because he distributed cattle, horses, and awards; the recalcitrant were forced into submission by punishment and murder. None of those who lived in Javanshir, Otuziki, or other villages and ilats dared to rebel against the orders and commands of Panah Khan.”32

26 See: Mirza Adigezal-bek, op. cit., p. 50. 27 See: N.A. Javanshir, “O rodoslovnoy Melik-Aslanovykh,” Izvestia Azerbaidzhanskogo istoriko-rodoslovnogo obshchestva, Issue 2, Baku, 2001, pp. 23-34. 28 These districts became inherited magals mainly in the mid-17th century and later (see: P.T. Arutiunian, Osvoboditel- noe dvizhenie armianskogo naroda v pervoy chetverti XVIII veka, Moscow, 1954, p. 60). 29 See: N.A. Javanshir, op. cit.; Mirza Adigezal-bek, op. cit., p. 48; Mirza Jamal Javanshir of Karabakh, op. cit., p. 66. 30 Mirza Adigezal-bek, op. cit., p. 51; in January 1823 General Yermolov wrote to Prince Abbas-mirza that Panah Ali Khan (Penakh Khan) had been jarchi-bashi, that is, the head of the public criers (see: AKAK, Vol. VI, Part II, Tiflis, 1875, p. 274, Document No. 510). 31 See: E.B. Shukiur-zade, op. cit. 32 Mirza Jamal Javanshir of Karabakh, op. cit., p. 67.

Volume 8 Issue 1-2 2014 133 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION In 1748, he built the Fortress of Bayat, the first capital of his khanate, where he moved his family, relatives, and nobles of the ilats (nomadic tribes) that sided with him while he fought for the throne. In the same year, Adil (1747-1748), the nephew of Nazir Shah and the new shah of Persia, recognized him as the khan of Karabakh and sent a document of formal recognition and presents to the fortress: a precious robe, a horse with a gilt saddle, and a sword encrusted with precious stones.33 In 1751/52, the hostile environment forced the khan to move his capital from Bayat to the Tar- naut Fortress (Shahbulaghy). The new residence, likewise, proved to be too vulnerable; the next year, Panak Ali Khan, acting on the advice of Shahnazar melik of Varand, started building new walls and fortifications six parasangs (roughly two leagues.—Ed.) from the small village of Shushikend on the ruins of an old fortress destroyed by the Mongols.34 In 1756, the khan moved the entire population of the Shabulaghy to the fortress of Shusha, which for some time was called Panahabad.35 By that time, Panah Khan had subjugated all the Khamse magals. “Melik Shahnazar-bek, the old melik of the Varand magal, was the first who deemed it wise to accept his rule… For some time, the melik of Khachyn magal, who had been stubbornly opposing the pressure, was finally subjugated and appointed melik of his hereditary dominions… The meliks of Dizag and Chilaberd, as well as the Talysh magals continued fighting (with Panah Khan) for several years and became subjugated after murders, plundering, and other necessary measures.”36 A.-Q. Bakikhanov wrote: “Panah Khan was strengthening his power day by day; he subjugated the Armenian meliks and all the lands in the triangle between Khudaferin Bridge on the Arax, the Kyurek River, and the Bargushat magal. He also joined Meghri and Gyuney of the Karadag province, Tatev, and Sisian of the Nakhchivan, Terter-Kyulani of the Erivan, and Zangezur and Kafan of the Tabriz provinces. From time to time, he spread his power to Ardabil and other provinces.”37 Muhammed-Khasan Khan Qajar and Fatali Khan Afshar, ruler of the Urmia Khanate, two claimants to the shah throne, repeatedly and without much success besieged Shusha. The latter even managed to capture Ibrahim Khalil Agha, heir to the Karabakh throne, under the pretext of exchanging prisoners and betrothing his daughter to Panah Ali Khan’s son. In 1759, Panah Ali Khan gathered his best troops and, after entrusting the khanate to his second son Mekhrali-bek, joined the ruler (vekil) of Persia Karim Khan Zand to besiege the Fortress of Urmia. The allies won, but Karim Khan proved to be no less perfidious than Fatali Khan of Urmia before him. He kept Panah Ali Khan as an honorary prisoner and dispatched his son Ibrahim Khalil Agha to Karabakh with rich presents and, most importantly, the firman for the Karabakh Khanate. Karim Khan invited several other Azeri khans to Shiraz, allegedly to celebrate the victory. They were imprisoned; this event went down in history as the Shiraz imprisonment of the Azeri khans.38 Fairly soon, Panah Ali Khan died under strange circumstances. The last vizier of the Karabakh Khanate pointed out that “Panah Ali Khan did not remain long in the city of Shiraz… Finally his last hour came, and he committed his spirit to God in Shiraz. His body was brought to Karabakh with great honors and buried at his estate, now known as Aghdam. Allah, have mercy upon him!”39 Mirza Adigezal-bek wrote that Panah Ali Khan died “his own death” after he arrived in Shiraz and that “his remains were brought, with great honors, to Aghdam and buried at his own estate.”40 Mirza Yusif Nersesov in his Tarixi-Safi (A Truthful Story) also wrote that Panah Ali Khan, after falling ill in Shiraz, died a natural death. At the same time, he also offered a different version:

33 See: Ibid., p. 71. 34 See: E.B. Shukiur-zade, op. cit. 35 The coins minted in Shusha and accepted outside the Karabakh Khanate were called panahbadi, that is, “from Panah- bad.” 36 Mirza Jamal Javanshir of Karabakh, op. cit., pp. 69-71. 37 A.-Q. Bakikhanov, op. cit., p. 156. 38 See: Mirza Jamal Javanshir of Karabakh, op. cit., p. 76; E.B. Shukiur-zade, op. cit. 39 Mirza Jamal Javanshir of Karabakh, op. cit., p. 77. 40 Mirza Adigezal-bek, op. cit., p. 74.

134 Volume 8 Issue 1-2 2014 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION in an effort to get out of Shiraz, Panah Ali Khan feigned death, while Karim Khan, who guessed what had happened, ordered that he be murdered, embalmed, and sent with honors to Karabakh.41 A.-Q. Bakikhanov described Panah Ali Khan as a “courageous and enterprising emir, very simple with people and very gifted.”42

Ibrahim Khalil Khan: Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea

The Karabakh khans remained independent until the end of the 18th century, when Ibrahim Khalil Khan, the strongest among the Azeri khans, and his khanate became a target of Russian and Persian expansion. After winning the 1768-1774 war with the Ottoman Empire and signing the highly favorable Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca, Russia became even more involved in the Caucasus. In the 1780s, Russia was nursing a project of setting up a vassal Christian state in the Azeri lands, including the Karabakh Khanate. To achieve this it was planned to remove Ibrahim Khalil Khan and transform his lands and the territory of Karadag, its neighbor, into “an Armenian region independent of all except Russia.” The task was entrusted to Lieutenant General Pavel Potemkin, who commanded the Russian army in the Northern Caucasus.43 In the summer of 1783, at the fortress of Georgievsk, he signed a treaty on patronage and supreme power of the Russian Empire over the Kartli-Kakheti Kingdom. To prevent similar developments, Ibrahim Khalil Khan contacted the Russian commander in the Caucasus: in April 1783, he informed Lieutenant General Potemkin that he was ready to accept Rus- sian citizenship. In January 1784, he sent another messenger to confirm his previous readiness to become a subject of Russia, but he wanted to know whether Russia would interfere in his internal affairs.44 Empress Catherine the Great, who wanted the speediest possible resolution of the problem, wrote to Prince Grigory Potemkin in May 1784: “The letters of Ibrahim Khan are much politer than what the Turks or Persians have written to me. Will you please let me know who he is? How did he become a khan? Is he young or old, strong or weak, and whether the Persians are disposed toward him?”45 When talking to her representatives, Ibrahim Khalil Khan could no longer conceal his negative attitude toward the invitation to become a Russian subject. In September 1787, the troops of King Heraclius II and two battalions of chasseurs under Colonel Burnashev stationed in Eastern Georgia used the need to return the people of Qazax (subjects of Heraclius) who had fled to Karabakh as a pretext to approach Ganja and move further. In August 1787, when another Russian-Turkic War had broken out, Colonel Burnashev was recalled to the Caucasian line.46 After avoiding the Russian invasion in the 1780s, in 1795, Ibrahim Khalil Khan beat back the first Iranian raid led by Agha Mohammed Khan (Shah since 1796), the founder of the Qajar dynasty in Persia. Having failed to place the North Azeri khans under his power with threats, the new ruler of

41 See: Mirzə Yusif Qarabaği, “Tarixi-Safi,” in: Qarabağnamələr, p. 27. 42 A.-Q. Bakikhanov, op. cit., p. 159. 43 See: P.G. Butkov, Materialy dlia novoy istorii Kavkaza s 1722 po 1803 god, Part II, St. Petersburg, 1869, pp. 142-143. 44 See: Ibid., p. 144. 45 Quoted from: V.N. Leviatov, Ocherki iz istorii Azerbaidzhana v XVIII veke, Baku, 1948, pp. 148-149. 46 See: Ibid., pp. 146-147.

Volume 8 Issue 1-2 2014 135 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION Persia had no choice but to cross the Arax and lead his multi-thousand troops into Northern Azerbai- jan. Late in July 1795, Agha Mohammed Shah dispatched his brother with troops to Erivan and entered the dominions of the khan of Karabakh. The huge army led by the shah tried to capture Shusha for thirty-three days, after which the dispirited shah moved to Tiflis. The city was captured on 12 September, 1795 and plundered.47 The Russian government could not reconcile itself to the Persian achievements in Transcaucasia. As could be expected, in the spring of 1796, a Russian army led by General Valerian Zubov entered Daghestan and Azerbaijan and captured the largest cities—Derbent, Baku, Quba, Shemakha, and Ganja. To remain independent, the North Azeri khans meandered between the strong powers: they demonstrated loyalty to Russia and Agha Mohammed Shah, while looking at Turkey for support. Mirza Adigezal-bek wrote that when Ibrahim Khalil Khan learned that the Russian troops had arrived, he “dispatched his son Abul Fatkh Khan with numerous rich presents to the representatives of Honorable Great Sardar Count Valerian Zubov. He expressed his loyalty and gratitude and wrote soothing letters to the close associates of Her Majesty Empress Catherine to demonstrate his mod- esty (obedience). The sardar treated Abul Fatkh Khan with unlimited honors and benevolence and dispatched, through Derbent to Kizliar, a letter from the late Ibrahim Khan, who abided in heaven, to bring it to the High Steps of the House of Her Majesty Powerful Empress. Count Zubov sent many precious presents to late Ibrahim Khan through one of the princes … and sent a staff encrusted with precious stones to learned Master Mollah Panah Vagif.”48 When quoting Ibrahim Khalil Khan’s letter to Zubov, in which he asked for Russia’s patronage, Russian historian Petr Butkov offered an apt comment: “Ibrahim Khan of Shusha, one of the main figures, behaved perfidiously on the sly” because “he was between two fires: he feared his enemy Agha Magomet Khan and feared losing his dominions to the Russians.”49 The death of Empress Catherine the Great on 6 November, 1796 put a stop to Russia’s pressure on the North Azeri khanates. Emperor Paul I pulled the troops back to the Caucasian line. Count Zubov asked for retirement and was granted permission; he was replaced with Count Ivan Gudovich as commander of troops on the Caucasian line.50 Having avoided Russia’s conquest, the North Azeri khans (Ibrahim Khalil Khan among others) were left to face Shah of Persia Agha Mohammed, who, in the spring of 1797, led an even larger army into the Karabakh Khanate. Aware that a starving and plundered Karabakh could no longer be able to defend Shusha, Ibrahim Khalil Khan, along with his closest associates, retreated from the fortress to seek refuge in the free communities (jamaats) of Jar-Belaken. “The people of Jar, Belaken, and Ilisa welcomed and honored him.”51 No wonder, Agha Mohammed Shah entered the practically abandoned city without a single shot being fired. Several days later, on 5 June, 1797, he was murdered by his courtiers.52 As soon as the news about his death reached Shusha, the Persian generals and nobles fled Shu- sha in panic. For some time, the fortress remained in the hands of Mohammed-bek, Ibrahim Khalil Khan’s nephew, who tried to remain in power by murdering those who supported his uncle, including Molla Panah Vagif.53 Ibrahim Khalil Khan, in turn, after hearing about the death of the Persian shah, first sent his second son Mekhti Quli Agha to Karabakh “to calm down the people and bring quiet and order; then

47 See: Ibid., pp. 171-173. 48 Mirza Adigezal-bek, op. cit., p. 84. 49 P.G. Butkov, op. cit., pp. 405-406. 50 See: V.N. Leviatov, op. cit., pp. 188-190. 51 Mirza Jamal Javanshir of Karabakh, op. cit., p. 84. 52 See: V.N. Leviatov, op. cit., pp. 188-190. 53 See: Ibid., pp. 192-193.

136 Volume 8 Issue 1-2 2014 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION he dispatched his eldest son Mohammed Hasan Agha to Karabakh” and later “arrived in Karabakh [himself] to pick up the reins of government.”54 As soon as his uncle appeared in Karabakh, Mohammad-bek fled to Sheki, where he was captured by Mohammad Hasan Khan of Sheki and transferred to Mustafa Khan of Shemakha, who executed him to revenge the murder of his father.55 After a while, new Persian ruler Fatali Shah (1797-1834) “sent an ambassador to Ibrahim Khan to express his insistent wish that the khan obey him.” Ibrahim Khan deemed it “wise to establish good relations with Fatali Shah:” he had no choice but to betroth his daughter Agha begim Agha to Fatali Shah and even sent one of his sons, Abulfat Agha, to the court “where he was treated as one of his [Fatali Shah’s] noblest emirs.”56

Russian Citizenship Accepted

In 1801, the murder of Russian Emperor Paul I changed the political situation in and around the Caucasus once more: from his very first days on the throne, Emperor Alexander I (1801-1825) never let the southern sector of Russia’s expansion out of his sight. In 1801, he issued a manifesto that made the Kartli-Kakheti Kingdom part of Russia. The Russian government used Eastern Georgia as a foot- hold from which to push into the North Azeri khanates, either peacefully or by force. It was under Lieutenant General Prince Pavel Tsitsianov, who in 1802-1806 commanded the Russian troops stationed in Georgia, that Russia moved into the North Azeri lands. In March 1803, a unit of Major General Guliakov subdued the Jar-Belaken jamaats and plundered Belaken. A month later, in April 1803, the Jar elders and representatives of the Elisu Tatar Sultanate “neighboring and invariably friendly” toward the Jar-Belaken jamaats, were left with only one option: to sign a document in Tiflis that made them subjects of Russia.57 In November 1803, Prince Tsitsianov moved his troops into the Ganja Khanate; on 29 Novem- ber, he presented an ultimatum to Jawad Khan of Ganja and demanded surrender. The khan refused; General Tsitsianov surrounded the fortress and took it by storm in the small hours of 3 January, 1804. Jawad Khan and one of his sons were among the 1,500 defenders killed; the Russians took 17,224 male and female prisoners (the figures quoted by Prince Tsitsianov). He wrote: “The geographic location of the Ganja fortress, which kept the rest of Azerbaijan in fear, makes it the most important acquisition for Russia.”58 After capturing the fortress and the khanate, Prince Tsitsianov dispatched threatening letters to the North Azeri khans. On 8 January, 1804, while in Ganja, he sent an ultimatum to Ibrahim Khalil Khan, which said in part: “The fortress was stormed and taken six days ago … which means that you, its closest neighbor, should have sought protection from the strongest, but you have not yet sent me a letter of greeting. Jawad Khan bathed his pride in blood and I do not regret him since God opposes the proud… I do hope, Your High Dignity, that you will not follow his example and will abide by the general rule that the weak bow to the strong and you do not expect to compete with me. I open the door to the high patronage of our Great and Elevated by God the Emperor and will look forward to meeting one of your confidential messengers or one of your children to announce to them the rules under which you will be received.”59

54 Mirza Adigezal-bek, op. cit., p. 89. 55 See: V.N. Leviatov, op. cit., pp. 192-193. 56 Mirza Jamal Javanshir of Karabakh, op. cit., p. 88. 57 See: AKAK, Vol. II, pp. 683-684, Doc. 1383. 58 Ibid., pp. 588-594, 597, Doc. 1172, 1173, 1179, 1181, 1182, 1186, 1194. 59 Ibid., p. 696, Doc. 1416.

