A History of Sports Coaching in Britain

Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 A History of Sports Coaching in Britain

At the London Olympics in 2012 Team GB achieved a third place ﬁnish in the medals table. A key factor in this achievement was the high standard of contemporary British sports coaching. But how has British sports coaching transitioned from the amateur to the professional, and what can the hitherto under-explored history of sports coaching in Britain tell us about both the early history of sport and about contemporary coaching practice? A History of Sports Coaching in Britain is the ﬁrst book to attempt to examine the history of British sports coaching, from its amateur roots deep in the nineteenth century to the high-performance, high-status professional coaching cultures of today. The book draws on original primary source material, including the lost coaching lives of key individuals, to trace the development of coaching in Britain. It assesses the continuing impact of the nineteenth-century amateur ethos throughout the twentieth century, and includes important comparisons with developments in international coaching, particularly in North America and the Eastern Bloc. The book also explores the politicization of sport and the complicated interplay between politics and coaching practice, and illuminates the origins of the structures, organizations and philosophies that surround performance sport in Britain today. This book is fascinating reading for anybody with an interest in the history of sport, sports coaching, sports development, or the relationships between sport and wider society.

Dave Day is Reader in Sports History at Manchester Metropolitan University, UK. His research interests include the history of sports coaching and constructing

Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 the biographies of coaches. His book Professionals, Amateurs and Performance: Sports Coaching in England, 1789–1914 was published in 2012.

Tegan Carpenter is a Sports Lecturer at Bath College, UK, where her research interests have centred on the history of coaching practice and training in the twentieth century. Routledge Research in Sports Coaching

The Routledge Research in Sports Coaching series provides a platform for leading experts and emerging academics in this important discipline to present ground- breaking work on the history, theory, practice and contemporary issues of sports coaching. The series sets a new benchmark for research in sports coaching, and offers a valuable contribution to the wider sphere of sports studies.

Available in this series:

A History of Sports Coaching in Britain Overcoming Amateurism Dave Day and Tegan Carpenter Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 A History of Sports Coaching in Britain Overcoming amateurism

Dave Day and Tegan Carpenter Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016

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Add AddAdd AddAdd AddAdd First published 2016 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2016 D. Day and T. Carpenter The right of D. Day and T. Carpenter to be identiﬁed as authors of this work has been asserted by them in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identiﬁcation and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Day, Dave. A history of sports coaching in Britain : overcoming amateurism / Dave Day and Tegan Carpenter. pages cm. -- (Routledge Research in Sports Coaching) Includes bibliographical references and index. 1. Coaching (Athletics)--Great Britain--History. I. Title. GV711.D37 2015 796.07’7--dc23 2015015405

ISBN: 978-1-138-02552-3 (hbk) ISBN: 978-1-315-77506-7 (ebk)

Typeset in Galliard by Taylor & Francis Books Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 Contents

Introduction 1

1 Laying the foundations: Victorian coaching practices 10

2 Coaching before the First World War 34

3 The inter-war years 58

4 Post-1945 coaching initiatives 80

5 British coaching in the 1950s and 1960s 102

6 Cold War inﬂuences 122

7 Coaching, science and medicine 145

8 Structural changes and British coaching 169

Conclusion 191

Index 199 Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 This page intentionally left blank Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 Introduction

Following failures at the Olympic Games at Stockholm in 1912, a debate ensued about the effectiveness of British coaching and this coaching discourse remained essentially unchanged two World Wars later, fuelled by ongoing pessimism about the country’s readiness to compete at the 1948 Olympics. A year before the Games, one author was proposing the establishment of a ‘College for Coaches’ to redress the low standards of coaching by offering three-year courses covering first aid, psychology, massage and the ‘modern methods of coaching’,1 but not everyone agreed. While Oxbridge members of the Achilles Club, the traditional backbone of national athletics teams, conceded that coaches might be necessary in technical events, they also expressed the view that runners could acquire good technique without ever being coached and that the rigid application of a coaching system could easily ‘ruin a man of great natural gifts’.2 For the rest of the twentieth century, coaching remained a bone of contention between these traditionalists and the emerging pragmatists in British sport, leading to a slow and uneven acceptance of the role of professional coaches. Even in 2007, the national media, apprehensive about prospects for the 2008 Beijing Olympics, were debating whether or not foreign coaches should be imported to fill the gaps left in British coaching expertise over the past fifty years.3 In the end, the British team achieved a total of forty-seven medals in Beijing, including nineteen gold, and when London hosted the Games for a third time four years later, Great Britain finished third in the medal table, winning twenty-nine events, a performance unmatched since 1908. These results had been achieved through the implementation of a carefully planned and well-resourced, professiona-

Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 lized system that integrated sports science and medicine, intensive training centres, full-time professional coaching and greater funding for athletes. In many respects, this represented a significant achievement for the structures created by government over the previous forty years, which had seen the creation of a Sports Council in 1972 and the National Coaching Foundation in 1983 (subsequently Sports Coach UK in 2001), the introduction of the National Lottery (1994), and the focusing of elite sports support through UK Sport (1996). Equally important was that the successes of 2012 marked something of a cultural transformation in the way that British professional coaches were perceived, by the media, by the public and by the National Governing Bodies (NGBs) of sport. 2 Introduction This comparatively recent shift towards a systematic programme of competitive preparation represented a significant change from the amateur approach taken to coaches, training, government involvement and centralized funding that had characterized British sport since the late nineteenth century. It is a change that has received little attention from researchers, and the history of sports coaching is distinguished primarily by the paucity of reference works available on this topic, somewhat surprising given that the ‘coach’ has been ever-present since Classical times. The aim here is to stimulate academic study into the history of British coaching, particularly in the twentieth century, and to establish something of a template for future research. Key features of this text are its focus on how structures and environment impacted on coaching lives and its emphasis on the centrality of the individual to coaching history. In the years before the creation of regulatory bodies of sport, the development of activities such as pedestrianism (the forerunner of modern athletics) and swimming was entirely dependent on the drive and initiative of motivated men and women.4 Although this changed somewhat during the late nineteenth century, when middle-class organizations assumed the control and direction of British sport, the role of the individual coaching innovator was never entirely marginalized and coaches such as Geoff Dyson and Bert Kin- near, who operated in the decades following the Second World War, displayed many of the characteristics of their predecessors. Accounts of coaching lives like these, located and understood in context, enable the narrator to construct larger stories about sport and society. Coaches are always influenced by the social and sporting structures within which they operate, so changes inevitably occur in the organization and meanings of the coaching role as relationships change and power balances shift. This can be easily demonstrated by examining the various ways in which the terms ‘coach’ and ‘coaching’ have been employed over time. Early twentieth-century professional, Harry Andrews, for example, always referred to himself as a trainer rather than a coach and Adolphe Abrahams reflected this dichotomy in 1913 when he suggested separating ‘coaching’ from ‘training’.5 The term ‘trainer’ had traditionally been applied to a professional whose key skills included massage, while ‘coach’ was more often used in the university sports of rowing and cricket.6 Although there was a class component to this differentiation, there was also a practical distinction in that rowing in a crew and batting in cricket required the subtle refinement of skills, whereas trainers in more plebeian sports focused on developing physical fitness. Language never remains static, however,

Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 and these terms have constantly evolved so that, in the twenty-first century, ‘coach’ refers to any individual who is responsible for directing the training of athletes and ‘coaching’ is the actual act of preparing an athlete for competition. This encompasses a number of tasks, including the orchestration and implementation of carefully developed training plans, the acclimatization of athletes for the competitive environment, and the giving of advice throughout a performance.7 As in all periods, successful ‘coaches’ have a clear understanding of the technical and tactical aspects of their sport, the ability to communicate this knowledge to athletes, and a ‘feel’ for what is required at any point in time. Many elite coaches discussed throughout this book, for example, believed that they had Introduction 3 an innate intuition about how to improve their athletes, commonly described by practitioners as having a ‘coaching eye’. As an activity, ‘coaching’ has always been socially and politically constructed and defined. It needs to be recognized, therefore, that coaching, especially in the earlier stages of the period covered here, was a highly gendered activity. Indeed, there is strong evidence to suggest that the struggle of female coaches to gain parity with their male peers continues to the present day. In some sports, such as swimming, the moral imperative that required female teachers to work with female pupils meant that practitioners such as Clara Jarvis, who accompanied the British swimming team to Stockholm in 1912, were able to establish themselves in coaching positions. The same cannot be said of athletics, however, and few, if any female coaches, managed to establish a public presence in the sport during the twentieth century. That is not to say, of course, that they did not exist but merely to point out that the media, the NGBs, and, indeed, the male coaches, consistently consigned them to the background. As a result, the reader will discover few examples of elite female coaches in this work and there is an urgent need for further research into these marginalized lives. Other social constructions, such as class, also impacted on the coaching environment, especially when middle-class groups, with a particular sporting agenda, appropriated sport in the late nineteenth century. Scholars agree that British sport has been fundamentally shaped by their philosophy of amateurism,8 an ethos which never relied merely on a technical definition of whether or not an athlete was paid but incorporated a range of ideals and beliefs that had social significance well beyond the sports field.9 Neil Carter argues that ‘amateurism was a state of mind, its rhetoric ever changing to justify itself’,10 so, for a variety of reasons, most influ- entially perhaps the lifting of the professional ban at the Olympics in 1986, the meaning of amateurism has continued to evolve. Indeed, NGBs often used the terms ‘amateur’ and ‘professional’ to mean just what they chose them to mean. For example, in 1956, in women’s hockey, netball and association football an amateur could receive a fee or honorarium for coaching but this was not allowed in lawn tennis and athletics, and while the Amateur Athletic Association (AAA) declared that being a professional in one sport constituted a loss of amateur status the Lawn Tennis Association (LTA) had no such regulation.11 It was inevitable that the amateur ethos would dictate the attitudes taken to coaches. From the start of formal regulation, there was often a preference for

Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 amateur or honorary coaches rather than professionals and, even in those sports where professionals were accepted as being necessary, administrators remained cautious about their involvement and controlled them by enforcing on them a master–servant relationship. Although the number of professional coaches rose significantly following the Second World War, their primary duties were often to educate a contingent of honorary coaches who could then pass on their knowledge to amateur participants. Administrators were never fully comfortable with employing professional coaches and the fact that they wanted payment for working with athletes offended the sensibilities of many officials. In some ways, this mind-set was to be expected, given the principles on which many NGBs 4 Introduction had been based, but it is less obvious why these attitudes survived for as long as they did. Internationally, there was a much more positive approach taken to professional coaches. In the period before the Second World War, America was pre-eminent in this respect and the value placed on coaching was reflected in the nation’s dominance of international sport. The emergence of the Soviet Union as another sporting leviathan after 1945 was also predicated on the use of expert coaches to develop elite athletes, as well as on the utilization of scientific research and the creation of governmental structures to support international performance. In both cases, the impact of these systems went beyond national boundaries. In the years before 1939, many European countries adopted the American system of coaching and training while Soviet methods permeated the whole of the Eastern Bloc in the decades after 1950. In contrast, the British sporting system was slow to react, primarily because officials were resistant to the introduction of ‘foreign’ methods, partly because of an inherent belief in the efficacy of their traditional approach to elite sport and partly because of an ongoing arrogance concerning the nation’s place in the sporting world. The struggles faced by British professional coaches to move beyond the traditional constraints of their sporting environments are reflected in this text, which builds on the limited historiography of elite coaching12 by examining its development in twentieth-century Britain through the lens of two sports, swimming and athletics. Although other sports are mentioned in passing, the British sporting landscape is so extensive that any attempt to consider a broader range of activities would inevitably result in a superficial consideration of the topic. The aim here is to use these sports as exemplars in order to give the reader an understanding of how NGBs reacted to the changing social and sporting contexts of the twentieth century. Athletics and swimming were selected primarily because of their ongoing popularity and because they have been ever-present at the Olympics since the revival of the Games in 1896. They are also the most appropriate starting point for research into British coaching history because their relevant NGBs, the AAA and the Amateur Swimming Association (ASA), consistently tried to incorporate some degree of coaching into their programmes during the course of the twentieth century. Similarly, the Olympic Games were chosen as the vehicle through which British coaching standards in relation to the rest of the world could be assessed rather than World Championship events. Not only are they a more established event

Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 (the World Championships for swimming and athletics did not begin until 1973 and 1983, respectively), but the Games also occur on a four-yearly cycle, thus enabling some limited assessment of the effectiveness of any coaching schemes which had been created. In addition, of course, the Olympics are widely seen as the pinnacle of achievement in both swimming and athletics.13 The underpinning research which informs this work drew on both archival and oral history sources to provide a contextualized account of the development of the coaching role in twentieth-century swimming and athletics. Documents from both the ASA and AAA archives offered key details about the internal workings of these organizations during this period, although these have been treated with some caution Introduction 5 since, as Martin Polley has observed, recorded minutes and reports inevitably reflect ‘an organisation’s … traditions, concerns, ideologies and internal politics’.14 Many officials attending these meetings had reservations about coaches and regarded coaching as a somewhat marginal activity, so it is likely that their ideology influenced the recording of events, and a detailed story of coaching could never be gleaned solely from these documents. Therefore, although NGB records were essential, this material was constantly triangulated with other sources for confirmation and clarification. Since both sports engaged with various incarnations of centralized coaching schemes throughout this period, albeit reluctantly on occasions, it has been possible to trace aspects of their attitudes to professional coaching by accessing official documents from sources such as the National Fitness Council and the Ministry of Education. Indeed, the communications between the NGBs and these grant awarding bodies are considered in some detail here because the way in which the debates about professional coaching appointments unfolded highlights the dilemma faced by amateur administrators. Although money and support were being made available so that they could engage more proactively with elite coaches, officials remained concerned about losing autonomy and ceding power to professionals. As a result, these NGBs did not fully embrace these opportunities and, in some instances, even rejected them completely. Further archival material from the likes of the British Olympic Association (BOA), the 1923 Decies Commission and the British Asso- ciation of Sports and Medicine (BASM) offered different perspectives, while the use of newspapers, period texts, census records, data from the General Records Office (GRO) and private family collections, enabled further cross-examination of information and a broader synthesis of material. Especially important sources in the context of this work were the voices of coaches and sports scientists who had been intimately connected to the developments of the past fifty years. Oral history is an umbrella term used to describe the various ways, including life histories, topical histories or thematic studies,15 in which memories and personal commentaries of historical significance are collected through interviews.16 Because the focus here was specifically on the experiences of coaches and sports science staff, a topical approach was used in order to concentrate on the ‘what, when, how, why, or with what consequence something happened’.17 Quotes, selected for their ‘typicality’, are presented throughout the work as short ‘pithy’ extracts18 and the interweaving of quotation with narrative and doc- umentary evidence through the text allows for the creation of ‘fresh historical 19

Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 interpretations’ and a ‘multi-dimensional picture of the past’. Interviewees were selected because of their previous or current involvement with elite swimming or athletics coaching and/or the provision of sports science support in British sport and, where possible, individuals were approached who had been engaged in different time periods. The brief biographies noted below will help to clarify for the reader the levels of expertise and experience of those whose voices permeate the latter stages of the text.

Professor Dave Collins: Holds a PhD in psychology and is a chartered psychologist. He has worked in various roles associated with performance 6 Introduction sport since 1985, was Performance Director for UK Athletics from 2005 to 2008, and has attended eight Olympic Games with different sports. Frank Dick: In 1970 was appointed as National Coach for Athletics in Scotland and in 1979 became the Director of Coaching for UK Athletics, where he stayed until 1994. In 1980 he published Sports Training Principles which offered British coaches an interpretation of the principles of periodization. Tom McNab: Appointed as National Coach for Southern Counties AAA from 1963 to 1977. In 1966 he developed several programmes including the Five Star Award and a junior national decathlon programme, which produced Daley Thompson. In 1978 he worked as the technical director for Chariots of Fire and the following year he trained the British bobsleigh team for the 1980 Lake Placid Games. Hamilton Smith: A successful swimmer in his youth, he frequently attended the Loughborough Summer School where he experienced a range of coaching and scientiﬁc methods. He later transferred his skills to coaching and took up various posts until he was appointed as National Technical Ofﬁcer for the ASA from 1963 to 1967. He worked in close conjunction with Bert Kinnear and between them they were responsible for introducing new and progressive methods into British swimming. Bill Furniss: Was head coach at both Nottingham County swim squad and Nova Centurion swimming club from 1980 and was appointed head coach for the 1996 British Olympic swim team. He was also the coach of 2008 double Olympic gold medallist, Rebecca Adlington, and is now Great Britain’s head swimming coach. Terry Denison: Became head coach at the City of Leeds swimming club in 1972 where he coached Adrian Moorhouse (Olympic gold medallist), Andrew Astbury (Olympic bronze medallist) and James Hickman (World short course champion). He was involved in the coaching staff at six different Olympic Games and was appointed chief coach in 1992. He was named coach of the year ten times by the British Swimming Coaches Association and in 1999 was awarded an MBE for his services to swimming. Alan Lynn: Has been involved in the preparation of a number of Olympic swimmers and was named coach of the year by sportscotland in 1999. He was appointed Technical Director of Scottish Swimming in 2000 and remained in

Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 post until 2002 before becoming an academic member of staff at the Uni- versity of Stirling School of Sport. He is now National Coach for Scottish swimming. Professor Les Burwitz: Gained a PhD at the University of Illinois and was appointed to staff at Manchester Metropolitan University (MMU) in 1974, where he developed and led one of Britain’s ﬁrst sports science departments. In 1984, he was one of the founding members of The British Association of Sport and Exercise Sciences. He retired in 1997 as Emeritus Professor. Dr Sarah Rowell: A successful long-distance runner who ran in the 1984 Olympic Marathon. She gained a ﬁrst class honours sports science degree and Introduction 7 completed her PhD in 1989. She was then appointed as the manager of the National Coaching Foundation Sports Science Support Programme and went on to become a technical advisor and help establish the English Institute of Sport.

When combined with the evidence from the archives, these oral testimonies help to provide an illuminating narrative about the issues faced by professional coaches operating within the British sporting environment in the twentieth century. The text presents this material in two discrete, but closely connected, sections. In chapters 1–4, the authors take a chronological approach in describing the development of the coaching role in Britain from its roots in the eighteenth century through to the years immediately following the Second World War. The narrative here is supported by archival research that highlights the ongoing debate within British sport about the employment of professional coaches, attitudes towards coaching systems abroad, particularly in America, and the operation of the NGBs in swimming and athletics. In chapter 5 the voices of the interviewees appear, as individuals reﬂect on coaching in the 1950s and 1960s. The second section of the book, encompassing chapters 6–8, describes developments in the second half of the twentieth century from a thematic, rather than purely chronological, perspective. The inﬂuence on coaching of the emerging Soviet model of sport, the coaching implications of the development of sports science, and the changes in supporting structures for elite sport were all key drivers for change and each has been dealt with as a separate entity, although a chronological approach has been retained within each chapter. The conclusion returns to the voices of interviewees for commentary on the current state of coaching in Britain before highlighting some important areas for future work. In that respect, it probably bears repeating that this book represents ‘A’ history, not ‘The’ history, of British coaching in the twentieth century and it merely marks the starting point in what will inevitably be a long and complex process of discovery.

Notes 1 Hedley Trembath, British Sport (London: Skelton Robinson British Yearbooks, 1947), 17–18. 2 Harold Albert Meyer, ed., Athletics (London: J.M. Dent, 1955), 3–4, 293. 3 Kate Hoey, Sports Pages, Daily Telegraph, September 26, 2007. 4 Samantha-Jayne Oldﬁeld, ‘Running Pedestrianism in Victorian Manchester’, Sport in

Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 History 34, no. 2 (2014): 223–248; Dave Day, ‘London Swimming Professors: Victorian Craftsmen and Aquatic Entrepreneurs’, Sport in History 30, no. 1 (2010): 32–54. 5 Adolphe Abrahams, ‘The Ladies Plate at Henley Regatta’, Lancet August 2 (1913): 352–353. 6 Dave Day, ‘Victorian Coaching Communities: Exemplars of Traditional Coaching Practice’, Sports Coaching Review 2, no. 2 (2014): 151–162. 7 Murray George Phillips, From Sidelines to Centre Field: A History of Sports Coaching in Australia (Sydney: University of New South Wales Press Ltd, 2000), xiii. 8 Richard Holt, Sport and the British: A Modern History (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992); Richard Holt and Tony Mason, Sport in Britain, 1945–2000 (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd, 2000); Tony Mason, ed., Sport in Britain: A Social History 8 Introduction (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); John Lowerson, Sport and the English Middle Classes, 1870–1914 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1995); Martin Polley, Moving the Goalposts: A History of Sport and Society in Britain since 1945 (Oxon: Routledge, 1998). 9 Norman Baker, ‘The Amateur Ideal in a Society of Equality: Change and Continuity in Post-Second World War British Sport, 1945–48’, International Journal of the History of Sport 12, no. 1 (1995): 101. 10 Neil Carter, ‘From Knox to Dyson: Coaching, Amateurism and British Athletics, 1912–1947’, Sport in History 30, no. 1 (2010): 60. 11 University of Birmingham Physical Education Department, Britain in the World of Sport: An Examination of the Factors Involved in Participation in Competitive Interna- tional Sport (Birmingham: The Physical Education Association, 1956), 15. 12 Dave Day, Professionals, Amateurs and Performance: Sports Coaching in England, 1789– 1914 (Bern: Peter Lang, 2012); Dave Day, ‘Craft Coaching and the “Discerning Eye” of the Coach’, International Journal of Sports Science and Coaching 6, no. 1 (2011): 179–196; Dave Day, ‘Victorian Coaching Communities: Exemplars of Traditional Coaching Practice’, Sports Coaching Review 2, no. 2 (2014): 151–162; Dave Day, ‘“Magical and Fanciful Theories”: Sports Psychologists and Craft Coaches’, Sports Coaching Review 1, no. 1 (2012): 52–66; Dave Day, Neil Carter and Tegan Carpenter, ‘The Olympics, Amateurism and Britain’s Coaching Heritage’, International Journal of Heritage Studies 19, no. 2 (2013): 139–115; Tegan Carpenter, ‘Uneasy Bedfellows: Amateurism and Coaching Traditions in Twentieth Century British Sport’ (PhD Diss., Manchester Metropolitan University, 2012); Carter, ‘From Knox to Dyson’,55–81. 13 Dave Collins, interview, February 17, 2011, Crewe, Cheshire. See Collins biography below. 14 Martin Polley, Sports History: A Practical Guide (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 102. 15 Texas Historical Commission, Fundamentals of Oral History: Texas Preservation Guidelines (Texas: Texas Historical Commission, 2004), 2. 16 Donald A. Ritchie, Doing Oral History: A Practical Guide (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 19. 17 Herbert J. Rubin and Irene S. Rubin, Qualitative Interviewing: The Art of Hearing Data, Second Edition (California: Sage Publications Inc., 2005), 11. 18 Lynn Abrams, Oral History Theory (Oxon: Routledge, 2010), 15. 19 Stephen Humphries, The Handbook of Oral History: Recording Life Histories (London: Inter-Action Imprint, 1984), 52.

Bibliography Abrams, Lynn. Oral History Theory (Oxon: Routledge, 2010). Meyer, Harold Albert, ed., Athletics (London: J.M. Dent, 1955). Baker, Norman. ‘The Amateur Ideal in a Society of Equality: Change and Continuity in Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 Post-Second World War British Sport, 1945–48’. International Journal of the History of Sport 12, no. 1 (1995): 99–126. Carpenter, Tegan. ‘Uneasy Bedfellows: Amateurism and Coaching Traditions in Twentieth Century British Sport’. PhD Diss., Manchester Metropolitan University, 2012. Carter, Neil. ‘From Knox to Dyson: Coaching, Amateurism and British Athletics, 1912–1947’. Sport in History 30, no. 1 (2010): 55–81. Day, Dave. ‘London Swimming Professors: Victorian Craftsmen and Aquatic Entrepreneurs’. Sport in History 30, no. 1 (2010): 32–54. Day, Dave. ‘Craft Coaching and the “Discerning Eye” of the Coach’. International Journal of Sports Science and Coaching 6, no. 1 (2011): 179–196. Introduction 9 Day, Dave. ‘“Magical and Fanciful Theories”: Sports Psychologists and Craft Coaches’. Sports Coaching Review 1 no. 1 (2012): 52–66. Day, Dave. Professionals, Amateurs and Performance: Sports Coaching in England, 1789–1914 (Bern: Peter Lang, 2012). Day, Dave. ‘Victorian Coaching Communities: Exemplars of Traditional Coaching Practice’. Sports Coaching Review, 2, no. 2 (2014): 151–162. Day, Dave, Neil Carter and Tegan Carpenter. ‘The Olympics, Amateurism and Britain’s Coaching Heritage’. International Journal of Heritage Studies 19, no. 2 (2013): 139–115. Holt, Richard. Sport and the British: A Modern History (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992). Holt, Richard and Tony Mason. Sport in Britain, 1945–2000 (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd 2000). Humphries, Stephen. The Handbook of Oral History: Recording Life Histories (London: Inter-Action Imprint, 1984). Lowerson, John. Sport and the English Middle Classes, 1870–1914 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1995). Mason, Tony, ed. Sport in Britain: A Social History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989). Oldﬁeld, Samantha-Jayne. ‘Running Pedestrianism in Victorian Manchester’. Sport in History 34, no. 2 (2014): 223–248. Phillips, Murray George. From Sidelines to Centre Field: A History of Sports Coaching in Australia (Sydney: University of New South Wales Press Ltd, 2000). Polley, Martin. Moving the Goalposts: A History of Sport and Society in Britain since 1945 (Oxon: Routledge, 1998). Polley, Martin. Sports History: A Practical Guide (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007). Ritchie, Donald A. Doing Oral History: A Practical Guide (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003). Rubin, Herbert J. and Irene S. Rubin. Qualitative Interviewing: The Art of Hearing Data, Second Edition (California: Sage Publications Inc., 2005). Texas Historical Commission. Fundamentals of Oral History: Texas Preservation Guidelines (Texas: Texas Historical Commission, 2004). Trembath, Hedley. British Sport (London: Skelton Robinson British Yearbooks, 1947). University of Birmingham Physical Education Department. Britain in the World of Sport: An Examination of the Factors Involved in Participation in Competitive International Sport (Birmingham: The Physical Education Association, 1956). Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 1 Laying the foundations Victorian coaching practices

Training knowledge is traditional and oral … imparted by mystery-men, adept professional trainers – cunning pedestrians and ancient mariners who derive their maxims from their predecessors, and polishing them by their own experience, duly instil them into the minds of admiring pupils.1

Introduction Ongoing industrialization and urbanization transformed the way in which sport in Britain was played and managed during the nineteenth century. A significant increase in disposable income, improved transport links and the influx of individuals from rural into urban areas, altered the amount of space and structured time available for leisure. Taken together, these factors subsequently encouraged the middle-class development of sporting rules, the creation of voluntary sporting organizations, and the consolidation of class distinction in sport. For much of the century, however, it was the working-class professional sportsman, and occasionally sportswoman, who held centre stage. Eighteenth-century pugilism was superseded in the early 1800s by pedestrianism, the forerunner of track and field athletics, as the preferred gambling and spectator sport of the lower classes, but professional rowing and swimming were also extremely popular. The majority of contestants, particularly in the first half of the century, employed professional trainers who utilized training systems based fundamentally on methods developed during the previous century, when social changes had stimulated the activities of sporting entrepreneurs. In London, George Smith sponsored foot racing and cricket at the Artillery Ground, William Kemp ran the Peerless Pool, where waiters taught Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 swimming, while combat sports were commercialized by James Figg, whose pupil John (Jack) Broughton, subsequently opened an amphitheatre, dedicated to the ‘Manly Art of Boxing’. Boxing became a significant feature of the cultural landscape for all classes by 1800 and invariably involved contests between working-class individuals backed by wealthy patrons who tried to improve their chances of success by putting their pugilists into training programmes.2 A combination of Enlight- enment thinking and increasing industrialization had stimulated the concept of achievement through improved performance, resulting in a commitment to systematic training programmes on the basis that training schemes, based on scientific Laying the foundations 11 principles, could extend the performance of humans beyond their God-given abilities.3 Commentators clearly distinguished between the acquisition of technique, ‘science’ or ‘art’,and‘wind’ or fitness, as well as referring to ‘bottom’,or‘game’,theabilityto endure the severity of an opponent’s blows. Although there were differences in the level of importance allocated to the various aspects of performance, there was unanimity that while some were naturally endowed others could be improved. Good wind, for example, could be established and enhanced by training and regu- larity of living, normally under the supervision of expert trainers, who drew on their own experiences, and an oral tradition surrounding pugilist training, to devise their regimes. The elements that underpinned these training programmes were part of the accepted wisdom of the period regarding health and its dependence on the six non-naturals of air, food, exercise, the passions, evacuation and retention, sleeping, and waking. Training practices were also influenced by humoral theory, which held that bodies were comprised of the four humours of earth, fire, water and air, each having its associated characteristic of melancholy, choler, phlegm or blood. The work of the trainer was to address humoral imbalances through a programme of diet, exercise and medication. The body was prepared by being well purged and cleared of all ill humours by taking medicines over two or three days. The first day purged the bowels, the second the liver and the third the ‘reins’ in which lay the ‘drain’ of the ill humours. Fighters ‘in training’ were supervised in all aspects of their lives for between ten days and six weeks and, because it was believed that the best quality air was found in rural areas, trainers normally took their men out of town. Diet was strictly controlled and particular hours of rest and recreation were observed throughout the training period. Exercise consisted of sparring, using dumbbells or walking, but avoided creating fatigue, and both fighter and trainer were advised to avoid excess in food, wine or women. This regime was described as having been ‘laid down and approved by many scientific men’,4 although training programmes were not always uniform in nature and it was recognized that specific training schemes could produce different outcomes. Towards the end of the century, Fewtrell declared that little more remained to be done to improve the sport since ‘no labour, no expense had been spared to attain perfection and every manoeuvre, every finesse, which the mind could suggest, or the body execute, had been attempted’.5 In 1800, it was being argued that a full understanding had been achieved of the importance of endurance,

Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 courage and technique, and Mendoza observed in 1816 that boxing had ‘been wrought into a regular system and elevated even to the rank of a science’.6 By this time, the sporting landscape of England was populated by a number of professionals who represented backers in a range of sports such as pedestrianism, which had been a regular competitive feature at festivals, fairs, race meetings and cricket matches, since the seventeenth century. Pedestrian events included hurdling, leaping over a height or for distance (either from a standing position or from a run), hop, step and jump, and vaulting, although the main disciplines were running and race walking, in which the heel touched the ground before the toes. There were also staged events in which solitary pedestrians competed in speciﬁc challenges 12 Laying the foundations against distance and time, and the sport, which had always been associated with a culture of gambling, was gradually formalized and contained within specialized running arenas as entrepreneurs began to develop the activity as a spectacle. By the mid-nineteenth century, several pedestrians had become national celebrities and pedestrianism had replaced pugilism as the major spectator sport of the working classes in the years immediately before the advent of organized football.

Trainers and coaching communities Pedestrianism’s organizational development had paralleled that of pugilism, and, given that trainers, backers and athletes moved easily between different sports, it is not surprising that training regimes and traditions also migrated seamlessly from one sport to another. Partly because of the physical demands of the sport, a career as a professional fighter was unlikely to be a long one so good fighters capitalized on their reputations by turning to teaching boxing skills or giving exhibitions. Many practitioners also developed careers as trainers, often using their experiential knowledge to prepare rowers and pedestrians in addition to fellow pugilists. The combination of emerging scientific and medical knowledge, part of the intellectual currency of many patrons, with practitioner experiences and observations resulted in rationa- lized programmes of physical and technical training. Going ‘into training’ in rural areas for periods of six to eight weeks and beginning with purging and sweating before moving on to a strict regime of diet and exercise remained the norm, as did engaging a professional trainer to oversee the process. Sir John Sinclair recorded some of the oral traditions and practices of these men in 1806 and his Code of Health and Longevity in 1807 drew on this material, as well as on medical and Classical sources, to describe regimes that were beginning to integrate more exercise, but, in essence, represented a refinement, not a replacement of traditional training programmes. When Robert Barclay turned to training, he used his own experiences as an athlete from working under pugilistic trainers and ex-pedestrian Jacky Smith, to devise a schedule for prizefighter Tom Cribb that reduced his weight by over two-and-a-half stone and improved his wind and strength so much that he had an easy victory over Molyneaux in 1811. Barclay’s approach was considered ‘completely scientific’7 and such men became even more central in sporting activities during the early nineteenth century as training systems gradually became more complex.

Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 In 1836, Walker observed that the art of training had reached ‘a degree of perfection almost incredible’. Trainers, who generally emerged from within the activity and used their own methods, understanding of skills, and approaches to contests, to underpin their training advice, were encouraged to use their judgement and avoid following rigid training rules. They generally began by assessing an athlete’s constitution, personality and habits, in order to assess how best to organize the training elements, which they then monitored closely. Training condition was assessed by whether the sweats stopped reducing weight and by the athlete’s time for a mile at top speed, a good result confirming either that his condition was perfect or that he had ‘derived all the advantages which can possibly Laying the foundations 13 result from the training process’.8 Each practitioner also experimented in applying emerging knowledge, accepting or rejecting appropriate material, thereby adding something to the training process, particularly in periods of educational, commercial and scientific advances. Their ‘know-how’ underpinned sports training for much of the century, partly because it proved highly effective in developing athletes well beyond the capacities of their contemporaries. George Seward recorded 9.25 seconds for the 100 yards in 1844, Henry Reed registered 48.5 seconds for the 400 yards in 1849 and William Jackson ran eleven miles 40 yards in one hour in 1845. Despite their acknowledged expertise, these early trainers were never entirely independent and the demands of their patrons imposed constraints on their behaviour. Dowling thought that a trainer should be intelligent and firm in his manner, flexible in his opinions about the use of ‘medicines’, open to instruction and ‘willingly obedient to the rules laid down for his guidance’. It was essential that he was ‘faithful’ and backers should investigate this thoroughly since a trainer could be tempted by ‘some unknown agent to swerve from his duty’. Once engaged, it was necessary to closely monitor a trainer’s movements. For his part, the trainer must report progress truthfully to the backers because ‘if he be found falsifying even in trivial matters, he will not be trusted when he tells truths of importance’.9 Gradually, though, as these men became more influential and gained a degree of financial independence, they began to take more control of their environments.

The athletic ‘stable’ Pedestrianism provided a career path from competitor to trainer and, as the sport replaced pugilism as the passion of the working classes, the communities that coaches operated within changed, driven primarily by the ﬁnancial returns associated with gambling.10 Competitors and coaches regularly engaged in various forms of deceit, often based on a ‘stable’ of runner, coach and fellow athletes, which acted as a unit for betting purposes, examples of which emerged in the North-West of England during the ﬁrst half of the century. Bolton publican Ben Hart, who was racing in the 1830s, had gained fame as a trainer in the 1840s, when his training system was described as ‘decidedly the best adapted for the end designed’, and by 1846, Hart and his head trainer, Thomas Wolfenden, were fully employed with four men training in their ‘stud’ at Newton.11 In 1851, Hayes,

Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 trained by Hart, beat Tetlow, trained by James Parker, a beer seller from Preston, whose own training system was ‘not to be surpassed by any professional of the present day’.12 While Parker’s involvement included ofﬁciating and promoting, aﬁcionados of pedestrianism were most familiar with him as ‘Jerry Jem’, the ‘celebrated trainer’, and an analysis of Bell’s Life reports from the 1840s to the 1860s suggests that he trained at least a hundred pedestrians, the majority of them sprinters. Like Hart, Parker used his premises as a training centre for groups of athletes and his obituary recalled that ‘so widely did his reputation extend that men from all parts of the country were placed in his charge’ with as many as nine men in his stable at any 14 Laying the foundations one time. In 1851, the census recorded a number of well-known ‘peds’ staying in his house, including George Eastham, Joseph Whitehead, John Harris, Joseph Holmes and John Saville. Eastham, Saville (later the proprietor of the Pedestrian Tavern in Oldham) and John Fitton (another prominent member of Jerry’s ‘stud’), all subsequently turned to training. Parker died in 1871 and his life course captures the involvement typical of the many individuals in this period that emerged from an activity and then placed themselves at the centre of a community that organized and developed the sport. In a manner reminiscent of Gramsci’s notion of the organic intellectual, Parker engaged through oral traditions with his athletes, the wider training community and his family, with sons James and Thomas both gaining reputations as pedestrians.13

Swimming communities Contemporary authors refer to ‘regimes of appropriation’, which recognize that financial incentives prevent those who have competitive knowledge from sharing it with outsiders.14 Sinclair had had difficulty in obtaining training information since coaches tended to keep their knowledge to themselves or pass it on to close associates because, for many men, ‘their training methods were their livelihood, with the details often kept within a family’.15 The degree of family involvement in coaching was influenced by the type of sporting activity and, for sports where finesse and skill were paramount, family involvement tended to be sustained over generations. Swimming coaches, in contrast to their pedestrian counterparts, whose training skills revolved around exercise and diet, had a body of sport-specific technical knowledge that was a valuable commodity for their associates and dependants. Many individuals designated themselves as ‘Professors’, indicating that they possessed specialist knowledge, and they were distinguished from other practitioners by the breadth and variety of their activities. These included teaching, competing, performing swimming feats and displays, as well as coaching promising individuals, recruited from within the family or from the locale of the baths. Professor Frederick Beckwith was operating in London by the 1840s, and his subsequent career as a swimming coach and entrepreneur emphasizes the role of the organic intellectual in stimulating and sustaining interest in sport. His swimming knowledge, social networks and entrepreneurial flair established him at the centre

Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 of a South London sporting and entertainment community and he maintained his reputation as the leading Victorian swimming professor through the interactions that took place between coach, family and other connected individuals. Beckwith’score community centred on his immediate family, children Jessie and Frederick, then Willie, Charles and Agnes, and finally Lizzie and Robert, along with other family members such as second wife Elizabeth, daughters-in-law Emma and Emily, and grandchildren Frederick and Agnes. Among non-familial members of his immediate community were professionals Thomas Attwood, David Pamplin and Richard Giles. In 1867, ‘Natator’, the twenty-year-old Attwood, was exhibiting in a large glass tank filled with six feet of water. Two years later, he was Beckwith’s assistant Laying the foundations 15 swimming teacher and he consistently described himself as a swimming teacher or swimming master between 1871 and 1891. Pamplin, whose father had been a swimming ‘waiter’ (teacher), exhibited with Frederick in 1858, aged ten, and he became swimming master at the Camberwell and Dulwich Baths in 1863. He listed swimming teacher, master or instructor, as his occupation between 1871 and 1911. In 1875, Richard Giles, then swimming master at the Albion Baths, was part of the Beckwith troupe, and he continued working as a swimming teacher or instructor between 1881 and 1911. Beckwith’s aquatic community broadened to encompass most of the prominent swimming professors and female natationists of the period. When the Professional Swimming Association (PSA) was formed in 1881, Frederick was made vice-president and his sons Willie and Charles were both captains of the PSA in the 1880s. Profes- sionals and amateurs, even after the formation of amateur organizations, continued to mix socially and the 1886 PSA dinner was attended by a number of amateurs, including Horace Davenport, the amateur champion, who had learnt to swim with Beckwith. Beckwith’s career highlights his sense of coaching community, established and maintained through family, colleagues and organizations such as the PSA. Craft and innovation were constantly engaged, for example, through the continuous refinement of traditional swimming techniques. When the sidestroke evolved into the overarm sidestroke it had supposedly been demonstrated to Beckwith by Australian C.W. Wallis in 1855, and Frederick then used it to establish himself as a champion before teaching it to Harry Gardner, who subsequently became 500 yards champion of England. Frederick had the acumen to develop his activities across a broad cultural range and he maintained strong connections to aristocrats, writers, journalists and sportsmen of all persuasions. While Victorian craft coaching normally involved specialist knowledge being conveyed through direct contact with family or significant others, knowledge exchange was never confined to these sources alone. Urban taverns, for example, were often specialized in terms of their clientele, and followers of sports frequented inns which provided a conduit for the transfer of coaching knowledge. In 1861, Beckwith took over The Good Intent, which included a good bar, with a comfortable parlour for members of Parliament and their friends, a large clubroom, a taproom and a covered skittle ground. There were weekly harmonic meetings and sparring, regular glove bouts for a purse, and every ‘convenience for gentlemen trying their dogs’, including plenty of rats. A large collection of pictures included

Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 portraits of celebrated athletes, while sporting books were kept behind the bar as were Beckwith’s racing colours. The pub became a celebrated sporting resort and was ‘nightly patronised by crowds of the right sort’, including leading sporting professionals, while news of every sporting event could ‘be constantly gleaned at the house of the Champion Swimmer of England’.16

Craft coaching Credibility was afforded to individuals like Parker and Beckwith based on their personal achievements, their age and experience, the competitive success of their 16 Laying the foundations athletes, and the respect given them by other leading practitioners. Such men felt under no obligation to provide theoretical justiﬁcations for their methods and they relied primarily on experience and intuition, an immediate insight made in the absence of a conscious reasoning process, which often led to training innovations, the creation of new ideas, concepts and methods. These attributes were acquired through socialization, trial-and-error or practice, providing individuals with a body of craft knowledge, an intuitive feel for coaching which was founded on tacit knowledge, all those skills that the individual cannot fully articulate, represent or codify.17 Tradition is not self-perpetuating, and each new generation of trainers had to be educated, primarily through kinship groups and coach–athlete relationships, thus replicating traditional craft or guild practices. As in other crafts, traditional knowledge was garnered through ‘organisational socialisation’, whereby aspiring coaches acquired knowledge and skills, as well as absorbing the nuances of coaching practice. Athletes entered coaching already provided with comprehensive ‘maps of meaning’ from their own experiences and they perpetuated the proven technical, tactical and physical strategies, and the coaching philosophies, passed on to them by their own coaches.18 These interactions occurred within small, locally based informal groups, communities of practice, which learnt how to coach effectively by sharing experiences, stories and solutions all which contributed to their ‘toolbox’ of craft knowledge. Skills and knowledge were reproduced across generations, not through instruction but through the granting of access to shared understandings, and for Victorian coaches the communities they generated and sustained were central to their working lives.19 Not surprisingly, trainers always prioritized experience and networks over theory and formal education and they drew on a range of potential information sources such as medical science, physical educators, animal trainers, circus performers and strongmen. Coaches also accessed newspapers, sporting journals and magazines. The portrayal of working-class professional trainers as illiterate ignores the artisanal nature of this highly specialized activity. The urban literacy rate was relatively high among skilled craftsmen like coaches, who were able to access books and articles describing proﬁles of elite athletes, training methods and the psychological components of competition, in literature such as Hardwicke’s Science Gossip, Science Monthly, English Mechanic and World of Science and Spalding’s Athletic Library.20 Some men wrote manuals in which they discussed training methods, psychology,

Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 ergogenic aids, diet and technique. In 1852, sculler Robert Coombes published notes on rowing and training,21 pedestrian John Levett wrote articles on training in the 1860s, and later coaches produced training manuals in which they distilled their experiential knowledge. There was little attempt to deal with the more implicit aspect of their work, the practice of coaching itself, because it was assumed that this could only be achieved through experience. In one of the earliest books on swimming, Frost emphasized that his work was not the product of a ‘speculative theory’ but the result of long and successful practice over many years.22 Authors consistently described themselves as practical men and, while this has been interpreted as meaning uneducated, it really represents the constant tension that Laying the foundations 17 existed between empirical scientiﬁc knowledge and tacit craft knowledge.23 These coaches were not scientists, except in the sense that they employed systematic methods in their work, and their coaching cultures, acting through tightly connected communities of practice, operated much like a cottage industry led by local experts. The operational nature of these small, non-regulated and self-contained communities, led to criticism for encouraging the perpetuation of ‘fads’ and secret training methods24 but it also gave considerable scope for innovation, and Sinclair concluded that trainers had created a new knowledge which those in occupations such as medicine should pay more attention to.25

‘Scientific’ training Each coach’s life course reflected the context in which it was lived and coaches had to continuously redevelop their competencies in order to operate in ever-changing environments. Successful practitioners, like Parker and Beckwith, proved capable of adapting their behaviours to meet the unique demands of their social contexts, and this ability became more critical as traditional approaches to training came under pressure from a number of influences, including advances in scientific knowledge. During the course of the century, the professionalization of science created an institutional framework for the spread of rationalistic ideas. Driven partly by the emerging professional societies, a reductionist approach to the body increasingly employed machine models such as the steam engine and the ‘human motor’ to explain physiological questions. Consequently, anatomy, mechanics, physiology and psychology were integrated into a rational structure and discourse for the study of human performance.26 At the same time, a drive to improve industrial efficiency encouraged a systems model, which eschewed individual characteristics in favour of standardization, specialization and macro-efficiency.27 The development of coaching had strong connections to these perceptions of the body as machine, and to the principles of industrial efficiency and scientific management. As competitive opportunities expanded in the decades before 1900, the sporting body became increasingly contained and reshaped through the expansion and optimization of training, characterized by discipline, perseverance and rationalism.28 This process was overseen by the coach who maintained surveil- lance as the athlete’s body was reshaped into an appropriate form, although the

Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 extent of this control was situation dependent. For example, the coaching role assumed very different trajectories in Britain and in America, where coaching emerged as a specialized and respected profession. As college status came to rely on the performance of athletic teams, coaches developed relationships with academics working in scientific disciplines and adopted industrialized approaches to team organization. When British trainers referred to their sporting activities as ‘scientific’ they were normally referring either to a systematic process of training or to the employment of skills. For trainers, sporting ‘science’ had little to do with experimental sciences, leading Cornhill Magazine to observe in 1864 that training had ‘no principles, 18 Laying the foundations only traditions’.29 Professional coaches worked intuitively by drawing on their craft knowledge so that there was little communication between scientists and the athletic community and an expanding scientific knowledge base never superseded customary practices. Trainers prioritized dealing with the athlete according to his strengths and weaknesses rather than applying universal laws of nature, and their practical understanding was rarely directly related to theoretical underpinning. Even after their training practices were condemned by a medical establishment that embraced scientific approaches to training, traditional methods remained popular and this longevity was matched by continuity in the range of skills and knowledge, generic and event specific, that a coach was expected to have at his command. The ability to control diet and develop fitness, the application of psychological techniques, the preparation of stimulants, massaging skills, medical treat- ments, talent identification and the individualization of training programmes, were all critical components in the coaching ‘toolbox’. In particular, the selection of appropriate athletes and their subsequent physical and mental training were central to professional practices. Identifying and developing potential athletes has always required extensive knowledge of the performance demands within a sport, an accurate assessment of athlete capabilities in relation to these demands, and the ability to predict future performance levels. Victorian coaches identified talent through a form of natural selection, with an athlete chosen for further training as a result of competition performance, or through subjective assessment by the coach. Craft coaches believed that a trainer could usually tell at a glance whether a prospective athlete was likely to be successful, although some men, ‘whilst in other ways no better trainers than the rest’ were especially gifted in this respect.30 Coaches employed a range of training methods to develop their man once he had been selected. Craven discussed repetition training for sprinters in 1855 and Walter George, who had been experimenting with a form of fartlek since the 1870s, subsequently advocated short runs for speed, longer runs for stamina and the necessity for regular recorded time trials. E.C. Bredin advocated daily interval training and year round conditioning, while sprinter Alfred Downer used punch balls in his training.31 The structuring of training was important because there was always the possibility of staleness, although it had long been recognized that trainers used their experiential knowledge to identify and deal with this problem. The coaching strategies employed in peaking athletes for optimum performance and avoiding overtraining,

Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 involved allowing extra rest and variation in the diet if coaches noted symptoms of staleness, ﬂaccid and sunken muscles, patches of red around the body, or a continual and unquenchable thirst.32 It was generally accepted that when a man gained weight he was not being overtrained, and skilled coaches kept a careful note of the daily weights of athletes, before and after training. Additional testing, including timing and assessing the technical parameters of performance such as stride length, would be supplemented by the use of a thermometer to monitor potential illnesses. The ‘discerning eye of the trainer’ could assess the effectiveness of his regime through observing the athlete’s ‘general bearing, appearance and spirits, and the way he does his work’.33 Laying the foundations 19 Craftsmen coaches also recognized that ‘mind’ was as important as ‘body’ for performance. Experiential learning had taught them a number of important lessons about a range of psychological issues including competition and race preparation, individual differences between athletes, how nerves affected performance and the development of courage. The implication for the coach of this connection between mind and body was that training needed to incorporate aspects of psychological preparation. Walsh emphasized that the athlete’s mind should be kept occupied throughout training, during which the coach should ‘draw out the powers of his pupil by walking against him, taking care not to dishearten him’, partly by allowing him to win, since many races had been lost through anxiety before the event. When Walsh discussed race day preparation for rowers, he suggested that ‘In every respect let the walking exercise and breakfast be as usual; then amuse your crew and keep them together as well as you can till about two hours before the race’.34

Amateurism Few, if any, professional training practices were based on the scientific discoveries emerging in the nineteenth century, and this became an issue for both the medical establishment and the public school and university educated middle-class faction that had formulated the principles of amateurism that underpinned their National Governing Bodies (NGBs). While only about 5.5 per cent of the total population were considered middle class in 1870, their social influence was extremely high in proportion to their numbers and they were able to exert their authority over all aspects of Victorian life. The middle class was never a distinct social entity but more a cluster of diverse groupings which were stratified according to their economic, political, social and religious standings, and those in the higher echelons were always keen to use social markers, like their use of leisure, to separate themselves from perceived inferiors. Fundamental to their philosophy of leisure was an adherence to the principle of volunteerism, which became a distinctive feature of the upper and wealthy middle classes. By immersing themselves in philanthropic activities and demonstrating their commitment to the amateur ethos, which stressed enjoyment and fair play over the work ethic, they were afforded the opportunity to create a distinction between themselves and other social groups and to fulfil their aspirations towards upward social mobility.35

Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 Whether developed instinctively or as a deliberate policy, the rigorous application of amateurism made it unlikely that anyone who lacked independent wealth and the requisite social status as a ‘gentleman’ could afford to compete at an elite level. At one time, being a ‘gentleman’ was defined by birth or wealth alone, but education had become the most significant marker of gentlemanly status by the late nineteenth century. ‘Gentlemen amateurs’ emerged as a distinct group of middle- and upper-class sportsmen from a shared educational background who began to argue that professionalism and gambling ‘destroyed the frame-work of healthy competition’.36 Amateur concerns also centred on the potential subversion of amateur values if powerful figures with contradictory sporting morals, such as professional 20 Laying the foundations coaches, were allowed to operate without restriction, and legislators used structural definitions to exclude professional pedagogues. This policy of exclusion was standardized across all amateur organizations created from the 1880s, which were aimed at individuals in similar social circumstances and designed with the participant in mind. This process can be clearly seen in athletics where early amateur contests mirrored many of the characteristics of professional events, including competing for prizes and for wagers. Increasingly, however, the educated classes became critical of professional athletics so they began to form separate organizations to control their athletic activity, often drawing on their university experiences. Oxford University sports were introduced at the end of 1860, with college meetings occurring at Cambridge by 1863, and the first meeting between the universities took place in March 1864. The Mincing Lane Club, later to become the London Athletic Club (LAC) in 1866, was formed in June 1863, and when the Amateur Athletic Club (AAC) was created by former Oxbridge athletes in 1865 it was primarily so that they could compete, ‘without being compelled to mix with professional runners’.37 The subsequent formation of the Amateur Athletic Association (AAA) in 1880 centralized the organization of athletics and excluded professionals, leading to the eventual demise of pedestrianism. The public school and university men responsible for creating these clubs and associations prided themselves on their social and educational backgrounds and this was reflected in their athletic discourse of amateurism, which was rooted in their particular interpretation of Classical sporting practices, and which directly impacted on their attitudes to coaching and training. The key factors in this respect are class attitudes in the rejection of professionals, an assumption of the amateur’s innate physical superiority, an emphasis on elegance and style, and a suspicion of training methods that produced muscular, specialized sporting bodies, rather than all-rounders.

Moderation Many amateur principles were derived from a familiarity with Greek texts although this did not guarantee that amateur sportsmen interpreted them accurately. The romantic image of the late Victorian amateur athlete as the inheritor of an Olympic tradition that rejected specialization and professionalization represented a selective reading of a society in which aristocratic participants were replaced by full-time

Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 labouring-class athletes, whose practices were actually mirrored much more closely by nineteenth-century professionals than by their amateur counterparts. Never- theless, amateurs drew on sources such as Galen, who argued that ‘healthy training is moderation in diet, stamina in work’ while a daily regime should consist of ‘work, food, drink, sleep, love, and all in moderation’,38 and when athleticism gained momentum in the universities it was driven by a mantra of ‘moderation’. Exercise should be pursued with moderation because severe physical training resulted in the ‘ultimate debility of the muscular system, and of all the organs of vitality’39 and anyone who trained with ‘moderation and skill’ would avoid the possibility of constitutional injury.40 Dr Henry Hoole believed that training Laying the foundations 21 principles should differ only slightly from those of ‘judicious living’ while the Lancet observed that, although training to achieve ‘vigour and moderate skill’ was perfectly safe, training to achieve records was dangerous to health.41 This philosophy applied to all aspects of competition preparation, including diet. When Walsh outlined training diets in 1857 his emphasis on meat and beer would have been recognizable to coaches of fifty years earlier.42 Although modifications did occur in dietary practices few, if any, emerged directly as a result of scientific research but were instead driven by amateur sportsmen on the basis that gentlemen needed different training regimes from those of professionals. In 1864, Cornhill Magazine argued that, ‘in exercise, as in diet, the grand rule is Modera- tion’. Training diets should resemble the normal diets of young men since the ‘horrible monotony of chops and steaks, steaks and chops, nauseates rather than nourishes’.43 Correspondents to the Manchester Guardian at the end of the century suggested that good condition could be maintained by taking reasonable care of diet and sleep, and exercising about thirty minutes a day44 – a continuing emphasis on moderation which reflected amateur assumptions that ‘staleness’ and overtraining were the inevitable outcomes of an obsession with sport, as exemplified by those athletes who prepared with professional coaches.

Specialization For the Victorians, manners, signifying virtue, and classical education, signifying a honed mind, were better qualifications than expert practical training or formal qualifications and this admiration for the gifted amateur permeated all aspects of social life. Specialization needed to be avoided and the ideal amateur was someone who could play several games well, demonstrating elegance of style and not giving the impression of strain.45 The gentleman amateur avoided employing a coach because rigorous practice might undermine his style and he trained judiciously, since to train too strenuously, to follow a specific diet or to be overly concerned with winning, were just ‘not cricket’.46 Amateurs in lawn tennis relied on playing themselves into fitness at the start of the season while training for racquets was ‘cursorily dismissed’ since two or three hard games a week would get an amateur into condition.47 The combination of this ideology with an increasing need for the medical profession to establish itself as the authority on all matters physical resulted in traditional

Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 coaching methods, especially those related to purging and sweating, being attacked. In 1851, Leathes criticized systems that drove men too hard, too early, arguing that no-one should reach maximum speed in the ﬁrst three or four days of training, except in very short and occasional spurts, changes of diet should be gradual, and athletes should be abstemious for a week before entering training periods limited to six weeks.48 Amateurs were particularly concerned about the potential of intensive training to lead to ‘training off’,49 as exempliﬁed by reports on oarsmen in 1864 which described Ryan as overtrained and stale and Cecil as weak from overtraining.50 In 1867, surgeon F.C. Skey warned that overexertion could lead to permanent injury and doctors continued to be critical of highly 22 Laying the foundations competitive environments arguing that training to achieve records was dangerous to health, especially in adolescents. Despite these concerns, coaching had been embedded into the practices of some amateur sports, and rowers understood that coaching was required if they were to row in unison with elegance and style, although they increasingly preferred to use amateur rather than professional coaches as the century progressed. Many amateurs and their organizations marginalized professional coaches partly because they generally came from the lower social orders. Engaging a professional to supervise training would therefore involve a reversal of class status with lower- class individuals exerting authority over their social superiors. Westhall also observed that upper-class athletes were likely to resent the strict discipline associated with professional training51 and the social distance between themselves and amateurs presented problems for trainers because gentleman amateurs generally believed that working-class men could not properly shape superior upper-class bodies.

The sporting body Because they preferred to view sporting performance as the product of natural talent, amateurs rejected the functional trained bodies of professionals, crafted through diet and exercise, which were considered unable to display the appropriate degree of sophistication and élan. The bodies of professional pedestrians throughout the nineteenth century, for example, generally reﬂected their origins. They were often small and lightly built, with an average across one sample of 5 ft 6–7 in. tall and 9 st. 9–10 lb in weight, distinguishing features of the working-class man in this period who averaged 5 ft 6 in. and 10 st. 3 lb.52 Amateur athletes believed that their own bodies were naturally superior and Wilkinson advised amateur sportsmen to avoid professional trainers whose ‘stereotyped code of rules’ ignored individual differences in class. Constitutions varied according to social status and the system employed by professionals was only appropriate when handling debauched working men. A gentleman had superior blood in his system, because of his better diet, and thus had a better foundation for training.53 Hoole noted that the majority of leading amateur athletes had grown up in the country or at the seaside and then attended public school, where their recreation had been tailored to their needs. This had naturally led to the development of the

Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 ‘large frames, powerful muscles, and exceptional vigour’ observed in senior schoolboys and undergraduates.54 For amateurs, this less specialized, more elegant, body became the ‘beau ideal’ of an athlete and they combined their classical interpretations with scientific arguments to justify their vision. National surveys of human characteristics utilized evolutionary theory, anthropometry and statistics, to suggest that variability in the human body, such as in height and weight, was related to class and heredity. It was also widely believed that lower-class physiology, especially the nervous system, qualitatively differed from that of gentlemen. A comparison of Galton’s measurements taken at the South Kensington Health Exposition with those of the average Cambridge student revealed that the latter Laying the foundations 23 had better lung capacity, height and other measurements thus confirming the superior ‘physical condition of the upper educated classes’.55 Physical educationalist Archibald MacLaren published data on height, weight and chest girth, and expressed particular concern about the uneven development found among athletes who specialized in one sport, reflecting a growing belief that body symmetry implied both physiological and spiritual fitness.56 Amateurism revived a classical ideal of human proportion, ‘balancing height, weight, muscle development and mobility’,57 and Hoole argued that efficient organs should be encased in a symmetrically developed body which conformed to accepted standards of height and weight. He highlighted the contemporary university ideal of a perfect athlete as ‘70 inches high and 168 lbs. in weight’58 – an athletic body that avoided any outward show of specialization or excessive muscularity and which contrasted with the height and weight of the pedestrian body. This ‘university athlete’ became a universally recognized reference point and when one journalist met the Scottish rugby team in 1900 he observed that their ‘physique and condition’ confirmed them as ‘an excellent stamp of the university athlete’.59 Other, more specialized sporting bodies were on display in this period, but, for those amateurs who valued moderation, the all-rounder and effortless achievement, the hard physical training required to produce these bodies was only appropriate to a manual worker or to a professional athlete. Given this philosophy, it is not surprising that the athletic events preferred were middle-distance rather than long=distance events, which required extensive training, and that throwing events were to be avoided, partly because the body type required was more akin to that of a muscular working-class labourer, and partly because technical events needed extensive coaching.

Coaching in America The application of amateur values was always somewhat fluid and it is probably more accurate to talk about ‘amateurisms’ in the plural because this philosophy was interpreted differently according to social class or local, regional and national historical traditions. Almost as soon as sport was codified and regulated, and then exported to the rest of the world, it was appropriated by local communities who had different social mores and different social agendas. Unlike the originators, most countries were less class-based and much more flexible about how amateur

Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 values should be interpreted and The Times noted as early as in 1882 that the status of American amateurs was very different to that of English amateurs.60 In America, amateurism was rapidly modified in a society which rejected class theories based on hereditable attributes and, because the ‘elitist and separatist’ English system of amateurism was considered an outdated non-egalitarian concept, it never gained much support in the American colleges, where the British university sporting model was considered inappropriate. Instead a meritocratic approach developed, one which relied on talent rather than ascribed status, and one which resulted in a highly systematic coach-centred model, emphasizing excellence and winning. 24 Laying the foundations Like their British counterparts, the American Inter-collegiate Association defined an amateur as one who had never ‘taught, pursued, or assisted at athletic exercises for money, or for any valuable consideration’,61 but this disguised a radically different approach to coaching in America where the term ‘professional’ designated not only a man paid for coaching, but also one who did it competently. Professional coaches were admired and respected so it is no surprise that a number of experienced British trainers eventually made their home there. Bob Rogers, a middle-distance professional, became trainer to LAC then went to New York in the 1880s and was appointed trainer to New York Athletic Club (NYAC). Matt Mann, born in Yorkshire in 1884, coached swim teams in Canada and America, including Harvard University. They joined a cadre of respected American coaches, men like Michael C. Murphy, who had a ‘rare genius for discovering new and improving old methods of promoting athletic efficiency’.62 Murphy became trainer at Yale in 1887, coached NYAC and trained the men who participated in the 1900 Paris Olympics as well coaching the 1908 and 1912 Olympic teams. The appointment of these full-time professional coaches was supplemented by a recruitment process in which men who would never have otherwise attended college were signed up to courses with the offer of payment for their athletic services. Coaches also had access to excellent facilities. By 1896, the training quarters at Princeton centred on ‘a perfectly arranged’ clubhouse with a reading-room, assembly-room, a large dining-room and ‘every comfort’.63 As college sport increasingly became a lucrative form of commercial entertainment, these practices escalated and the significant cultural differences which existed between Britain and America meant there was always going to be conflict over issues of professionalism.

British reactions British criticism revolved around specialization, the controlling role of coaches, and the subsidizing of athletes, an anathema to British amateurs who believed that money fundamentally changed the nature of sport and led to the development of specialists rather than the encouragement of the all-round athlete. The American approach caused disquiet in British rowing circles whose criticism of American rowing coaches focused on the discipline they exercised over their crews, a serious issue for British observers suspicious of a system which allowed a professional, ‘to

Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 whom the impulse is to take advantage of everything’, to impose tactics which stretched the letter of the law.64 The 1869 Harvard–Oxford boat race had generated British criticism of the intensity of American training methods and when Cornell University competed at Henley in 1895 their professional coach, Charles Courtney, was criticized for isolating his oarsmen and holding secretive training sessions.65 For coaches like Courtney, however, this was standard practice. As the London Daily News pointed out, Yale and Harvard athletes refused to allow anyone to observe their training sessions while, at the same time, creating an ‘elaborate spy brigade’ to ‘note the doings of the enemy’. This objectionable practice seemed ‘to destroy all the benefit that may be gained by athletics’.66 Laying the foundations 25 The AAA was equally suspicious of the American approach and this was reinforced in 1895, when athletes representing LAC were whitewashed 11–0 by those of the NYAC, coached by Murphy. England’s leading athletics administrator, Montague Shearman, recognized the ‘magnificent state of training in which these men were brought to the post’, but he also drew attention to a number of concerns he had about the American approach. Clubs and colleges trained and maintained their selected representatives entirely at the club’s expense, often providing them, not only with board and lodging, but with well-paid and competent instructors. NYAC, for example, had about 2,000 members, plus ‘athletic members’, who were enrolled for a small subscription and then supported by their club during the period in which they were in training. At the American universities ‘gate money’ from football matches was used to create endowments for athletic skill. Shearman described the system as ‘radically vicious, and more likely to kill than to foster the genuine spirit of sport’. He concluded that while American amateurs were prepared in their training quarters by a skilled trainer, and remained completely under his orders, the British amateur followed ‘his own sweet will’ in training himself.67 The Morning Post observed that clubs and universities published balance sheets showing their expenditure on the production of amateur athletes, with one university spending £5,000 in one year, and the paper concluded that it was the money question that had led to the decay of amateur sport.68 Following the 1900 AAA Championships, in which American competitors won eight out of the thirteen championships, The Morning Post challenged the notion that these victories were due to any physical or psychological superiority. Instead, they were the result of a scientific system of supervised practice and the provision of free board, which essentially implied the ‘abolition’ of the English distinction between amateurs and professionals. If scientific training was impossible without these practices then it was better to be content to lose like a gentleman. Many American athletes aimed to become salaried trainers and coaches, who were accorded a social position and income equivalent to that of a college professor. These professionals were able to devote all their time and energies to a study of the ‘human racing-machine and its imperfections’, so their success in the identification and development of talent was always going to be greater than that of an English amateur coach.69 In their ‘human training stables’ the American trainer was more important than the athletes, and trainers like Murphy looked after their men just as a horse trainer looked after a horse, and with the same degree of control. Athletes

Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 were put up at a sort of hydropathic establishment, an up-to-date training stable, and drilled by a ‘scientific process and professional bullying into the greatest excellence’ of which they were capable. If Britons imitated these methods then performances would certainly improve but, just as surely, this would convert the game from a pleasure to a pain.70 The Observer summarized these criticisms by noting that British amateurs trained mainly ‘by the help chiefly of the light of nature’ in contrast to American amateurs who were trained even more strictly than British professionals. As a result, while ‘we train under the English amateur system and the Americans train under an efficient professional trainer, they will continue to beat us’.71 This became ever more apparent as international competitions 26 Laying the foundations increased, especially after the Olympic Games became established as a global sporting event.