Volume 8 Issue 1-2 2014 137 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION This means that the Russian general threatened the Khan of Karabakh with the sad fate of Jawad Khan of Ganja if he refused to follow his advice. The threats were based on the fact that under the Treaty of Georgievsk, two Russian battalions were stationed in Eastern Georgia, while the Caucasian Corps of the Russian Army stood nearby, along the Caucasian Line.60 This triggered the First Russo-Persian war of 1804-1813: in May 1804, Persia demanded that Russia pull out from Transcaucasia; in June 1804, it started a war.61 Ibrahim Khalil Khan found himself in a quandary: Russia was pressing from the north, while Persia was advancing from the south. He had no choice but to seek the patronage of the Russian crown. In May 1804, he sent his representative to Prince Tsitsianov to ask for military support.62 In October 1804, Prince Tsitsianov dispatched Georgian noble Ninia Joraev to Ibrahim Khalil Khan to present the main points of the future treaty with Russia. In January 1805, after reaching a verbal agreement on military support, the prince instructed Major Dmitry Lisanevich of the 17th Regiment of Chasseurs to carry on the talks. He was expected to deliver a copy of the discussed treaty to Ibrahim Khalil Khan and decline any amendments; he was further instructed to invite the khan to Elisavetpol (Ganja) to sign the treaty; to reconnoiter the strategic situation of the Shusha fortress and persuade Mohammed Hasan Agha, elder son of Ibrahim Khalil Khan, “that he and his descendants will profit from what has been done.”63 Simultaneously, the khan received a letter from Prince Tsitsianov, in which the Russian general guaranteed him personal safety, continued existence of the Karabakh Khanate, and transfer of power in it to the khan’s descendants. He also congratulated the khan on the December 1804 victory of the Karabakh troops led by Mohammed Hasan Agha at Dizag over the Persian troops fighting under Abulfat Agha, another son of Ibrahim Khalil Khan.64 On 14 May, 1805, Ibrahim Khalil Khan of Karabakh, who accepted the terms of the treaty, signed it in the Russian camp on the shores of the Kurakchay River (in the Elizavetpol District). Under his Oath of Allegiance, Ibrahim Khan of Shusha and Karabakh declared his submission to the Russian Empire, along with his family, descendants, and property (the so-called Treaty of Kurakchay). General of Infantry Prince Tsitsianov signed the treaty on behalf of Emperor Alexander I. Under the treaty, Alexander I “promised by His Imperial Majesty and in the name of his descendants that the khan and his heirs will keep all their dominions… Ibrahim Khan and the house of his heirs and descendants will remain, under all conditions, in the Shusha Khanate; they will preserve the power to administer it, mete out justice and punishment, distribute incomes produced by his estate, while 500 Russian military with guns will be stationed in the Shusha fortress.” Ibrahim Khalil Khan, in turn, accepted the power of the Russian Emperor together with the responsibility to pay the imperial treasury 8 thousand gold rubles every year; find houses for troops stationed in Shusha, supply them with food, and send his grandson as a hostage to Tiflis with a maintenance of 10 silver rubles a day. Under the treaty, Ibrahim Khalil Khan could no longer deal with third countries and lost the right of independent communication with the neighboring khanates.65 Under the imperial decree of 8 July, 1805, Ibrahim Khalil Khan was made Lieutenant General as Prince Tsitsianov had suggested; his two elder sons (Mohammed Hasan Agha and Mekhti Quli Agha) were made major generals, while his third son Hanlar Agha was promoted to colonel. Ibrahim Khalil Khan and his descendants were expected to receive a flag with the National Emblem of the Russian Empire and a saber encrusted with precious stones as a sign of their power. Prince Tsi- tsianov also suggested that Mohammed Hasan Agha, the heir apparent of the Karabakh Khanate,

60 See: F.M. Abasov, Karabakhskoe khanstvo, Baku, 2007. 61 See: AKAK, Vol. II, pp. 807-810, Doc. 1665, 1668. 62 See: Ibid., pp. 697-698, Doc. 1421. 63 Ibid., pp. 698-699, Doc. 1422, 1425. 64 See: Ibid., pp. 698-700. Doc. 1423, 1428, 1429. 65 See: Ibid., pp. 702-705, Doc. 1436.

138 Volume 8 Issue 1-2 2014 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION should receive a gold medal encrusted with diamonds and an inscription “For Loyalty” in Russian and Farsi.66 On 17 August, 1805, the imperial decree on the approval of the Treaty of Kurakchay, the document confirming the title of the khan for Ibrahim Khalil Khan and his descendants, as well as imperial decree that made the khan of Karabakh and his sons generals and colonels, reached General Tsitsianov in Tiflis,67 from where the papers were dispatched to Ibrahim Khalil Khan and his sons along with a letter of congratulations from Prince Tsitsianov (dated 1 October, 1805). The letters said that the flag with the National Emblem of the Russian Empire, the sword that “confirms the title of the khan,” as well as the medal for Mohammed Hasan Agha were already being made in the cabinet of His Impe- rial Majesty.68 Submission of the strategically important Karabakh Khanate meant that subjugation of all khanates of Northern Azerbaijan was only a matter of time. After correctly assessing the importance of joining Karabakh to Russia, Prince Tsitsianov wrote to the emperor on 22 May, 1805 when the Treaty of Kurakchay had been signed that “its geographic location makes Karabakh the gate to Azer- baijan;” Karabakh brought Georgia closer to the Baku Khanate, which Prince Tsitsianov expected to capture by the fall of 1805.69

Death of Ibrahim Khalil Khan and Investigation of His Murder

The Treaty of Kurakchay proved a bad shield against the active military actions of the First Russo-Persian War of 1804-1813. The Russian generals correctly expected that Persia would move its army concentrated on the opposite bank of the Arax against the Karabakh Khanate. This explains why as soon as the treaty was signed, six companies of the 17th Regiment of Chasseurs (not more than 300 military) with three guns and 30 Cossacks under Major Lisanevich were stationed in Shusha. In June 1805, Persian troops crossed the Arax and launched a military offensive on Kara- bakh.70 These developments divided the closest circle of old Ibrahim Khalil Khan into two camps. Those who supported the pro-Russian orientation sided with Mohammed Hasan Agha, the eldest son of Ibrahim Khalil Khan, the heir apparent under the Treaty of Kurakchay; on many occasions he led the Karabakh cavalry against the Persian troops. Those who looked toward Persia concentrated around Mirza Ali-bek, the old khan’s cousin, and his nephew Fawzi-bek. They remained in contact with Abulfat Agha, another son of Ibrahim Khalil Khan, who commanded the forward detachments in Abbas Mirza’s army. In November 1805, the sudden death of Muhammed Hasan Agha deprived Russia of its main supporter among the retinue of the khan of Karabakh. In his report to Alexander I, Prince Tsitsianov described Major General Mohammed Hasan Agha as the emperor’s “most loyal and most faithful slave,” whose death deprived Prince Tsitsianov of “his firmest support in Karabakh, which he could always expect from him.” At the same time, the Russians acquired another lever of pressure on Ibra- him Khalil Khan’s closest circle through the choice and approval of a new heir. Under the Treaty of

66 See: AKAK, Vol. II, pp. 712-713, Doc. 1455, 1456. 67 See: Ibid., pp. 718-719, Doc. 1471. 68 See: Ibid., p. 722, Doc. 1477, 1478. 69 See: Ibid., pp. 702-705, Doc. 1436. 70 See: P.O. Bobrovskiy, Istoria 13-go leyb-gvardeyskogo Erivanskogo Ego velichestva polka za 250 let, Part III, St. Pe- tersburg, 1893, p. 221.

Volume 8 Issue 1-2 2014 139 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION Kurakchay, this post belonged to the eldest son of Major General Mohammed Hasan Agha. By late 1805, however, his second son, Major General Mekhti Quli Agha, had managed to gather a much stronger group of Karabakh beks.71 In December 1805, Mekhti Quli Agha earned another point by joining the troops under the command of Prince Tsitsianov in the Shirvan Khanate with his own 350-strong unit of Karabakh cavalry. On 25 December, 1805, Prince Tsitsianov signed a treaty with Mustafa Khan of Shirvan, which joined his khanate to Russia; on 9 January, he moved his troops to Baku. As soon as information about the intrigues of Abulfat Agha, Mirza Ali-bek, and Fawzi-bek in Karabakh reached Prince Tsitsianov, he sent the cavalry unit of Mekhti Quli Khan back to Shusha. In his letters to Ibrahim Khalil Khan, Mekhti Quli Khan, and Major Lisanevich, Prince Tsitsianov wrote that “the old khan was a weak ruler” and that he had instructed Mekhti Quli Khan to help his father “liquidate the traitors.”72 Fighting in Karabakh continued in the summer of 1806; earlier, on 8 February of the same year, General of Infantry Prince Pavel Tsitsianov, supreme commander in Georgia, was killed at the walls of the Baku Fortress; in the small hours of 27 May, 1806, Karabakh ruler Lieutenant General Ibrahim Khalil Khan Javanshir was killed outside Shusha. After learning about the death of Prince Tsitsianov, Major General Petr Nesvetaev, who commanded the troops in Pambak in Azerbaijan, arrived in Tiflis where he wrote an order to appoint himself supreme commander of the troops in Transcaucasia. Lieutenant General Grigory Glazenap, who commanded the troops on the Caucasian Line, was appointed acting chief commander. He remained in Georgievsk, from where he issued orders to Major General Nesvetaev. On 2 June, 1806, General of Infantry Count Ivan Gudovich (1806-1809) was appointed supreme commander in Geor- gia and was expected in Tiflis no earlier than July or August 1806.73 By mid-May 1806, the Persians had brought a fairly sizable army to the southern borders of the Karabakh Khanate. Continued hunger in Shusha and the threat that the Persians might destroy the grain harvest forced Ibrahim Khalil Khan to deny Major Lisanevich and his unit food supplies, which the latter interpreted as a violation of the Treaty of Kurakchay.74 In May 1806, the conflict with the Shusha commandant drove Ibrahim Khalil Khan, along with several members of his family (his wife Tuba Khanym of Sheki, sons Colonel Hanlar Agha and Ab- bas Quli Agha, and daughter Soltanat Begim) and their retinue, out of Shusha under the pretext of “seeking fresh air” (the hot season had already begun). They settled 4 versts away from the fortress in a place the Russian sources called Mirza Ali Bekov Sengir.75 According to the Shusha elders who complained about Major Lisanevich and his actions, Ibra- him Khalil Khan left Shusha because he was dissatisfied with the orders of the Russian commander: “Majors Lisanevich and Joraev did not know how to deal with people; they treated us badly, oppressed the subjects, acted contrary to the conditions of the treaty, and interfered in local affairs outside their competence without consulting us. Saddened by their behavior, late Ibrahim Khan ordered a tent to be pitched outside the fortress and stayed there with one of his wives and three sons. All the other wives and children remained in the fortress; every two or three days the khan visited the fortress and then returned to the tent.”76 In September 1806, Lisanevich, by that time promoted to Lieutenant Colonel, wrote in his report to Major General Nesvetaev that neither he nor Major Joraev had ever said anything offensive enough to Ibrahim Khalil Khan to “make him leave the fortress with wife and children.” He insisted that by

71 See: AKAK, Vol. II, pp. 725-726, Doc. 1485. 72 Ibid., p. 727, Doc. 1491, 1492, 1493; P.O. Bobrovskiy, op. cit., pp. 241-242. 73 See: P.O. Bobrovskiy, op. cit., p. 243. 74 See: Ibid., p. 244. 75 See: Ibid., p. 245. 76 AKAK, Vol. III, Tiflis, 1869, pp. 340-341, Doc. 624.

140 Volume 8 Issue 1-2 2014 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION the time the khan left the fortress, he was traitorously disposed. He left the capital where the chasseurs of Lisanevich were stationed to be able to maintain contacts with the Persian military, his son Abulfat Agha, and relatives Mirza Ali-bek and Fawzi-bek, who were expected to reach the khan in the small hours of 27 May with a two-thousand-strong Persian unit.77 Lieutenant Colonel Lisanevich also pointed out that he had received this information from different sources: from secret agents sent abroad, from the melik of Jamshid, from the people living in Karabakh and, most important, from the khan’s closet relatives and two contenders to the throne—Ibrahim Khalil Khan’s son Mekhti Quli Agha and his grandson Jafar Quli Agha. The latter never denied this; in a letter addressed to Count Gudovich, who commanded the Rus- sian troops in Georgia he wrote: “…in the absence of Prince Tsitsianov, the enemies gained control over my very old grandfather, who succumbed to their arguments and flattering suggestions; I prefer to pass over in silence what he has done against his oath of allegiance—he was gradually pushed toward this, and this was the cause of his death. I can only tell you that I have done everything I could to keep him away from what happened, but failed. I informed the head of the Shusha garrison of these events.”78 Iranian historians confirm that Ibrahim Khalil Khan and Persian Prince Abbas Mirza, heir apparent, exchanged letters. In Rovzat-us-Safa, its author Rza Quli Khan Idayat wrote that Ibrahim Khalil Khan sent a letter to Prince Abbas Mirza in Ardabil, in which he asked the prince “to dispatch his favorite and mighty young lion of a son Abulfat Khan Javanshir in front of his troops as soon as they reached Karabakh by the Kapan road so that he will be able to support his old father.” According to the same source, Ibrahim Khalil Khan asked “to dispatch Farajollah Khan Shahsevan with another unit along the Chanagchy road in front of the victorious army.”79 The Shusha elders explained that when the Persian troops were moving toward Karabakh, the khan, who did not want “to lose the harvest as had happened the year before” and afraid that the Persians would plunder his estate, “sent people to the Persians and stopped them before the Russian troops arrived.”80 After learning that Ibrahim Khalil Khan had allegedly betrayed him, Lisanevich sent Mekhti Quli Agha and Jafar Quli Agha to him “to persuade him to end his contacts with the Persians and come back, together with the family, to Shusha.” Ibrahim Khalil Khan refused to return to Shusha, which forced Major Lisanevich (who imagined that Ibrahim Khalil Khan would join forces with Abulfat Agha) to move, in the small hours of 27 May, together with 100 chasseurs of the 17th regiment to the place where Ibrahim Khalil Khan was camping with his family. There are several widely differing stories about what happened at that night. Lieutenant Colonel Lisanevich reported to Major General Nesvetaev: “I ordered the attacking officers and privates not to open fire before the enemy did this and asked those who knew the language to shout to the enemy not to open fire but to surrender together with the khan. I attacked along a different road, not the one that led straight to the fortress where there were outposts. They did not open fire until they were a rifle shot away, at which point they started shouting and opened heavy fire. No matter how long I and others shouted to them to persuade them to cease fire and surrender, they continued firing and wounded one of the chasseurs, who died several days later. Seeing this impudence I ordered the chasseurs to open fire and attack; they bravely moved forward; very soon the traitors were pushed away from their advantageous position; the khan and several other people were killed by a rifle shot on spot; the chasseurs hunted others in the shrubbery and ravines; his son, daughter, and wife, who died of their

77 See: AKAK, Vol. III, pp. 334-335. Doc. 610; P.O. Bobrovskiy, op. cit., p. 245. 78 Ibid., pp. 339-340. Doc. 621. 79 Quoted in Azeri from: Ə. Çingizoğlu, “İbrahimxəlil xan Sarıcalı-Cavanşir,” Soy: elmi-kütləvi dərgi, Baku, No. 6 (26), 2009, pp. 47-53 (A. Chinghis-ogly, “Ibrahim Khalil Khan Saryjally-Javanshir,” Soy scientific journal, Baku, No. 6 (26), 2009, pp. 47-53). 80 AKAK, Vol. III, pp. 340-341, Doc. 624.