Conclusion During the late nineteenth century, then, there was clearly a shift in the social context within which professional coaches operated as the introduction and enforcement of the amateur ethos made its mark, leaving a legacy that permeated nearly all aspects of British sport throughout the twentieth century. Although there has been a tendency in recent years to downplay the extent to which amateurism as an ethos was dominated by a rejection of financial rewards for playing sport it is nevertheless true that this was central to the arguments over American elite sport. Part of the superiority of American sportsmen was credited to the willingness of the American public to pay to watch notable athletes, and this caused disquiet among British observers since those who were in the forefront of defending the amateur ethos preferred to emphasize the benefits of widespread participation rather than elite performance. In contrast to the specialized training present in America, which had led to ‘small bands of gladiators being maintained by large companies of admiring spectators’, the British system supposedly resulted in thousands of active participants.72 Rather worryingly for some observers, however, signs of American influences began to impact on the long-established structures of British sport when, in 1903, the university sports were moved to a Saturday, probably to try to get a bigger ‘gate’. In addition, and reflecting the introduction of ‘rather extravagant ideas of training’ from America, university teams now spent time training at Brighton and efforts were being made to support a regular professional coach.73 These initiatives emphasize that the rhetoric of amateurism was never matched by its application in the practical sense and that British amateurs, especially at elite levels, were becoming far more specialized than contemporaries were prepared to admit. Even within the professional middle class not everyone applied amateur values with equal rigour, and the realities of playing elite sport were reflected in criticisms of the intensity of preparation adopted by some amateurs. British university oarsmen clearly took their work seriously. Describing rowing at Oxford in 1891, Chase Mellen noted that the coaches, recruited from alumni or dons, put the crew into hard training about a month before the race and he observed that ‘No army is 74

Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 drilled with more precision than Oxford oarsmen’. This level of training certainly gave the English university sportsman an advantage in competing against rivals at home. When Eton headmaster Edmund Warre urged a ban on all foreign crews at Henley in 1901 he received support from amateur rowing coaches like Woodgate who referred to ‘specialized alien rivals, trained exclusively for months for one race only’. However, Frank Lowe, captain of London Rowing Club, pointed out that there was nothing in the Amateur Rowing Association’sdeﬁnition of an amateur to prevent a crew submitting itself to a rigorous course of training. If foreign crews were barred because their training was more severe than that enforced by the universities then the universities should also be excluded because their crews gave Laying the foundations 27 more time to training than metropolitan clubs and thus were ‘more nearly allied to the professional’.75 Some amateurs, including Shearman, argued for a limited system of professional trainers in athletics,76 although the leadership given by the emerging governing bodies was considered critical in preventing any excesses and the AAA suspended athletes like C.A. Bradley who had included the costs of his trainer in his expense claims.77 What amateur legislators had overlooked was that for some athletes it was the symbolic capital and feelings of personal satisfaction they received from winning, rather than money, that persuaded them to seek professional training advice. Jack White, ‘The Gateshead Clipper’, who had coached several amateur champions at the Star Grounds, Fulham, from the 1870s, became trainer to LAC during 1889 and to Cambridge University in 1893. In 1893, James ‘Choppy’ Warburton was the ofﬁcial trainer at Manchester Athletic Club, where many ‘racing men attributed their success to his careful though severe mode of preparation’.78 Spencer (Sam) Wisdom, trainer to professional sprinter Henry Hutchens and to the 1908 Olympic champion, Reggie Walker, had a long career as a professional trainer.79 It should be noted here that suggestions that ‘Sam’ Wisdom, who died in 1912, was actually an alias for Sam Mussabini are obviously erroneous since both men appear simultaneously in census returns.80 In fact, it is only Wisdom who actually referred to himself as a trainer and a number of similar individuals achieved artisan status, mainly because professional coaching remained highly specialized. Even some amateur critics recognized that this class of trainers included men ‘steady, observant and capable of forming clear and sound conclusions’.81 In contrast to the American method of handing control to the coach, however, gentlemen amateurs in Britain structured their relationships with coaches by drawing on their traditional social and working experiences to impose a master– servant relationship on the sporting pedagogue. Distance between middle-class organizers and working-class amateur boxers was maintained by the hiring of servants, in the form of professional trainers like Bat Mullins and Bill Natty, who trained both amateurs and professionals. When England cricketer William Attewell coached public schoolboys, who addressed him as ‘Attewell’, he was required not only to coach but to mark out pitches and perform other chores. In golf, professionals operated as servants, even after the formation of the Professional Golfers’ Association in 1901, while real-tennis markers, normally referred to by their sur-

Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 names, repaired equipment as well as coaching members. In football, trainers, many of them with boxing or pedestrian experience, such as Manchester United trainer Fred Bacon, were employed to maintain discipline and to prepare players but they were strictly controlled by the amateurs who sat on the clubs’ boards. Nevertheless, although British professional coaches were certainly being marginalized towards the end of the nineteenth century, it is important not to see the emergence of amateurism and its impact on coaching and training as providing a significant break with the past. Even when training programmes became more refined in the later stages of the century, under the influence of a middle-class emphasis on moderation, they continued to address the key essentials of diet, 28 Laying the foundations exercise, psychology and technique, as chronicled within eighteenth-century boxing manuals. Little, if any, of this coaching advice was the result of collabora- tions between coaches and scientists, even though scientific interest in human performance had begun to emerge by the end of the nineteenth century. The coach remained the master of a body of specialist craft knowledge embedded within close-knit interest groups, which developed a shared methodology and a repertoire of resources that constituted the key elements of their coaching ‘toolbox’. As the century ended, coaches and trainers remained unconstrained by any formal coach education programmes and coaches still learnt their trade actively, normally within the context of self-selected and self-organized coaching communities.

Notes 1 Cornhill Magazine, XV, January, 1867, 92. 2 Dave Day, Professionals, Amateurs and Performance: Sports Coaching in England, 1789–1914 (Bern: Peter Lang, 2012). 3 Peter Mewett, ‘From Horses to Humans: Species Crossovers in the Origin of Modern Sports Training’, Sports History Review 33, no. 2 (2002): 95–120. 4 Daniel Mendoza, The Modern Art of Boxing (London: Mendoza, 1789), 24–27. 5 Thomas Fewtrell, Boxing Reviewed; or, the Science of Manual Defence, Displayed on Rational Principles (London, 1790), 42–46. 6 Daniel Mendoza, Memoirs of the Life of Daniel Mendoza (London: G. Hayden, 1816), xvi. For a fuller discussion of training in this period see Dave Day, ‘“Science”, “Wind” and “Bottom”: Eighteenth Century Boxing Manuals’, International Journal for the History of Sport 29, no. 10 (2012): 1446–1465. 7 Pierce Egan, Sporting Anecdotes, Original and Selected (New York: Johnstone and Van Norden, 1823), 9–22, 103–105. 8 Donald Walker, British Manly Exercises (Philadelphia: Thomas Wardle, 1836), 279–280, 283–285. 9 Francis Dowling, Fistiana or the Oracle of the Ring (London: Wm Clement Jun., 1841), 91–92. 10 Samantha-Jayne Oldfield, ‘Narratives of Manchester Pedestrianism: Using Biographical Methods to Explore the Development of Athletics During the Nineteenth Century’ (PhD Diss., Manchester Metropolitan University, 2014). 11 Bell’s Life, March 15; March 29; November 22, 1846. 12 Bell’s Life, October 5, 1851. 13 Census Parker 1841 (107/498/3), 1851 (107/2265); BMD, James Parker 67 Preston 8e 376; Bell’s Life, February 11, 1871. For more detail see Dave Day, ‘Jerry Jim’s Training Stable in Early Victorian Preston’,inPedestrianism, ed. Dave Day (Manchester: Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 MMU Sport and Leisure History Group, 2014), 57–77. 14 Paul Duguid, ‘“The Art of Knowing”: Social and Tacit Dimensions of Knowledge and the Limits of the Community of Practice’, The Information Society 21, no. 2 (2005): 109–118; David J. Teece, ‘Profiting from Technological Innovation: Implications for Integration, Collaboration, Licensing, and Public Policy’, Research Policy 15 (1986): 285–305. 15 John Sinclair, The Code of Health and Longevity; Or, a Concise View of the Principles Calculated for the Preservation of Health and the Attainment of Long Life (Edinburgh: Arch. Constable, 1807). 16 For fuller details on the Beckwith family and swimming community, see Dave Day, ‘“What Girl Will Now Remain Ignorant of Swimming?” Agnes Beckwith, Aquatic Laying the foundations 29 Entertainer and Victorian Role Model’, Women’s History Review 21, no. 3 (2012): 419–446; Dave Day, ‘Kinship and Community in Victorian London: The ‘“Beckwith Frogs”’, History Workshop Journal 71, no. 1 (2011): 194–218. 17 Alexander Styhre, ‘Rethinking Knowledge: A Bergsonian Critique of the Notion of Tacic Knowledge’, British Journal of Management 15, no. 2 (2004): 177–188; See also Dave Day, ‘Victorian Coaching Communities: Exemplars of Traditional Coaching Practice’, Sports Coaching Review 2, no. 2 (2014): 151–162 for discussion of this topic as it relates to coaching. 18 George Sage, ‘Becoming a High School Coach: From Playing Sport to Coaching’, Research Quarterly for Exercise and Sport 60, no.1 (1989): 81–92. 19 Etienne Wenger and William Snyder, ‘Communities of Practice: The Organizational Frontier’, Harvard Business Review January–February (2000): 139–145. 20 D. Brett King, Brittany L. Raymond and Jennifer A. Simon-Thomas, ‘History of Sport Psychology in Cultural Magazines of the Victorian Era’, The Sport Psychologist 9 (1995): 376–390. 21 Member of C.U.B.C. (Possibly J.F. Bateman), Aquatic Notes, or Sketches of the Rise and Progress of Rowing at Cambridge, With a Letter Containing Hints on Rowing and Training by Robert Coombes, Champion Sculler (Cambridge: J. Deighton; London: G. Bell, 1852), 101–107. 22 J. Frost, Scientific Swimming (London, 1816). 23 Sara Delamont and Paul Atkinson, ‘Doctoring Uncertainty: Mastering Craft Knowledge’, Social Studies of Science 31, no. 1 (2001): 87–107. 24 Day, ‘Kinship and Community in Victorian London’, 194–218; Dave Day, ‘Craft Coaching and the “Discerning Eye” of the Coach’, International Journal of Sports Science and Coaching 6, no. 1 (2011): 179–195. 25 John Sinclair, A Collection of Papers, on the Subject of Athletic Exercises (London: Blackader, 1806). 26 Anson Rabinbach, The Human Motor: Energy, Fatigue and the Origins of Modernity (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990). 27 Jacques Gleyse, Charles Pigeassou, Anne Marcellini, Eric De Leseleuc and Gilles Bui-Xuan, ‘Physical Education as a Subject in France (School Curriculum, Policies and Discourse): The Body and the Metaphors of the Engine – Elements Used in the Analysis of a Power and Control System During the Second Industrial Revolution’, Sport, Education and Society 7, no. 1 (2002): 5–23. 28 Alan Tomlinson, ‘Speculations on the Body and Sporting Spaces: The Cultural Sig- nificance of Sport Performance’, American Behavioral Scientist 46, no. 11 (2003): 1577–1587. 29 Cornhill Magazine, IX (50), 1864, 224. 30 Harry Andrews, Training for Athletics and General Health (London: C. Arthur Pearson, 1903), 46, 91–92. 31 Carleton Craven, ed., Walker’s Manly Exercises and Rural Sports, 9th edn, (London: H.G. Boon, 1855); Rob Hadgraft, Beer and Brine: The Making of Walter George – ’

Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 Athletics First Superstar (Westcliffe-on-Sea: Desert Island Books, 2006); Walter George, Athletics and Kindred Sport (London: Southwood, Smith and Co., 1902); Edgar C. Bredin, Running and Training (Northampton: The Author, 1902); Alfred R. Downer, Running Recollections and How to Train (London: Gale & Polden Ltd, 1902), 55. 32 Saturday Review, 1884, 58, November, 558; Charles Westhall, The Modern Method of Training for Running, Walking, Rowing, Boxing, Football, Lawn-Tennis, etc., Including Hints on Exercise, Diet, Clothing and Advice to Trainers (London: Ward Lock and Co., 1890), 32–34. 33 Sam Mussabini, The Complete Athletic Trainer (London: Methuen and Co., 1913), 78–79, 86, 103–108, 143–148, 257–258. 34 John Henry Walsh, Manual of British Rural Sports Comprising, Shooting, Hunting, Coursing, Fishing, Hawking, Racing, Boating, Pedestrianism and the Various Rural 30 Laying the foundations Games and Amusements of Great Britain, 2nd edn (London: G. Routledge & Co., 1857), 363, 444–447, 449–450, 486. 35 Mike Huggins, ‘Second-Class Citizens? English Middle-Class Leisure and Sport 1850– 1910: A Reconsideration’, International Journal of the History of Sport 17, no. 1 (2000): 2; Martin Pugh, Sport and Society: A Social and Political History of Britain since 1870 (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2012), 99. 36 Richard Holt, Sport and the British: A Modern History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), 113. 37 Henry Fazakerley Wilkinson, Modern Athletics (London: Frederick Warne and Co., 1868), 7–8, 12–14, 91, 95, 100; Sporting Gazette, December 23, 1865, 936. 38 Galen, ‘Exhortation for Medicine’,9–14 ca. 180 AD,inArete: Greek Sports from Ancient Sources, ed. Stephen G. Miller (London: University of California Press, 1979), 173–176. 39 St James’s Magazine, February, 1863, 323–325. 40 Manchester Guardian, June 30, 1870, 6. 41 Henry Hoole (MD), The Science and Art of Training: A Handbook for Athletes (London: Trübner, 1888), 1, 2–4, 18, 85–86; Lancet, April 11, 1903. 42 Walsh, Manual of British Rural Sports, 444–447, 451–457. 43 Cornhill Magazine, IX (50), 1864, 220–229. 44 Manchester Guardian, October 26, 1895, 7; March 26, 1900, 7. 45 Baily’s Monthly Magazine, April 14, 1861, 394. 46 Vanessa Heggie, ‘Only the British Appear to Be Making a Fuss: The Science of Success and the Myth of Amateurism at the Mexico Olympiad, 1968’, Sport in History 28, no. 2 (2008): 230. 47 Alfred E.T. Watson and Eighth Duke of Beaufort, The Badminton Library: Tennis, Lawn Tennis, Rackets, Fives (London: Ashford Press Publishing, 1903, Republished 1987): Lawn Tennis, C.G. Heathcote, 232; Rackets, E.O.P. Ouverie, 400–401. 48 Hill Mussenden Leathes, Aquatics, as Applied Chieﬂy to the Amateur Sculler, By a Rower of Thirty Matches (London: Whittaker and Co., 1851), 23–24. 49 Cornhill Magazine, XV, January, 1867 XV, 98–101. 50 Baily’s Monthly Magazine, VIII (54), August, 1864, 259–260. 51 Westhall, The Modern Method of Training,23–25. 52 Dave Day and Samantha-Jayne Oldﬁeld, ‘Delineating Professional and Amateur Athletic Bodies in Victorian England’, Sport in History 35, no. 1 (2014): 19–45. 53 Wilkinson, Modern Athletics,71–79, 91–110. 54 Hoole, The Science and Art of Training,23–25, 5–6. 55 Roderick Floud, ‘The Dimensions of Inequality: Height and Weight Variation in Britain, 1700–2000’, Contemporary British History 16, no. 3 (2002): 13–24; Lancet,May8, 1888. 56 Archibald Maclaren, A System of Physical Education, Theoretical and Practical (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1869); Training in Theory and Practice (London: Macmillan and Co., 1866), 176. 57 ‘

Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 Richard Holt, The Amateur Body and the Middle-Class Man: Work, Health and Style in Victorian Britain’, Sport in History 26, No. 3 (2006): 362–363. 58 Hoole, The Science and Art of Training,20–26. 59 Western Mail, January 27, 1900. 60 The Times, August 14, 1882, 8. 61 Theodore Andrea Cooke, The Fourth Olympiad: The Ofﬁcial Report of the Olympic Games 1908 (London: The British Olympic Association, 1908), Appendix E, 762–778. 62 Michael Murphy, Athletic Training (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1914), preface, xiii. 63 Walter Camp and Lorin Deland, Football (Boston: Houghton, Mifﬂin and Co., 1896), 78. 64 Badminton Magazine, October, 1895, 419–420. Laying the foundations 31 65 William G. Durick, ‘The Gentlemen’s Race: An Examination of the 1869 Harvard– Oxford Boat Race’, Journal of Sport History 15 no.1 (Spring, 1988): 54; Roberta J. Park, ‘Athletes and Their Training in Britain and America, 1800–1914’,inSport and Exercise Science: Essays in the History of Sports Medicine, eds Jack W. Berryman and Roberta J. Park (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1992), 71–72, 83. 66 London Daily News, February 28, 1895, 6. 67 Montague Shearman, ‘International Athletics’, Badminton Magazine, December, 1895, 574–592. 68 Morning Post, December 9, 1895, 2. 69 Morning Post, July 14, 1900, 4. 70 Daily Mail, March 28, 1903, 4. 71 Observer, August 4, 1901, 6. 72 Shearman, ‘International Athletics’, 589–590. 73 Daily Mail, March 28, 1903, 4. 74 Chase Mellen,‘Undergraduate Life at Oxford’, Outing, XVII, no. 5, February, 1891, 351. 75 The Times, July 18, 1901, 7; Baily’s Monthly Magazine, LXXV, April, 1901, 226–227, 470–471. 76 Shearman, ‘International Athletics’, 585–590. 77 Manchester Guardian, July 27, 1896, 7. 78 Manchester Guardian, April 10, 1893, 6. 79 Census Returns 1871(RG10/10/32/55); 1881(RG11/6/34/36); 1901(RG13/ 1218/113/11); 1911(RG14PN59RG78PN2). 80 Dave Day and Deborah Pitchford, ‘“Play It Again Sam”. Mussabini and Wisdom: A Biographical Conundrum’, British Society of Sports History Conference, Glasgow, September 6–7, 2012. 81 Hoole, The Science and Art of Training,7.

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Day, Dave. ‘“What Girl Will Now Remain Ignorant of Swimming?” Agnes Beckwith, Aquatic Entertainer and Victorian Role Model’. Women’s History Review 21, no. 13 (2012): 419–446. Day, Dave. ‘“Science”, “Wind” and “Bottom”: Eighteenth Century Boxing Manuals’. International Journal for the History of Sport 29, no. 10 (2012): 1446–1465. Day, Dave. ‘Jerry Jim’s Training Stable in Early Victorian Preston’ ,inPedestrianism, ed. Dave Day (Manchester: MMU Sport and Leisure History Group, 2014) , 57–77. 32 Laying the foundations Day, Dave. ‘Victorian Coaching Communities: Exemplars of Traditional Coaching Practice’. Sports Coaching Review 2, no. 2 (2014): 151–162. Day, Dave and Samantha-Jayne Oldfield. ‘Delineating Professional and Amateur Athletic Bodies in Victorian England’. Sport in History 35, no. 1 (2014): 19–45. Delamont, Sara and Paul Atkinson. ‘Doctoring Uncertainty: Mastering Craft Knowledge’. Social Studies of Science, 31, no. 1 (2001): 87–107. Dowling, Francis. Fistiana or the Oracle of the Ring (London: Wm Clement Jun., 1841). Downer, Alfred R. Running Recollections and How to Train (London: Gale & Polden Ltd, 1902). Duguid, Paul. ‘“The Art of Knowing”: Social and Tacit Dimensions of Knowledge and the Limits of the Community of Practice’. The Information Society 21, no. 2 (2005): 109–118. Durick, William G. ‘The Gentlemen’s Race: An Examination of the 1869 Harvard–Oxford Boat Race’. Journal of Sport History 15 no. 1 (Spring1988): 41–63. Egan, Pierce. Sporting Anecdotes, Original and Selected (New York: Johnstone and Van Norden, 1823). Fazakerley, Wilkinson Henry. Modern Athletics (London: Frederick Warne and Co., 1868). Fewtrell, Thomas. Boxing Reviewed; or, the Science of Manual Defence, Displayed on Rational Principles (London, 1790). Floud, Roderick. ‘The Dimensions of Inequality: Height and Weight Variation in Britain, 1700–2000’. Contemporary British History 16, no. 3 (2002): 13–24. Frost, J. Scientific Swimming (London, 1816). George, Walter. Athletics and Kindred Sport (London: Southwood, Smith and Co., 1902). Gleyse, Jacques, Charles Pigeassou, Anne Marcellini, Eric De Leseleuc, and Gilles Bui-Xuan. ‘Physical Education as a Subject in France (School Curriculum, Policies and Discourse): The Body and the Metaphors of the Engine – Elements Used in the Analysis of a Power and Control System During the Second Industrial Revolution’, Sport, Education and Society 7, no. 1 (2002): 5–23. Hadgraft, Rob. Beer and Brine: The Making of Walter George – Athletics’ First Superstar (Westcliffe-on-Sea: Desert Island Books, 2006). Heggie, Vanessa. ‘Only the British Appear to Be Making a Fuss: The Science of Success and the Myth of Amateurism at the Mexico Olympiad, 1968’. Sport in History 28, no. 2 (2008): 213–235. Holt, Richard. Sport and the British: A Modern History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989). Holt, Richard. ‘The Amateur Body and the Middle-class Man: Work, Health and Style in Victorian Britain’. Sport in History 26, no. 3 (2006): 362–363. Hoole, Henry (MD). The Science and Art of Training: A Handbook for Athletes (London: Trübner, 1888). Huggins, Mike. ‘Second-Class Citizens? English Middle-Class Leisure and Sport 1850– 1910: A Reconsideration’. International Journal of the History of Sport 17, no. 1 (2000): Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 1–35. King, D. Brett, Brittany L. Raymond and Jennifer A. Simon-Thomas. ‘History of Sport Psychology in Cultural Magazines of the Victorian Era’. The Sport Psychologist 9 (1995): 376–390. Leathes, Hill Mussenden. Aquatics, as Applied Chiefly to the Amateur Sculler, By a Rower of Thirty Matches (London: Whittaker and Co., 1851). Maclaren, Archibald. Training in Theory and Practice (London: Macmillan and Co., 1866). Maclaren, Archibald. A System of Physical Education, Theoretical and Practical (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1869). Laying the foundations 33 Member of C.U.B.C. (Possibly J.F. Bateman). Aquatic Notes, or Sketches of the Rise and Progress of Rowing at Cambridge, with a Letter Containing Hints on Rowing and Training by Robert Coombes, Champion Sculler (Cambridge: J. Deighton; London: G. Bell, 1852). Mendoza, Daniel. The Modern Art of Boxing (London: Mendoza, 1789). Mendoza, Daniel. Memoirs of the Life of Daniel Mendoza (London: G. Hayden, 1816). Mewett, Peter. ‘From Horses to Humans: Species Crossovers in the Origin of Modern Sports Training’. Sports History Review 33, no. 2 (2002): 95–120. Miller, Stephen G. Arete: Greek Sports from Ancient Sources (London: University of California Press, 1979). Murphy, Michael. Athletic Training (London: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1914). Mussabini, Sam. The Complete Athletic Trainer (London: Methuen and Co., 1913). Oldfield, Samantha-Jayne. ‘Narratives of Manchester Pedestrianism: Using Biographical Methods to Explore the Development of Athletics During the Nineteenth Century’. PhD Diss., Manchester Metropolitan University, 2014. Park, Roberta J. ‘Athletes and Their Training in Britain and America’,inSport and Exercise Science: Essays in the History of Sports Medicine, eds Jack W. Berryman and Roberta J. Park (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1992), 71–83. Pugh, Martin. Sport and Society: A Social and Political History of Britain since 1870 (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2012). Rabinbach, Anson. The Human Motor: Energy, Fatigue and the Origins of Modernity (Berke- ley: University of California Press, 1990). Sage, George. ‘Becoming a High School Coach: From Playing Sport to Coaching’. Research Quarterly for Exercise and Sport 60, no.1 (1989): 81–92. Sinclair, John. A Collection of Papers, on the Subject of Athletic Exercises (London: Black- ader, 1806). Sinclair, John. The Code of Health and Longevity; Or, a Concise View of the Principles Cal- culated for the Preservation of Health and the Attainment of Long Life (Edinburgh: Arch. Constable, 1807). Styhre, Alexander. ‘Rethinking Knowledge: A Bergsonian Critique of the Notion of Tactic Knowledge’. British Journal of Management 15, no. 2 (2004): 177–188. Teece, David J. ‘Profiting from Technological Innovation: Implications for Integration, Collaboration, Licensing, and Public Policy’. Research Policy 15 (1986): 285–305. Tomlinson, Alan. ‘Speculations on the Body and Sporting Spaces: The Cultural Significance of Sport Performance’. American Behavioral Scientist 46, no. 11 (2003): 1577–1587. Walker, Donald. British Manly Exercises (Philadelphia: Thomas Wardle, 1836). Walsh, John Henry. Manual of British Rural Sports Comprising, Shooting, Hunting, Cour- sing, Fishing, Hawking, Racing, Boating, Pedestrianism and the Various Rural Games and Amusements of Great Britain, 2nd edn (London: G. Routledge & Co., 1857). Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 Watson, Alfred E.T. and Eighth Duke of Beaufort. The Badminton Library: Tennis, Lawn Tennis, Rackets, Fives (London: Ashford Press Publishing, 1903, republished 1987). Wenger, Etienne and William Snyder. ‘Communities of Practice: The Organizational Frontier’. Harvard Business Review 78, no. 1 (2000): 139–145. Westhall, Charles. The Modern Method of Training for Running, Walking, Rowing, Boxing, Football, Lawn-Tennis, etc., including Hints on Exercise, Diet, Clothing and Advice to Trainers (London: Ward Lock and Co., 1890). 2 Coaching before the First World War

There is no reason why America should not out-class every nation on the face of the globe, because she is the most progressive of all countries, and her scientiﬁc advancement in training, for all kinds of sports, has been phenomenal.1

Introduction At the beginning of the twentieth century, Britain still governed a quarter of the world’s population, its navy was twice the size of the next largest fleet, commercial prosperity had been assured by the Industrial Revolution, and its sporting practices had penetrated overseas cultures. The nation’s role as the birthplace of much of the vocabulary and practice of modern sport was reflected in the establishment of international sports organizations, sporting competitions and the widespread acceptance of British regulations. Increasingly, however, its sporting representatives were being defeated by overseas competitors and a series of events, particularly poor military performance in the Boer Wars that had exposed deficiencies in military organization and national fitness, were adding to belief that Britain was losing its world position. The perception that Britain was in decline was exacerbated further by shifts in global industrial supremacy that had seen the rise of America, which used its significant natural resources to become the world’s dominant economy. By 1910, America had overtaken Britain as a producer of iron and steel and established itself, along with Germany, as a world leader in the emerging chemical and electrical industries.2 The loss of military and economic prestige was accompanied by diminishing fl

Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 British competitiveness in international sport. Re ecting on the victory by a Belgian crew in the Grand Challenge Cup at Henley in 1906, the Daily Mail observed that this first ever foreign victory in the ‘Blue Riband of the rowing world’ was further evidence that Britain’s ‘vaunted supremacy’ in sport was being superseded. Australian cricketers, New Zealander rugby players and North American athletes were all proving superior, and even in swimming, a ‘purely British sport’, the nation’s representatives were finding success elusive. The Times concurred and suggested that international defeats had fuelled concerns over the nation’s physical degeneracy.3 British commentators were also concerned that the full implications of amateurism were not being recognized elsewhere, although this was clearly not Coaching before the First World War 35 the case with the Belgian winners of the Grand Challenge Cup in 1909. They had ‘knocked off smoking’ the previous Saturday at the captain’s and trainer’s request, they had no particular diet, they were not tied down by rigid training restrictions and they had only rowed together fourteen times.4 While these may have been appropriate behaviours for their British hosts, this was not an approach that would have been acceptable in America, where the value of the professional coach to competitive success was well-established. Systematic sports performance, like its equivalent in industry, needed a hierarchy of control to ensure efficiency, so the professional coach assumed a managerial role and Taylorism now provided the underlying principles for ‘scientific’ coaching, with players being constantly subjected to ‘the close scrutiny of the trainer’.5 Glen Warner emphasized in 1913 that it was impossible to achieve results in America without a coach – a strong intelligent character who was a good teacher, had personal experience of the sport and had ‘unswerving will power’.6 Coaching provided well-defined career opportunities and there were significant numbers of skilled coaches throughout America by 1914, men who were respected and remunerated in a way that professionals never would be under a British system that emphasized amateur values. As in the previous century, some British coaches emigrated in order to develop their coaching careers. In 1902, professional sculler Bill Haines was coaching while running the Buffalo Hotel in Blyth. After a period coaching the Royal English College, he ran the Star and Garter and coached London Rowing Club (LRC) before coaching in Norway, Germany and Austria, and then going to America to coach the Union Boat Club, Harvard University and MIT.7 Despite this exodus, attitudes to coaching in Britain continued to be dictated by class and the diktats of amateurism, reflected, to a certain extent, by the approach taken within its universities. American amateur, Caspar Whitney, believed that the men at Oxbridge did not ‘seem to care whether they win or not’ in contrast to his countrymen whose instinct in both sport and business was ‘to rest nowhere short of first place’.8 While he was incorrect in assuming that British elite sportsmen were not concerned with winning, differences in sporting philosophy did exist. Oxford and Cambridge proposed a joint contest with Harvard and Yale in July 1900 but only after Oxford had withdrawn their objections to the amateur status of American undergraduates.9 Amateur concerns about specialization and the loss of the all-rounder manifested themselves in The Times in 1907, which observed that British university and elite sportsmen preferred not to specialize and liked to

Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 play several games well, rather than becoming the ‘virtuoso of a single pastime’,an approach that resulted in well-balanced, all-round physiques and the ‘precious gift of physical adaptability’. In contrast, American college athletes were invariably specialists whose professional trainers rarely allowed them to ‘combine two kindred specialities’.10 Reﬂecting continuing differences in approaches to preparation, the Edwardian gentleman amateur still viewed coaching with some suspicion. A 1910 Times editorial suggested that the usefulness of games for character training would ‘be lessened if they are reduced too much to routine … by excessive coaching’11 and legislators continued to structurally exclude professional trainers and coaches. As in the late 36 Coaching before the First World War nineteenth century, however, practice sometimes deviated from the philosophy and J.A. Jarvis, Amateur Swimming Association (ASA) champion, trained regularly with Joey Nuttall, the world’s professional champion, ﬁnding his advice ‘invalu- able’.12 In 1902, American Ralph Paine noted that English rowers did not like to be beaten, despite their philosophy of ‘sport for sport’s sake’, and that English amateur scullers generally hired professional coaches.13 Amateur Henry Black- staffe, winner of the 1908 Olympic sculls, went into training for some weeks before Henley and the Olympics, prefacing his programme by contesting the Senior Sculls at Amsterdam, where he could race some of the best Continental oarsmen.14

The Olympics The establishment of the modern Olympic movement generated a focus for international competitions, and rifts over approaches to coaching and training widened further as the Games became an important vehicle for demonstrating cultural superiority and promoting nationalism. When the International Olympic Committee (IOC) was established it adopted a core set of amateur values, which included barring professional instructors. Coubertin was aware that his British contemporaries had a strong afﬁnity to its principles and he acted pragmatically in accepting amateurism as a prerequisite for Olympic participation, subsequently revealing that he had never been fully committed to the concept:

Personally I was not particularly concerned. Today I can admit it; the question never really bothered me. It had served as a screen to convene the congress designed to revive the Olympic Games. Realising the importance attached to it in sport circles, I always showed the necessary enthusiasm, but it was an enthusiasm without real conviction.15

The British Olympic Association (BOA) was formed in 1905 when W.H. Grenfell (later Lord Desborough) was elected chairman and the Reverend Robert Stuart de Courcy Laffan, who developed the BOA more than anyone else over the next thirty years, became honorary secretary.16 A small council, which included Theodore Andrea Cook, was appointed, and its members were instructed to draft rules for the governance of the association and to invite leading National Governing Bodies

Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 (NGBs) to each nominate one representative, thus ensuring that ‘full information as to the views of experts in every branch of sport’ would be heard.17 The social background of those involved in the formation of the BOA demonstrates the class of man involved in the administration of British sport in this period. Desborough had represented Harrow at cricket and Oxford in fencing, athletics and rowing, twice swum across the base of Niagara Falls, rowed the English Channel, stroked the London–Oxford stretch of the Thames in twenty-two consecutive hours, and ascended the Matterhorn via three different routes. During his career he held many positions of influence within sporting bodies, including president of the Life Saving Society, president and chairman of the Bath Club, and president of the Coaching before the First World War 37 Marylebone Cricket Club and the Lawn Tennis Association.18 Laffan had obtained a first in Classical Moderations followed by first class honours in Latin and Greek before becoming senior classical master at Derby School.19 As a journalist for the Daily Telegraph and editor-in-chief of The Field, Theodore Cook was well known in sporting circles. While at Oxford he founded the university fencing club and in Paris in 1903 he acted as a non-playing captain to the first British fencing team to compete abroad, later becoming vice president of the Amateur Fencing Associa- tion.20 These individuals epitomized the aristocratic and educated middle-class men who were attracted to the BOA, men who, unlike Coubertin, were wedded to the concept of amateurism. There was also a strong sense of autonomy that ran through an organization that ‘cherished and defended its independence, and rejected all political interference in its affairs’,21 a common trait amongst British sporting bodies throughout much of the twentieth century. The BOA saw its formation as an opportunity to demonstrate to the rest of the world that British sport was not in decline and to re-emphasize the values of amateurism, especially when it took on the role of Olympic Games organizer in 1908.

London 1908 Considering the significant differences that characterized their approaches to sport, it is not surprising that the 1908 Olympics witnessed a fierce rivalry between Britain and America. From a British perspective the Games were an organizational and sporting success, since their athletes topped the medal table, although it was later recognized that the host nation had framed a programme which included all the ‘sports which we hold in high estimation, and at which we are therefore specially proficient’.22 The Americans were particularly dissatisfied with the calcu- lating of total points from all the events in the programme and wanted track and field athletics to be considered as a separate entity. The American media subsequently based its own calculations solely on the track and field results, with The New York Times declaring that American athletes were, ‘as usual, well in the lead’;23 and Anglo-American relations were clearly strained by the closing of the athletics. Although The Times accepted that the Games had not been ‘plain sailing’,24 there was a widespread feeling in Britain that, because the nation had organized the Games in only two years after Italy had dropped out, any deficiencies should be

Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 overlooked. However, their signiﬁcant advantage in having ‘home’ ofﬁcials and an accommodating competitive programme had concealed just how badly British athletes had performed. While it was recognized that American athletes had outstripped their British rivals in terms of speed and strength, the belief remained that the British system retained both a moral and athletic potency:

Business-like methods may sometimes have results which, from our British and possibly insular point of view, have a tendency to spoil the game. After giving all due honour to the magniﬁcent performances of the Americans, we may say that we have contrived to exhibit a very respectable degree of 38 Coaching before the First World War excellence, and so we shall not go far wrong, in the cause of true sport, if we stick to our antiquated methods.25

Despite some observers, during and after the Games, drawing a distinction between the virtue of amateurism and the fault of amateurishness,26 British commentators remained suspicious of professionalized sport directed by specialized trainers in order to win international victories.27 Consequently, there was little reassessment of the preparation of British athletes, either at the level of the individual sport or more centrally, and this apparent lack of concern over Britain’s diminishing athletic competitiveness meant that preparations for Stockholm 1912 did not begin until late 1911.

Preparing for Stockholm Despite the somewhat late start, there were two initiatives which potentially went some way to developing British athletics coaching. Prompted by suggestions that the failures of British athletes were due to a lack of ‘scientific training and coaching’, a group of enthusiasts formed an Athletes’ Advisory Club (AAC) to ‘induce old athletes of experience to act as amateur advisers and coaches to young athletes’, help discover new athletic talent, and hold meetings to discuss diet, technique and training. The club was dominated by Oxbridge graduates and every influential member of the committee ‘was a university man’. Inevitably, therefore, the AAC adhered to the accepted amateur discourse on coaching, with a committee member suggesting on one occasion that ‘a gentleman athlete could only hope to be properly coached by a man who was also a gentleman’. The main aim was to appoint experienced amateur athletes to act as coaches, which was justified by arguing that the average athletic club could not afford the permanent employment of a professional coach, in itself suggesting that some prominent amateur clubs of the period were in the habit of regularly engaging professionals.28 A second development came with a proposal from The Sportsman that it was prepared to work in conjunction with the Amateur Athletic Association (AAA) by offering financial support for a coaching programme, an attractive offer for an NGB that relied on donations and subscription fees. The ‘Sportsman’s Scheme’,as it became known, proposed Walter George as chief advisor for an Olympic training scheme, although the AAA asked The Sportsman to reconsider their nominee and

Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 accept Alec Nelson, the Cambridge coach, instead. Since George had been integral to their proposal, The Sportsman withdrew its offer and the AAA began to make its own plans. In November 1911, the AAA Olympic committee resolved to appoint ‘a supervising trainer’, supported by subsidiary trainers at district level, and an appeal was placed in the Daily Mail requesting donations from all affiliated clubs.29 The response was lacklustre and the amount raised was not enough to engage Nelson so F.W. Parker of the London Athletic Club (LAC) was asked to accept the position of ‘Chief Athletic Advisor’, for an honorarium of £50. It is somewhat ironic, given the insistence of amateur bodies that money was the root of all evils in sport, that Parker had long been employed as a paid sports Coaching before the First World War 39 administrator. By 1911 he was giving his occupation as the secretary of a limited company, in reality the LAC, and an official handicapper.30 Parker visited all the main training centres in England to advise athletes on their preparation and he considered individuals who might act as trainers at these centres.31 When he reported back to the committee, Parker presented a list of points on which athletes wanted advice, which ‘practically necessitated an essay on the “ABC” of training, dieting, arm action and breathing’. In a rather odd turn of events, he had sent them a copy of Walter George’s book on training because he considered this ‘the only means of answering their many queries’. Parker also made a number of recommendations for the appointment of trainers, selected from a ‘very large number of applications, both personal and written – as well as by proxy’. His had taken into account both the ability and qualifications of the candidate, combined with a desire to satisfy ‘the wishes of the majority of athletes who would come under their care’. He proposed that Alec Nelson (Chief) and William Cross should be situated at Stamford Bridge (although a pencilled note on the minutes added ‘H. Andrews’), W.G. Thomas should be based at Herne Hill, F. Clark and F. Jenny at Paddington, and T. James at Kensal Rise. Blackheath Harrier candidates at Crystal Palace preferred their own club trainer, W.J. Parrish, while Sam Fritty was recommended for Reading. The committee accepted these nominations for the South and advised the North and Midlands to make similar arrangements in their own districts. It was suggested that £5 should be paid to each trainer, with seven men employed in the North, seven in the South and five in the Midlands.32

British coaches in Stockholm The British team at Stockholm was accompanied by a number of individuals who had coaching or training experience, such as Parker, who went to Stockholm as a ‘team functionary’. Among the journalists attending was ‘L.A. Mussabini’ who was working for the Daily Telegraph. This was almost certainly Scipio Augustus Mussa- bini, who had reportedly trained sprinters Vic D’Arcy and Willie Applegarth, members of the team that won the sprint relay in Stockholm.33 Harcourt Gilbey Gold, the ‘leader’ of the rowing team, was not from the same social class as Mussabini or Parker, having stroked the Etonian, Oxford and Leander crews as a young man, and census returns for 1911 showed him as a gentleman of private 34

Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 means. Gold coached the Oxford boat race crew from 1906, the Leander crew that won at the 1908 Olympics and the eight that won in Stockholm. As a coach, he ‘had no superior after leaving Oxford’. He was the consummate amateur coach and when he travelled to America to help prepare Yale for their 1913 match with Harvard, he refused to accept expenses.35 In addition, the team was attended by eleven officially designated professional trainers, all from decidedly different social backgrounds to that of Harcourt Gold. Cycling trainer John Sykes had progressed from being a labourer to earning a living as a cycle repairer over the course of thirty years,36 while the football team was attended by Adrian Birch, who began his working life as a labourer in a 40 Coaching before the First World War shipyard but was designating himself as a football trainer by 1901.37 The wrestling trainer was Prussian-born William Hugo Klein, whose occupation in the 1911 census was given as a music hall artist. Klein was considered a capable instructor and masseur, and he had trained weightlifter Launceston Elliott, Britain’s first Olympic champion, in 1896.38 The swimming team also had professional help from Walter Septimus Brickett, who was attending his second Games as official trainer to the swimming team. Born in 1865 in Camden, Walter had followed in the footsteps of his brothers as a pianoforte maker, athlete and swimmer, as well as being involved in the creation of the Life Saving Society in 1891, along with leading amateurs William Henry and Archibald Sinclair. After becoming a professional coach, Walter acted as trainer to the Olympic team in 1908, following which he was presented with a testimonial by the ASA in appreciation of ‘the valuable and unremitting services of professor Brickett, to whom all British Olympic swimmers were greatly indebted’.Followinghisappointmentas‘trainer and adviser- in-chief’ for Stockholm by the ASA in 1912, he departed for Stockholm at the end of June alongside diver Belle White. White, who won a bronze medal, later recalled Walter as ‘a fatherly type of man, but he was a hard disciplinarian in training. He gave you marvellous encouragement and always tried to make you feel confident’. Walter’s business card subsequently advertised him as the ‘well-known British Olympic Trainer, appointed by the Amateur Swimming Association, and teacher of all styles of Swimming’.39 In Stockholm, Walter worked alongside Britain’s first female Olympic trainers. Females had always taught gender-appropriate activities such as swimming. Fanny Easton worked as a swimming mistress between 1881 and 1911, Eleanor Mary Classey (Clarrey) was a professional swimming teacher in Marylebone in the same period, and the Humphrey sisters, Charlotte and Jane, spent all their working lives as swimming teachers in London.40 International swimming authorities agreed in 1910 to allow women’s events and, after two swimming events and a diving contest were included in the 1912 Olympic programme, the British team were accompanied by two women: a Mrs Holmes and Clara Jarvis. Twenty-seven-year- old Clara Jarvis, sister of leading swimmer Jack Jarvis, was a swimming teacher in 1911, by which time she was instructress to the Leicester, Loughborough, Burton, Coventry and Hinckley Ladies’ swimming clubs.41 Clara held the RLSS Diploma and the ASA professional certificate, making her as qualified as any male professional, and the committee report following Stockholm commended both

Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 Clara and Walter, ‘who accompanied the team as professional trainers and attendants’ for discharging their duties ‘in the most capable manner’.42 Four men were appointed to take care of the track and field athletes, all of whom had been involved in helping to prepare the team. In June 1912, the AAA Olympic committee had appointed William Cross, who had offered his services for £5, from then until the end of the Games. Cross, whose father was a Turkish bath proprietor, had used this name when competing as a professional although he appeared in the 1911 census as a trainer under his real name of William Lock.43 William James Parrish had been a commercial clerk in 1901 but he was being employed as a manager at a newspaper by 191144 and he had offered his services free of charge and to defray Coaching before the First World War 41 part of his travelling expenses, although the committee eventually agreed to reim- burse all of these. The committee also engaged Frederick William George (‘Bill’) Thomas, a ‘buyer in athletic goods’, as marathon trainer from June until the end of the Games for £10–12, plus expenses.45 His first job as a trainer was in 1906, when he was taken on by his club, Herne Hill Harriers, but he is best remembered for his coaching at Oxford University between the wars. There was clearly some trepidation within the AAA regarding the operating practices of professional trainers because they decided to insure them ‘against accidents of all the athletes’.46 The chief athletics trainer was Alec Nelson, who began athletics as an amateur member of Goldsmith’s Institute AC, although he had become a professional by January 1905, and in the 1911 census he was designating himself as a self- employed athletics trainer.47 Nelson had been coaching at Cambridge University since at least 1908 and Cambridge remained superior to Oxford throughout his thirty-year period as coach. In 1911, an Athletic News correspondent con- gratulated Alec on his results at both Cambridge and Surrey Cricket Club and observed that there was no-one better qualified to look after the interests of the British athletes at Stockholm.48 Athletic officials, many of them with university backgrounds, agreed but they were faced with some initial difficulties, not least the fact that Nelson wanted a retainer of £150 per annum for four years and that he would only be available from April to the end of September because of his Cambridge commitments. The compromise was to secure his services for two months from 1 June for £50 in order to take charge of selected athletes and accompany them to Stockholm, although the Honorary Treasurer was later authorized to draw cheques to the order of Nelson of up to £100.49 Nelson’s appointment was well received by those who believed that ‘in order to be efficiently represented at the great world’scontest,England’s athletes must receive every opportunity to give their best’. There were some reservations, however, since, although Nelson was ‘an excellent and progressive coach’, it was considered unrealistic to expect him to have the breadth of knowledge demonstrated by Mike Murphy in America.50

Stockholm The 1912 Olympics saw participants from all ﬁve continents compete for the ﬁrst time, providing particularly strong competition for the British team. The Games were an organizational success for Sweden, and, in contrast to the British Olympic Com-

Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 mittee (BOC), which was criticized for not having spent more money on the continuous training of competitors since the 1908 Games,51 the Swedish Olympic Committee had made methodical arrangements for the training and the preparation of their athletes. Adverts for trainers were placed in British and American journals, after which Ernie Hjertberg, a Swede by birth who had been coaching athletics in America for forty years, was appointed as athletics trainer. British coaches were engaged to work with Swedish teams in swimming, tennis, rowing and football, not an entirely new phenomenon given that ex-Manchester City goalkeeper Charlie Williams had coached the Danish football team in 1908. The Swedish football authorities sought the advice of Charles Bunyan, formerly the professional at the 42 Coaching before the First World War Orgryte Athletic Club, Gothenburg. The lawn tennis committee engaged Charles E. Hagget, the English lawn tennis professional already in Stockholm and the swimming committee appointed Charles Hurley of Leicester, who remained in charge from 1910 to 1911. The rowing committee felt that ‘a prominent English expert should be engaged as trainer and instructor’, and, on the recommendation of London Rowing Club, they appointed J. Farrel, who had been coaching in England and Germany, and who was considered ‘a very competent man indeed’.52 Training of the Swedish track and ﬁeld athletes began in 1910, some two years prior to that of the British athletes. The athletes followed a carefully designed training plan developed by Hjertberg and his professional assistants, which included breaks for the athletes to recover and opportunities for the athletes to participate in international competition prior to the Games.53 This investment paid dividends when Sweden achieved sixty-ﬁve medals compared to the sixty-two won by America. However, these Olympics were anything but a success for Britain, which only managed to gain forty-one medals, placing them third in the overall table, despite the AAA coaching scheme and comments that the athletes who had been under the guidance of Parker had improved noticeably in training.54 It was not the quality of the scheme that had resulted in a poor showing, but the amount of time in which the new developments had been expected to make an impact. As Sidney Abrahams had pointed out in May,

With this appointment of a coach our troubles are not over; in fact, they have only just begun. It seems to have been thought in many circles there is something magical in the very words ‘coach’ and ‘trainer’ that it was only necessary to appoint one of the very numerous and perfectly competent professional experts … it does not seem to have struck such optimists that a successful coach must be developed like a successful athlete, and even more so, for the born coach in the strictest sense can hardly be said to exist.55

It was also apparent that the coaching and training environment in which Parker and his associates had been expected to operate was not conducive to producing successful athletes. As Parker noted, athletes ‘appeared to have no regular system of training’, many had ‘never been able to train on a track’ and there was a ‘lack of implements’ available for ﬁeld events.56 It was becoming clear that not only were consistent coaching improvements required but also a change of attitude was

Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 needed to promote investment in British sport in order to enhance the environment in which athletes were able to train.

Reactions to Stockholm Amateurs were never entirely indifferent to international performances. There were those who argued that, since sporting activities were primarily a vehicle for socializing with peers, Britons should take pride in having been successful in rowing and football, which called ‘for combination rather than individual effort’.57 For the majority, however, failure at Stockholm was regarded as a ‘tale of national Coaching before the First World War 43 disaster’58 and athletics coach and writer Frederick Annesley Michael (F.A.M.) Webster was not alone in expressing a ‘feeling of shame that we should fall so low as to be beaten by even the lesser European nations, who for generations past have been our pupils in all sporting pastimes’.59 The Times pointed out that

Our representation at Stockholm was deplorable, not because we do not possess abundance of ﬁrst-class material, but because the arrangements made for our share in the Games, the training and the preparation for our athletes, and the care taken of them at Stockholm were almost pathetically farcical.60

Commentators accentuated the harm that international sporting failure could do to Britain, and questions were asked about Britain’s continuing participation in Olympic competition, although the principal of Southport Physical Training College argued that Britain had too much responsibility as a nation to ‘throw up the sponge’ because its athletes had been unsuccessful at Stockholm. He called for better organization, perhaps through a National Olympic Society which would have responsibility for finding suitable physical material, and then training it, maybe even paying expenses if necessary.61 For Beach Thomas, the staging of athletics at the Games did more harm than good, primarily because the Americans had ‘specialized to so extreme a pitch’. British athletes had been so outclassed that they could not win even heats in the shorter races and were not in the first dozen or so in the longer races. He blamed bad training and organization before going on to criticize British competitors for their lack of ‘spirit’. Men representing their nation should at least attempt to win and it was ‘bad advertising’ for the nation to field a team ‘unprepared to do the nation honour since everyone in the Stadium had felt that England lost repute, in character more than in athletic capacity’. Compli- menting the Swedes for being less ‘specialistic’ and for incorporating scientific physical training in the form of gymnastics into their national habit, he concluded that it was the Swedish example ‘we should follow and avoid the American, which is its antithesis’.62 For one American commentator, though, Sweden had achieved her results by sending her athletes to America to compete and by engaging a trainer with American experience. Sweden had been ‘imbued with American athletic ideas’. In contrast, the British authorities and their athletes had not taken the Games seriously enough and British complacency had ‘received a rude jolt’.63

Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 Thoughts of Berlin Criticism over the Stockholm performances turned outwards as well as inwards, and an anti-coaching rhetoric was evident in the continuing disapproval of the coaching and training practices of other countries who had obviously misunder- stood the traditions and heritage of British sports. This was particularly true of the Americans who were accused of taking their sport too seriously and whose system of specialization was condemned as ‘a reductio ad absurdum’ of the meaning of sport.64 The Saturday Review complained that, although Britain had taught the world to play games for fun, other nations now made it a business,65 and, by the 44 Coaching before the First World War time calls for a ‘National Athletic Council’ were being discussed in March 1913, it was clear that state-sponsored programmes were already operating elsewhere in Europe where coaching and training were being given a high priority.66 Different sporting histories and social contexts had resulted in distinctive European coaching heritages that were far closer to the American model than that of the British. Austria engaged American coach Alexander Copland, Germany appointed four national athletics coaches, headed by Alvin Kraenzlein, formerly coach of Princeton University and four times Olympic champion, while France brought Olympians together in long-term central training camps under coach George Hébert. Because of their preference for voluntarism, government support was never anticipated in Britain and the field was initially left to the AAC, which called a meeting soon after the Games to address ‘England’sfailures’ and develop a ‘scheme to restore British prestige’. The old tensions regarding coaching emerged almost immediately. Some believed that importing an American trainer was essential while others argued that English training methods were just as comprehensive and that, ‘provided men were willing to submit to them’, they would achieve similar success to that of the Americans. Overall, the meeting believed that, in order for British sport to develop, more finance was required, with Laffan suggesting that a minimum of £30,000 would be needed for athletics alone before 1916. In the event of the public not contributing, the AAC hoped that ‘a rich philanthropist would take up the Olympic Games as a hobby’.67 A second, and much more significant initiative, was the publication of the BOC Aims and Objects of the Olympic Games Fund in 1913, which proved somewhat controversial, given the often acrimonious nature of the debate surrounding amateurism, coaching and international sport. What was noticeable at this point was a change in language, which now linked national pride with the need to improve performance through better coaching. In 1910, The Times had noted that the American athlete specialized at an early age while the British approach developed all-rounders. There should be no more criticism of an approach to sport which did not compel athletes to specialize or put them under a ‘paid professor of the dynamics of the human body’. If to avoid semi-professionalism was decadence, ‘let us be decadents with a good heart’.68 Now, however, The Times was accentuating the harm that international sporting failure could do to Britain, since ‘whether we took that result very seriously ourselves or not, it was widely advertised in other countries as evidence of England’s “decadence”’.69

Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 The BOC drew comparisons between Britain and other countries, particularly America, and suggested that the failure to improve in ‘chief stadium events … is only the inevitable result of slackness which grows only more slack when all the rest of the world is becoming much keener and taking the Games more and more seriously’. The report fully supported a complete reform of British sport and provided both sides of the argument for the development of a ‘Special Committee’ and the creation of an Olympic appeal for £100,000, closing with the observation that

Those who, for a dislike of the whole notion of the Olympic Games and an attachment to the old Arcadian village-green era of British sport, choose to Coaching before the First World War 45 indulge in more or less diffused and impractical criticisms of the Committee’s plans make very hard work for those who … are bent on seeing it carried to a successful conclusion.70

The ‘Special Committee’ was formed in March and included Cook and Sir Arthur Conan Doyle alongside ‘all-round sportsmen’ who represented ‘the best amateur traditions’. Since it was considered ‘essential that so far as professional advice and material appliances go, our representatives should be on equal terms with their competitors’, NGBs were asked to prepare a scheme for ‘the systematic preparation and training’ of their available talent, not to produce a ‘team of gladiators’ but to encourage widespread improvements in ‘national hygiene and physical development’. The BOC proposed training centres in the big cities and nationwide competitions to discover new talent, with anyone who demonstrated ability subsequently being granted access to an ‘official trainer’ and having the benefitof expert coaching. A scheme of awards would encourage the ‘man in the street’ to attain a badge by competing in five out of nine events spanning across a number of different sports. Presumably, because these schemes were required to adhere to the strictest amateur principles, they would help encourage the cultivation of the much admired all-round sportsman.71 In addition to the estimates given in Table 2.1, there would be the costs for central training quarters, a chief trainer and trainers for the central training

Table 2.1 Estimates received from NGBs for the implementation of their plans National Governing Body Breakdown of costs Total Amateur Athletic Association £4,000 per annum for four years £16,000 Irish Amateur Athletic Association £900 per annum for four years £3,600 Scottish Amateur Athletic £250 per annum for four years £1,000 Association National Cyclists’ Union £800 per annum for three years, with an £2,730 additional £150 for ﬁnal training Amateur Gymnastics Association 1913, £215; 1914, £430; 1915, £430; £1,945 1916, £870 Amateur Clay Bird Shooting £500 Association

Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 Amateur Wrestling Association £600 per annum for three years and £2,050 £250 for Olympic team Amateur Swimming Association £5,577 Amateur Fencing Association £810 British Olympic Committee Estimated cost of sending 500 athletes a £15,000 fortnight before Berlin at £30 each Total costs £49,212

The Straits Times, October 18, 1913, 12. 46 Coaching before the First World War quarters, training arrangements in other big centres, field events apparatus, indoor training quarters and office expenses.72 In order to fund these plans, the committee launched an appeal for £100,000,73 but the public response ‘underlined the nation’s apathy’ and only £7,000 had been donated by September 1913. There was a feeling in some quarters that the target was excessive but The Times pointed out that Germany would be spending much more and that America had spent ‘between £30,000 and £40,000 just on taking its men to Stockholm’.74 The Daily Mail reinforced this argument by highlighting the ‘astonishing preparations’ for the Olympics taking place in Sweden, France, Germany and America. The Swedes were paying an American trainer £1,500 a year while the Germans were sending a specialist to America for six months to study American training methods.75 In contrast to the British government, which consistently refused to become involved fiscally or politically in sport, the German government subsidized its Olympic squad, with the Secretary of the Interior providing money to help equip and send the team in both 1908 and 1912.76 Emphasizing how much their rivals had invested was an attempt to play on British insecurities, but the public remained unmoved and the appeal was closed in January 1914 having achieved only £11,000 of its initial target of £25,000, leaving £5,393 for the committee to spend, of which £3,850 was allocated for training purposes: £3,000 to the AAA, £600 to the ASA and £250 to the National Cyclists’ Union.77

The coaching debate The BOC initiative resulted in a polarization of public opinion and the debate over coaching that surrounded the report reflected the tensions in British sport over the loss of its customary place at the top of the sporting table set against its adherence to the more intangible, but nevertheless culturally recognizable, values of ‘pure’ amateurism. Immediately after Stockholm, Moss had observed that the British track and field athletes had been unable to compete with the Americans, and he compared it to putting ‘an army of untrained men armed with pikes into the field with a well-drilled force with every modern scientific implement’.78 In response to this and similar comments, swimming and athletics administrators rapidly produced coaching programmes in preparation for the next Games. The ASA’s reaction to Stockholm, where American, Canadian and German men won

Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 the individual gold medals, was to reject a post-Stockholm report and appoint a sub-committee to investigate the failure of the team and to draw up a strategy for Berlin.79 The cornerstone of the plan was the proposed engagement of professional instructors for twenty-five weeks during the summer, three for the crawl stroke, two for distance and one each for breaststroke and backstroke, at an estimated cost of £1,000.80 Part of the AAA’s response was to establish training sites around the country where official trainers would be available to advise approved athletes.81 In January 1914, the AAA appointed its first full-time national athletics coach, Walter Knox, a Scottish-Canadian professional Highland Games all-rounder and the Canadian Olympic coach at the 1912 Games, who was given a three-year Coaching before the First World War 47 contract at an annual salary of £400, the same as a Member of Parliament, plus travelling expenses worth £150.82 Nine supplementary trainers, four allocated jointly to Scotland and Ireland, two in the north of England, two in the south and one in the Midlands, were also employed to work under Knox for twenty-six weeks of the year over two years at an estimated annual cost of £700.83 A not insubstantial coaching network consisting of over twenty assistant trainers was also to be established at an annual cost of £2,000.84 By contrast, the Amateur Rowing Association declined to be associated with the fund, pointing out that oarsmen lost their amateur status if their expenses were paid by funds raised outside of their own clubs.85 One Times correspondent countered that, while some believed that giving professional coaching to an amateur turned him into a professional, everyone outside the ‘charmed circle of the public school’ should have similar opportunities.86 A series of articles in the Daily Express in 1913 suggested that the proposed scheme would not identify anyone capable of competing successfully against well-trained and carefully selected foreigners, especially Americans, and argued that improvement strategies should look beyond Berlin. It was time to establish a committee of experts, independent of NGBs, who would recommend athletes for coaching by professionals in dedicated training centres.87 Much of the argument against professional coaching was directed against suggestions that British sportsmen would benefit from importing American methods. The Daily Mail reported that the Americans and the Swedes had a dozen or more men who could beat the best British pole vaulter by an ‘outrageous margin’ while university hammer throwers had improved by no less than thirty feet after a little instruction from the Americans. With the right training and coaching, similar improvements could be achieved in other events.88 This drew a vitriolic response from ‘Outspoken’ in the Daily Express, whose comments encapsulated the antagon- ism to the idea of engaging an American coach. It was hard to believe that England, the home of athletics, was to take the ‘degrading step’ of going abroad for the trainer of her 1916 Olympic team, even though reports suggested that an American college trainer was likely to be engaged for an honorarium of £2,000. This was

an insult to our own good men; a craven acknowledgement of weak-kneed legislators; a menace to our chances of again rising to our proper place; and a playing into the hands of our keenest (and I can safely say, not too scrupulous)

Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 opponents.

The dominant late nineteenth-century English champions had been ‘home-trained in the old-fashioned school of running’, which was now followed by American trainers, and many of them would be only too willing to help in preparing Olympians if they were asked. Unfortunately, because they had been excluded by the AAA for some years, most of these ‘old-time professional masters of the art of training’ had disappeared and the ‘stripping rooms of our London grounds have since been frequented by trainers of a much inferior brand who have not made a study of what they profess to perform’. ‘Outspoken’ noted that Sam Wisdom, ‘Cabbage’ 48 Coaching before the First World War Perry and Harry Ransom were still proving their worth as athletics coaches while many others had moved into football. Sadly, although these men were all experts in the ‘trainer’sart’, the AAA would never condescend to engage them, even though most would be willing to work for out-of-pocket expenses and depend on results for their remuneration. Bonuses should be paid to those who unearthed champions and international athletes in order to concentrate the wisdom of the old and new school of trainers, amateurs and professionals alike. These men should be supervised by chief coaches, such as Charles Rammage, the winner of two Shefﬁeld handicaps, a ‘walking compendium of sprinting lore and a scientist in everything relating to sprinting’, W.G. George or Harry Watkins for track or cross-country running, and Perry for the marathon. These coaches could form a professional advisory committee which was desperately needed by the AAA, the BOC and the universities. They knew their business thoroughly and ‘would qualify in face of an examination of experts and doctors’, while their combined fees would amount to only half of the £2,000 suggested for an American trainer. Since no single individual could do justice to the training of a large team, sectional trainers should be selected by an independent committee, consisting of amateur or authoritative practitioners rather than being left to ‘amenable but innocent members of the AAA and BOC’. The author concluded that if

Varsity people want an American trainer so very badly, they are rich enough to have one on their own account. Let them try him by all means – and note results if they come up against the English-trained men, if the right trainers – as is so seldom the case in this unfortunate country – get the job.89

‘Outspoken’ was not alone in these views and many other amateur sportsmen resisted the ‘outcry for the importation of American coaches and trainers for the purpose of teaching us what we had originally taught them’.90 Coaching initiatives led to fears that a horde of Americanized trainers, employing their purely empiric craft, ‘based upon a smattering of physiology and a vast self-assurance, will march onward through many failures to some rare success’. Another critic foresaw ‘an army of professional coaches’ over-running the country although his opponents replied that this ‘army of coaches does not and never will exist’.91 Hugh Legge observed that those not interested in who won at the Olympics generally had a concern ‘for the interest of amateur sport, and they are by no means convinced

Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 that these interests will be served if the proposals which are now being set forth are carried out’.92 Philip Noel-Baker, President of Cambridge University Athletic Club, pointed out that the American athlete was backed by an organization, managed by paid organizers and ﬁnancially supported, which he regarded as suspect since money turned sport into a commercial enterprise. American athletes specialized in one or two events and before important races they not only devoted most of their time to training but often employed professional coaches. This resulted in descriptions of American participants as ‘acrobatic freaks’.93 One writer warned that Coaching before the First World War 49 Americans are obsessed with pot-hunting. Runners are set upon by paid coaches so that while they were still plastic they could learn the machine-like characteristic of American champions and of those of no other country. They become semi-professionals who cheat just as they did in Stockholm. American athletics keep the athlete from being a good all-round man and he has all the defects of a premature specialist. We should be thankful that the recent appeal for the formalising and perfecting of our athletics on the American model fell on deaf ears in England.94

Rowing coach Rudolf Lehmann argued that ‘the scheme … means specialisation, and I cannot help saying that, in my opinion, sport would be ruined’. Achieving success by such means would require making ‘professional slaves’ of the men who took part and Britain would be much better off with ‘the old idea of games for games’ sake’.An‘American Educator’ replied that attempts to improve British performances would prove futile unless there was a nationwide commitment to competition and training. In defence of the proposals, it was pointed out that Britain would travel to Berlin and that, ‘it only remains to settle whether the British contingent is to consist of a keen but inglorious mob, or of a properly selected, properly trained team which will, it is to be hoped, do credit to the country’.95

Coaches and coaching on the eve of war Looking back at the 1912 Games from the vantage point of 1936, Annison observed that Britain had ‘met her Waterloo’ at Stockholm96 and that the AAA and ASA post-Games proposals, plus the middle-class debate about coaching and training that appeared concurrently in the national press, could be seen as evidence of a signiﬁcant change in British attitudes to coaches and training. However, the experiences of men like Alec Nelson and Walter Brickett suggest that, in many ways, the 1912 Games really accelerated an already existing trend. The Olympic fund established in 1913 may have brought the issue to public notice but elite sportsmen had apparently already accepted the need for professional support. This indicates that more attention needs to be paid to the ﬂuid nature of interpretations of amateurism in this period, in particular the tensions between those who argued for participation and those who concentrated on performance. Those who were

Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 most vociferous in defending the amateur ethos generally preferred to emphasize the benefits to the nation of widespread participation, and their concerns about the commercialization of sport centred around the possibility that, when winning became more important than taking part, then ‘fair play’ would suffer, especially if professional coaches were in control. However, while there was consistency of purpose across British sports in the way that professional coaches were regulated, the boundaries that legislators created around the margins of amateur hegemony were flexible. For those concerned with elite performance there were always tensions between the rhetoric of amateurism and the desire to be competitive and, by 1911, it was being argued that a gentleman amateur could no longer expect to be 50 Coaching before the First World War a champion unless he was ‘prepared to devote the whole of his leisure time to training’.97 Inevitably, this desire for success meant adopting professional help, especially since there was plenty of evidence to suggest that the employment of a trainer or a coach markedly improved a man’s performance. This professional help took many forms in the years before the First World War and when medical doctor Adolphe Abrahams, who attended Stockholm as an official with the athletics team, suggested separating ‘coaching’ from ‘training’ in 191398 he was highlighting a distinction already familiar to most sportsmen. Harry Andrews, who trained athletes, swimmers and cyclists, and was later appointed as trainer to Olympic teams, normally referred to himself as a trainer rather than a ‘coach’, mainly because he saw tasks such as massage as central to his engagement with athletes. Andrews argued that other aspects of training were much less important and he considered professional massage infinitely superior to self-massage because an athlete could relax completely as the trainer addressed all the muscle groups. He normally gave twenty to thirty minutes massage from head to foot after training, while pre-event massage, applied twenty to thirty minutes before competition, was limited to five to ten minutes to loosen up the muscles without inducing relaxation. A good trainer would always be able to adapt his massage methods ‘to the constitutions and temperaments’ of his athletes.99 Massage was widely regarded as integral to the training process and most commentators insisted that a rub down by an expert trainer was a key component of training. Channel swimmer Jabez Wolffe recommended plenty of massage with a good embrocation, which would keep muscles soft and pliable, while athlete Alfred Shrubb noted that every good trainer needed to be a good masseur.100 Other trainers adopted additional roles. As the professional for LAC at Stamford Bridge, Charles Perry became the leading expert on running tracks and not only did he supervise the laying of the track for the 1896 Olympic Games, he organized the refurbishment for the Games of 1906 and was then in charge of the construction of the tracks for the Olympics of 1908, 1912 and 1920. Like his father, he also had a reputation as a timekeeper and he officiated at the 1896 Games where his brother acted as coach to the Hungarian team.101 Professor Andrew Newton, lightweight boxing champion (1888–1890) and a physical culture expert, spent many years as boxing instructor to Perry Hill, Richmond and Ealing gymnasia, Barnsbury, Belsize, Isledon and West London boxing clubs, Guy’s Hospital, and the 17th Middlesex Volunteers.102 Elsewhere, in sports like cricket

Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 and tennis, professionals acted much more like ‘coaches’ as they would be understood nowadays. Many of these individuals became respectable icons of hard work and prudence, thereby reinforcing amateur-like qualities, and the concept of the ‘respectable professional’ had been commonplace in county cricket since the 1870s.103 In 1904, R.H. Lyttleton argued that the professional, though still drawn from the shop, the factory, the pit and the slum, was a prosperous individual whose dress and deportment made it hard for spectators to tell him from the amateur and he observed that the profession of a cricketer was ‘in every way an honourable … one’.104 Tennis player and coach Peter Latham clearly impressed one writer who left a meeting with him in 1902 ‘with a feeling of Coaching before the First World War 51 interest in and respect for a professional athlete’105 and, in 1913, The Times described professionals in golf, cricket, rackets, tennis and ‘practically every other form of sport’ as ‘deservedly one of the most respected classes in the community’.106 The important point for many British amateurs was the relationship established between athlete and trainer or coach. Twenty-first-century researchers have emphasized that coaches only realise their ambitions through the success of their athletes, so coaching reputations depend on what athletes learn and on how their increased capability translates into improved athletic performance. As a result, although coaches can never gain absolute predictive control, they are inclined to tightly manage the coaching process and the coaching environment.107 These tensions were clearly understood at the end of the Victorian period, even by amateur coaches like W.B. Woodgate, who observed that ‘Autocracy is the first requisite for a trainer, and implicit subordination for a crew’,108 but it was the manner in which this was applied that was important. In a lecture on the best way of teaching rowing Dr Edmund Warre, Eton headmaster and a leading defender of ‘pure’ amateurism, ‘urged the absolute necessity of coaches being able to give and always giving a reason for their instructions’.109 As a result, although British athletes wanting to be competitive at events like the Olympics certainly turned to trainers for advice and assistance, they adopted a peculiarly British approach. Resistance to the use of American-style coaching was as much about the degree of control that was employed by the professional as it was about any devaluation of coaching or competition, and as long as coaches adopted their allotted role as servants then suitable men might be acceptable as trainers or instructors. The important thing for British sporting administrators was that these professionals recognized their place within the greater scheme of amateur-controlled sport. Because professional teachers were necessary for the widespread propagation of swimming the ASA supported the creation of a strong professional association, but this did not prevent them from reaffirming the exclusion of professionals from holding any office within the ASA, or its districts, in 1908.110 Olympic athletic trainers Alec Nelson and Bill Thomas both went on to have long careers at Cambridge and Oxford, respectively, following the First World War, but the limited archival material available always highlights the influence of patronage and the ongoing master–servant relationship that existed between university athletes and their coaches. Walter Brickett’s involvement with life

Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 saving, and the social networks that he created with leading amateurs, established his status as a respectable artisan, but only so long as he displayed a degree of subservience to amateur administrators. Their appointments as trainers to the Olympic team in 1912 highlights the increasing opportunities afforded to these men, and to other British professional coaches, by the creation and expansion of formal international competitions, but the final decision about whether or not their skills were to be employed remained firmly within the control of their amateur masters, and this is a theme that continued to permeate attitudes towards coaching in the inter-war years, despite the coaching initiatives proposed following the Stockholm Games. 52 Coaching before the First World War Notes 1 Randolph Faries, ‘On Training in General’, Outing XXX, no. 2 (May 1897): 180. 2 Paul Warwick, ‘Did Britain Change? An Inquiry into the Causes of National Decline’, Journal of Contemporary History 20, no. 1 (1985): 101. 3 Daily Mail, July 6, 1906, 8; The Times, July 18, 1907. 4 Daily Mirror, July 9, 1909, 5. 5 William H. Lewis, ‘Making a Football Team’, Outing XLI, no. 2 (November 1902): 221. 6 Glen Warner, ‘Reminiscences of a Football Coach’, Baseball Magazine X, no. 3 (January 1913): 65–71. 7 The Tech, December 8, 1924, 4. 8 D. Brett King, Brittany L. Raymond and Jennifer A. Simon-Thomas, ‘History of Sport Psychology in Cultural Magazines of the Victorian Era’, The Sport Psychologist 9, no. 4 (1995): 388. 9 Manchester Guardian, May 22, 1899, 8. 10 The Times, July 18, 1907. 11 The Times, December 29, 1910, 7. 12 Baily’s Monthly Magazine of Sports and Pastimes LXXVI, no. 502 (December 1901): 484. 13 Ralph D. Paine, ‘American University Rowing’, Outing XXXX, no. 3, (June 1902): 341. 14 Daily Mirror, May 15, 1908, 14. 15 Pierre de Coubertin, Olympism: Selected Writings, ed. Norbert Muller (Lausanne: International Olympic Committee, 2000), 653–654. 16 Theodore Andrea Cook, The Fourth Olympiad: The Official Report of the Olympic Games 1908 (London, British Olympic Association, 1908), 145. 17 British Olympic Association, Committee, December 2, 1906, 3, File BOA/M/1/1, British Olympic Association Collection, University of East London Archives, Dock- lands Campus (hereafter cited as BOA Collection, UEL Archives); Cook, Olympic Games, 145–146. 18 Ian F.W. Beckett, ‘Grenfell, William Henry, Baron Desborough (1855–1945)’, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography Online Edition, January 2011, www. oxforddnb.com/view/article/33566 (accessed 25 October, 2011). 19 Steve Bailey, ‘A Noble Ally and Olympic Disciple: The Reverend Robert S. de Courcy Laffan, Coubertin’s “Man” in England’, Olympika: The International Journal of Olympic Studies VI (1997): 53–64. 20 Ian Buchanan, ‘Cook, Sir Theodore Andrea (1867–1928)’, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography Online Edition, www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/55483 (accessed 25 October, 2011). 21 Martin Polley, ‘No Business of Ours?: The Foreign Office and the Olympic Games, 1896–1914’, International Journal of the History of Sport 13, no. 2 (1996): 97–98. 22 British Olympic Council, Aims and Objects of the Olympic Games Fund (London: British Olympic Association, 1913), 3. Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 23 The New York Times, July 15, 1908, 7. 24 The Times, July 27, 1908, 10. 25 Ibid. 26 Matthew McIntire, ‘National Status, the 1908 Olympic Games and the English Press’, Media History 15, no. 3 (2009): 271–286. 27 Daily Mirror, August 1, 1908. 28 Otautau Standard and Wallace Country Chronicle, June 16, 1914, 7; A.B. George, ‘An Athletes’ Advisory Club’, Manchester Guardian, December 23, 1911, 14; Grey River Argus, October 23, 1912, 7; The Straits Times, August 28, 1912, 2. 29 AAA Olympic Committee, November 2, 1911, November 25, 1911, January 13, 1912, June 11, 1912, File 1/2/4/1, Amateur Athletic Association Collection, Coaching before the First World War 53 University of Birmingham Special Collections Archives, Birmingham (hereafter cited as AAA: Birmingham). 30 Census 1891(RG12/53/113/17); 1901(RG1367/46/20); 1911(RG14PN3457RG 78PN129). 31 AAA Olympic Committee, January 13, 1912; Daily Mirror, January 20, 1912, 14. 32 AAA Olympic Committee, March 9, 1912, File 1/2/4/1, AAA: Birmingham. 33 Census 1881(RG11/333/21/2); 1891(RG12/809/73/25); 1901(RG13/430/ 56/48); 1911(RG14PN2480RG78PN83); Swedish Olympic Committee, The Offi- cial Report of the Olympic Games of Stockholm 1912, ed. Erik Bergvall and trans. Edward Adams-Ray (Stockholm: Wahlstrom and Widstrand, 1913); Daily Mirror, July 6, 1914, 14. 34 Baily’s Magazine of Sports and Pastimes LXXIV, no. 485 (July 1900): 42–45; Census 1901(RG13/81); 1911(RG14PN10220RG78PN537). 35 Richard Desborough Burnell, The Oxford and Cambridge Boat Race, 1829–1953 (London: Oxford University Press, 1954), 240–242; The Times, February 24, 1906, 13; February 19, 1907, 11; February 22, 1907, 8; April 5, 1924, 13; July 29, 1952, 8; May 8, 1981, 19; The New York Times, May 11, 1913, S4; Daily Mirror,December 1, 1920, 18. 36 Census 1891(RG12/3877); 1901 (RG13/4428); 1911(RG14PN28317RG78PN 1620). 37 Census 1891(RG12/4007); 1901(RG13/4575); 1911(RG14PN3407RG78PN128). 38 Census 1911(RG14PN1848RG78PN65). 39 For a full biography of Brickett see Dave Day, ‘Walter Brickett. A Respectable Pro- fessor’,inRecording Leisure Lives: Sports, Games and Pastimes in 20th Century Brit- ain, ed. Bob Snape and Helen Pussard (Brighton: Leisure Studies Association, 2010); Census 1871(RG10206/60/15); 1881(RG11182/99/15); 1891(RG12117/115/ 34); 1901(RG13150/124/36), 1911(RG14PN714RG78PN25). 40 Census Returns. Fanny Easton 1881(RG11/337/61/1818); 1891(RG12/141/84/ 67); 1901(RG13/1253/67/40); 1911(RG14PN7287RG78PN355). Classey 1881 (RG11/1009/5/4); 1891(RG12/96/68/26); 1901(RG13/110/61/10). Char- lotte Humphrey 1871(165/19/30). Charlotte and Jane Humphrey 1881(RG11/31/ 10/13); 1891(RG12/22/91/11); 1901(RG13/23/123/12); 1911(RG14PN162RG 78PN5). 41 Census 1911(RG14PN19275RG78PN1152A); Leicester Mail, December 16, 1911. 42 Amateur Swimming Association, Committee Minutes, Report of the Selection Com- mittee, Stockholm Olympic Games 1912, 150, Amateur Swimming Association Headquarters, SportPark Loughborough University (hereafter cited as ASA). 43 Census 1911(RG14PN218RG78PN7). 44 Census 1901(RG13/2911); 1911(RG14PN2457RG78PN82). 45 Census 1891(RG12/1170); 1901(RG13/227); 1911(RG14PN978RG78PN33). 46 AAA Olympic Committee, June 11, 1912, File 1/2/4/1, AAA: Birmingham. 47 Census 1891(RG12/634); 1901(RG13/928); 1911(RG14PN352RG78PN11). 48

Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 Athletic News, March 27, 1911, 3. 49 AAA Olympic Committee, January 13, 1912, June 11, 1912. File 1/2/4/1, AAA: Birmingham. 50 The Singapore Free Press and Mercantile Advertiser, May 27, 1912, 10; for a detailed biography of Nelson see Ian Stone, ‘Alec Nelson: Professional Runner, Athletics Coach and “Entrepreneur-Client”’ in Sporting Lives, ed. Dave Day (Manchester: MMU Institute for Performance Research, 2011), 88–111. 51 BOC, January 16, 1912, 2. 52 Swedish Olympic Committee, The Ofﬁcial Report 1912,46–48, 287, 292–298. 53 Ibid., 289 54 Daily Mirror, May 15, 1912, 14. 55 Singapore Free Press and Mercantile Advertiser, May 27, 1912, 10. 54 Coaching before the First World War 56 AAA Olympic Committee, March 9, 1912, File 1/2/4/1, AAA: Birmingham. 57 Manchester Guardian, July 23, 1912, 16. 58 Duke of Westminster, letter to the editor, The Times, August 27, 1913, 3. 59 University of Birmingham Physical Education Department, Britain in the World of Sport: An Examination of the Factors Involved in Participation in Competitive Inter- national Sport (Birmingham: The Physical Education Association, 1956), 9. 60 The Times, July 27, 1912, 10. 61 A. Alexander, ‘Games Versus Athletics’, Spectator, 109, no. 4388, August 3, 1912, 167. 62 W. Beach Thomas, ‘Games Versus Athletics’, Spectator, 109, no. 4388, August 3, 1912, 167. 63 Edward Baynard Moss, ‘America’s Athletic Missionaries’, Harper’s Weekly, July 27, 1912, 8–9. 64 Manchester Guardian, July 23, 1912, 16. 65 Saturday Review, August 17, 1912, 195–196. 66 Manchester Guardian, March 14, 1913, 12. 67 The Straits Times, August 28, 1912, 2; Otautau Standard and Wallace County Chronicle, July 1, 1913, 2. 68 The Times, July 26, 1910, 21. 69 The Times, August 18, 1913, 7. 70 BOC, Aims and Objects,1–44. 71 The Times, March 14, 1913, 8; July 23, 1913, 14; August 18, 1913, 6; September 5, 1913, 11; BOA, Council Meeting, 2 April 1913; BOC, Aims and Objects, 15, 32. 72 The Straits Times, October 18, 1913, 12. 73 The Times, August 18, 1913, 6. 74 Matthew P. Llewellyn, ‘A Nation Divided: Great Britain and the Pursuit of Excel- lence, 1912–1914’, Journal of Sport History 35, no. 1 (2008): 82, 86; The Times, September 22, 1913, 29. 75 Daily Mail, February 1, 1913, 5. 76 Arnd Krüger, ‘“Buying Victories Is Positively Degrading”: European Origins of Government Pursuit of National Prestige through Sport’, International Journal of Sports History 12, no. 2 (1995): 186–187. 77 The Times, January 16, 1914, 9. 78 P.J. Moss, ‘Britain and the Olympic Games’, Daily Mirror, July 23, 1912, 14. 79 Daily Mirror, October 14, 1912, 14; ASA Committee, October 13, 1912, ASA. 80 The Times, September 27, 1913, 10; September 2, 1913, 11; Dave Day, ‘Massaging the Amateur Ethos: British Professional Trainers at the 1912 Olympic Games’, Sport in History 32, no. 2 (2012): 17; The Times, January 16, 1914, 55. 81 MCAAA Committee, 3 July, 1913; August 7, 1913; August 14, 1913; August 27, 1913, AAA: Birmingham; Daily Mirror, July 23, 1913, 14; Manchester Guardian, August 29, 1913, 8. 82 Sports Council, Coaching Matters: A Review of Coaching and Coach Education in the United Kingdom (London: Sports Council, 1991), 10. 83 ﬁ

Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 The Times, January 16, 1914, 50; Peter Lovesey, The Of cial Centenary History of the Amateur Athletic Association (Enfield: Guinness Superlatives, 1979), 119; Greg Moon, Albert Hill: A Proper Perspective (Cheltenham: The Author, 1994), 22; Manchester Guardian, January 16, 1914, 9, 55. 84 AAA Olympic Committee, November 21, 1913; February 20, 1914, AAA: Birming- ham; Dave Day, ‘From Barclay to Brickett: Coaching Practices and Coaching Lives in Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Century England’ (PhD Diss., DeMontfort University, 2008), 239. 85 Morning Post, September 25, 1913, 5. 86 The Times, October 22, 1913, 12. 87 Daily Express, June 2, 1913, 8; August 30, 1913, 2; September 5, 1913, 9; September 19, 1913, 5. Coaching before the First World War 55 88 Daily Mail, February 1, 1913, 5. 89 Daily Express, February 26, 1913, 8. 90 Daily Express, September 19, 1913, 5. 91 Manchester Guardian, August 28, 1913, 7; The Times, August 27, 1913, 3. 92 Hugh Legge, The Times, August 10, 1912, quoted in BOC, Aims and Objects, 12. 93 Derek Birley, Playing the Game: Sport and British Society, 1910–1945 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1995), 30–31; Norman Baker, ‘Whose Hegemony? The Origins of the Amateur Ethos in Nineteenth Century English Society’, Sport in History 24, no.1 (2004): 11–12. 94 Manchester Guardian, February 25, 1914, 8. 95 The Times, July 21, 1912; August 17, 1912, 11; August 14, 1912. 96 Harold E. Annison, Swimming (London: Pitman and Sons, 1936), 9. 97 Harold Wade, ‘Cross-Country Running’ in The Encyclopaedia of Sports and Games Vol. 1, ed. The Earl of Suffolk and Berkshire (New York: J.B. Lippincott Co., 1911), 98. 98 Adolphe Abrahams, ‘The Ladies Plate at Henley Regatta’, Lancet August 2, 1913, 352–353. 99 Harry Andrews, Training for Athletics and General Health (London: C. Arthur Pearson, 1903), 21; Harry Andrews, Massage and Training (London: Health and Strength, 1910). 100 Jabez Wolffe, The Text-Book of Swimming (London: Ewart, Seymour and Co., 1910), 52–59; Alfred Shrubb, Running and Cross-Country Running (University of Michigan, 1908), 65. 101 Michael Biddiss, ‘Faster, Higher, Stronger: The Birth of the Modern Olympics’, The Sports Historian 17, no. 1 (1997): 1–11. 102 Andrew Newton, Boxing, with a Section on Single-stick (London: C. Arthur Pearson Ltd, 1910). 103 Rob Light, ‘“Ten Drunks and a Parson”?: The Victorian Professional Cricketer Reconsidered’, Sport in History 25, No. 1 (2005): 71–73. 104 Derek Birley, ‘The Primrose Path: The Sports Pages Lecture 1995’, The Sports Historian 16 (1996): 1–15. 105 Manchester Guardian, April 12, 1902, 5. 106 The Times, September 13, 1913, 7. 107 Robyn L. Jones and Mike Wallace, ‘Another Bad Day at the Training Ground: Coping with Ambiguity in the Coaching Context’, Sport, Education and Society 10, no. 1 (2005): 119–134. 108 Walter Bradford Woodgate, ‘Rowing and Sculling’ in Handbook of Athletic Sports, Volume II, Rowing & Sculling – Sailing – Swimming (London: George Bell & Sons, 1890), 119–120. 109 Manchester Guardian, February 15, 1907, 12. 110 ASA Committee, September 21, 1894; ASA Annual General Meeting, April 14, 1894; March 30, 1895; March 7, 1908; March 6, 1909, ASA. Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 Bibliography Andrews, Harry. Training for Athletics and General Health (London: C. Arthur Pearson, 1903). Andrews, Harry. Massage and Training (London: Health and Strength, 1910). Annison, Harold E. Swimming (London: Pitman and Sons, 1936). Bailey, Steve. ‘A Noble Ally and Olympic Disciple: The Reverend Robert S. de Courcy Laffan, Coubertin’s “Man” in England’. Olympika: The International Journal of Olympic Studies VI (1997): 53–64. 56 Coaching before the First World War Baker, Norman. ‘Whose Hegemony? The Origins of the Amateur Ethos in Nineteenth Century English Society’. Sport in History 24, no. 1 (2004): 1–16. Biddiss, Michael. ‘Faster, Higher, Stronger: The Birth of the Modern Olympics’. The Sports Historian 17, no. 1 (1997): 1–11. Birley, Derek. Playing the Game: Sport and British Society, 1910–1945 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1995). Birley, Derek. ‘The Primrose Path: The Sports Pages Lecture 1995’. The Sports Historian 16 (1996): 1–15. Burnell, Richard Desborough. The Oxford and Cambridge Boat Race, 1829–1953 (London: Oxford University Press, 1954). Cook, Theodore Andrea. The Fourth Olympiad: The Official Report of the Olympic Games 1908 (London, British Olympic Association: 1908). Coubertin, Pierre de. Olympism: Selected Writings, ed. Norbert Muller (Lausanne: Interna- tional Olympic Committee, 2000). Day, Dave. ‘From Barclay to Brickett: Coaching Practices and Coaching Lives in Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Century England’. PhD Diss., DeMontfort University, 2008. Day, Dave. ‘Walter Brickett. A Respectable Professor’,inRecording Leisure Lives: Sports, Games and Pastimes in 20th Century Britain, ed. Bob Snape and Helen Pussard (Brighton:Leisure Studies Association, 2010). Day, Dave. ‘Massaging the Amateur Ethos: British Professional Trainers at the 1912 Olympic Games’. Sport in History 32, no. 2 (2012): 157–182. Jones, Robyn L. and Mike Wallace. ‘Another Bad Day at the Training Ground: Coping with Ambiguity in the Coaching Context’. Sport, Education and Society 10, no. 1 (2005): 119–134. King, D. Brett, Brittany L. Raymond and Jennifer A. Simon-Thomas. ‘History of Sport Psychology in Cultural Magazines of the Victorian Era’. The Sport Psychologist 9 (1995): 376–390. Krüger, Arnd. ‘“Buying Victories is Positively Degrading”: European Origins of Govern- ment Pursuit of National Prestige through Sport’. International Journal of Sports History 12, no. 2 (1995): 183–200. Light, Rob. ‘“Ten Drunks and a Parson”?: The Victorian Professional Cricketer Reconsidered’. Sport in History 25, no. 1 (2005): 60–76. Llewellyn, Matthew P. ‘A Nation Divided: Great Britain and the Pursuit of Excellence, 1912–1914’. Journal of Sport History 35, no. 1 (2008): 73–97. Lovesey, Peter. The Official Centenary History of the Amateur Athletic Association (Enfield: Guinness Superlatives, 1979). McIntire, Matthew. ‘National Status, the 1908 Olympic Games and the English Press’. Media History 15, no. 3 (2009): 271–286. Moon, Greg. Albert Hill: A Proper Perspective (Cheltenham: The Author, 1994). Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 Newton, Andrew. Boxing, with a Section on Single-stick (London: C. Arthur Pearson Ltd, 1910). Polley, Martin. ‘No Business of Ours?: The Foreign Office and the Olympic Games, 1896–1914’. International Journal of the History of Sport 13, no. 2 (1996): 96–113. Shrubb, Alfred. Running and Cross-Country Running (University of Michigan, 1908). Sports Council. Coaching Matters: A Review of Coaching and Coach Education in the United Kingdom (London: Sports Council, 1991). Stone, Ian. ‘Alec Nelson: Professional Runner, Athletics Coach and “Entrepreneur- Client”’,inSporting Lives, ed. Dave Day (Manchester: MMU Institute for Performance Research, 2011), 88–111. Coaching before the First World War 57 University of Birmingham Physical Education Department. Britain in the World of Sport: An Examination of the Factors Involved in Participation in Competitive International Sport (Birmingham: The Physical Education Association, 1956). Wade, Harold. ‘Cross-Country Running’,inThe Encyclopaedia of Sports and Games, Vol. 1, ed. The Earl of Suffolk and Berkshire (New York: J.B. Lippincott Co., 1911). Warwick, Paul. ‘Did Britain Change? An Inquiry into the Causes of National Decline’. Journal of Contemporary History 20, no. 1 (1985): 99–133. Wolffe, Jabez. The Text-Book of Swimming (London: Ewart, Seymour and Co., 1910). Woodgate, Walter Bradford. ‘Rowing and Sculling’,inHandbook of Athletic Sports, Volume II, Rowing & Sculling – Sailing – Swimming, ed. E. Bell (London: George Bell & Sons, 1890). Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 3 The inter-war years

Introduction By the end of the First World War, Britain had lost over 700,000 men, most of them under forty-five, while the 1918 worldwide influenza pandemic accounted for a further 200,000. Coupled with a large national debt and the discharge of four million men from the armed services, the indications were that Britain might enter a period of economic depression, although the nation actually experienced a post-war boom. For a short period, Britain appeared to be the ‘land fit for heroes’ that Lloyd George had promised, but, with unemployment rates gradually escalating and post-war reparations on the horizon, the government was forced into retaining high war-time rates of taxation, limiting disposable incomes.1 These economic difficulties exacerbated social tensions and stimulated changes in the status hierarchy. Before the war, discontents arising from class divisions had been restrained by limited working-class expectations but the working class was not so easily placated by 1923, when the Labour Party formed its first administration, while a decline in the British aristocracy was increasingly evident – not only had their numbers diminished but they also had to contend with death duties on their inherited wealth.2 The middle classes were also affected financially and this helped to weaken the barriers between the middle and lower classes. Class differences were also reduced by the 1918 Representation of People Act and the fact that upper-class officers and lower-class soldiers had fought together during the war. Nevertheless, an ongoing disparity in educational opportunities ensured the continuation of a class-divided society. Free elementary schools were provided for the working classes, but their education was finished at fourteen. Fee-paying schools offered greater opportunities, but even then there were differences, dictated primarily by wealth. The elite sent their children to preparatory and public schools whereas the middle classes had to Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 be content with small private and secondary schools. Higher education was predominately reserved for those who had a public school background, the traditional ‘gentleman amateurs’,3 and, as a result, educational differences ensured that amateur hegemony remained firmly entrenched within British sport.

A return to amateurism Sport had been closely connected to the war effort with sporting organizations encouraging large numbers of professional and elite amateur athletes to enlist. As a The inter-war years 59 result, Britain lost a large contingent of its promising sportsmen, with nearly 28 per cent of the young men going up to Oxford and Cambridge between 1910 and 1914 perishing, and this had a debilitating effect on sports like athletics and swimming.4 Although there had been signs before 1914 that a more pragmatic approach to coaching might become acceptable when placed under the pressure of poor international performances, any potential legacy was short-lived and the pre- war coaching proposals put forward by the British Olympic Committee (BOC), Amateur Athletic Association (AAA) and the Amateur Swimming Association (ASA),5 failed to be developed further after 1918. Altering years of tradition would have required a change in mindset, something that modernizers had been unable to achieve successfully by 1914, and amateur administrators, who felt that Britain had little to learn from foreigners and believed in the natural superiority of the British sportsman, reverted to type. Huggins and Williams have highlighted a degree of conservatism in sport in this period. War-time experiences caused many individuals to view the pre-war era as a time of security and reason and helps explain a nostalgic desire to return to a world that supposedly existed before the war, a world in which amateurism provided a philosophical direction for sport.6 These attitudes remained unpopular in America, Europe and in much of the Empire, not least because of amateurism’s basic association with class. In 1920, Ernest Charles Buley, an Australian journalist, objected to the Amateur Rowing Association (ARA) excluding working men, arguing that ‘what man, whose honest valuable work is branded as “menial” by one of the written laws of sport, can believe that in sport all men are esteemed equal?’.7 His comments reflected a different perspective on amateurism outside Britain, where the intense training and commitment required to be successful in top-level sport had accelerated a shift away from the traditional British approach. Amateurism was always a fluid philosophy, interpreted differently according to social class, playing status, or local, regional and national traditions, and less class-based societies than Britain were more flexible about how amateur values should be interpreted. In America, the result was a highly systematic coach-centred model, emphasizing excellence and winning, which brought rapid success in the international arena. Elite British athletes were thus faced with a difficult dilemma in having to decide how to balance amateurism with the systematic training approaches being adopted by their competitors. Actually, for many critics it was not the idea of

Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 training and coaching that had become the issue, but the notion of engaging too closely with specifically American methods. The solution, as in the pre-war period, was to adopt a master–servant relationship with British coaches in contrast to the coach-centred system adopted in America. This marginalization of professional coaches was connected both to the amateur ideology and to a broader nationalism, especially when it became clear that the American paradigm was being adopted elsewhere. British commentators became defensive over their failure to compete effectively, and reacted by insisting that they were more interested in playing fairly than winning and by placing even more emphasis on the place of the volunteer, as administrator and coach. 60 The inter-war years Post-war Olympics Immediately after the war there was a concern that British athletes would not be prepared enough to participate in the 1920 Olympics at Antwerp and that there would be a repeat of the Stockholm disappointments, although, once again, arrangements were rushed and pre-war differences over coaching and training re-emerged. Some argued for copying the methods that had made America a global sporting powerhouse but the late entry of America into the war had not been well received and resentment continued into the inter-war period.8 Memories of London in 1908 were still fresh and many Britons had no desire to look to America for guidance, especially in sport, where American programmes of intensive training of selected athletes produced men who outclassed everyone else. Elite athletes, however, understood that America’s dominance in international sport was the result of ‘rigorous and extensive training and careful attention to efficiency’9 and the emergence of Finland and Sweden as athletic nations reinforced the notion that the American system of athletic specialization had eclipsed the British system of ‘sport for sport’s sake’ as the dominant global sporting model. Following Antwerp, where Britain’s fifteen gold medals placed them well behind the Americans who won forty-one, the coaching debate intensified. While American ‘scientific training’ clearly produced results, many amateurs still believed it better to lose ‘rather than to risk the stigma of semiprofessionalism’ through coaching,10 and Eustace Miles doubted whether Britons would ever undertake the serious training needed to produce athletic specialists, rather than all-rounders.11 The Manchester Guardian objected to ‘wholly alien’ American methods in which good athletes, selected by a professional coach, received specialized training. Although Americans were more successful, English sportsmen, without ‘such strict training methods and, without the autocratic coach’, had more enjoyment,12 while the ARA suggested that the intensive training required to send a fully prepared team to the Olympics was ‘entirely contrary to the true spirit of amateur sport’.13 The Observer pointed out, however, that almost every other country had its Director of Athletics, usually an old army or university man, and Britain needed to appoint a man of ‘good education and social position’, supported by expert coaches.14

Preparing for Paris It would be a mistake to think that, whatever their objections to professional

Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 coaching, British swimming and athletics administrators were indifferent to Olympic performances, and representatives of both the ASA and AAA set about planning for Paris in advance of the Games.

Swimming On 19 July 1908, ASA president George Hearn had used the opportunity afforded by the London Games to form the Fédération Internationale de Natation Amateur (FINA). Based on the English ASA model, its objectives were to establish rules for international competitions, to verify and publish world records, and to direct The inter-war years 61 Olympic swimming events. It might be assumed that the ASA, as the first national swimming governing body, would have had an advantage over other FINA members but the primacy of the ASA actually resulted in a degree of intransigence and arrogance among amateur aficionados of the sport. While professional coaches worldwide were employing innovative approaches to both stroke development and training, ASA officials remained entrenched in their distrust of coaching, training and new initiatives in technique. Although the front crawl was quickly adopted in America and Australia, the ASA insisted on retaining the much slower trudgen, both within its teacher certification structure and in its educational material. Part of this intransigence was the traditionalism of officials proud of the English position as initiators of organized swimming and resentful of foreign developments. The outcome was that the competitiveness of British swimmers declined rapidly. Early in 1922 the ASA appointed a special sub-committee, which included a leading British swimming coach of the period, W.J. Howcroft, to consider failures at Antwerp and the best way to prepare for 1924. The sub-committee concluded that the chief causes of international decline were that Britain had not adopted modern developments in swimming strokes and that there was a lack of competent instructors. They proposed the universal adoption of the ASA scholarship scheme, as initiated in 1913, the demonstration of modern swimming strokes by expert swimmers in centres throughout the country, and a drive to persuade public authorities to appoint swimming instructors who held the ASA teacher’s certificate. The committee recognized that there was little prospect of financial assistance towards the cost of training and sending a team to Paris so they suggested inaugurating a swimmers’‘one-million-penny fund’ supplemented by galas and social functions.15

Athletics and the Decies Commission The dichotomy between traditionalists and progressives over coaching in athletics presaged a British Olympic Association (BOA) special commission, appointed to take ‘evidence on matters of far-reaching importance to the athletic future of the country’, in late 1923. The constitution of the committee, which sat daily for a fortnight under chairmanship of Lord Decies, reﬂected the core membership of the BOA and it was agreed that evidence should be taken from coaches, athletes and administrators.16

Professional coaches Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 The commission interviewed a number of professional coaches, starting with the sixty-year-old Ernest Hjertberg, Swedish by birth but a naturalized American, whose career had included coaching both the Swedish and Dutch national teams. Hjertberg assumed that a chief coach would be appointed and that, since athletic potential was so scattered, he would be supported by assistant coaches. After being instructed by the chief coach these assistants would carry out their duties wherever the best athletes lived. The commission was concerned about conflict with coaches who had different methods, but Hjertberg suggested that the chief coach should use his judgement in working with coaches, not changing anything without good 62 The inter-war years reason. If he was appointed to this role, he would travel around the country keeping in continuous touch with the coaches. He then outlined a proposed programme. For the next month he would have athletes concentrate on their techniques, especially in the field events, before taking a month-and-a-half of rest. They would recommence work on 15 January, doing the same sort of preparatory work as before the break on about three days a week, and easy work would be carried on for about two months before starting intensive training. This would give at least one month for preparation before the County and District championships. The commission questioned the notion of winter training and struggled to see how working men could train to this extent, particularly if Sundays were involved. Commission members also exposed other amateur concerns. Surely a more intelligent athlete could be developed more quickly, and was specialization essential in producing an Olympic athlete? When asked whether the Olympic athlete was the product of training or was ‘one of nature’s aristocrats’, Hjertberg replied that all but one of his athletes had been ‘hand-made champions’ who had been successful through perseverance and coaching.17 The British professionals interviewed had much less to say than Hjertberg, although whether this was the result of their ongoing master–servant relationship with commission members or the way in which the minutes chose to record them is hard to say. Alec Nelson, then coach to Cambridge University, thought that there should be centres established around the country with coaches at each. He suggested a system of having registered trainers and educating them up to the chief coach’s standard, although some might be unhappy about having their work supervised.18 Bill Thomas, who was at that stage coaching the Royal Air Force, struggled to give any real advice and revealed his relationship to commission members by using ‘Sir’ in his replies. When asked what he thought about another professional being appointed as a ‘super-coach’ he replied that ‘if he could teach me anything. I am always ready to learn’. Thomas believed it was difficult for a professional coach to earn his living in Britain and that a professional should be paid ‘about £6 or £8 a week, according to his ability, and if a man gave his whole time to it’.19 Sam Mussabini was also much less insightful than might have been expected given that the commission recorded his ‘wide experience as a trainer’. He was not amenable to the idea of having to negotiate with an ‘expert coach’,since‘He would probably be in conflict with my ideas. No doubt he would hold strong opinions of his own, as he should and I too hold strong opinions and I think we should clash’.He 20

Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 would listen to his views on ﬁeld events but only ‘if he were a gentleman’.

Athletes The commission interviewed both past and present athletes. Joe Binks, a previous mile record holder, thought there was enough work for a professional trainer but he was ‘rather afraid of a foreigner’ and considered that employing a foreigner would be unfair to British coaches like Nelson.21 Albert Hill, the current British mile record holder, coached by Mussabini and now a professional coach, was asked if British athletes would be prepared to undergo so ‘organized system of training as The inter-war years 63 in force in the United States, Sweden and other countries’ and replied that an ambitious athlete would do anything he was told. When asked if he would accept advice from someone like Nelson or Harry Andrews, he said that an athlete should normally listen to his own coach but, if his coach thought the head coach’s methods were better, then he would follow that advice. Hill would not put himself ‘under a foreigner however good he was because his ideas would be entirely different from mine’,22 but British high jump record holder B. Howard Baker had learned a lot from Walter Knox, the Canadian coach appointed by the AAA in 1914, and said that a good coach, irrespective of his nationality, would always be accepted by most athletes. When asked if his own coach would take instructions from another, ‘superior coach’, Baker was sure he would be happy to do anything he could.23 Percy Hodge, winner of the steeplechase at Antwerp, recommended that a ﬁrst-class coach be engaged immediately but he thought that amateur trainers might be best and he agreed with instituting an Advisory Board if professionals were to be engaged.24 This perspective found another supporter in P.J. Baker, team captain from Antwerp, who considered coaches ‘good but not essential’ and proposed structural ways to ‘do away with undesirable professional training’. He went on to argue for the appointment of a ‘small committee of amateurs’ who had sufﬁcient ‘time to give to the task of supervising the general work of any local trainers and of the chief trainer’.25

Administrators The athletics administrators interviewed had a variety of perspectives on the need for a chief coach. Eckersley, from Manchester, thought that amateur trainers would readily accept the advice of an expert professional although, like the majority of interviewees, he believed that a chief coach should not interfere with the athlete or his trainer but just set general guidelines. He agreed with commission members that a well-trained ‘educated’ man with wide world experience would be a better Director of Athletics than a professional coach like Nelson.26 David Scott Duncan, from the Scottish AAA, said a chief coach with comprehensive knowledge should be appointed to supervise coaching throughout Britain,27 while Bert Ives was in favour of having a ‘super-coach’ who would co-operate with club coaches and be readily accepted if he were ‘of the right type’, although much would depend on his personality.28 In contrast, W.W. Alexander, from Birchﬁeld Harriers, thought ‘no trainer in the world can teach what a man can ﬁnd out himself’ and he would

Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 not recommend a professional trainer, although he exempted Nelson because he had ‘practically sprung up from the amateur ranks’.29 A. Fattorini, an AAA vice president, agreed, saying that the Northern Counties Athletics Association (NCAA) already had capable coaches and trainers who were, ‘if not entirely honorary, very nearly’ and he did not think a super-coach necessary.30

Amateur coaches and medical men Leading amateur coach, A.B. George, believed that centres should be established in the main towns and a chief coach, who had a ‘comprehensive knowledge of 64 The inter-war years field events’, engaged to implement a centrally organized plan. Although he would meet opposition, he should get the coaches together, to help them work ‘in harmony’, and not interfere with a coach if he found he was doing well, even if his methods were different. Commission members were keen on ‘a man of education, tact and an expert knowledge of sport’ and George was asked whether a professional trainer would be as good as a gentleman amateur. Could he ‘talk to the men and get their sympathy in the same way as a man of their own class could’? George thought it better to have a ‘man of education’ if possible but, if professional coaches were employed, they could be supervised by an Advisory Committee.31 The traditional amateur perspective was articulated most clearly by Dr Adolphe Abrahams, founder member of the Athletes Advisory Club in 1911 and medical adviser to the British team in 1912, who emphasized the influence of tradition in Britain and the existence of class distinctions that were not present in America or in Europe. He accepted that a few working-class athletes were gentlemen by nature, but the ‘usual type is uncultured, with unpleasant mannerisms, and it is nauseating for the gentleman to mix with that type’. Adolphe also sympathized with those not willing to try field events since ‘that sort of specialisation is a most tedious and uninteresting business’. On the question of whether it would be better to appoint a man of the ‘Varsity type’ as an athletic director or to employ a chief coach like Hjertberg or Nelson, he was unequivocal. Speaking ‘in confidence’, he said of both men that it was ‘difficult to say whether their ignorance or their conceit is the greater. Certainly I have never found that they possess any of the knowledge they are credited with’. An amateur type would be preferable and, although his athletic attainments were important, ‘Iwouldnotomitpersonality and education, as one is accustomed to do’.32 The work of the commission came to an abrupt conclusion after it learnt with ‘surprise and regret’ that its status had been questioned and its members agreed that their proceedings should be formalized before continuing.33 At a subsequent BOA meeting it was decided that

the action taken by the Chairman of the BOA with regard to the Commission be now conﬁrmed by the Council, that a report on the evidence already taken on Athletics be submitted, and that no further evidence be taken by the Commission except at the request of the Council.34

Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 While it is unclear why BOA members decided to terminate the commission’s activities there were signs in the AAA minutes from January 1924 that athletics administrators may not have been entirely happy with their sport being publically discussed by an organization other than their own.35

Paris and beyond Athletics received £2,250 from the BOA in 1924,36 enabling the AAA to consider engaging trainers, still something of a contentious issue since an NCAA meeting in September 1923 had resolved that ‘The committee is not in favour of The inter-war years 65 professional coaches’.37 The AAA proposed that professional trainer Harry Andrews should be engaged at Crystal Palace while amateur coach, A.B. George, should go to the White City. A field events coach should be appointed at each ground and a ‘first-class coach for field events’ should be engaged immediately on a long-term basis while district associations were asked to appoint honorary advisors who would meet periodically with coaches and honorary coaches. In January 1924, it was agreed to appoint Andrews until the Paris Games for £7 a week and, in February, the AAA agreed terms with A.B. George for him to act as an honorary coach and to deliver ‘lantern lectures’ around the country.38 Their major concern was to find a suitable field events coach. The direction the Decies commission had taken in the questioning of Hjertberg hints at an interest among BOA members in engaging him for the Games, an interpretation reinforced by an Observer article which recalled that there had been an opportunity to secure the services of one of the ‘greatest coaches on earth’ for a reasonable sum but the chance had been allowed to pass.39 Irrespective of whether or not this was referring to Hjertberg, the AAA clearly lacked a field events expert and, for some reason, they were not particularly keen on allowing F.A.M. Webster, founder of the Amateur Field Events Association, to fill the gap. He declined their request to act as honorary field events coach at the White City and Crystal Palace, and when he subsequently asked to be appointed honorary field events coach for the British team the committee were ‘unable to entertain his proposal’.40 Some Decies Commission members had recommended Sergeant Starkey, champion weight putter and hammer thrower of Scotland, and, after receiving permission for his appointment from the army, and with the support of the BOA, the AAA earmarked £100 for his expenses, and added a gratuity of £50.41 The Observer was not convinced the right men had been selected, arguing that the quality of British coaches and masseurs was poor in comparison with the men of ‘standing or education’ seen abroad and that ‘it would not be a national disgrace to employ a foreigner’. Since amateurs did not have enough time to devote to coaching, a professional chief coach and assistant coaches should be appointed to tour the country, a system that had been successful in Europe.42 Nevertheless, the die was cast and the AAA subsequently took some of these men with the team to Paris. Athletics trainers Andrews, Claydon, McKerchar, Parrish, Starkey and Wright, each paid £7 per week, were accompanied by masseurs Battley, Johannson and Smith, who each received a gratuity of £10. A.B. George and J.F. Wadmore went

Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 as team manager and assistant team manager respectively, while Captain J.G. Skeet from the RAF attended as medical adviser.43 In Paris, Britain finished fourth in the medal standings and had only nine Olympic champions as compared with fifteen at Antwerp. Disappointing performances led to a degree of self-analysis and some limited attempts to address these issues, with the AAA immediately proposing the introduction of a scheme of honorary coaches so that Games preparation could take place over three or four years rather than a few months.44 Gerald Ellison, who had been encouraged by the success of an Australian training centre, called for a similar venture to be adopted in Britain in 1927, observing that athletes who worked with a professional coach 66 The inter-war years performed significantly better than those that did not.45 Later that year, the AAA decided that it would be sensible to have a special trainer for the marathon competitors for Amsterdam but it was not considered advisable to appoint a chief coach and they delayed making a decision about trainers.46 Bill Thomas was subsequently appointed as marathon trainer and it was proposed to take five paid masseurs, including Johansson, Wright, Smith and Battley, who had all been in Paris. As to coaching, Webster wrote to the AAA Olympic committee but there is no record of what he said and whether or not there was any discussion about his comments.47 Between Amsterdam in 1928 and Los Angeles in 1932, the ASA called for a voluntary fund to be established for the purpose of coaching and training, to be administered by a special coaching committee.48 Commentators of the period, though, remained critical of British swimming standards. Shimmin pointed out that other nations were demonstrating ‘greater earnestness, determination and application’ and blamed failures on the continuing use of strokes ‘which our fathers developed’ while overseas swimmers had evolved strokes which resulted in ‘greater progress for less expenditure of energy’.49 For Collins, the level of technique in Britain was ‘a great deal farther below championship form in swimming than in other sports where coaching pertains’ and he blamed both the ASA, for their insistence on standardized stroke teaching, and British coaches, ‘even men of experience and reputation’, for enforcing the ASA standard style.50 Their pessimism appears justified given ongoing failures in Amsterdam and in Los Angeles, when Britain won only two bronze medals in the pool, and two gold, four silver and two bronze medals on the track. Both National Governing Bodies (NGBs) had decided not to take a coach and there was only one masseur for each of the athletics and swimming teams.

Coaching debates Much of the discussion over coaching in this period remained framed within the context of the tensions between British and American systems. Results from the 1924 tennis season suggested that America, who had won the Davis Cup for ﬁve successive years, looked likely to hold on to it indeﬁnitely. The British game had not improved and was unlikely to do so since its methods of training promising young players appeared to be ineffective, although plans were in place to produce players who would reach their peak in their early twenties, as they did in America.51 Comparing

Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 English and American athletic potential in 1925, one reporter noted that British schools were far behind similar institutions in America, where they ‘take as much trouble over teaching the right technique of track and field events as we do over coaching young cricketers’. Great athletes were ‘born and made’ and even the best British youths would have to acquire technique before they could hold their own with the mass-produced Americans. The trouble with American coaches was that they crushed individuality by adopting a set of hard-and-fast conventions to turn out athletes who all did the same thing in the same way. British schoolboys could surpass their transatlantic rivals, provided their natural gifts were not ‘sacrificed to the craze for uniformity of method’.52 An Observer correspondent, writing in The inter-war years 67 1927, rejected the notion that Britain was in decline but accepted that British pre- eminence in international sport had now been superseded by American. While other nations took their sport more seriously, the fact that Britain had yet to win the athletic section of an Olympiad was no cause for alarm. This was not due to the quality of the raw material but a function of a lack of facilities and coaching.53 Other observers were less muted in their comments. Immediately after Paris, one attributed American successes to their ‘elaborate training quarters’, staffed by a ‘caste of men who specialized on training’, but questioned if it was worthwhile to study ‘athletic arts’ to this extent. In Britain, ‘when we are soundly trounced at some game or another, it is a real explanation, if not an excuse, that we play too many games well to be able to play any one game supremely well’. The truth was that ‘we play more games than other people and play them more light-heartedly’.54 Another noted in 1928 that American athletes were overtrained and that British athletes did ‘not submit to a kindred servitude and never will’.55 In April 1931, however, Sir Harold Bowden, chairman of the BOA, said that the time had come to end Britain’s insular attitude towards international sport and to recognize that Britain would only retain the respect of the world for its sportsmanship if it made sportsmanship mean the ability to win as well as the ability to lose. Those people trying to excuse failures by saying that the Americans took their sports too seriously were adopting ‘a most unsporting attitude’ and he criticized the universities for their failure to encourage field events.56

Athletics coaching scheme, 1933–1936 Despite differences of opinion, it was apparent after Los Angeles that if improvements were to be achieved in British athletics then some form of proactive intervention was required. In 1933, individuals within the AAA, most notably Harold Abrahams and E.A. Montague, developed the idea of creating an ‘annual school of athletics science’. Prompted by Webster, the AAA decided that a body of amateur coaches was required, so they developed a two-week Summer School in connection with Lough- borough College in 1934. Webster, who went on to establish the School of Athletics, Games and Physical Education at Loughborough in 1936,57 and Montague were appointed as organizers and the school was made available to both ‘active athletes and would-be coaches’. Around 160 athletes attended the ﬁrst course, including Geoffrey Dyson, who would go on to become national athletics coach, and Armas

Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 Valste, a Finn who later coached the 1936 Finnish Olympic team, agreed to attend as head coach without payment, apart from travel expenses. It subsequently became accepted policy to invite foreign coaches to lead the Summer School and other notable individuals included Franz Stampfl (Austria), Pierre Lewden (France), Johannes Viljoen (South Africa) and Jaako Mikkola (Finland). Each year they would teach techniques to schoolmasters, directors of physical training and athletes, in an attempt to develop a body of amateur coaches who could ‘diffuse expert knowledge throughout the country’.58 Given that many officials involved in this initiative held deep-rooted beliefs about coaching and amateurism, it was somewhat surprising that the use of coaches, particularly foreign coaches, was so 68 The inter-war years well supported, although each coach only received expenses and they remained under the direct control of amateur administrators for the duration of the course, thus not posing any threat to the AAA’s authority. Despite the success of the early Schools, the AAA were aware that immediate improvements were not to be expected and accepted that it would be at least five years before the full benefits of the programme would be realized.59

The Berlin Olympics During the 1930s, governments overseas clearly recognized the value of sport as a means of demonstrating national prestige and of forging international relationships. In 1931, the French government donated £240,000 to the French national sports development scheme, which helped ensure the continued success of athletes such as middle-distance runner Jules Ladoumegue and swimmer Jean Taris.60 The British Foreign Office saw some sports, particularly football, as a potential diplomatic tool, but this did not necessarily apply to the Olympics. Responding to an enquiry from the Spanish Embassy asking if Britain would be participating in Berlin, H.S. Seymour from the Foreign Office replied that this was entirely in the hands of the BOA, ‘a private organisation with whom His Majesty’s Government have no connexion, and there is no question of any official patronage or assistance (financial or otherwise) being given to British teams participating’.61 Other nations had no such reservations and staging the Games in 1936 provided Germany with an opportunity for diplomatic and political credibility. Having established a number of training and coaching initiatives, Germany headed the medal table with thirty-three gold medals, followed by America, which secured twenty-four, while Britain only achieved five. The Daily Express observed that ‘our athletes have been left as far behind as a donkey’stail’,whileThe Observer recorded that Britain had been ‘outstripped’ by Germany, America, France, Italy and Japan, and even ‘lesser’ nations such as Finland, Sweden and Hungary. They had ‘licked us hollow, what was worse, they made us look ridiculous’. British training and coaching methods came under scrutiny from those who regarded British performances as ‘lamentable, not because our luck was out, but because the majority of our representatives were not good enough’. Athletes needed to train harder for a longer period of time and to a level which would allow them to cope with the strenuous nature of Olympic events. Echoes of previous post-Games comments

Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 resurfaced, with the Daily Express urging that Britain should abandon the Olym- pics if men ‘cannot train for them properly, and view them with the necessary seriousness’.62 Apologists for the British team offered a range of excuses covering every facet of performance while carefully avoiding criticizing the sporting system. Other nations’ athletes had arrived six to eight weeks before the Games while the British went only four days beforehand, and their accommodation had been fifteen miles from the city centre, although this conveniently ignored the fact that other countries had been similarly housed. The key explanation, however, was that other nation- alities employed different interpretations of the amateur definition, and supporters The inter-war years 69 pointed out that ‘our own particular amalgam of work and play expressed a better philosophy of life than those other codes which have reaped superior honours at Berlin’. British athletes had not infringed amateur rules and performed as a ‘gentleman’ should, which was more than could be said for countries whose athletes enjoyed government subsidies enabling them to train longer and more intensely. Foreign athletes ‘kept by their governments’ clearly had an advantage over British competitors who had to treat the Games as their summer holidays and take unpaid leave.63 Although the BOA report for 1936 conceded that devoting more time to specialist training would improve standards it also queried whether this would ‘demonstrate anything of national importance’.64 Remaining true to the belief that the ‘dear ol’ game is the thing that matters, and that results … are not of our concern’ might not ensure success as it once had but it would guarantee that British sport remained amateur and ‘dignified’.65

Coaching schemes Following Berlin, German successes were widely attributed to the ‘Strength through Joy’ movement, initiated by the Nazi party to try and improve the overall fitness of the nation,66 and these Games highlighted more than ever concerns over the poor level of fitness in Britain. Fears were raised not only regarding athletes but also about the quality of British soldiers, leading to the passing of the Physical Training and Recreation Act in 1937, an attempt to improve and maintain the physical state of the nation that also had an indirect impact on the level and quality of British coaching. A National Fitness Council (NFC) was established to meet the requirements of the Act with the aim of providing financial assistance for sporting organizations, who were invited to submit applications for the education of their teachers and physical training leaders.67

Athletics Soon after the formation of the NFC, in March 1937, the AAA submitted their proposals, which repeatedly highlighted that ‘exercise for the multitude, rather than competition for the specialist’ was their underpinning rationale. If they were provided with the means to develop a ‘National Training College’ the AAA guaranteed that ‘qualiﬁed instructors’ would be situated throughout the country to 68

Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 ‘disseminate’ coaching and technical knowledge. It was argued that this ‘national scheme of instruction would be of great benefit’ not only to elite athletes but also to the multitude, because ‘any game is more enjoyable when played properly’.69 The early organization of the NFC appears to have been somewhat haphazard because they failed to respond until October, at which point they requested that a fully prepared proposal be delivered within a week. The AAA Committee, not a group that welcomed direction from others, responded accordingly, demanding that more consideration be paid to them in the future and arguing that it was ‘hardly reasonable to expect a comprehensive national scheme to be produced at two days’ notice’.70 Working to their own timescale, they 70 The inter-war years undertook a survey to assess the current status of British athletics coaching in order to inform their planning, and established that there were only seventeen paid coaches operating in England and Wales, equating to one coach for every 200 athletes wanting personal coaching. Even though over 3,000 individuals declared a desire to learn how to coach on a voluntary basis, the responses stressed just how serious the situation had become. Clubs repeatedly highlighted the lack of facilities for field events and the lack of tracks in many cities. The survey responses were ‘sufficient testimony to the demand for coaching’, and persuaded the AAA to submit an application to the NFC on 8 June 1938 requesting grant-aid for the employment of three full-time paid coaches, plus an organizer, to teach running and field events and to train others ‘likely to become coaches’.71 On 21 July 1938, the NFC awarded the AAA a grant to enable them to ‘appoint a full time organiser to stimulate interest in physical training and recreation’ but held back on granting the request for coaches because the NFC considered that it was ‘scarcely one of the purposes of the Act to train budding Olympic champions’!72 Deliberation over the grant to appoint coaches continued while the AAA acted to engage an organizer by advertising in the Daily Telegraph. After receiving multiple applications, six individuals were selected for interview and C.F.R. Hilton was subsequently appointed at £450 per annum.73 Hilton was twenty-nine years old and had considerable experience in the ‘organisation of all types of recreational work’ having previously been involved in the physical education department at Loughborough College.74 His referees included J.W. Bridgeman, head of the Loughborough Summer School, who acknowledged Hilton as ‘a man of good speech and attractive personality’. Although Hilton lacked any extensive knowledge of physical training or athletics, Bridgeman noted that, ‘as these are of secondary importance to you, I can recommend him’.75 Apparently Hilton was well-known to both the AAA and NFC committees so, while he may not have been the most qualified candidate, he was probably selected because he was sympathetic to their approach and likely to be amenable to accepting the master–servant relationship required by the NGB. Eventually, the NFC were satisfied that the AAA scheme aligned itself to their ideals and a grant for 75 per cent of the salaries of three coaches was agreed on the basis that they would visit local clubs and schools and ‘pass on enough of their own knowledge to some among those they teach to enable these in their turn to instruct their fellow members on an amateur basis’.76 The AAA then tried to

Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 negotiate a larger grant, arguing that the newly appointed coaches could not only be employed to train honorary coaches but could also be used at the Loughbor- ough Summer School, but the NFC refused to allocate more money. Somewhat begrudgingly, the initial offer was accepted by the AAA, although it soon declared that it could not afford to appoint three coaches at £450 per head, even though it would only be required to cover 25 per cent of each salary. In the end, they decided to appoint three coaches, but at a reduced salary of £300 per annum, although the scheme was revised again in February 1939 after the AAA had made such a substantial loss in 1938 that they could no longer afford to appoint coaches in the Midlands and the North, which would have to finance any coaches The inter-war years 71 themselves, leaving only a position in the South to be filled immediately. Reflecting the ongoing influence of traditional amateur attitudes, Hilton suggested at this point that, instead of appointing professional coaches, students of the Loughbor- ough Summer School could be used as voluntary coaches with each coach servicing four clubs and the association paying them a maximum of £2 per week to cover expenses.77 After receiving few applications for the professional coaching position in the South, it was decided to appoint Franz Stampfl, a twenty-nine-year-old Austrian who had been a successful athlete until he decided to take up coaching in 1934. He had been involved in the Loughborough Summer School and had taken various coaching positions throughout the country, where he had given ‘complete satisfaction’.78 The quality of his coaching attributes was well-known within the AAA and made him an ideal candidate, but the appointment of a foreign coach was not universally popular. Henry Pelham, a member of the NFC Committee, stated ‘I do not much like the idea of the appointment of an Austrian refugee to a post the salary of which will be mainly found from Government funds’ and declared that he would prefer the appointment of an Englishman.79 Fearful of the matter being raised in Parliament, Captain Lionel Ellis contacted two former Olympic athletes and now MPs, Lord Burghley and Phillip Noel-Baker, to solicit their views on appointing a foreigner.80 Both men agreed that Stampfl was ‘more likely to be satisfactory’ than any British coach, stressing that the only alternative would be Alec Nelson, who was currently employed at Cambridge, although he was nearly seventy and had not applied for the position.81 Although the NFC was ‘surprised to find that we have no British coach really capable’,itfinally agreed to allow the appointment of Stampfl.82 The uneasiness surrounding Stampfl’s appointment soon became irrelevant when, as the threat of war became apparent, the ‘Security People’ expressed a ‘serious objection to Mr. Stampfl being employed by the Amateur Athletic Association as their principal coach’ not only because he might be required to visit ‘Service Depots’ but also because they had doubts regarding his coaching credentials.83 At the outbreak of war, Stampfl was interned and then sent to Australia (eventually returning to Britain in 194684) and attempts to establish a national coaching scheme were put on hold.85

Swimming

Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 Sir Henry Pelham wrote to Alderman Harold Fern (ASA Honorary Secretary, 1921–1970, and FINA President, 1936–1948) on 21 October 1937 indicating that grant-aid would soon be available to enable the ASA to ‘appoint a whole-time organiser to go about the country gingering things up’ and asking that, if the ASA were thinking about putting in an application, then they let him know quickly so that it could be raised at the next meeting of the sub-committee.86 It is not clear why he wrote to the ASA directly, particularly when there is no evidence that suggests this was done for other sports, but Fern was an active member of the NFC Advisory Council and had a number of contacts within the NFC. Fern responded only four days later, indicating that, ‘for some time past I have been 72 The inter-war years working on a scheme for submission to the Grants Committee’ and he began formalizing plans for an official application.87 As with the AAA proposals, the aim was to ‘create swimmers, not would-be champions’, so, after becoming a ‘competent swimmer, he or she would no longer be eligible for instruction’. While it was hoped that once an individual had been taught to swim they would join local clubs this was ‘not the purpose of the scheme’.88 The ASA believed that the ‘appointment of a whole-time paid organiser would be of great assistance in spreading the cult of swimming’, so much so that they suggested that two organizers should be appointed, one for the North and one for the South. Although the ASA valued its amateur tradition, it was clear that, coupled with a lack of finance, this philosophy had significantly impacted on the scale of work they had been able to accomplish and Fern emphasized how ‘over-worked’ the ASA officials were as a result of their working on a purely honorary basis.89 The NFC recognized that providing financial support could improve the situation but declared they were unable to authorize grant-aid for two organizers, because they had to ‘adhere to the practice which they had followed in other cases’,so they offered funding of £450 a year for one individual.90 Fern argued that, during discussions prior to the grant allocation, there had been no suggestion that it would not be awarded and that it had been unanimously agreed that ‘the work contemplated was much too heavy for one organiser, and that two was the minimum to warrant the Association embarking on the scheme with any expectation of success’. The ASA, interpreting the NFC offer as a lack of ‘sufficient confidence in the ASA Committee’s knowledge and experience’, then ‘regrettably’ decided to reject the offer and agreed that there was ‘no point in troubling the Board further on the matter’ because it appeared that neither party was willing to compromise.91 Somewhat irritated, the NFC replied that, ‘there was never any lack of confidence in the ASA’ and that they were merely following procedure because, until a scheme had proved its worth, they would not be justified in providing further grant-aid. They also added that ‘other bodies have found it possible to start with one officer’ and that, to date, the ASA was the ‘only organisation so far to reject … help’.92 At the next meeting of the Grants Committee, in December 1937, Fern took the opportunity to again protest against the committee’s refusal to fund two organizers. Although he was ‘not seeking to re-open the matter’ it was clear he was trying to provoke a reaction from the committee when he suggested that the ASA ‘only sought to help forward the work which the National Fitness Council

Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 was formed to undertake’. Fern argued that swimming was potentially of greater value than other sports so financial support should be more forthcoming, and he reiterated that ‘all the officials work in an honorary capacity and there is no paid staff as in the case of a good many other governing bodies of sport’. Although he was in favour of helping other sports, he suggested that, because the circumstances and opportunities were different among NGBs, the NFC’s ‘rule of thumb attitude’ which argued against a second organizer because no other NGB had been granted one, was inappropriate.93 The committee noted the NFC ‘attach the greatest importance to the development of swimming along with other sports and are very sorry to think that we are not to co-operate to the fullest The inter-war years 73 extent with the Amateur Swimming Association’. Although they agreed that some amount of ‘elasticity’ was desirable when considering applications they were not willing to compromise on the decision they had made but would consider the matter again at a later stage.94 Encouraged by this, the ASA decided to submit a further application in March 1938 to enable them to establish training centres and classes leading to the ASA certificate, which would be open to amateurs and professionals alike.95 Once again it was claimed that two organizers were needed and, following much discussion and indecision, the committee eventually agreed.96 The NFC was willing to contribute ‘up to £450 a year each in the case of a man or £350 for a woman’ as well as £150 a year towards travelling expenses. However, they were only willing to offer a grant up until the end of March 1939 (less than a year) and the organizers would be required to submit reports describing, in detail, the work they had carried out so that the committee could monitor their activities.97 A sum of £300 per annum had also been awarded towards the ASA’s headquarters’ administrative expenses but the committee declared that this was ‘contingent on the appointment of the two proposed organisers’.98 Fern was less than satisfied, pointing out that the appointments would ‘take some time to arrange’ and that the administration expenses of the ASA had increased considerably because of the activities of the NFC.99 In response, the NFC explained that because it had recently changed its policy, thereby allowing the ASA funding for two organizers, it was necessary to attach conditions to the grants for headquarters expenses. The grants were ‘intended to cover the increased work which the newly appointed organiser would create if he were doing his job properly’ and, therefore, ‘one half of the … grant would begin with each of the two organisers’. However, it was suggested that if the ASA ‘did not feel satisfied with the conditions attached’ they should submit a case in writing so that it could be re-considered and, in the end, the NFC com- promised observing that the ‘special situation of the ASA renders it desirable to make some concession’.100 It was agreed that two-thirds of the administrative grant would start from the May 1, 1938 and the remaining one-third would be payable upon the appointment of the organizers.101 In June 1938, the NFC was informed that Miss Molly Laxton Lloyd had been appointed for the North of England and Miss Elaine Frances Burton for the South. The appointment of women was unusual, not only for the time period but also because no women had been appointed in a coaching or organizing position

Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 by any other governing body to date. It was emphasized by the ASA that ‘people of the right type and quality are obviously not attracted by an appointment for such a limited period’, although women may have been selected because this would cost less.102 Burton was thirty-four years old and held a diploma in teaching but, while she possessed ‘time certificates of the ASA’, there is no mention in her application that she held any swim coaching or teaching certificates. It was also noted that she had been unemployed, that she wanted to utilize her time efficiently, and that she did not want to accept ‘minor posts’. There is no suggestion that she had much experience in swimming from either a coaching or administrative perspective, but it can be assumed that the ASA believed that she had transferable skills 74 The inter-war years from her previous achievements as an athlete.103 Laxton, on the other hand, could be considered somewhat more qualified since the thirty-five-year-old held a Physical Training Diploma and an Advanced Teacher’s Certificate for the ASA.104 This qualification had emerged in 1919 as part of a reform to the Professional Certifi- cate, first introduced in 1899 when there had been difficulty in securing enough amateurs to take up teaching roles and the ASA had conceded that ‘professional teachers were necessary for the widespread propagation of swimming’. By introducing certification, professional teachers and coaches could be regulated and monitored by amateur administrators.105 The first report that Burton sent to the NFC Committee highlighted a ‘crying need … for leaders’, noting that, although the ‘enthusiasm is there’, individuals’ contributions were restricted for financial reasons.106 Burton and the ASA proposed that six courses should be developed around the country so that those interested in voluntary service could ‘improve their own swimming, learn the art of imparting it to others and thus enable the clubs who have not the means to provide their own coach to have equal advantages with others better off than themselves’. Individuals ‘would contribute to the cost according to their ability, but nobody would be debarred’, and it was hoped that the remaining costs would be covered by a grant from the NFC. It was intended that the course would last for six months and each candidate would attend one night per week. On completion it was envisaged that every attendee would have gained the ASA Teacher’s Certificate and the Bronze Medallion and Intermediate Certificate from the Royal Life Saving Society.107 The NFC Grants Committee clearly saw the benefitof running such courses and agreed to provide a grant of £300.108 The NFC was so satisfied with the work of both Burton and Lloyd that, after three months of service, they agreed to extend the grant for their salaries until March 1940.109 They also proposed to Fern that they would be willing to offer a 75 per cent grant towards the employment of a full-time coach so that a contingent of honorary coaches could be produced along similar lines to those seen in other sports such as the AAA.110 Fern was cautious, suggesting that the ASA would not be able to raise the remaining 25 per cent of the salary and the required travelling expenses because they ‘were already finding it difficult’ to cover the cost of the organizers, even though ‘by employing two women organisers, we are spending less in salaries than was authorised had men organisers been engaged’.111 With respect to the appointment of a full-time professional coach, the ASA con- 112

Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 cluded, while this might be desirable, it had no funds available, an issue faced by so many amateur NGBs during this period. In the end, of course, these problems were inconsequential because, with the outbreak of the war in 1939, the country was placed in a state of ‘National Emergency’ and all grants offered under the Physical Training and Recreation Act were terminated.113

Conclusion Despite the continuing decline of British sporting performances in the inter-war period, partly because British athletes were now no longer able to contend with The inter-war years 75 the coaching and training techniques being utilized in other countries, British sporting administrators still felt they had little to learn from foreign coaches and athletes. Even though British athletics was willing to accept some input from foreigners, the foreigners’ advice appeared to have little impact on the organization of British sport, and administrators continued to organize sport in the way they had become accustomed to, along amateur lines. These factors, coupled with the state of British society following the war in 1918 and the general indifference of the British public regarding issues surrounding sport, did not create an environment which was conducive to the development and formalization of British coaching throughout this period. While the First World War undoubtedly had an impact, the virulence of the debate surrounding coaching proposals suggests that any new initiatives were never going to remain uncontested. For the rest of the twentieth century, amateur values continued to take precedence over any residual coaching legacy left by the post- Stockholm initiatives, demonstrating just how fragile that legacy had been and emphasizing the power of resistance inherent among those who adhered to traditional perspectives. Despite the fact that the pre- and inter-war periods saw a marked increase in coaching utilization and availability around the globe, particularly with regards to Olympic competition, British sport continued to align itself to the principles of volunteerism and amateurism, and professional coaches continually struggled to gain acceptance. Although poor performances in 1936 finally stimulated the adoption of additional coaching support in both swimming and athletics, British administrators remained wary of its full integration because these methods implied a shift towards the American system and greater specialization. On the positive side, there were signs that government anxieties over national fitness and concerns over the military threat posed by Germany were leading to a greater involvement in sport and that this was having an indirect impact on coaching. However, although the gradual integration of coaching schemes might be seen as indicating an acceptance of greater professionalization and specialization in British sport, it needs to be remembered that the rationale behind these programmes was to create a contingent of honorary coaches rather than to improve the standard of Olympic athletes. This approach appeared to satisfy NGBs because it ensured that professional coaches would remain under their jurisdiction, and the volunteers associated with these organizations continued to exert significant control over the way in which coaching developments unfolded. This was summed up neatly by Oxbridge man Bevil Rudd in 1938

Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 when he praised the work of amateur coaches who ‘nobly tackled the spade-work that an army of paid coaches undertake in America and on the Continent’.114

Notes 1 Arthur Marwick, Britain in the Century of Total War: War Peace and Social Change 1900–1967 (Middlesex: Penguin Books Ltd, 1968), 62; Niall Johnson, Britain and the 1918–1919 Influenza Pandemic: A Dark Epilogue (Oxon: Routledge, 2006), 2. 2 Mike Huggins, ‘Sport and the Upper Classes: Introduction’, Sport in History 28, no. 3 (2008): 357. 3 Marwick, Britain in the Century of Total War, 170, 179. 76 The inter-war years 4 Mike Huggins and Jack Williams, Sport and the English, 1918–1939 (Oxon: Routle- dge, 2006), 4; Jay Winter, ‘“Lost Generation” of the First World War’, Population Studies 31, no. 3 (1977): 449. 5 Dave Day, ‘The “English Athlete Is Born Not Made”: Coaching, Amateurism, and Training in Britain 1912–1914’. Presentation at Sport and Leisure on the Eve of the First World War symposium, MMU Cheshire, June 27 and 28, 2014. 6 Huggins and Williams, Sport and the English, 75. 7 Ernest Charles Buley, ‘Sport Snobbery: More of it since the War’, Northern Advocate, January 31, 1920, 4. 8 Alan P. Dobson, Anglo-American Relations in the Twentieth Century: Of Friendship, Conflict and the Rise and Decline of Superpowers (London: Routledge, 1995), 43. 9 Barbara Keys, ‘Spreading Peace, Democracy, and Coca Cola: Sport and American Cultural Expansion in the 1930s’, Diplomatic History 28 (2004): 165–196. 10 F.A.M. Webster, ‘Scientific Application of Brains to Sport’, Baily’s Magazine of Sport and Pastimes, 710 (October 1919): 163. 11 Scotsman, August 26, 1920, 6. 12 Manchester Guardian, August 10, 1921, 9; May 16, 1922, 5. 13 Observer, August 7, 1921, 15. 14 Observer, April 27, 1924, 22. 15 Manchester Guardian, July 7, 1922, 4. 16 ‘Terms of Reference’, BOA, October 9, 1923, 2–3. 17 BOA Special Commission on Athletics, October 15, 1923, 1–14. 18 Ibid., October 17, 1923, 33–35; Daily Mail, October 20, 1923, 6. 19 BOA Special Commission, October 19, 1923. 20 Ibid., October 22, 1923, 86–93. 21 Ibid., October 16, 1923, 20–22. 22 Ibid., October 16, 1923, 23–26. 23 Ibid., October 18, 1923, 58–63; Manchester Guardian, October 22, 1923, 5. 24 BOA Special Commission, 1923, 56–57. 25 Ibid., October 23, 1923, 105–118. 26 Ibid., October 17, 1923, 27–32. 27 Scotsman, October 26, 1923, 3. 28 BOA Special Commission, October 22, 1923, 81–85. 29 Ibid., October 18, 1923, 48–51. 30 Ibid., October 23, 1923, 97–100; Manchester Guardian, October 27, 1923, 15. 31 BOA Special Commission, October 16, 1923, 15–18. 32 Ibid., October 19, 1923. 33 BOA Commission on Athletics, November 14, 1923. BOA Archives, UEL Archives. 34 BOA, December 12, 1923, item 6. 35 AAA General Olympic Committee, January 8, 1924, AAA Collection, Birmingham (cited hereafter as AAA: Birmingham). 36 BOA Council and AGM 26/5/25–19/12/28; Daily Mirror, December 15, 1923,

Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 14. 37 Athletic News, September 10, 1923, 2. 38 AAA Olympic Committee, August 27, 1923; December 18, 1923; January 8, 1924; February 5, 1924; February 26, 1924; April 15, 1924; AAA: Birmingham; Manchester Guardian, April 19, 1924, 12; April 30, 1924, 3 39 Observer, June 29, 1924, 21. 40 AAA Olympic Committee, February 5, 1924; February 26, 1924; March 18, 1924; May 27, 1924. AAA/1/2/4/2, AAA: Birmingham. 41 BOA Special Commission, October 18, 1923, 63; October 23, 1923, 97–100; Manchester Guardian, April 14, 1924, 11; AAA Olympic Committee, February 26, 1924; March 18, 1924; April 15, 1924; May 27, 1924; June 23, 1924; September 16, 1924. AAA/1/2/4/2, AAA: Birmingham. The inter-war years 77 42 Observer, April 27, 1924, 22; May 11, 1924, 21. 43 AAA Olympic Committee, April 15, 1924; May 6, 1924; May 27, 1924; June 23, 1924. AAA/1/2/4/2, AAA: Birmingham;BOA Official Report 1924, 14, 18. 44 AAA Olympic Committee, September 16, 1924, AAA: Birmingham. 45 Gerald F. Ellison, ‘English Athletics: A Training Centre Needed’, The Times, August 2, 1927, 6. 46 AAA Olympic Committee, October 10, 1927. AAA/1/2/4/2, AAA: Birmingham. 47 Ibid., February 2, 1928; March 27 1928; May 23, 1928. 48 Manchester Guardian, March 10, 1930, 14. 49 Walter R. Shimmin, Swimming for Schoolboys (London: National Association of Schoolmasters, 1931), 7. 50 Gilbert Collins, The New Magic of Swimming (London: William Heinemann, 1934), 10–15. 51 Observer, September 28, 1924, 22. 52 Daily Mirror, April 18, 1925, 5. 53 Observer, April 10, 1927, 27. 54 Singapore Free Press and Mercantile Advertiser, September 29, 1924, 14. 55 Manchester Guardian, August 6, 1928, 6. 56 Manchester Guardian, April 16, 1931, 4. 57 The Times, April 13, 1949, 2. 58 Manchester Guardian, September 6, 1934, 9; Peter Lovesey, The Official Centenary History of the AAA (Enfield: Guinness Superlatives, 1979), 120; The Times, April 11, 1934, 5; Manchester Guardian, September 18, 1956, 9; Daily Mail, August 11, 1938. 59 Manchester Guardian, September 6, 1934, 9. 60 Scotsman, November 5, 1931, 9. 61 FO communication, April 30, 1936, National Archives, Kew, FO/371/19940/ 3137, Foreign Office Collection, National Archives, Kew (hereafter cited as FO Col- lection, NA). 62 Peter Wilson, ‘Black Flash Shatters More Olympic Records’, Daily Express, August 5, 1936, 26; Trevor Wignall, ‘Will Not Take Old Excuses’, Daily Express, August 12, 1936, 1; Trevor Wignall ‘Ashamed at Exhibition at Berlin’, Daily Express, August 14, 1936, 13; Observer, August 16, 1936, 12. 63 Wignall, ‘Will Not Take Old Excuses’; Daily Express, August 14, 1936, 3; Daily Mirror, August 14, 1936, 3; Observer, August 16, 1936, 12. 64 Harold M. Abrahams, British Olympic Association: The Official Report of the XIth Olympiad Berlin 1936 (London: British Olympic Association, 1937), 54. 65 Wignall, ‘Ashamed at Exhibition at Berlin’. 66 Stephen G. Jones, ‘State Intervention in Sport and Leisure in Britain between the Wars’, Journal of Contemporary History 22, no. 1 (1987): 165. 67 Board of Education, Physical Training and Recreation Act, 1937, 1 Edw. 8 &1 Geo. 6, Ch. 46. 68

Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 AAA Memorandum to NFC, May 10, 1937, File ED 113/54, NFC Collection: AAA 1937–1939, National Archives, Kew (cited hereafter as NFC: AAA, NA). 69 AAA Memorandum to NFC, May 10, 1937, File ED 113/54, NFC: AAA, NA. 70 Captain L.F. Ellison to D.G.A. Lowe, October 22, 1937, File ED 113/54, NFC: AAA, NA. 71 AAA Physical Fitness Committee Memorandum, March 4, 1938, File AAA/1/2/9/ 1: AAA: Birmingham; E.J. Holt to Captain L.F. Ellis, June 8, 1938, File ED 113/54, NFC: AAA, NA. 72 R. Howlett to E.J. Holt, July 21, 1938, File ED 113/54; H.B. Usher to D.B. Davidson, July 19, 1938, File ED 113/54, NFC: AAA, NA. 73 AAA Physical Fitness Committee, July 28, August 13, 1938, File 1/2/9/1, AAA: Birmingham. 78 The inter-war years 74 AAA, Qualiﬁcations of Mr C.F.R. Hilton, File ED 113/54, NFC: AAA, NA. 75 F.J. Davis to E.J. Holt, August 22, 1938, File 113/54; J.W. Bridgeman to E.J. Holt, August 8, 1938, File ED 113/54, NFC: AAA, NA. 76 H.B. Usher to D.B. Davidson, July 19, 1938, File ED 113/54, NFC: AAA, NA. 77 AAA Physical Fitness Committee, August 13, 1938, October 4, 1938, February 2, 1939, File 1/2/9/1, AAA: Birmingham. 78 E.J. Holt to Captain L.F. Ellis, May 2, 1939, File ED 113/54, NFC: AAA, NA. 79 AAA, Physical Fitness Committee, March 25, 1939, File 1/2/9/1, AAA: Birming- ham; E.H. Pelham to Lord Burghley, May 3, 1939, File 113/54; E.H. Pelham to E. J. Holt, May 5, 1939, File ED 113/54, NFC: AAA, NA. 80 Captain L.F. Ellis to Phillip Noel Baker, May 12, 1939, File 113/54; Philip Noel Baker to Captain L.F. Ellis, May 15, 1939, File ED 113/54; Captain L.F. Ellis, Memorandum, May 16, 1939, File ED 113/54, NFC: AAA, NA. 81 Philip Noel Baker to Captain L.F. Ellis, May 15, 1939, File ED 113/54, NFC: AAA, NA. 82 NFC Memorandum, May 22, 1939, File ED 113/54, NFC: AAA, NA. 83 NFC Memorandum, June 16, 1939, File ED 113/54, NFC: AAA, NA. 84 Belgrave Harriers, ‘Advisor to the Four Minute Mile’, The Belgravian 2, no. 5 (2007): 25. 85 H.B. Jenkins to E.J. Holt, September 2, 1939, File ED 113/54, NFC: AAA, NA. 86 E.H. Pelham to A.H.E. Fern, October 21, 1937, File ED 113/57, National Fitness Council Collection: Amateur Swimming Association 1937–1940, National Archives, Kew (hereafter cited as NFC: ASA, NA). 87 A.H.E. Fern to E.H. Pelham, October 25, 1937, File ED 113/57, NFC: ASA, NA. 88 A.H.E. Fern to NFC, June 14, 1937, File ED 113/57, NFC: ASA, NA. 89 A.H.E. Fern to E.H. Pelham, October 27, 1937, File ED 113/57, NFC: ASA, NA. 90 NFC Grants Committee, November 11, 1937, File ED 113/57, NFC: ASA, NA. 91 A.H.E. Fern to E.H. Pelham, November 20, 1937, File ED 113/57, NFC: ASA, NA. 92 E.H. Pelham to A.H.E. Fern, November 24, 1937, File ED 113/57, NFC: ASA, NA. 93 A.H.E. Fern to Lord Aberdare, December 13, 1937, File ED 113/57, NFC: ASA, NA. 94 Lord Aberdare to A.H.E. Fern, December 20, 1937, File ED 113/57, NFC: ASA, NA. 95 NFC ASA Application for Grant-Aid (No. G. 38. 13), March 26, 1938, File ED 113/57, NFC: ASA, NA. 96 NFC Grants Committee, March 30, April 4, April 8, 1938, File 113/57; R. Howlett to A.H.E. Fern, May 5, 1938, File ED 113/57, NFC: ASA, NA. 97 R. Howlett to A.H.E. Fern, May 5, 1938, File ED 113/57, NFC: ASA, NA. 98 A.H.E. Fern to R. Howlett, May 6, 1938, File ED 113/57, NFC: ASA, NA. 99 Ibid.; R. Howlett to Mr Pearson, May 7, 1938, File ED 113/57, NFC: ASA, NA. 100 NFC Grants Committee, May 7, 1938, May 11, 1938, File ED 113/57, NFC: ASA, NA. 101 NFC to A.H.E. Fern, May 19, 1938, File ED 113/57, NFC: ASA, NA. 102 A.H.E. Fern to R. Howlett, June 11, 1938, File ED 113/57, NFC: ASA, NA. 103 Elaine Frances Burton, ‘Application for Appointment as Organiser’, May 21, 1938, File ED 113/57, NFC: ASA, NA. 104 ‘ ’

Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 Mollie Lloyd Laxton, Application for Appointment as Organiser , May 25, 1938, File ED 113/57, NFC: ASA, NA. 105 Dave Day, ‘Walter Brickett. A Respectable Professor’,inRecording Leisure Lives: Sports, Games and Pastimes in 20th Century Britain, ed. Bob Snape and Helen Pussard (Brighton: Leisure Studies Association, 2010), 195. 106 Elaine F. Burton, ASA Application for Grant-Aid (G.38.45), File ED 113/57, NFC: ASA, NA. 107 Ibid. 108 NFC to A.H.E. Fern, September 10, 1938, File ED 113/57, NFC: ASA, NA. 109 NFC to A.H.E. Fern, November 23, 1938, File ED 113/57, NFC: ASA, NA. 110 E.H. Pelham to A.H.E. Fern, December 9, 1938, File ED 113/57, NFC: ASA, NA. 111 A.H.E. Fern to E.H. Pelham, December 12, 1938, File ED 113/57 NFC: ASA, NA. The inter-war years 79 112 A.H.E. Fern to Captain R. Stephens, January 19, 1939, File ED 113/57, NFC: ASA, NA. 113 NFC to A.H.E. Fern, September 2, 1939, File ED 113/57, NFC: ASA, NA. 114 Bevil Rudd, ed. Athletics (London: J.M. Dent & Sons, 1938).