Volume 8 Issue 1-2 2014 141 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION injuries, had been obviously been wounded when they fled in the dark along with others and were not recognized. I treated the traitors’ personal belongings that remained in the tents as the rightful spoils of war acquired through the use of force. There were few of them and I let my troops take them. The best had been removed by the servants as soon as the fighting began. Later Mekhti Agha found many of them.”81 Iranian historian Mirza Mohammad Sadig Marwazi offered his own description of the slaughter organized by Lieutenant Colonel Lisanevich: “As soon as the Russians learned that Ibrahim Khalil Khan had asked Abbas Mirza for help, they subjugated Jafar Quli Khan to their power and at night entered the imaret of Ibrahim Khalil Khan when all the people were asleep.” It should be said here that since Jafar Quli Agha, grandson of Ibrahim Khalil Khan, supported a pro-Russian orientation, the Iranian historians accused him of the death of his grandfather or even implied that he had been personally involved. The documents published by the Caucasian Archeographic Commission show that that night Jafar Quli Agha remained in Shusha. Mirza Mohammad Sadig Marwazi further writes: “As soon as the Russian soldiers saw the traitor next to them, they fell upon him and tore him to pieces. He cried out after the first blow and woke the rest. All women finally woke up. The Russians who saw this killed two small children of Ibrahim Khalil Khan with sabers. A Russian official pierced a baby with his sword and threw it out of the cradle into the center of the room.”82 The Shusha elders who complained about Lieutenant Colonel Lisanevich offered their own version of the same event: “Major Lisanevich and the milakhvar (a title of Georgian nobles; the reference is to Major Joraev.—E.I.) unintentionally took troops, moved against the khan at midnight and killed first him, then his wife, who was the sister of Ali Khan (sister of Selim Khan of Sheki.—E.I.), one of his daughters and his son, as well as about 30 officials and relatives, who tried to hide (Colonel Hanlar Agha, son of Ibrahim Khalil Khan was the only survivor.—E.I.). They plundered and stole all the murdered people’s belongings, their money, clothes, and jewelry, causing despair among us and our neighbors. If Ibrahim Khan indeed had gone against his duties as a subject of Your Majesty, he should have been captured, along with his family and relatives, and put in the fortress. They should have been kept there, while you, Your Majesty, should have been informed about this; no one could have opposed Your Majesty’s fair decision.”83 Selim Khan of Sheki, brother-in-law of Ibrahim Khalil Khan, was of the same opinion. In a letter to the Elizavetpol commandant, he wrote that Ibrahim Khalil Khan had entered into correspondence with the Persians because of Major Lisanevich’s behavior: “Major Lisanevich, Milahvar, and melik of Karabakh Jimshid came into collusion among themselves and killed Ibrahim Khan and his servants; they captured my sister; they killed her too, even though they recognized her. Aggrieved by what Major Lisanevich was doing, the late khan did negotiate with the Persians, but he should have been treated according to his loyalty as a Russian subject: he surrendered the fortress without a fight and gave you foodstuffs and paid tribute, contrary to the Muslim ruler.”84 The last vizier of the Karabakh Khanate Mirza Jamal Javanshir left us the following description of the same events: “In the same spring of 1806, the Qizilbash troops crossed the Arax into Karabakh once more. Secret agents were sent to Ibrahim Khan to calm him and assure him of Iranian support. The Karabakh troops and the chasseurs of Major Lisanevich were not enough to oppose this strong army. It could have easily trampled the ilats and villages of Karabakh, the threat increased by the fact that this was happening at harvest time. Ibrahim Khan decided to remain polite when dealing with the Qizilbashi and deemed it necessary to inform the Major, who firmly assured him that very soon the troops of the High State of Russia would arrive. In fact, they came too late. Meanwhile, since the

81 Ibid., pp. 334-335. Doc. 610; P.O. Bobrovskiy, op. cit., p. 245. 82 Quoted in Azeri from: Çingizoğlu Ə. İbrahimxəlil xan Sarıcalı-Cavanşir, pp. 47-53. 83 AKAK, Vol. III, p. 341, Doc. 624. 84 Ibid., p. 272, Doc. 491.

142 Volume 8 Issue 1-2 2014 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION Qizilbash troops had come up as close to two parasangs from the fortress, Ibrahim Khan removed his family from Khanbagy to a locality close to the fortress. Ill-intentioned people stirred up the Major with their lies. At night he went to the place where the khan was staying; he and some of the members of his family and closest circle were murdered by the will of fate.”85 The document Supreme Commander in Georgia Count Ivan Gudovich sent to Minister of Land Forces Sergey Viazmitinov on 21 August, 1806 looks like indirect confirmation that Major Lisanev- ich was guilty of at least exceeding his powers: “According to the reports I received from commander of troops in Georgia Major General Nesvetaev, it became clear that Lieutenant Colonel Lisanevich of the 17th Regiment of the Chasseurs and Major Joraev, who acted with him, had attacked, together with a unit of chasseurs, and without any reason, Ibrahim Khan of Shusha (who had no troops at his side except 35 male and female servants), who was camping with one of his wives and three small children outside the fortress of Shusha in the orchards on a mountain without any kind of fortifications. He came out of the tent to meet the unit without firing a single shot. The chasseurs began firing and using their bayonets. Ibrahim Khan was killed; his property became the war spoils of the attackers.” Count Gudovich further referred to information supplied in a letter from Mekhti Quli Agha and a report by the Shusha elders, as well as confirmation supplied by the chief of the Trinity Mus- keteer Regiment Major General Petr Nebolsin. This forced Count Gudovich “to launch a formal investigation to show the relatives of Ibrahim Khan and the other resigned peoples that the laws and justice of His Imperial Majesty do not allow room for crime and invariably offered fair protection.”86 The investigation was entrusted to a commission chaired by Lisanevich’s superior, Chief of the 17th Regiment of Chasseurs Colonel Pavel Kariagin, who had become a legend during his lifetime. Lieutenant Colonel Kotliarevskiy of the same regiment and Major Reni of the Trinity Musketeer Regiment were appointed members of the commission. Here was how Pavel Bobrovskiy, author of the well-known Istoria 13-go Leib-Grenadersko Erivanskogo Ego Velichestva polka za 250 let (History of 250 Years of the 13th His Majesty Erivan Grenadiers of the Life Guards Regiment), described the course of investigation: “Kariagin, who had barely recovered from the illness he suffered during the march and who had no time to rest properly, had to go to Shusha. Lisanevich accused Kariagin of being biased; he complained that he was slan- dered and asked to be transferred to Tiflis. Count Gudovich refused. It seems that Lieutenant Colonel Kotliarevskiy sided with Lisanevich and was very rude to the chief. Apprehensive of violence (emphasis mine.—E.I.), Kariagin had to leave Shusha for Elisavetpol. Count Gudovich, in turn, deemed it necessary to recall Kotliarevskiy to Tiflis and ordered Kariagin to assume the duties of the military commandant of Shusha, commander of the troops stationed in Karabakh, and continue the investigation. We can assume that Kariagin personally and from the military standpoint did not approve of what Lisanevich had done in Shusha. Lisanevich, whose treatment of Ibrahim Khalil Khan had been far from perfect, was indignant.”87 When writing the regiment’s history, Pavel Bobrovskiy relied on a large number of documents from the archives of the headquarters of the Caucasian Military District; he deemed it necessary, however, to drop the details that brought Colonel Kariagin to the conclusion that “what Lisanevich had done in Shusha was far from impeccable.” General Bobrovskiy, likewise, dropped the details of the conflict between Kariagin and Lisan- evich and Kotliarevskiy and offered the following by way of summing up: “These circumstances shook straightforward and noble Colonel Kariagin, whose health was strongly affected by the exces- sive efforts and incessant military marches. He fell ill with a fever that rapidly developed and brought him to his grave. He died on 7 May, 1807.”88

85 Mirza Jamal Javanshir of Karabakh, op. cit., p. 96. 86 AKAK, Vol. III, pp. 331-332, Doc. 605. 87 P.O. Bobrovskiy, op. cit., p. 252. 88 Ibidem.

Volume 8 Issue 1-2 2014 143 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION After his death it was discovered that “Lisanevich was not guilty of Ibrahim Khalil Khan’s violent death; ‘fully convinced’ of this, the supreme commander asked the Emperor to relieve Lisanevich, who had been diligent officer, of responsibility for this crime.”89 Supreme commander in Georgia General of Infantry Count Gudovich remained unimpressed by the results of the preliminary investigation by Major General Nebolsin, which confirmed that Lisanevich and Joraev had attacked Ibrahim Khalil Khan “without any reason” and by Nebolsin’s personal conviction that “their actions did not comply with their official duties and official ranks.”90 The supreme commander refused to take into account the results of the investigation carried out by late Colonel Kariagin, who was convinced that the way Lieutenant Colonel Lisanevich had treated Ibrahim Khalil Khan was neither impeccable nor irreproachable.91 The investigation of the murder of Ibrahim Khalil Khan of Karabakh was discontinued and the case was closed.

Claimants to the Khan Throne and Confirmation of the New Khan of Karabakh

The death of Ibrahim Khalil Khan made Major General Mekhti Quli Agha and his nephew Jafar Quli Agha, who both had claims to the throne, irreconcilable rivals. Mirza Jamal Javanshir wrote that “without violating the rules of loyalty to the High State, they tried to pacify the disturbed population.”92 The day after the murder, Persian troops (which, according to Lisanevich, had to join the troops of late Ibrahim Khalil Khan) appeared at a distance of two versts from the fortress. After leaving Mekhti Quli Khan in Shusha, Major Lisanevich, at the head of 150 chasseurs and the cavalry of Jafar Quli Agha, moved toward the Persians; he forced them to retreat and brought back several people from the Karabakh villages who had followed the Persian detachment.93 Full-scale fighting between the Russian and Persian troops in Karabakh was resumed two weeks after the death of Ibrahim Khalil Khan. The Persians and their commander Prince Abbas Mirza camped in Agoglan. On 5 June, 1806, Chief of the Trinity Musketeer Regiment Major General Nebolsin (appointed by Major General Nesvetaev, who was acting commander of the troops in Transcaucasia, the Brigadier General of the Russian troops stationed in the North Azeri khanates) moved out of his camp on the Kurakchay toward Shusha. Not far from the Askeran Fortress, his regiment of 1,092 infantrymen, 113 Cossacks, and 8 guns was strengthened by 109 chasseurs of Major Lisanevich and the Karabakh infantry under Major General Mekhti Quli Khan. On 13 June, 1806, the Russian and much stronger Persian troops (about 4 thousand infantrymen and 16 thousand strong cavalry) clashed in the Khonashin Gorge. After defeating the much larger Persian army, Major General Nebolsin instructed Major Lisanevich to pursue the retreating enemy. On 16 June, Lisanevich with 900 chasseurs, a 250-trong Azeri cavalry unit, and 200 Armenian infantrymen under Jafar Quli Agha moved by forced march out of Shusha toward the Nakhchivan border. Four days later, he caught up with the Persian unit of Abulfat Agha, Mirza Ali-bek, and Fawzi-bek, defeated them and drove them beyond the Arax. In his report to Major General Nebolsin, Lisanevich pointed to “the outstanding bravery of Jafar Quli and his officers.”94

89 Ibid., p. 246. 90 AKAK, Vol. III, p. 331, Doc. 604. 91 See: P.O. Bobrovskyi, op. cit., p. 252. 92 Mirza Jamal Javanshir of Karabakh, op. cit., p. 97. 93 See: AKAK, Vol. III, pp. 334-335, Doc. 610. 94 P.O. Bobrovskiy, op. cit., pp. 246-248; Mirza Jamal Javanshir of Karabakh, op. cit., pp. 97-98.

144 Volume 8 Issue 1-2 2014 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION A detailed description of what went on in the first weeks after the death of Ibrahim Khalil Khan explains why the Russian commanders in the Caucasus recommended Major General Mekhti Quli Agha, rather than his nephew and heir apparent to the Karabakh throne Jafar Quli Agha, as the next khan of Karabakh. I have written above that until General of Infantry Count Gudovich, appointed on 2 June 1806 as supreme commander in Georgia, arrived in the Caucasus, Lieutenant General Glazenap, who commanded the Caucasian Line and was based in Georgievsk, had been acting supreme commander, while Major General Nesvetaev was acting commander of the troops in the Transcaucasia. He received reports on the hostilities from Major General Nebolsin, who praised Major General Mekhti Quli Agha’s role in the Khonashin battle and recommended him as a “very devoted” person who “could not be involved in perfidy.”95 Lieutenant General Glazenap wanted to know what Major General Nesvetaev thought about the best candidate for the throne of the murdered khan. In his report of 18 July, 1806, Nesvetaev wrote that Mekhti Quli Agha, son of Ibrahim Khalil Khan, had already been governing the khanate by that time before he had received “supreme permission.” It seems that Mekhti Quli Agha used the absence of his 19-year-old nephew from Shusha late in June 1806 (he and his beks were fighting with Lisanevich) to bring together his supporters; with Neboslin’s tacit support, he became the ruler of the khanate. In the same report, Major General Nesvetaev went forth with a long list of services Mekhti Quli Agha had rendered to Major General Nebolsin and emphatically pointed to the “respect he earned among the people and the power he acquired from the best and loyal beks.” The Russian general balanced his praise with mentioning the services of Jafar Quli Agha. It seems that his opinion about Mekhti Quli Agha predetermined the choice made by Lieutenant General Glazenap and Count Gu- dovich who, in August 1806, after being appointed Supreme Commander in Georgia, took over the Lieutenant General’s duties.96 On 21 August, 1806, Count Gudovich, who had familiarized himself with the reports of Lieuten- ant General Glazenap as soon as he arrived in Georgievsk, wrote to Foreign Minister General of In- fantry Baron Andrey Budberg that he recommended appointing Major General Mekhti Quli Agha as khan of Karabakh by a decree of His Majesty.97 Three months later, on 23 November, 1806, Count Gudovich informed Baron Budberg that his choice of Mekhti Quli Agha was based on the reports of Major General Nebolsin to Major General Nesvetaev and from Nesvetaev to Lieutenant General Glazenap and that he had received these documents earlier than he received Jafar Quli Agha in Tiflis.98 On 4 September, 1806, after receiving a letter from the foreign minister, Count Gudovich sent a letter from Georgievsk to Major General Mekhti Quli Agha in which he congratulated him on being appointed khan of Karabakh and Shusha by a decision of His Majesty; he also asked him to come to Tiflis so that he could take his oath of allegiance to the Emperor.99 On 11 November, 1806, Major General Mekhti Quli Khan arrived in Tiflis where he gave his oath of allegiance to Emperor Alexander I in the presence of Supreme Commander in Georgia Gen- eral of Infantry Gudovich.100 At the end of the ceremony, Count Gudovich handed Mekhti Quli Khan a decree of His Impe- rial Majesty signed by Alexander I early in September 1806 that confirmed his new status. The document said: “We confer Our Imperial grace and benevolence on our beloved and loyal subject

95 AKAK, Vol. III, pp. 344-345, Doc. 631. 96 See: Ibid., pp. 330-331. Doc. 602. 97 See: Ibid., p. 332. Doc. 606. 98 See: Ibid., pp. 339-340. Doc. 621. 99 See: Ibid., pp. 333-334. Doc. 609. 100 See: Ibid., p. 338. Doc. 618.