Bibliography Collins, Gilbert. The New Magic of Swimming (London: William Heinemann, 1934). Day, Dave. ‘Walter Brickett. A Respectable Professor’,inRecording Leisure Lives: Sports, Games and Pastimes in 20th Century Britain, ed. Bob Snape and Helen Pussard (Brighton: Leisure Studies Association, 2010). Day, Dave. ‘The “English Athlete Is Born Not Made”: Coaching, Amateurism, and Training in Britain 1912–1914’. Presentation at Sport and Leisure on the Eve of the First World War symposium, MMU Cheshire, June 27 and 28, 2014. Dobson, Alan P. Anglo-American Relations in the Twentieth Century: Of Friendship, Conflict and the Rise and Decline of Superpowers (London: Routledge, 1995). Huggins, Mike. ‘Sport and the Upper Classes: Introduction’. Sport in History 28, no. 3 (2008): 351–363. Huggins, Mike and Jack Williams. Sport and the English, 1918–1939 (Oxon: Routledge, 2006). Johnson, Niall. Britain and the 1918–1919 Influenza Pandemic: A Dark Epilogue (Oxon: Routledge, 2006). Keys, Barbara. ‘Spreading Peace, Democracy, and Coca Cola: Sport and American Cultural Expansion in the 1930s’. Diplomatic History 28 (2004): 165–196. Lovesey, Peter. The Official Centenary History of the AAA (Enfield: Guinness Superlatives, 1979). Marwick, Arthur. Britain in the Century of Total War: War Peace and Social Change 1900–1967 (Middlesex: Penguin Books Ltd, 1968). Rudd, Bevil, ed. Athletics (London: J.M. Dent & Sons, 1938). Shimmin, Walter R. Swimming for Schoolboys (London: National Association of Schoolmasters, 1931). Winter, Jay. ‘“Lost Generation” of the First World War’. Population Studies 31, no. 3 (1977): 449–466. Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 4 Post-1945 coaching initiatives

Introduction During the Second World War, the government assumed a much greater role in the everyday lives of the British public. Rationing was introduced in 1940, and, although not initially welcomed, it was acknowledged that these measures were being introduced to safeguard people’s welfare, regardless of their social status. Increased government involvement in individual lives was believed to be having a positive outcome and resulted in a growing feeling that the country should not return to the pre-war order. At this point, Britons wanted reassurances about post- war society and a guarantee that the sacrifices and hardships endured would be ‘rewarded with a more just and egalitarian society’ once the conflict was over.1 In particular, many working-class people wanted ‘an end to the tradition of “privi- leged” and “leisured” classes’.2 The Beveridge report, published in December 1942, ‘set the agenda for social reconstruction for the next decade’ by calling for an expansion in social service provision and a minimum quality of life for everyone, including full employment, family allowances and a national health service. It clearly appealed to the public, selling over 600,000 copies within a year, although the government reacted with a lukewarm attitude that was credited to its having a Conservative majority. Labour seized the opportunity to present themselves as the party most likely to fulfil the public’s demand for post-war social reform and this strategy reaped its reward when, on 26 July 1945, Labour achieved a 126-seat majority in the first post-war general election.3 Britain subsequently underwent a political revolution, although the anticipated social revolution, which it was hoped would alter the British class system, was not Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 so forthcoming. While the war had highlighted ‘some of society’s defects and given an impulse to social reform, victory seemed to imply that, for all its faults, the social … order was basically sound’ so the impetus for change faded rapidly.4 In addition, prompted by the lack of suitable housing and the continuation of rationing, which actually became more stringent and did not end until 1954, there was an increasing desire to return to normal in everyday life.5 Post-war British sport, therefore, emerged as a reflection of a society in which ‘continuities were prized and came generally to prevail over any significant impulse for fundamental change’.6 Coupled with a government that continued to distance itself from sport, Post-1945 coaching initiatives 81 this ensured that sporting structures returned to their pre-war arrangements and administrators reverted to a sporting philosophy based on traditional amateur values, one which continued to penetrate all aspects of the sporting environment, including coaching and training. This return to the traditional format of sport organization and administration meant that poor international performances, commonplace before 1939, extended into the immediate post-war period. British tennis players were convincingly defeated at Wimbledon, boxers lost their world titles, the English cricket team was beaten by Australia, New Zealand and the West Indies, and the football team was defeated by the United States at the World Cup in 1950, a defeat compounded further by the loss of an unbeaten home record to Hungary in 1953.7 Critics emerged everywhere, none more so than in rowing where Britain, the birthplace of the sport, was now being beaten by ‘lesser’ nations. This lack of achievement and loss of prestige was made even more humiliating due to the fact that successful scullers, who had also been actively coaching, were being appointed as full-time coaches abroad. Eric Phelps, for example, accepted a post in Argentina where ‘excellent terms were offered for the very work he wanted to do here, and was never invited to undertake’.8 Tennis, it was argued, ‘is more poverty stricken than ever before. The complete annihilation of our Davis Cup team in Paris last summer was humiliating’.9 Wimbledon had become a ‘foreign-dominated championship’ and it was observed that the ‘Perry days are but beautiful memories for British tennis and that Wimbledon titles have been added to the long list of extravaganza for export only’.10 Whilst it was recognized that British economic and imperial decline would inevitably have an impact on sporting performances, there was a tendency to attribute all sporting failures to the war and its aftermath, to the extent that other factors were ignored.11 This disguised significant deficiencies in the sporting system, particularly the failure to engage with professional coaches and the poor quality of elite training. It was also argued that Britain had suffered the greatest impact as a result of the war, although, in reality, other countries had actually experienced a much more considerable drain on resources and yet they were still achieving international successes. Nevertheless, British sporting administrators continued to feel that they had little to learn from overseas and a proposal to import foreign coaches was quickly rejected, with F.A.M. Webster observing:

Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 The suggestion has now been made that we must employ foreign coaches. But why? We have the material and the men to handle it. No department of national life stands alone, and we shall lose more in prestige than we might possibly gain in performance by going hat in hand to some foreign country for a so-called expert.12

The prevailing view remained that the British, as the originators of modern sports, were the ‘teachers not the students’ and that Britain would remain true to the virtues of amateurism, especially in playing by the rules.13 British traditionalists were convinced that the ‘scientific’ system of training and coaching employed 82 Post-1945 coaching initiatives elsewhere would inevitably result in athletes being willing to cheat to achieve success while their own approach would lead to athletes being respected for their adherence to the amateur ethos. One report commenting on defeat by the Americans in the 1947 Walker Cup suggested that, while it was ‘very sad’, Britain could remain safe in the knowledge that they had played the game in the intended way, unlike their opponents.14 On the other hand, there were an increasing number of dissenters who wanted to see an improvement in international performances. The Daily Express argued that ‘we must stop playing games’ and that simply turning up to golf courses and sporting grounds and ‘playing at it’ was no longer acceptable. Although there had been a time in which this casual approach had been sufficient to ensure victory, these athletes were merely deluding themselves that they could compete internationally.15 To succeed, not only would they require regular training and some form of coaching but they also needed a ‘keenness’ and ‘impudent confidence’, something ‘entirely lacking amongst the Englishman’.16

Coaching schemes While sport did not rank highly on the government’s post-war agenda, developments already put in place before the end of the war would offer some support for British coaching. Two sports in particular, athletics and swimming, responded by making preparations to improve the quality of coaching available, although both associations created signiﬁcant boundaries around their professional coaches, partly because their coaching schemes, as in previous incarnations, focused on the production of a contingent of honorary coaches rather than on supporting exceptional athletes.

Athletics In April 1946, discussions began within the Amateur Athletic Association (AAA) about the possibility of creating a national coaching scheme and Lt Col. Roland Harper, with the help of a newly formed Coaching Committee, drew up a proposal for a programme that included the appointment of a professional coach, which was circulated to AAA members in September.17 The Development Com- mittee, chaired by Harold Abrahams, concurred and recommended that Major

Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 Geoffrey Dyson be tentatively approached with the offer of a two-year contract at a salary of £700 for the first year, rising to £750 in the second. If he was not available the AAA should approach the Austrian coach Hoke or re-appoint Franz Stampfl at a fee of £600–£800 per annum.18 In the event, Dyson was satisfied with the terms of employment and consequently, in February 1947, with the aid of a £522 donation from the News of the World, he was appointed, provisionally for two years.19 Dyson would later be repeatedly credited with the success of the coaching scheme and for ‘laying its foundations’,20 although initial satisfaction over his appointment would dissipate as conflict began to emerge between him and AAA officials. Post-1945 coaching initiatives 83 Dyson’s duties included taking charge of the AAA coaching courses, coordi- nating the work of the AAA honorary coaches throughout Britain, and acting as chief coach at the annual Loughborough Summer School.21 While it was not stipulated that the duties of the national coach included the coaching of elite athletes, it was clear, initially at least, that this was to be one focus of his work since the financial contribution from the News of the World had been ‘specifically given for the purpose of employing a coach or coaches to help towards development for the Olympic Games’. Indeed, the AAA itself commented:

We realise that it is impossible to accomplish much in the way of producing ﬁrst class athletes in such a short space of time for 1948, but a start has been made along these lines, not so much with the idea of producing world beaters, although we are keen to hold our own from a prestige angle.22

As part of this new approach, their professional coach could be loaned to Oxford and Cambridge, at a charge of £10 per week, to train individual athletes, although the use of professionals at these universities was actually nothing new since both Alec Nelson and Bill Thomas had been employed throughout the 1920s and 1930s.23 As time progressed, it became increasingly evident that not only was Dyson’s workload far too demanding for one individual but also that the AAA were struggling to pay his salary and so the Association began to explore other options.24 For- tunately, significant, albeit inadvertent, opportunities for support had been created by the 1944 Education Act, a by-product of the Beveridge Report that had led to the development of the Ministry of Education.25 The Ministry had assumed control of the pre-war National Fitness Council (NFC) Grants Committee and part of their remit was to develop national coaching schemes by providing financial support to sporting associations. Initially, the AAA decided to prioritize equipment rather than coaches so their first bid to the Ministry consisted of a request for £3,000 for athletic implements.26 In many respects, this reinforces the low esteem afforded to British coaching at the time and reflects the widespread view that international failures were due to poor facilities and lack of equipment rather than the paucity of quality coaching. In reality, of course, although there were a number of honorary coaches operating around the country, many lacked the technical expertise to coach field events and, without a solid coaching foundation and the correct organizational structures, it was unlikely that simply supplying equipment would 27

Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 improve the quality of elite athletics. A second application was sent to the Ministry in August 1947 for a grant for 80 per cent of the cost of the salary of three national coaches and the success of the application provided the coaching scheme with an opportunity to expand. However, the grant came with conditions, since the Ministry, which requested six-weekly reports of the work undertaken by the national coaches, had to approve the appointments and the majority of the coaches’ time had to be devoted to the training of teachers, organizers and club coaches.28 The AAA, which was struggling financially, then decided to use one of the grants to pay a proportion of Dyson’s wages, thus changing his remit. The original intention, which was for him to prepare the 1948 84 Post-1945 coaching initiatives Olympic squad, now became obsolete because the Ministry’s coaching scheme was not established to ‘polish up a few stars’ but rather to disseminate a good knowledge of coaching and athletics around the country.29 When Dyson subsequently coached Maureen Gardner to a silver medal at the 1948 Games he therefore did so voluntarily. With the remainder of the grant money, Tony Chapman and Dennis Watts were appointed in September 1947 and 1948, respectively, although Chapman resigned in 1949 to take up a similar appointment abroad at a better salary.30 Encouraged by these grants, the AAA requested further financial support for additional coaches and they appointed Allan Malcolm and Jim Alford in late 1948.31 While Dyson and Chapman had been selected because they had been connected to the AAA through various coaching circles, others were appointed following job advertisements, although coaching expertise was in limited supply and the AAA had noted in 1947 that none of its applicants possessed any outstanding qualifications for the posts.32 This lack of expertise was to be expected since Britain, unlike other nations, did not yet have an organized system of coaching. A sporting environment controlled by a committee of part-time officials had never been conducive to the development of coaching proficiency, so it is unsurprising that coaches such as Watts, Malcolm and Alford, lacked a comprehensive knowledge of coaching techniques.33 These coaching initiatives proved equally difficult for some administrators, whom professional coaching had never been thought necessary,34 and for whom notions of amateurism remained potent, so some readjustment was required. Prior to the appointment of Alford to the Welsh AAA, Ray Thomas ‘expressed the doubt of his association as to whether there would be sufficient work to occupy a coach for all the weeks of the year’.35 Although the emphasis in these formative years was on coaching the coaches, some officials could see the potential advantages of utilizing the national coaches to train active athletes and suggested that a proportion of their time should be devoted to this. However, the AAA honorary secretary responded by arguing that their roles needed to be kept in perspective and that their employment was to be mainly to teach coaches and teachers.36 Fear of reprisals from the Ministry was regularly used as a reason for not using national coaches to train elite athletes but, since the AAA apparently never challenged the Ministry over this issue, it seems that they quietly acquiesced to this arrangement. For amateur officials this ensured that the work of the national coaches would remain ‘amateur’ without giving the appearance that they were insisting on this approach. However, the success of

Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 Gardner in 1948 initiated a shift in thinking, from the perspective of both the Ministry and some AAA ofﬁcials, and there appears to have gradually been a greater degree of ﬂexibility regarding the coaching of promising athletes even though, as Tom McNab later observed, Dyson had to continually battle with administrators to gain access to them.37

Geoff Dyson

You have heard a lot about playing for the game’s sake, that winning does not matter but my advice to you is to PLAY TO WIN with every fibre of your being.38 Post-1945 coaching initiatives 85 Major Geoffrey Harry George Dyson, sometimes labelled as the ‘father of modern British athletics coaching’,39 was the leading British athletics coach during this period, continuing to influence the sport until his resignation in 1961. He was born on 22 June 1914 in Camberwell, London, and he attended Croydon British School, although his home life was far from settled and he ran away from home in 1930. Dyson recalled, ‘things were pretty tough for a while, I sold newspapers, did odd jobs and sometimes slept on the Embankment … It wasn’t much fun in the early thirties’.40 On 2 March 1931, he falsified his age to enlist with the Somerset Light Infantry and, after taking extra classes in English, mathematics, geography and map-reading, he became a teacher in regimental schools.41 In 1933, he requisitioned a high hurdle, which he trained with every day until achieving his army colours in 1936. Dyson later commented that ‘choosing a technical event like hurdling and having no coach made me begin to examine the how and why of athletics’.42 His success so impressed F.A.M. Webster that he recruited Dyson to the first Loughborough Summer School in 1934, where Dyson met some of the most prominent foreign coaches of the time, including Valste, Hoff and Mikkola, as well as many British trainers and administrators, such as Harold Abrahams. When Webster was in the process of establishing the School of Athletics, Games and Physical Education at Loughborough College, he invited Dyson to join his staff as chief instructor for athletics, a position he took up in 1938. Webster described him as an excellent lecturer and a ‘very good demonstrator’ in both running and field events, which, considering the poor standard of British field events, was particularly welcomed, and Dyson later referred to his Loughborough appointment as his ‘golden days’, a time when he ‘learnt so much about the coach’s art’.43 His own athletic career had now come to a close. At the 1937 AAA Championships, Dyson ran a close second to Don Finlay, silver medallist in the 110 m hurdles at the 1936 Olympics, and clearly had the potential to be selected for the 1940 Games but AAA administrators, including Abrahams, decided that he could no longer be considered an amateur because he had been a lecturer in athletics. From that point on, Dyson never hurdled again and it is likely that this incident underpinned his subsequent confrontations with AAA officials. Dyson was recalled from the reserves to serve in the war in 193944 and Webster believed that this was the making of Dyson as it allowed him to mature and he quickly gained a reputation for ‘brilliant organisation combined with hard discipline’.45 After being promoted to sergeant, he applied for a position in the regular 46

Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 army and was eventually posted to the King’s African Rifles (KAR), transferring to one of the KAR battle schools in Nakuru, Kenya, where he became a Major in charge of Physical Training. It was Dyson’s duty to train and develop men to make them physically and mentally prepared for battle and he achieved this by establishing physical training and athletics centres everywhere he served.47 This allowed him to continue coaching athletics as part of the generic PT programme and these experiences undoubtedly went some way to refining his coaching ability. In 1945, he returned to his post at Loughborough where he began to apply principles of engineering and mechanics to the movements and actions of athletics.48 At that point, the AAA Coaching Committee was in the process of appointing 86 Post-1945 coaching initiatives their first national coach and, as Dyson was the only Englishman on the list of ‘possibles’, he was offered the job, beginning his duties in February 1947.49 Abrahams had supported the appointment of a British coach because he ‘certainly did not want an American type demagogic coach’, although, as it turned out, this was exactly what they were getting.50 Dyson’s first six weeks were spent at Oxford University but his ‘ebullient almost aggressive personality collided with the traditional Oxford approach’.51 Tom McNab recalls that during Dyson’s first visit to Oxford he had been warned ‘not to speak to the athletes unless they speak to you first’.52 One positive to come out of his time there would be the discovery of Maureen Gardner, who had taken to athletics after abandoning a planned ballet career. She had joined the Oxford Ladies Athletic Club and with the help of Walter Morris, the Iffley Road groundsman, she soon became an accomplished sprinter, although Dyson switched her to the 80 m hurdles. Within three months she was national champion and within eighteen she had equalled the World Record and achieved a silver medal at the London Olympics.53 Dyson and Gardner were married following the Games, going on to have two children and remaining together until Maureen’s death in 1974.54 Dyson had a talent for spotting athletic potential and commented that he had two priorities when doing so, ‘first, to start them from scratch (it’s easier!) and, second, to tackle events which the British have previously neglected’. The majority of his athletes, including John Disley, John Savidge, Geoff Elliott and Shirley Cawley, had been discovered in a similar way to that for Gardner. Disley, for example, was a promising middle-distance runner when Dyson encountered him at Loughborough in 1947 but Dyson directed him to the steeplechase and, with Dyson’s coaching, he achieved a bronze medal at the 1952 Helsinki Games. Dyson had met the 6 ft 7 in. Savidge when he was conducting a course for the Navy in 1949 and together they raised the profile of British shot putting when Savidge achieved 55 ft 2 in., making him the first British man to throw over 50 ft. Dyson commented that ‘even when you have international colours for sprinting you may still be in the wrong event!’ and believed it was his ‘coaching eye’, the ability to differentiate between a ‘fundamental movement, a mere idiosyncrasy and a fault’, that made him such an accomplished coach.55 As well as his ‘coach’s eye’, Dyson’s coaching success stemmed from his belief that to be successful required not only a coordinated effort from the coach and the athlete but also the incorporation of science and international expertise and he was

Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 conscious that, because Britain was the ‘last of the great sporting countries to turn to coaching’, he needed to understand foreign techniques and methods.56 In 1949, Dyson submitted a request to visit Sweden in order to improve his own expertise in events in which the Swedes were considered leading experts. Although the AAA recognized the potential benefits they did not have the ‘funds for this purpose at present’ and suggested that Dyson approach the Ministry of Education instead. The Ministry were similarly unable to provide a grant and so Dyson wrote to Swedish governing bodies in an attempt to get funding. He successfully secured backing from the Anglo-Swedish Society in London and other Swedish authorities and he was able to visit Sweden during February and March, 1950. The general Post-1945 coaching initiatives 87 consensus was that ‘great benefit had been brought to the coaching scheme from his visit’,57 although this did not persuade the AAA to offer future financial support and these initiatives, as with most aspects of British coaching in this period, continued to rely on personal drive and enthusiasm. Dyson gradually refined his knowledge of human movement and engineering and this developed into a vital aspect of his coaching work. He incorporated the use of slow-motion ‘loop’ films in which the movements of an athlete could be projected onto a screen and analysed. He also encouraged his athletes to purchase ‘peepscopes’ so that they could take Dyson’s analysis away with them and study it. He believed that once the athlete had the ability to identify their own mistakes they were more likely to successfully alter their action. Dyson would plot the films frame by frame onto a graph so that he could establish the athlete’s acceleration and deceleration or the angle of release in throws.58 He also used a wooden doll, nicknamed ‘His Nibs’ by the athletes, to demonstrate in real time the correct position athletes needed to adopt during a particular movement and this helped eradicate errors as soon as they occurred. Dyson believed that a coach could analyse the technique of an athlete with almost mathematical precision and he began working in collaboration with universities, in particular Loughborough and Leeds, in order to understand more about motion, muscle control and its relationship to respiration. Contemporary academics also monitored American techniques which they would then report back on to Dyson59 – a dialogue between British coaches and universities that is now commonplace but which was unusual during the 1950s, in contrast to the situation in America where coaches and universities were inextricably linked. In many respects, this incorporation of scientific ‘foreign’ methods was exactly what British officials had been trying to prevent because this signalled not only a shift towards greater specialization but also a potential threat to their authority. Professionalization and the use of science in sport were always going to create difficulties and so it was inevitable that amateur administrators began to resent their national coach. By 1961, the disagreements between Dyson and the administration had reached such a pitch that he felt compelled to resign. One commentator observed that there were ‘still too many officials at the top who are jealous of his influence and the authority which his great knowledge gives him’ and, until these barriers were broken down, coaches with Dyson’s vision would never be welcomed in British sport.60 Although Dyson later reflected, ‘I don’t think that … I made much 61

Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 impression on the British as far as coaching was concerned’, Canada evidently recognized his potential by offering him a five-year contract as the Director of the Royal Canadian Legion Sports Training Plan. Critics argued that ‘the Canadians will benefit from one of the greatest crimes of British sport’62 and that ‘Britain’s loss is Canada’s gain – apparently they place far greater importance on athletics coaching in Canada than we do’.63 It was widely believed that Dyson had been forced from his position because AAA officials had not fully appreciated his coaching knowledge and had been unwilling to compromise, leading one reporter to note that, ‘Perhaps when Dyson returns to Britain in five years’ time we might be ready to use his talents properly. But somehow I doubt it’.64 88 Post-1945 coaching initiatives Swimming In November 1946, the Amateur Swimming Association (ASA) appealed to the Ministry of Education for financial support, not to appoint professional coaches but to ‘develop courses of instruction in swimming for youth leaders and organizers’ in order to expand the ASA Teachers Certificate. In addition, because the ASA was in such a ‘parlous state financially’, it was hoped support would be made available for clerical assistance. Although the Ministry sympathized, they were unable to help because the capacity in which they could supply funding was ‘essentially in the direction of coaching personnel’,65 a response which upset the ASA Committee, with Harold Fern stating he was seriously thinking of giving up the work connected with the ASA Teacher Certificate because he did not feel warranted in spending so much of his own money on such a cause. He hoped he would not have to ‘give up a life of work’ but the Ministry was making it difficult to see any other option.66 This type of outburst from Fern was nothing new, as can be seen from his behaviour in 1937, but this time the Ministry were unwilling to compromise, although they were prepared to offer the ASA, as they had with every other sport, 80 per cent of the salaries for three to four coaches. Since they had not requested this, and the Ministry was not prepared to support their own proposals, the ASA were not particularly cooperative, claiming they were not ‘in a position financially to take advantage of it’ because unlike other amateur organizations, they were unable to raise their own income from events because there was not a suitable pool in the country.67 They thanked the Ministry but decided to reject their offer while urging them to re-consider the matter in the future,68 although the ASA did not submit another request for grant-aid for coaching until almost ten years later, suggesting that the Ministry remained resistant to modifying its approach to funding. While the ASA had not requested financial assistance for the employment of coaches they were aware that coaching and training were required and, prior to their grant rejection, a national appeal had been initiated in the Swimming Times in order to raise monies to enable British swimmers to make ‘an adequate contribution’ to the 1948 Games. It was claimed that ‘six years of war and no income have left the Association very impoverished’ and the only way they could produce a competitive team was through donations and fundraising from the nation’s swimming clubs.69 As with the rationale behind Dyson’s employment, the appeal had been started so that British swimmers would be fully prepared for the Games, but the Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 training of Olympic athletes was to be kept in perspective. The scheme was to remain true to the amateur ethos by ensuring that this ‘training must not take precedence over the training of school children’.70 In 1946, at the first ASA meeting since 1939, it was reported that £2,000 had already been raised but that a further £4,000 was needed if a comprehensive training scheme was to be implemented.71 Harry Koskie was appointed as ‘Chief Swimming Advisor’ (not ‘coach’) to make periodical visits to each district for the purpose of ‘seeing trainees in action’, and to discuss training with coaches, while training facilities were provided in 1947 and 1948 at ‘Summer Camps’, which would eventually become the Post-1945 coaching initiatives 89 Advanced Swimming and Coaching Course at Loughborough College. Unlike the AAA, the ASA had raised enough funds to pay Koskie’s salary themselves, so, although this meant that only one individual could be appointed, he was not controlled by the conditions of a Ministry grant and the ASA were able to use him as they had always intended, specifically to coach potential Olympic athletes. As a result, resources began to be funnelled towards the preparation of British Olympic swimmers. Shortly after his appointment, Koskie addressed the Olympic hopefuls, drawing on his significant coaching and training knowledge to refer to the dangers of overtraining. He suggested that competitors ‘in their own and the nation’s interest’ should refrain from participating in exhibition swims because engagement in long and tiring journeys with the subsequent loss of sleep could inadvertently impact on their physical state. He further suggested that ‘swimmers who wish to attain the highest honours should be prepared to accept reasonable guidance’.72 It is not clear whether this was said to reassure athletes that they would receive the support they required or to prepare athletes to accept some amount of direction since, for each athlete who wanted coaching there was often another who was wary of allowing a coach to ‘tamper’ with their training. By appointing Koskie, the ASA were beginning to address some of the coaching issues that had plagued British swimming and this was supplemented by the extension of training opportunities with the ‘First Special Course’ being held at Loughborough College for two weeks in August 1947. Forty-seven swimmers and seven coaches, who had been recommended by Koskie, were invited to attend by the ASA. Max Madders, an ex-international swimmer before becoming a lecturer in Physical Education at Birmingham University, had been persuaded to contribute by organizing sessions and talks on the benefits of physical and relaxation exercises. Although the intentions were positive, and this was the first course of its kind in British swimming, pool time was limited and, on average, each swimmer could only be in the water for approximately two hours a day. However, it would appear that water fitness was not Koskie’s primary objective since he prioritized the creation of a good rapport between Olympic hopefuls. Methods of building team spirit were to constitute a special feature of the course, something which Koskie confessed he was ‘fanatical’ about. The programme received good publicity, thanks to his initiative in inviting the BBC to attend, and this certainly raised the profile of the sport. In his final observations, Koskie commented on the potential benefits of the whole team training together for one month prior to the Games,

Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 although he recognized that ‘as we are all amateur, I realise this cannot be considered but it also does not prevent one from wishing it was possible to complete the job’. For Koskie, the amateur environment clearly had a restrictive impact on the quality of British swimming and, whether because of his frustrations or because of a desire to direct his attention elsewhere, Koskie, while arguing that a Loughbor- ough school should be held every year as it ‘could not fail to raise the standard of British swimming’, requested that he ‘not be invited to be responsible’.73 The second Loughborough Summer School was held in March 1948 and made up the final part of Koskie’s two-year plan to prepare for the London Games. This course, compared with the previous one, adopted a much more scientific approach. 90 Post-1945 coaching initiatives Dr Richard Bolton from Birmingham University examined every swimmer on the course and monitored them throughout and Max Madders was again in attendance, this time offering physiotherapy. Compared with the levels of sports science and training witnessed in other nations at the time these interventions were fairly basic and, rather than being used to improve performance, they were primarily used to monitor responses to exercise. To guarantee the programme did not appear too professional, everyone who donated their services did so in an honorary capacity,74 but one beneficial outcome of the course was the opportunity for the ASA to select swimmers for the Olympic team, including Bert Kinnear (who would later become the first ASA National Technical Officer). This resonates with the experiences of Dyson since both men attended Loughborough as athletes, both were influenced by their encounters and experiences, and they were both subsequently engaged in developing similar programmes. Koskie had been appointed in 1946 on the premise that he would gather together and condition a group of swimmers to represent Britain at the 1948 Games and thereby ‘lay foundations for the future’, which would include preparations for Helsinki in 1952.75 However, although the ASA would take Koskie’s selection recommendations into consideration, the final decision on who was selected remained theirs and they reserved the right to ‘make such additions or alterations to the list as circumstances demand’.76 Clearly, the Association was determined to remain in control of their professional coach and, although they would allow an advisor to ‘assist’ them, they would continue to make the crucial decisions, even though they generally lacked the same degree of expertise. This was a common feature of the administration practices of the period and further parallels can be drawn here between Koskie and Dyson. In 1958, Dyson argued that it should become a requirement for the British team coach to be in attendance during team selection because this had only occurred once throughout his eleven years of duty. Apart from the 1952 Games, the team coach had ‘had little to say in determining relay running orders’ and he considered this extremely unsatisfactory. Dyson suggested that the desire of amateur administrators to remain in control and their resistance to professional coaches was due to their belief that if the ‘influence of professional coaching increases it will dominate athletics to the det- riment of the sport’, but, he observed, ‘professional coaching seeks no more power than is needed to serve our international athletes efficiently’.77 Evidence elsewhere suggests that the hostile environments experienced by

Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 Koskie and Dyson were not isolated cases. In 1949, the Oxford University Athletic Club (OUAC) agreed on the need for a full-time professional coach and, based on the advice of the AAA Coaching Committee, they employed John Jeffrey. He was twenty-two and had qualified at Loughborough College where he had undoubtedly interacted with, and been influenced by, Dyson at the Summer School. Essentially, he was a product of Dyson’s teaching and coaching and this was inevitably going to be an issue for the OUAC, especially considering how negatively they had received Dyson in 1947. It was accepted after Jeffrey had completed two terms that the ‘standard of performances at the top of the OUAC had probably never been much higher’, but the committee were dissatisfied Post-1945 coaching initiatives 91 because his coaching methods were not considered ‘the Oxford approach’ and ‘if given a free hand’ he would organize training along American lines. There was a fear that if Jeffrey was allowed to become established he would be able to manip- ulate ‘officials of the club who are younger and less experienced than him’,so restrictions were put in place to avoid his gaining too much influence and to ensure that he realized ‘the coach is the advisor to the club and not the controlling brain behind its organisation’. The president was to retain ‘complete discretion in selecting teams’, although he could seek the coach’s advice, Jeffrey was not allowed to be a member of the OUAC Committee or to attend Annual General Meetings, and he was not to be included in team photos or ‘listed amongst the officials of the club’.78 The lengths to which the OUAC Committee were willing to go to ensure that a coach did not assume any real authority, accentuate how amateurism and the nature of social relations within the club remained its dominant principles. Reflecting Dyson’s comments about the influence of professional coaching and its relationship to power, there was evidently an underlying fear within the OUAC that a strong-willed, professional coach would be able to overpower a weak committee and then challenge the traditional tenets of Oxford athleticism. Unsurpris- ingly, despite improving performances, Jeffrey did not stay at OUAC for long and he resigned in 1953, a satisfactory outcome for the OUAC because he had on ‘many occasions taken offence’ to their decisions and as such was ‘not the ideal type of coach’ for the club.79 The committee did recognize, however, that ‘while lacking the personal understanding of the great coach’ he had brought with him a scientific approach that had undoubtedly made OUAC ‘less of a slapdash, haphazard affair’,80 suggesting, perhaps, that the barriers towards increasing specialization were gradually being lowered in the aftermath of the Helsinki Games.

The 1948 Olympic Games Had elite sport in Britain been conﬁned to the nation’s borders and to sports such as cricket and rugby there might have been little change in the status quo, but the internationalization of sport and the creation of mega-events such as the Olympics meant that National Governing Bodies (NGBs) were forced to respond in order to maintain their credibility. The post-war coaching schemes described here represented an acknowledgement of that imperative, and this became especially impor-

Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 tant when hosting the Olympics in 1948. The British sporting authorities were keen to use the Games to resurrect a supposedly glorious sporting past81 and The Times suggested that, although British sport had experienced a period of decline in recent years, the Games could provide the perfect opportunity to demonstrate that British athletes could hold their own ‘in amateur sport with all comers’.82 However, there were also fears that the event would actually demonstrate just how disastrous the sporting situation had become, which led to warnings that ‘something must be done or else the gloomy procession of British defeats since the end of the War will reach the humiliating climax of the Olympics being staged in London without a single British victory’.83 92 Post-1945 coaching initiatives Once the Games had begun it became apparent that visiting nations, in particular America, were surprised by the severity of post-war austerity and some American coaches were forced to improvise. Melvin Patton, who won gold in the 200 m and 4Â100 m relay, recalled that athletes had to stand while travelling on the Underground, so American coaches, who believed that this was detrimental to performance, chartered buses to create a shuttle service between the arena and the housing at Uxbridge.84 Criticism from the Americans was not well received and the way in which the Americans approached the Games caused problems. While visiting teams had been encouraged to bring to bring their own food in order to reduce the burden on Britain, the actions of the Americans were seen as excessive. They imported over 15,000 chocolate bars and 5,000 steaks and arranged daily flights from Los Angeles to RAF Uxbridge to provide enriched white flour and fresh fruit, most of which had not been seen in Britain since 1939.85 These initiatives generated resentment in Britain where American complaints were con- strued as an attempt to demonstrate American superiority by emphasizing how much Britain was struggling. Criticisms, however, were not confined to the American team. The British swim team, who had undertaken comprehensive training and coaching in order to prepare, argued that the accommodation and training facilities provided had prevented these initiatives from achieving their potential. In his post-Games analysis, Koskie commented that, although he appreciated that the Organising Committee had been faced with the problems of post-war austerity, he believed that the preparation and availability of resources were ‘in some respects, unsatisfactory’.Eventhoughhe accepted that it was customary to segregate the sexes when housing Olympic competitors, he ‘greatly deplored’ a separation of seventeen miles, an arrangement which had reversed the team spirit that he had fought so hard to build. The distance between the two groups prevented them training together in the final stages before the Games and, as a result, the female chaperones had taken on the responsibility of preparing the women’s team. In addition, the male swimmers had faced great difficulty in organizing training swims. An arrangement had been made to use Uxbridge Pool but, because this was privately owned, the favourable weather during the Games meant that the pool refused to close to the public and the pool was ‘swamped with bathers’. Koskie commented, ‘after all the hard work of preparing for the Olympic Games, it will readily be understood just how we all felt about the final set-up’. These arrangements had taken the ‘edge’ off the whole

Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 team, which was reflected in the fact that, although numerous British swimmers managed to reach finals, the best placing achieved was a bronze medal. Koskie was far from complacent and his forward-thinking attitude allowed him to ‘profitfromthe experience’ and ‘plan for the future’.Reflecting what is now common practice in the sport,hesuggestedthatarrangementsshouldbemadebyeachDistricttobring together their most promising young swimmers to train under one chief coach and he made recommendations about ‘spotting’ promising young swimmers.86 Despite complaints from athletes and coaching staff alike, the general British perception was that the 1948 London Games had been a success, at least from an organizational perspective.87 This was not reflected in the number of medals won, Post-1945 coaching initiatives 93 however, because the London Games were ‘athletically, a disappointing Olympics for the British’,88 and quite how badly Britain had done could not be ignored, although failures were repeatedly attributed to poor diet and lack of facilities. Far from taking the opportunity to question coaching and training methods, commentators argued that the reason British athletes had not achieved was not because they were mediocre but because other nations were improving rapidly. The Sporting Mirror observed that ‘the world has moved on a stage since Britain taught the rest of the nations a great deal in sport. The pupils have caught up their masters’, and reports emphasized that the Olympics were not just about focusing on winners but appreciating ‘the standard achieved by all the competitors’.89

The aftermath British sporting ofﬁcials had hoped that the national coaching schemes would have demonstrated their potential and, although not all the national coaches had been directly involved with elite athletes, there was an underlying optimism that, because they had travelled the country and educated a large contingent of honorary coaches, these men would then have been able to make an impact. While there had been little expectation that British athletes would have regained former standards of performance,90 there was a belief that the recent advances made in coaching and training should have resulted in a more successful overall team performance. The potential beneﬁt that coaching could have on performance had been highlighted by the fact that, ‘the one athlete who obtained whole time professional coaching broke a world record’ and, far from suggesting that British coaches did not have the technical knowledge to produce medallists, it was argued that ‘our coaches are as well-equipped in the details of their craft as any foreign land’. What was clear was that, if Britain was to keep pace with countries where employing professional coaching was accepted practice, then further initiatives would be required. Imme- diately following the Games, the AAA vowed that ‘in the future, some personal instruction will be given’ in order to achieve a ‘much better showing’ at the 1952 Games, although it was recognized that any such developments would probably not reach their full potential until 1956.91

Athletics

Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 The Olympic success of Gardner had highlighted the beneﬁts of intensive training. Despite failing to achieve gold she had managed to equal the world record after only one season of hurdling through following a thorough and methodological coaching programme developed by Dyson, who had accurately predicted her success in the knowledge that ‘her competitive temperament is excellent. We need to have no fears of her “going to pieces” in the Games’. Prior to the Games, Gardner had been training on average four times a week, considered a relatively heavy schedule in 1948, and each training session included a warm-up and cool-down as well as working towards a speciﬁc aim by minimizing faults. Dyson provided Gardner with a set of ‘Golden Rules’ that he would reinforce every session, one of which read, 94 Post-1945 coaching initiatives If there is any question of leaving work out for the day’s training, leave out the work you LIKE. Discipline yourself in this way – tackle the not-so-pleasant task – and you will reap your reward the next day.

He had also encouraged her to keep a daily training diary through which he could monitor not only her physical state but also how she was coping mentally.92 It was clear to AAA officials that the level of personal coaching attention provided to Gardner had made her more successful than if she had trained alone, and that there were many similar athletes ‘not receiving the assistance from a coach who is qualified to coach them up to international standard’.93 In November 1948, a ‘Coaching Active Athletes for International Competition’ scheme was proposed and this was initiated in January 1949,94 the purpose being to ‘provide coaching or advice for athletes who show promise of reaching international standard’. Although there was some initial hesitation from both the AAA and the Ministry, the scheme was approved, provided that it could be guaranteed that no more than one-third of the national coach’s workload would be devoted to coaching athletes.95 Provisions were made so that each national coach could work with up to eight athletes of particular promise and coach them over a period of many months or years.96 The remaining athletes (the saturation point of the scheme was established at 150 athletes) would be placed with honorary senior coaches and other honorary coaches recommended by the AAA. The AAA Committee made it clear that no athlete would be compelled to join the scheme, or forced to accept any form of coaching, and that their main focus remained on the development of a contingent of honorary coaches.97 The overall coaching programme remained reliant on volunteerism, a central pillar of amateurism, and even the national coaches would receive no extra remuneration for their work with elite athletes so, they too, were essentially coaching on a voluntary basis. Although the scheme initially only catered for athletes who had placed in the first three in National or Area, Senior or Junior Championships, as it grew in popularity the AAA were able to consider applications from top six finishers.98 By 1954, the ‘Active Athletes’ programme had assisted over 250 athletes and a review of the long-term efficacy of the scheme suggested that it had been effective in about 75 per cent of cases.99 However, as the scheme expanded, the Ministry, who carefully monitored the programme, began to view it with a degree of suspicion because they felt the main purpose of their grant-aid was being over-

Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 looked. Although they could see the benefit of using national coaches in this way, they regarded ‘this side of the work as incidental to the main function of the coaches’ and they were concerned ‘that employment in other fields may possibly interfere with their full use in being available for the work which they are primarily appointed’.100 The AAA assured them that the coaching of athletes consisted of no more than one-third of a national coach’s work and the reports sent to the Ministry confirmed this. Somewhat reluctantly, the Ministry allowed the scheme to continue but, once the AAA had been made aware of their reservations, it may have made the Association more cautious about developing the scheme further. Post-1945 coaching initiatives 95 Swimming In reviewing the Olympic Games, Koskie commented that ‘with all things considered the team put up a very good performance’. Although it was accepted ‘that world beaters cannot be developed in a few months’ there was a desire to improve significantly on a single bronze medal before the Helsinki Games in 1952. Koskie developed a list of suggestions for the future which he hoped would ensure that the steady development of British swimming would continue.101 He recommended that good relationships between leading swimmers and bath managers should be encouraged, commenting, ‘I consider an enthusiastic bath manager to be our best friend’ because ‘he can do more than anybody else in assisting the development of champion swimmers’.102 This view was later reinforced by Hamilton Smith who explained ‘there was no coach, I coached from a book … I was coaching myself’. In his first year of college he had the key to Paisley Baths in Scotland and he used to ‘get the 6 o’clock bus go down, open the baths … went in did my training, on my own, nobody else in the building’.103 Smith noted that if he had not been granted the use of the baths in this way then he would not have had the time to complete the training required to remain at the elite level. Koskie also recommended that the Loughborough Summer School become a fixed annual event under the direction of Max Madders and that a ‘top-class’ American coach be asked to visit. He noted how successful the American swim team had been at the 1948 Olympics and argued that if Britain was to attain similar levels of performance then they would need to learn from, and adopt, some of their principles. This American coach should attend the Loughborough Summer School, to supervise the training of each swimmer and to offer advice to coaches, as well as travelling the country to present lectures on the principles of training and stroke technique and to provide training sessions.104 Encouraged by Koskie’s comments, Carl Wootton of the Sciverers Swimming Club in Hove organized the visit of Matt Mann, later to be American Olympic coach for the 1952 Games, and his Michigan State University team in August 1951.105 Although the ASA Committee fully supported this initiative they had made no plans to organize such a visit and without the intervention of Wootton and others this venture, which stimulated significant interest within British swimming, would not have occurred. Considering that amateurism was so ingrained within the ASA hierarchy it might appear somewhat surprising that they would encourage the infiltration of specialized ‘foreign’ methods of coaching and training, Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 but the initiative met all amateur guidelines since Mann was not receiving any form of payment for his services and he even paid his own airfare. Mann visited Britain with his Michigan squad between 25 August and 17 September 1951 and travelled the country to provide demonstrations.106 Hamilton Smith described his own experience of one of these events:

We got there and we were put into groups and there was about a million of us … you just swam across the width and he was on the end and one of his swimmers was down the pool for each group and I was in the shallow end … and I started 96 Post-1945 coaching initiatives swimming breaststroke and this guy … Burwell Jones … looked at me and he said ‘hey coach’, he called Matt Mann over and he said, ‘what do you think of this’, and Matt Mann looked at me and he said ‘oooh’ he says ‘son’ I can remember it like it was yesterday, ‘You should swim fly!’ and … that made me think and I started swimming butterfly and I became the first Scottish butterfly champion and I was Scottish butterfly champion for five years. All because that man, that great coach, looked at me and he said ‘You should swim fly!’ and I can hear it like it was yesterday.107

It seems then that Mann, like Dyson, possessed an expert ‘coach’s eye’. Towards the end of his visit it was arranged that he would run a swimming clinic in Hove for potential Olympians and a number of coaches so that they could be familiarized with American coaching methods. Each district had the opportunity to nominate two swimmers and two coaches who they believed would beneﬁt. The ASA Committee clearly saw this as an opportunity to raise the standard of the 1952 British Olympic swim team and agreed to cover the cost of the clinic but they were saved from honouring this commitment when the News Chronicle agreed to pay all the expenses. The consensus of everyone involved was that the time spent with Mann and his squad had been both successful and instructive, although there were those who believed it was too little too late to have any impact on swimming results at the 1952 Games.108 Unlike other countries, Britain had ‘not got down to selecting a team to get into training – or even get accustomed to playing as a team’ and, although it was agreed swimmers would beneﬁt immensely from American coaching methods, considering the state of British swimming it needed ‘all the boost it can get’. As one journalist bemoaned, ‘Why, oh why, do we always leave everything to the last moment’.109

Conclusion The evidence clearly suggests that, even though British sport was gradually becoming more accommodating to coaching in the immediate post-war period, NGBs remained wary of the intentions of professional coaches and, in order to remain in control of their sports, they continuously placed restrictions on the activities of the national coaches. However, even though these coaches had to function within limitations, they were gradually being granted permission to work

Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 directly with athletes, something which suggested a gradual loosening of amateur constraints. This emphasizes once again the ﬂuid nature of amateurism, which was continuing to shift subtly, and almost imperceptibly, towards an acceptance of the kind of coaching support that had long been commonplace elsewhere in the world. This late start for British coaches, however, meant that, even though they were slowly beginning to integrate different coaching and training practices, they were constantly outstripped by coaches from abroad who were utilizing ever more specialized techniques. This was particularly true of the Americans, of course, who had been applying systematic coaching methods to their sport for over ﬁfty years, but, as the Games became ever more important in the context of the Cold War, which Post-1945 coaching initiatives 97 developed rapidly after 1945, it was the Soviet Union and its satellites that began to take centre stage.

Notes 1 James Chapman, ‘British Cinema and “The People’s War”’,inMillions Like Us: British Culture in the Second World War, ed. Nick Hayes and Jeff Hill (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1999), 58–59. 2 Geoffrey G. Field, Blood, Sweat, and Toil: Remaking the British Working Class, 1939–1945 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 371. 3 Arthur Marwick, Britain in the Century of Total War: War, Peace and Social Change 1900–1967 (Middlesex: Penguin Books Ltd, 1968), 291; Robert Mackay, The Test of War: Inside Britain 1939–1945 (London: Taylor & Francis, 1999), 59; Eric Russell Chamberlain, Life in Britain (London: B.T. Batsford Ltd, 1972), 183; Thomas William Heyck, A History of the Peoples of the British Isles: From 1870 to the Present (London: Routledge, 2002), 205; Juliet Gardiner, Wartime Britain 1939–1945 (London: Headline Book Publishing, 2004), 501, 579, 580–581. 4 Mackay, Test of War, 16. 5 Gardiner, Wartime Britain, 587. 6 Norman Baker, ‘The Amateur Ideal in a Society of Equality: Change and Continuity in Post-Second World War British Sport, 1945–48’, International Journal of the History of Sport 12, no. 1 (1995): 100. 7 University of Birmingham Physical Education Department, Britain in the World of Sport: An Examination of the Factors Involved in Participation in Competitive Inter- national Sport (Birmingham: The Physical Education Association, 1956), 7. 8 Hylton Cleaver, ‘Rowing’,inThe Sports Book: Britain’s Prospects in the Olympic Games and in Sport Generally, ed. James Rivers (London: MacDonald and Co. Ltd, 1948), 97–98. 9 John Macadam, ‘Britain’s Failures Make Us Tired’, Daily Express, February 6, 1947, 6. 10 Frank Rostorn, ‘Wimbledon Goes Wild as Empire Pair Win’, Daily Express, June 26, 1947, 6; Frank Butler, ‘We Don’t Like It, Mr Bromwich’, Daily Express, June 18, 1947, 4. 11 Norman Baker, ‘Sport and National Prestige: The Case of Britain 1945–48’, Sporting Traditions 12, no. 2 (1996): 86. 12 F.A.M. Webster, ‘The Olympic Games’, The Times, July 1, 1946, 5. 13 Baker, ‘Sport and National Prestige’, 86. 14 The Times, May 19, 1947, 2. 15 John Macadam, ‘We Must Stop Playing Games’, Daily Express, November 10, 1947, 4. 16 The Times, January 30, 1947, 2. 17

Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 AAA Development Committee, April 27, July 27, 1946, File 1/2/10, AAA Collection, Birmingham Archives (hereafter cited as AAA: Birmingham). 18 AAA Development Committee, October 12, 1946, File 1/2/10, AAA: Birmingham. 19 AAA Coaching Committee, January 27, 1949, File 1/2/13/1, AAA: Birmingham; E.J. Holt to Colonel Parker, March 5, 1947, File ED 169/30, Ministry of Education and Department of Education and Science Collection: AAA – Coaching 1947–55, National Archives, Kew (hereafter cited as MoE: AAA, NA); AAA National Coaches General Policy, 1, File ED 169/30, MoE: AAA, NA. 20 Peter Lovesey, The Official Centenary History of the Amateur Athletic Association (Enfield: Guinness Superlatives, 1979), 122. 21 AAA Development Committee, October 12, December 7, 1946, File 1/2/10, AAA: Birmingham. 98 Post-1945 coaching initiatives 22 E.J. Holt to Colonel Parker, March 5, 1947, File ED 169/30, MoE: AAA, NA. 23 Oxford University Athletic Club (OUAC) Committee Meeting, October 16, 1928, Oxford University Athletic Club Archives, Oxford (hereafter cited as OUAC Archives). 24 E.H.L. Clynes to Ministry of Education, August 25, 1947, File ED 169/30, MoE: AAA, NA. 25 Department of Education, Education Act, 1944, 7 & 8 Geo. 6, c. 31, section 53, 43. 26 AAA to Ministry of Education, July 3, 1947, File ED 169/29, MoE: AAA, NA. 27 The Times, August 13, 1952, 5. 28 AAA National Coaches General Policy, 1, 4, File ED 169/30, MoE: AAA, NA; Lovesey, Official Centenary, 122. 29 F.W. Collins, ‘Training of Athletes’, The Times, August 20, 1948, 5. 30 E.H.L. Clynes to F.G. Ward, February 11, 1949, File ED 169/30, MoE: AAA, NA. 31 AAA General Committee, October 20, 1948, File 1/2/2; AAA Coaching Commit- tee, November 13, 1948, 1/2/13/1; January 1, January 27, April 21, 1949, File 1/ 2/13/1. All AAA: Birmingham. 32 AAA Coaching Committee, December 20, 1947, File 1/2/13/1, AAA: Birmingham. 33 Lovesey, Official Centenary, 122. 34 John Disley, ‘Reflections on Soviet Sport’, Physical Recreation, no. 1 (1956): 71. 35 AAA Coaching Committee, August 26, 1948, File 1/2/13/1, AAA: Birmingham. 36 AAA Coaching Committee, March 9, 1948, File 1/2/13/1, AAA: Birmingham. 37 Tom McNab, interview, May 6, 2011, St Albans. 38 Frank Ross, ‘Play to Win’, Daily Graphic, March 14, 1949. 39 Ron Marshall, ‘Geoff Dyson’, Glasgow Herald, February 6, 1981, 23. 40 Neil Allen, ‘Once He Slept on London’sEmbankment’, World Sports, Spring 1965, 9. 41 British Army, ‘Regular Army: Certificate of Service’ 108; British Army, ‘Army Certi- ficate of Education: First Class’, October 11, 1933, Private Collection: Dyson Family. 42 Allen, ‘Once He Slept on London’s Embankment’. 43 F.A.M. Webster, ‘The Man Who Knows It All’, The Amateur Athlete, July, 1947, 15; Tony Ward, ‘Echoes of Infamy’, Running Magazine, April, 1987, File HA Box 3, AAA: Birmingham. 44 British Army, ‘Certificate of Transfer or Re-Transfer to the Army Reserve, Discharge or Disembodiment’, August 27, 1939, Private Collection: Dyson Family. 45 Webster, ‘The Man Who Knows It All’. 46 The War Office to Major G.H.G. Dyson, January 15, 1947, Private Collection: Dyson Family. 47 Webster, ‘The Man Who Knows It All’. 48 Christopher Brasher, ‘Dyson of Athletics’, Observer, November 3, 1957, 23. 49 M.C. Noakes, ‘Report of the Work of the Coaching Sub-Committee since Its Appointment’, File ED 169/30, MoE: AAA, NA. 50 Ward, ‘Echoes of Infamy’. 51 Brasher, ‘Dyson of Athletics’. 52

Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 Tom McNab, interview. 53 Picture Post, May 1, 1948, 22; August 12, 1950, 27. 54 Judith Rawlins (née Dyson), August 11, 2011. 55 Picture Post, August 12, 1950, 27; ‘Sport Needs Unity’, Private Collection: Dyson Family; Geoffrey Dyson, ‘Development of Coaching’, The Straits Times, September 21, 1950. 56 Geoffrey Dyson, ‘Forty Years On: Some Thoughts on Coaching and Development’ (Paper Presented at the International Olympic Academy Nineteenth Session, Olympia, July 6–19, 1979), 210. 57 AAA Coaching Committee, May 6, November 12, 1949, File 1/2/13/1; AAA Report of the Coaching Committee Agenda Item 8, November 12, 1949, File 1/2/ 13/1. Both AAA: Birmingham. Post-1945 coaching initiatives 99 58 ‘Joint Effort’, Private Collection: Dyson Family. 59 ‘Robot for Record Breakers’, Private Collection: Dyson Family; Geoffrey Dyson, ‘The Use of Coaching Films’, The Straits Times, September 25, 1950. 60 Christopher Brasher, ‘Hail and Farewell’, Private Collection: Dyson Family. 61 Geoffrey Dyson, interview by Tom McNab, 1970. 62 Brasher, ‘Hail and Farewell’. 63 ‘Exports’, Athletics Weekly, April 25, 1964. 64 Brasher, ‘Hail and Farewell’. 65 A.H.E. Fern to Colonel Parker, November 23, 1946, File ED 169/70; Ministry of Education to A.H.E. Fern, November 29, 1947, File ED 169/70, MoE: ASA, NA. 66 A.H.E. Fern to Colonel Parker, September 15, 1948, File ED 169/70, MoE: ASA, NA. 67 A.H.E. Fern to Colonel Parker, October 15, 1947, File 169/70; R.B. Martin to G.W. Hedley, December 13, 1947, File ED 169/70, MoE: ASA, NA. 68 ASA Annual Report 1947 – Committee, March 8, 1947, 17, ASA Headquarters (hereafter cited as ASA). 69 Swimming Times, June, 1946, 5. 70 Evening Sentinel, March 11, 1946, 4. 71 ASA Annual Report 1946 –‘ASA National Appeal’, 5, ASA. 72 ASA Annual Report 1946 –‘Interim Report of English Members of the Olympic Games (1948) Management Committee’, 18, ASA. 73 ASA Annual Report 1947 –‘First Special Training Course Loughborough College, August 2–16, 1947’, 35, ASA. 74 ASAAnnualReport1948–‘Olympic Games (1948) Preparation 2nd Special Training Course Loughborough College, March 26–April 4, 1948’,29–31, ASA. 75 Harry Koskie, ‘Points to Be Pondered No. 19’, 1948, ASA. 76 ASA Annual Report 1947 –‘Olympic Games (1948) Management Committee, November 15, 1947’, 43, ASA. 77 John Wheatley, ‘Experience Tells’, Athletics Weekly, July, 1958, 2. 78 OUAC, ‘Coaching Problems 1949–1950’, OUAC Archives. 79 Ibid. 80 OUAC, ‘The Coach’, 1953, OUAC Archives. 81 Norman Baker, ‘Olympics or Tests: The Disposition of the British Sporting Public, 1948’, Sporting Traditions 11, no. 1 (1994): 59; ‘The Setting of the Games’, The Times, May 8, 1948, 5. 82 Cecil W. Cooke, ‘The Olympic Games’, The Times, June 10, 1946, 5. 83 Frank Butler, ‘Our Olympic Men Have No Tracks’, Daily Express, May 23, 1947, 6. 84 Melvin Patton, interview by Margaret Costa, December, 1999, Amateur Athletic Foundation of Los Angeles Collection, www.la84foundation.org/6oic/OralHistory/ OHpatton.pdf (accessed June 26, 2012). 85 Janie Hampton, The Austerity Olympics: When the Games Came to London in 1948 (London: Aurum Press, 2008), 75–76. 86 ASA Annual Report 1948 –‘Report of the Olympic Games (1948) Management ’ –‘

Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 Committee , 28, ASA; ASA Annual Report 1948 Olympic Games 1948 Hon. Team Manager’s Report’,31–33, ASA. 87 Frank Rostron, ‘Half-Time: The Gloomy Ones Were Wrong’, Daily Express,August6, 1948, 2; British Olympic Committee, The Ofﬁcial Report of the Organising Committee for the XIV Olympiad (London: Organising Committee for the XIV Olympiad, 1948), 106–107. 88 Baker, ‘Sport and National Prestige’, 91. 89 The Times, August 18, 1948, 5; Sporting Mirror, May 7, 1948, 12. 90 University of Birmingham, Britain in World Sport,7. 91 F.W. Collins, ‘Training of Athletes’, The Times, August 20, 1948, 5. 92 Judith Rawlins (nee Dyson), August 11, 2011; Geoffrey Dyson, Maureen’s Training Programme – Situation at the End of 1947, Private Collection: Dyson Family. 100 Post-1945 coaching initiatives 93 AAA ‘Coaching Bulletin’, May, 1949, 23–24, File ED 169/30, MoE: AAA, NA. 94 AAA Coaching Committee, November 13, 1948, File 1/2/13/1, AAA: Birmingham. 95 Ministry of Education, Minute Sheet bo5a/46, March 5, 1955, File ED 169/30, MoE: AAA, NA. 96 AAA ‘National Coaches General Policy’, 6, File ED 169/30, MoE: AAA, NA. 97 AAA Coaching Committee, November 13, 1948, File 1/2/13/1, AAA: Birmingham. 98 AAA Coaching Committee, January 1, 1954, File 1/2/13/1, AAA: Birmingham. 99 Ibid.; AAA Coaching Committee, August 19, 1956, File 1/2/13/1, AAA: Birmingham. 100 Ministry of Education, Minute Sheet bo5a/46, March 5, 1955, File ED 169/30, MoE: AAA, NA. 101 ASA Annual Report 1948 –‘Olympic Games 1948 Hon. Team Manager’s Report’, 33, ASA. 102 Harry Koskie, ‘Suggestions for the Future’, October, 1948, ASA. 103 Hamilton Smith, interview, July 27, 2011, Edinburgh, Scotland. 104 Koskie, ‘Suggestions for the Future’. 105 ASA Annual Report 1951 – Committee, March 3, 1951, 10, ASA. 106 Peter Wilson, ‘Swim Tourists’, Daily Express, April 26, 1951, 6; Carl Wootton, Letter to the Editor, The Times, February 15, 1952, 7; ASA Annual Report 1951 – Committee, April 6–7, 1951, 12, ASA. 107 Hamilton Smith, interview. 108 ASA Annual Report 1951 – Committee, April 6–7, 1951, 17, 24, ASA. 109 Wilson, ‘Swim Tourists’.

Bibliography Baker, Norman. ‘Olympics or Tests: The Disposition of the British Sporting Public, 1948’. Sporting Traditions 11, no. 1 (1994): 57–74. Baker, Norman. ‘The Amateur Ideal in a Society of Equality: Change and Continuity in Post-Second World War British Sport, 1945–48’. International Journal of the History of Sport 12, no. 1 (1995): 99–126. Baker, Norman. ‘Sport and National Prestige: The Case of Britain 1945–48’. Sporting Traditions 12, no. 2 (1996): 81–97. Chamberlain, Eric Russell. Life in Britain (London: B.T. Batsford Ltd, 1972). Chapman, James. ‘British Cinema and “The People’s War”’,inMillions Like Us? British Culture in the Second World War, eds Nick Hayes and Jeff Hill (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1999), 58–59. Cleaver, Hylton. ‘Rowing’,inThe Sports Book: Britain’s Prospects in the Olympic Games and in Sport Generally, ed. James Rivers (London: MacDonald and Co. Ltd, 1948), 97–98. ‘ ﬂ ’ –

Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 Disley, John. Re ections on Soviet Sport . Physical Recreation, no. 1 (1956): 71 72. Dyson, Geoffrey. ‘Forty Years On: Some Thoughts on Coaching and Development’. Paper presented at the International Olympic Academy Nineteenth Session, Olympia, July 6–19, 1979. Field, Geoffrey G. Blood, Sweat, and Toil: Remaking the British Working Class, 1939–1945 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). Gardiner, Juliet. Wartime Britain 1939–1945 (London: Headline Book Publishing, 2004). Hampton, Janie. The Austerity Olympics: When the Games Came to London in 1948 (London: Aurum Press, 2008). Heyck, Thomas William. A History of the Peoples of the British Isles: From 1870 to the Present (London: Routledge, 2002). Post-1945 coaching initiatives 101 Lovesey, Peter. The Ofﬁcial Centenary History of the Amateur Athletic Association (Enﬁeld: Guinness Superlatives, 1979). Mackay, Robert. The Test of War: Inside Britain 1939–1945 (London: Taylor & Francis, 1999). Marwick, Arthur. Britain in the Century of Total War: War Peace and Social Change 1900–1967 (Middlesex: Penguin Books Ltd, 1968). University of Birmingham Physical Education Department. Britain in the World of Sport: An Examination of the Factors Involved in Participation in Competitive International Sport (Birmingham: The Physical Education Association, 1956). Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 5 British coaching in the 1950s and 1960s

Introduction The London Olympics in 1948 were viewed by many British commentators as having been successful in organizational terms, despite all the difficulties associated with post-war austerity, but even the most optimistic of observers could not have claimed that it had been anything less than disappointing with respect to British performances. While much of the subsequent rhetoric reflected the prevailing opinion that the war had affected the nation’s competitiveness, this perspective was no longer supportable during the 1950s when Olympic performances continued to fall below expectations. As criticism mounted, the National Governing Bodies (NGBs) for swimming and athletics turned their attention to dealing with their coaching structures and their coaches, although, in both cases, officials struggled to come to terms with the contradictions between their sporting ideals and the ambitions of professional coaches. Irrespective of what was happening elsewhere on the global stage, and there were many administrators who acknowledged that British sport was falling behind the rest of the world, the men in charge of NGBs found it almost impossible to leave their traditional prejudices about career coaches behind. While subsequent chapters discuss how international influences eventually impacted on national attitudes to coaching, this section of the text takes time to consider these tensions purely in the British context by using primary material to explore the difficulties faced by senior coaches of the period, through their experiences and through their voices. What emerges is a narrative that highlights the ongoing influence of amateurism in these men’s working environments, the values of which were never really compatible with the competitive instincts of the Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 coaches themselves.

Athletics In athletics, the relationships between British coaches and administrators remained characterized by the establishment continually refusing to accommodate the views of professional coaches, even though the emergence of the Soviet Union, with its use of the Olympic Games as a way of demonstrating national superiority, was leading to a significant increase in the appointment of professional coaches abroad. British coaching in the 1950s and 1960s 103 National coach Geoff Dyson and his colleagues could see that these individuals were receiving a salary that was commensurate with their status and that they had the respect and support of their officials, something which coaches in Britain were unlikely to achieve while amateurism continued to dominate as a sporting philosophy. Amateur officials often believed they understood the ‘simple’ mechanics of coaching. Les Truelove, who took over from Jack Crump as British team manager, often referred to coaching as ‘90 per cent kidology’ and outwardly expressed the view that he did ‘not believe in coaching’, an opinion which probably reflected the majority opinion of administrators.1 This perspective on the value of the coaching role resulted in frequent disagreements between administrators and the national coaches, particularly Dyson. Many officials felt that the work of the national coaches did not warrant any degree of status and they made no attempt to mediate an approach which would ultimately mark the beginning of the end of Dyson’s role as national coach.2 In 1957, Dyson had accompanied the British athletics team on a tour of Poland and Germany during which Crump, the team manager, failed to consult Dyson before making changes to the order of the relay team, a decision that resulted in a less than satisfactory performance. Dyson demanded to be allowed to return home and, although he was eventually persuaded to stay, the rift between Dyson and Crump was almost irreparable.3 Once the press learnt of Crump’s actions, criticisms of the ‘pig-headed’ administrators and an ‘out of touch’ system began to surface.4 It had become clear that Dyson was being consistently undervalued, especially when it was revealed that his role in Warsaw consisted of ‘weighing a discus, a javelin and a hammer’, tasks, it was suggested, ‘which an office boy … might be required to do’.5 One reporter was appalled because ‘surely the job of chief coach in this country’s athletics organization entitles him to a more official position than implement checker on a foreign tour’.6 The options were clear. If Britain was to continue to improve in athletics then coaches were a necessity and in order for the coaches to perform to their potential they needed to be ‘treated better than native bearers’.7 Dyson voiced his own opinion in July 1958, when he stated that he had ‘always approved of the British system where coaches serve under honorary team managers’ but he believed that the team manager should only overrule the coach’s decision regarding technical matters in the ‘most exceptional circumstances’. Although no coach could be a ‘100 per cent expert’ in all track and field events, he believed that professional coaches who had been ‘at it for years’ and taught and

Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 coached athletics full-time were probably more qualified to make technical decisions than a ‘part-time administrative official’.8 For their part, administrators actually saw no need for a coach at international competitions, suggesting that it was unnecessary because they believed that anyone had the ability to make successful last-minute changes. Thus, there was no issue with someone like Crump making the changes that he did. Dyson’s response was simple. If, after all the time of working with professional coaches, administrators still thought they could make technical alterations without harming performances then it was clear that nothing had progressed and they still did ‘not understand the nature of coaching’.9 Com- menting on the events of the 1957 Poland tour, Tom McNab observed that 104 British coaching in the 1950s and 1960s Crump’s behaviour made Dyson reassess his position as chief coach because it was becoming increasingly apparent that, even after eleven years, the sport had made very little progress in terms of embracing professional coaching. Overruling Dyson on coaching matters almost certainly encouraged him to move to a different environment which would place more value on his expertise as a coach.10 Attempts to undermine Dyson were constant. Dennis Watts, rather than Dyson, was selected to accompany the British team to the Commonwealth Games in 1958, and then later in the year at the European Championships in Stockholm when the Amateur Athletic Association (AAA) made their first appointment of a team coach, rather than a mere observer, they selected John Le Masurier to travel with the team. While Dyson’s absence from this coaching role came as a surprise to many, Dyson had been expecting it and, although the appointment of a team coach could be seen as a defining moment, for the AAA a more likely reason for this selection was its potential to aggravate Dyson.11 Considering that the AAA now frequently referred to Dyson as the ‘Little Caesar’ it is unsurprising that when he offered his services to the 1959 Russian Tour, an act which the AAA believed was an attempt to bolster his own profile, they refused to accept, claiming that only one coach could be sent with the team, because of financial reasons, and that Lionel Pugh had already been appointed. However, when the International Athletes Club (IAC), founded in 1958 as a forum for British international athletes,12 discovered that Dyson had been omitted on financial grounds they proposed covering all his expenses. While the IAC were convinced the AAA would ‘somehow try to wiggle out of accepting this gesture to a man who has done much for and received little from British athletics’ they wanted to demonstrate the level of support Dyson had from the athletes.13 As they predicted, the AAA refused to accept their offer with Harold Abrahams claiming that the reasons for not taking two coaches with the team ran much deeper than mere finances, although he refused to elaborate further as to what the exact reasons were.14 In another public act of blatant disregard for Dyson’s value as a coach, the AAA tried to ensure that he would not be involved with the 1960 Olympic team. However, this attempt backfired when Truelove fell ill and was unable to manage the team and so Dyson had to be appointed as unofficial team manager.15 Following the series of disputes between Dyson and the AAA, one press report commented that a simple way to avoid further disagreements would be to ‘just treat him as the chief coach!’.16 However, in a final move that would ensure

Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 Dyson’s resignation, the AAA commissioned a confidential inquiry in April 1959 into the terms and conditions of the national coaching roles. Harold Abrahams’ nephew, Anthony Abrahams, was appointed to conduct the review and he presented his main conclusions to the AAA in September 1959 (a full written review being subsequently published in November 1959). Abrahams praised the coaching scheme, referring to it as ‘first class’ and suggested that employing ‘professional servants’ to train amateur coaches was of great importance to the development of a sport like athletics. Echoing the sentiments of his uncle, he commented that its development had been ‘particularly British’ and suggested that the main successes of the scheme were the result of the AAA’s ability to resist ‘the temptation to British coaching in the 1950s and 1960s 105 concentrate the efforts of its professional coaches upon a few super-athletes in an attempt to win gold medals’. In other countries, there had been active encouragement of this use of coaches and, although in many cases this had resulted in greater international success, this had reduced the professional coach to a ‘ruthless demi-god’ who dispensed his ‘cracker-barrel philosophy’ to his charges. He believed that the AAA scheme had greater value than those abroad because it had ‘been built on a broader, more educational basis and … in a more wholesome way’.17 Interestingly, it had been suggested to Abrahams that the appointment of a Director of Coaching would allow the scheme to expand and ensure that the national coaches were being utilized in the most beneficial way. As this is now a successful and integral part of both coaching and administration in many sports it might be assumed that such an opportunity would have been actively encouraged. However, Abrahams rejected the suggestion, arguing that employing a Director would be a waste of money since ‘the chief national coach is completely competent to deal with current technical problems’.18 In many respects, Abrahams’ findings reflected what was being expected of the national coaches. Although they were only paid at college lecturer rates, their role involved not only an extensive range of demanding duties but also significant amounts of travel, which often resulted in working a large number of unsociable hours.19 During one year, for example, John Le Masurier spent a total of forty Saturdays and Sundays away from home on AAA business. However, there was an ongoing assumption within the AAA that the national coaches were being offered extremely good terms of employment and that if these coaches were to seek employment elsewhere they would not receive comparable salaries. After reviewing the employment conditions, Abrahams was inclined to disagree, noting that if the coaches were to take up teaching and lecturing posts they ‘could earn, quite easily, what the Association at present pays them’. Not only could they earn more they would also ‘have less arduous jobs and a more settled home life’.20 This view was reinforced when Jim Alford, described by Dyson as one as of the finest athletics coaches in the world, resigned from his post in 1961 following his appointment as chief coach to Northern Rhodesia where, it was said, he had been offered better terms of employment and a much higher salary. Alford’s example highlights the issues that many British sporting administrators had with professional coaching. While Britain had long been considered one of the world’sleading sporting nations, although admittedly not in terms of recent performances, the

Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 organization was unwilling to offer a more attractive contract than a much less affluent nation such as Northern Rhodesia in order to retain the services of one of their leading athletics coaches. While the AAA claimed that Alford’s resignation was primarily due to his securing a more lucrative contract abroad, it seems that there were many underlying reasons, mostly associated with the legacy of amateurism, which had influenced his departure. The AAA’s determination to ensure that national coaches remained under their strict control and that they were never allowed to fully develop as professional coaches were clearly important factors behind his decision. Alford commented that he was fed up with the attitude of AAA officials because ‘they look down on us coaches because we are professionals; distrust our 106 British coaching in the 1950s and 1960s work and our motives; insult us by sending us to important international events as observers who are not allowed to help our own athletes’.21 Anthony Abrahams had observed the national coaches in a working environment, seemingly experiencing first-hand quite how laborious and demanding the national coaching role had become, and he described Dennis Watts as having been ‘steadily overworked for the past eleven years’.22 As a result he advised that the coaching salaries be increased from £1,200 to £1,370 per year (deemed the equivalent of a Senior Lecturer salary) and that the chief coach should always be paid £350 above what the other national coaches received. He suggested that if this could not be met due to financial constraints then the national coaches should be told ‘as soon as possible as it may well be that several of them would then wish to seek other employment’.23 The AAA had commissioned this review, at least partly, because they saw it as an opportunity to ensure that Dyson would not be willing to accept any new terms of employment and leave the role of chief coach. Their plan appeared to be a success when, in December 1960, Dyson submitted his resignation and, although this was quickly retracted, the AAA had no issues with leaking his supposedly confidential resignation to the press. However, far from turning public opinion against Dyson as had been hoped, the reaction to Dyson’s resignation was incre- dulous, and many athletes and sporting officials came forward to praise his efforts and demonstrate their support. Don Anthony, a finalist in the hammer at the 1956 Games stated, ‘It will put athletics back a dozen years, Dyson is almost irreplaceable. His appointment was one of the most progressive steps ever made in British athletics’ while shot-putter Arthur Rowe suggested that ‘this is a very serious loss to British athletics. Geoff is one of the finest coaches in the world … an expert in all aspects of sport’.24 Regardless of the level of public support for Dyson the AAA seemed determined to ensure that he left his post, so, in a move that completely disregarded the recommendations of Abrahams’ report, a decision was made to remove the £350 differential in salary between the chief coach and the other national coaches, although this was subsequently reversed.25 Perhaps this had been done to annoy Dyson and to guarantee he would not accept the new terms of employment but, when he requested an opportunity to discuss these events, his opinions were simply disregarded. It was commented that

The Chief National Coach asked permission to make a statement regarding

Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 National Coaches. This statement dealt at length with feelings of insecurity of position and salary and with the relationship between National Coaches and the Association. A long discussion followed but no action was recommended.26

This confrontational approach, coupled with years of struggle over amateurism and the role of the professional coach, resulted in Dyson’s decision to leave. Despite the coaching scheme owing ‘much of its shape and a good deal of its success to his personal efforts’, it was noted in the minutes, without thanks (which had been commonplace upon the resignation of previous coaches), that Dyson had resigned on 1 September 1961 with six months’ pay.27 In answering British coaching in the 1950s and 1960s 107 questions about why the AAA had been willing to grant this amount, a letter to the Ministry of Education revealed that Dyson had provided six months’ notice, effective from 1 September 1961 and so, according to his contract, he would have remained in his coaching role until 28 February 1962. The AAA believed it would have been ‘extremely embarrassing to have to keep him employed until then, in view of his openly expressed criticism of their policy in respect of their coaching scheme’ and so they wished to ‘terminate his employment on 1st September by paying him six months’ salary and then getting rid of him’.28 The AAA asked the Ministry that, in light of the situation, to continue to pay the grant intended for Dyson’s salary so that it could be used in a severance package. Although the Ministry sympathized, they were unwilling to pay for a coach who would no longer be carrying out his required duties and so they advised the AAA that if they were unwilling to keep Dyson in their employment they should ‘cut [their] losses, pay Mr Dyson what his contract required them to pay, and get rid of him on the 1st September’.29 In the end, the AAA were so determined not to have Dyson that they were willing to pay his remaining salary from their own funds rather than letting him complete his notice while having the benefitoffinancial support from the Ministry. Before Dyson left for Canada, a presentation was organized by those who recognized that he had made a difference to British sport, although only one AAA official was in attendance, a clear indication of the low esteem in which Dyson was held by amateur administrators.30 Tom McNab, who was appointed as an AAA National Coach shortly after Dyson resigned, noted that a monetary collection had been organized for Dyson but, far from receiving significant support from the clubs and athletes he had assisted over the years, only twelve out of 2,000 clubs contributed, even though it was frequently being reported that the athletic community were unhappy about the circumstances of his departure. McNab suggests that Dyson’s resignation and this subsequent lack of support did not provide a great advertisement for anyone thinking of becoming a national coach and potentially ‘tarnished’ how people viewed the role, so much so that there was very little competition for the coaching jobs because

People didn’t want to be involved in it. People advised against it, said you don’t want to do that, look at what happened to the other guys that were in it, look what happened to Dyson. If they get rid of people like Dyson, what 31

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As a result, the position did not attract particularly skilled people with much experience in coaching and many of the individuals who were subsequently appointed had to learn ‘on the job’ how to be a successful national coach.32 Dyson was not the only national coach who resented the lack of cooperation he received from the AAA and, in November 1961, Lionel Pugh followed Dyson and left his post. According to the AAA this was the result of a disagreement regarding the appointment of a team coach for the Empire and Commonwealth Games in 1962.33 Prior to leaving, Pugh commented, quite openly to both the press and 108 British coaching in the 1950s and 1960s the AAA, that he had only been selected for one official English team in ten years and even after he volunteered his service to the British team when they travelled to Paris in September 1961 they decided not to take a coach at all.34 As in previous cases the reasons behind Pugh’s resignation actually went much deeper. On leaving the AAA he stated that he ‘agreed with the principles which Geoff Dyson fought for … let us be honest – most athletic officials do not want coaches with personality who are prepared to speak honestly’.35 The quick succession of three resignations from national coach positions resulted in an open debate about the AAA’s methods and values. Although they had repeatedly claimed the resignations had been entirely the coaches’ decisions it was clear that the unwillingness of the AAA to allow professional coaches the freedom to do their job successfully had left the coaches no other option. All three agreed that they had left because they were ‘frustrated by Victorian-minded administrators who resented their advice’.36 Geoff Elliot, one of Britain’s leading pole-vaulters agreed, commenting that ‘while I would have been willing to admit that a clash of personalities would have led to one resignation. I cannot believe that it has led to three … unless the personality in the wrong is an official of the AAA’. As a result, he explained that he was ‘dissociating’ himself from the AAA because the ‘distasteful events’ which had led to the resignations were ‘unforgivable’.37

Swimming Although there had been references in the 1952 Amateur Swimming Association (ASA) committee minutes to plans for re-opening negotiations with the Ministry of Education regarding grant-aid for coaches, it was not until December 1957 that an official application was submitted.38 Contained within the application was the suggestion that the ASA could extend the scope of the work to which they were already committed ‘if only we had a paid coach’. Harold Fern, who believed that swimming, because it was a life skill, was of greater social value than any other sport, commented, ‘I notice that a grant had been made to the Amateur Fencing Association, no doubt very justifiably, but one can hardly rank fencing in the same category as swimming’ and he suggested that swimming ‘might well be ranked higher than any other sports for which coaching grants are already made’.39 In many respects, this highlighted the ongoing conflict between sports over which

Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 NGBs should receive financial support and resources, and ensured that creating and developing a central organization for sport was always going to be difficult. Many NGBs believed that their sport was somehow superior and any hint that another association was receiving what they considered to be unequal levels of support would immediately engender conflict. It might be assumed that this issue has now been resolved in the twenty-first century and that contemporary NGBs are more willing to co-operate but, because the contemporary sporting environment is fuelled by a demand for results and characterized by greater financial opportunities, inter-organizational rivalry is actually even more prevalent. As Bill Furniss points out, British coaching in the 1950s and 1960s 109 There’s a lot of sports that are envious of other sports and think they’re not getting a fair crack of the whip and now it’s results driven so if you don’t produce the results you don’t get the money … it used to be that sports could get more, a bigger slice of the cake without producing results.40

The Ministry’s response to the ASA’s request for money was lukewarm, possibly as a result of Fern having questioned their administrative methods. They asked the ASA to follow the correct procedure by making an official application and to outline the scheme they intended to implement before they could award any funds.41 According to Ministry officials, merely stating a desire to apply for a grant was not a constructive approach, even if the ASA viewed themselves as superior to other sports. The ASA subsequently submitted a formal application, albeit a very brief one, stating that they wanted to appoint a National Technical Officer (NTO) to organize and direct various courses throughout the country.42 Once again the response was negative, with the Ministry arguing that this was not the ‘kind of scheme to which we can properly give grant aid’ because it was not within their jurisdiction to ‘aid the salaries of organizers’.43 There was a concern that if they were to award funding to the ASA on these grounds they ‘may have other applications following in their footsteps’44 so they directed the ASA to reassess their application and submit it according to grant-aid regulations. Fern responded that the ASA should not be required to amend their paperwork because the Ministry had clearly misinterpreted what had been outlined. The ASA argued they had only used the term National Technical Officer to avoid confusion because individuals who gained the requisite ASA coaching certificate were currently classified as ‘national coaches’. The ASA assured the Ministry that they had every intention of appointing a fully qualified coach and that he would follow the working procedures adopted by the AAA coaches.45 Although a majority of the Ministry Committee were prepared to accept that what the ASA were proposing was a bona fide coaching scheme, some individuals had clearly been irritated by the ASA’s refusal to accept support some eleven years previously. It was noted, for example, that ‘for 10 years we have dangled this carrot for them to take, and a good deal of unobtrusive action has been taken behind the scenes in order to get them to eat it’.46 An objection was also raised on financial grounds with the suggestion that the ASA did not have a particularly strong case in requesting grant-aid because they had £16,000 in the bank and they

Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 were constantly showing a regular surplus. The Ministry ‘should not just spend money because it happens to be available’ and if the ASA were not willing to undertake a coaching scheme without ‘an extra carrot from the Exchequer’ then there was no plausible reason for the ASA to have accumulated such a large reserve.47 It should be noted at this point, however, that this appears to have been a common policy amongst voluntary amateur organizations, many of whom generally had large sums of money available, although they were often reluctant to use them constructively. Even though the ASA argued they were unable to raise funds in a similar fashion to organizations such as the AAA, who had the opportunity to 110 British coaching in the 1950s and 1960s organize competitions and profit from gate money, their financial position remained relatively stable and yet they were reluctant to use their reserves to develop their sport. This perspective is reinforced by paid athletics and swimming coaches employed by NGBs in this period, many of whom recognized that amateur officials were much more inclined to use, although often begrudgingly, their own personal finance to cover their coaches’ expenses rather than drawing on their Association’s money. Both Tom McNab and Hamilton Smith described situations when, having just started in their national coaching role, they required some form of transport in order to fulfil their commitments. Arthur Kendal, the then Southern Counties AAA secretary, asked McNab if he was going to buy a car and, when McNab responded that he was unable to afford one,

He got his cheque book out, this was a guy who was a completely altruistic man, he signed it on the wall I remember and he gave me this cheque! … I always remember that £350 cheque; I mean that was a lot of money in those days, that was a third of my year’s salary that he had given me. And that was his personal cheque; it wasn’t from the governing body.48

Hamilton Smith described a similar scenario during an encounter that he had with Fern:

I asked if the association might be able to give me some money and I could buy a car and I could pay it back. He almost had smoke coming out of his ears. Money! Money! He was trembling, so he changed the subject and we must have talked about something else for a bit and then suddenly his secretary, the famous Miss Righter by name, came in; now how he communicated I don’t know, but she came in with a book like this and he took the book and he opened it up and it was a cheque book, it was his cheque book and he wrote me a cheque, his personal cheque, to go and buy a car. He said pay that back when you can! It was £500 in 1963, that’s the equivalent of £10,000 to £15,000 now … But he wouldn’t give me the association’s money he gave me his own money.49

Smith believed that this ‘aristocratic’, altruistic element was present amongst the majority of amateur ofﬁcials and suggested that it was akin to ‘what was portrayed

Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 in the Chariots of Fire’ in which there was an upper-class element controlling amateur sport. He explained that ‘if you understood that relationship then everything was fine as long as you were positive and respectful’.50 However, problems arose if one questioned either the officials’ authority or the way in which they managed the sport. Although the context in which these organizations operated was ever-changing, their foundations remained essentially the same, as did the values of thrift held by those middle-class individuals who wanted to retain their control over amateur sport. Although there appeared to be little support for awarding the ASA any money, there were those who believed that, despite everything, they had a duty to provide British coaching in the 1950s and 1960s 111 financial help and that it was ‘not a case of wanting to spend money just because it happens to be available, but of implementing a small part of an offer previously made’. It was also noted that, considering British swimming had only achieved one gold medal in 1956, when it had been assumed that they would have done significantly better, it ‘would be a singularly inopportune moment to refuse an application for a grant which … might do much to improve national standards’.51 There was clearly a case for considering both sides of the argument, but it was eventually decided that there would be no grant awarded to the ASA, although the Ministry hoped they would ‘be able to start a coaching scheme with its own funds’.52 While there is a lack of recorded information in both the ASA Committee Minutes and the Ministry of Education documents regarding their reaction to this suggestion it is clear that the ASA did not immediately initiate their own coaching scheme, even though they had the finances available to do so. Despite the many objections raised by the Ministry, they were re-considering their position on the matter within a year after the ASA had submitted a revised application. When the coaching grants were first established it had been agreed that they would be able to subsidize the work of twenty-five to thirty coaches at an annual cost of £20,000. However, the Ministry were only currently spending £7,000 per year to fund ten full-time coaches across four different sports, namely athletics, fencing, women’s hockey and lawn tennis. This, it was agreed, was a ‘very much smaller scheme than was originally contemplated’,53 suggesting that the amateur organizations were not the only ones who had been reluctant to spend available funds. It was eventually agreed to offer a grant to the ASA for 80 per cent of the salary of one professional coach and the ASA immediately got ‘busy to find the right man for the job’.54 The ASA advertised the role and received over twenty applications from individuals willing to fulfil the position at an annual salary of £1,000 and A.D. (Bert) Kinnear, who was well known to the ASA because of his previous involvement with the Loughborough Summer School, was considered the most suitable and qualified candidate, even if he wanted an annual salary of £1,500.55 The Ministry approved Kinnear’s appointment and considered the ASA ‘very lucky’ to have secured such a high-calibre coach. Since Kinnear had accepted a lower salary than he was currently receiving in order to take up the post, this helped persuade the Ministry of ‘his enthusiasm even at some personal loss’.56 Kinnear took up office on 1 January 1960 and, as was standard protocol with all

Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 the coaching grants, he was contracted to submit annual reports to the Ministry outlining the work that he had completed. Amongst the many tours and lectures which Kinnear had organized and presented it was noted that he had also visited a hydrodynamics laboratory on the Isle of Wight ‘in an attempt to solve the many problems associated with resistance and propulsion in the water’.57 Although initiatives like this could have potentially done much to improve the standard of British swimming, the Ministry were not impressed and they reminded the ASA that ‘our grant is given on the distinct understanding that his main duty will be the training of persons to fit them to become local coaches … I am sure that Mr Kinnear will be anxious to keep in mind the main object for which our grant is 112 British coaching in the 1950s and 1960s given’.58 Clearly, the Ministry was keen to remain in control regarding the function of the national coaches and the basic principle on which the coaching grants were allocated, which was to train a contingent of honorary coaches rather than to raise the international profile of British sport, emphasizes that amateurism and all its associated values remained a potent force. While it is true that the coaching schemes often received praise from other countries, particularly America, this was probably more to do with their novelty for those working abroad, where the emphasis was not on developing voluntary coaches but on utilizing numerous professional coaches to improve their international standing in sport.59 Unlike the athletics coaches, Kinnear, and other national coaches in various sports, were not given the opportunity to coach individual athletes on a regular basis. In his first annual report, in which he noted he had spent two months intermittently coaching the entire Olympic Squad (which was distinctly different to the system in athletics), he appealed to the Ministry to allow him to coach athletes consistently because, ‘If I am to keep in touch with coaching I must be permitted to coach several pupils at varying levels of ability’.60 Tom McNab comments that a real strength of the athletics scheme was that they were allowed to coach athletes, albeit a small number, and suggests that it was a mistake that other national coaches had been prevented from coaching because that meant that they ‘stopped experiencing’ and, as a result, failed to develop their expertise.61 There is no evidence to suggest that Kinnear was ever granted permission to coach a select group of swimmers on a regular basis and the first indication that an NTO was going to be allowed to do this came in 1967 with the appointment of Hamilton Bland. Hamilton Smith recalls that Bland persuaded the first director of swimming, Norman Sarsfield, to allow him to operate within a club environment for nine months between 1972 and 1973, when he became the head coach at Coventry and acted as the first ever local authority professional coach. From this point onwards the programme continued to develop and was rolled out to other situations throughout the country, with local authorities funding professional swimming coaches to work within certain clubs.62 By 1961, it was becoming increasingly apparent that Kinnear was unable to manage the workload and fulfil his duties effectively without some sort of assistance, especially when it was revealed that within a one-year period he had ‘covered approximately 20,000 miles by road and rail … worked with 6,000 swimmers and non-swimmers and approximately 13,000 interested persons’ had attended his 63

Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 lectures and demonstrations. It is unsurprising, therefore, that his duties ‘fully occupy his time and leave him little margin even to visit his home to see his wife and family’.64 The Ministry approved the ASA’s application for a second NTO in June 1961 and they began interviewing for a suitable appointment, although the interviewing process was ‘delayed owing to queries raised by Mr Kinnear in connection with his job as National Coach’.65 As was the case with the AAA national coaches, Kinnear felt he was not being utilized in the most productive way in order to further develop British swimming and the ASA worked hard to persuade him to stay, partly by making changes in his terms of employment, following which he signed a contract for a further two years.66 This was the first real sign in British coaching in the 1950s and 1960s 113 any official documents that Kinnear was beginning to have issues with his coaching role and there is a sense here that he was now feeling undervalued. Although the ASA had successfully dealt with the issue on this occasion, this was a portent of things to come. Despite the delay, a decision was made in November 1961 to appoint Tony Holmyard at a salary of £950–£980 per annum and he was scheduled to begin his official duties on 1 January 1962.67 In his annual report in 1962, Kinnear recognized that the appointment of the second NTO had resolved some of his difficulties but he wanted the programme to expand further. He suggested that he would ‘like to see greater development in the organization of coaching throughout the country with a closer liaison between coaches’ because this would create a system which allowed for the regular exchange of ideas.68 Kinnear could see real benefit in allowing coaches to network, something which many of the coaches who were working at the time have suggested was one of the ways they gained a lot of their coaching knowledge, and this highlights just how advanced his own approach to coaching actually was.69 Kinnear also expressed a desire to develop a ‘universal system of bringing the better swimmers together for group and team training in areas’, something very similar to Koskie’s proposals following the 1948 Olympics.70 The fact that over ten years later such a scheme had still not come to fruition emphasizes just how reluctant amateur sporting organizations were to initiate change in this period. As with the AAA national coaches, it appears that the environment in which the NTOs operated was difficult. Holmyard resigned after less than two years and he was replaced by Hamilton Smith who began his duties on 1 October 1963.71 Smith had emigrated to Canada and had been coaching there for about eighteen months when he received a telegram from Kinnear (who he had become acquainted with at Loughborough) explaining that the ASA were advertising for another national coach and that he wanted him to apply. Smith was keen but he did not have the funds to pay for the airfare until he received another telegram, this time from Fern, simply stating ‘come for an interview we will pay your fare’. Within two days he was on a plane and being interviewed by ‘the whole of the ASA committee … half of them didn’t know the shallow end from the deep end in any sort of coaching or technical context but Bert had wanted me to get the job, so I got the job’.72 The ASA appealed to the Ministry for a further grant to appoint a third NTO and Helen Elkington started in her role on 1 April 1964.73 Working in an environment where there was constant questioning from the amateur

Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 administration regarding their work eventually began to take its toll on the NTOs. In 1966, they were handed new terms of employment but there was disagreement over some issues and they refused to sign them.74 They were given until April 1967 to comply and, although Kinnear and Elkington were content (for the time being) to continue in post, Smith decided to resign.75 He explained that it was not one specific factor that caused him to leave but a culmination of reasons although ‘the straw that broke the camel’s back’ was when he was accused of cheating on his expenses. It transpired that there had been a complication with the paperwork and that Smith had actually been submitting it correctly but it was not being processed. By then he had become so frustrated with the working 114 British coaching in the 1950s and 1960s environment and the amateur officials that he had already made the decision to leave and return to education.76 Shortly after Smith’s resignation, the ASA were awarded another Ministry grant to appoint three further NTOs, Hamilton Bland, John Hogg and Charles Wilson. Unfortunately for British swimming, Kinnear was soon to follow Smith and resign, partly over his issues with Smith’s intended replacement, John Stace, who had been personally selected by Sarsfield. This was no real surprise since Kinnear and Sarsfield had always had a somewhat strained relationship because they failed to find common ground over the status of professional coaches.77 The problem here was that Stace did not hold the diploma of Physical Education, which Kinnear believed should have been a prerequisite in order for an individual to fulfil the role of NTO successfully. He commented:

I have spent seven and a half years building up a scheme which has earned the respect and support of the teaching and physical education professions, and the competitive swimming fraternity. The basis of its success had been the high qualifications in teaching physical education and swimming of its officers … and their exceptional ability. I am not prepared to lower these standards by accepting what I consider to be unqualified personnel.78

The ASA Committee was ‘not prepared to take the advice of Mr Kinnear on this particular occasion’ and so he resigned as of October 1967.79 Once the basis of Kinnear’s resignation was made public the ASA received a torrent of criticism and they defended their actions by suggesting that Kinnear had recognized that Stace was the best candidate for the job but his only objection had been regarding the absence of a teaching qualification.80 Whether or not this was the case, it was claimed that their refusal to even consider Kinnear’s opinion resulted in the ‘greatest loss’ to British swimming of an individual ‘who had done so much towards the improvement of coaching and towards the dissemination of information’. Kinnear never coached again. He withdrew his coaching services from the 1968 Olympics, although he did agree to fulfil an arrangement he had made with ITV to be a swimming commentator at the 1968 and 1972 Games, and he had no further direct contact with swimmers, choosing instead to run a restaurant with his wife before retiring to Spain in 1981. He passed away at the Aberdeen Acute Stroke Unit in January 2011. Reflecting on his time working with the ASA he described the ‘system as an 81

Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 example of a ruling oligarchy run by very few personalities’, and it seems that, although the sport might have progressed in terms of coaching provision and athlete development, amateur swimming administrators continued to maintain their control by adhering to their traditional principles, even if this resulted in a signiﬁcant loss to the sport.

Attitudes to coaching

The whole attitude towards coaching was very, very poor, right throughout sport, not just in my sport but all throughout sport. They distrusted the whole idea of British coaching in the 1950s and 1960s 115 actual preparation and really taking it seriously. We were still permeated with the public school ideas of ‘good show old chap’, that kind of approach.82

Later chapters of this book will show that, by the late 1960s, British sport was slowly improving its organization and was beginning to attract increased government interest. Alongside these advances sat a growing acknowledgement of the value of professional coaching, and attempts were being gradually made to not only improve the provision of coaching but also raise its profile in terms of its perceived value. How- ever, material tracing the development of British coaching in this period, gathered from interviews of Geoff Dyson by Tom McNab in 1970, demonstrates clearly that the changes being implemented in this respect by sporting officials were always predicated on the belief that it was they, not the coaches, who should retain control of their sport and that coaches should accept their place as a ‘servant’ class within the sporting hierarchy. As a result, amateur officials continued to manage sports organizations in accordance with their long-established beliefs and suspicions about professional coaches; and their unwillingness to fully embrace the coaches’ expertise meant that coaching as a career remained a marginalized and subsidiary occupation.

Attitudes towards professional coaches within the NGBs When Dyson was appointed national coach in 1947 the existing athletic administration was still suspicious of the act of coaching and of the coaches themselves. This attitude remained present in the sport for many years, possibly because so many of these administrators had a long association with their sports and they were able to influence the perspectives taken by any new officials. Tom McNab suggests that when national coaches were introduced into athletics many administrators felt threatened by their presence and this further fuelled the resistance these coaches faced. Prior to the appointment of the national coaches the administrators were the ‘top dogs’, the people who everybody approached if they had issue, but when national coaches appeared ‘they challenged them’. Harold Abrahams in particular was never satisfied with this scenario and displayed considerable ‘malice’ towards the coaches, especially Dyson, who ‘was a particular manifestation that he didn’tlike’.83 The question arises then about why administrators were willing to appoint professionals in the first place if they were so uncomfortable with their presence. Hamilton Smith believes that amateur officials, who were generally from a higher class background, ‘recognized that they didn’t know an awful lot’ about the technical Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 matters of their sport so they felt it necessary to appoint coaches to manage this.84 However, despite accepting input from coaches on technical matters, administrators still approached them with a degree of superiority because they saw themselves as the ‘masters’ and the national coaches ‘as a serf, a sort of creature’.85 It was unsurprising, therefore, that they were not willing to take direction from the coaches.86 When Dyson suggested to Rowland Harper, a member of the Coaching Committee, that he should be referred to as the ‘Director of Coaching’ because that was essentially the job he was doing, Harper replied, ‘Oh, the Coaching Committee would never agree to that, for we cannot be directed by anyone’.87 116 British coaching in the 1950s and 1960s Coupled with this refusal to take direction, was the fact that amateur administrators viewed coaches as inferior, because they had very little respect for them. Dyson noted that ‘Harold Abrahams didn’t make any differentiation between a coach who held a stopwatch and a coach who had to do a big national administrative job. He couldn’t care less about it’.88 McNab suggests that, because those involved in the administration of the AAA ‘were very conservative people by nature’, they had a tendency to overlook the value of the coaches. He explained that they never supported the national coaches in any of their activities and they never connected with them on a personal level. The relationship was purely professional and they ‘never asked about whether you had a family or a wife or what you were doing’.89 If the national coaches ever demonstrated any sort of initiative, as Dyson and Kinnear frequently did, then administrators viewed them ‘with suspicion’ but if coaches followed directions and ‘didn’t cause any ripples of any sort’ they would be tolerated.90 From the administrator’s perspective, since they were not only controlling and managing the coaching scheme but also ensuring its success, they were the ones that should receive recognition, not the coaches. Dyson believed that, ‘as long as the official gets the OBE because of the overall success of the coaching scheme and as long as the athlete doesn’tmentionhiscoach’snametoo many times on television, all is well’. He went further to suggest that if this was not the case then on ‘the rare occasions when there are any sort of awards to be gained, why is it the officials always get them?’.91 Dyson recalled a period when the AAA were in financial difficulties, at which point it was suggested that they could only afford to keep the national coaches on for a maximum of five years (because their salaries would increase annually). Part of the argument was that, since many of these individuals came from a physical education background, they would then be able to return to teaching and continue to pass on their knowledge. Dyson argued that this would be a complete waste of both resources and money because the national coaches would just reach the point ‘when they’ve become national coaches, and then you would get rid of them’.92 Lack of finances is one obvious reason why administrators were keen to replace the national coaches after five years, but it could also be a judicious move to remove coaches before they had the opportunity to build their reputations to a point where they would be willing to challenge the authority and decision-making capacity of the administrators. Officials could justify replacing national coaches because not only would this would reduce financial expenditure but it would also

Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 ensure that any new coaches employed would be fairly willing, initially at least, to accept direction without too much disagreement. While both the ASA and the AAA appointed coaches from abroad to work at Loughborough Summer School over the years, the majority of sporting organizations remained cautious about accepting advice from foreigners because there was still a desire to monitor the methods that were to be introduced into British sport. This was even reﬂected within the boundaries of the coaches’ own organization. Dyson recalled an incident at a British Association of National Coaches (BANC) committee meeting during a discussion about potential speakers for an upcoming conference when all the names being mentioned were British and he argued, British coaching in the 1950s and 1960s 117 For twenty years you British have been talking to yourselves, I know theore- tically you go to the Olympic Games I know in theory you’re in the Olympic Village and you rub shoulders with the other coaches and you learn – but that’s not the way. I’ve been to too many Olympic Games to know … that’s not the way you learn, and [in reality] you and your athletes come back from your international trips with very, very little opportunity of technical exchange with other people. By and large you British have been talking to yourselves and now you’re thinking up a British Association of National Coaches conference and out comes one of the familiar names to talk on the familiar subject. Why on earth don’t you spend a few hundred dollars and get someone to come over from across the seas and say something quite outrageous, something which may be wrong but something which will set you thinking.93

Public perceptions of coaching Sporting administrators were not the only individuals who had difficulty in fully embracing coaching in a period during which the British public also failed to appreciate its value. This could have been due to a lack of familiarity with the subject because, at this time, people were rarely exposed to coaching and there was a degree of uncertainty regarding what the job entailed. Dyson believed that, ‘when they see that little man run out on the Wembley football ground with his bottle of water and his sponge, I personally think that is what they think it is’. The ‘average British person wouldn’t be able to explain the difference between a trainer and a coach’ and that while he was national coach, his neighbours and other individuals, who were fully aware of his job title, would complain to him about their ailments, because this was their concept of what a coach did, to which he would respond ‘well go and see someone’.94 Many of those who did actually understand more about the coaching role, still felt that it was ‘unimportant’ and did not see the benefit because they had ‘this suspicion’ that the coach was ‘a sort of hanger-on in many sports’.95 Dyson suggested that the way in which sport developed in Britain may have influenced how people perceived coaching since the act of coaching ultimately undermined amateurism and what sport stood for. Consequently, a culture had developed whereby coaching was never fully accepted within British sport and, because they had been cherished for so long, the traditions of amateurism had become difficult to challenge. It was only by the late 1960s, Dyson believed, 96

Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 that these attitudes were beginning to be diluted. If this really was the situation, then it is unsurprising that for sporting administrators, and for a proportion of the British public, negative connotations surrounded the coaching role. In contrast, sport had developed somewhat differently in other countries and coaching was generally welcomed, particularly in America, where the majority of the public would have been exposed to and experienced the coaching process in schools and colleges. McNab highlights that ‘the coach was a god to them, that whole idea of the coach being a leader was fundamental to American society, here it never was … it’s been built into their psyche from the beginning’.97 Although this approach had never been popular in Britain, there was a slow and gradual 118 British coaching in the 1950s and 1960s recognition that, if the nation’s athletes were to become more competitive internationally, then some positive intervention was required and, as a result, the amount of coaching available began to increase, particularly after the 1950s. As resources expanded to support coaching provision so too did the expectations from the British public as to what coaching could achieve. A general consensus developed around the belief that, since athletes now had the opportunity to experience regular coaching, this would immediately remedy the poor standard of performances. As a result of this expectation, when coaching did not have the instant impact it was expected to, it was regarded as not having been particularly successful. Then the public and press began to ‘bemoan their lot, the fact that they aren’t getting out of coaching what they think, or they ought to be getting’. Even though people were gradually coming to terms with what coaching could and could not do, it was difﬁcult to alter existing perceptions and, while it might indeed be the key to ensuring success in the long term, the British public continued to harbour ‘a rather uneasy feeling about coaching’.98

Conclusion By the late 1960s, Dyson was arguing that ‘there’s no reason now in this day and age, why coaching and ofﬁciating should be divorced’.99 However, although he and his colleagues had made efforts to break down any existing barriers, especially during his time as national coach, Dyson wondered, on reﬂection, if they had made any impact.100 Even at this point, and after a number of years of engagement with professional coaches, there remained an assumption amongst British administrators that they could continue to offer mediocre salaries and contracts and still entice individuals who had the ability and knowledge to implement change. In 1968, it emerged that AAA administrators were willing to offer only £3,000 a year for someone to undertake a coaching role that had a much wider remit than the position that Dyson had once occupied. Dyson viewed the low salary offer as an insult to any applicant and asked:

Have the powers-that-be stopped to think of the enormity of the task, the committees they now have to attend; the travelling; the man-management that’ll be involved; the smattering of technical knowledge; and many different facets of the game to pay such a man £3,000 a year?101 Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 Despite a reluctance to fully embrace coaching, and the low status afforded to career coaches, a few British athletes did experience some international success during the 1960s. At Wimbledon, Angela Mortimer and Ann Jones, in 1961 and 1969, respectively, provided Britain with its first ladies singles titles since 1937, and England won the football World Cup in 1966, a success in sporting endeavours that appeared to provide a boost to public morale. These were isolated incidents, however, and they seemed to have been achieved in spite of the British sporting system rather than because of it. What is in little doubt is that in the Olympic Games, which had become a global event by the 1960s, British athletes from all British coaching in the 1950s and 1960s 119 Olympic disciplines, including track and field and swimming, faced an uphill task against well-coached competitors from around the world, not only from their traditional American opponents but also from the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc countries. In many respects, the drivers for future change in British coaching were external, rather than internal, and it was the adoption of ‘scientific’ approaches to coaching and the structural changes wrought to British sports administration under pressure from foreign competitors that eventually changed the coaching landscape.

Notes 1 Christopher Brasher, ‘The Path to Rome: Smoothing the Way’, Observer, October 4, 1959, 31. 2 Tony Ward, ‘Echoes of Infamy’, Running Magazine, April, 1987, File HA Box 3, AAA Collection, Birmingham (hereafter AAA: Birmingham). 3 Peter Wilson, ‘Athletics Chief Talks Dyson into Staying’, Daily Mirror, September 9, 1957, 3. 4 Peter Wilson, ‘Why Miss the Coach?’, Daily Mirror, August 29, 1959, 19. 5 Wilson, ‘Athletics Chief Talks Dyson into Staying’. 6 Peter Wilson, ‘The Eyes Have It’, Daily Mirror, September 12, 1957, 23. 7 Wilson, ‘Athletics Chief Talks Dyson into Staying’. 8 John Wheatley, ‘Experience Tells’, Athletics Weekly, July 1958, 2. 9 Ibid. 10 Tom McNab, interview, May 6, 2011, St Albans. 11 Ward, ‘Echoes of Infamy’; ‘A Momentous Weekend’, Athletics Weekly, Private Collection: Dyson Family. 12 Dilwyn Porter and Adrian Smith, Amateurs and Professionals in Post-War British Sport (London: Routledge, 2014). 13 Peter Wilson, ‘We Want Dyson – We’ll Pay, Say Athletes’, Daily Mirror, August 28, 1959, 23. 14 Peter Wilson, ‘Why Miss the Coach?’, Daily Mirror, August 29, 1959, 19. 15 Roy Moor, ‘Chief Coach Quits Over Pay’, Daily Mail, July 5, 1961. 16 Sydney Hulls, ‘Dyson Must Have Bosses’ Support’, Daily Express, December 3, 1960, 10. 17 Anthony Abrahams, ‘Review of the AAA Coaching Scheme’, November, 1959, 17, File HA Box 14, AAA: Birmingham. 18 Ibid., 18–19. 19 Peter Lovesey, The Ofﬁcial Centenary History of the Amateur Athletic Association (Enﬁeld: Guinness Superlatives, 1979). 20 Abrahams, ‘Review of the AAA Coaching Scheme’, 13, 16. 21 ‘CoachNo3in“IQuit” Storm’, Daily Mirror, October 24, 1961, 25; John Bromley, ‘Mirror Spotlight’, Daily Mirror, February 25, 1963, 20. 22 ‘ ’

Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 Abrahams, Review of the AAA Coaching Scheme , 10. 23 AAA Coaching Committee Minutes, October 27, 1956, File 1/2/13/1, AAA: Birmingham; Abrahams, ‘Review of the AAA Coaching Scheme’, 19. 24 George Harley, ‘Dyson Shock – AAA Jump the Gun’, Daily Mirror, December 2, 1960, 27. 25 Tony Ward, ‘Echoes of Infamy’; AAA Coaching Committee Minutes, January 7, 1961, File 1/2/13/2, AAA: Birmingham. 26 AAA Coaching Committee Minutes, January 7, 1961, File 1/2/13/2, AAA: Birmingham. 27 AAA, Coaching Committee Minutes, January 1, 1949, File 1/2/13/1, AAA: Birmingham; E. Strickland, ‘Report by the Coaching Administrator’, 1961, File 1/2/ 13/2, AAA: Birmingham; Abrahams, ‘Review of the AAA Coaching Scheme’, 14. 120 British coaching in the 1950s and 1960s 28 E.H.B. Baker, Note-0605/81, July 19, 1961, File ED 169/31 Ministry of Education: AAA, National Archives, Kew (hereafter cited as MoE: AAA, NA); E.H.L. Clynes to E.H.B. Baker, August 9, 1961, File ED 169/31, MoE: AAA, NA. 29 E.H.B. Baker, Note-0605/81, July 19, 1961, File ED 169/31 MoE: AAA, NA; E.H.L. Clynes to E.H.B. Baker, August 9, 1961, File ED 169/31, MoE: AAA, NA. 30 Ibid. 31 Tom McNab, interview. 32 Ibid. 33 E. Strickland, ‘Report by the Coaching Administrator, 1961’, File 1/2/13/2, AAA: Birmingham. 34 ‘Coach No 3 in “I Quit” Storm’, Daily Mirror. 35 Terry O’Connor, ‘Pugh Storms Over “Lies and Deceit”’, Private Collection: Dyson Family. 36 ‘Britain May Try to Lure Dyson Back Home’, Private Collection: Dyson Family. 37 Geoff Elliot, ‘The AAA Are Frightened of the Professionals they Employ’, Singapore Free Press, December 28, 1961, 19. 38 ASA, Annual Report 1951 – Committee Minutes, November 28–29, 1952, 31, ASA Headquarters, Loughborough (hereafter cited as ASA). 39 A.H.E. Fern to E.H.B. Baker, December 31, 1957, File ED 169/70, Ministry of Education: ASA, National Archives, Kew (hereafter cited as MoE: ASA, NA). 40 Bill Furniss, interview, March 29, 2011, Nottingham. 41 E.H.B. Baker to A.H.E. Fern, January 6, 1958, File ED 169/70, MoE: ASA, NA. 42 ‘ASA Proposed Ministry of Education Grant’, May 31, 1958, File ED 169/70, MoE: ASA, NA. 43 E.H.B. Baker to A.H.E. Fern, June 25, 1958, File ED 169/70, MoE: ASA, NA. 44 Ministry of Education, Minutes, June 11, 1958, File ED 169/70, MoE: ASA, NA. 45 A.H.E. Fern to E.H.B. Baker, June 30, 1958, File ED 169/70 MoE: ASA, NA. 46 Ministry of Education, Minutes, July 16, 1958, File ED 169/70, MoE: ASA, NA. 47 Ministry of Education, Minutes, July 17, July 21, 1958, File ED 169/70, MoE: ASA, NA. 48 Tom McNab, interview. 49 Hamilton Smith, interview, July 27, 2011, Edinburgh, Scotland. 50 Ibid. 51 Ministry of Education, Minutes, July 24, 1958, File ED 169/70, MoE: ASA, NA. 52 E.H.B. Baker to A.H.E. Fern, August 7, 1958, File ED 169/70, MoE: ASA, NA. 53 Ministry of Education, ‘Coaching Grants’, File ED 169/70, MoE: ASA, NA. 54 E.H.B. Baker to A.H.E. Fern, April 20, 1959, File ED 169/70; A.H.E. Fern to E.H. B. Baker, April 22, 1959, File ED 169/70. Both MoE: ASA, NA. 55 A.H.E. Fern to E.H.B. Baker, September 29, 1959, File ED 169/70, MoE: ASA, NA. 56 Ministry of Education, Minutes AW0628/17, October 1, 1959, File ED 169/70, MoE: ASA, NA. 57 A.D. Kinnear to A.H.E. Fern, February 22, 1960, File ED 169/70, MoE: ASA, NA. 58

Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 E.H.B. Baker to A.H.E. Fern, March 3, 1960, File ED 169/70, MoE: ASA, NA. 59 Larry Montague, ‘Coaching Scheme Progress’, Manchester Guardian, April 9, 1954, 13. 60 A.D. Kinnear, ‘Annual Report for 1960’, File ED 169/70, MoE: ASA, NA. 61 Tom McNab, interview. 62 Hamilton Smith, interview. 63 A.D. Kinnear, ‘Annual Report for 1962’, File ED 169/70, MoE: ASA, NA. 64 A.H.E. Fern to E.H.B. Baker, April 27, 1961, File ED 169/70, MoE: ASA, NA. 65 ASA, Annual Report 1961 – Committee Minutes, June 10, 1961, 21, ASA Headquarters; E.H.B. Baker to H. Sager, May 16, 1961, File ED 169/70, MoE: ASA, NA; J.W. Ramaeres to E.H.B. Baker, September 11, 1961, File ED 169/70, MoE: ASA, NA. 66 J.W. Ramaeres to E.H.B. Baker, September 11, 1961, File ED 169/70, MoE: ASA, NA. British coaching in the 1950s and 1960s 121 67 ASA, Annual Report 1961 – Committee Minutes, December 1–2, 1961, 27, ASA; A. H.E. Fern to L.C.J. Martin, December 12, 1961, File ED 169/70, MoE: ASA, NA; the exact ﬁgure is unclear as the ASA’s Minutes and communication with the Ministry state different amounts. 68 A.D. Kinnear, ‘Annual Report for 1962’, File ED 169/70, MoE: ASA, NA. 69 Alan Lynn, interview, April 8, 2011, Stirling, Scotland; Bill Furniss, interview; Terry Denison, interview, September 14, 2011, Leeds. 70 A.D. Kinnear, ‘Annual Report for 1962’, File ED 169/70, MoE: ASA, NA. 71 ASA Annual Report 1962, 6; ASA Annual Report 1963 – Committee Minutes, March 29–30, 1963, 25. ASA. 72 Hamilton Smith, interview. 73 ASA Annual Report 1963, 5–6, ASA. 74 ASA Annual Report 1967 – Committee Minutes, January 27, 1967, 12, ASA. 75 ASA Annual Report 1967 – Committee Minutes, June 2–3, 1967, 20, ASA. 76 Hamilton Smith, interview. 77 Ibid. 78 Brian Crowther, ‘Chief Coach Resigns on Principle’, Guardian, July 25, 1967, 13. 79 Ibid. 80 ASA Annual Report 1967 – Committee Minutes, June 2–3, 1967, 34, ASA. 81 Hamilton Smith, interview; Ian Keil and Don Wix, In the Swim: The Amateur Swimming Association from 1869 to 1994 (Loughborough: Swimming Times, 1996), 97. 82 Tom McNab, interview. 83 Ibid. 84 Hamilton Smith, interview. 85 Tom McNab, interview. 86 Hamilton Smith, interview. 87 Geoff Dyson, interview by Tom McNab, 1970. 88 Ibid. 89 Tom McNab, interview. 90 Ibid. 91 Geoff Dyson, interview. 92 Ibid. 93 Ibid. 94 Ibid. 95 Ibid. 96 Ibid. 97 Tom McNab, interview. 98 Geoff Dyson, interview. 99 Ibid. 100 Ibid. 101 Ibid.

Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 Bibliography Keil, Ian and Don Wix. In the Swim: The Amateur Swimming Association from 1869 to 1994 (Loughborough: Swimming Times, 1996). Lovesey, Peter. The Official Centenary History of the Amateur Athletic Association (Enfield: Guinness Superlatives, 1979). Porter, Dilwyn and Adrian Smith. Amateurs and Professionals in Post-War British Sport (London: Routledge, 2014). 6 Cold War influences

Introduction Given the increasing globalization of sport throughout the twentieth century it was difficult for the traditional British amateur approach to coaching and training to establish any degree of worldwide credibility, especially in the light of ongoing defeats and disappointments. The British model had never been the only exemplar for the international sporting community and the consistently successful American system, predicated around the use of professional coaches and intensive training techniques, had become the gold standard for Western nations by the 1940s. In the confrontational political climate of the post-war period (the ‘Cold War’), a challenge to American sporting supremacy arose in the form of state-sponsored systems of athletic preparation in Soviet-controlled Eastern Europe, regimes which also focused on professional coaching and systematic modes of training.1 There was a significant difference, however, between the two systems in that, in contrast to the centrality of the American colleges and private enterprise athletic clubs, the Soviet Union re-directed significant resources from the government to develop a comprehensive sport system that included an increasingly sophisticated use of sports science and formal coach education programmes. The subsequent rivalry between these sporting superpowers radically changed global attitudes to coaching and consigned the British amateur model to the annals of history, as Soviet and American successes encouraged other nations, including Britain, to adopt a much more specialized sporting model based around government support, science and coach education. Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 Soviet sport before the Second World War Tsarist Russia was one of the founding members of the modern Olympic movement, although Russian athletes did not compete until 1908 when the five contestants achieved one gold and two silver medals, placing them fourteenth overall. As a result, the Russian government established an Olympic Committee, which provided financial support to send a larger team to Stockholm, although it only managed one silver and three bronze medals. As with the British in 1912, these results were perceived as anything but a success since they had exposed Russia as a ‘backward Cold War influences 123 country in the sphere of sport’.2 In an attempt to remedy the situation, and to improve the nation’s physical wellbeing, the Tsarist government developed a state organization to manage sport, the Office of the General Supervisor for the Physical Development of People in Russia.3 The outbreak of war in 1914 and the need for a large number of physically fit soldiers further emphasized the need for physical training. These two key aspects, nationalism and militarism provided the key foundation stones for the subsequent Soviet sport system.4 Russia organized its own ‘Olympiads’ in 1913 and 1914, but it would be another forty years before Russian athletes participated in the Olympics again.5 The Soviet Union was formed in 1922 and, as a result of an increasing resistance to the West in general, the new nation declined on ideological grounds to affiliate with ‘bourgeois’ Western-dominated sporting events.6 Instead, focus was placed on a system, ‘based on a distinctly proletarian brand of sport and physical culture’, which shunned individualism and competition.7 Physical culture was developed as a means to promote healthy living and increase hygiene education and this became the dominant ideology in the early 1920s. However, sport in the Soviet Union underwent a period of instability following Lenin’s death in 19248 as attempts to establish a system of participation that was ‘class based, collectivist and mass orientated’ failed when competing with the capitalist bourgeois-centred sports culture, and opposition towards elitist sport gradually diminished in the late 1920s and early 1930s.9 The 1930s ‘were to be a decade of competitive sport’10 and these activities helped advance Stalin’s industrial drive as well as acting as a means of raising the nation’s health in order to prepare for possible military action.11 In April 1930, physical education and sport were placed under greater government control when an All-Union Council of Physical Culture was established with a structure that meant it operated essentially as a ministry of sport.12 Established sports clubs were transferred to local workplaces and voluntary trade-union sports societies were developed. These sporting ‘collectives’ were charged with discovering and training proficient athletes, and, as they proliferated, district and regional competitions were established in popular sports such as soccer, basketball and ice hockey.13 Another significant development was the creation and integration of a uniform ranking system, the ‘Ready for Labour and Defence’ (GTO) programme, by the Komsomol (Communist Youth Organization) to ‘improve the general level of physical fitness and to create a basis for raising the level of athletic standards’.14

Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 These initiatives were accompanied by a rapid expansion of sporting facilities, which almost quadrupled between 1931 and 1940, with the 1939 census recording 649 stadia, 8,000 playing fields, 20 cycle tracks and 342 swimming baths.15 Hostility towards Western sport was officially reversed in 1934 when the objective to ‘catch up and overtake bourgeois records’ was launched, although, unlike Western nations, the Soviet Union viewed amateur principles with indifference. The initial aim of Soviet sport was to surpass half of all world records within three years but the target was subsequently adjusted to achieving as many top finishes as possible in international competitions in order to ‘bring worldwide glory to Soviet sport’. Paralleling this was the introduction of a second tier to the GTO badge, which 124 Cold War influences came with the coveted title of ‘Master’ of sport. The authorities also began to monitor Western sport by establishing a foreign department within the Physical Culture Council, which intercepted and translated manuals, journals and newspapers in order to examine overseas training methods. However, there was no attempt to join the Olympic movement or International Sporting Federations (ISFs) before 1939, possibly for fear of losing a degree of control, since joining ISFs would have meant competing against all their member countries rather than being able to select opponents. In addition, the government wanted its athletes only to compete in sports in which they were guaranteed to excel and affiliating to organizations such as the IOC might have meant sending as many athletes as possible across a range of sports.16 With the emphasis now being placed on winning and achieving records, it is unsurprising that rigorous sport programmes began to appear, with successful athletes being rewarded accordingly and being transferred from the workplace to full-time training facilities. Partly in an attempt to comply with notions of amateurism, the Moscow Committee on Physical Culture of Sports Affairs condemned such practices in January 1937. In 1939, it was reiterated that ‘half-trained sportsmen should not receive extra money for fictional “work”, they should not receive subsidies and all manner of gifts for success in competition’ since such ‘bourgeois’ practices should not be allowed. Nevertheless, assistance to athletes became commonplace amongst sporting societies, although, when Soviet involvement in the war began in June 1941, the direction of the sports movement shifted radically towards military objectives.17 Victory in the war restored national pride and the accelerated period of industrialization that accompanied it enhanced the global status of the Soviet Union. Sport now assumed a more prominent role because it was seen as a peaceful means through which the nation could demonstrate its superiority and, as a result, more money and resources were directed towards sport.18

Soviet sport after 1945 During the war, Soviet military power successfully penetrated Central and Eastern Europe and resulted in the creation of ten aligned communist states, as a result of which the balance of global power was altered.19 The Soviets became determined ‘to catch up and overtake the most advanced industrial powers’, particularly America, which had long been the world’s most powerful political and military 20

Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 force. This ensured that these nations would embark on a new struggle after the war, generally referred to as the ‘Cold War’, in which each superpower attempted to gain allegiance from other nations through psychological conflict and propaganda.21 Both realized that international sporting success could offer a mechanism for exerting influence and so the sporting arena developed into a field of great significance,22 with the Soviet drive to win international competitions becoming part of a campaign to convince those outside its boundaries of the superiority of the ‘Soviet way of life’.23 International sport subsequently became intertwined with both Soviet and American political philosophies, a particularly alarming development from a British perspective since the general feeling of uneasiness Cold War influences 125 arising from ongoing poor international performances was now accompanied by a fear that more was at stake than a mere win on the playing field. National prestige was now inextricably linked with success in sport, and international competition had far-reaching political and educational implications.24 Initially, the Soviet government undertook a degree of reconstruction in their sports administration, a process that included a more productive form of athletic incentives.25 In October 1945, the Council of People’s Commissars of the USSR developed a financial reward scheme for those who achieved performance targets. The use of bonuses and increased salaries for athletes, awarded according to their sport ranking, stimulated the emergence of exceptional elite athletes,26 whose development was assisted by the creation of Sports Schools, staffed by highly qualified coaches.27 While these initiatives clearly contravened existing Interna- tional Olympic Committee (IOC) and international sporting organizations’ rules on amateurism, the Soviets had shown little desire to seek inclusion, even after receiving an invitation from Sigfrid Edström to join the International Association of Athletics Federations (IAAF). However, the Soviet Union did begin to participate in global sporting competitions during late 1946 and was engaging more widely with international federations, often by stretching the rules. At the time of the European Championships in August, the Soviets were still not members of the IAAF but David Burghley, acting head of the IAAF, granted them permission to enter. A similar instance occurred in October at the International Weightlifting Championships. Each time technically ineligible Soviet athletes were allowed to compete their sports system was provided with increasing authority, although, in reality, it was never considered entirely legitimate in the West due to suspicions over the payment of athletes and the existence of state-controlled sport schools.28 The American Avery Brundage, then IOC vice-president, commented:

My own guess is that the real object of the Russians is to humiliate the West … Every time they force a Federation to break its own rules in order to let them compete, Russian prestige is increased and Western prestige is decreased. The trouble at the moment … is that about half the countries don’t want to annoy Russia, and any country which is anxious to obtain a World Championship or World Congress is reluctant to annoy the Eastern Bloc.29

In order to make the greatest impact, the Soviets needed to compete in the

Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 Olympics, and an important first step was to join the relevant sporting federations. In January 1947, they applied to join the International Wrestling Federation and the IAAF, although Soviet authorities attached several conditions, notably that Russian had to be introduced as an official language of the Federations, the executive board should include a Soviet representative and ‘fascist’ Franco-Spain should be ejected. Brundage warned Edström that the Soviets ‘must not be given any special consideration’, emphasizing that their athletes would not be accepted without confirmation that they were amateurs.30 Recognizing that they would have to comply with, or at least appear to be adhering to, all the rules regarding participation, particularly those relating to amateurism,31 the Soviet government 126 Cold War influences reversed its decree ‘on remuneration of sporting attainments’. They also appeared to address the issue of occupational status by declaring that ‘professional entertainer’ was no longer a legitimate profession and that athletes would in future be classified as ‘student, serviceman or physical education instructor’.32 It soon became apparent that these ‘students’ and ‘soldiers’ were, in fact, state-sponsored professionals but, because they had now met all the conditions for membership, the Soviets were admitted to the IAAF in December 1947.33 The Soviet Union did not compete in the Games in 1948 because they had failed to create a National Olympics Committee (NOC) in time, a prerequisite to participation under the Olympic Charter.34 However, a delegation was sent to London in order to monitor Western athletes and, following the Games, the Soviet government declared that if they had participated they would have placed second overall, only marginally behind the United States.35 Encouraged by this analysis, the Communist Party Central Committee published policy targets in December 1948 stating that their overall goal was to ‘win supremacy in the major sports within the next few years’,36 in the belief that this would provide ‘irrefutable proof of the superiority of socialist culture over the decaying culture of the capitalist states’.37 Olympic officials remained apprehensive about admitting them, however, for a number of reasons. Brundage was adamant that Soviet athletes were paying lip service to the notion of amateurism, commenting that ‘from the Western point of view we must question ourselves if the Russian athletes can be considered amateurs. We must face the fact that many of them are professional’.38 Other resistance was more overtly politically driven and reflected a desire to prevent the Soviet Union from gaining credibility by achieving international sporting success, although there were those who believed that allowing the Soviets and their ‘Satellite States’ to join would bolster the authority of the Olympic movement. There was also a feeling that one of the most powerful nations in the world could not realistically be excluded, so, in 1951, the Soviet Union was admitted into the IOC.39 The Soviet Union made its debut in every event except field hockey at the XVth Summer Olympiad in Helsinki where it confronted America for the first time in international sport. The extensive and systematic preparation programme undertaken by the Soviet athletes soon became apparent but, despite the Soviets achieving an early lead in the medal table, the American team successfully recaptured top place towards the end of the Games. Even so, what the Soviet athletes had achieved was considered significant since, despite lacking high-level experience,

Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 they won more silver and bronze medals than the Americans. What damaged American pride most was that, according to the ofﬁcial scoring system, the ‘Olympic Bulletin’, the Soviet Union and the United States were considered tied for points.40 Olympic rivalry would become ever more intense as America, which had dominated for so long, partly as a result of their coaching and training structures, now faced a challenger prepared to match their resources and one which was determined to use sport as a means of demonstrating the superiority of their political philosophy.41 The Melbourne Olympic Games in 1956 witnessed the culmination of an intense four-year drive by the Soviets to dominate the Games, an investment Cold War inﬂuences 127 that reaped its reward when Soviet athletes achieved ninety-eight medals, well in excess of the Americans’ seventy-four. This 40 per cent increase on their previous gold medal tally not only demonstrated the power of the Soviets to mobilize and direct resources but also emphasized how traditional attitudes were limiting levels of performance elsewhere. Soviet training and preparation regimes were not con- strained by the Olympic rules of amateurism as was the case in the West, particularly in Britain, and their athletes were essentially training full-time.