Volume 8 Issue 1-2 2014 145 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION Major General, heir to the Karabakh land, Mekhti Quli Agha. By the deed of Our Imperial Majesty drawn up in the last 1805 year, we honor you and all the people living in the Karabakh land by accepting you as our loyal subjects and by offering you all the conditions that were accepted until the end of time by your late father and Our General of Infantry Prince Tsitsianov for the benefit of the people and your house. It is with deep regret that We learned about the incidence that led to the death of your father Ibrahim Khan. Today, being aware of your devotion to your duties in relation to Our Imperial Throne and especially of your numerous services to Our troops, We confirm you the Khan of Shusha and Karabakh in reward for the praiseworthy evidence of your loyalty and permit you to own this land under Our Supreme patronage and protection of the Russian Empire. You must swear allegiance to it as its subject and in recognition of Our power as the only power over you. We Most Graciously confer on you and all your descendants all the duties of the Karabakh Khanate, as well as the rights and advantages given to it and registered in writing and attached in full to this deed. When entrusting you with the right to rule the Karabakh people with gentleness and fairness, We are convinced that you and your descendants will remain steadfast in your loyalty to Our Imperial Throne and in the faithful performance of your duties as the duty of loyal subjects demands of you. Our Imperial deed with Our personal signature and with the State Seal attached is given to you in confidence and as a sign of Our Imperial grace toward you and the people of Karabakh.”101 On 7 January, 1807, Foreign Minister Baron Budberg informed Count Gudovich in a special document that the Emperor Alexander I had conferred on Major General Mekhti Quli Khan of Kara- bakh the symbols of a khan’s power—a flag with the Russian Imperial Emblem and a saber encrusted with precious stones—sent after the death of Prince Tsitsianov and made for the late Ibrahim Khalil Khan.102

General Yermolov and Liquidation of the Khanate of Karabakh

The Russian Empire concluded its conquest of the North Azeri khanates and sultanates with the Treaty on Perpetual Peace and Friendship signed on 12 October, 1813; known as the Treaty of Gulistan (by the name of the Karabakh village in which it was signed), it ended the First Russo-Persian war. Under Art 3, Persia recognized Russia’s sovereignty over “the Karabakh Khanate, the Ganja Khanate (which had been changed to the Elisavetpol Province), the Sheki, Shirvan, Derbent, Quba, Baku, and Talysh khanates, Dagestan, Georgia and the Shuragel Province, Imeretia, Guria, Mingre- lia, and Abkhazia.”103 In 1816, Lieutenant General Alexey Yermolov (1816-1827) was appointed supreme commander in Georgia. Adolf Berge, Chairman of the Caucasian Archeographic Commission, had the following to say about Yermolov’s policy: “In relation to the Transcaucasian Muslim dominions, his policy was different from that of his predecessors. Being absolutely prejudiced against the power of khans and being convinced that it was as burdensome for the people and harmful for the government because of the khans’ contacts with Persia and Turkey, which were hostile toward us, as it was incompatible with Russia’s dignity, he posed himself the task of depriving them of their power and joining their dominions to the Empire. He was especially interested in the Sheki, Shirvan, and Karabakh khanates.”104

101 Ibid., pp. 336-337. Doc. 613. 102 See: Ibid., p. 330. Doc. 601; p. 342. Doc. 625. 103 Polnoe sobranie zakonov Rossiyskoy imperii (Complete Collection of Laws of the Russian Empire) PSZ RI, since 1649 (Collection I), Vol. XXXII, 1812-1815, St. Petersburg, 1830, pp. 641-645, No. 25.466. 104 AKAK, Vol. VI, Part I, Tiflis, 1874, p. V.

146 Volume 8 Issue 1-2 2014 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION In April 1817, General Yermolov was sent to Persia as ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary; he came back in October 1817. Between these two dates Major General Alexander Kutuzov, who commanded the division stationed in Georgia, performed the duties of commander of the troops and administrator of the Caucasus.105 Earlier, in February 1817, in a report On the Need to Liquidate the Power of the Khans in the Provinces addressed to Emperor Alexander I General Yermolov described his methods of changing the system of administration in Sheki and Karabakh, which should be ruled “according to the same principles as the Elizavetpol District, formerly the Ganja Khanate.”106 General Yermolov mentioned Colonel Jafar Quli Agha, the heir to the throne and nephew of Major General Mekhti Quli Khan of Karabakh, who had no children and whose health, according to Yermolov, “was weak.” He also wrote that, after returning from Persia, Jafar Quli Agha was restored in his former rights of heir to the throne. This was done by General of Infantry Nikolay Rtishchev, Yermolov’s predecessor as supreme commander. General Yermolov asked Alexander I not to confirm the rights of Colonel Jafar Quli Agha as heir to the Karabakh throne and promised to find “plausible reasons to keep him away from the throne.”107 The document Foreign Minister of Russia Count Karl Nesselrode signed on 25 May, 1817 makes it abundantly clear that Emperor Alexander I liked the measures General Yermolov had suggested and allowed the supreme commander in Georgia to “implement them” as the general saw fit.108 In other words, the general was given free rein to find means and reasons to avoid the treaties entered with the Azeri khans. General Yermolov immediately got down to work: he relied on Major General Grigory Madatov, commander of the military districts of the Karabakh, Sheki, and Shirvan khanates (so-called commander of the military districts of the Muslim Provinces) to implement his plans of liquidating the khans’ power. The Sheki Khanate was the first victim. Major General Ismail Khan of Sheki died under suspi- cious circumstances in July 1819; he had no children, which means that his death “gave the Russians an opportunity to liquidate the Sheki Khanate once and for all.” In August 1820, the Caucasian policy of General Yermolov forced Lieutenant General Mustafa Khan of Shirvan to flee to Persia; in November 1822, Major General Mekhti Quli Khan of Karabakh followed in his footsteps.109 The khanates were transformed into provinces with Russian commandants as their heads; they took orders from the commander of the military districts organized in these territories,110 who, in turn, obeyed the supreme commander in Georgia. In his fundamental work about Ivan Paskevich, Lieutenant General Prince Alexander Shcher- batov wrote the following about what General Yermolov and his administration had been doing in the khanates of Northern Azerbaijan: “The means used to remove the khans were beneath the dignity of the Russian government; in practically every case, the disgusting crimes were concealed with the help of minor figures. The khan of Shirvan, for example, had to flee to Persia under the pressure of the ruler of three border khanates, Major General Prince Madatov. His rich treasury was stolen by Ma- datov and his aide, Commissioner Mokeev. A contemporary and official figure in the Caucasus left the following description: “When Mustafa Khan of Shirvan had been driven out of his rich dominions, the Armenians and Georgians, greedy for money, filled all the ruling positions; embezzlement and

105 See: AKAK, Vol. VI, Part I, p. II. 106 “Prilozheniia k zapiskam A.P. Yermolova, Part II, 1816-1827,” in: Zapiski Alekseia Petrovicha Yermolova. S prilozhe- niiami. 1816-1827, published by N.P. Yermolov, Part II, Moscow, 1868, pp. 37-39. 107 AKAK, Vol. VI, Part I, p. 835. Doc. 1264. 108 See: Ibid., pp. 691-692, Doc. 1016. 109 See: Ibid., p. V. 110 See: PSZ RI, since 1649 (Collection I), Vol. XLIV, Part II, Book of Personnel, Departments III and IV, St. Petersburg, 1830, pp. 214-215, No. 29.735.

Volume 8 Issue 1-2 2014 147 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION plunder became common in the khanate.” At the same time, the Talysh Khanate was systematically plundered by Russian official Major Ilyinskiy.111 In Nukha (Sheki), Major General Prince Madatov, the central figure in the campaign to drive the khans away from their dominions, poisoned Khan Is- mail, the last of the khans of Sheki; in Karabakh he forced Mekhti Quli Khan of Karabakh “to transfer to him the lands and villages that belonged to the Shah-Nazarovs.” After receiving them, Madatov persuaded the khan to flee to Persia and increased his dominions by moving 300 families from Kara- bakh to Shirvan.”112 The “contemporary and official figure in the Caucasus” to whom Prince Shcherbatov referred was Nikolay Muravyev (1794-1866), a prominent Russian general. At the time of Yermolov’s administration, he commanded the 7th Rifleman Regiment; later, in 1854, as Adjutant General under the General of Infantry, he was appointed the Viceroy of the Caucasus. His diaries were published under the title “Zapiski Nikolaia Nikolaevicha Muravyeva” in 1880s- 1890s in Russkiy arkhiv, a journal of historical literary documentary collections, “from the original notebooks filled personally by Nikolay Muravyev and kept by his daughter Alexandra Nikolaevna Sokolova.” This is a valuable source not only of political and military, but also of geographic, economic, and ethnographic information. The diaries give us a clear idea of General Yermolov and his cruel Caucasian policy, which stirred up the Caucasian War of 1817-1864, the longest in the history of the Russian Empire. Here are several pertinent examples of how General Yermolov and his administration promoted Russia’s interests in the Caucasus described by Nikolay Muravyev as an eyewitness. “On 11 January (1820.—E.I), we reached Quba… There I also met Naumov’s brother, Major Leventsov, and Tabunshchikov, who were returning after completing, together with Prince Madatov, the campaign against the hapless villagers who had been plundered, hung, and cruelly liquidated. On 13 January, we left Quba; on 15 January, we reached Derbent… Major General Baron Vrede, the brigadier commander, greeted me with the same kindness and friendship I had enjoyed in Tiflis. His stories and those I heard from other people about Alexander Petrovich’s campaign cannot be re- counted here: without direct information, I am reluctant to condemn what the twenty-thousand-strong corps was doing throughout the summer. I have the impression that it was plundering and ravaging nearby villages and beat off several armed attacks of the locals.”113 “On 17 January (1820.—E.I.), Alexey Petrovich himself arrived (in Derbent.—E.I.) … very upset by the state of affairs, which took twenty hours of his day. Many tried to set him against the Tatars (Azeris.—E.I.), whom they called traitors because of personal disagreements. Every time, the Supreme Commander was indignant to the extent that he punished the hapless people with his own hands. The cruelty he demonstrated last year can hardly be compatible with his usual benevolence. One shudders to think about the fate of Ismail Khan of Sheki poisoned by Major General Madatov.”114

111 See: “Zapiski grafa Ivana Osipovicha Simonicha,” to which Prince Shcherbatov referred when describing what Major Ilyinskiy had been doing, were kept in the Military Research Archives of the Main Headquarters and published in Ka- vkazskiy sbornik, Vol. 22, 1901, pp. 2-25 (under the title “Persidskaia voyna. Kampania 1826 goda, iz zapisok grafa Simoni- cha”). This military and political figure of the first half of the 19th century left us the following description: “The Talysh Khan betrayed his oath to us out of fear of sharing the sad fate of his neighbors and, mostly, because of insults by the Lenkoran commander (Major Ilyinskiy.—E.I.). This official, unworthy of his uniform, was later punished, but the very fact that he had been appointed stigmatized General Yermolov’s administration.” 112 A.P. Shcherbatov, General Field Marshal Prince Paskevich. Ego zhizn i deiatelnost, Vol. II, August 1826-October 1827, St. Petersburg, 1890, pp. 28-30. 113 “Zapiski Nikolaia Nikolaevicha Muravyeva-Karskogo. 1820 god,” in: Russkiy arkhiv. Istoriko-literaturny sbornik, Issue 11, 1887, Moscow, pp. 396-397. 114 Ibid., p. 397.

148 Volume 8 Issue 1-2 2014 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION “I spent the evening of 31 January (1820.—E.I.) at Baron Vrede’s, who told me about the cruelties and tortures that Alexey Petrovich had used against innocent people while staying in Derbent.”115 “On 12 April (1821.—E.I.), Prince Madatov, who was traveling from Nukha to Shirvan, caught up with me… There we found Makaev, commander of the Shirvan region, an uncouth, uneducated, and illiterate Georgian, who remains in his post by fair means or foul. After Mustafa Khan of Shirvan was driven out of his rich dominions, Armenians and Georgians, greedy for money, filled all the ruling positions; embezzlement and plunder became common in the khanate.”116 “On 1-2 January (1822.—E.I.), I stayed in Nukha in the palace of the former khan who had been traitorously poisoned by Prince Madatov… Starkov (Lieutenant Colonel, commandant of Shirvan after Major Makaev and Lieutenant General Vysotskiy.—E.I.) told, among other things, that Major Makaev, commandant in the Shirvan Khanate, had died. The money of Mustafa Khan, which the khan was reported to have taken abroad, was found in Makaev’s home in Tiflis; there are rumors that Prince Madatov was also involved. There are no doubts that the khan was robbed, his money hidden, and the treasury people tricked; the government here appoints all sorts of people to these posts… I cannot say whether Madatov was guilty or not; it seems that as a friend of Makaev, he was guilty. If he was guilty in this case too, he will correct it because he knows quite well that Alexey Petrovich, after presenting him to the Emperor in flattering terms and helping him to acquire awards and wealth, cannot go against his previous opinions all of a sudden. It’s very hard to sort things out; they are all despicable creatures. Some people say Makaev was poisoned: they like to talk about horrible things here.”117 “Mekhti Quli Khan of Karabakh fled, or was forced to flee, in the summer of 1822 (in fact, in November 1822.—E.I.) by the efforts of the government, which wanted to seize the khanate… In an effort to remain in the khanate, he promptly transferred all the land and villages that belonged to Shah-Nazarovs to Madatov in the hope of gaining his patronage. As soon as he received them, Ma- datov immediately pledged to persuade him to flee in the same way as happened with the khan of Shirvan. Mekhti Quli Khan fled: he feared that he would be taken to Russia on false accusations; Madatov, whom he had helped so much, was nothing but an instrument of the government, in the same way as he acted when driving the khan of Shirvan out of his khanate and poisoning the khan of Nukha.”118 Let’s have a look at how General Yermolov’s administration and “Prince” Madatov in particular managed to force Mekhti Quli Khan of Karabakh to leave his dominions and flee to Persia. It should be said that at first General Yermolov, after returning from his mission in Persia, did not want to evict Mekhti Quli Khan—he wanted to take him to Russia. In July 1818, he wrote about his plans to Foreign Minister Count Nesselrode: “If the external situation is favorable, I will send this khan and his family to Russia.”119 Since 1817, Russian officials in the Caucasus actively exchanged letters with the Cabinet of Ministers and Mekhti Quli Khan in an effort to justify what was called a present to General Madatov (consisting of several landed estates in Karabakh) to receive imperial permission to these lands and falsify General Madatov’s origin from “influential Karabakh families.” Finally, on 21 April, 1821, Alexander I permitted “Prince Madatov to enter into hereditary possession” of the lands “offered him by Mekhti Quli Khan.”120

115 “Zapiski Nikolaia Nikolaevicha Muravyeva-Karskogo. 1820 god,” p. 400. 116 “Zapiski Nikolaia Nikolaevicha Muravyeva-Karskogo. 1821 god,” in: Russkiy arkhiv. Istoriko-literaturny sbornik, Issue 1, 1888, Moscow, pp. 81-82. 117 “Zapiski Nikolaia Nikolaevicha Muravyeva-Karskogo. Dekabr 1821-May 1822,” in: Russkiy arkhiv. Istoriko-literaturny sbornik, Issue 5, 1888, Moscow, p. 100. 118 “Zapiski Nikolaia Nikolaevicha Muravyeva-Karskogo. 1822 i 1823 gody,” in: Russkiy arkhiv. Istoriko-literaturny sbornik, Issue 7, 1887, Moscow, pp. 350-352. 119 AKAK, Vol. VI, Part II, Tiflis, 1875, pp. 191-193, Doc. 361. 120 AKAK, Vol. VI, Part I, p. 842. Doc. 1279.

Volume 8 Issue 1-2 2014 149 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION It was rumored, at the same time, that Mekhti Quli Khan planned to flee to Persia. General Yermolov was part of the campaign. On 12 October, 1820, he wrote to Mekhti Quli Khan: “I received a letter from Tabriz that your ill-wishers want to do harm to you. Recently, they started saying that you want to abandon your estates and move to Persia.”121 In the same letter, General Yermolov assured the khan of Karabakh of his friendship and wrote that he did not believe the rumors. We can surmise, nevertheless, that the supreme commander merely passed the desirable for the real or even tried to push the khan into action. “I ridiculed these stupid rumors,” Yermolov went on to say, “and treated them as the invention of two fugitives—jenka Khambutay and former khan Mustafa (Surkhay Khan of Gazikumukh and Mustafa Khan of Shirvan.—E.I.). Intending to conceal their base treachery, they are trying to prove that they left the lands because of displeasure and that you should leave Russia for the same reason.”122 A little later General Yermolov drew attention to himself again; this allowed Hierarch Nerses to “count all the Karabakh Armenians.” Mekhti Quli Khan was very amazed: if Yermolov wanted to acquire this information, he should have invited an official. The khan deemed it necessary to point out that both the Azeris and the Armenians should be counted together because “they all live in the same domain.” In July 1822, this answer forced General Veliaminov to write to Hierarch Nerses to postpone the population census until “winter, a time more suitable for this sort of activity”. This clarifies everything that happened to the khan of Karabakh.123 Here is what Raffi, an Armenian author, wrote about this: “…it was decided to use the khan’s state of health to remove him from Karabakh, as long as the documents received from him remained valid. Mekhti Khan, a fairly timid man, was intimidated from all sides: it was said that the Russians wanted to murder him or exile him to Siberia, etc. It was said that Prince Madatov himself added to the khan’s uncertainty.”124 In November 1822, unknown people wounded Jafar Quli Agha, heir to the Karabakh throne, when he was returning home after “a talk at the card table with General Madatov.”125 We can only guess what subjects the commander of the military district discussed with his irreconcilable enemy and heir to the Karabakh khanate. Nikolay Muravyev, in his Notes, surmised that Jafar Quli Agha injured his hand himself to be able to spread rumors that it was Mekhti Quli Khan who had tried to murder him. “I, in turn, believe,” wrote Muravyev, “this it was Madatov who instructed him to acquire a good reason to exile him to Russia and capture his khanate. I cannot understand how Madatov persuaded Jafar Quli Agha to remain silent about Madatov’s advice; talking to me he insisted that it was the khan’s servants who wounded him when he tried to run away.”126 Jafar Quli Khan not only feared General Madatov, he remained silent probably because the general had promised him the Karabakh throne once Mekhti Quli Khan escaped. Mekhti Quli Khan, in turn, was firmly convinced that the attack had been organized to accuse him of a crime against his nephew. Finally, the supreme commander in Georgia, acting through Gen- eral Madatov, realized his initial intention: on 21 November, 1822, frightened by the provocation and threats, Mekhti Quli Khan, accompanied by several nukers (guards), fled abroad, leaving his family behind. Significantly, General Madatov, who had not bothered to find out why the khan had fled the khanate, announced the same day that “the khan has fled Karabakh and will never come back” and

121 Ibid., p. 840. Doc. 1274. 122 Ibidem. 123 See: E. Mamedli, “Khronika trekhvekovoy istorii rossiysko-azerbaidzhanskikh otnosheniy. Kak byla presechena khanskaia vlast v Karabakhe,” Azerros newspaper, No. 4 (80), 20 February-3 March, 2006, p. 13. 124 Raffi, “Melikstva Khamsy”—klassicheskiy trud po istorii Artsakh-Karabakha (1600-1827), Transl. from the Arme- nian by L.M. Kazarian, Erevan, 1991. 125 AKAK, Vol. VII, Tiflis, 1878, pp. 456-457, Doc. 405. 126 “Zapiski Nikolaia Nikolaevicha Muravyeva-Karskogo. 1822 i 1823 gody,” pp. 350-352.