Western reactions

It is an open secret in the Soviet Union that the nation’s top sports ﬁgures are ‘shamateurs’. Highly competent experts who devote full time to their sport and get paid for it with a heady mix of money, cars, apartments and travel.42

The strategic integration of sport into the political and social foundation of the Soviet state and a focus on elite sport, ‘supported by a systematic process of talent identification … scientific coaching; shamateurism; and reliance upon performance-enhancing drugs’, ensured that the Soviet Union continued to dominate the Games.43 Western attitudes, particularly American, were consistently critical, with commentators acclaiming the capitalist system of sport whilst condemning the Soviet Union and their methods.44 The Soviet strategies used to achieve sporting supremacy were repeatedly scrutinized and analysed, often being presented as ‘machine-like’ and inhuman. It was commented ‘that every Russian athlete of international promise has been taken out of his job and given intense, year-round training which few in the West can equal and which, of course, is state- paid’.45 It was considered unrealistic to expect American athletes to compete successfully against these ‘machines’ of the Eastern Bloc, particularly when there was evidence that the Soviet authorities were ‘buying their athletes, working them full- time and making mockery of the Olympic ideal’.46 Perhaps one of the most critical comments came from US Senator John Marshall who described the Soviet athlete as a ‘paid propaganda agent of the USSR, one more slave in the hideous chain gang of brainwashed individuals slavishly advancing the Communist cause’.47 From a British perspective, the primary issue was the somewhat suspect Soviet interpretation of amateurism and, although Soviet authorities claimed that professionalism did not exist in their country, British press reports argued that ‘by Western standards of amateurism this is open to dispute’.48 There were repeated Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 references to ‘shamateurs’ and, because countries like the Soviet Union and Poland were not being prevented from entering such athletes, it was argued by some observers that professional athletes should be admitted to the Olympics so that Britain could compete on a level playing field.49 While there was a lack of any real analysis of Soviet sport in the press, Soviet sporting activity was placed under careful scrutiny through some official channels. In April 1950, a report from the British Embassy in Moscow to the research sector of the Foreign Office raised concerns amongst British officials because it highlighted the ‘motives behind the importance attached to the supremacy in sport in the Soviet Union’ and it was 128 Cold War influences clear ‘they would not rest’ until they were ‘supreme in all branches of sport’.50 Soviet officials were clearly aware of the potential threat from Western athletes but this was not given too much consideration because ‘the bourgeois system of physical education is in a state of moral decay. And its ruin, together with the ruin of bourgeois culture as a whole, is inevitable’.51

Components of Soviet success The emergence of the likes of the Soviet Union in the post-war period created an increased emphasis on winning and breaking records and a shift in the role of international sport. The Soviet sporting environment was focused on a centrally controlled programme whereby the government devoted ever more resources to an increasingly sophisticated and comprehensive sports system. Although drug taking and blood doping amongst athletes in countries such as the Soviet Union was endemic during the Cold War it would be far too simplistic to suggest that their success rested solely on the use of performance-enhancing substances. The Soviets were never alone in their use of unethical training methods and the manipulation of ergogenic aids was merely a small part of a much larger complex preparation system that was based on three main tenets: first, the systematic and scientifically guided selection of children for a particular sport; then the placing of these young athletes in fully equipped facilities with methodical and structured training programmes guided by informed professional coaches; and, finally, the concentration of effort and resources onto selected sports.52 There were also extensive and technical sports science techniques being implemented in Eastern Bloc countries during the Cold War, designed and developed, for the most part, by Soviet researchers. This research was scarcely known in the West, due to the inaccessibility of journals, lack of familiarity with the language, and the secrecy surrounding such work. The free dissemination of scientific ideas and research had been suppressed in the early 1950s as a direct result of the actions of the Joint Sessions of the Academy of Science and the Academy of Medical Sciences of the USSR.53 This, coupled with the pressures exerted as a result of the Cold War, meant that communication between Soviet and Western scientists was virtually non-existent. What was happening in the Soviet sport system remained a mystery and caused much speculation, especially among British coaches of the period. Swimming coach Hamilton Smith commented that, ‘nobody knew what the hell

Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 the Soviets were doing’, and that he and athletics coach Tom McNab often disagreed about the mechanics of the system. Although they both believed that Eastern Bloc athletes must have been using performance-enhancing substances, Smith also thought that they were probably working harder than anyone else since ‘you can’t take drugs and go faster, the drug enables you to train harder’.54 This uncertainty resulted in growing unease over the Soviet system and its ability to produce such superior athletes. In an attempt to gain some evidence, Michael Speak and Victoria Ambler visited the Soviet Union in 1975 and they noted in a report on their return how the State selected gifted children and developed their talents in well-equipped facilities under the guidance of many Cold War influences 129 ‘excellent’ and ‘qualified’ coaches. In order to qualify as a coach, individuals were required to attend university or institutes of physical education and sport for three years before they were granted access to athletes. This ensured that the quality and standard of coaches was consistently high because they were all qualified to a similar level, whereas in Britain anyone who was willing to donate their free time was able to train and teach athletes.55 The average coach working in a Soviet sport school earned only 200–300 roubles a month but if the coach was working with ‘Masters’ of sport he/she earned considerably more. There was also a sense of loyalty towards coaches in the Soviet Union whereby, once they reached an age where it was no longer suitable for them to coach, or they were no longer considered in ‘touch with current coaching methods’, they would be provided with other related jobs such as physical education teaching, talent identification of younger athletes or sports administration.56 It became even more apparent that British and Soviet sport systems had been founded on different political, economic and cultural principles when Speak and Ambler highlighted an incident at the Leningrad Sports School between the director of the gymnastic school, a former Olympic champion, and a group of three female gymnasts (aged 14, 13 and 11). The quality of the work ‘appeared to be of international calibre and the coaches were very, very demanding. At one stage the coach told [a] girl, “you’ll do it until you cannot stand”’.57 They observed that the work was very repetitive and this essentially highlighted the exact nature of the relationship between the athletes, coaches and the system, with athletes being employed as a means to an end, cogs within a much larger machine. This is not to say that they were undervalued or not respected by their coaches but there was a clear agenda to their participation in sport, something which would have been alien to British athletes of all ages. Athletes in the East and West were following different patterns of socialization through sport which had been framed by different structures and attitudes to sporting practice.58 Speak and Ambler concluded with the suggestion that the focused direction of Soviet sport and physical culture ‘could solve many of the problems associated with the British system’ but that a system which had been built on, and sustained by, the values of amateurism, would probably have preferred to retain its problems rather than ‘sacrifice personal and professional freedom’ by adopting Soviet methods.59 Olympic swimming coach Terry Denison also saw the Soviet sport system first hand when he and Adrian Moorhouse (later 1988 Olympic 100 m breaststroke

Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 gold medallist) arranged to visit and train with the swim team in 1981. In 2011, he commented that ‘the whole Soviet system was really very, very efficient … they were more organized and planned on a national level, more back-up support, more scientific support … they were just like we are today’.60 One example of this was the availability of medical support. Speak and Ambler had observed that the Soviet knowledge of sports medicine was particularly advanced and widespread, far outranking anything seen in Britain. Each Sport School had a suite of medical rooms in which physiotherapists were available to assist and children were ‘tested six months after they begin to attend, to establish whether they have enough potential to continue’. There were other rooms that were supervised by a qualified 130 Cold War influences doctor, which included spaces for treatment, diagnosis and massage, but perhaps the most beneficial and advanced use of these facilities was the ability to establish whether illness or injury was the ‘result of physiological deficiency or overtraining’.61 By contrast, Western athletes generally relied on the observations and often limited medical knowledge of their coaches. Denison experienced just how advanced the Soviet’s medical knowledge was when Moorhouse incurred a shoulder injury on the second day of the visit:

If he had had that sort of an injury back home, it would have been physio treatment, if we could get it, it would certainly have been a number of days out of the water in recovery; however, as soon as he got the injury, they brought the sport scientists in and they sprayed him with, I didn’t know what but it was obviously some sort of coolant thing that they had in these ﬁles that they had, they gave him physio treatment immediately, the physios told us what we should do overnight and then the next day and he was back in the water. That would have been impossible over here at that time. It was all strapped up just like you see the athletes strapped up today, it was done well and he didn’t lose a day’s training. Whereas, in England, it would have been quite a serious injury. So it was obvious that there were things available that we didn’t know about or we weren’t using in this country, not in swimming anyway, I don’t know if athletics was or whatever but swimming wasn’t.62

Although Denison acknowledged that the Soviet coaches and swim team were ‘very welcoming’ and ‘very supportive’ they clearly had reservations about sharing all their training methods. He commented ‘the only time in Russia it didn’t work was when I asked to see the science labs, to see what they were doing, that caused a bit of consternation’. After much deliberation he was allowed to view the lab, but far from seeing the methods and techniques being implemented, he was subjected to ‘a beautiful pristine lab with not a soul in it!’. It was obvious that the Soviets did not want outsiders to see what they were doing, although Denison believes that this was not necessarily because they were doing anything unethical but more due to the fact that he was the opposition and sharing such secrets and methods would have disadvantaged them.63 Immediately prior to, and following, the dissolution of the Soviet Union it became clear that success in Soviet sport had been achieved by a comprehensive athletic

Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 agenda, within which research into exercise biochemistry, physiology and psychology was fully integrated. Sport institutions received specific research assignments from the Union of Research Institutes of Physical Culture and more than twenty-eight of these institutions were in existence by 1970.64 One of the most influential and important developments to emerge from Soviet sporting research was an alternative training paradigm, termed periodization. Lev Pavlovich Medveyev analyzed the athletic performances of a large number of athletes across a range of different sports and produced a systematic training programme which would encourage the optimal development of an athlete’s performance.65 In 1965, he published his theory in the Periodization of Sport Training and, after it was translated into the majority of Cold War influences 131 languages used throughout the Eastern Bloc, this encouraged the widespread dissemination of the training method to the global community of coaches and athletes.66 Sport psychology had also received considerable attention, and shortly after the war the Soviet Union began to generate this as a self-contained science, which continued to develop and be utilized alongside other aspects of performance enhancement. Avksenty Cezarevich Puni created a department at the Institute of Physical Culture where he began to develop sport psychology courses for students and researchers as well as creating multiple laboratories to conduct research. Following the success of the Soviet team in 1952, when the sports sciences were credited with having been significant factors in the team’s performances, there had been an increased demand for applied research and education in sport psychology in order for coaches to effectively incorporate these methods into their training.67

The British perspective The rivalry between the Soviet Union and the United States at both the Helsinki and the Melbourne Games ensured that competition standards were particularly high. Despite the tentative steps being taken after the 1948 Olympics towards improving coaching in Britain, schemes were still being framed within the context of the traditions of amateurism, and British athletes were unable to keep pace. This was clearly highlighted by the lack of achievement, particularly at Helsinki. While previous British failures had been attributed to the aftermath of the war, by 1952 this could no longer be convincingly used to explain failure, and, as a result, the performances of the British team were widely touted as a ‘ghastly failure’.68 A gold medal tally of just one, coupled with the success of the Soviet Union and the United States, once again stimulated debate about the British sporting system since it was obvious that the improved training and coaching methods now being utilized abroad far outstripped anything that existed in Britain. Helsinki conﬁrmed that the British sport system was ill-equipped to prepare its elite athletes, in terms of both structures and facilities. Britain was ‘disastrously short of tracks; America has, perhaps, 100 tracks for every one that we possess; and they have indoor facilities as well’, while the traditionalist approach to sport had hampered the development of British training methods. There were ‘too few coaches and their status still leaves something to be desired’.69 The issue of specialized training techniques was also raised and, although it was acknowledged that

Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 some British athletes were beginning to train in a ‘laboratory atmosphere of stop watches, statistics and records’, many traditionalists continued to question these methods by suggesting that they were inappropriate for British sport.70 This resistance to the incorporation of science into British sport was nothing new. In 1927 A.V. Hill had observed that, ‘in America … people are more inclined to treat the subject of athletics scientifically … there are I fear, many athletes and sportsmen in England who would be shocked by such an idea’.71 Although the failures at Helsinki raised questions over British attitudes to the relationship between science and sport, progress was not immediately forthcoming. In 1953, football administrator Sir Stanley Rous, commented that, ‘the British, compared with many other 132 Cold War influences nations, usually go about their games in a surprisingly unserious way … who cares about the … chemical structure of a muscle?’.72 It was clear that the debate regarding British sport and science would be on-going and that the integration of science would be a slow process. Despite widespread criticism, Harold Abrahams attempted to defend the British athletes who competed at the Helsinki Games, suggesting that their performances would have been sufficient to secure medals in both 1936 and 1948. In response, The Times argued that it was exactly ‘this curious backward-looking and sideways thinking’ that was the ‘root of the problem’ in British sport.73 It was becoming increasingly apparent that amateurism was no longer an acceptable excuse for poor performances and that the evidence suggested that this was no longer a workable philosophy in international sport. The alternative was clear; if Britain wanted to achieve global success in sport then it would require a significant shift towards a more specialized system. John Disley argued that the close relationship between British sport and amateurism had not only hindered the development of coaching and training it had also ‘built up a psychological barrier to winning’ amongst aspiring athletes.74 The Picture Post also highlighted the differences between British and foreign interpretations of amateurism and suggested, ‘what’stheusein“being British” and saying “the game’s the thing – not the result”? No other country comes off so badly. Either we go flat out to win – or not enter’.75 The more professionalized systems of sport, as witnessed in their different guises in both America and the Soviet Union, began to have an impact in Britain and elements of both systems were increasingly presented by some critics as a means of developing a sporting model that would improve the standard of the nation’s elite athletes. If Britain ever wanted to achieve sporting success again they would need ‘to get rid of this absurd smugness about amateurism’ and ‘train every day, all year round’ under the supervision of professional coaches.76 Interestingly, some of these attitudes were being adopted by administrators themselves and, in this respect, comments made by Kenneth Sandilands (‘Sandy’) Duncan, the British Olympic Association (BOA) secretary, are particularly illuminating.

Our Governing Bodies must decide whether they will, or can, make the all-out effort to train their Olympic teams. The day of the dilettante in international competition is ﬁnished. To achieve supreme success, many months, or perhaps years of hard training must be carried out, and this requires wise direction,

Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 and great courage and self-control on the part of the competitor … we must realise precisely what we are up against, discard any surviving old-time methods, and start now planning ahead for the XVIth Olympiad, Melbourne, 1956.77

Although British performances at Melbourne in 1956, where they managed to secure twenty-four medals, including six gold, marked a significant improvement on previous Games it was the emergence of other factors which indicated that British sport still remained in a state of flux. There was growing discontent amongst the athletes, particularly over British officials and their definitions of amateurism. Although these disagreements had begun to surface following Helsinki it was not Cold War influences 133 until Melbourne that athlete dissatisfaction emerged in the public domain. The disputes, which were reported in the press, were associated with the request for ‘pocket money’ at the Games, something already allowed in other countries such as Australia, whose swimmers had received five shillings per day for expenses. An appeal for similar funds by British athletes was denied by the BOA with Sandy Duncan stating, ‘definitely no pocket money. You knew that when you accepted the invitation to go to Melbourne’.78 Given that Duncan had acknowledged that British athletes required greater training and a more professional attitude, this is somewhat ironic. Clearly, the BOA, like other British sporting organizations, was struggling to come to terms with the changes occurring in the international sporting arena and, despite publicly signalling an acceptance of the notion of specialization, the fundamental ethos of amateurism, a rejection of monetary rewards, remained particularly influential. In fact, it gradually became apparent that the issues went much deeper and the far-reaching restrictions which British amateur officials had placed on their athletes were beginning to cause repercussions, with a series of confrontations occurring between administrators and athletes. Jack Crump, athletics team manager from the British Amateur Athletics Board (BAAB), referred to the majority of athletes as a ‘miserable lot’ who had not approached the competition in the correct way. This resulted in a wave of criticism with one commentator suggesting there was ‘no point in sending athletes who … clearly don’t care whether they win or lose’.79 Chris Brasher, who had won a gold medal in the 3,000 m steeplechase, came to the defence of the athletes and declared that although there was a level of ‘cynicism’ in the team this was because of ‘the breakdown in confidence and respect between the officials and athletes’.80 He also argued that ‘sport is undemocratically controlled by a few amateur and professional dictators … old men have clung to the dreams of their childhood when a gentleman was an amateur and an artisan a professional’.81 British athletes suggested that officials were ‘out of touch with the sport’ and that this had resulted in a ‘wide gap’ between athletes and administrators, particularly since the war.82 They were not alone in their criticisms. When asked why British athletics had ‘folded up’, the Australian team manager proposed that there was a lack of discipline in the team, administrators were too old and needed replacing by ‘younger people who had some conception of what modern athletics entailed’, and, tellingly, there was a notable lack of coaching.83 Prompted by events at Melbourne, both administrators and participants recognized

Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 a need for change. In its report on the Games the BOA stated that

It has become apparent that we need more professional coaches in this country and that in some sports the competitors from other countries train over longer distances and for longer hours. The amount of training that competitors felt that they required in 1956 was for some sports more than double that which was considered necessary in 1948.84

For their part, athletes called for a complete re-organization of the entire British sport system,85 including a review of attitudes to coaching and coaches. In May 134 Cold War influences 1959, a group of seventy athletes, among them both John Disley and Chris Brasher, created the International Athletes Club (IAC) to encourage the development of facilities and coaching for British athletics.86 In order to tackle some of the issues, they required financial backing but, since this was not forthcoming from other sources, they set about raising their own funds. They produced a book entitled Road to Rome and the royalties were used to organize a pre-Olympic training weekend for forty-eight athletes and ten coaches, which encouraged them to make plans to develop a permanent training centre in Hampshire, although lack of finance and sufficient support prevented it from ever becoming established. It was also hoped that ‘never again should a national coach have to dip into his own pocket to enable one of our brightest hopes to travel to London for coaching’. Despite making considerable progress in a short period of time, when the IAC made attempts to be represented officially they were rebuffed by the BAAB, which did not object to the IAC’s existence but was not willing to offer them any role in the sport’s organization.87 On paper, it seems that attempts were indeed being made to raise the profile of British sport and to change how professional coaching was being valued but, in reality, it was also apparent that sporting bodies remained resistant to the employment of full-time coaches. The manner in which amateur administrators approached coaching, and their athletes, was still determined by the traditional cultures of British sport in which, historically, the connection between administrators and coaches or trainers had always been moulded around the master–servant relationship. From this perspective, ‘as long as coaches adopted their allotted roles as servants then suitable men might be acceptable as trainers’.88 It was extremely difficult to break down the barriers to professional expertise that had existed in the sport for so many years and it is unsurprising that this approach to coaches continued to exert a residual impact. However, in the post-war era, appointed coaches were no longer willing to accept the role of servant, since they wanted greater autonomy and control over their working environment, and they were encouraged in this respect by the examples they witnessed overseas, particularly in America and the Soviet Union. From the perspective of the administrators, however, professional coaches were now encroaching on matters which should not come within their jurisdiction and they continued to rely on their traditional authoritarian approach in an attempt to maintain control. Tom McNab suggests that even as late as the 1960s, when he was acting as national coach, there was still this assumption 89

Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 among administrators that ‘you’ll do as you’re told, we’re the masters here’. It would be wrong to assume, however, that all administrators were resistant to change and that all sports adopted the same approach. Surprisingly, given their history with respect to professional coaches, rowing authorities were the first to take a decisive step towards adopting an Eastern Bloc approach to their elite teams, and Christopher Dodd has provided an insightful commentary on the development of professional coaching in British rowing during this period. In doing so, he highlights the increasing democratization of elite sport in the late 1960s, even in sports like rowing, which had clung most strenuously to the amateur ethos for nearly a century. His narrative also emphasizes how important individuals can be in making history, Cold War influences 135 in sport as in all other fields. Coaching developments in swimming and athletics were driven by significant people within the National Governing Bodies (NGBs) and the role played by Amateur Rowing Association (ARA) secretary Freddie Page and other key supporters in initiating a more systematic coaching scheme in rowing was critical. Previous initiatives had foundered on class rivalries and a selection system that preferred its own members, normally ‘Old Blues’, while the NGB had been arguing about rowing style and amateur status since 1882. Although Jim Railton, a Loughborough graduate, had been employed as a trainer by the ARA in the 1960s this had not been a particularly revolutionary step. On the other hand, appointing Bob Janousek, a foreigner from the Eastern Bloc and the first foreign coach of a British Olympic sport, at the height of the Cold War to take charge of coaching was a courageous act. Even for some within the professional coaching community this was a step too far. Professional sculler Lou Barry believed that British rowing had nothing to learn from the Eastern European coach because ‘we invented the sport in Britain and got it up to great heights’. For his part, Janousek later described Barry as a ‘clever and cunning’ coach. In many respects, Barry reflected the traditional British professional coach, individuals who were maybe not ‘that hot on theory and sciences and all that stuff but they’ve got something … they have a feel … coaching is a mixture of art and science’.90 On arrival in Britain in 1969, Janousek found six or seven amateurs coaching two weeks each since few men could take more than a couple of weeks off work. The British rowing system was ‘ad hoc and largely hand me down’ and funds were always in short supply. At one point Janousek asked the BOA to write to employers asking for his crew to have an hour off work in the morning, in response to which the BOA ‘threw their hands up in the air, claiming that such a move was unprecedented’. Rowers were asked to pay £50 towards attending one Lucerne regatta and in another year there was discussion about their contributing to travel to the European Championships. Tensions between officials and athletes were ongoing, such as when the ARA ordered one rower to have his hair cut and when rowers referred to Henley stewards as a ‘bunch of old farts’.91 Tellingly, only five officers of the Sports Council spoke to Janousek in his seven years in post, there was no provision for in-service training of coaches, and no specialist courses for PE students or retired top-class athletes. Britain had medical specialists but no sports medicine and no overall syllabus, plan or structure for physical education. Chris Baillieu noted that to the rest of the world, especially the Eastern Bloc, English rowing

Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 was a joke because of its amateur preparations, while traditionalists still held on to the belief that professionalism encouraged individual careerism and selﬁshness. Oarsman John Yallop observed that

most of us are giving up. It’s difficult in this country to take sport seriously because you get no backing from the government or anything, it’s all your own time. You lose money, job, you lose all the way along, so at some stage you have to stop and get on with your career … Every other country gets support from the government, from large professional organizations and we don’t, you know, totally amateur, and it’s unfair competition.92 136 Cold War influences In a similar manner to the way in which the first national coaches in athletics were expected to make the education of amateur coaches a priority, Janousek’s first allotted task was to create a coach qualification scheme for the large body of amateur instructors. The long-term aim was to agree on a recognized basic technique to be taught universally in England by qualified experts and the 1971 booklet Training in the Boat set out training analysis and methods of preparation for different levels of rowing. As national coach, Janousek was also nominally in charge of the GB team for international championships, but this role was limited initially to ‘negotiating with vested interests, cajoling competitors, persuading doubters and schemers, and appealing for support from selection boards’ and it was only after the 1973 European Championships that Janousek was finally given direct responsibility for coaching top oarsmen. Janousek knew that the British set-up would not allow him to mimic the methods or the resources of the Eastern Bloc countries and that there would be very little in the way of support. To deliver results he would have to match the professional full-timers of the communist states with a tailor-made methodology dovetailed to a lifestyle of study and career development that was a feature of the British amateur oarsman. He was critical of the East European use of drugs, often applied under medical supervision, being particularly scornful of the Russians and Bulgarians in this respect. He believed that their use of drugs might have improved some second-tier athletes but that it did not benefit the elite and that successful performance could only be achieved by training and hard work. He constantly monitored the training himself, introduced concepts such as periodization, and implemented training camps at Nottingham and an altitude camp in Switzerland.93 He also engaged with universities to work on boat design, something which had been driven by professional oarsmen during the nineteenth century but which was now becoming part of the gradual move to use sports science to support elite athletes and coaches. Importantly, he recognized the need to be inclusive and he ensured that coaches like Barry and Railton were involved in the programme, while his egalitarian approach to team selection resulted in his transcending the traditional Leander–Tradesmen divide by generating united crews, despite differences in social origin, rowing styles and club affiliations. At the Montreal Olympics, Mike Hart and Chris Baillieu won silver in the double sculls and the eight won a silver behind East Germany. The next day Janousek mailed his resignation to the ARA. By this point, his three levels of national coaching

Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 awards were in place, as was the first multi-lane rowing course, the performance of youth rowing was improving, advances had been made in boat and oar design, some sponsorship was now available for the national team, clubs were cooperating with each other and with the national squad, while the sport’s administration and team management had developed significantly. Above all, Britain’s Blue Riband boat had returned to the medal podium for the first time since 1948. His efforts had changed the social and competitive landscape of British rowing but he realized that rowing had now ‘reached a ceiling in areas over which he had control’.94 In reflecting on Janousek’s impact, Dodd notes that British rowing won another silver medal in 1980 and that, since then, at least one British crew has won gold at Cold War influences 137 each Olympics. For his oarsmen, Janousek was an enigma, a man who believed in discipline and hard work, but one who was flexible, charismatic and structured, and someone who took account of individual differences. As one oarsman put it, ‘When he spoke, no-one else spoke. When he did something, everyone looked. We were his disciples and he was like Christ’.95 Perhaps his greatest legacy was through these ‘disciples’. At least eight of his oarsmen became professional, semi- professional or amateur coaches, some full-time, some part-time. Others became Henley stewards and administrators and officials, newspaper reporters and media commentators. Through these individuals, his coaching philosophy and practices were perpetuated in British rowing and, as was often the case, his appointment paved the way for further appointments, including Penny Chuter.

Conclusion British sporting performances had continually declined since the interwar period but it was the emergence of the Soviet Union in international sport that made these losses even more apparent. Previously, the results of British athletes could be attributed to the impact of the war and the continued strict adherence to amateurism, but the success of the Soviets meant that these excuses were no longer satisfactory. The inadequate performances of British athletes at the 1952 Olympics appear to have been much more inﬂuential, in terms of encouraging change, than the results experienced at previous Games, and athlete unrest at both Helsinki and Melbourne suggests that discontent in British sport was now no longer just con- ﬁned to professional coaches. However, despite increasing pressures to adopt Soviet techniques of coaching and training, British administrators remained reluctant to incorporate a more specialized approach to coaching, and this resistance ultimately led to a number of coaching resignations in both swimming and athletics. On the other hand, although NGBs were unwilling to relinquish their master–servant relationship with professional coaches, the Soviet success and continued poor performances of British athletes encouraged external bodies, and the government in particular, to begin to review the state of British sport, although the government took many years to establish a symbiotic relationship with elite sport. The sporting Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union was far-reaching, beginning in the aftermath of the Second World War and lasting until the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. The rivalry reached its peak in

Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 the 1980s when the United States boycotted the Moscow Games, supposedly in retaliation for the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, although there were other factors at play here, not least American concern over the Soviet Union’s sporting policies and methods. The British Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, voiced her support for the boycott, which was approved by the House of Com- mons in March 1980, but, since the Olympic Charter states that ‘the NOC have the exclusive authority for the representation of their exclusive countries’, the BOA decided to defy the government and send a team to Moscow.96 This placed a strain on its relationship with the government, with the then Minister of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Douglas Hurd, commenting that, ‘sport 138 Cold War influences itself has lost the support in Parliament by the BOA’s decision’ and observing that it was unlikely that the government ‘would make an effort to repair the damage to sport in this country’.97 This rift undoubtedly influenced the willingness of the government to provide both the BOA and British sport with further financial support and resources, at least in the short term.98 A series of complex events, such as the political and economic reform of the Soviet Union initiated by Mikhail Gorbachev during the 1980s and the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, contributed to the dissolution of the Soviet Union, effectively marking the end of the Cold War.99 By this stage the Soviet ethos had penetrated global sports and their professionalization of athletes and coaches, which had clearly paid dividends, persuaded other nations to actively canvass for an alteration to Olympic eligibility standards. Although this did not cause an immediate removal of the amateur ruling, and it was not until 1988 that professional athletes were eligible to enter the Games, nations began to shift towards a professional approach, particularly in the way in which internal sport systems were organized.100 The British, who believed they retained a unique appreciation of amateurism and its principles, initially continued to control and organize their sport along voluntary lines wherever possible, and continued utilizing honorary officials to make executive decisions about the direction of their sports. Nevertheless, as pressures began to mount as more and more nations moved towards open professionalization, Britain was forced to follow suit, and this was reflected in the way that the two key pillars of the Soviet sports system, government intervention and sports science, gradually became intertwined with the national approach to international sport. The far-reaching sporting success of the Soviet Union encouraged governments around the world to emulate some of their sporting policies and the significant contributions that had been made to the understanding of exercise biochemistry, sports nutrition and sport psychology, and the development of sophisticated methods of training such as periodization, would transform British sport coaching. During the 1990s, sporting policies began to reflect some of those which had been in use in the Soviet Union and, while it could be argued that these systems might have been introduced anyway, the Soviet exemplar does seem to have been highly influential.101 For example, the principles of periodization penetrated coaching practices, especially after Frank Dick reproduced the Soviet theories for a British audience in 1975, although not everyone embraced them wholeheartedly. However, while Soviet sporting policies certainly encouraged greater specialization

Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 and increased government intervention in British sport, there was less obvious immediate engagement with the sports science disciplines or with sports medicine, with public, government-funded research only really emerging in 1965 with the Mexican altitude project directed by the BOA. This resistance to scientific training methods in Britain may well have been associated with some ethical concerns surrounding Eastern Bloc techniques, since the somewhat dubious practices believed to be commonly in use within Soviet programmes had become inextricably linked with the sports science disciplines. An association had therefore been made between the incorporation of science and cheating in sport because it was increasingly difficult to disassociate the two.102 As Terry Denison commented, Cold War influences 139 The system was … fantastic at identifying talent, of putting talent in the right places, of getting the right coaches and the right sport scientists together, the system was brilliant but it involved the use of drugs, so that tainted everything … you couldn’t justify the use of drugs on young people anyway … but also, you couldn’t even look at the rest of it and say well, they did that well didn’t they, well, yeah but … we can’t be following that. It just tainted everything. But their systems were good; the Soviet sport school system was good.103

Consequently, while professional coaching was beginning to gain acceptance in Britain there remained unease, among both administrators and coaches, about the use of science to improve sporting performance, something which would come as a surprise to twenty-ﬁrst century coaches, many of whom have established close relationships with the scientiﬁc community.

Notes 1 Peter Beck, ‘Britain and the Cold War’s “Cultural Olympics”: Responding to the Political Drive of Soviet Sport, 1945–58’, Contemporary British History 19, no. 2 (2005): 170. 2 Komsomolskaya Pravda, Why Soviet Sportsmen Win, March 31, 1950, 5, File FO 371/86796, Foreign Office Collection, National Archives, Kew (hereafter cited as FO: NA); Manchester Guardian, December 28, 1951, 8. 3 James Riordan, Sport in Soviet Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 31–32. 4 Jenifer Parks ‘Red Sport, Red Tape: The Olympic Games, the Soviet Sports Bureau- cracy, and the Cold War, 1952–1980’ (PhD Diss., University of North Carolina, 2009), 21. 5 Norman Shneigman, The Soviet Road to Olympus: Theory and Practice of Soviet Phy- sical Culture and Sport (Ontario: The Ontario Institute for Studies in Education, 1978), 19. 6 James Riordan ‘The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Olympic Champions’, Olympika 11 (1993): 25; James Riordan, ‘Sport Which Came in from the Cold … for Health and Efficiency’, Guardian, March 4, 1980, 23; Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Sport in the Soviet Union – Background Brief, June, 1980, 2, File FO 973/97, FO: NA. 7 Barbara Keys, Globalising Sport: National Rivalry and International Community in the 1930s (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006), 159. 8 Shneigman, Soviet Road to Olympus, 23; Riordan, Sport in Soviet Society,60–67. 9 Keys, Globalising Sport, 159.

Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 10 Riordan, Sport in Soviet Society, 122. 11 Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Sport in the Soviet Union – Background Brief, June, 1980, 2, File FO 973/97, FO: NA. 12 Baraukh Hazan, Olympic Sports and Propaganda Games: Moscow 1980 (New Brunswick: Transaction Inc., 1982), 22. 13 Riordan, Sport in Soviet Society, 126–127. 14 Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Sport in the Soviet Union – Background Brief, June, 1980, 2, File FO 973/97, FO: NA. 15 George Sinfield, A Nation of Champions: All about Soviet Sport (London: Russia Today Society, 1941), 7. 16 Keys, Globalising Sport, 165, 172. 140 Cold War influences 17 Riordan, Sport in Soviet Society, 133, 153–155. 18 Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Sport in the Soviet Union – Background Brief, June, 1980, 2, 159, File FO 973/97, FO: NA; Keys, Globalising Sport, 179. 19 James Riordan, ‘Rewriting Soviet Sports History’, Journal of Sports History 20, no. 3 (1993): 248. 20 Riordan, Sport in Soviet Society, 161–162. 21 Toby Rider, ‘An Unwitting Target: The IOC, Exiled Athletes, and US Government Covert Operations, 1950–1960’, International Olympic Committee Research Project (2010): 3. 22 James Riordan, ‘The Role of Sport in Soviet Foreign Policy’, Soviet Studies 26, no. 3 (1974): 571; Robert Edelman, Serious Fun: A History of Spectator Sports in the U.S.S. R. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 125. 23 Lincoln Allison and Terry Monnington, ‘Sport, Prestige and International Relations’, in The Global Politics of Sport, ed. Lincoln Allison (Oxon: Routledge, 2005), 116. 24 University of Birmingham Physical Education Department, Britain in the World of Sport: An Examination of the Factors Involved in Participation in Competitive International Sport (Birmingham: The Physical Education Association, 1956), 7. 25 Rob Beamish and Ian Ritchie, Fastest, Highest, Strongest: A Critique of High Performance Sport (Oxon: Routledge, 2008), 18. 26 Riordan, Sport in Soviet Society, 162. 27 Alfred Erich Senn, Power, Politics and the Olympic Games (Champaign: Human Kinetics, 1999), 85. 28 Senn, Power, Politics and Olympic, 87; Beamish and Ritchie, Fastest, Highest, Stron- gest,18–19. 29 Brundage to Edström, January 21, 1947, Brundage Papers Box 42, University of Illinois Collection, Champaign-Urbana, quoted in Espy, Politics of Olympic Games,28. 30 Robert Creamer, ‘Of Greeks – and Russians’, Sports Illustrated, February 6, 1956, 30–32; Senn, Power, Politics and Olympic, 87. 31 Riordan, ‘Rewriting Soviet Sports History’, 248. 32 Riordan, Sport in Soviet Society, 163. 33 Robert Edelman, ‘The Professionalisation of Soviet Sport: The Case of the Soccer Union’, Journal of Sport History 17, no. 1 (1990): 45. 34 Espy, Politics of Olympic Games, 27. 35 Keys, Globalising Sport, 178. 36 James Riordan, ‘The USSR’,inSport under Communism: The USSR, Czechoslovakia, the G.D.R., China, Cuba, ed. James Riordan (London: C. Hurst, 1978), 30. 37 James Riordan, ‘The Impact of Communism on Sport’,inThe International Politics of Sport in the 20th Century, ed. James Riordan and Arnd Kruger (London: E and FN Spon, 1999), 57. 38 Espy, Politics of Olympic Games, 35. 39 Ibid., 35; Lincoln Allison, ‘The Olympic Movement and the End of the Cold War’, World Affairs 157, no. 2 (1994): 92. 40 –

Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 Beamish and Ritchie, Fastest, Highest, Strongest,19 20. 41 Hunt, ‘Countering the Soviet Threat’, 797. 42 ‘Amateurism: Soviet Facade Not Likely to Change’, Palm Beach Post, February 18, 1972, 60. 43 Beck, ‘Britain and “Cultural Olympics”’, 175. 44 John Massaro, ‘Press Box Propaganda? The War and Sports Illustrated, 1956’, The Journal of American Culture 26, no. 3 (2003): 363. 45 Andre Laguerre, ‘Russia Takes Over’, Sports Illustrated, February 6, 1956, 17. 46 Charles A. Bucher, ‘Are We Losing the Olympic Ideal’, Sports Illustrated,August2,1955. 47 Barbara Keys, ‘The Soviet Union, Global Culture, and the 1956 Melbourne Olympic Games’, Paper presented at the Conference of Globalization of Sport in Historical Context, University of California, San Diego, March, 2005, 2. Cold War influences 141 48 Colin Groom, ‘Are the Russians Good Sports?’, The Sydney Morning Herald, February 2, 1952, 7. 49 James Mossop, ‘Shamateurs Should Be Kicked Out’, Sunday Express, 25 July, 1978, 24. 50 British Embassy – Moscow to Northern Department – Foreign Office, April 6, 1950, File FO 371/86796, FO: NA. 51 Komsomolskaya Pravda, Why Soviet Sportsmen Win, March 31, 1950, 6, File FO 371/86796, FO: NA. 52 Beamish and Ritchie, Fastest, Highest, Strongest, 100. 53 Michael Kalinski, ‘State Sponsored Research on Creatine Supplements and Blood Doping in Elite Soviet Sport’, Perspectives in Biology and Medicine 46, no. 3 (2003): 446. 54 Hamilton Smith, interview, July 27, 2011, Edinburgh, Scotland. 55 Michael Speak and Victoria Ambler, Physical Education, Recreation and Sport in the U.S.S.R. (Lancaster: Centre for Physical Education, University of Lancaster, 1976), 27; Terry Denison, interview, September 14, 2011, Leeds. 56 Speak and Ambler, Sport in the U.S.S.R., 27. 57 Ibid., 36. 58 Vassil Girginov and Ivan Sandanski, ‘From Participants to Competitors: The Trans- formation of British Gymnastics and the Role of the Eastern European Model of Sport’, International Journal of the History of Sport 21, no. 5 (2004): 817. 59 Speak and Ambler, Sport in the U.S.S.R., 92. 60 Terry Denison, interview. 61 Speak and Ambler, Sport in the U.S.S.R., 23, 25. 62 Terry Denison, interview, 63 Ibid. 64 Kalinski, ‘State Sponsored Research’, 446. 65 Nicholas David Bourne, ‘Fast Science: A History of Training Theory and Methods for Elite Runners through 1975’ (PhD Diss., Texas University, 2008), 33–34. 66 Lev Pavlovich Matveyev, Periodization of Sport Training (Moscow: Fizkultura I Sport, 1965). 67 Tatiana Ryba, Natalia Stambulova and Craig Wrisberg, ‘The Russian Origins of Sport Psychology: A Translation of an Early Work of A.C. Puni’, Journal of Applied Psychology 17, no. 2 (2005): 158–160. 68 University of Birmingham, Britain in World Sport,7;The Times, August 7, 1952. 69 Philip Noel-Baker, ‘The Olympic Games: Britain’s Immense Progress’, The Times, August 9, 1952, 5. 70 J.L. Manning, ‘The Olympic Games’, The Times, August 13, 1952. 71 Archibald Hill, Muscular Movement in Man: The Factors Governing Speed and Recovery from Fatigue (New York, McGraw-Hill, 1921), 2; Roberta J. Park, ‘Cells or Soaring?: Historical Reflections on “Visions” of the Body, Athletics, and Modern Olympism’, International Journal of the History of Sport 24, no. 12 (2007): 1710. 72 Stanley Rous, foreword to Sidney Simon Knight, Fitness and Injury in Sport: Care,

Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 Diagnosis and Treatment by Physical Means(New York: Van Nostrand, 1953). 73 ‘Olympic Games’, The Times, August 13, 1952, 5. 74 John Disley, ‘Reflections on Soviet Sport’, Physical Recreation no. 1 (1956): 71. 75 Geoffrey Hoare, ‘Training by Candlelight?’, Picture Post, August 9, 1952, 12–13. 76 T. Loftus-Tottenham, ‘Amateurs: No Such Thing?’, Picture Post, February 2, 1952, 8. 77 British Olympic Association, Olympic Games 1952: Official Report (London: World Sports, 1952), 107. 78 British Olympic Association, Olympic Games 1956: Official Report (London: World Sports, 1956), 63; Desmond Hackett, ‘British Olympic Athletes Row with Manager Crump’, Daily Express, November 17, 1956, 9. 79 Peter Wilson, ‘Athletes Are Wasting Your Money’, Daily Mirror, November 28, 1956, 23. 142 Cold War influences 80 Chris Brasher, ‘Cynicism Beats Our Athletes’, Observer, August 10, 1958, 1. 81 Chris Brasher, ‘Youth and Age in Open Conflict’, Observer, January 4, 1959, 21. 82 Chris Brasher, ‘Ideas Must Be Backed with Cash’, Observer, May 8, 1960, 31; John Rodda, ‘IAC Projects Require Much More Active Support’, Guardian, April 21, 1961, 4. 83 Brasher, ‘Cynicism Beats Our Athletes’,1. 84 British Olympic Association, Olympic Games 1956,11. 85 Sydney Hulls, ‘Rebel Athletes Say Give Us New Deal’, Daily Express, December 14, 1956, 12. 86 Sydney Hulls, ‘Star Athletes “Locked Out”’, Daily Express, July 18, 1959, 8. 87 Brasher, ‘Ideas Must Be Backed with Cash’, 31; Rodda, ‘IAC Projects Require Much More Active Support’,4. 88 Dave Day, ‘A Man Cannot See His Own Faults: British Professional Trainers and the 1912 Olympics’, Paper presented at the Sport and Leisure History Seminar, London, February 6, 2012, 8. 89 Tom McNab, interview, May 6, 2011, St Albans. 90 Christopher Dodd, Pieces of Eight: Bob Janousek and His Olympians (Henley-on-Thames: River and Rowing Foundation, 2012), 23. 91 Ibid., 138, 146. 92 Ibid., 189. 93 Ibid., 55, 158. 94 Ibid., 195. 95 Ibid., 173. 96 Moscow Should Not Be Allowed an Olympics Spectacle’, The Times, March 18, 1980, 5; Hugh Noyes, ‘MPs Vote for Boycott of Olympics by Majority of 168’, The Times, March 18, 1980, 1; International Olympic Committee, Olympic Charter (Lausanne: International Olympic Committee, 1997), 62; John Hennessy, ‘Britons Vote to Send Team to Olympics’, The Times, March 28, 1980, 1. 97 Douglas Hurd, Minister of State to Hector Munro, Parliamentary Under-Secretary, April 21, 1980, http://politics.guardian.co.uk/foi/images/0,1717021,00.html (accessed April 26, 2012). 98 ‘A Soviet Nyet to the Games’, Time Magazine, May 21, 1984, Section A. 99 Michael J. Hogan, The End of the Cold War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992). 100 Edelman, ‘Professionalisation of Soviet Sport’, 45. 101 Allison and Monnington, ‘Sport, Prestige and Relations’,inGlobal Politics of Sport, 115. 102 Hamilton Smith, interview. 103 Terry Denison, interview.

Bibliography Allison, Lincoln. ‘The Olympic Movement and the End of the Cold War’. World Affairs Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 157, no. 2 (1994): 92–97. Allison, Lincoln and Terry Monnington. ‘Sport, Prestige and International Relations’,in The Global Politics of Sport, ed. Lincoln Allison (Oxon: Routledge, 2005), 116. Beamish, Rob and Ian Ritchie. Fastest, Highest, Strongest: A Critique of High Performance Sport (Oxon: Routledge, 2008). Beck, Peter. ‘Britain and the Cold War’s “Cultural Olympics”: Responding to the Political Drive of Soviet Sport, 1945–1958’. Contemporary British History 19, no. 2 (2005): 169–185. Bourne, Nicholas David. ‘Fast Science: A History of Training Theory and Methods for Elite Runners through 1975’. PhD Diss., Texas University, 2008. Cold War influences 143 British Olympic Association. Olympic Games 1952: Official Report (London: World Sports, 1952). British Olympic Association. Olympic Games 1956: Official Report (London: World Sports, 1956). Day, Dave. ‘“A Man Cannot See His Own Faults”: British Professional Trainers and the 1912 Olympics’. Paper presented at the Sport and Leisure History Seminar, London, February 6, 2012, 8. Dodd, Christopher. Pieces of Eight: Bob Janousek and His Olympians (Henley-on-Thames: River and Rowing Foundation, 2012). Edelman, Robert. ‘The Professionalisation of Soviet Sport: The Case of the Soccer Union’. Journal of Sport History 17, no. 1 (1990): 44–55. Edelman, Robert. Serious Fun: A History of Spectator Sports in the U.S.S.R. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993). Espy, Richard. The Politics of the Olympic Games (London: University of California Press, 1979). Girginov, Vassil and Ivan Sandanski. ‘From Participants to Competitors: The Transforma- tion of British Gymnastics and the Role of the Eastern European Model of Sport’. International Journal of the History of Sport 21, no. 5 (2004): 815–832. Hazan, Baraukh. Olympic Sports and Propaganda Games: Moscow 1980 (New Brunswick: Transaction Inc., 1982). Hill, Archibald. Muscular Movement in Man: The Factors Governing Speed and Recovery from Fatigue (New York, McGraw-Hill, 1921). Hogan, Michael J. The End of the Cold War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992). Hunt, Thomas. ‘Countering the Soviet Threat in the Olympic Medals Races: The Amateur Sports Act of 1978 and American Athletics Policy Reform’. The International Journal of the History of Sport 24, no. 6 (2007): 796–818. Kalinski, Michael. ‘State Sponsored Research on Creatine Supplements and Blood Doping in Elite Soviet Sport’. Perspectives in Biology and Medicine 46, no. 3 (2003): 445–451. Keys, Barbara. ‘The Soviet Union, Global Culture, and the 1956 Melbourne Olympic Games’. Paper presented at the Conference of Globalization of Sport in Historical Context, University of California, San Diego, March, 2005. Keys, Barbara. Globalising Sport: National Rivalry and International Community in the 1930s (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006). Massaro, John. ‘Press Box Propaganda? The War and Sports Illustrated, 1956’. The Journal of American Culture 26, no. 3 (2003): 361–370. Matveyev, Lev Pavlovich. Periodization of Sport Training (Moscow: Fizkultura I Sport, 1965). Park, Roberta J. ‘Cells or Soaring?: Historical Reflections on “Visions” of the Body, Athletics, Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 and Modern Olympism’. International Journal of the History of Sport 24, no. 12 (2007): 1701–1723. Parks, Jenifer. ‘Red Sport, Red Tape: The Olympic Games, The Soviet Sports Bureaucracy, and The Cold War, 1952–1980’. PhD Diss., University of North Carolina, 2009. Rider, Toby. ‘An Unwitting Target: The IOC, Exiled Athletes, and US Government Covert Operations, 1950–1960’. International Olympic Committee Research Project, 2010. Riordan, James. ‘The Role of Sport in Soviet Foreign Policy’. Soviet Studies 26, no. 3 (1974): 571. Riordan, James. Sport in Soviet Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977). 144 Cold War influences Riordan, James. ‘The USSR’,inSport under Communism: The USSR, Czechoslovakia, the G.D.R, China, Cuba, ed. James Riordan (London: C. Hurst, 1978), 30. Riordan, James. ‘The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Olympic Champions’. Olympika 11 (1993): 25–44. Riordan, James. ‘Rewriting Soviet Sports History’. Journal of Sports History 20, no. 3 (1993): 247–258. Riordan, James. ‘The Impact of Communism on Sport’,inThe International Politics of Sport in the 20th Century, eds James Riordan and Arnd Kruger (London: E and FN Spon, 1999), 48–66. Rous, Stanley. Foreword to Sidney Simon Knight, Fitness and Injury in Sport: Care, Diagnosis and Treatment by Physical Means (NewYork:VanNostrand,1953),ix. Ryba, Tatiana, Natalia Stambulova and Craig Wrisberg. ‘The Russian Origins of Sport Psychology: A Translation of an Early Work of A.C. Puni’. Journal of Applied Psychology 17, no. 2 (2005), 157–169. Senn, Alfred Erich. Power, Politics and the Olympic Games (Champaign: Human Kinetics, 1999). Shneigman, Norman. The Soviet Road to Olympus: Theory and Practice of Soviet Physical Culture and Sport (Ontario: The Ontario Institute for Studies in Education, 1978). Sinfield, George. A Nation of Champions: All about Soviet Sport (London: Russia Today Society, 1941). Speak, Michael and Victoria Ambler. Physical Education, Recreation and Sport in the U.S.S.R. (Lancaster: Centre for Physical Education, University of Lancaster, 1976). University of Birmingham Physical Education Department. Britain in the World of Sport: An Examination of the Factors Involved in Participation in Competitive International Sport. (Birmingham: The Physical Education Association, 1956). Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 7 Coaching, science and medicine

Introduction British athletes approached the post-war Olympic Games at a disadvantage in comparison with their Eastern European and North American rivals whose systematic approaches to coaching and training were beginning to be informed by wider developments in science and medicine. Early twentieth-century research studies had been designed to monitor physiological response to exercise rather than to systematically study athletic performance, so the context within which contemporary sports science and medicine operates was still at an early stage in its evolution. The scientific marginality of sport during this period contributed to a failure to use research findings to assist coaches because other areas of research into human capacity, such as manual labour and military service, were considered much more important. In addition, researchers of the period were reluctant to apply science to improving athletic performance because of the widespread concern that overtraining and overexertion could damage the vital organs, particularly the heart.1 Communication between scientists and the athletic community was limited. Because research information remained largely confined to scientific journals, which were not readily accessible, coaches continued to rely on their accumulated experience and knowledge. Even if the transfer of knowledge and ideas between researchers and coaches had been more fluid, coaches probably would have remained reluctant to incorporate experimental science since Victorian and Edwardian coaching practice was heavily predicated on the concept of a ‘craft knowledge’, acquired through experience and the oral and visual transfer of Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 coaching information. Coaching was considered an art as much as a science, something which had been forged and developed through accumulated wisdom. Although the term ‘scientific’ had become increasingly associated with training methods, this was not used to indicate the incorporation of scientific principles but rather to describe a systematic process of training.2 As the British Medical Journal observed in 1873,

The absence of any scientiﬁc work on exercise and training for the guidance of athletes is to us no matter of surprise. Experience has built up a system of 146 Coaching, science and medicine training which, although in some respects … open to improvement by the application of scientiﬁc knowledge, is on the whole probably much more correct than would be the programme recommended by the whole body of our savants in the Council … When we come to the effects of training and exercise on the health of the body, we are at a loss.3

Coaches had developed strategies of effective training long before the incorporation of science proved or disproved its effectiveness and, even though contemporary sport has seen the institutionalization of science, there is still a reliance on traditional knowledge. Many subsequent coaches achieved consistent results without the use of a scientiﬁc approach and so they felt under ‘no obligation to provide theoretical justiﬁcation’.4 Athletics coach Arthur Lydiard said ‘Coaches already know what works, and the scientist’s job is to tell them why it works!’,5 while athletics coach Steve Jones suggested his coaching is ‘simple … there’s no science in it, no heart- rate monitors, nothing … it’s just about running instinctively … none of it comes out of a book. It all comes out of my own experience’.6

Inter-war developments The direct integration of science into sport was stimulated by the 1911 Dresden International Hygiene Exhibition. After it ended, Henry Beyer, while commending the efforts made by England as having added to the ‘completeness of the results of the undertaking’ and regretting the absence of America, concluded that the progress made by Germany in terms of scientific study in this field were far more advanced than those seen elsewhere.7 In an attempt to continue the Dresden success, a research laboratory was established in Berlin and there was a nationwide drive in Germany, in preparation for the 1916 Games, to advance the study of sport and focus research on factors related to improving athletic performance.8 These initiatives extended into the inter-war period, when European researchers began to develop ascientific body of knowledge concerning human anatomy and physiology.9 Progress was made in the 1920s in America, particularly in the field of exercise physiology, by David Bruce Dill at the Harvard Fatigue Laboratory, opened in 1927 and responsible for producing some of the most extensive research data of the period, and British physiologist A.V. Hill, who won the Nobel Prize for physiology or medicine in 1922 for discoveries relating to heat production in the muscle. Hill

Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 had a personal interest in the study of athletic performance and his research addressed muscular contraction, lactic acid production and oxygen debt.10 These experiments were physically demanding so it was considered particularly appropriate to work with trained athletes who were willing to work to maximum capacity. As Hill explained in 1927,

The processes of athletics are simple and measurable and carried out to a constant degree, namely to the utmost of a man’s powers … and athletes themselves, being in a state of health and dynamic equilibrium, can be experimented on without danger and can repeat their performances exactly Coaching, science and medicine 147 again and again. I might perhaps state a third reason and say … that the study of athletes and athletics is ‘amusing’: certainly to us and sometimes I hope to them.11

Ernst Jokl later suggested that Hill’s work had provided an impetus to the field12 and Dill credited him for providing the inspiration for much of the research produced at Harvard.13 By working in conjunction with physiologist, Arlie V. Bock, and the Boston General Hospital, the laboratory was able to carry out a series of studies in 1928 that included among its subjects Clarence DeMar, who had been in a continuous trained state for approximately twenty years. Results suggested that physical training significantly increased lung capacity and reduced the pulse rate, which led researchers to conclude that the trained athlete was more efficient than the sedentary individual because they had a superior ability to be able to meet a demand for oxygen.14 However, the research team failed to bridge the gap between monitoring physiological responses to exercise and effective performance enhancement, a frustrating outcome for DeMar who remained dismissive of officials, trainers and coaches throughout his life.15 During this period there was a growing connection between the medical and scientific aspects of sport and the Olympic Games. The first obvious example of this had emerged at the 1908 London Games when the organizing committee insisted on medical checks for anyone entering the marathon. Each competitor was required to submit a ‘medical certificate of fitness’ with his entry and then undergo further medical examinations by officers appointed by the British Olympic Council (BOC). The committee could also be credited with introducing the first drugs ban when it stated that ‘no competitor either at the start or during the progress of the race may take or receive any drug. The breach of this rule will operate as an absolute disqualification’.16 The first real example of a concentrated programme of scientific research at an Olympic competition, however, occurred at the 1928 Games after Professor Buytendijk had asked if he could take advantage of the presence of athletes during the Olympic Games to carry out sport-physiological research. The organizing committee had been more than willing to lend their support and they even installed a laboratory for him to conduct his research.17 Buytendijk enlisted the help of researchers from around the world, including Britons Professor Crighton Bramwell and Dr Reginald Ellis, and their review after the Games concluded ‘that such investigations were not only of scientific importance,

Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 but must also be considered of the greatest significance for the sports world and medical advisers’. The group proposed that similar studies should become a permanent feature of future Games under the supervision of the International Olympics Committee (IOC), although they noted that despite the ‘praiseworthy co-operation of many trainers and athletes, a very large proportion of the competitors shirked the examinations’, something that they attributed to ‘short-sightedness’.18 This reluctance to get involved probably stemmed from the perception of many athletes and trainers that the scientific investigation of sport was being conducted primarily for the benefit of researchers because there was no effort being made to connect experimental results with performance enhancement.19 It was not until the 148 Coaching, science and medicine emergence of the Soviet Union as a sporting powerhouse that socio-cultural conditions became conducive to the application of modern training principles20 and it was from this point onwards that sports science really developed, along with the related field of sports medicine.

Sports medicine

The provision of medical services to sport in Britain has for years been bedevilled by our casual amateur attitude. Simply caricatured this is: ‘sport isn’t serious, so sports medicine can’tbe’.21

Although British coaches had long had an informal association with medical practitioners, there was something of a hiatus at the end of the nineteenth century when professional training practices were heavily criticized by a medical profession consisting of middle-class men inclined towards the amateur ideals of sport. While this led to confrontation with the professional coaches of the period, their class status and support for amateurism meant that doctors could be more easily accepted in supporting roles by administrators and officials. By the time of the 1948 Games, medical services were widely regarded as essential, and the organizing committee, which had agreed that free comprehensive medical support should be available to all officials and athletes, were so confident in their ability to provide this service that they even discouraged other countries from bringing their own doctors.22 Arthur Porritt, a founding member of the British Association of Sport and Medicine (BASM), was appointed as director of the Olympic Medical Services and chair of a medical sub-committee which included notables such as A.V. Hill and Adolphe Abrahams. The committee used its allocated £1,000 to provide a variety of services at all the arenas and at the athletes’ accommodation, including medical officers, nurses, physiotherapists, x-ray facilities and bacteriological examinations, together with an ‘Olympic hospital’ outside Wembley so that injured athletes could access medical attention without travelling any distance. An evaluation of the scheme after the Games commented, ‘in general the medical services worked smoothly and, although … ample cover was provided at all points, at no time was any real strain thrown on the organisation’.23 However, a subsequent survey of the athletes did not fully endorse this positive appraisal. Of the thirty responses received, the general consensus was that athletes had been unaware of any medical support and that if treatment was received, Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 either at the Games or throughout their athletic careers, it was via personal contacts. One athlete commented that she had never met any of the team doctors, she had not been aware of any medical provision available at the Games, and the only medical contact she had had throughout her athletic career was with her own doctor, and then only in order to obtain a certificate to prove she was female. Another athlete remarked he was not aware that doctors were available and that if he had any serious medical problems he would ask his mother for advice as she had taught him how to ‘live a normal clean life’.24 Roger Bannister later referred to the ‘old-nineteenth-century masseur, or rubber’ being commonplace before the Coaching, science and medicine 149 war,25 and this seems to have still been the case in 1948 since a number of respondents mentioned Micky Mays, an untrained individual attached to the team who ‘treated all the famous athletes of my time in a tiny room in a council house’.26 Volunteerism and amateurism shaped and controlled the way in which sports medicine developed and it was not until the mid-1950s that any sort of structure began to emerge.27 The BASM was formed in 1953 with the ‘aim of making it the authoritative body on every medical aspect of athletics and exercise’, by a group of doctors who had been acting as medical advisors to National Governing Bodies (NGBs).28 Membership was reserved for individuals with a recognized medical qualification and those who had been nominated by the NGBs to act in an advisory capacity (often national coaches) so the association only had about 100 members by 1960. In 1961, it was decided to make the BASM more accessible and it granted membership to psychologists, physiologists, physiotherapists and physical educationalists, almost trebling its numbers within two years.29 However, its impact was minimal, possibly because of an ingrained hostility towards formal sports medicine,30 and commentators in the mid-1960s observed there was ‘no money, not just no recognition, but a “vindictive hostility” to the expression “sports medicine” in the senior medical world’.31 Inevitably, therefore, the BASM persistently lagged behind its counterparts in other countries32 and the Secretary General of the International Federation of Sports Medicine (FIMS) commented in 1960 that, although sports medicine was widely accepted within many European countries, it remained relatively unknown in Britain.33 Even in 1970 it was being observed that ‘British athletes desperately need a good medical service. Their success depends on it … if specialised treatment is not provided … [they] will fall further and further behind the rest of the world’.34 Despite this appeal, many issues remained unresolved and it was still being recorded twenty years later that

Despite achieving outstanding success at the highest level of international competition in a wide range of sports, Britain had lagged behind many countries in providing medical support at both elite and grassroots level … The Director of Coaching for the British Amateur Athletic Board has expressed the opinion that at each major games approximately 25% of this country’s medal winning opportunities is lost through illness or injury.35

Indifference towards the discipline resulted in its slow development as a formal

Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 speciality and it was not until 1981 that London Hospital Medical College offered a postgraduate Diploma in Sports Medicine, which eventually developed into a Master’s degree in Sports and Exercise Medicine, and it was only in 2005 that the government ofﬁcially recognized Sport and Exercise Medicine as a specialism.36 This lack of formal qualiﬁcations meant it was impossible to control standards as Peter Sperryn, team doctor for the British Amateur Athletic Board (BAAB) in 1969, explained:

They always had a team of ‘physios’,mostofwhomweren’t, and this caused a great deal of ill feeling between the professions. They had some very well-known 150 Coaching, science and medicine and highly favoured masseurs called physiotherapists, with no qualiﬁcations except charm, and they made a good cup of tea and looked after the worries of the team.37

There were attempts in the 1970s to reduce the animosity between professional medical staff and these assistants when the British Olympic Association (BOA) declared that ‘unqualified persons would not be taken to the Olympic Games described as physiotherapists’,38 but issues of suitability and qualifications remained a problem. In the mid-1980s, the BASM wrote to the BOA expressing their disquiet regarding the selection of some doctors because they lacked experience in the sporting environment.39 Even in 1995, there were complaints about some doctors who were not correctly qualified working with sports teams and, although it was considered ideal that they held a Diploma in Sports Medicine, this was not an actual requirement,40 reflecting, in many ways, the ongoing influence of amateur ideals:

What of the worthy doctors, who accompany our international teams abroad, or give up their time for no reward, out of interest and involvement in sport? Commendable as it is, interest and involvement do not make up for specialised expertise. Every time I, or any other critic, assail ofﬁcials in various sports for different inadequacies, I am made to feel a ‘cad’ or an ‘outsider’ because I have attacked someone ‘who after all, old boy, isn’t getting anything out of it and is just doing it for the love of the sport’.41

Throughout the second half of the twentieth century the whole process remained amateur. Malcolm Read was a member of the 1968 Olympic hockey team and a qualified doctor so he was familiar with athletics, the BOA and the Common- wealth teams. He accompanied a number of teams to several Olympics and went on world tours with the British hockey team but he never received any remuneration. Doctors were expected to donate their services and use their own holidays to attend events so Read faced difficulties when his employer refused to pay him in his absence. In 1986, he was asked to act as chief medical officer for the Olympics and he explained to the BOA that, in order to do the job correctly, it would require a minimum of four days a week so they would need to pay him accordingly. After they refused, he declined to take on the role, explaining that it would be impossible 42

Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 to try and earn a living and work four days a week for free. Like the BOA, the Amateur Athletic Association (AAA) and the BAAB both wanted to incorporate sports medicine but only on an amateur honorary basis and doctors were expected to donate their time, just as all honorary officials and coaches did. Sperryn, who became honorary secretary of BASM in 1964, noted that when he was team doctor for the European Championships in 1971, it was announced that, while athletes would be awarded a daily allowance, support staff would receive nothing. Harold Abrahams argued ‘there is no allowance, we don’t have any money’, although it later transpired he did have access to team expenses but had not wanted to ‘waste’ any of them. Eventually, doctors and support staff were Coaching, science and medicine 151 offered ‘pocket money’ but ‘it was a gratuity and not a fee!’.43 That same year, when he was already an established BAAB medical officer and had recently qualified as a consultant, Sperryn approached Arthur Gold for funding to develop a medical centre for athletes at Loughborough, something that the BAAB had requested. However, ‘the minute … I had suggested some remuneration on professional terms, strictly according to the NHS consultant contracts … I was sacked!’.44 This resistance within NGBs towards the professionalization of the medical services was exacerbated by the fact that medical organizations were unwilling to cooperate with each other or with key people such as the coaches. It was acknowledged by the medical contingent, for example, that ‘doctors and coaches do not work closely enough together, with doctors probably being most at fault’.45 Even in the late 1990s, UK Sport observed that, ‘from what is reported to us by both coaches and athletes, and from our own experience … sports medicine … has been hindered by disagreements’.46

Sports science During the period immediately following the Second World War, sports science, like sports medicine, developed in a disconnected manner. There was no central scheme controlling its formation and the minimal progress achieved was through initiatives driven by experienced and skilled coaches rather than being actively encouraged by NGBs. As Terry Denison noted, administrators ‘didn’t obstruct it but they weren’t proactive in saying this is what we should do … they relied on the chief coaches or whatever to say, this is what I need’.47 This was particularly true of the Loughborough Swimming School, which was signiﬁcantly more advanced in applying scientiﬁc principles than its counterpart in athletics. Perhaps this was due to the generally greater acceptance of professionalization in swimming, which is not to say professional coaches were valued within the Amateur Swimming Association (ASA) but merely to make the point that they had always had a presence within the sport.