150 Volume 8 Issue 1-2 2014 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION hastened to inform civilian administrator in Georgia Lieutenant General Ivan Veliaminov about this. He sent him a document in which he assured his superiors of his readiness to compile an inventory of the khan’s property and specifically pointed to the herd of horses preserved under his instructions issued to a Russian staff-officer on the eve of the khan’s flight!!!127 Four days later, General Yermolov feigned surprise when told about Mekhti Quli Khan’s flight. In his instructions to General Madatov, he offered the official version to be used every time an explanation of the flight was needed: “He could use any means to exonerate himself from all complaints about injustices and hope that the commanders, who never stopped paying him respects, would demonstrate lenience toward him. He could have demanded and himself used the strictest of measures designed to find those guilty of the attempt on the life of Colonel Jafar Quli Agha if he was innocent of it. This means that I cannot ignore the accusations against him in this latter case.”128 On 27 November, 1822, General Yermolov wrote to Colonel Jafar Quli Agha that he “was extremely surprised and indignant when he learned about his wound” and instructed General Madatov “to carefully investigate the incident and find those guilty of this coup so that they should be tried according to the laws.”129 This means that the organizer of the crime was instructed to investigate it! General Yermolov’s statement to the people of the Karabakh Khanate was probably written in advance: “It was with great amazement that I learned about the treachery and flight to Persia of Me- khti Quli Khan of Karabakh.” Under the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca of 1806, it was Colonel Jafar Quli Agha who should have become the next khan of Karabakh, but General Yermolov announced that the power of the khan was liquidated and the khanate would be transferred to direct Russian rule. Gen- eral Yermolov did not spare words to assure the people of the former khanate that their property would remain intact, but “those involved in the treachery of the fugitive khan and those bold enough to enter into secret communication with him will be persecuted.”130 On 14 December, 1822, that is, two weeks later, General Yermolov finally informed the emperor and reported that the Karabakh Khanate had been transferred to Russia’s direct rule.131 Several years later, on 21 June, 1827, Mekhti Quli Khan described the events in a letter to Ma- jor General Prince Ivan Abkhazov, who had replaced General Madatov as commander of the military district of the Muslim Provinces. He wrote: “When General Yermolov was appointed here as supreme commander in 1816, I fulfilled everything what was required of me according to my duty. At that time, Madatov was also close to Yermolov. During the few days I spent in their company, I was asked to cede Karabakh to the Emperor… Then General Madatov came to my place to say: ‘They want to take your district and even the khanate from you; if you side with me and cede some of your dominions and subjects to me, I will preserve your district and your khanate for you, and I am ready to give a corresponding document.’ They brought the Bible, on which he vowed in front of several people, and signed the paper I now have in my possession. It said that in future he would not act against me and would prevent any harm done to me, even if coming from Yermolov himself. After pronouncing this oath, he took villages, plough land, summer and winter pastures, leased farms, cash, and other belongings from me. “Some time later, General Yermolov departed for Persia, while General Kutuzov demanded an explanation from me about Madatov’s princely title. He also wanted to know whether I had given him the villages of my free will, or had they been taken from me by force, or had they been in his possession since earlier times? Madatov came from very simple Armenians of Karabakh (his father Georgy paid taxes and was, therefore, from the lower class; he was not even the head of his village, but a

127 AKAK, Vol. VI, Part I, pp. 848-849, Doc. 1293. 128 Ibid., p. 849. Doc. 1294. 129 Ibid., pp. 849-850. Doc. 1296. 130 Ibid., p. 850. Doc. 1299. 131 See: Ibid., pp. 850-851. Doc. 1301.

Volume 8 Issue 1-2 2014 151 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION common peasant, so he could not possess either land or people). Being afraid of him, I answered that I had given him these villages not because of his princely dignity, but because he was a general of His Imperial Majesty. Kutuzov wrote to me for the second time to say that there were many generals at the service of His Imperial Majesty and that if I gave each and everyone so many villages I would be left with nothing. When Yermolov returned from Persia, it turned out that Kutuzov, who had guessed rightly, instructed me to take my villages and other possessions back from Madatov, and I did this. Soon after that General Kutuzov died. “When Yermolov sent me another letter written in his own hand and translated by Mirza Jana Madatov (Yermolov’s interpreter), in which he ordered me to return the villages to Madatov… I had to obey the supreme commander and gave the paper to Madatov for the second time. After receiving it and secretly conferring with Yermolov, Madatov asked me to send the Emperor the paper under which I transferred the villages and other possessions to him. Some time later, he came back to announce that His Majesty had confirmed my paper, but that the villages and other places transferred to him were not enough and that I should include in the paper other places, of which no one would learn, and that this would be in his favor. This was why I added other villages, places, and camps to the paper. For several years, I paid him 500 chervontsy, the taxes that should have been paid by these villages. He gathered this money, or even more, from the villages and built himself an excellent house in Tiflis; he also took workers and beasts of burden to build a house in Chanakhchi. I was too frightened to say anything about this to anyone… Later, he asked me to give him a paper confirming that Yermolov’s sons Bakhtiar and Allah Yar were the sons of Ibrahim Khan. I refused and he, very angry, left for Tiflis. Upon his return, he banned all contacts with me and gathered all the officials in the fortress to order that I be kept out of all the affairs… He relied on all sorts of tricks and rumors to force me to flee from Karabakh, but I did nothing of the sort… Finally he arrested Captain Rustem-bek, made an inventory of his house, and took his real estate and all other property away from him. “At a loss, I asked him to send me his uncle Petrus, and he did this… ‘He said: You have been deprived of your khanate and if you want to remain here you will be arrested’… I decided to go to Tiflis, no matter what, to tell everything in detail; all of a sudden I learned that Colonel Jafar Quli Agha had been wounded with a bullet. Madatov immediately announced that I had done this out of hatred; he sent people who captured and brought him two of my servants who were arrested without investigation. This made me wonder about my own fate; I decided to go to Terter in the hope of finding several people there who would accompany me to Tiflis to explain my situation. Melik Vani was dispatched with an order not to let me reach Tiflis, but drive me away from Karabakh. He caught up with me and, being frightened, I moved to Erivan. In fact, I should not have left Karabakh, but I might have been wounded by a bullet in the same way as Jafar Quli Agha, so I went to Erivan in the hope of saving my life… Meanwhile, at that time, there was peace between Persia and Russia, so I fled to Persia for my life; I expected that sooner or later my oppressors would be removed from my land… Today, thanks to Allah, a new supreme commander endowed with benevolence, justice, and courage has arrived, therefore I pray that my request be delivered to the supreme commander as promptly as possible so that he can lay it at the feet of my Great Emperor.”132 “The strictest possible investigation” of the attempt on the life of Colonel Jafar Quli Agha was carried out by General Madatov. General Yermolov wrote that “it was completed and clearly demonstrated that the Khan was not involved; many of my best people, on the contrary, came to the conclusion that Jafar Quli Agha had done this himself with the intention of compromising the Khan, so that he would be punished, thus permitting the first to ascend to the throne in his place.”133

132 AKAK, Vol. VII, pp. 458-459, Doc. 406. 133 “Zapiski generala Yermolova vo vremia upravleniia Gruziey,”in: Zapiski Alekseia Petrovicha Yermolova. S prilozhe- niiami. 1816-1827, pp. 138-140.

152 Volume 8 Issue 1-2 2014 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION The results of General Madatov’s investigation proved to be extremely suitable for Yermolov’s purposes: the supreme commander in Georgia was “forced” to “remove” Colonel Jafar Quli Agha to Russia. On 26 December, 1822, former heir apparent to the Karabakh throne and his son Kerim were exiled to Simbirsk “for the sake of peace in Karabakh.”134 So the power of the khans in Karabakh was liquidated late in 1822.

Incomes of the Former Khans of Karabakh Transferred to Russia’s Treasury

In January 1923, supreme commander in Georgia General of Infantry Yermolov ordered a description of the newly formed Karabakh Province to identify the incomes of the former Karabakh Khanate, up to and including the leased incomes.135 From that time on, taxes were sent to the treasury together with the incomes produced by the landed property of the members of the khan family and other landlords of Karabakh.136 The landed property of fugitive Mekhti Quli Khan, including the “land under the fortress of Shusha… because it belonged as private property to the ruling Khans of Karabakh, having being bought by Ibrahim Khan from private owners,”137 as well as the property of former heir to the Kara- bakh throne Jafar Quli Agha exiled to Russia and the property of all the other members of the khan family and the Karabakh beks who had followed Mekhti Quli Khan to Persia, was transferred to the treasury of the Russian Empire. On 2 May, 1823, Councilor of State Mogilevskiy and Colonel Yermolov 2nd, earlier entrusted with the task of supplying an inventory of the incomes of the Karabakh Province, handed a report to General Yermolov with an attachment of “35 registers which contained descriptions of Shusha and the magals; it was the property of the treasury and private property. The documents supplied detailed information about the population of Karabakh and all the types of taxes that had been gathered in favor of Mekhti Quli Khan, who had fled abroad, and that would be gathered in favor of His Impe- rial Majesty.138 The thirty-five documents were summed up to form a single final document that listed the incomes of all magals of the Karabakh Province, as well as the incomes produced by private landed properties and by leased taxes that had previously enriched the Karabakh khan. Starting in 1823, these incomes went to the Russian treasury. Significantly, according to the 1823 figures, Major General Madatov was the largest landowner in Karabakh. (As soon as General Yermolov, Madatov’s patron, was recalled from the Caucasus, the commander of the military district was first removed from his civilian and then his military posts; in 1829, an investigatory commission confirmed that his landed estate and a house in Tiflis had been acquired illegally; they were confiscated.139) According to the final document drawn up by Councilor of State Mogilevskiy and Colonel Yermolov 2nd, until 1822, the treasury of the Karabakh khan received 9,506.5 gold chervontsy (in-

134 AKAK, Vol. VI, Part I, pp. 851-852, Doc. 1302. 135 Leased articles—a system of tax collection and other state incomes and also the right to sell certain commodities (salt, silk, etc.), under which the state leases the right of collection to private persons. 136 See: AKAK, Vol. VI, Part I, p. 852, Doc. 1304. 137 Opisanie Karabaksskoy provintsii, sostavlennoe v 1823 godu po rasporyazheniyu glavnoupravlyayushchego v Gru- zii Yermolova deystvitelnym statskim sovetnikom Mogilevskim i polkovnikom Yermolovym 2-m, Tiflis, 1866. 138 See: AKAK, Vol. VI, Part I, pp. 856-858, Doc. 1308. 139 See: S.A. Akhmedov, “Materialy Shushinskoy i Bakinskoy bekskikh comissiy v Gosudarstvennom istoricheskom arkhive Azerbaidzhanskoy Respubliki,” in: Izvestia Azerbaijanskogo istoriko-rodoslovnogo obshchestva, Issue 6, Baku, 2007, pp. 118-124.

Volume 8 Issue 1-2 2014 153 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION cluding 8,000 paid to the Russian government in the form of annual tribute), 185,592.88 local silver coins (panabadi), which amounted to about 30,364.10 silver rubles, as well as 4,987 stacks of firewood every year from the magals and private landed possessions. The khan’s treasury received 49,725 panabadi and 10,893.10 silver rubles in leased taxes.140 On 1 August, 1823, under General Yermolov’s order, the zerrab khane item was removed from among the leased taxes items: the contract with the leaseholder had expired and minting of local coins had been discontinued.141 It should be said that the coins of the Karabakh Khanate hold a special place in Azeri numismatics. Silver coins known as panabadi, that is, from Panakhabad, were minted in Panakhabad (Shusha), the capital of the Karabakh Khanate. This is the only coin in the history of coin minting in Azerbaijan named after the city where it was minted. The earliest coins known so far are dated to 1787; judging by other coins, the panabadi were minted until 1822, when the khanate was liquidated.142 One panabadi was equal to about 15 Russian silver kopeks.

Conclusion

In 1827, Mekhti Quli Khan was allowed to return to Karabakh; two years later, in 1829, his nephew Jafar Quli Agha also returned; they were returned the landed possessions taken away from them under General Yermolov. Other members of the khan family remained in possession of their estates, albeit not as vast as those of the former khan and the former heir to the khanate. In fact, in the 19th century, the members of the khan family became fairly large Caucasian landowners. In the latter half of the 19th century, the descendants of the Karabakh khans in the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union mainly used a Russified version of their clan name: either Javanshir or Javanshirov. In May 1870, Second Captain of Cavalry Ahmed-bek Javanshir, author of a political history of the Karabakh Khanate, sent a request to the Shusha bek commission, in which he wrote that the name Javanshir belonged to the founder of the clan of the Karabakh Khanate Panah Ali Khan and all his descendants; he also pointed out that the name was confirmed in Russia by the Governing Sen- ate “on the strength of the firman presented to it and issued by Shah of Persia Karim Khan Zand to Mehrali bek, one of our common ancestors, appointed Beglyarbek, that is, ruler of the Karabakh Khanate.” The reference is to the younger son of Panah Ali Khan, who ruled the Karabakh Khanate during Panah Ali Khan’s march on Urmia and while he was kept prisoner in Shiraz, of which I have written above. Ahmed-bek Javanshir wrote further: “This is confirmed by the inscriptions on the gravestones at the burial sites of many of my ancestors, which can still be seen in the cemetery in the village of Aghdam, by the documents issued by the shahs of Persia kept in the family, by Persian and Turkish historical books that described the events related to our ancestors, and, finally, by the fact that those relatives who descended directly from our common ancestor Panah Khan and who live in Persia bear this family name.”143 Some of the members of the junior branch of the clan of the Karabakh khans had the names Panakhkhanovs (Panakhanovs), Begbudovs, Saryjalinskie, etc. In the 19th and early 20th centuries, the descendants of Ibrahim Khalil Khan who lived in the Russian Empire were titled Agha, while the ancestors of his brother were called bek.144

140 See: AKAK, Vol. VI, Part I, pp. 856-858, Doc. 1308. 141 See: Ibid., pp. 852-855. Doc. 1305. 142 See: A. Rajabi, “Monetnoe delo Karabakhskogo khanstva,” İRS-Nasledie, No. 35, 2008, pp. 12-13. 143 See: The State Historical Archives of the Azerbaijan Republic (GIAAR), rec. gr. 69, inv. 1, f. 143 (Delo po prosh- eniyu Abas-beka i Aga-beka Jevanshirovykh o prichislenii ikh roda k bekskomu sosloviiu. 5.04.1870-31.01.1873), sheets 6-9. 144 See: Ibid., sheets 32-36rev.

154 Volume 8 Issue 1-2 2014 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION On the other hand, the descendants of the khans of Karabakh, and other khan and bek families of Northern Azerbaijan for that matter, saved and used their local titles, but were never ranked on a par with the Russian hereditary nobles; they were accepted as nobles according to the posts and awards received during service to the empire. All descendants of Ibrahim Khali Khan could be accepted as Russian nobles because they descended from a Lieutenant General in the Russian service; the descendants of his brothers had to earn nobility by personal services. In 1843 Emperor Nicholas I ordered the draft of a project of personal rights of the highest Mus- lim social groups in Transcaucasia. In March 1843, a committee staffed by the region’s highest officials was set up “to organize a privileged social estate among the Muslims of Transcaucasia.” Under the draft, the highest Muslim social groups should have been divided according to the rules practiced in Russia—hereditary and personal nobility. Under the project, direct descendants of the last khans were to become princes and titled Excellencies; the other members of the highest social group were to be titled Your Honor and permitted to use all the other local titles they had been using before. On 6 December, 1846, Emperor Nicholas I signed a decree that established the landed rights of the khans, sultans, meliks, agalars, and beks who, together, formed the highest Muslim social group in Transcaucasia and confirmed hereditary rights to the lands they owned when the Caucasus became part of the Russian Empire. The same decree ordered that the personal rights of this social group be identified and, “if possible, adjusted to the rights of the Russian nobility.” In 1862, after completing the delimitation of landed possessions, the Council at the Caucasian Viceroy, transferred the file on personal rights to the Department of Court Affairs, which, in 1863, drafted instructions for four bek commissions—Tiflis, Erivan, Baku, and Shusha—to inform of and “identify the personal rights of the supreme social groups in the Muslim parts of Transcaucasia.” The bek commissions compiled lists of clans to be treated as hereditary or personal bek nobility and lists of the clans left outside the highest social group. These lists were studied in the Council at the Main Administration of the Caucasian Viceroy and the Council at the Supreme Civilian Ad- ministrator of the Caucasus. The following personal lists were compiled on the strength of the Coun- cils’ decision: (1) a list of the khan clans; (2) a summary list of the clans counted as belonging to the social groups of hereditary beks and clan agalars, which, as was expected, would acquire the rights of hereditary nobility of the Russian Empire; and (3) a summary list of clans that belonged to the social groups of personal beks who would acquire the rights of personal nobility. These projects were never legally implemented by the Russian Empire.145

145 E.E. Ismailov, “Problema resheniia soslovnogo voprosa na Kavkaze i dopolnitelnye istochniki po istorii azerbaidzhanskikh bekskikh familiy,” Izvestia Azerbaidzhanskogo istoriko-rodoslovnogo obshchestva, Issue 7, Baku, 2010, pp. 171-180; for more details about the bek commissions in Azerbaijan, see: E.E. Ismailov, “Bekskie komissii i proekt polozheniia o pravakh vysshego musulmanskogo soslovia Zakavkazya,” in: Genealogicheskiy vestnik, Issue 9, St. Petersburg, 2002, pp. 47- 51; S.A. Akhmedov, “Materialy Shushinskoy i Balinskoy bekskikh komissiy v Gosudarstvennom istoricheskom arkhive Azer- baidzhanskoy Respubliki,” Izvestia AIRO, Issue 6, Baku, 2007, pp. 118-124; R.M. Abramian, “Materialy Erivanskoy bekskoy kommissi kak genealogicheskiy istochnik,” Izvestia AIRO, Issue 6, Baku, 2007, pp. 125-133.

Volume 8 Issue 1-2 2014 155 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION Oleg KUZNETSOV

Ph.D. (Hist.), Associate Professor, Deputy Rector for Research, Higher School of Social and Managerial Consulting (Institute) (Moscow, the Russian Federation).

Abstract

his article takes a look at the previously into scientific circulation heretofore unknown unstudied political and legal aspects of archival documents that are the result of the T the acquisition and subsequent institu- efforts of the supreme political leadership of tionalization of the political and legal status of Soviet Russia and make it possible to take an the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic as a entirely fresh look, in historical hindsight, of the constituent part of the Azerbaijan Republic by political and administrative status of Nakh- means of international law. The author puts chivan as a constituent part of Azerbaijan.

KEYWORDS: Azerbaijan S.S.R., Nakhchivan A.S.S.R., the Nakhchivan Territory, the Moscow Conference of 1921, the Moscow Treaty on Friendship and Fraternity of 1921, the Kars Conference of 1921, the Kars Treaty of 1921.

Introduction

The 90th anniversary of the formation of the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic as a constituent part of the Azerbaijan Republic is a wonderful official opportunity to revisit the history of its creation, and at the same time, in the light of the new results of archival research, correct the ideas circulating in the social sciences of the post-Soviet expanse about the emergence, political and legal institutionalization, and first years of its existence. This article does not claim to present a comprehensive analysis of the international events that, ninety years ago, determined the current status of Nakhchivan as a constituent part of the present-day Azerbaijan state. Its aim is to give readers interested in this topic the opportunity to review its historical and legal aspect based on new documental sources of 156 Volume 8 Issue 1-2 2014 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION Russian foreign policy of the Soviet period that have long been kept “top secret” and so have only been made available to researchers recently. However, first we must make a very salient point regarding the international legal and political historical nature of the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic as a constituent part of the Azerbaijan Republic (NAR AR), without which it will be difficult to understand why we are focusing so much attention on how the treaty rules of international law influence the origin and inextricably related legal nature of the NAR AR. The current political and legal status of Nakhchivan, as an internal sovereign autonomous republic that is a constituent part of Azerbaijan, differs significantly in its origin from other well-known autonomies that are constituent parts of European countries (Catalonia and the Basque Country as constituent parts of Spain, Tatarstan and the Crimea as constituent parts of Russia, and Northern Ireland as a constituent part of the United Kingdom, for example). The thing is that Nakhchivan acquired its status not as the result of regulating relations or removing collisions between this region and the state-political center, i.e. Baku (this is precisely how autonomization of several administrative- territorial entities took place in most of the European states today), but as a result of international law treaties entered simultaneously by several countries of the Caucasian region that endorsed Nakhchivan with the status of a political-administrative autonomy as a constituent part of Azerbaijan in two international treaties at once—the Moscow and Kars treaties of 1921. In other words, autonomization of Nakhchivan was not the result of an “internal affairs” decision made by the Azerbaijan Republic, but the consequence of the consolidated (partly also under the threat of the use of armed force) will of the political elites of several countries at once that saw this step as an effective way to overcome the region’s political problems that objectively existed at the beginning of the 1920s. The autonomization of Nakhchivan, or to be more precise, the international legal recognition and provision of its special political and legal status as a constituent part of Azerbaijan, pursued a geopolitical (and also domestic political for Soviet Russia) aim that was extremely urgent at the time—of diffusing the high level of ethnopolitical tension and related territorial conflict between the Armenians and the Muslim peoples of the Transcaucasus (primarily the Azeris and Kurds), the roots of which go back to the decisions of the Berlin Congress in 1878. The reasons for, driving forces behind, and specific manifestations of this conflict and its territorial aspects are well known and have been described many times in the scientific and journalistic literature. However, they do not have any direct relation to the current topic, playing more of a historical background role, and so we will not dwell on a description or analysis of them. We will only point out that the actual fact of this conflict and the joint efforts of the region’s countries to localize and minimalize its consequences after the end of World War I presupposed the unique nature of the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic, which was more of foreign political than domestic political origin. We have every confidence in saying that in the specific historical conditions of the beginning of the 1920s, the autonomization of Nakhchivan was a unique way at the time (and unique in the history of international law) of ensuring international legal protection of the national and political rights and interests of one ethnicity in conditions of aggression on the part of another at a time when both ethnicities were acquiring their national (meaning state-legal) identity. So studying and comprehending the historical experience of the state-political building of the Nakhchivan Au- tonomous Republic at the beginning of the 1920s is of continued importance not only for the history of Azerbaijan statehood and the political identity of Azerbaijan as such, but also for the universal state history and law in general as a unique example of a real way to efficiently apply international law to resolve an acute regional conflict. In 1921, the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic became the first state-territorial entity in another state, the political and legal status of which was defined from the outside, whereby with the direct participation of the metropolis state, under the jurisdiction of which it was transferred. It stands to reason that there have been examples before in the history of mankind (particularly after each consolidated armed aggression of European countries against the Ottoman Empire), when foreign Volume 8 Issue 1-2 2014 157 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION states collectively determined the legal status of a particular part of the defeated country by means of international treaties on the results of the armed conflict. Examples of this are the history of the gradual administrative autonomization of some of the Balkan countries in the Ottoman Empire with their subsequent state-political sovereignization. This process on the part of the European nations pursued the precise goal of consistent withdrawal from the power of the metropolis of those regions and ethnicities populating them, as well as religious communities that were objectively in national- religious and, correspondingly, sociocultural antagonism with it (Bulgaria, Greece, Rumania, and Serbia underwent similar processes in their history of acquiring their current political and legal status). In other words, the policy of autonomization long pursued the goal of gradually weakening and subsequently fragmenting empires, whereby not only the Ottoman, but also the Austro-Hungarian, Rus- sian, and even the British. However, the question of the autonomization of Nakhchivan was diametrically opposite. In this separate, and so unique case, the policy of autonomization pursued the goal of preserving the political, cultural, and religious unity of the Azeri ethnicity in specific historical conditions of acquiring its national statehood that were not easy for it. The establishment of the Nakhchivan Autonomous Re- public ensured not only political self-determination, but partly even the physical survival of some of the Azeri people during ethno-religious persecution of them, which predetermined the possibility of all Azeris of the Transcaucasus merging into a single political nation in the very near future. So we can say very definitely that the history of autonomization of Nakhchivan in the political and legal history of contemporary history showed an example of how state and political isolation of a specific territory could pursue not only separatist, but entirely unionist and integration goals, as well as serve the ideals of preserving and ensuring national unity of an ethnicity through diverse forms and ways of practical expression of political self-determination of this ethnicity. The Moscow and Kars treaties of 1921 only formalized and legally registered the political will of the Azeris for national-state self- determination in the form of international legal documents, even in the form of the simultaneous and parallel coexistence of two state (or administrative-state) entities formed by the representatives of one ethnicity (or several sub-ethnicities objectively close to each other in the sociocultural respect). This is why the political and legal history of the formation of the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic deserves the closest and scrupulous study, even if it is an exception to the rule. The problems relating to the establishment of the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic have been repeatedly and diversely examined in Soviet, Azeri, and Turkish scientific literature. The authors of these studies include the following: S.I. Aralov, Yu.A. Bagirov, J.P. Hasanli, V. Gafarov, N.G. Kireev, S.I. Kuznetsova, A.F. Miller, P.P. Moiseev, Yu.N. Rozaliev, M. Mustafaeva, R.S. Mustafazade, M. Oz- tiurk, A.N. Kheifets, and A.M. Shamsutdinov.1 However, absolutely all of the authors indicated examined this process exclusively from a historical-political and partly even administrative-ethnograph-

1 See: S.I. Aralov, Vospominaniia sovetskogo diplomata, 1922-1923, Institute of International Relations Publishers, Moscow, 1960; Yu.A. Bagirov, Iz istorii sovetsko-turetskikh otnoshenii v 1920-1922 gody, AzSSR Academy of Sciences Publishers, Baku, 1965; J.P. Hasanli, Istoriia diplomatii Azerbaidzhanskoi Respubliki, in 3 vols, Vol. 2: Vneshiaia politika Azerbaidzhana v gody sovetskoi vlasti (1920-1939), FLINTA, Nauka, Moscow, 2013; V. Gafarov, “Russian-Turkish Rap- prochement and Azerbaijan’s Independence (1919-1921),” The Caucasus & Globalization, Vol. 4, Issue 1-2, 2010; N.G. Kireev, Istoriia Turtsii, XX vek, Institute of Oriental Studies, RAS, Moscow, 2007; S.I. Kuznetsova, Ustanovlenie sovetsko- turetskikh otnoshenii (K 40-letiiu Moskovskogo dogovora mezhdu RSRSR i Turtsiei), Oriental Literature Publishers, Moscow, 1961; A.F. Miller, Turtsiia: Aktualnye problemy novoi i noveishei istorii, Nauka Publishers, Moscow, 1983; P.P. Moiseev, Yu.N. Rozaliev, K istorii sovetsko-turetskikh ontoshenii, State Publishers of Political Literature, Moscow, 1958; S. Musta- faeva, “Soviet Russia and the Formation of Borders between the Caucasian States (Based on a Case Study of Azerbaijan and Armenia),” The Caucasus & Globalization, Vol. 4, Issue 1-2, 2010; R.S. Mustafazade, Dve respubliki. Azerbaidzhano-rossiiskie otnosheniia v 1918-1922 gg., MIK, Moscow, 2006; M. Oztiurk, Sovetsko-turetskie otnosheniia na Kavkaze v 1918-1923 gg.: dissertation in defense of a PhD in History, St. Petersburg State University, St. Petersburg, 2010 (this work is interesting in that it contains an extensive bibliography of research studies on the dissertation topic published in Turkish); A.N. Kheifets, Sovetskaia diplomatiia i narody Vostoka, 1921-1927, Nauka Publishers, Moscow, 1968; A.M. Shamsutdinov, Natsionalno- osvoboditelnaia borba Turtsii v 1918-1923 gg., Nauka Publishers, Moscow, 1966.

158 Volume 8 Issue 1-2 2014 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION ic viewpoint, completely ignoring the historical-legal aspects. In other words, they were primarily interested in the political context and to some extent the implication of the content of the Soviet- Turkish and Transcaucasian-Turkish talks that ultimately led to the signing of the Moscow and Kars treaties, but paid no attention to how the agreements reached were formulated and enforced in the texts of international legal acts or the context in which this occurred. These aspects revealed some enigmas and revelations, however, which will be examined more closely below.

First Step to the Autonomization of Nakhchivan: Behind the Scenes and the Outcome of the Soviet-Turkish Moscow Talks of 1921

As we know, the legal status of Nakhchivan as an autonomous republic within the jurisdiction of Soviet Azerbaijan was first regulated in international law by Art III and Appendix I (C) of the Moscow Treaty of 16 March, 1921 entered between the government of the Russian Socialist Federa- tive Soviet Republic (R.S.F.S.R.) and the government of the Great National Assembly of Turkey (GNAT), whereby the content of the appendix to the agreement largely copied and only partially specified the provisions of the second paragraph of the indicated article of the agreement that defined the direction (leading line) of the border of the Nakhchivan District (this was precisely what the Na- khchivan Autonomous Republic was called in the Russian version of this agreement) toward Armenia. However, despite all the brevity and even terseness of the legal formulations, the Moscow treaty regarding Nakhchivan (at least in its officially published Russian version2) contained three principal aspects that none of the researchers we know of had paid attention to before, so they should be examined in closer detail.  First, as follows from the formulations of the original text of the agreement, the government of the R.S.F.S.R. and the government of GNAT “agree,” that is, recognize de jure the existence de facto around Nakhchivan of an autonomous territory under the protectorate of Azerbaijan, which was already Soviet at that time. In other words, both sides were only legitimizing in the form of a regulatory provision of an international legal act a historical fact that already objectively existed at the time the Moscow agreement was entered, signed, and ratified (it was ratified by the All-Russia Central Executive Committee of the R.S.F.S.R. on 20 July, 1921 and by GNAT on 31 July, 1921, and ratification instruments were exchanged on 22 September, 1921 in Kars at the opening of the Turkish-Transcaucasian talks) in this geographic area.  Second, neither the government of the R.S.F.S.R., nor the government of GNAT had a precisely formulated position regarding what the prospect or even the reality of the Nakh- chivan Autonomous Republic might be. The vague ideas and positions of the parties to the Moscow treaty on this issue can best be described by the vague definition of the object of their legal regulation: for example, in the first paragraph of Art III of the treaty, the geographic area of the administrative jurisdiction of the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic is defined as “the Nakhchivan District,” in the second paragraph as “the Nakhchivan Terri- tory,” and in Appendix I (C) as “the Territory of Nakhchivan.” It is well known that French was the working language of the Soviet-Turkish talks in Moscow, which was known for its precise and unambiguous semantic meaning of each

2 See: Sobranie uzakonenii i rasporiazhenii Rabochego i Krestianskogo pravitelstva RSFSR, No. 73, 12 December, 1921, pp. 731-735.