ASA and sports science The second Loughborough Swimming School in 1948 saw, for the ﬁrst time, the involvement of a medical ofﬁcer, R.H. Bolton, who attended in an honorary

Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 capacity in order to provide lectures for the swimmers, compile their medical histories and monitor them throughout the course. It was also noted that he was particularly interested in observing their reactions to training.48 Max Madders, a Birmingham University lecturer and friend of coach Harry Koskie, was invited to administer ‘swimming gymnastics’ and ‘relaxation techniques’ in the belief that if swimmers were taught how to relax through land exercises they would be able to transfer this to the water and improve their stroke technique. Madders and his wife Jane acted as physiotherapists and were responsible for administering ‘sunray’ and infrared.49 The use of ultra-violet radiation (UV) at Loughborough became a regular aspect of the course and, whilst this may have been primarily for medicinal 152 Coaching, science and medicine purposes, the process could have had additional beneﬁts,50 since, by the 1930s, Soviet and German researchers were proposing that there were athletic advantages in using UV:

It is a well-known fact that physical performance can be increased through ultra-violet irradiation. In 1927, a heated argument arose after the decision by the German Swimmers’ Association to use the sunlamp, as an artiﬁcial aid, as it may constitute an athletic unfairness, doping, so to speak.51

By 1949, Madders had taken responsibility for the course because Koskie felt he could no longer donate enough of his time to ensure its success. Madders was familiar with strength exercises, as a result of his physical education training, and he began to introduce swimmers to conditioning activities because he regarded greater physical strength in British swimmers as essential.52 Strength exercises continued to feature prominently on the course and as the techniques began to evolve with improved research so too did the methods used. The 1949 course also saw the first use of a mechanical pacer, purchased by the ASA for £20, which was considered a ‘great help in controlling the speed of the swimmers’ and enabling them to learn pace judgment.53 In 1950, £500, which had been raised from a number of sources including contributions from readers of Swimming Times, was allocated to allow Madders to visit Japan, which had won eleven medals in 1936, in order to study their methods of teaching swimming and ‘the specialised training given to competitive swimmers’.54 Madders would be the ‘first English coach to be sent abroad on an ASA sponsored mission to help our champions’ and it was hoped that, while he was there, he would have the opportunity to compare the techniques and methods of training.55 Unfortunately, the ASA Committee cancelled his visit suggesting that ‘the time is not now opportune for the visit to take place’ and all subscriptions were returned to donors.56 A year later, Madders was authorized to visit the Netherlands to observe the training methods of Jan Stender, the Dutch Olympic coach for the 1948 Olympics, whose swimmers held forty-one individual world records and had participated in ten world record relay teams, and, this time, the trip was fully supported by the ASA.57 Dr Noel Bleasdale had become the new resident medical officer at Loughborough in 1949 and he carried out research and testing there for many years, with his

Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 experiments becoming ever more sophisticated as the school developed. In his first year, he monitored vital capacity and pulse rates and noted that the resting pulse rates of the swimmers were exceptionally slow, leading him to believe that ‘this is very significant when one considers that a small body always tends to have a higher pulse rate and indicates that cardiac function is well above average’.58 In 1950, he was administering glucose and vitamin B supplements throughout the fortnight in an attempt to establish their impact on performance.59 Ten years later, he was conducting an array of tests including chest x-rays, electrocardiograms, oxygen diffusion of the lungs and the ventilatory costs of interval training. This research was conducted in association with the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Coaching, science and medicine 153 Medicine, which suggests that British swimming was beginning to establish research relationships with higher education institutes.60 Bleasdale’s approach to swimming nutrition became more experimental and, in 1964, he gave the swimmers ‘Pro-Nutro’, a concentrated food used to treat malnutrition in South Africa. He concluded that it made ‘an excellent pre-game meal’ because it contained a good balance of protein, carbohydrate, fat, minerals and vitamins.61 These pioneering investigations were at the forefront of this type of sports science research in Britain in this period since there is no evidence to suggest that athletics, or any other sport, was carrying out this level of engagement on a regular basis.62 Importantly, it reflected a practical association between scientists and coaches because these individuals were working alongside each other throughout the duration of the Loughborough courses. By 1954, the Loughborough swim school had entered what Koskie referred to as its third phase. The first phase (1947–1948) had been to gather and train a suitable team for the 1948 Games; the second phase (1949–1953) was to establish the school’s credentials by training as many coaches and swimmers as possible in four years. The third phase was the long-term preparation of future Olympic swimming teams.63 This was facilitated by an increase in available pool time after the course was moved to Easter in 1953, which ensured that the baths would be available all day rather than the previous four hours a day. A.D. (Bert) Kinnear was appointed as assistant tutor and Matt Mann ran the course in 1954.64 It had been agreed that it would benefit British swimming if ‘the services of a coach, with outstanding abilities, from another country’ could be enlisted and Mann, who had assisted the ASA in 1951, agreed to attend on the proviso that the ASA paid his airfare, although he requested no other payment.65 Despite some initial concerns, primarily because Mann did not appear to have an overall plan for the ten days, it was unanimously concluded that, owing to his personal attributes and his ability to keep the swimmers ‘on their toes’, the course had been a success.66 The 1956 course saw the culmination of Koskie’s ten-year plan and the introduction of new methods of training and coaching. Weight training was incorporated into the scheme and it was anticipated that this would eventually ‘be found in every swimmer’s training schedule’.67 Al Murray, an ‘iconic figure of coaching and weight training in those days’, had been appointed (for an undisclosed sum) by the ASA to introduce swimmers to land training methods.68 Symptomatic of the creative nature of coach thinking were the attempts by Madders and Kinnear on

Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 the 1956 course to analyse the movements of an eel. They believed that if they could establish the key principle behind efficient undulatory movement in the water then they would be able to demonstrate this to the swimmers to ensure they were as supple and flexible as an eel.69 All the expense outlaid for the increased training of swimmers and the introduction of scientific principles was justified when Judy Grinham achieved the first British swimming gold medal for thirty-two years at the 1956 Games,70 although it was also clear that British training methods still trailed behind the advanced techniques being implemented in both Australia and America. Comments made following the Games by the Honorary Team Manager, A.C. Price, suggest that, despite progress, the amateur tradition 154 Coaching, science and medicine remained a potent force in dictating how coaches and athletes should operate. Although he could appreciate the ‘sacrifices and the tremendous amount of hard work’ it had taken for the Australian and American swimmers to achieve their results, Price doubted the desire of those involved in sport in Britain to adopt their systems because it was not ‘in accord with our British outlook’.71 Kinnear was appointed as tutor at Loughborough from 1957 and he began to develop further his theme of land and water conditioning by encouraging Murray to increase the amount and type of weight training for swimmers by including pulley weight and spring work.72 A year later, Kinnear recruited John Atha, a member of staff at Loughborough College of Technology, to organize a scheme of tests and measurements, which included measuring balance, pulse rate, strength, power and agility.73 Atha incorporated the use of dynamometers, had a keen interest in shoulder flexibility, and experimented with a flotation tank in order to establish the swimmer’s centre of gravity and buoyancy.74 Not only did Kinnear have the swimmers accumulate a daily average of 4,000 yards and significantly increase the volume of circuit and weight training, he also introduced underwater filming, something which marked him as being ‘way ahead of his time’.75 Swimmers were filmed on the first day of the course and, with the cooperation of Kodak Ltd, they were able to analyse the film with the coaches only four days later.76 This increase in scientific provision at Loughborough must be attributed directly to Kinnear, who commented in his 1960 annual report that the ASA should continue to widen their scope and carry out research since the ‘mechanical problems’ and ‘physiological problems in training’ for the competitive swimmer were areas that needed to be urgently addressed.77 Hamilton Smith, who worked in close association with him during his time as National Technical Officer, suggested that Kinnear was aware that to incorporate new swimming principles he had to bring in outside experts.78 Evidence clearly suggests that he did this on a regular basis, as in the cases of both Murray and Atha, and that he also looked outside of Britain. Internationally, the most influential individual with regards to science and swimming during this period was Jim or ‘Doc’ Counsilman, head coach at Indiana University from 1958 and American Olympic head coach for the 1964 and 1976 Games, who had adapted training principles from track and field for use in swimming. Smith suggested that he was the first person to introduce the idea of repetition and he made coaches begin to question the science behind swimming ‘as opposed to having preconceived notions of how the strokes might be swum’.79 Counsilman’s

Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 book, The Science of Swimming, was published in 1968 and soon became established as the swimming ‘bible’.80 Kinnear arranged for ‘Doc’ to visit Britain and during one of his demonstrations at Crystal Palace there were over 300 people in attendance.81 As the integration of scientific training methods accelerated, the ASA Committee not only wanted to retain some control but they also required a body that could answer their specific queries, so they created a Scientific Advisory Committee.82 The committee comprised of six members, including Atha and Kinnear, and its aim was the ‘scientific investigation of all aspects of aquatic sport and of swimming training’, with a specific focus on the physiological implications of interval training Coaching, science and medicine 155 and on the somatotyping of swimmers and its relationship to style and technique.83 The committee planned to build good relationships with external bodies, including universities, and this was the beginning of the environment which is commonplace today, whereby NGBs often have close affiliations with university sports science departments. The ASA began working with physiologists at Middlesex Hospital and carried out tests on eight selected Southern Counties swimmers in a similar fashion to Atha’s work at Loughborough, although, with the benefit of extra financial backing from the ASA, the researchers were able to incorporate the use of the most up-to-date equipment.84 In 1960, the committee was authorized to undertake an investigation into the techniques of swimming strokes using the tank and wind tunnel at Liverpool University.85 During this period, scientific research into elite sport began to penetrate coaching practice as the sporting success of other nations, particularly the Soviet Union, with their sophisticated sports science systems, started to exert its influence. One indication that the ASA were keen to monitor and, perhaps, incorporate some Soviet methods of training and coaching surfaced in 1960 when they authorized Dr E. Kendall, Honorary Secretary of the Scientific Advisory Committee, to visit the Department of Medical Research at Lenin Stadium in Moscow. Kendall had already been in discussions with a Professor Litvinoff about the physiological dangers of intensive training and suitable ways to prevent overtraining and staleness.86 However, perhaps the most progressive work of the Scientific Advisory Committee was in attempting to establish a bridge between coaches and the use of sports science by running annual weekend courses for coaches that focused on different aspects of science in swimming. The course created a great deal of interest and it was noted that the twenty coaches in attendance in 1964 had all paid their own expenses to attend, suggesting that there was a growing desire to utilize experimental science within the coaching community.87 A second indicator that things were changing more rapidly perhaps in the ASA than elsewhere was the Association’s response to issues surrounding the 1968 Games. Frank Dick has suggested that an increased interest in physiology in the mid-1960s was a direct result of the impending Mexico Olympics and a realization that altitude and dehydration could impact on sporting performance. A need to develop practical assistance for coaches was the catalyst not only for training at altitude but also for the wider incorporation of sports science and medicine.88 The BOA became directly involved in these initiatives with the launch of their Mexican

Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 research project, which specifically focused on the effects of altitude. This represented a pivotal movement in the history of British sports science because it was the first instance of a major sporting organization investing large sums into a research project. A total of £5,000 was allocated, £2,500 from the Government via the Sports Council and £2,500 from the BOA,89 thus marking the birth of a modern, medicalized, ‘expert’ BOA.90 Results from the project helped influence the IOC in relaxing its training camp rules to allow six weeks training instead of four,91 which, ironically, attracted criticism from British amateur officials concerned that the amount of training that would be required to compete at altitude might invalidate the amateur principles of the Olympic movement.92 156 Coaching, science and medicine The BOA began its efforts to establish suitable training arrangements for British competitors following an offer from the French government to train at the high- altitude athletic centre at Font Romeu in the Pyrenees,93 although the response from NGBs was generally disappointing.94 The ASA had begun its own planning in earnest in 1966, when it had reserved £6,000 to develop an Olympic Training Squad consisting of swimmers who could equal a sixth placed finalist in the 1964 Olympic Games. In order to acclimatize, the squad would travel to Switzerland at Christmas in 1967 for ten days, not to swim but to participate in a range of different endurance activities. In addition, the team would spend ten days at both Easter and in Spring in 1968 training at Font Romeu as well as utilizing the full four-week IOC allowance by acclimatizing in Mexico before the Games.95 The publicity surrounding these plans engendered a degree of criticism, leading Norman Sarsfield, team manager for the squad, to reply:

Do the IOC really think that the Russians are spending £3,500,000 on an altitude training centre in the Caucasus and then not be able to use it in Olympic year? Are the Australians going to abandon their training camp at 7,000 ft in the Snowy Mountains? Have the Americans built a centre at Lake Tahoe at 6,200 ft so that they can leave it idle? I am sure we will be told that whatever the others do we must not sin but I am going to recommend to the ASA committee … that we go right ahead with our plans because all other countries are going ahead.96

The AAA and sports science In athletics, the relationship between science and coaching took a slightly different form from swimming, although it was similar in that initiatives were driven by experienced coaches rather than administrators. The writing of basic instructional booklets and pamphlets for use by honorary coaches was an expected duty of the AAA national coaches,97 but these texts evolved over time into informative in-depth and inﬂuential publications. Arguably the most important was Geoff Dyson’s The Mechanics of Athletics, ﬁrst published in 1962, which was translated into French, Italian, Spanish and Japanese and ran to eight editions.98 Dyson had always had a keen interest in engineering and human mechanics and often applied these principles when working with his athletes but this text enabled the dis-

Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 semination of his scientific principles to a much wider audience. John Disley noted that Dyson devoted his life to making coaching a science and that he was acutely aware of the benefits that the application of scientific principles could offer sport, although Dyson believed that it was the application of those principles that ensured success. He commented that ‘because athletes learn their skills through kinaesthetic sensations’, descriptive rather than mechanical explanations were often more beneficial for the athletes as ‘too much analysis bears paralysis!’.99 If the coach could successfully correct faults and inspire confidence using these methods then ‘herein lies the art, as opposed to the science, of coaching athletics’. Even though Dyson’s book was predominately an analysis of the mechanics of sport, Coaching, science and medicine 157 ‘biomechanics’ as it is now more commonly known, he constantly reinforced his view that coaches needed to adopt an integrated multi-science approach.100 For him,

In his study of athletic performance the modern coach stands at the crossroads of several sciences. Thus, to the physiologist, athletic performance is a phenomenon of cells, humours, tissues and nutrient ﬂuids obeying organic laws. The psychologist sees the athlete as a consciousness and a personality, while to the physicist he suggests a machine unique in its organisation, adaptiveness and complexity. To the imaginative coach the borders of these and other specialities are seen to overlap; the techniques of one science become meaningful and illuminating in others.101

Athletics coach Frank Dick also introduced scientific method, not only into athletics but also into a multitude of sports, when he produced Sports Training Principles in 1980,102 in which he presented an adapted overview of the principles of periodization, the training method used widely in Eastern Europe. Dick recalls that he was constantly aware of the impact of science on training and sport and, although he felt he had enough scientific ‘know-how’ to do his job effectively, he was conscious that something was lacking. The ‘bridge between training and the art of delivery on the day seemed to me to be bound into the notion of preparation, was there something out there that was making that bridge?’. He monitored the research emerging from Poland that had specifically focused on speed, noted what Romanian and Finnish coaches were employing in their regimes, and became aware of the training paradigm which was being developed by Eastern Bloc researchers, in particular Lev Pavlovich Matveyev, and by Dietrich Harre in Germany.103 Dick

looked at periodization of athlete planning and that was it, I could see the whole … there was a connection between everything you did from the moment you started training until you ﬁnished your competitions in the summer and then that caused me to look a lot deeper at the whole notion of adaptation because I began to understand the cycles very well and the notion that you adapted during recovery not during activity.104

Prior to the publication of this text, the long-term planning of training programmes in Britain had been very basic because scientiﬁc understanding was lacking and 105

Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 training was often just fitted in around other factors. Breaking an athlete’s training into meso (4–6 weeks) and micro (1 week) cycles, the fundamental principles of periodization, allowed for optimal adaptation since altering the training programme every six weeks ‘shocked’ the body and prompted further adaptations. This had to be planned carefully because if changes were made too early then the athlete would not get the full benefit from the programme. By adapting these theories for a Western audience, Dick enabled British coaches and athletes to begin to utilize the successful methods that Soviet Olympic teams had incorporated during the 1960s and 1970s, and his interpretation of periodization has been considered a pivotal moment in the history of training in Britain. 158 Coaching, science and medicine Formalization of sports science During the 1970s, scientific work with a specific focus on sport, particularly in the areas of experimental psychology and physiology, was beginning to emerge in British universities and higher education institutes. However, because the Sports Council was unable to develop an efficient sports science system, coordination between these establishments was lacking, as was a successful process of dissemination. Conse- quently, as well as dealing with coaching issues, it was decided that one of the main responsibilities of the National Coaching Foundation (NCF), when it was created, would be to ensure the development and formalization of sports science, although progress was slowed by a lack of finance and it was not until 1989 that the Sports Science Support Programme (SSSP) and the Sports Science Education Programme (SSEP) were firmly established within the NCF.106 Sarah Rowell suggests that any sports science that was being employed prior to the development of the SSSP ‘was there simply because the governing bodies had been enlightened enough to decide it wanted to use some of the money it got to do it’. However, because the value of sports science had not yet been firmly established, in reality very few NGBs were using their often limited funding in this way. When the SSSP emerged, the Sports Council agreed to ‘ring fence’ £900,000 a year to be used solely for sports science research and support, which provided an opportunity for those NGBs who had the desire, but not the means, to incorporate this into their programmes. The SSEP essentially controlled and administered this Sports Council funding but the SSSP, which Rowell had been appointed to oversee, dealt with sports directly through the NGBs. Rowell’s role was to meet with sports and discuss what sort of support they required. If they had clear ideas about the practitioners they wanted to work with then these links would be made but, for others, it was a case of establishing a relationship between suitable practitioners from the British Association of Sport and Exercise Sciences (BASES) and the NGBs. The project would then be monitored through frequent reports from both the researchers and the NGBs to ensure they were achieving their objectives.107 When the SSSP emerged it was well received by the most NGBs and ‘there was always more demand than there was funding available’,108 although some sports were more willing than others to fully embrace the programme. Les Burwitz, who worked with both the athletics and netball programmes, suggested that it was ‘very hard to break down … traditional barriers and boundaries’. In order for elite sport to progress some of the ‘oldschoolthingsneededtogo’, but, because there was Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 so much power in the hands of the ‘old brigade’ in some sports it became increasingly difficult to ensure the successful integration of a scientific approach, although sports such as cycling were much more willing to experiment and incorporate new methods. Once again, individual coaches were normally the driving force for change. In his discussions with British cycling in 1998 Burwitz found that Peter Keen, who was in charge, ‘had a vision that was ahead of its time’.109 While the success rate ‘in terms of getting the right delivery matching what the governing body was actually looking for … was probably no more than 50–60 per cent’, the SSSP was generally productive, particularly given the climate in which it Coaching, science and medicine 159 was required to function.110 Rowell suggests that this programme was the start of true integration between the sports sciences and NGBs in British sport and that many of the relationships between the practitioners and the sports were extremely positive, with some programmes lasting over eight years. In addition, since projects were available to all sports, and because it was based on a ‘first come, first served’ basis, some minority sports, such as lacrosse, were able to secure funding. However, the SSSP did not always reach its full potential because of the sporting environment in which it operated.111 For Burwitz, sports science in the UK at this time ‘was at least on par if not leading the way’ in terms of scientific research but, because ‘people needed to prove themselves, evidence needed to be gathered to show these things actually worked … it took quite a few years before sports science was accepted and used in practice by some of the Governing Bodies’.112 The SSSP ended on the 31 March 1998, almost ten years after its introduction, partly, Rowell believes, because of the advent of Lottery Funding. Prior to this there had been ‘tight financial controls’ placed on each project but now, ‘it was basically an open book’ because NGBs had access to other sources of financial support and had no need to go through the SSSP. Reviewing the SSSP, Rowell suggested that while a lot of the NGBs had used the programme, ‘some of them probably used it because it was there, rather than they really believed in it’. However, from that point onwards, British sports science continued to expand because people had had the opportunity to discover its potential to make a difference. The combination of these factors has resulted in contemporary twenty-first century attitudes to performance sport whereby ‘you would be hard pushed … to find many coaches that believe that it is coaching alone that makes an Olympic Champion in any sport’.113

Resistance to sports science

There is no attempt to apply the sciences to sport, sport has been obliged to apply and adapt themselves to the sciences, that was a mistake. Science in my knowledge has never led sport and it shouldn’t. In fact I believe in the very words of Sir Winston Churchill when he said, ‘scientists should be on tap not on top’.114

Burwitz believes that it took about fifteen years from the initial introduction of science through the NCF SSSP for it to be widely accepted and even then he suggested that ‘it was more about one-off relationships actually beginning to work’.115 An aversion among British amateur officials to the integration of what Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 were perceived to be Soviet methods probably delayed its incorporation, although evidence from professional coaches of the period suggests that the reluctance to employ sports science was far more complex and that coaches themselves were sometimes less than positive. Frank Dick argues that this was the result of a belief that the research and testing conducted by sport scientists were purely used as a means to further their own research and not to benefit the athlete. He explained:

this is not a scientiﬁc experiment, this is not a laboratory. If you’re gonna do tests … ﬁrst of all, maybe very old fashioned, I want to know what the hell 160 Coaching, science and medicine you are doing, I don’t want my athletes’ legs to look like Swiss cheese and I want to know why and I want to see the outcome because whatever you’re doing has got to be effective for what I’m doing, it has to be exclusively in the interest of the athlete. I don’t want some daft experiment going on that someone wants to get a degree on at the expense of the athlete, these are not guinea pigs.116

Swimming coach Alan Lynn recalled that, when he was a swimmer, his own coach had a close connection to the local Physical Education College and they would often have researchers join them during training sessions to carry out tests. Although these were fairly basic, the swimmers were being made to do ‘some pretty extensive things’ in the lab and his coach had been furious because the researchers failed to provide any feedback after the completion of the experiments. The swimmers had merely been used as subjects and received no real beneﬁt from cooperating with sports science staff.117 It was situations like this that tainted how coaches viewed academics and how they approached the integration of sports science. There was also an assumption by some coaches that allowing sport scientists to work with their athletes could impact on the athlete–coach relationship and this made them suspicious of science. Frank Dick described a scenario at the 1992 Barcelona Olympics when he was Director of Athletics, explaining that, ‘when one luckless sport psychologist thought it was a good idea to walk into the warm-up area … I made sure that the military escorted him off very quickly, I didn’t want anybody in there who could distract the athletes’.118 Bill Furniss believes that the ‘coaching triangle’, consisting of the coach, athlete and sport scientist, needs to be managed well in order for the relationship to be successful because the ‘sport scientist can easily interfere with the relationship between the coach and athlete and can easily undermine him’. When sports science was initially introduced, Furniss suggests that it was not handled well and that it caused a lot of tension amongst the coaching fraternity. The coaches viewed it as a threat because individuals were coming into the coaching environment and trying to tell coaches what they were doing wrong; so, as a result, when sports science was initially employed, ‘it created as many problems as it solved’.119 The overriding consensus among elite coaches who were working in the 1990s is that, although the introduction of money undoubtedly improved British sporting performances, weak management meant that there was a tendency to pour money

Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 into projects just in a hope that that would develop the sport. As Terry Denison highlights,

It’s not just about having money, you can throw loads of money at whatever you want, but you’ve got to use it well, you’ve got to know exactly what it is you want to do with it in order to make a difference.120

In the early stages, because sports science was seen as key to improving British performance, large sums of money were funnelled towards its provision, resulting in a greater availability of scientific support but this was often so disorganized that Coaching, science and medicine 161 coaches viewed it with suspicion. Almost immediately after the introduction of Lottery funding, science and testing were being ‘forced’ into sports, and coaches, who had had little time to consider how these methods would be incorporated into their training programmes, initially resented both the scientific methods and associated personnel. Dick suggests that it was the way in which sports science provision developed in the West that ultimately influenced the way in which it was perceived by coaches. He commented:

What was happening in Eastern Europe was that the coaches were asking questions so the scientists could get solutions to their problems. Whereas what was happening in the West was that the sciences were pushing answers to questions that had never been asked, to the coaches who didn’t want to hear the science. So there was a different kind of relationship between sports science and coaching from the very outset.121

There are also suggestions from these coaches that when sports science staff ﬁrst became involved ‘there was a bit of ivory towerism’, partly because they were on a higher salary than the coaches and partly because there was a perception that they were in some way superior in terms of technical knowledge.122 On occasions, the sport scientist would ‘go in really arrogant and try and say what needs to be done’ thereby alienating the coach, who would then retaliate by resisting the researcher’s advice, often arguing that they had ‘never been on the poolside at 5 o’clock in the morning’ and therefore ‘what the hell does he know about successful coaching and training’.123 Alan Lynn believes, on the other hand, that ‘as long as the coach holds the whip in that relationship I think, generally speaking, the coach gets what they want’.124 If the sport scientist clashes with the coach, then, as Rowell notes, ‘the coach will win’ and ensure that the researcher is removed from the environment. Although the coach may have been ‘open to trying it’ as soon as the researcher tried to tell the coach they were ‘doing it wrong’ the coach would ‘fall back to their areas of safety’ and return to relying on their traditional methods.125 Many of the coaches believed that there was initially opposition to sports science because the interactions between coaches and sport scientists were poorly managed. Lynn knew of relationships that had broken down but the issue was more to do with personalities, with coaches not saying ‘I don’t want you because you’re a sport scientist, they say I don’t want you because you’re lazy or I don’t 126

Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 want you because I don’t like the way you talk to the swimmers’. Rowell agrees that when a coach has a problem with a sport scientist it is rarely because they have an issue with their technical skills but because they have a problem with the individual themselves. She explained that the key to resolving this is ‘in the working relationship between the two groups’.127 Lynn further suggests that

When it worked of course it was about the good relationships that had been built up between the sport scientist and the coaches. By and large it was just about relationships again, when people were accepted, particularly by key people within the sport, there wasn’t too much difﬁculty. As with anything, 162 Coaching, science and medicine the more you build a relationship, the more you develop trust, the more you start to accept each other’s point of view.128

In some cases it was suggested that it was not the coach who had resisted the incorporation of science but other key individuals, amateur officials in particular. Terry Denison described a situation when he was head coach for the Olympic swim team in 1992 and wanted to engage a sport psychologist. This was the first time that a psychologist had been officially involved with the British Olympic swimming team and he had worked well with both the coaches and athletes, with the overall consensus being that he had benefitted the team. However, because the team had not been particularly successful, both the press and British officials branded the psychologist as a ‘waste of time’. Essentially he was used as a ‘scape- goat’ for the poor performance of the team and British officials refused to engage a psychologist again for a number of years. As Denison highlights it was not ‘until we got into this modern period, post 2000 when we did start to bring it back in’ by which time ten or more years of potential development had been lost.129

Conclusion Despite the successes enjoyed by Soviet athletes in the 1950s there was a significant time lag between the emergence of Soviet sports science techniques and their uptake in British sport, although medical involvement was more readily accommodated, not least because of the social status afforded to doctors. Even then, the manner in which the medical world engaged with sport remained under the control of amateur administrators and this was reflected in the ad-hoc and informal way in which this functioned. Similarly, although sports science has become increasingly integrated into British sport, particularly in the last thirty years, the manner in which NGBs, and indeed their coaches, have interacted with the field over the years has been influenced both by an adherence to the traditional concepts of amateurism and by a degree of uncertainty as to its benefits. Evidence would suggest that much of this uncertainty within the coaching community arose from a failure to really integrate scientists with coaches, in contrast to the processes in place in Eastern Europe, and from a lack of any real management structure. As Tom McNab has emphasized, even though amateurism was no longer considered the guiding principle by the late twentieth century, the amateur traditions had left a void in British sport and

Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 the legacy of its ethos had left no one with any sort of professional managerial approach to sport. It was this lack of appreciation of how to integrate the specialized components of sport that ultimately created difﬁculties in Britain130 and led to a degree of resistance from coaches, the very people who needed all the help they could get in their efforts to improve British elite sporting performance.

Notes 1 Rob Beamish and Ian Ritchie, ‘From Fixed Capacities to Performance-Enhancement: The Paradigm Shift in the Science of Training and the Use of Performance-Enhancing Coaching, science and medicine 163 Substances’, Sport in History 25, no. 3 (2005): 414; Ivan Waddington, ‘The Development of Sports Medicine’, Sociology of Sports Journal 12 (1996): 183. 2 Dave Day, ‘“Magical and Fanciful Theories”: Sports Psychologists and Craft Coaches’, Sports Coaching Review 1, no. 1 (2012): 52–66; Dave Day, ‘Craft Coaching and the “Discerning Eye” of the Coach’, International Journal of Sports Science and Coaching,6, no. 1 (2011): 179. 3 Anon., ‘Reviews and Notices’, British Medical Journal 1 (1873): 589. 4 Day, ‘Craft Coaching’, 187 5 Ross Tucker, ‘Coaching and Science: What’s the Big Deal and Who Cares for the Science?’, The Science of Sport, www.sportsscientists.com/2009/10/coaching-a nd-science-asset-or-liability.html (accessed July 4, 2012). 6 Simon Turnbull, ‘It’s Easy to Keep up with the Jones Boy – But Then He Is 54’, Independent, October 25, 2009. 7 Henry Beyer, ‘The International Hygiene Exhibition at Dresden’, Popular Science Monthly 80 (1912): 124–125, 128. 8 Roberta Park, ‘Cells or Soaring?: Historical Reflections on “Visions” of the Body, Athletics, and Modern Olympism’, International Journal of the History of Sport 24, no. 12 (2007): 1713. 9 Rob Beamish and Ian Ritchie, Fastest, Highest, Strongest: A Critique of High Performance Sport (Oxon: Routledge, 2008), 55. 10 David Basset, ‘Scientific Contributions of A.V. Hill: Exercise Physiology Pioneer’, Journal of Applied Physiology 93 (2002): 1573. 11 Archibald Hill, Muscular Movement in Man: The Factors Governing Speed and Recovery from Fatigue (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1927), 3. 12 Ernst Jokl, ‘90th Birthday of Professor A.V. Hill’, The Journal of Sports Medicine and Physical Fitness 16, no. 4 (1976): 349. 13 Basset, ‘Scientific Contributions of A.V. Hill’, 1573. 14 Arlie V. Bock, C. Vancaulaert, David Bruce Dill, Asbjörn Fölling and Lewis M. Hurxthal, ‘Studies in Muscular Activity III: Dynamical Changes Occurring in Man at Work’, Journal of Physiology 66, no. 2 (1928): 159. 15 David Martin, ‘Physiology: Its Role in Explaining Athletic Performance’, New Studies in Athletics 10, no. 1 (1995): 12. 16 Theodore Andrea Cook, The Official Report of the Olympic Games of 1908 (London: BOA, 1908), 72. 17 George Van Rossem, ed., The Ninth Olympiad Being the Official Report of the Olympic Games of 1928 Celebrated at Amsterdam (Amsterdam: J.H. De Bussy,1928), 950–951. 18 Professor Buytendijk, ‘Short Report Regarding the Medical Scientific Research Work during the Olympic Games’,inOfficial Report 1928 Games (Amsterdam: J.H. De Bussy, 1928): 952–955. 19 Day, ‘Craft Coaching’, 187. 20 Beamish and Ritchie, ‘From Fixed Capacities’, 426. 21 Peter Sperryn, ‘With No Thanks to the DHSS, Let’s List Our Achievements’, Medical

Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 News, February 9, 1984, 30, File GC/253/A/36/12, Volume 36: The Development of Sports Medicine in Twentieth Century Britain Collection: Sports Medicine Related Documents – Peter Sperryn, Wellcome Collection, London (hereafter cited as Sperryn Collection). 22 BOC, The Ofﬁcial Report of the Organising Committee for the XIV Olympiad (London: Organising Committee for the XIV Olympiad, 1948), 180; Roger Bannis- ter, in The Development of Sports Medicine in Twentieth-Century Britain, eds Lois A. Reynolds and E.M. Tansey (London: Wellcome Trust Centre for the History of Medicine at UCL, 2009), 44. 23 BOC, Ofﬁcial Report XIV Olympiad, 181, 185. 24 Malcolm Bottomley, ‘A Modern History of Sports Medicine: Athlete Questionnaire’, September, 2001. 164 Coaching, science and medicine 25 Bannister, Development of Sports Medicine, 44. 26 Bottomley, ‘Sports Medicine: Athlete Questionnaire’. 27 Neil Carter, ‘Metatarsals and Magic Sponges: English Football and the Development of Sports Medicine’, Journal of Sports History 34, no. 1 (2007): 53–73. 28 BASM General Meeting, February 27, 1953, File SA/BSM/A/2/1, BASM 1952– 2003 Collection: Minutes and Associated Papers 1952–1982, Wellcome Collection, London (hereafter cited as BASM: Wellcome); Anon., ‘A Brief History of the British Association of Sport and Medicine’, British Journal of Sports Medicine, no. 3 (1968): 143. 29 Anon., ‘Brief History Sport Medicine’, 143. 30 Vanessa Heggie, ‘Sport (and Exercise) Medicine in Britain: Healthy Citizens and Abnormal Athletes’, Canadian Bulletin of Medical History 28, no. 2 (2011): 257. 31 Peter Sperryn, in Development of Sports Medicine, 22. 32 Dan Tunstall Pedoe, Requirements for an Institute of Sports Medicine, February 19, 1985, File GC/253/A/36/14, Volume 36: The Development of Sports Medicine in Twentieth Century Britain Collection: Sports Medicine Related Documents – Dan Tunstall Pedoe, Wellcome Collection, London (hereafter cited as Pedoe: Wellcome). 33 Carter, ‘Metatarsals and Magic Sponges’, 403. 34 Peter Wilson, ‘Dr Liz Puts Her Finger on the Spot’, Daily Mirror, August 4, 1972, 26. 35 Sports Council, Discussion Paper – Medical Support for Sport, April 10, 1990, 1, File SA/BSM/A/1/1, BASM: Wellcome. 36 Carter, ‘Metatarsals and Magic Sponges’,53–73. 37 Peter Sperryn, Development of Sports Medicine,42–43. 38 BASM Executive Committee Minutes, March 14, 1974, File SA/BSM/A/2/2, BASM: Wellcome. 39 Dr D.T. Pedoe to C. Palmer, February 19, 1985, File GC/253/A/36/14, Pedoe: Wellcome. 40 Dr S. Motto to Dr M. Read, London Bridge Clinic, April 6, 1995, 1, File GC/253/ A/36/11, Volume 36: The Development of Sports Medicine in Twentieth Century Britain Collection: Sports Medicine Related Documents – Malcolm Read 3, Wellcome Collection, London. 41 Peter Wilson, ‘Dr Liz Puts Her Finger on the Spot’, 26. 42 Malcolm Read, in Development of Sports Medicine, 46. 43 Peter Sperryn, in Development of Sports Medicine,44–45. 44 Ibid., 45. 45 Dr E.L. Lloyd to National Coaching Foundation, July 13, 1998, File SA/BSM/B/5, BASM: Wellcome. 46 D. Chesterton, Chief Executive UK Sport to J. Clegg, BASM Secretary, June 23, 1999, File GC/253/A/12, British Association of Sport and Exercise Medicine 1952–2003 Collection: John Clegg Papers 1997–1999, Wellcome Collection, London (hereafter cited as Clegg: Wellcome). 47 Terry Denison, interview, September 14, 2011, Leeds. 48 –‘

Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 ASAAnnualReport1948 Olympic Games (1948) Preparation 2nd Special Training Course Loughborough College, March 26–April 4, 1948’, 30, ASA Headquarters, Loughborough (hereafter cited as ASA). 49 Harry Koskie, ‘Olympic Games (1948) Preparation’; ASA Annual Report 1948 – ‘Olympic Games (1948) Preparation 2nd Special Training Course Loughborough College, March 26–April 4, 1948’, 30, ASA. 50 Noel Bleasdale, Annual Report 1950 –‘ASA Advanced Training Course: Report of Dr H.N. Bleasdale, Medical Officer’, 41, ASA. 51 G.W. Parade and H. Otto, ‘Die Beeinflussung der Leistungsfahigkeit Durch Hohen- sonnenbestrahlung’ [The Effect of Sunlight on Performance], Zeitschrift für Klinische Medizin 137 (1940): 17–21, quoted in John J. Cannell et al., ‘Athletic Performance and Vitamin D’, Medicine and Science in Sports and Exercise 41, no. 5 (2009): 1104. Coaching, science and medicine 165 52 Max Madders, Annual Report 1949 –‘Loughborough College Summer School ASA Advanced Training: Report of Max Madders, Tutor’, 29, ASA. 53 ASA Annual Report 1949 –‘Loughborough College Summer School ASA Advanced Training’,28–29, ASA. 54 ASA Annual Report 1950 – Committee Minutes, March 31–April 1, 1950, 12, ASA. 55 The Straits Times, June 18, 1950, 19. 56 ASA Annual Report 1950 –‘ASA Advanced Training Course: Recommendations for 1951’, 44, ASA. 57 ASA Annual Report 1951 – Committee Minutes, March 3, 1951, 11, ASA. 58 Noel Bleasdale, Annual Report 1949 –‘Loughborough College Summer School ASA Advanced Training: Report of Dr H. Noel Bleasdale on the Health of the Loughborough Swimmer’, 31, ASA. 59 Noel Bleasdale, Annual Report 1950 –‘ASA Advanced Training Course: Report of Dr H.N. Bleasdale, Medical Officer’, 42, ASA. 60 Noel Bleasdale, Annual Report 1960 –‘ASA Advanced Swimming Training Course 1960: Medical Officer’s Report’, 48, ASA. 61 Noel Bleasdale, Annual Report 1963 –‘Report of the Advanced Swimming Training Course at Loughborough 1963: Medical Officer’s Report’, 38, ASA. 62 Ian Keil and Don Wix, In the Swim: The Amateur Swimming Association from 1869 to 1994, (Loughborough: Swimming Times, 1996), 65. 63 Harry Koskie, ‘Suggestions for a Practical Training Plan’, October 23, 1952, 1, ASA. 64 ASA Annual Report 1952 –‘ASA Advanced Swimming Training Course Loughbor- ough 1952’, 57; ASA Annual Report 1953 – ASA Advanced Swimming Training Course Meeting, July 30, 1953, 28, ASA. 65 ASA Annual Report 1953 – ASA Advanced Swimming Training Course Meeting, July 30, 1953, 28, ASA. 66 ASA Annual Report 1954 –‘ASA Advanced Swimming Training Course’, 49, ASA. 67 Max Madders, Annual Report 1956 –‘ASA Advanced Swimming Training Course 1956’, 42, ASA. 68 Hamilton Smith, interview, July 27, 2011, Edinburgh, Scotland; ASA Annual Report 1956 –‘ASA Advanced Swimming Training Course 1956’, 43, ASA. 69 ‘Swimmers Study Wriggling Eel’, Singapore Free Press, April 28, 1956, 15. 70 ASA Annual Report 1956, 6, ASA. 71 A.C. Price, Annual Report 1956 –‘Olympic Games 1956: Hon. Team Manager’s Report’, 52, ASA. 72 A.D. Kinnear, Annual Report 1957 –‘ASA Advanced Swimming Training Course 1957: Director’s Report”,57–58, ASA. 73 A.D. Kinnear, Annual Report 1959 –‘ASA Advanced Swimming Training Course: Director’s Report’, 55, ASA; Keil and Wix, In the Swim, 68. 74 Hamilton Smith, interview. 75 Keil and Wix, In the Swim, 68. 76 A.D. Kinnear, Annual Report 1959 –‘ASA Advanced Swimming Training Course: ’ ’

Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 Director s Report , 55, ASA. 77 A.D. Kinnear, ‘Annual Report for 1960’, File ED 169/70, MoE Collection: ASA, NA. 78 Hamilton Smith, interview. 79 Ibid. 80 James E. Counsilman, The Science of Swimming (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1968). 81 Hamilton Smith, interview. 82 Keil and Wix, In the Swim, 82; ASA Annual Report 1959 – Scientific Sub-Committee Minutes, July 25, 1959, 47, ASA. 83 ASA Annual Report 1959 – Committee Minutes, April 20, 1959, 17; Annual Report 1959 – Scientific Sub-Committee Minutes, July 25, 1959, 47, ASA. 84 ASA Annual Report 1959 – Scientific Sub-Committee Minutes, July 25, 1959, 47, ASA. 85 ASA Annual Report 1960, 7; Annual Report for 1961, 8, ASA. 166 Coaching, science and medicine 86 ASA Annual Report 1961 – Committee Minutes, August 26, 1961, 25, ASA. 87 ASA Annual Report 1963 – Scientific Advisory Sub-Committee Report 1963, 66; Annual Report 1965 – Meeting of the ASA Scientific Advisory Committee, January 4, 1965, 97, ASA. 88 Frank Dick, interview, May 27, 2011, Manchester. 89 BOA Medical Advisory Committee Minutes, July 14, 1965, File BOA/MED/1, BOA Collection, UEL Archives. 90 Vanessa Heggie, ‘Only the British Appear to Be Making a Fuss: The Science of Suc- cess and the Myth of Amateurism at the Mexico Olympiad, 1968’, Sport in History 28, no. 2 (2008): 225; See also Tegan Carpenter, ‘Uneasy Bedfellows: Amateurism and Coaching Traditions in Twentieth Century British Sport’, PhD Diss. Manchester Metropolitan University, 2012. 91 Comité International Olympique, ‘Training Camps’, Olympic Review, no. 1 (1967): 22. 92 H.A. Meyer, ‘Olympic Games in Mexico’, The Times, April 20, 1966, 13. 93 Ibid. 94 Chris Brasher, ‘Let’s Stop Being Gentlemen’, The Observer, May 28, 1967, 14. 95 ASA Annual Report 1966 – Committee Minutes, December 17, 1966, 57–58. 96 Chris Brasher, ‘Let’s Stop Being Gentlemen’. 97 AAA Coaching Committee Minutes, May 6, 1949, File 1/2/13/1, AAA: Birmingham. 98 Timothy Dyson, telephone discussion, July 29, 2011. 99 John Disley, England Athletics Hall of Fame, 2008, Private Collection: Dyson Family; Dyson, ‘Forty Years On’, 208. 100 Dyson, Mechanics of Athletics, 11, 13. 101 Dyson, ‘Forty Years On’, 207. 102 Frank Dick, Sports Training Principles (London: Lepus Books, 1980). 103 Frank Dick, interview. 104 Ibid. 105 Ibid. 106 Sarah Rowell, interview, August 31, 2011, Batley, West Yorkshire. 107 Sarah Rowell, interview; Les Burwitz, interview, June 25, 2011, Crewe, Cheshire. 108 Sarah Rowell, interview. 109 Les Burwitz, interview. 110 Ibid. 111 Sarah Rowell, interview. 112 Les Burwitz, interview. 113 Sarah Rowell, interview. 114 Frank Dick, interview. 115 Les Burwitz, interview. 116 Frank Dick, interview. 117 Alan Lynn, interview, April 8, 2011, Stirling, Scotland. 118 Frank Dick, interview. 119

Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 Bill Furniss, interview, March 29, 2011, Nottingham. 120 Terry Denison, interview, September 14, 2011, Leeds. 121 Frank Dick, interview. 122 Terry Denison, interview. 123 Sarah Rowell, interview. 124 Alan Lynn, interview. 125 Sarah Rowell, interview; Dave Collins, interview, February 17, 2011, Crewe, Cheshire. 126 Alan Lynn, interview. 127 Sarah Rowell, interview. 128 Alan Lynn, interview. 129 Terry Denison, interview. 130 Tom McNab, interview, May 6, 2011, St Albans. Coaching, science and medicine 167 Bibliography Anon. ‘Reviews and Notices’. British Medical Journal 1, no. 687 (1873): 579–589. Anon. ‘A Brief History of the British Association of Sport and Medicine’. British Journal of Sports Medicine, no. 3 (1968): 143–147. Basset, David. ‘Scientific Contributions of A.V. Hill: Exercise Physiology Pioneer’. Journal of Applied Physiology 93 (2002): 1567–1582. Beamish, Rob and Ian Ritchie. ‘From Fixed Capacities to Performance-Enhancement: The Paradigm Shift in the Science of Training and the Use of Performance-Enhancing Substances’. Sport in History 25, no. 3 (2005): 412–433. Beamish, Rob and Ian Ritchie. Fastest, Highest, Strongest: A Critique of High Performance Sport (Oxon: Routledge, 2008). British Olympic Committee. The Official Report of the Organising Committee for the XIV Olympiad (London: Organising Committee for the XIV Olympiad, 1948). Cannell, John J.et al. ‘Athletic Performance and Vitamin D’. Medicine and Science in Sports and Exercise 41, no. 5 (2009): 1102–1110. Carpenter, Tegan. ‘Uneasy Bedfellows: Amateurism and Coaching Traditions in Twentieth Century British Sport’. PhD Diss. Manchester Metropolitan University, 2012. Carter, Neil. ‘Metatarsals and Magic Sponges: English Football and the Development of Sports Medicine’. Journal of Sports History 34, no. 1 (2007): 53–73. Cook, Theodore Andrea. The Official Report of the Olympic Games of 1908 (London: BOA, 1908). Counsilman, James E. The Science of Swimming (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1968). Day, Dave. ‘Craft Coaching and the “Discerning Eye” of the Coach’. International Journal of Sports Science and Coaching 6, no. 1 (2011): 179–195. Day, Dave. ‘“Magical and Fanciful Theories”: Sports Psychologists and Craft Coaches’. Sports Coaching Review 1 no. 1 (2012): 52–66. Dick, Frank. Sports Training Principles (London: Lepus Books, 1980). Dyson, Geoffrey. The Mechanics of Athletics (Kent: Biddles Ltd, 1977). Dyson, Geoffrey. ‘Forty Years On: Some Thoughts on Coaching and Development’. Paper Presented at the International Olympic Academy Nineteenth Session, Olympia, July 6–19, 1979. Heggie, Vanessa. ‘Only the British Appear to Be Making a Fuss: The Science of Success and the Myth of Amateurism at the Mexico Olympiad, 1968’. Sport in History 28, no. 2 (2008): 213–235. Heggie, Vanessa. ‘Sport (and Exercise) Medicine in Britain: Healthy Citizens and Abnormal Athletes’. Canadian Bulletin of Medical History 28, no. 2 (2011): 249–269. Hill, Archibald. Muscular Movement in Man: The Factors Governing Speed and Recovery Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 from Fatigue (New York, McGraw-Hill, 1927), 3. Jokl, Ernst. ‘90th Birthday of Professor A.V. Hill’. The Journal of Sports Medicine and Physical Fitness 16, no.4 (1976): 349. Keil, Ian and Don Wix. In the Swim: The Amateur Swimming Association from 1869 to 1994 (Loughborough: Swimming Times, 1996). Martin, David. ‘Physiology: Its Role in Explaining Athletic Performance’. New Studies in Athletics 10, no. 1 (1995): 9–12. Park, Roberta J. ‘Cells or Soaring?: Historical Reflections on “Visions” of the Body, Ath- letics, and Modern Olympism’. International Journal of the History of Sport 24, no. 12 (2007): 1701–1723. 168 Coaching, science and medicine Reynolds, Lois A. and E.M. Tansey eds. The Development of Sports Medicine in Twentieth- Century Britain (London: Wellcome Trust Centre for the History of Medicine at UCL, 2009). Tucker, Ross. ‘Coaching and Science: What’s the Big Deal and Who Cares for the Sci- ence?’, The Science of Sport, www.sportsscientists.com/2009/10/coaching-and-science-a sset-or-liability.html (accessed July 4, 2012). Van Rossem, George ed., The Ninth Olympiad Being the Official Report of the Olympic Games of 1928 Celebrated at Amsterdam (Amsterdam: J.H. De Bussy, 1928). Waddington, Ivan. ‘The Development of Sports Medicine’. Sociology of Sports Journal 12 (1996): 179–196. Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 8 Structural changes and British coaching

Introduction While amateur administrators remained ambivalent about professional coaching, the ongoing poor results recorded by British athletes in the international arena began to encourage other individuals and organizations to question the state of British sport, especially as it had become apparent that an in-depth review of the individual components of the sporting model was required if things were to improve. However, it was equally obvious that this review would not be forthcoming from the National Governing Bodies (NGBs) themselves and this prompted external bodies to take action, informed in the main by two documents, the 1956 report, Britain in the World of Sport, and the 1960 Wolfenden Report, both of which signalled a new approach to sport in Britain. To a signiﬁcant degree, these initiatives were informed by the recognition that state involvement, as observed in the emerging competitive cultures in Eastern Bloc countries, was a prerequisite for competitive success in international sport.

Britain in the World of Sport Although British athletes had fared considerably better at Melbourne than they had at Helsinki, the long series of high-profile defeats of British teams suffered during the 1940s and 1950s could not be ignored. This, coupled with the emergence of the Soviet Union in international sport, put pressure on the prevailing amateur hegemony, and it was becoming increasingly clear that this approach was no longer sufficient to ensure success. If Britain wanted to perform well inter- Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 nationally then more sophisticated coaching and intense training were required. Prompted by these issues, a group of interested individuals at the University of Birmingham explored the state of British sport in 1956 and then published their findings in a pamphlet entitled Britain in the World of Sport. The report presented an array of recommendations concerning amateurism, coaching and the finance of international competition. Comparisons were drawn with other countries and the report concluded that the traditional amateur regulations needed to be relaxed if Britain was to become more competitive. In addition, the current levels of government intervention in sport, through the Ministry of Education, needed to be 170 Structural changes and British coaching expanded because the opportunities for sporting organizations to secure financial support were limited and increasingly accompanied by unrealistic demands. National athletics coach Geoff Dyson praised the report stating that ‘at a time of much idle conjecture and muddled thinking over Britain’s sporting performances’ it was refreshing to read ‘informed, carefully reasoned and well expressed views of a group of people who know what they are talking about’.1 He argued that the report should not remain confined to the sporting world but should be read by every politician and councillor in the country since it provided a useful and informative insight into the future direction of British sport. With respect to amateurism in sport the report argued that

When Britain takes part in international competitions the [amateur] regulations often prevent the selection of our best players. Practice abroad is often less in line with this precept. ‘Amateur’ Soviet athletes and ‘amateur’ American college athletes enjoy coaching opportunities, training facilities and freedom from ﬁnancial sacriﬁce not regularly available to English athletes outside the armed forces.2

It was also suggested that the amateur ethos, embedded within the notion of the ‘spirit of the game’, may have been satisfactory for those who chose to play for fun but this idea of ‘playing for the game’s sake’ was no longer applicable at the high performance levels now being observed internationally. New standards were being achieved by intensive and extensive training and the single-minded attitude to sport that made such training possible was not ‘easily allied to the detachment necessary to regard the result as unimportant’. The authors believed that the government should be asked to allocate speciﬁc funds to sport and, although this may have been considered somewhat unorthodox by traditionalists, it was clearly the only way that Britain was ever going to be able to compete effectively.3 This particular recommendation rapidly gained widespread support. Only a year later it was being pointed out in the press that the national coaching scheme in athletics was

ﬁnanced by an annual grant of £3,000 from the Ministry of Education, plus a ﬂuctuating sum, privately donated, of approximately £3,500. Now costs are rising – among other things, the salary of coaches. This means that, unless fresh help is given, the coaching scheme will be on its uppers in two-and-a-

Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 half years. Other amateur sports – swimming, gymnastics, cycling – are nearly always ﬁghting undeserved ﬁnancial crises … The Arts Council get £860,000 a year – with supervision and scrutiny, but without interference in control – from the Government. A grant one-twentieth as big – without strings – would save amateur sport.4

It is not clear whether the ‘without strings’ comment refers to the demands previously placed on sporting bodies as a prerequisite for grant-aid from the Ministry, but what is obvious is that, while the reporter believes that government intervention would ‘save amateur sport’, what is actually being described here is, by traditional Structural changes and British coaching 171 definitions, no longer amateur at all. The proposal for financial intervention from the government in itself signifies a shift away from existing amateur traditions, and the rising salaries of coaches to which the author refers suggests an increasing degree of professionalism was emerging within British sport. A final proposal within the 1956 publication centred on the idea that sporting bodies might combine to develop a joint advisory council, which would enable a greater level of coordination between organizations and encourage relevant developments. Any changes or modifications to accepted practices in sport would require input from individuals who were ‘involved enough to appreciate the problems but detached enough’ to recommend solutions. If British sport continued ‘neither taking a policy decision to withdraw from international sport, nor taking sufficiently energetic steps to see that representative teams really are representative … our declining performance will be resented at home and misinterpreted abroad’. Public responses to defeats had been, and would continue to be, fuelled by a press which generally described every incident as a ‘calamity’. The authors believed this could be easily rectified by using a joint advisory council to introduce improvements in training and coaching facilities, which, it was argued, would help reverse the poor performance levels of the late 1940s and early 1950s.5 The tone and content of this report makes it clear that some interested parties were beginning to appreciate that the values of amateurism and fair play were no longer a suitable foundation on which to base international sport and that they clearly understood that success, more than ever before, now required significant resources, intense training and a change in mindset. Britain in the World of Sport was a revolutionary publication for its time, not because it questioned the much cherished amateur tradition but because it did so constructively. Far from suggesting abandoning notions of amateurism without offering any alternative direction, as was the case with much of the press comment, it offered practical solutions that could be incorporated into, and potentially shape, the future of British sport. Although the subsequent 1960 Wolfenden Report has often been viewed as the blueprint for the later development of British sport, it is difficult to argue with those who consider Britain in the World of Sport, with its many innovative recommendations, as a primary catalyst for future progress.6

The Wolfenden Report

Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 Barrie Houlihan and Anita White argue that the motivation of the Wilson Government in establishing a Sports Council in 1965 was ‘less a reflection of its particular interest in sport and recreation than of its general willingness to expand the boundaries of the welfare state’.7 Whether or not this is true, crucial to the increased willingness of the government to become involved in sport was the publication five years earlier of the Wolfenden Report, Sport in the Community,8 although the impact of the previous Birmingham University Department 1956 publication should also be taken into account. The year after that publication, the Wolfenden Committee was established, mainly as the result of lobbying by the Central Council of Physical Recreation (CCPR), which had been prompted by a 172 Structural changes and British coaching number of factors, such as the successful development of elite sport systems elsewhere, particularly in the Soviet Union and America, and a growing realization that international sport was now inextricably linked with prestige. The CCPR therefore commissioned the Wolfenden Report in an attempt to resolve a number of contentious issues and thus improve the structure and organization of British sport.9 The history and the development of the CCPR has previously been covered in depth by Justin Evans (secretary of both the CCPR and Wolfenden Committee)10 and it is not necessary to reprise that history here, although a brief overview is required in order to set the scene. The Central Council of Recreative Physical Training (CCRPT), as it was then known, was established in 1935 as a direct result of the influence of Philys Colson, who subsequently played a significant role in the creation, growth and functioning of the CCPR.11 Colson appreciated the benefits of enlisting the help of powerful and influential individuals from the sporting world so she appealed to Sir Stanley Rous and Lord Aberdare, amongst others, to be founding members of the CCRPT. Rous, an amateur football player in his youth, secretary of the Football Association (FA) and eventually president of FIFA, had clear ideas about the position of amateurism in sport. Similarly, Aberdare, who was a member of the International Olympic Committee (IOC), as well as a member of the 1948 London Games Organizing Committee, and went on to become chairman of the National Fitness Council (NFC), did his upmost to ensure that the amateur principles of sport remained a consistent presence in British sport. Since many of the members who initially agreed to serve on the committee had come from amateur sporting backgrounds it was inevitable that their cultural values and beliefs influenced both the direction and development of the CCRPT, which had been created in response to a number of contemporary social problems, including high unemployment rates and poor national health levels. There was also a ‘realisation by the governing bodies of sport that some form of collective cooperation could assist hugely with both separate and corporate aspirations’.12 The CCRPT was initially involved with the development of the NFC, increasing the provision of recreational facilities in an attempt to raise fitness levels within communities and affording school leavers the opportunity to participate in sport.13 In 1944, the CCRPT became the CCPR, by which point it had already developed into an influential and proactive body within British sport by establishing itself as an umbrella organization for a wide range of sporting bodies and becoming

Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 heavily involved in activities such as the training of coaches and physical education teachers.14 For Evans, the CCPR had ‘transformed the concept of recreation in Britain. Long before the purposeful use of leisure became a general topic of discussion … the Council set about creating recreation centres, training leaders and coaches, encouraging participation and developing new recreational centres’.15 It was against this background that the CCPR instigated the Wolfenden Com- mittee in 1957, an event that at the time ‘aroused no particular concern other than general broad interest’. However, when its report emerged in 1960 it appeared to heed the calls of those who had demanded a new approach to sport in Britain and it subsequently was recognized as having been a publication of both significance Structural changes and British coaching 173 and influence, one that would ‘alter the face of British Sport within a decade’.16 Not only did it raise the profile of sport from a government perspective it also indirectly led to other key developments such as the appointment of a Minister for Sport in 1962 and the creation of the Sports Council in 1965.17 For the first time in British history there was to be a formal recognition that the government might have a responsibility not only to provide opportunities for the public at large but also to support elite athletes competing at an international level. The committee, which was composed of twelve individuals and chaired by Sir John Wolfenden, was appointed to conduct an impartial study into the factors which were affecting the development of games, sport and outdoor activities in the UK and to recommend ‘any practical measures which should be taken … in order that these activities may play their full part in promoting the general welfare of the community’. The first meeting was in January 1958 and for the following two years the committee collected oral and written evidence from a variety of sporting bodies, government departments and other interested parties, including Geoff Dyson and other national coaches. In 1960, the Wolfenden Report made fifty-seven recommendations that covered several areas in depth, including coaching, amateurism and facilities, and these were all framed around the notion of a ‘gap’,defined as the break between school sports and adult participation.18 Developing its recommendations around this idea allowed the committee to identify a concept which could be

interpreted positively by those with a concern for the social development of young people and those with a narrower concern for the production of the next generation of elite athletes, thus uniting two signiﬁcant elements within the sports lobby.19

This versatility enabled the report to appeal to a wide variety of administrative bodies by ensuring that each organization would beneﬁt, thereby encouraging them to support the proposals. As Fred Coalter and others have indicated, ‘the concern of Wolfenden was to achieve reforms which would not introduce major structural change, but would assist existing organizations to perform more efﬁ- ciently’.20 Houlihan and White argue that this diplomatic approach, together with the simplicity of its recommendations, guaranteed that the report had a substantial and long-term impact on the development of British sport.21

Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 An ongoing theme throughout the report was a defence of the voluntary infrastructure that characterized British sport, which, it was argued, was the foundation, or cornerstone, of sports development and organization.

The whole fabric of British sport is held together by the labours of unpaid and devoted enthusiasts, who at all levels give of their time and energy in order that other people may enjoy themselves. In countless ways these volunteers, unsung and often unhonoured, make the wheels go round; without them the incredible variety of activities we have examined simply could not exist.22 174 Structural changes and British coaching Although there were tentative suggestions that there might be some drawbacks to retaining a voluntary approach, it was argued that ‘where there are weaknesses and shortcomings the reason is not so much lack of interest as lack of money’. Since volunteerism had always been a strong feature of amateurism it is obvious why the committee approached the subject with caution. In order for its report to truly act as a catalyst for change in British sport it required widespread support, and any alienation of those traditionalists who valued amateurism could easily result in the report being marginalized. On the other hand, the report was equally explicit about the need for government intervention if there were to be improvements in terms of coaching and facilities. The committee were therefore placed in something of a predicament and this dilemma permeated through the whole report. While it was clear that a professional system of organization, coupled with some form of government involvement, would raise the overall standard of British sport, the committee were keen to preserve both volunteerism and the autonomy of the NGBs, regarded as something of a ‘sacred principle’.23 In the end, it was concluded that although

We believe that public opinion in this country would want our national participation in international sport to continue to depend in the main upon voluntary effort … we have come to the conclusion that some measure of statutory ﬁnancial assistance should be forthcoming to support the administrative and other work of the B.O.A.24

Contained within the report was also the recognition that some NGBs still harboured reservations about engaging professional coaches since ‘some Governing Bodies have taken an active interest in coaching, while others have been content … to let the game develop without coaching’. Far from trying to encourage NGBs to adopt a more positive approach, the committee, not wanting to be seen as encroaching on their autonomy, accepted that, with regards to their recommendations concerning an increased coaching presence in sport, ‘some governing bodies … do not share that view, and we entirely recognise their right to their opinion and their policy’. Attempts were also made to establish why coaching had ‘tended to play a technically less effective role in sport in Britain than elsewhere’. The committee concluded that this was primarily historical and ‘connected with the essentially haphazard and amateur way in which the sports themselves have grown up’. The ‘carefree parti-

Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 cipation and a tolerance of low standards’ present in British sport may not have been entirely antagonistic to the development of coaching, but it certainly did not encourage it.25 Reflecting on the contemporary coaching situation, the committee commended the work of the Ministry of Education coaching schemes, noting that, despite the somewhat hostile attitudes to professional coaching, these schemes had managed to support initiatives in a limited number of sports, although it was also apparent that the expertise of professional coaches remained undervalued in many organizations. The committee suggested that any coaching scheme would only prosper if each NGB embraced it wholeheartedly and that, in order to achieve this, Structural changes and British coaching 175 they would have to be willing to regard the appointment of national coaches as fundamental to ensuring its success.26 Interestingly, although the committee could see the benefits of using the national coaches to develop a contingent of honorary coaches there was a fear that this might lead to an ‘over-supply of coaches’.27 This could be avoided by not only implementing a system of regular re-examination of the honorary coaches but also by diverting more of the national coaches’ time to a focus on elite athletes because, they argued, it was ‘logical that … any national or official representative team should have the services of the professional national coaches’.28 Despite recommending more coaching opportunities and better organized coaching, there was a reluctance within the committee to endorse a shift in direction towards an American or Soviet coaching system. Even though American athletes often experienced more success due to a sophisticated coaching structure it was ‘not obvious that the … American systems are preferable to our own’ because the British system of sport had ‘considerable merits’.29 The string of defeats suffered by British competitors and the overall gradually diminishing competitiveness of British sport, which, in part, had acted as a catalyst for both Britain in the World of Sport and the Wolfenden Report, was addressed in great depth. It was obvious that British sporting techniques and training were no longer fit for purpose and, although they lacked any definitive evidence, the committee were inclined to believe that sports abroad were ‘prepared to devote much more time and much more money to [training and practising] than we are in Britain’. It was recognized that if British sport was to compete effectively abroad then not only was some form of investment required but there also had to be an acceptance that all sports, particularly those associated with the Olympic Games, were experiencing rising standards of performance and that, therefore, there was a need for more intensive and widespread training.30 Committee members agreed that

for those players who display a degree of skill and promise which justiﬁes the expectation that they will develop into ‘top-class’ performers … the player will need equipment and training and match-play on a high competitive level at home and abroad.31

Despite urging the NGBs to adopt a more vigorous approach to the training and

Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 conditioning of athletes, the report never appeared to shift too far from the accepted system of amateur British sport and it maintained the position that both winning and losing needed to be kept in perspective.

It is not the end of the world if British teams are defeated, still less is it a symptom or proof of national decadence. To talk, as some do, as if sport could properly be used as a major instrument in international diplomacy, or as if a nation’sauthorityandinfluence in world affairs at large are to be measured by its successes or failures in the Olympic Games, seems to us to reveal a serious lack of sense of proportion.32 176 Structural changes and British coaching In this respect, the committee reverted to some traditional arguments in suggesting that the British public had come to expect success purely because ‘so many sports and games originated in this country and were later adopted abroad’.33 Tied in with this nostalgic view of the supposed ‘golden days’ of sport was an assumption that the reason British competitors were no longer successful was not because British standards had dropped but because other nations had progressed. It was pointed out that, ‘with the great development of international sport and the increase in the number of participating nations, success is likely to become increasingly rare and hard to achieve’ and so expectations needed to be altered to take into account the standards now seen abroad.34 This brought with it some difficulties, since it meant going into competitions with no expectation of victory but, even though it was acknowledged that ‘being a good loser’ could result in a defeatist attitude, the committee believed that it was ‘better to lose gracefully and good-humouredly than to win by sharp practice or unsportsmanlike conduct’.35 Much of the content of the report had some resonance with the concept of amateurism and the tone of the text reveals an underlying respect for its values and a reluctance to depart from its central tenets. In fact, it was proposed that the retention of traditional amateur principles was essential to ‘preserve standards of behaviour and sportsmanship, to ensure fair grouping for competition, and to reflect in sport the social dimensions which were then current in society as a whole’.36 Even in the process of planning for change a latent apprehension remained about dealing with the topic, although, clearly, the sporting environment in which the amateur ethos had become established as a guiding philosophy for British elite sport had been radically different. Clouding the issue was the fact that differing interpretations of ‘amateur’ by different NGBs had resulted in a situation whereby the amateur regulations were not always consistent across sports.37 This created a problem for the committee, who may have been unanimous in their ‘dissatisfaction with the present position’ regarding amateurism but could never agree as to the ‘ultimate solution for the present difficulties’.38 Some members, like Albert Davis Munrow, believed ‘that the right solution is to abolish, quite simply and straightforwardly, the formal distinction between amateur and professional’ but the majority were unable to accept this ‘radical solution’ and Arthur Porritt, for one, emphasized that he would refuse to sign off on the report if such a clause was included.39 The outcome of this debate appeared to be influenced by the ingrained loyalty which

Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 committee members felt towards the NGBs, in particular the need for them to remain autonomous, since it was generally agreed that, ‘for so long as the Governing Body is recognised as the controlling authority in its particular sport it must, we feel, have the authority to decide who may participate in that sport, and on what terms’. Removing this option from the NGBs would be an infringement of autonomy so serious as to ‘deprive its title of meaning’.40 However, the committee urged ‘Governing Bodies not to confuse autonomy with separatism or non- co-operation’ because it had become apparent that amateur organizations were becoming increasingly isolated from each other and that if British sport was to progress then it would require a combined, coordinated effort.41 Structural changes and British coaching 177 One significant proposal emanating from the report was for the creation of a Sports Development Council (SDC), mirroring the suggestion previously made in Britain in the World of Sport. Any SDC would consist of a ‘small body of six to ten persons of varied experience who have a general knowledge of the field and such personal standing as will give them accepted authority and influence’.42 It was proposed that a sum of £5 million be made available for use by the SDC, for which it would be only loosely accountable to Parliament, while the NGBs would have some form of authority and discretion as to how the money was allocated. This would allow for greater public investment in sport but also protect the voluntary foundation of the NGBs and allow them to retain some degree of autonomy. Importantly for the future of British sport, the committee proposed that this SDC should also become involved in the bio-medical aspects of sport. Apart from isolated instances, there had been previously been little engagement with these kinds of support services, but now it was suggested that

With the very limited resources available to them, several medical and scientific groups … have carried out constructive and instructive work. But much of this has hitherto been un-co-ordinated, and we see a real opportunity for the Sports Development Council to encourage and stimulate an increased and more widespread interest in medical and scientific matters related to sport. Not the least significant of these are advances in methods of training and technique.43

Reactions to Wolfenden Initial reactions to the Wolfenden Report, although varied, were for the most part favourable. Perhaps the most important group, the NGBs, saw potential in the report and its proposals.44 The press also offered support, particularly The Times, the Daily Express and The Economist, somewhat surprisingly given that the report contained criticisms of the press at large.45 The committee had described the press as being more concerned ‘with sensationalism than accuracy, with circulation than truth’ and claimed that reporters lacked the ‘knowledge or experience to comment adequately or constructively on the sport about which they write and that this ignorance shows itself inevitably in ill-balanced judgements and a failure to understand or to represent correctly what they have seen’.46 The press response

Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 suggests that there was real potential in the report because, despite these criticisms, the majority of newspapers supported the proposals. Nevertheless, the press were realistic and well aware that it would be difﬁcult to instigate any real changes, particularly with regard to amateurism and the NGBs. The Economist commented:

They [the NGBs] are mostly not particularly democratic bodies, members who pay club subscriptions have little direct opportunity to vote them out of ofﬁce and spectators who pay entrance fees have even less. They are generally composed of people who have given a lifetime of service (and sometimes spent a deal of their own money) for their sport. But once in ofﬁce their 178 Structural changes and British coaching different methods of running their organizations, though extraordinarily haphazard, are often characterised by a determined restrictionism and a most dubious autocracy.47

Disappointingly, although there appeared to be substantial support for the creation of a Sports Council, a number of sporting organizations, the Executive Committee of the CCPR and the Ministry of Education were much less positive. From the outset, when the committee had begun to gather evidence, the Ministry were not particularly accommodating and Evans commented that ‘no-one could be found to speak to the committee with any real authority about the Ministry’s policy’. When a meeting was eventually arranged it was with three civil servants who possessed little authority in the grants procedure and they had been unable to ‘conceal the fact that … the development of sport was not high among the Ministry’s priorities’.48 However, once it emerged that it was the intention of the committee to recommend that grant-aid for sport should no longer be administered through the Ministry of Education, the Ministry reacted.49 While the Ministry were happy enough to be relieved of the financial burden its officials recognized that this would also reduce their power and influence so they opposed the transfer of responsibility to another organization, arguing that ‘public opinion was not yet ready for the State to take a greater part in grant-aiding adult sport, in view of the tradition of voluntary participation’.50 The Ministry also claimed that if the government was to assign greater funds to sport then they were the most obvious choice as a means of distribution because they had greater experience in this field than anyone else and they would ensure that support was provided to worthy organizations.51 Following publication of the report, the Ministry strongly defended its previous interventions in sport, arguing that ‘if local authorities and government departments have not done more in the past it was not because the machinery was inadequate but because the government chose other priorities’. Given their stance on this issue, it was no surprise that the Ministry publicly rejected outright the proposal for an SDC and appealed to others to do the same.52 Colson also raised objections, which was again entirely understandable since the CCPR were, at that stage, receiving the largest slice of the Ministry of Education grant. If the power of grant-aid was removed from the Ministry and bestowed upon another body there would be no guarantee of the same level of financial support for the CCPR and, since this was their primary source of income, Colson 53

Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 was obviously keen for the existing situation to continue. The CCPR Executive Committee was split over the possible creation of an SDC, with some in favour and others strongly opposed. However, to avoid their disagreements being made public the decision was taken to not press the matter to a vote and members were discouraged from expressing any personal views about the SDC.54 Considering that the Wolfenden Report was a private initiative and not a government endorsed report, the levels of attention it received from official channels were unprecedented.55 In February and April 1961 the report was debated in the House of Lords and House of Commons, respectively, but, although the discussions were generally supportive, the government showed little commitment to Structural changes and British coaching 179 accepting the report’s recommendations.56 In the February debate it had been reported that the government had not yet taken a final decision about the SDC, but that it was doubtful whether ‘such a radical intervention was needed’.57 Much to the satisfaction of both the CCPR and Ministry of Education, the notion of developing an SDC would lie dormant for another four years before any concrete developments took place. Kevin Jeffreys has argued that, as a result of this delay and despite a belief that the Wolfenden Report was the catalyst for change in British sport, the actual short-term and medium-term impacts were minimal. However, even though this specific proposal may not have been addressed straightaway, the report did prompt other, smaller changes which had more immediate impact. It was agreed that more capital investment was required in sporting facilities, including the creation of new swimming baths, and so the ceiling of the Ministry of Education’s grant-aid for such initiatives was increased from £3,300 to £6,600 for each sport. There was also a realization that professional coaches were being undervalued and, in an attempt to improve their status, an agreement was made to increase the Ministry’s grant for coaches’ salaries from £1,000 to £1,200. Altera- tions were also made to enable sports to apply for administrative grants towards their coaching schemes. Although it had never been the Ministry’s policy to refuse such grants there had consistently been a reluctance to award financial support on these grounds alone.58 Jeffreys suggests that these developments would have occurred regardless of any report and argues that ‘the most generous interpretation of what happened was that Wolfenden pushed the government to consider going a bit further and faster than it might otherwise have done’.Havingsaidthat,however, there is no concrete evidence to suggest that the government was intending to make these improvements until the emergence of the report.59 The Wolfenden Report clearly made an impact, but perhaps in a slightly different way to that envisaged by the CCPR when they had first commissioned it. Despite the support for its proposals and a growing awareness that other countries were now exploiting sport for international recognition, something which Britain was still ill-equipped to compete with, the Conservative Government at the time of the publication remained somewhat cautious regarding the role of the State with respect to British sport. However, although it would be another four years before the creation of an SDC, there was an indication that the battle for greater government investment in sport was being won when, in 1962, Lord Hailsham, Lord President of the Council and Minister for Science, was appointed as Minister with 60

Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 special responsibility for sport. Considering that this idea had been rejected by the Prime Minister in 1961, claiming that sport did not need such a ‘spectacular’ intervention, it seems that the government was gradually becoming more accommodating. Those parties who had envisaged progress primarily in terms of the development of an SDC were somewhat disappointed, particularly when it emerged that, while he agreed with the majority of the content of the report, Hailsham did not agree with establishing an SDC.61 His steadfast opposition to this proposal was generally unpopular and this led, during a House of Commons debate in 1964, to the question being asked as to whether or not the Prime Minister realised that, ‘the Lord President of the Council is either too busy to be 180 Structural changes and British coaching interested in sport or is just not interested in sport?’.62 In the end, although Hailsham fought until he left office against creating an SDC, his appointment did bring about greater government investment both in coaching and in international sport.63 For example, in June 1963 the government announced that financial assistance would be made available, ‘in suitable cases’, to support British amateur sporting teams competing in international events – a welcome development to many NGBs considering that the Tokyo 1964 Olympic Games were on the horizon.64 The Soviet sporting model, with its almost guaranteed success through the development of centralized sporting structures, clearly appears to have offered an alternative vision to some of those concerned about the traditional British approach to sport. However, although the media, in particular, often vociferously supported the adoption of the more specialized approach signposted within these reports of the late 1950s and early 1960s, many amateur administrators continued to shy away from the critical issues. The continued reluctance of the NGBs to allow professional coaches a greater level of freedom, particularly with regards to their coaching role, eventually resulted in the loss of influential coaches in both athletics and swimming. Both Geoff Dyson and Bert Kinnear were key individuals in the international coaching world but, because amateur administrators were unwilling to relinquish control, they found their positions untenable and felt obliged to resign, thereby slowing the progress of their sports. On the other hand, initiatives such as Britain in the World of Sport and the Wolfenden Report did stimulate greater government intervention and this could be considered something of a breakthrough. Encouraged by a growing realization that Olympic success now had a much wider political, as well as sporting, significance the British government began to take a much more active role in sport, a development that led inevitably to greater specialization as financial support became linked to sporting success and medal attainment.