Volume 8 Issue 1-2 2014 159 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION word, and the Turkish delegation took back to Angora (now Ankara) with them a copy of the Moscow Treaty with the R.S.F.S.R. on Friendship and Fraternity drawn up in French. The different definitions mentioned emerged as a compromise of the positions of the Bol- sheviks and Kemalists or as a result of the general vagueness of the situation, or as a result of the mutual lack of desire of the sides to specify their position in precise terms on the legal status of the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic. Whatever the case, the fact remains that according to the provisions of the Moscow treaty, the Nakhchivan Autonomous Repub- lic was postulated as a sovereign territory under the protectorate of Azerbaijan, which, in turn, could not refuse to perform the international legal obligation it had assumed in favor of a third party.  Third, in keeping with the second paragraph of Art III of the Moscow treaty, Soviet Russia stood aside of its own accord (or under pressure from Turkey) from participating in defining and subsequently demarcating the border between “the Nakhchivan District” and Armenia. The parties to the Moscow treaty concurred that all the issues relating to territorial demarcation and in situ determination of the borders of the Nakhchivan autonomy legitimized under the treaty should be resolved by a three-party commission consisting of representatives of Turkey, Azerbaijan, and Armenia. Russia’s “interference” in this process was strictly technical and limited to ensuring that demarcation and determination of the border line by the delegates of this commission was carried out according to the map of the Russian General Headquarters at a scale of 1/210000—5 versts to one inch. The three historical-legal aspects mentioned, which contemporary researchers and their Soviet predecessors failed to see, raise two principally important questions for us today, without an answer to which formation of the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic will not be comprehensive, therefore inadequately studied. The first question is related to the vague state-legal titles of Azerbaijan at that time in the text of the Moscow treaty. It was signed by authorized persons on 16 March, 1921, when the Azerbaijan Socialist Soviet Republic, declared on 28 April, 1920, already existed as a result of Sovietization. However, Art III of the agreement uses the term “Azerbaijan,” and not “the A.S.S.R.,” that is, an ethnonymic, rather than a state-political toponym. This means that at the Moscow talks, both Soviet Russia and Kemalist Turkey were little interested in the political-legal institutionalization of the Soviet Azerbaijan state that existed at the time when defining the status of the autonomy of Nakhchi- van. Instead the emphasis was placed on legalization of the state-legal unity of Nakhchivan and Azerbaijan, and not on specifying the political regimes existing in their territories. Nor does the text of the Moscow treaty make it possible to talk reliably about whether the delegation members of the negotiating parties understood that the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic was a legal successor of proto-state entities existing earlier in its territory in 1918-1921 in the form of the Araz-Turkic Republic, the Southwest Caucasian Republic, the Provisional Governorate Gen- eral of Southwest Azerbaijan, and so on. This opinion of ours is based on the terminology of the treaty: if the negotiators considered one of them to be a precursor, then why did Soviet Russia and Kemalist Turkey use the term “the Nakhchivan District,” and not some autochthonous name (self- name)? In the specific historical conditions of the spring of 1921, there were Turkish troops in the territory of Nakhchivan under the command of Colonel Vaisal Unuvar, which ensured, as it says in the verbatim records of the meetings of the political commission at the Soviet-Turkish talks in Moscow (kept in the depositories of the Russian Federation Foreign Policy Archive and studied in detail at one time by J.P. Hasanli), “Turkey’s patronage” over the Muslim population of this territory. The Muslim population had called the Turkish troops to their defense, whereby they were willing to give the right of patronage exclusively to Azerbaijan. Due to this objective circumstance, the opinion of the Turkish side in the talks on this issue was decisive, which gave it the initiative to propose not only the content 160 Volume 8 Issue 1-2 2014 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION of the regulations in the articles of the Moscow treaty regarding the autonomous status of Nakhchivan and Azerbaijan’s protectorate over it, but also their formulation. The members of the GNAT delegation at the Moscow conference, like all other revolutionaries of all times and peoples, wanted to be the creators of history themselves and start on a clean page, whereby being the founding fathers of the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic as a constituent part of Azerbaijan, and so were not willing to share this glory with the creators of the proto-state formations that existed before them in their territory and had now faded into oblivion. Proof that the above conclusions are just can be found in the chronology and content not only of the official talks of the delegations of Soviet Russia and Kemalist Turkey, but also of the consultations held behind the scenes of their representatives, both among themselves and with the supreme political leadership of the two countries. J.P. Hasanli described the chronology of the Soviet-Turkish talks in sufficient detail by in Chapter VI “Russian-Turkish Conference in Moscow: The Nakhchivan Question in Regional Policy” in the second volume of his multivolume The History of Diplomacy of the Azerbaijan Republic,3 so there is no need for us to discuss it in detail here. However, we deem it necessary to draw readers’ attention to the following aspect of these talks: having begun on 25 February, three days later they were on the verge of breaking up and the GNAT delegation returning to Angora due to the unwillingness of the authorized representatives of the Soviet government to unconditionally accept the provisions of the National Pact of the Ke- malists regarding several territories of the Transcaucasus that had earlier been part of the Russian Empire. The supreme political leadership of Soviet Russia was categorically against Ajaria’s (the former Batum District) accession to Turkey, which, in turn, was just as categorically against transferring the rights to the territory of Nakhchivan to anyone else but Azerbaijan. Resolution of this collision required the personal unofficial interference during the talks of two political heavy- weights—member of the Politburo and Organizational Bureau of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) Joseph Stalin and former chief of General Headquarters of the Ottoman Empire in Soviet Russia at that time Army General Ismail Enver-pasha, the participation of whom in the back rooms of the Soviet-Turkish talks in Moscow ultimately ended in GNAT prohibiting him from entering the country for the rest of his life (the order on this was issued on 12 March, 1921, but by that time he had already succeeded in doing his part to persuade the Turkish delegation to leave Batum under the jurisdiction of the newly declared Socialist Soviet Republic of Georgia). As a result, everything boiled down, as often happens in diplomatic practice, to mutual concessions that were of principal importance to the historical destiny of the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic. The personal participation of Joseph Stalin and Ismail Enver-pasha in the Soviet-Turkish talks ended in two personal unofficial meetings of the first with the GNAT delegation and a conversation of the second with Colonel General Ali Fuat Cebesoy, plenipotentiary of GNAT in Soviet Russia, a member of the official delegation. When preparing Joseph Stalin’s second meeting with the Turkish negotiators, which was held on 9 March, 1921, People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the R.S.F.S.R. Georgy Chicherin sent him a written request about what specifically he had to say to the Turkish plenipotentiaries as one of the political leaders of Soviet Russia. Stalin’s written reply, which is now kept in the Russian State Archives of Sociopolitical Information, to Chicherin’s note came on 6 March, that is, three days before the scheduled meeting. This fact makes it possible for us to say very definitely that the content and course of the talks were under Stalin’s constant and keen attention. He not only controlled, but also orchestrated each diplomatic step and statement of the Soviet delegation, being essentially its political supervisor, while People’s Foreign Commissar Chicherin, as official leader of the delegation, was left to carry out representative and strictly technical functions, relaying the decisions Stalin had already made to the other side.

3 See: J.P. Hasanli, op. cit., pp. 356-435.

Volume 8 Issue 1-2 2014 161 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION This can be fully seen in the directive tone of this letter, the content of which we present in full in Appendix 1.4 At the Soviet-Turkish talks in Moscow in 1921, Azerbaijan was represented by People’s Com- missar for Justice of the A.S.S.R. Behbud Shakhtakhtinskiy, who was also the representative of the A.S.S.R. in the R.S.F.S.R. at that time. Due to his excellent knowledge of the Turkish language, he was an indispensable mediator between the official delegations when holding informal consultations behind the scenes of the talks and, since Stalin knew him personally during the years he spent in Baku, he essentially became his confident. Suffice it to say that as early as 7 March, he told Stalin about the reaction of the Turkish side to the proposals he had still not made on possible concessions on the part of the R.S.F.S.R, which he did not voice until 9 March. In so doing, Behbud Shakhtakhtinskiy did not inform the People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the R.S.F.S.R. Georgy Chicherin about the content and results of his contacts with the Turkish delegation to the same extent that he informed Stalin about them. In particular, on 6 March, 1921, the day Joseph Stalin responded to Georgy Chicherin’s inquiry about the precise content of his upcoming statement to the Turkish delegation, the text of which we published above, Behbud Shakhtakhtinskiy had already discussed it with the official Turkish representatives. The next day, 7 March, he informed Stalin that the day before he had conversed at length with the Turks, as a result of which he found out that they were no longer particularly interested in Nakhchivan or Batum, since they were convinced that any arguments relating to those areas were futile, and were now more engaged in the initiative of moving the border line 20 versts from the railway right of way, in light of which they wanted to meet with Stalin personally as soon as possible.5 However, after his talk, he said to Chicherin only that the Turkish representatives were asking Stalin to allow three hours to discuss all the articles of the treaty.6 As we can see, thanks to Behbud Shakhtakhtinskiy, member of the Politburo and Organizational Bureau of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik) Joseph Stalin was much better informed about the moods and position of the GNAT delegation at the talks in Moscow than People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the R.S.F.S.R. Georgy Chicherin. Incidentally, at that time the definition “the Nakhchivan District” was being actively used by Azerbaijani diplomacy to designate the territory located within the borders of the Nakhchivan, Sharur- Delaragez, and part of the Irevan uezds of the former Erivan Gubernia of the Russian Empire and controlled in the spring of 1921 by Turkish troops, as a result of which it de facto came into legal circulation during the Moscow conference in the form of legal custom. Behbud Shakhtakhtinskiy naturally also had something to do with this, whom Joseph Stalin had essentially given the go-ahead in the final legal formulation of the results of the Soviet-Turkish talks on the Nakhchivan question. As a result of this, the term proposed by an outside participant in the talks who was not an official participant in the delegation of either negotiating party was used by the signatories in the text of the Moscow treaty. In this way, as a participant in the Moscow conference as an observer, Azerbaijan nevertheless had significant, if not to say decisive, influence on the content and outcome of this vitally important question for it. In this respect, readers’ attention should be drawn to another essentially important, in our opinion, circumstance: discussion of the Nakhchivan question and ultimate coordination of the formulation of Art II of the Moscow Treaty on Friendship and Fraternity took place on 10 March, 1921, that is, the day after the representatives of the Turkish delegation met with Joseph Stalin, which was re-

4 J.P. Hasanli included this document in the text of his work indicated above with unstipulated cuts in its reproduction, which is a violation of the rules of academic etiquette, and without adhering to rules accepted in Russia for the publication of archival sources, which led to significant loss of the emphasis of the semantic meaning contained in it (cf.: J.P. Hasanli, op. cit., p. 388). 5 See: Letter from B. Shakhtakhtinskiy to J. Stalin of 7 March, 1921, RGASPI, rec. gr. 558, inv. 1, f. 3529, sheets 1-2. 6 See: Ibidem.

162 Volume 8 Issue 1-2 2014 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION corded in the verbatim records of the meeting of the political commission of the talks. The question of transferring Nakhchivan under the protectorate of Azerbaijan did not arouse any major objections in any of the parties, just as the content of the appendix to this article containing a description of the borders actually existing at the time of the Nakhchivan District did not arouse any arguments. The discussion only developed during a search for ways to formulate the special guarantee of the autonomy of Azerbaijan after its territory was transferred to the state-political jurisdiction of Azerbaijan, as a result of which two interrelated regulations were included in Art III of the treaty that “the Nakh- chivan Region … forms an autonomous territory under the protectorate of Azerbaijan, providing that Azerbaijan does not concede its protectorate to a third state.”7 The content and outcome of the talks during the meeting on 10 March graphically show that Stalin’s political will, which he voiced a day earlier, that “in the question on Nakhchivan, word is granted to the representative of Azerbaijan,” that is, Behbud Shakhtakhtinskiy, was executed by the participants in the talks without objections, with particular effort, and in the shortest time possible. And this was the first step on the way to institutionalizing the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic as a constituent part of Azerbaijan in its current form.

Second Step in the Autonomization of Nakhchivan: Collisions of Political and Legal Interpretation of the Results of the Kars Conference of 1921

The political-legal status of the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic as a constituent part of Azer- baijan, according to Art V of the Kars Treaty of 13 October, 1921, entered between the government of the Great National Assembly of Turkey and governments of the Socialist Soviet Republics of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia with the participation of representative of the R.S.F.S.R. Ya.S. Ganetskiy (Furstenberg), was defined even more tersely than in the text of the Moscow Treaty. The essence of the article boiled down to the fact that the plenipotentiaries of the Soviet governments of Azerbaijan and Armenia, as well as of Kemalist Turkey “agree” that “the Nakhchivan Region within the borders defined in Appendix 3 of this treaty form an autonomous territory under the patronage of Azerbaijan.” At first glance, the impression is created that this regulation of the Kars Treaty is identical in general in form and content to the same provision of the Moscow Treaty, but that is not the case. The most superfluous comparative analysis of the text of Art III of the Moscow Treaty and Art V of the Kars Treaty make it possible to identify two principal differences between them of a legal, rather than political nature. As has already been mentioned above, the Moscow Treaty regulated the legal status of “the Nakhchivan District” or (in different formulations) “the Nakhchivan Territory,” while in the Kars, the matter concerns an entirely defined “Nakhchivan Region.” This fact, which is quite obvious from the historical-legal point of view, was unfortunately not noticed by most contemporary Azeri researchers, who prefer today (for well-known and understandable reasons) to place the focus on the ethnopolitical and not the legal aspects of the topic. And they, nevertheless, make it possible to quite definitely claim that the shift in definition was based on an adequate understanding by the participants in the Kars conference of the fact that in the six months that had passed between signing the Moscow and the Kars treaties, state-administrative organization of the territory had been completed or largely carried out in Nakhchivan, which had acquired during this time all the necessary administration and governance institutions that qualitatively distinguish an organized and self-governed in the administrative respect region from a self-declared territory of which elements of anarchy and patrimony are characteristic. A short speech by head of the A.S.S.R. delegation at the Kars con-

7 J.P. Hasanli, op. cit., pp. 394-395.

Volume 8 Issue 1-2 2014 163 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION ference, Behbud Shakhtakhtinskiy, was devoted to the first results of and further prospects for state- political building in the Nakhchivan Autonomy of Azerbaijan. He gave an account of the general state of the administration of the autonomy and the conditions in which it would have to function. In addition, he gave the Turkish side a special memorandum that reflected the unified consolidated position of the Transcaucasian Soviet republics on the Nakhchivan question, in which the “formation of the Autonomous Nakhchivan Soviet Republic as a constituent part of the Azerbaijan S.S.R.” was declared.8 Both B. Shakhtakhtinskiy’s speech and the memorandum itself were a graphic and, most important, objective and legitimate reflection of the first steps of the Azerbaijan Nakhchivan autonomy’s existence under the protectorate of the A.S.S.R., which proved that Soviet Russia, although it had its geopolitical interests in the Transcaucasian regions, tried nevertheless to observe previously reached international agreements. The second major textual difference in the content of the “Nakhchivan” articles of the Moscow and Kars treaties concerns the legal definition of the relations between Nakhchivan and Azerbaijan. The Moscow Treaty talked about the protectorate of Azerbaijan over Nakhchivan, while the Kars called it patronage. It is paradoxical but true that not one research study we know of on the history of Russian-Turkish-Transcaucasian relations in the 1920s published in Russian mentions, or consequently analyzes, the reasons for this terminological collision. And we think this is the main and even most essential difference in the content of the Moscow and Kars treaties in the context of the topic we are examining (at least this claim is entirely fair with respect to the officially published Russian- language versions of these two international legal acts9). The reason for this terminological difference is quite easy to explain. In the history and practice of Russian and Turkish foreign policy, the term “protectorate” had a very specific semantic meaning, which was determined empirically. In 1775-1791, the Russian Empire carried out protectorate functions with respect to the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth (Rzechzpospolita), and in 1786-1801, with respect to the Kartli-Kakhetia Kingdom; a large part of the khanates of North Azerbaijan (Karabakh, Sheki, and Shirvan) was transferred to Russian power on protectorate conditions at the beginning of the 19th century. So Soviet diplomats were well aware of the sizes and limits of such a political-legal regime from their courses on the history of diplomacy. The Turkish side was also very well aware of the legal gist of the protectorate regime, since in the 16th-19th centuries the Crimean khanate, Tuni- sia, and Tripolitania (or Tarabulus in Arabic)—a historical region in North Africa that corresponds to the northwest territory of present-day Libya—were under the protectorate of the Ottoman Empire. In correspondence with these universal ideas, the protectorate of the A.S.S.R. over the Nakhchivan District, in keeping with the provisions of the Moscow treaty, took the form of interstate relations, under which one country recognized the supreme sovereignty of the other over it, primarily in international relations, while retaining autonomy in domestic affairs and its own dynasty being replaced in the reality of the Soviet system with an independent set of power and administrative bodies that copied the state-administrative structure of the metropolis. It seems that this kind of state-political co-subordination, according to the Bolsheviks and Kemalists, most adequately took into account the specifics of the relations between Azerbaijan and Nakhchivan at the beginning of 1921, particularly in conditions when Azerbaijan was deprived at the official level of the opportunity to formulate and express its political-legal position (the Revolutionary Committee of the A.S.S.R. delegated its foreign policy powers to the All-Russia Central Executive Committee of the R.S.F.S.R.). So they used the term “protectorate” directly in the text of the corresponding article of the Moscow treaty. Entering the Kars Treaty on Friendship between the GNAT government and the Socialist So- viet Republics of Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia with the participation of the R.S.F.S.R. initially presumed a certain amount of ideological kinship and unity (at least on record) based on the provisions

8 Ibid., pp. 480-481. 9 For the officially published text of the Kars treaty in Russian, see: Foreign Policy Documents of the U.S.S.R., Vol. 4, International Relations, Moscow, 1960, pp. 420-429.

164 Volume 8 Issue 1-2 2014 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION of the Moscow Treaty on Friendship and Fraternity between the R.S.F.S.R. and the GNAT government. So the term “protectorate,” which had a specific legal meaning and was used in the text of the Moscow treaty to designate the co-subordination of Azerbaijan and the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic, was replaced with the word “patronage,” which is neutral in terms of international law and vaguer. In so doing, it should not be forgotten that at the Moscow conference, the delegation of the GNAT government had already declared Turkish patronage at one time with respect to Nakhchivan. As a result, this concept became part of the terminology that circulated during the negotiations between the Bolsheviks and Kemalists, and so the shift in concepts occurred without any severe objections during the discussions. The reason for this could have been the very reasonable formal-legal factor the delegations of the Soviet Transcaucasian states put into effect at the very beginning of the Kars conference. We have already mentioned above how a special memorandum of the A.S.S.R., S.S.R.A., and S.S.R.G. delegations was handed to the Turkish side before the talks began that indicated that Soviet power in the Transcaucasus carried out priority measures aimed at “the formation of the Autonomous Nakhchivan Soviet Republic as a constituent part of the Azerbaijan S.S.R.” In terms of the study of legal theory, the main distinction of any republic is formal-legal equality of all homogeneous entities of legal relations—citizens, legal entities, types of property, legal institutions, and so on, which, in turn, are a cornerstone of the theory of egalitarianism or universal equality, which is one of the ideological premises of Bolshevism and, strange as it may seem, of pan-Turkism. Such ideas about the “revolutionary” equality of all and everything naturally had an influence on the practice of international relations of the newly formed states, to which all of the Soviet republics and Kemalist Turkey participating in the Kars conference belonged. Based on the fervor of the revolutionary restructure of the world, the subordination of one of the two Soviet republics to another was unacceptable, however a specific and precise semantic meaning of the legal concept “protectorate” presupposed the subordination. So in order to avoid the difference in political ideal and legal reality, the authors of the Kars Treaty changed it to “patronage.” It should also be kept in mind that the Kars conference was held in specific historical conditions when the GNAT government was waging the 1919-1923 war of independence against all protector- ates—British, French, Greek, and Italian—imposed by the provisions of the Treaty of Sèvres of 1919 on certain Turkish territories. Therefore, from the ideological standpoint, it could not permit in the Nakhchivan question that one part of a state friendly toward it carried out protectorate over another part of it. As we see, there are many legitimate reasons for replacing one concept with the other in the textually similar articles of the Moscow and Kars treaties, each of which has the right to exist and so cannot be the only authentic one. We, in turn, believe that this terminological replacement was not accidental and expressed the change in views regarding Azerbaijani-Azerbaijani relations that was occurring as the sovereignty of Soviet Azerbaijan over the territories under its jurisdiction strengthened. The change in terminology, that is the replacement of the specific-legal term “protectorate” for the indefinite-political concept “patronage,” automatically entailed excluding mention of the impos- sibility of it conceding to “any third state.” If from the formal-legal point of view, the right of protectorate could be conceded from one state to another, of which there were already examples in the history of the French-British alliance cooperation with respect to the occupied territories of the former Ottoman Empire in the Middle East, as happened in Trans-Jordan, for example, depriving a particular territory of patronage by a specific state in the legal reality of the 1920s was impossible, since patronage was a political formulation and not a legal definition. While insisting on the adoption of precisely that formulation of the regulation of the first paragraph of Art V of the Kars Treaty, the countries of the Transcaucasus were essentially transforming the protectorate of Azerbaijan over Nakh- chivan into a state-political sovereignty, thus depriving Nakhchivan of the known limits of political independence within the framework of an autonomy. Volume 8 Issue 1-2 2014 165 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION The fact that the initiative of the GNAT delegation on the definition and enforcement in the treaty text in the form of appendices to the corresponding articles of the general legal foundations of the autonomy of Nakhchivan and Batum expressed when developing the corresponding articles of the previously adopted Moscow Treaty on Friendship and Fraternity was not reflected in either the structure or the text of the Kars Treaty on Friendship proves that our thesis is correct. We know that this initiative of the Turkish side existed from the telegram of plenipotentiary of the R.S.F.S.R. at the Kars conference Ya.S. Ganetskiy of 3 October, 1921 to People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs of Soviet Russia Georgy Chicherin, in which he states: “There were fervent disputes about Nakhchivan and Batum, since the Turks insisted adding an appendix for every article to the treaty to provide a precise definition of the general foundation of the autonomy of these regions drawn up immediately at the conference by the corresponding republics along with the Turks.”10 The Bolsheviks (both the Russians and the Azeris) saw this initiative as threatening to spread the ideas of Kemalism to the territories they considered their own, and so they began actively opposing it, as a result of which appendices were included in the final rendition of the Kars Treaty that concerned only territorial and border issues. The Bolsheviks, as bearers of the idea of world revolution and supremacy of the principle of revolutionary expediency over legal regulations, found the autonomy of Nakhchivan extremely alien from the ideological viewpoint, which was why they used the conversations about it exclusively as a lever of influence or a bargaining chip in the talks with the Kemalists, for whom the autonomy of Nakhchivan as a constituent part of Soviet Azerbaijan was one of the ideological and, possibly, partly moral dominants. Subsequent events showed this very obviously. J.P. Hasanli described the dynamics of their development in sufficient detail in his History of the Diplomacy of the Azerbaijan Republic,11 and so we will not examine the ups and downs of the political process of gradual deprivation of the Nakhchivan Region of its autonomous status as a constituent part of the A.S.S.R. This status was little coordinated with the international legal regulations of the Moscow and Kars treaties, the adoption of which was initiated by the Bolsheviks themselves. We will only point out that as a result of consistent and tar- geted efforts that took a little more than eighteen months, the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic was brought down from the heights of a semi-sovereign state to the level of an ordinary district. And Ke- malist Turkey was the only entity of international legal relations that really protested against this. This abrupt change in the political-legal status of Nakhchivan as a constituent part of the A.S.S.R. greatly concerned Turkey, the Foreign Ministry of which sent a note to the R.S.F.S.R. People’s Com- missariat for Foreign Affairs on 25 June, 1923 saying that the changes in the state structure of Nakh- chivan after entering the Kars Peace Treaty had led to annexation of its territory by Azerbaijan. This is shown by the documents of the Politburo Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik) sitting of 23 August, 1923, long kept under “strictly secret, to be returned within 5 days.” To be very exact, the matter concerns the memorandum of the R.S.F.S.R. People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs Georgy Chicherin to Politburo Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik) member Joseph Stalin on the changes in the situation in the state structure and political life of Nakhchivan soon after entering the Kars Treaty that evoked such a severe reaction in Turkey. Since this document was previously unknown not only to the broad public, but also to specialists, we will present its text in full in Appendix 2. This memorandum was examined at the sitting of the Politburo Central Committee of the Rus- sian Communist Party (Bolshevik) on 23 August, 1923, and on its basis a decision was made, which was entered into the minutes of this sitting No. 27 with the following formulation: “To adopt the proposal of Comrade Chicherin, entrusting the Secretariat (Central Committee of the Russian Com-

10 Telegram from Ya.S. Ganetskiy (Furstenberg) to G.V. Chicherin of 3 October, 1921, RGASPI, rec. gr. 159, inv. 2, f. 108, sheet. 8. 11 See: J.P. Hasanli, op. cit., pp. 489-492.

166 Volume 8 Issue 1-2 2014 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION munist Party (Bolshevik).—O.K.) with regulating this question with the Transcaucasian Territorial Committee.”12 Bringing the practice of state party-Soviet building in Soviet Nakhchivan into harmony with the regulations of international law was not long in coming: on 8 January, 1924, the Transcaucasian Central Executive Committee approved the decision of the Central Executive Com- mittee of Azerbaijan on the formation of the Nakhchivan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic as a constituent part of the Azerbaijan S.S.R. and on 9 February, a corresponding decree was issued by the Central Executive Committee of Azerbaijan. This resulted in final state-legal institutionalization of Nakhchivan as part of the A.S.S.R., T.S.F.S.R., and U.S.S.R. as the Nakhchivan A.S.S.R., the successor of which at present is the NAR AR.

Conclusion

Summing up the above, we have every reason to draw several general conclusions:  First, the regulations of international law that were enforced in the Moscow and Kars treaties of 1921 have always played and continue to play an exclusive role in the history of the political-legal institutionalization of the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic as a constituent part of Azerbaijan in the Soviet period, creating in aggregate a legal foundation for the current state-legal status of the autonomy. This is why studying and comprehending the political history of the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic is absolutely impossible without a detailed analysis of the legal side of this problem, since it is precisely the regulations of international law and not their interpretation in compliance with the political will of the ruling elite that were and still remain the cornerstone of the current state status of Nakhchi- van. This speaks again in favor of our thesis that the history of Nakhchivan acquiring an autonomous status as a constituent part of Azerbaijan is unique not only in the history of the Transcaucasus (although it was caused by its intricacies), but also in the context of human development in contemporary history.  Second, the state-legal status of the contemporary Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic (in contrast to the legal foundations of most other autonomies as constituent parts of all the other countries of the world) has as broad international legal guarantees as possible. This not only predetermines the unique status in contemporary times of the NAR as a constituent part of the AR, which cannot be compared with any other autonomy in the world, but also its inviolability, which fully excludes all transformations or modernization.  Third, the historical experience of the autonomization of Nakhchivan, its international legal recognition and support, as well as subsequent existence have also shown in practice and proven that this kind of state-political organization of one part of a state with respect to another could pursue the aim not only of creating an enclave to fully satisfy the social, economic, and cultural rights and legal interests of some of the citizens of this country in the ethnic or religious minority (as is happening today in most cases in essentially every country of the world), but also of pursuing a diametrically opposite—unionist—aim of ensuring civil and political unity of the representatives of one ethnicity living in two parts of the same country that do not have a common land border between them. Unfortunately, this political-legal fact has not been duly recognized and comprehended in the Russian- language scientific literature we know of on the history of state and law, and so will inevitably demand the closest attention in the near future.

12 Minutes No. 27 of the Politburo Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik) sitting of 23 August, 1923, RGASPI, rec. gr. 17, inv. 3, f. 375, sheet 2.

Volume 8 Issue 1-2 2014 167 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION And last, when talking in historical hindsight about the political and state-administrative autonomization of Nakhchivan as a constituent part of Azerbaijan (both during Soviet and contemporary times), we cannot forget the great and even exclusive influence that the position of, first, the Kemal- ist government of the Great National Assembly of Turkey and, later, the Turkish Republic that followed autonomization had on its content and the results of the political and legal institutionalization of the autonomy. In the three years—from February 1921 to February 1924—that separated declaration of the idea of giving Nakhchivan the status of an autonomy within Azerbaijan enforced in the text of the Moscow Treaty on Friendship and Fraternity and its practical political and legal implementation in the form of issuing a decree of the Central Executive Committee of the Azerbaijan S.S.R. on the creation of the Nakhchivan A.S.S.R., first the Kemalists and the Turkish army and then the Turk- ish Republic were active and consistent protectors of the Muslim population of the region both from exile or destruction by the Armenian nationalists and from assimilation by the Bolshevik internation- alists. Throughout the political history of the Nakhchivan autonomy, the role of the Turkish factor as a guarantee of its status has been more than significant. Time has shown that the historical experience of the creation and subsequent institutionalization of the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic as a constituent part of Azerbaijan is of immense significance. The Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic became a unique way in its time of ensuring ethnic and territorial unity of the Azeri nation when two areas of settlement of the representatives of one ethnicity divided by a strip of compact residence of the representatives of another and hostile ethnicity joined into a single state.

APPENDICES Appendix 1

“COMRADE CHICHERIN. “I would like to inform you, according to your request, of the precise content of my statements to the Turkish delegates on possible, in my opinion, concessions by the R.S.F.S.R. “1. A large part of the Batum District will remain in the R.S.F.S.R., Artvin and Ardenuch will go to Turkey, the new border between the R.S.F.S.R. and Turkey will pass approximately along the Liman-Bokhchkha-River Chorokh-River Imerkhevi line [and on toward the east] to the border of the Kars Region. It stands to reason that I am speaking of an approximate line, for a precise border based on this approximate line must be determined by a corresponding commission. “2. The military does not agree to concede Ardohan to Turkey, considering it the key to Tiflis, nevertheless I (Stalin) hope to break the military and achieve concessions so that the border between the R.S.F.S.R. and Turkey passes approximately along the line of the old border between the Kars Region and the Tiflis Gubernia, whereby I make the same specification about a precise border based on the approximate line I made above in point one. “3. Alexandropol is being cleansed by Turkey, whereby along the entire Alexandropol-Kamar- lu railway (to the west of this line), a strip of approximately 20 versts in width is provided in favor of the R.S.F.S.R. “4. In the Nakhchivan question, the last word goes to the representative of Azerbaijan. “6 March, 1921. “The Kremlin “[Stalin] “[P.S. I made the inserts in red ink. J. St.].”13

13 Letter from J.V. Stalin to G.V. Chicherin of 6 March, 1921, RGASPI, rec. gr. 5558, inv. 11, f. 824, sheet 8.

168 Volume 8 Issue 1-2 2014 THE CAUCASUS & GLOBALIZATION The text of the document is typed, hand-written author’s inserts are in square brackets, publication is carried out in accordance with the spelling and punctuation rules of contemporary Russian retaining the author’s spelling of proper names.

Appendix 2

“21 August, 1923 “To Comrade STALIN “Copies to members of the Politburo and members of the collegium of the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs. “Dear Comrade, “We once received a protest from the Turkish Government against annexation of Nakhchivan by Azerbaijan… According to the Moscow and Kars treaties, Nakhchivan is an autonomous territory under the patronage of Azerbaijan. The Turkish Government found out that by a decision of the Cen- tral Executive Committee of the Azerbaijan Republic, Nakhchivan has been turned into part of Azer- baijan territory, which contradicts the agreements with Turkey. None of our letters and telegrams sent to Tiflis about this (the matter concerns the Central Executive Committee of the T.S.F.S.R.—O.K.) have been answered. When Comrade Orjonikidze arrived in Moscow, I wrote to him about this, and now I have received a reply from him from Berlin that the congress of the Nakhchivan Territory has declared itself an inseparable part of Azerbaijan, and that at present it has been given the rights of a district. Comrade Orjonikidze adds that no one objected to this, believing that Nakhchivan has the right to do this. “This, unfortunately, is not correct. If a certain territory has a certain status under an agreement, its status cannot be changed without the consent of the negotiating parties. Luxemburg, for example, cannot be annexed either by France, or by Germany, or by Belgium, no matter what the people of Luxemburg itself want. So, in this case, there has indeed been a violation of our agreements with Turkey. I do not see why Nakhchivan cannot be declared an autonomous region, which essentially will not differ particularly from its status as a district. “With best communist regards, “Chicherin.”14

The author of this article is putting the full text of this document into scientific circulation for the first time.

14 Minutes No. 27 of the Politburo Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik) sitting of 23 August, 1923, RGASPI, rec. gr. 17, inv. 3, f. 375, sheet 12.