The 1965 Advisory Sports Council

It has been claimed that there should be no relation between sport and politics – that sport and politics do not mix. I myself would oppose this contention … sport and politics are becoming increasingly and irrevocably intertwined … as day follows night there is an involvement of politics with sport. But of course from a sporting perception the essential word is involvement – not interference.65 Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 The Labour Government under Harold Wilson entered office in October 1964 and, remaining true to their manifesto with regards to sport, Denis Howell, Joint Under-Secretary of State for Education and Science, was appointed as Minister with responsibility for Sport. An Advisory Sports Council (ASC) was established in February 1965 to advise the government ‘on matters relating to the development of amateur sport and physical recreation services and to foster cooperation among the statutory authorities and voluntary organizations’.66 The ASC was purely an advisory body and not the executive Sports Council recommended in the Wolfenden Report so the control of sport was to be handled through a department of state Structural changes and British coaching 181 and not through a body of men and women well-versed in sport. Although the government had now agreed to implement one of the main recommendations of the Wolfenden Report, John Coghlan has argued that the advisory nature of this new body prevented it from ‘having teeth and a cutting edge’ in the organization and control of sport.67 Nevertheless, support for sport now increased, thanks mostly to the work of Howell, who had been appointed deputy chairman of the Sports Council. Considered by some to have been the best Sports Minister that Britain has had, he was described as ‘a credit to British sport, a trail blazer’ and his commitment to sport would ensure that significant progress was made regarding sports provision.68 Regardless of the uncertainties and disagreements about the direction that sport should take, the government began to provide financial support and, four years on from Wolfenden, it was now inextricably and formally linked with sport for the first time.69 One of the first tasks of the ASC was to address means of supporting elite sport, and four committees, each with their own specific focus, were developed in order to broaden the scope of work that could be attempted: the International Com- mittee, the Research and Statistics Committee, the Sports Development and Coaching Committee and the Facilities Planning Committee.70 The International Committee had been established to deal with the issues of British elite sport both at home and abroad by developing a programme that complemented the Olympic four-year cycle and dealt with the financing of the training and preparation of national teams. After they had formulated and presented their suggestions, the government agreed to donate £30,000 directly to the Olympic Appeal for the 1964 Games.71 The Appeal, which had traditionally been funded through public donations, was now being supported officially, and this provided the British Olympic Association (BOA) with a ‘safety net’ if they were unable to achieve their targets through other contributions.72 The Sports Development and Coaching Committee was created to provide advice to the government regarding those areas of British coaching which required financial support. It was agreed that more national coaches were necessary and that more full-time professional members of staff were required within the NGBs, so the funds allocated for coaching and administration increased from £565,000 in 1965/6 to £876,608 by 1970.73 This growing recognition of the value of expert coaching was also reflected in the development of the British Association of National Coaches (BANC) in 1965, formed by two national coaches, Geoff

Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 Gleeson of judo and Bob Anderson of fencing, who had recognized a need to bring together contemporary thinking about British training and coaching. They organized annual conferences, which were to become ‘the bedrock of their existence’ because they encouraged the coming together of like-minded individuals and the dissemination of information from high-calibre speakers.74 Based on his own experiences, Tom McNab suggested that national coaches were not given any training on the job by their NGBs and that the BANC provided the opportunity to gain knowledge from other coaches who were often in a similar situation.75 However, its creation caused a degree of consternation within NGBs and the Sports Council because the organization would not be directly under their 182 Structural changes and British coaching authority and therefore they had no way of controlling what the BANC was doing.76 The Sports Council were particularly cautious about its activities and appointed a liaison ofﬁcer, Harry Littlewood, who, although he was a ‘nice guy … he was under a watching brief to make sure these men did not stray into forbidden territory, he had to report back about these chaps like they were some kind of maﬁa that had suddenly arisen’.77 McNab suggests that the Sports Council always had a tendency to align themselves with the NGBs rather than the coaches because ‘they were people they could get on with’ and they had recognized that the administrators were generally in control. Thus, because the Sports Council would ‘gravitate to where the power was’, they tried to appease the NGBs by monitoring the BANC activities. For their part, the NGBs had always assumed that they were the ‘voice of coaches’ because coaches came directly under their jurisdiction so they remained concerned about the activities of an external organization that was actually beginning to ‘speak on behalf of the coaches’.78

The 1972 Executive Sports Council and beyond In 1972, the newly elected Conservative Government created an Executive Sports Council (ESC) by Royal Charter. Whether this was the result of improving international sporting performances or the result of a realization that sport now played a much larger role within society is unclear, but it seems obvious that the Con- servatives had been seeking to change the organization of the current body even before they got into office because they considered that the ASC was too closely linked to government and that a more ‘arm’s length’ approach would be suitable. This newly formed ESC would retain all the advisory functions of the ASC but it would have the additional responsibility for grant-aid to voluntary organizations. The ‘new’ Sports Council fulfilled the hopes of the Wolfenden Report since, although the organization would receive funding from the government, it would also be free from state control. This also seemingly satisfied those who valued the existing voluntary infrastructure because, in some ways, it allowed sport in Britain to continue in the same vein as it always had done. The ESC would remain firmly situated within the voluntary sector and, despite increased government involvement through enhanced levels of funding, the government would not try to interfere in terms of organization.79 Despite the creation of the ESC receiving widespread approval from many

Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 sports, the CCPR viewed the situation as anything but beneficial and believed this move posed a serious threat to the relationship between themselves and the Sports Council. The existing connections between the original ASC and the CCPR had been so close that some suggested that during the period between 1965 and 1971 it became increasingly difficult to separate the work of the CCPR from that of the Advisory Sports Council. When discussions about the creation of the potential ESC began, it was generally concluded that, if the Sports Council developed into an executive body, the CCPR, which had been so closely involved with its activities, would have to accept some form of merger with or absorption by the Sports Council. As the CCPR were well aware that any alterations to the organizational Structural changes and British coaching 183 situation would compromise their level of control over British sport, they continually resisted the creation of the ESC. However, their efforts proved futile, and in 1972, when the ESC was created, the two bodies were merged, with the CCPR going into voluntary liquidation, with all its assets and staff being transferred to the ESC.80 By agreeing to abide by these terms, the CCPR ensured it remained in existence to act as both a representative body of the NGBs and as a purely consultative body for the new ESC. The main objective of the ESC was to develop and improve the knowledge and practice of sport and physical recreation ‘in the interests of social welfare and the enjoyment of leisure among the public at large and to encourage the attainment of high standards’.81 Although the Council’s primary concerns were with mass participation, they also had a focus on elite and international sport. The aim was to ‘raise the standards of performance in sport and physical recreation,’ but, because there was a general consensus that increasing facilities was the first priority, it was agreed that mass sport would be the initial focus and this resulted in the emergence of the scheme known as ‘Sport for All’.82 It should be noted, however, that it has been argued that the ‘Sport for All’ policy was never more than a slogan and that the continual demand by the government to direct resources to specific groups resulted in ‘Sport for All’ being rebranded variously as ‘sport for the disadvantaged’ and ‘sport for the inner city youth’.83 An increasing awareness by the government that ‘success in international competition had an important part to play in national morale’ resulted in more funding being funnelled towards the ESC for the purposes of elite and international sport. In 1975, the first White Paper on sport, Sport and Recreation, expressed the desire of the government to direct resources to those who were considered especially gifted in sport, with a suggestion that this was to be done through the development of centres of excellence based in colleges and universities.84 As Ken Hardman and Roland Naul suggest, this document acted as ‘a precursor to a change in philosophy, a call for a better coordinated system of performance sport to enable young people to develop their full potential’.85 Despite initial resistance from some NGBs, because such a move signalled a loss of some of their autonomy, the ESC could see the benefits and gave the scheme its support. In 1977, the first centre of excellence opened in Leeds, soon to be followed by centres in both Manchester and Birmingham. The creation of these centres marked an important landmark for coaching in Britain because it provided a focus for the development of elite-level

Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 coaching for both Olympic and non-Olympic sports. This increased concentration on elite coaching encouraged debates and caused disagreements between the NGBs and the ESC regarding the development of a coaching framework in British sport.86 A lack of consensus regarding the direction of elite British coaching emerged because

There has always been … a somewhat schizophrenic attitude to coaching and coaches and nothing rouses the sporting passions more quickly than the topic of coaching. Perhaps it is a throw-back in the psyche to those halcyon days when athletes just took of their coats and ran.87 184 Structural changes and British coaching There was a growing realization that in order to deal with issues of coaching there needed to be some sort of centralized body that could work in association with both the NGBs and other sporting organizations to guarantee a degree of cooperation with regards to coaching policies. In 1983, encouraged by the years of lobbying by the BANC, the Sports Council established a ‘coaching arm’ known as the National Coaching Foundation (NCF). Influenced by the sporting systems which had developed in the East, it was believed that a system of coaching units set up within universities and colleges would ensure greater collaboration throughout the country.88 By 1987, Leeds Polytechnic was acting as the NCF headquarters and there was a network of fourteen national coaching centres housed within other higher education institutes.89 The NCF initially concerned itself with producing study packs and organizing short courses in an attempt to create a national standard for coaching, although, by 1990, it had also developed a sports coaching diploma on a distance learning basis that soon became the ‘gold standard’ for high-level, experienced coaches.90 However, whilst interest in the diploma course was initially positive, Les Burwitz, who had experience of how the programme operated while working at Manchester Metropolitan University, suggests that the distance learning format was ‘one of the critical limitations’. The diploma was directed towards active coaches, who by their very nature were committed to their coaching role and so facilitating them to complete even a part-time academic role was difficult. Burwitz believes that ‘it took a lot of nurturing’ to get people from start to finish of the programme and that was only possible if they were willing to remain on the course for the duration. Nevertheless, one significant positive of the NCF programme was that it raised awareness amongst the NGBs regarding the potential benefits of coaching; and those NGBs that saw the coaching qualification as a positive initiative encouraged and, in some cases, even funded their coaches to participate in the programme. The work of the NCF continued to expand during the 1990s but, as academic institutions became aware that they could run similar undergraduate coaching programmes and therefore gain financially, the emphasis was shifted away from the NCF. Burwitz indicates that when institutions began to encroach on what had previously been considered NCF territory, this ‘was the kiss of death’ and it marked the end of the NCF.91 As the programmes became obsolete the NCF gradually began to reduce its involvement and a series of redevelopments led to it being rebranded as Sports Coach UK in 2001.

Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 The election of John Major in 1990 saw another shift in the government’s approach to sport and witnessed the introduction of further structural changes. Mick Green suggests that the 1996 policy statement Sport: Raising the Game signalled that sport was now considered ‘a discrete domain for government intervention’ as the ‘organizational, administrative and funding framework for elite-level support’ was further developed.92 Raising the Game focused on plans to develop elite Institutes of Sport and considered how universities, in particular, could assist in the development of elite athletes. Essential to the new structure of British sport was the introduction of the National Lottery in 1994, something which Hamilton Smith referred to as ‘the greatest thing of all’.93 This was a recurring theme among Structural changes and British coaching 185 discourses with coaches operating in this time period,94 with all interviewees suggesting that the availability of funding from the Lottery was a pivotal moment because it caused a radical shift, both in the direction of British sport and the opportunities for professional coaches. For the ﬁrst time, signiﬁcant sums of money were being allocated to elite sport and this allowed for the introduction of improved methods of coaching and training. Terry Denison remembered that, ‘we had a budget of £100,000 a year for British swimming, international swimming, once we got into Lottery funding that went up into the £2 million bracket so suddenly there was a whole different game’.95 Les Burwitz suggests that the Lottery funding introduced the idea of payment by results and that this encouraged more exploration of ways of ‘enhancing and improving their particular sport’s performance’.96 This sentiment was echoed by Sarah Rowell who considers the Lottery as the catalyst for introducing people into sport whose main focus was purely on performance rather than participation.97

Conclusion The eventual reconstruction of the Sports Council in 1996 into the UK Sports Council (now UK Sport) and the English Sports Council (now Sport England) was a final decisive move by the Conservative Government to increase provision for sport and it also reflected the widespread view that separate organizations were needed. The UK Sports Council was to be responsible for developing excellence in sport and controlling drug-related issues, whereas the English Sports Council would be more focused on grass-roots-level sport and the ways in which a transition could be made into the higher echelons of performance. This division was yet another reflection of the government’s desire to improve elite sporting success at international level,98 and, encouraged by the success of Soviet sporting policies in such areas, has resulted in pressure being placed on all NGBs to have talent identification strategies that involve the development of ‘performance pathways’ for individuals who wish to progress to higher levels of competition.99 This became more firmly established through the Game Plan publication in 2002, which stipulated that each NGB had to develop a sport-specific Long Term Athletic Development (LTAD) plan in order to secure government funding.100 The LTAD model, developed by Istvan Balyi, proposed that a specific and well-planned training, competition and recovery regime would ensure optimum development throughout

Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 an athlete’s career and he concluded that it takes eight to twelve years or 10,000 hours of training, under the guidance of appropriate coaches, for a talented athlete to reach elite levels.101 A Sporting Future for All, which was published in 2000, signalled a further change in the way that British sport, particularly at the elite level, was being funded.102 In acknowledging that international success had its advantages, the government now wanted some guarantee of outcome from their investment. The report stated that each sport would be required to develop realistic medal targets and ‘the success or failure in achieving milestone targets in performance … will be an important factor in deciding future levels of funding’.103 Examples of this can 186 Structural changes and British coaching be seen in both British swimming and cycling. Elite swimming in Great Britain has experienced variable success at the Olympic Games; at the Sydney Games in 2000 the British swim team achieved no medals and four years later in Athens they only achieved two bronze medals. Poor performances at Sydney resulted in a drop in funding and performing well at the following Games would have been difficult to achieve. However, those two bronze medals in Athens created a slight increase in funding which clearly paid dividends when Rebecca Addlington secured two gold medals at the Beijing Games in 2008. Although a total of six medals were achieved by the British swimming team in Beijing, it was primarily these two gold medals that generated a 24 per cent increase in funding from £20.66 to £25.61 million for the 2012 London Games. Similarly, cycling achieved fourteen medals in total at Beijing, eight more than the expected target, which resulted in a 21.5 per cent increase in funding for the 2012 Games.104 Clearly, financial investment by the government is now entirely dependent on results, and for sports that fail to achieve medal targets then the situation can become perilous, as was the case with British shooting. For the 2008 Games, their funding was £5.06 million and they were required to achieve two medals, but when British shooters failed to secure any medals at all, their funding for the following Games suffered a 75.8 per cent decrease to £1.225 million.105 Mick Green argues that the unfavourable consequence of such a scheme is that, without funding, Olympic athletes struggle to achieve the medal performances demanded by the government targets, and that the resource- dependent relationship which all Olympic sports now have with government is one that will only endure if the sports deliver their Olympic targets.106 These pressures, on both coaches and NGBs, are a far cry from the world of Geoff Dyson, Bert Kinnear and other national coaches in the post-war period. The contemporary structures surrounding British sport thus mark a significant change in the sporting landscape of the nation and have had major impacts on the role and status of elite coaches. While the Soviet and American organizational models of the 1950s and 1960s provided exemplars of how successful international performances could be achieved, it was never realistic to imagine that the long-held traditions of amateurism in Britain would be abandoned overnight, so it is no surprise that it took over fifty years for change to occur. Even now, the underlying principle of volunteerism, which has underpinned the British approach to coaching since the nineteenth century, continues to exert its influence in a nation where coaching is still regarded as a ‘hobby’ and opportunities for making a career in

Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 coaching remain limited. British professional coaches still have some way to go before their social status matches that of their counterparts around the globe.

Notes 1 Geoffrey Dyson, Britain in the World of Sport (Review), AAA Coaching Newsletter, July 1956, 9–10, Private Collection: Dyson Family. 2 University of Birmingham Physical Education Department. Britain in the World of Sport: An Examination of the Factors Involved in Participation in Competitive International Sport. Birmingham: The Physical Education Association, 1956, 62. 3 University of Birmingham, Britain in World Sport,62–64. Structural changes and British coaching 187 4 Denzil Batchelor, ‘Sportfolio’, Picture Post, February 25, 1957, 8. 5 University of Birmingham, Britain in World Sport,65–68. 6 Lincoln Allison and Terry Monnington, ‘Sport, Prestige and International Relations’, in The Global Politics of Sport, ed. Lincoln Allison (Oxon: Routledge, 2005), 119. 7 Barrie Houlihan and Anita White, The Politics of Sport Development: Development of Sport or Development through Sport? (London: Routledge, 2002), 17. 8 CCPR, Sport and the Community: The Report of the Wolfenden Committee on Sport – 1960 (London: CCPR, 1960). 9 ‘National Sport Enquiry’, The Times, November 1, 1957, 6. 10 Justin Evans, The Story of the CCPR – 1935 to 1972: Service to Sport (London: Pelham Books, 1974). 11 Ibid., 25. 12 John Coghlan, Sport and British Politics since 1960 (London: The Falmer Press, 1990), 6. 13 Houlihan and White, Politics of Sport Development, 18. 14 Coghlan, Sport and British Politics, 5; Houlihan and White, Politics of Sport Development, 18. 15 Evans, Story of the CCPR, 11. 16 Coghlan, Sport and British Politics,8. 17 Houlihan and White, Politics of Sport Development, 18. 18 CCPR, Sport and Community, 5, 23, 150. 19 Houlihan and White, Politics of Sport Development, 19. 20 Fred Coalter, Jonathan Long and Brian Dufﬁeld, Rationale for Public Sector Investment in Leisure (London: Sports Council and Economic and Social Research Council, 1986), 46. 21 Houlihan and White, Politics of Sport Development, 20. 22 CCPR, Sport and Community, 11. 23 Ibid., 11–13. 24 Ibid., 47. 25 Ibid., 36–39. 26 Ibid., 39. 27 Ibid., 41. 28 Ibid., 40. 29 Ibid., 37. 30 Ibid., 60. 31 Ibid., 53. 32 Ibid., 58. 33 Ibid. 34 Ibid. 35 Ibid., 59. 36 Ibid., 54. 37 Ibid., 53. 38 Ibid., 87. 39 –

Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 Ibid., 54 55. 40 Ibid., 55. 41 Ibid., 44. 42 Ibid., 79. 43 Ibid., 83. 44 Coghlan, Sport and British Politics, 11. 45 House of Commons Parliamentary Debates, ‘Wolfenden Report (part two)’, June 29, 1960, vol. 625, par. 7.0, 1459. 46 CCPR, Wolfenden Committee on Sport, 62. 47 ‘Sporting Offer?’, The Economist, October 1, 1960, 21. 48 Evans, Story of the CCPR, 150. 49 Ibid. 188 Structural changes and British coaching 50 Ministry of Education, Minute of Oral Evidence Presented by the Ministry of Education, December 16, 1958, 2, File ED 169/73, Ministry of Education and Department of Education and Science Collection: The Wolfenden Committee of Sport, National Archives, Kew (hereafter cited as MoE: Wolfenden, NA). 51 Ministry of Education, Minute of Oral Evidence Presented by the Ministry of Education, December 16, 1958, 4, File ED 169/73, MoE: Wolfenden, NA. 52 Ministry of Education, 4, File ED 169/73, MoE: Wolfenden, NA. 53 Ministry of Education, Minute of Oral Evidence Presented by the Ministry of Education, December 16, 1958, 3, File ED 169/73, MoE: Wolfenden, NA; E.B.H. Baker, Debate on Wolfenden Report, April 20, 1961, File ED 169/73, MoE: Wolfenden, NA. 54 Evans, Story of the CCPR, 155. 55 Coghlan, Sport and British Politics, 11. 56 House of Commons Parliamentary Debates, ‘Sport (Wolfenden Committee’s Report)’, April 28, 1961, vol. 639. 57 E.B.H. Baker, ‘Debate on Wolfenden Report’, April 20, 1961, 1, File ED 169/73, MoE: Wolfenden, NA. 58 E.B.H. Baker, ‘Debate on Wolfenden Report’, April 20, 1961, File ED 169/73, MoE: Wolfenden, NA. 59 Kevin Jeffreys, ‘The Impact of the Wolfenden Report on Sport’ (Paper presented at the Annual Conference of the British Society of Sports History, London, 10–11 September 2010, Wellcome Collection). 60 Coghlan, Sport and British Politics, 12. 61 Evans, Story of the CCPR, 157. 62 House of Commons Parliamentary Debates, ‘Sport (Ministerial Responsibility)’, March 17, 1964, vol. 691, 1183. 63 Evans, Story of the CCPR, 158. 64 I.F.T. Martin to Ministry of Education, February 5, 1965, File ED 169/127, Ministry of Education and Department of Education and Science Collection: Sports Council, National Archives, Kew (hereafter cited as MoE: SC, NA); Evans, Story of the CCPR,158. 65 Richard Palmer, Enquiry into the Sports Council, 1985, File BOA/PAR/3, BOA Collection, UEL Archives. 66 House of Lords Parliamentary Debates, ‘Establishment of a Sports Council’, February 3, 1965, vol. 262; Iain Dale, Labour Party General Election Manifestos 1900–1997 (London: Routledge, 2000), 103. 67 Coghlan, Sport and British Politics, 22. 68 John Goodbody, ‘Manchester’s Ship Comes in with Flag Flying’, The Times, May 20, 1988, 48. 69 Coghlan, Sport and British Politics, 15. 70 Ibid., 272. 71 UK Steering Committee: British Empire and Commonwealth Games, Memorandum on the Participation of the Six Teams from the British Isles at the British Empire and Commonwealth Games Kingston, Jamaica in August 1966, April 1965, 1, File ED

Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 169/127, MoE: SC, NA. 72 Coghlan, Sport and British Politics,33–34. 73 Ibid., 35. 74 Hamish Telfer, ‘To Be Seen but Never Heard: The Struggle for a “Voice” for Coa- ches in Britain: A Brief Account of the Context, Life Cycle and Demise of the British Association of National Coaches (BANC)’, International Sports Studies 33, no. 1 (2011): 57–58. 75 Tom McNab, interview, May 6, 2011, St Albans. 76 Coghlan, Sport and British Politics, 46. 77 Telfer, ‘Seen but Never Heard’, 58; Tom McNab, interview. 78 Telfer, ‘Seen but Never Heard’, 58. 79 Coghlan, Sport and British Politics, 66. Structural changes and British coaching 189 80 Evans, Story of the CCPR, 209, 218, 224. 81 Coghlan, Sport and British Politics, 67. 82 Mick Green, ‘Olympic Glory or Grassroots Development? Sport Policy Priorities in Australia, Canada and the United Kingdom, 1960–2006’, The International Journal of the History of Sport 24, no.7 (2007): 936. 83 Barrie Houlihan, The Government and Politics of Sport (London: Routledge, 1991), 99. 84 Department of the Environment, Sport and Recreation (London: Williams Lea, 1975). 85 Ken Hardman and Roland Naul, ‘The Development of Sporting Excellence in England and Germany’,inSport in the Global Village, ed. Ralph Wilcox (Morgantown: WV Fitness Information Technology, 1994), 451. 86 Coghlan, Sport and British Politics, 103; Houlihan and White, Politics of Sport Development, 46. 87 Coghlan, Sport and British Politics, 46. 88 Ibid., 176–177; John Lyle, Sports Coaching Concepts: A Framework for Coaches’ Behaviour (New York: Routledge, 2002), 13. 89 Paul Robinson, Foundations of Sports Coaching (Oxon: Routledge, 2010), 8. 90 Lyle, Sports Coaching Concepts, 11. 91 Les Burwitz, interview, June 25, 2011, Crewe, Cheshire. 92 Green, ‘Olympic Glory or Grassroots’, 937. 93 Ibid.; Hamilton Smith, interview, July 27, 2011, Edinburgh, Scotland. 94 Tom McNab, interview; Terry Denison, interview, September 14, 2011, Leeds; Hamilton Smith, interview; Bill Furniss, interview, March 29, 2011, Nottingham; Sarah Rowell, interview, August 31, 2011, Batley, West Yorkshire; Les Burwitz, interview; Alan Lynn, interview, April 8, 2011, Stirling, Scotland. 95 Terry Denison, interview. 96 Les Burwitz, interview. 97 Sarah Rowell, interview. 98 Houlihan and White, Politics of Sport Development, 70. 99 Green, ‘Olympic Glory or Grassroots’, 940. 100 Melanie Lang and Richard Light, ‘Interpreting and Implementing the Long Term Athlete Development Model: English Swimming Coaches’ Views on the (Swimming) LTAD in Practice’, International Journal of Sports Science and Coaching 5, no. 3 (2010): 389; Department for Culture Media and Sport/Strategy Unit, Game Plan: A Strategy for Delivering the Government’s Sport and Physical Activity Objectives (London: Cabinet Ofﬁce, 2002), 125–128. 101 Istvan Balyi, Sport System Building and Long-Term Athlete Development in British Columbia (Canada: SportsMed BC, 2001), 1–2; Lang and Light, ‘Interpreting and Implementing’, 390; Dave Day, ‘Craft Coaching and the “Discerning Eye” of the Coach’, International Journal of Sports Science and Coaching 6, no. 1 (2011): 180–181. 102 Department for Culture Media and Sport, A Sporting Future for All (London: DCMS, 2002). 103 Ibid., 16. 104 ‘ ’

Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 BBC Sport, 2012 Funding Sport-by-Sport , http://news.bbc.co.uk/sport1/hi/ olympic_games/7761495.stm (accessed January 6, 2012). 105 Ibid. 106 Green, ‘Olympic Glory or Grassroots’, 939.

Bibliography Allison, Lincoln and Terry Monnington. ‘Sport, Prestige and International Relations’,in The Global Politics of Sport, ed. Lincoln Allison (Oxon: Routledge, 2005), 119. Balyi, Istvan. Sport System Building and Long-Term Athlete Development in British Colum- bia (Canada: SportsMed BC, 2001). 190 Structural changes and British coaching CCPR. Sport and the Community: The Report of the Wolfenden Committee on Sport – 1960 (London: CCPR, 1960). Coalter, Fred, Jonathan Long and Brian Dufﬁeld. Rationale for Public Sector Investment in Leisure (London: Sports Council and Economic and Social Research Council, 1986). Coghlan, John. Sport and British Politics since 1960 (London: The Falmer Press, 1990). Day, Dave. ‘Craft Coaching and the “Discerning Eye” of the Coach’. International Journal of Sports Science and Coaching 6, no. 1 (2011): 179–195. Department for Culture Media and Sport. A Sporting Future for All (London: DCMS, 2002). Department for Culture Media and Sport/Strategy Unit. Game Plan: A Strategy for Deli- vering the Government’s Sport and Physical Activity Objectives (London: Cabinet Ofﬁce, 2002). Department of the Environment. Sport and Recreation (London: Williams Lea, 1975). Evans, Justin. The Story of the CCPR – 1935 to 1972: Service to Sport (London: Pelham Books, 1974). Green, Mick. ‘Olympic Glory or Grassroots Development? Sport Policy Priorities in Australia, Canada and the United Kingdom, 1960–2006’. The International Journal of the History of Sport 24, no. 7 (2007): 921–953. Hardman, Ken and Roland Naul. ‘The Development of Sporting Excellence in England and Germany’,inSport in the Global Village, ed. Ralph Wilcox (Morgantown: WV Fitness Information Technology, 1994), 451. Houlihan, Barrie. The Government and Politics of Sport (London: Routledge, 1991). Houlihan, Barrie and Anita White. The Politics of Sport Development: Development of Sport or Development through Sport? (London: Routledge, 2002). Lang, Melanie and Richard Light. ‘Interpreting and Implementing the Long Term Athlete Development Model: English Swimming Coaches’ Views on the (Swimming) LTAD in Practice’. International Journal of Sports Science and Coaching 5, no. 3 (2010): 389–402. Lyle, John. Sports Coaching Concepts: A Framework for Coaches’ Behaviour (New York: Routledge, 2002). Robinson, Paul. Foundations of Sports Coaching (Oxon: Routledge, 2010). Telfer, Hamish. ‘To Be Seen But Never Heard: The Struggle For a “Voice” for Coaches in Britain: A Brief Account of the Context, Life Cycle and Demise of the British Association of National Coaches (BANC)’. International Sports Studies 33, no. 1 (2011): 57–58. University of Birmingham Physical Education Department. Britain in the World of Sport: An Examination of the Factors Involved in Participation in Competitive International Sport. Birmingham: The Physical Education Association, 1956. Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 Conclusion

Administrators thought they were the most important people; that the sport couldn’t exist without them. Nothing could be further from the truth … coaches [are] the key, not administrators.1

The individual experiences of professional coaches in Britain during the course of the last 200 years have been dictated by the social, political and economic conditions of the particular age in which they lived and worked. This will come as no surprise, given that ‘coaching’ is itself a social construction, and so definitions of who is a coach, and what a coach does, change as the world that surrounds sport alters. Although contemporary elite coaches fundamentally operate in ways that would be familiar to their predecessors – by developing fitness and skill, attending to psychological issues and preparing athletes for competition, while continuing to rely on their experience and their ‘coach’seye’–the environment within which these activities now takes place would be unrecognizable to the pugilist or pedestrian trainers of the early nineteenth century.2 Indeed, it is unlikely that more recent practitioners like Geoff Dyson and Bert Kinnear, who were, after all, coaching only fifty years ago, would see many similarities between their own situations and those of Bill Furniss or Dave Collins. Given their personal reputations for adopting a ‘scientific’ approach to their work it is more than likely that they would approve of the greater incorporation of sports science into coaching, now an integral part of the modern elite environment, and that they would also appreciate the increased status afforded to coaches in the twenty-first century. Whether or not they would be equally impressed by the current drive for standardization through professio-

Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 nalization and the development of a UK Coaching Certificate (administered through Sports Coach UK), a process that could well have blunted the innovative nature of their own work, can only be speculated about. Previous generations of professional coaches could not fail to be impressed by the current levels of government involvement in elite sport, the funding available to athletes, and the existence of organized coaching programmes that centralize and support the role of elite coaches. Under pressure from the Americans and, increasingly, from European nations that were adopting American approaches to coaching, proposals for training and coaching schemes had traditionally emerged following disappointing Olympic results, such as in 1912, but these initiatives 192 Conclusion normally developed in a very haphazard and uncoordinated manner and were often short-lived.3 Since these schemes were never able to gain momentum, they failed to substantially improve the performance of British athletes, resulting in an ongoing cycle whereby poor performances constantly stimulated the formation of new programmes. When centralized coaching schemes were attempted in swimming and athletics, before and after the Second World War, the impetus for these initiatives was equally haphazard, despite the increasing availability of funding, and it took the continued Olympic successes of both America and the Soviet Union to finally stimulate a serious reorganization of the British system in the latter half of the twentieth century. Of course, these particular international sporting models – the Soviet system of coaching allied to sport science, and the American system of professional coaching – were never directly compatible with either the British culture or its existing sporting structures. Quite sensibly, then, especially given the difficulties noted in other fields such as education about issues surrounding ‘policy borrowing’,4 it was the principles, such as professional coaching, the coordination of government support and structures, and the provision of adequate funding, rather than the details of these exemplars, that were absorbed and moulded to fit into a specifically British system. This has not been an easy process and remains fraught with difficulties, some of which continue to provide contemporary coaches with significant challenges. Inflexibility, organizational self-interest and an unwillingness to cooperate across institutional boundaries are traditional features of British sport that continue to this day. Dave Collins notes that when the UK Sport Institutes were originally established they were seen as separate little companies that would almost compete against each other.5 Sarah Rowell, who was closely involved in the work of the National Coaching Foundation, believes that Sport England, UK Sport and Sports Coach UK all have areas of overlap where they could effectively work together but, because each organization jealously guards its autonomy, these partnerships are not as effective as they could be.6 Although these bodies have undeniably developed substantially since they were first created, it appears that they have also been vulnerable to some of the insularity that has traditionally characterized National Governing Bodies (NGBs). Unlike the structured coaching programmes established abroad, the centralized coaching schemes established in Britain initially adhered to the traditional principles of NGB officials in that, rather than encouraging professionals to work with

Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 promising athletes, the primary rationale behind appointing national coaches in the decades after the Second World War was to produce a contingent of honorary amateur coaches. Despite imposing these restrictions on their work, there was still an assumption within NGBs, which also became the view of the public at large, that national coaches would somehow raise the standard of the nation’s Olympians. When, inevitably, there were no immediate signs of success, this tainted the way in which professional coaching was received because, despite the expense, these coaches were perceived as not having been particularly successful. This was clearly a fallacy and continuing British sporting failure did not occur because of a lack of coaching expertise. Both Kinnear and Dyson, for example, were considered to be Conclusion 193 at the forefront of the coaching world during their working lives but, because amateur administrators adopted a master–servant relationship with these men and continually resisted their full integration into their sports, they were never able to develop their ideas as they would have wished. Both men could have undoubtedly done much more to further British elite sport if they had been able to function without so many constraints, but their coaching environments were not supportive of their visionary approaches and increasing acrimony between them and amateur officials led to their becoming so disillusioned that they resigned. As a result of these tensions, a professionalized sporting system was not integrated as successfully into Britain as it was in other countries during the 1950s and 1960s. While some of the difficulties lay with officials and coaches having different interpretations of the coaching role, there were wider issues connected to the traditions and values surrounding British sport. These had such an influence that change was difficult and when it did occur it was a slow process often directed by individuals who lacked an understanding of how to manage it effectively. When greater government involvement and increased funding levels became available to British elite sport, for example, there was a complete lack of understanding as to how to use these opportunities successfully because no-one had experience in administering sport with this level of resource. Tom McNab suggests that, when athletics first received greater funding, officials did not employ suitable people and, while he acknowledges that it was not an easy task, they, in turn, then ‘appointed people who weren’t very good, second rate people then appointed third rate people so the mediocrity was multiplied’. In order to be successful he suggests that ‘you’ve got to appoint people as good as you are. Or better, in some ways, if you’re going to achieve success’. He notes that sports such as cycling have achieved this, whereas athletics continues to struggle to find successful administrators, something which he believes may never be resolved.7 During the last thirty years there has been a much greater acceptance within government, and inside the NGBs, that carefully planned, structured and managed centralized coaching and training programmes are essential if British athletes are to pose a serious threat of winning medals at World Championships and the Olympics. The abolition of the amateur ruling at the Olympics in 1986 marked a seminal turning point for those officials involved in both swimming and athletics and this was accompanied by an agreement that change was needed, particularly in moving towards the more widespread employment of professional coaching expertise.

Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 Increased funding, not least through the National Lottery, has been the key to making change possible, and the organization of this through government quangos and their establishment of performance targets completely altered not only British sport but also the attitudes adopted by NGBs and the opportunities afforded professional coaches. Coupled with an increasing focus on international performance was a gradual realization that grass-root- and elite-level sport required very different types of support and attention, particularly regarding personnel and resources. However, despite this shift towards greater specialization, and because its traditions and values have dominated the British sporting environment for so long, it is inevitable that some remnants of the amateur ethos remain. As a result, Dyson, 194 Conclusion Kinnear and their colleagues from the 1950s and 1960s, might still detect echoes of their own experiences in the current coaching climate. They lived and worked through a period during which professional coaching constantly struggled to gain acceptance within British amateur sport and, even when it did gain a foothold, thanks mostly to their own efforts, it continued to be marginalized within the NGBs. This was reflected in the way that administrators interacted with professional coaches and the way in which traditional master–servant relationships were maintained wherever possible. It was not necessarily the case that post-war administrators rejected the value of coaching and training, because there are many instances where they actively sought to appoint amateur honorary coaches, but it was just that the notion of being paid to coach did not match their vision for sport. This attitude extended beyond coaching to include medical support staff, with the expectation that highly qualified and experienced individuals would donate their time free of charge in the interests of amateur sport. It is often assumed that the significant structural initiatives implemented at government level during the 1970s and 1980s and supported, at least outwardly, by the NGBs, led to the demise of amateurism as the guiding principle in British sport.8 However, although it cannot be disputed that its impact was diluted, the evidence suggests that amateurism still exerts its influence, even in elite British sport, and that this continues to affect the way that coaches are obliged to operate. Bill Furniss suggests that, while the elite sporting system now in place in Britain has reduced amateur hegemony and encouraged people to become more selfish, something he believes is a prerequisite in order to be successful in elite sport, he still experiences examples of traditional amateurism, even at the performance level.9 Fellow swimming coach, Terry Denison, observes that there is now a greater acceptance that if an athlete wants to be successful they have to train and prepare thoroughly, and that this perspective has been encouraged by the emergence of a new generation of officialdom who, ‘accept that’s how it works and they’re most supportive of it’.10 In swimming, for example, people now recognize that ‘if you’re not training 50,000 metres a week at sixteen years of age, you are not going to compete internationally’.11 However, he believes that, even within the current results-driven climate, there is still something of an uneasiness associated with professionalism and, while no-one acknowledges this outright, this unease remains an underlying presence. Although Alan Lynn suggests that British performance sport is now ‘an island … that has drifted further and further from the mainland’, particularly as funding and

Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 professionalism have increased, he points out that there is still an ‘amateur channel’ that connects the island to the mainland.12 It is this continuing transfer of individuals from the mainland (the club and grass-roots environments), where the amateur ethos remains particularly ingrained, to the island (elite sport), that ensures that the principles of amateurism continue to have an impact. The same sentiments can be detected in the voices of some of the athletics coaches. When asked if amateurism still influences British sport, Dave Collins responded ‘staggeringly, completely and utterly’. He suggested that ‘people who loved athletics tried to run athletics, for athletics’ and, as a result, the performance levels of British competitors had continued to decline. The results at the 2004 Conclusion 195 Athens Games, as in the 1908 Games, covered up significant failures in the British sporting system. Kelly Holmes had managed to achieve two gold medals, and while Collins acknowledges that she prepared thoroughly and worked extremely hard for that result, it meant that British athletics had been ‘saved by the Americans having a bad day at the office and Kelly having two good days at the office … it covered up loads of other things, they couldn’t carry on going like that’.13 Unlike 1908, attempts were made to try and remedy the situation but Collins suggests that the sport failed to make progress because the amateur philosophy still held sway over British athletics. He explained:

Soon after I got the performance director job someone asked me if I had seen the Southern League results and I said ‘No’ and they said ‘Well you aren’t really interested in athletics are you?’. No, I’m interested in winning, I am interested in performance. I’m a performance director not an athletics director and that for me, that was the difference. The traditions of athletics and its failure to embrace quick enough the new world has limited it and in my perception continues to limit and that ethos is still there.14

Tom McNab argues that, although its principles may not be as inﬂuential as they once were, because it had been such a fundamental feature of British sport for such a long period of time, the amateur legacy has left a vacuum which will subsequently impact on any future developments. He commented:

I had this naive belief when I was young that once we got professional coaches in charge, professional administrators, that we would suddenly, we would ﬂy off. I thought that’s the way, indoor facilities here we go. Totally wrong. It left a vacuum, the amateur setup, it left no one behind that had any professional attitudes to develop athletics in coaching or any other way.15

For McNab, while athletics has not suffered from a lack of investment, particularly in the last ten years, these resources have not been utilized correctly so they have resulted in no beneﬁt to the sport; ‘the advantage we’ve had is building facilities, which are excellent, but the men not the walls make the city and there’s this belief that if you have all these facilities and systems in place that you can produce performance’.16 This sort of mind-set appears to be a throwback to a time when

Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 amateur athletics administrators placed more value on facilities than coaches. There was an assumption in the 1920s and 1930s, for example, that if the equipment and facilities were provided then that, in turn, would produce results, although, clearly, if sports are not supplied with individuals who have been coached in the correct techniques in the first place no amount of ‘impedimenta’ can guarantee success. McNab concludes that because of the far-reaching impact of amateurism, which has left such a big void in many sports, ‘we don’t have the right people in place and I’m not sure we ever will have’.17 On the other hand, some interviewees suggest that amateurism’sinfluence has in some ways been beneficial for British sport and that it should be further 196 Conclusion encouraged. Frank Dick is thankful that the amateur tradition remains because ‘we had and we still have people who are amateur who are producing world-class performances from their athletes’. He often had this argument with Harry Wilson, in which he asked ‘If I give you a million is Steve [Ovett] going to run much faster?’. Wilson suggested that was not the point but Dick argued:

Yes it is, it’s an attitude … it’s not economics. I’d love to support if we could do it, give proper rewards to those persons who produce genius as amateurs but that’s not possible, but that the fact is, getting paid doesn’t make you a good coach.18

Similarly, Hamilton Smith argues that the amateur tradition has actively encouraged individuals to donate their time to sport and this has made British sport available to everyone. The option for anyone to volunteer has ensured that sport has not become an exclusive pastime for elite athletes only, as was frequently seen in other countries such as the Soviet Union. Like Dick, Smith recognizes that money does not necessarily make someone an expert coach and believes that the unique aspect of the British sporting system is that ‘giants’ in coaching can emerge simply because they have been willing to volunteer. These individuals are not initially motivated by the prospect of reward but simply because they want to help their chosen sport progress.19 Les Burwitz also indicates that he would ‘ﬁght’ for the ‘old school ethos of the amateur coach’ because this forms the back-bone of what British sport represents. He suggests that, ‘yes we need mechanisms to be able to compete at the highest level but let’s not throw the baby out the back all the time’. He argues that the grass-roots American coaches are often ‘mirror images of professional coaches’ and that they treat their athletes (often children) in a way that is inappropriate and not conducive to their development. Burwitz would not like to see these attitudes transposed to British sport because ‘it’s much better that we are amateurs in our approach, providing we know when to cut off and when to shift from play to a professional mode so they’ve got a half decent chance of achieving medals’.20 It also needs to be considered that, as many of the interviewees highlighted, committed individuals will always ﬁght to retain principles of volunteerism within the British sporting model because the positives, such as the availability of sport for everyone and a belief that everyone should have the opportunity to achieve

Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 success, outweigh any potential negatives. If these advantages of this unique sporting system are to be retained, then it has to be accepted that amateurism, even though now somewhat diluted, will continue to exert an influence at the elite end of sport. Consequently, how well Britain’s athletes fare in future international sport will depend primarily on how well the system and associated personnel can work within the amateur confines. Central to this will be the way in which the professional coaches are treated, in terms of both recognition and rewards. Terry Denison believes that ‘we’ve moved on, but there is still something of the old amateur tradition and there is still something of it’s not quite right, it’s professional, it’s not quite acceptable’.21 Bill Furniss suggests that, as was the case previously, Conclusion 197 ‘even now … I still think coaches are undervalued’.22 Although some elite-level coaches are now on ‘pretty good salaries’ he believes that this is not really comparable to other positions in the sports world given the environment in which they have to work and the pressures they have to face. He argues that there is ‘no comparison’ between a coach working with an athlete and sports support services and ‘yet a lot of sport service people are paid more than the coaches they support! Which is somewhat of an anomaly!’.23 In concluding the narrative at this point it is useful to reflect for a moment on how far professional coaching in Britain has come, over the last fifty years in particular, in moving from the constant struggle against traditions and officialdom to the more secure platform of the present day. Much of the credit for this transition must go to the individual coaches whose drive, knowledge and passion, have made change possible; and twenty-first century elite professional coaches in swimming and athletics owe a considerable debt to Dyson, Kinnear, their colleagues and, indeed, to the interviewees in this text, whose testimonies bear witness to the path that they helped to forge. Whether or not similar scenarios played out in other sports, Olympic and non-Olympic, professional and amateur, team and individual, is a matter for future research. As stated earlier, this book marks a starting point for the exploration of elite coaching experiences in twentieth-century Britain since it presents ‘A’ history of coaches in two specific sports, leaving much more to be explored. There is a specific need for future work to address the experiences of female coaches across sports and for work that investigates the lives of those who followed the traditional amateur approach to sport by becoming volunteer coaches. In this respect, the approach taken here of combining oral history with archival research will prove especially valuable.

Notes 1 Peter Snell, ‘Coaches the Key, Not Administrators’, New Zealand Herald, January 9, 2011. 2 Dave Day, Professionals, Amateurs and Performance: Sports Coaching in England, 1789–1914 (Bern: Peter Lang, 2012). 3 Dave Day, Neil Carter and Tegan Carpenter, ‘The Olympics, Amateurism and Britain’s Coaching Heritage’, International Journal of Heritage Studies 19, no. 2 (2013): 139– 152; Dave Day, ‘Massaging the Amateur Ethos: Professional Coaches at Stockholm in 1912’, Sport in History 32, no. 2 (2012): 157–182; Dave Day, ‘The “English Athlete Is Born Not Made”: Coaching, Amateurism, and Training in Britain 1912–1914’, Pre- Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 sentation at Sport and Leisure on the Eve of the First World War Symposium, MMU Cheshire, 27 and 28 June, 2014. 4 David Phillips and Kimberly Ochs, ‘Researching Policy Borrowing: Some Methodolo- gical Challenges in Comparative Education’, British Educational Research Journal 30 (2004): 773–784. 5 Dave Collins, interview, February 17, 2011, Crewe, Cheshire. 6 Sarah Rowell, interview, August 31, 2011, Batley, West Yorkshire. 7 Tom McNab, interview, May 6, 2011, St Albans. 8 Tegan Carpenter, ‘Uneasy Bedfellows: Amateurism and Coaching Traditions in Twentieth Century British Sport’ (PhD Diss., Manchester Metropolitan University, 2012). 9 Bill Furniss, interview, March 29, 2011, Nottingham. 198 Conclusion 10 Terry Denison, interview, September 14, 2011, Leeds. 11 Ibid. 12 Alan Lynn, interview, April 8, 2011, Stirling, Scotland. 13 Dave Collins, interview. 14 Ibid. 15 Tom McNab, interview. 16 Ibid. 17 Ibid. 18 Frank Dick, interview, May 27, 2011, Manchester. 19 Hamilton Smith, interview, July 27, 2011, Edinburgh, Scotland. 20 Les Burwitz, interview, June 25, 2011, Crewe, Cheshire. 21 Terry Denison, interview. 22 Bill Furniss, interview. 23 Ibid.

Bibliography Carpenter, Tegan. ‘Uneasy Bedfellows: Amateurism and Coaching Traditions in Twentieth Century British Sport’. PhD Diss., Manchester Metropolitan University, 2012. Day, Dave. Professionals, Amateurs and Performance: Sports Coaching in England, 1789–1914 (Bern: Peter Lang, 2012). Day, Dave. ‘Massaging the Amateur Ethos: Professional Coaches at Stockholm in 1912’. Sport in History 32, no. 2 (2012): 157–182. Day, Dave. ‘The “English Athlete Is Born Not Made”: Coaching, Amateurism, and Training in Britain 1912–1914’. Presentation at Sport and Leisure on the Eve of the First World War Symposium, MMU Cheshire, 27 and 28 June, 2014. Day, Dave, Neil Carter and Tegan Carpenter. ‘The Olympics, Amateurism and Britain’s Coaching Heritage’. International Journal of Heritage Studies 19, no. 2 (2013): 139–152. Phillips, David and Kimberly Ochs. ‘Researching Policy Borrowing: Some Methodological Challenges in Comparative Education’. British Educational Research Journal, 30 (2004): 773–784. Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 Index

Page numbers in bold indicate tables.

AAA see Amateur Athletic Association amateurism 3–4, 186; 1950s/1960s (AAA) attitudes 102–3, 117, 132–3, 153–4, AAC see Amateur Athletic Club (AAC); 169–71, 172; abolition of Olympic Athletes’ Advisory Club (AAC) amateur ruling 138, 193; Britain in the Aberdare, Lord 172 World of Sport report 169–71; inter-war Abrahams, Adolphe 2, 50, 64, 148 attitudes 58–9, 68–9, 75; nineteenth- Abrahams, Anthony 104–5, 106 century attitudes 19–23, 25, 26–7; in Abrahams, Harold 67, 82, 85, 86, 104, Olympic Games 36, 37–8; post-1945 115, 116, 132, 150 attitudes 81–2, 94, 96; pre-First World Abrahams, Sidney 42 War attitudes 34, 49; present-day Achilles Club 1 attitudes 193–6; and Soviet Union ‘Active Athletes’ programme 94 125–6, 127, 138; and sports medicine Addlington, Rebecca 186 149–51; and sports science 153–4, 162; Advanced Swimming and Coaching in United States 23–6; Wolfenden Report Course, Loughborough see 173–4, 175–6; see also volunteerism Loughborough Swimming Schools Amateur Rowing Association (ARA) 47, Advisory Sports Council (ASC) 180–2 59, 60, 135 Afghanistan 137 Amateur Swimming Association (ASA) Alexander, W.W. 63 4–5; 1950s/1960s 108–14; inter-war Alford, Jim 84, 105 years 60–1, 66, 71–4; post-1945 88–90, all-round athletes 23, 24, 35, 44, 45, 60 95–6; pre-First World War 40, 45, 46, All-Union Council of Physical Culture, 51, 59; sports science 151–6; Teacher Soviet Union 123 Certiﬁcate 61, 73, 74, 88 altitude training 136, 138, 155–6 Amateur Wrestling Association 45 Amateur Athletic Association (AAA) 3, Ambler, Victoria 128–30 – – – –

Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 4 5; 1950s/1960s 103 8, 109 10, American coaching system 23 4; British 115–16, 118; inter-war years 64–5, resistance to 24–6, 44, 46–9, 51, 59, 60, 67–8, 69–71; nineteenth century 20, 25; 66–7, 175 post-1945 82–7; pre-First World War American Inter-collegiate Association 24 38–9, 40–1, 42, 45,46–8, 59; sports Amsterdam Olympics (1928) 66, 147 medicine 150; sports science 156–7 Anderson, Bob 181 Amateur Athletic Club (AAC) 20 Andrews, Harry 2, 50, 65 Amateur Clay Bird Shooting Annison, Harold E. 49 Association 45 Anthony, Don 106 Amateur Fencing Association 37, 45, 108 Antwerp Olympics (1920) 60 Amateur Field Events Association 65 Applegarth, Willie 39 Amateur Gymnastics Association 45 appropriation, regimes of 14 200 Index ARA see Amateur Rowing Association Beckwith, Frederick 14–15, 17 (ARA) Beckwith, Willie 14, 15 Argentina 81 Beijing Olympics (2008) 1, 186 Artillery Ground, London 10 Belgium 34, 35 ASA see Amateur Swimming Association Bell’s Life reports 13 (ASA) Berlin Olympics (1936) 68–9 ASA Teacher Certiﬁcate 61, 73, 74, 88 Beveridge report (1942) 80, 83 ASC see Advisory Sports Council (ASC) Beyer, Henry 146 Atha, John 154 Binks, Joe 62 Athens Olympics (2004) 186, 194–5 biomechanics 156–7 athlete dissatisfaction 132–4 Birch, Adrian 39–40 Athletes’ Advisory Club (AAC) 38, 44, 64 Birmingham University 169–71 Athletic News 41 Blackstaffe, Henry 36 athletics 4–5; 1950s/1960s coaching Bland, Hamilton 112, 114 102–8, 109–10, 111, 115–16, 118; Bleasdale, Noel 152 Athens Olympics (2004) 194–5; Decies BOA see British Olympic Association Commission 5, 61–4, 65; inter-war (BOA) coaching 59, 64–5, 67–8, 69–71; boat design 136 London Olympics (1908) 37–8; Bock, Arlie V. 147 nineteenth century 20, 24, 25, 27–8; bodies 22–3 post-1945 coaching 82–7, 93–4; Bolton, R.H. 151 pre-First World War coaching 38–9, Bolton, Richard 90 40–1, 42, 45,46–9, 59; sports medicine Boston General Hospital 147 150; sports science 156–7; see also Bowden, Sir Harold 67 pedestrianism boxing 10–11, 12 Attewell, William 27 Bradley, C.A. 27 attitudes to coaching: 1950s/1960s Bramwell, Crighton 147 114–18, 132, 174–5; inter-war years 59, Brasher, Chris 133, 134 60, 66–7; nineteenth century 24–6; Bredin, E.C. 18 pre-First World War 44, 46–9, 51 Brickett, Walter 40, 49, 51 Attwood, Thomas 14–15 Bridgeman, J.W. 70 Australia 133 Britain in the World of Sport report (1956) Austria 44 169–71 British Amateur Athletics Board (BAAB) BAAB see British Amateur Athletics Board 133, 134, 149, 150, 151 (BAAB) British Association of National Coaches Bacon, Fred 27 (BANC) 116–17, 181–2 Baillieu, Chris 135, 136 British Association of Sport and Exercise Baker, B. Howard 63 Sciences (BASES) 158 Baker, P.J. 63 British Association of Sport and Medicine Balyi, Istvan 185 (BASM) 5, 148, 149, 150 BANC see British Association of National British Medical Journal 145–6

Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 Coaches (BANC) British Olympic Association (BOA) 5; Bannister, Roger 148–9 1950s/1960s 132, 133, 135, 181; Barcelona Olympics (1992) 160 Decies Commission 5, 61–4, 65; Barclay, Robert 12 formation 36–7; medical services 150; Barry, Lou 135, 136 Mexican altitude project 138, 155–6; BASES see British Association of Sport and Moscow Olympics (1980) 137–8; pre- Exercise Sciences (BASES) First World War 41, 44–5, 45, 59, 147 BASM see British Association of Sport and Broughton, John (Jack) 10 Medicine (BASM) Brundage, Avery 125, 126 BBC 89 Buley, Ernest Charles 59 Beach Thomas, W. 43 Bunyan, Charles 41–2 Beckwith, Charles 14, 15 Burghley, David, Lord 71, 125 Index 201 Burton, Elaine Frances 73–4 Courtney, Charles 24 Burwitz, Les 6, 158, 159, 185, 196 craft coaching 15–17, 18–19, 145 Buytendijk, F.J.J. 147 Craven, Carleton 18 Cribb, Tom 12 Cambridge University 20, 27, 35, 41, 83 cricket 50 Canada 87 Cross, William 39, 40 Carter, Neil 3 Crump, Jack 103, 133 Cawley, Shirley 86 cycling 39, 45, 46, 158, 186 Central Council of Physical Recreation (CCPR) 171–2, 178, 179, 182–3 Daily Express 47–8, 68, 82, 177 Central Council of Recreative Physical Daily Mail 34, 38, 46, 47 Training (CCRPT) 172 Daily Telegraph 37, 39 centres of excellence 183 D’Arcy, Vic 39 certiﬁcation, swimming teaching 61, 73, Davenport, Horace 15 74, 88 Davis Cup 66, 81 Chapman, Tony 84 Decies Commission (1923) 5, 61–4, 65 Chuter, Penny 137 DeMar, Clarence 147 circuit training 154 Denison, Terry 6, 129, 130, 138–9, 160, Clark, F. 39 162, 185, 194, 196 class: distinctions in sport 3, 10, 19–22; Desborough, Lord 36–7 physical differences in nineteenth cen- Dick, Frank 6, 138, 155, 157, 159–60, tury 22–3; post-First World War 58; see 161, 196 also working classes diet 11, 12, 21; see also sports nutrition Classey, Eleanor Mary 40 Dill, David Bruce 146, 147 classical sporting ideals 20 Diploma in Sports Medicine 149, 150 coach, use of term 2 Disley, John 86, 132, 134, 156 coach education programmes 122, 135, distance learning courses 184 136, 184, 191 Dodd, Christopher 134, 136–7 coaching: gendered nature of 3; use of Dowling, Francis 13 term 2 Downer, Alfred 18 ‘Coaching Active Athletes for International Doyle, Sir Arthur Conan 45 Competition’ scheme 94 Dresden International Hygiene Exhibition Coaching Committee, Amateur Athletic 146 Association 82, 85–6, 90, 115 drugs 128, 136, 139, 147, 185 coaching communities, nineteenth century Duncan, David Scott 63 12–19 Duncan, Sandy 132, 133 coaching debates: inter-war years 59, 60, Dyson, Geoffrey 2, 67, 82–7, 90, 93–4, 66–7; nineteenth century 24–6; pre-First 103–4, 115–18, 170, 173, 192–3; World War 44, 46–9, 51; see also resignation 104, 106–7, 180; sports attitudes to coaching science 87, 156–7 ‘coaching eye’ 2–3, 18, 86, 96 Coalter, Fred 173 Eastern Europe 122, 136, 157, 161

Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 Coghlan, John 181, 183 Easton, Fanny 40 Collins, Dave 5–6, 192, 194–5 Economist, The 177–8 Collins, Gilbert 66 Edström, Sigfrid 125 Colson, Philys 172, 178 education see coach education programmes; Commonwealth Games (1958) 104 qualifications Cook, Theodore Andrea 36, 37, 45 Education Act (1944) 83 Coombes, Robert 16 eels 153 Copland, Alexander 44 Elkington, Helen 113 Cornell University 24 Elliot, Geoff 86, 108 Cornhill Magazine 17–18, 21 Elliott, Launceston 40 Coubertin, Pierre de 36 Ellis, Lionel 71 Counsilman, Jim 154 Ellis, Reginald 147 202 Index Ellison, Gerald 65 Game Plan 185 employment conditions, national coaches Gardner, Harry 15 82, 105–6, 111, 113 Gardner, Maureen 84, 86, 93–4 English Sports Council 185; see also Sports General Records Office 5 Council ‘gentlemen amateurs’ 19, 22, 35 ESC see Executive Sports Council (ESC) George, A.B. 63–4, 65 European Championships, athletics 104, George, Walter 18, 38, 39, 48 125, 150–1 Germany 34, 44, 46, 68, 103, 146 Evans, Justin 172 Giles, Richard 15 Executive Sports Council (ESC) 182–5 Gleeson, Geoff 181 Gold, Arthur 151 family involvement in coaching 14–15 Gold, Harcourt Gilbey 39 Farrel, J. 42 golf 27, 82 Fattorini, A. 63 Gorbachev, Mikhail 138 Fédération Internationale de Natation government support 1, 5, 191, 193; Amateur (FINA) 60 1950s/1960s 108–9, 155, 169–71, female coaches 3, 40 178–80; 1970s 183; inter-war years fencing 37, 45, 108, 111 69–74; post-1945 83–4, 88, 94 Fern, Harold 71–2, 73, 74, 88, 108, 109, Gramsci, Antonio 14 110 Grand Challenge Cup, Henley 34, 35 Fewtrell, Thomas 11 grant-aid: 1950s/1960s 108–9, 169–71, Field, The 37 178, 179; inter-war years 69–74; Figg, James 10 National Lottery 1, 159, 161, 184–5, filming: slow-motion ‘loop’ 87; underwater 193; payment by results policy 185–6; 154 post-1945 83–4, 88, 94 FIMS see International Federation of Sports Green, Mick 184, 186 Medicine (FIMS) Grenfell, W.H. 36–7 financial support 1, 5, 191, 193, 195; Grinham, Judy 153 1950s/1960s 108–11, 155, 169–71, 178, 179; amateur officials’ use of own Hagget, Charles E. 42 money 110; inter-war years 69–74; Hailsham, Lord 179–80 National Lottery 1, 159, 161, 184–5, Haines, Bill 35 193; payment by results policy 185–6; Hardman, Ken 183 post-1945 83–4, 88–9, 94; pre-First Harper, Roland 82, 115 World War 38, 44–6; United States 25 Harre, Dietrich 157 Finland 60, 68, 157 Hart, Ben 13 Finlay, Don 85 Hart, Mike 136 fitness, national 34, 45, 69; Soviet Union 123 Harvard Fatigue Laboratory 146, 147 Font Romeu, Pyrenees 156 Harvard–Oxford boat race 24 football 27, 39–40, 41–2, 118 Harvard University 24, 35 foreign coaches, attitudes towards 1; Hearn, George 60 1950s/1960s 116–17, 135; inter-war Hébert, George 44 – – –

Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 years 62 3, 65, 67 8, 71, 75; height 22 3 post-1945 81 Helsinki Olympics (1952) 86, 126, 131–2 Foreign Ofﬁce, British 68, 127–8 Henley 24, 26, 34, 35, 135 foreign visits by British coaches 86–7, 152 Henry, William 40 France 44, 46, 68 Hill, Albert 62–3 Fritty, Sam 39 Hill, A.V. 131, 146–7, 148 front crawl 61 Hilton, C.F.R. 70 Frost, J. 16 Hjertberg, Ernie 41, 42, 61–2, 65 Furniss, Bill 6, 108–9, 160, 194, 196–7 hockey 111, 150 Hodge, Percy 63 Galen 20 Hogg, John 114 gambling 10, 12, 13 Holmes, Kelly 195 Index 203 Holmyard, Tony 113 Jarvis, J.A. 36 Hoole, Henry 20–1, 22, 23 Jeffrey, John 90–1 Houlihan, Barrie 171, 173 Jeffreys, Kevin 179 Howcroft, W.J. 61 Jenny, F. 39 Howell, Denis 180, 181 Jokl, Ernst 147 Huggins, Mike 59 Jones, Ann 118 humoral theory 11 Jones, Steve 146 Humphrey, Charlotte 40 Humphrey, Jane 40 Keen, Peter 158 Hungary 68 Kemp, William 10 Hurd, Douglas 137 Kendal, Arthur 110 Hurley, Charles 42 Kendall, E. 155 Hutchens, Henry 27 Kinnear, Bert 2, 90, 111–14, 116, 153, hydrodynamics laboratory 111 154, 180, 192–3 Klein, William Hugo 40 IAAF see International Association of Knox, Walter 46–7, 63 Athletics Federations (IAAF) Kodak Ltd 154 IAC see International Athletes Club (IAC) Koskie, Harry 88–90, 92, 95, 152, 153 infrared lamps 151 Kraenzlein, Alvin 44 inituition 2–3; see also ‘coaching eye’ in-service training of coaches 135 LAC see London Athletic Club (LAC) Institute of Physical Culture, Soviet Union lacrosse 159 130, 131 Ladoumegue, Jules 68 Institutes of Sport 184 Laffan, Robert Stuart de Courcy 36, 37, 44 International Association of Athletics Latham, Peter 50–1 Federations (IAAF) 125 Lawn Tennis Association (LTA) 3, 37 International Athletes Club (IAC) 104, Laxton Lloyd, Molly 73, 74 134 Leathes, Hill Mussenden 21 International Committee, Sports Council Leeds Polytechnic 184 181 Legge, Hugh 48 International Federation of Sports Lehmann, Rudolf 49 Medicine (FIMS) 149 Le Masurier, John 104, 105 International Olympic Committee (IOC) Lenin Stadium 155 36, 125, 147, 155 Levett, John 16 International Sporting Federations Lewden, Pierre 67 (ISFs) 123 Life Saving Society 36, 40, 74 International Weightlifting Championships literacy 16 125 Littlewood, Harry 182 International Wrestling Federation 126 Liverpool University 155 interval training 154 London Athletic Club (LAC) 20, 24, 25, interviewees 5–7 38–9, 50 IOC see International Olympic Committee London Daily News 24

Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 (IOC) London Hospital Medical College 149 Irish Amateur Athletic Association 45 London Olympics (1908) 37–8, 147 ISFs see International Sporting Federations London Olympics (1948) 1, 84, 86, (ISFs) 89–90, 91–6, 102, 126 Italy 68 London Olympics (2012) 1, 186 Ives, Bert 63 London Rowing Club 42 London School of Hygiene and Tropical Jackson, William 13 Medicine 152–3 James, T. 39 Long Term Athletic Development (LTAD) Janousek, Bob 135, 136–7 plans 185 Japan 68, 152 Los Angeles Olympics (1932) 66 Jarvis, Clara 3, 40 Lottery Funding 1, 159, 161, 184–5, 193 204 Index Loughborough College 67, 85, 151 moderation 20–2 Loughborough Summer Schools 67–8, 70, Montague, E.A. 67 71, 83, 85, 116 Montreal Olympics (1976) 136 Loughborough Swimming Schools 88–90, Moorhouse, Adrian 129, 130 95, 151–4 Morning Post, The 25 Lowe, Frank 26 Morris, Walter 86 LTA see Lawn Tennis Association (LTA) Mortimer, Angela 118 LTAD see Long Term Athletic Develop- Moscow Olympics (1980) 137–8 ment (LTAD) plans Moss, P.J. 46 lung capacity 147 Mullins, Bat 27 Lydiard, Arthur 146 Munich Olympics (1972) 114 Lynn, Alan 6, 160, 161–2, 194 Munrow, Albert Davis 176 Lyttleton, R.H. 50 Murphy, Michael C. 24, 25, 41 Murray, Al 153, 154 MacLaren, Archibald 23 Mussabini, Sam 27, 39, 62 McNab, Tom 6, 84, 86, 103–4, 107, 110, 112, 115–18, 128, 134, 162, 181–2, national coaches 115–16, 174–5, 192–3; 193, 195 athletics 82–7, 93–4, 103–5, 156–7, Madders, Jane 151 170, 173, 180; British Association of Madders, Max 89, 90, 95, 151, 152, 153 National Coaches 116–17, 181–2; Major, John 184 employment conditions 82, 105–6, 111, Malcolm, Allan 84 113; resignations of 87, 91, 104, 105–8, Manchester Athletic Club 27 113–14, 136, 137, 180; rowing 135–7; Manchester Guardian 21, 60 swimming 109, 111–14, 180 Manchester United 27 national coaching centres 184 Mann, Matt 24, 95–6, 153 National Coaching Foundation (NCF) 1, Marshall, John 127 158–9, 184 massage 2, 50 National Cyclists’ Union 45,46 masseurs 65, 66, 148–9, 150 national ﬁtness 34, 45, 69; Soviet Union master–servant relationships 3, 27, 51, 59, 123 62, 70, 134, 193, 194 National Fitness Council (NFC) 5, 69, 70, Matveyev, Lev Pavlovich 130–1, 157 71–4, 83, 172 Mays, Micky 149 National Lottery 1, 159, 161, 184–5, 193 mechanical pacers 152 national prestige 44, 68–9, 124, 125, 183 Mechanics of Athletics, The (Dyson) National Technical Ofﬁcers (NTOs), 156–7 swimming 109, 111–14, 180 media see press comment and debate Natty, Bill 27 medical profession 18, 19, 21–2, 64, 148 Naul, Roland 183 medical services 129–30, 148–51 NCAA see Northern Counties Athletics medicine, sports 129–30, 135, 148–51 Association (NCAA) Melbourne Olympics (1956) 126–7, 131, NCF see National Coaching Foundation 132–3, 153 (NCF)

Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 Mellen, Chase 26 Nelson, Alec 38, 39, 41, 49, 51, 62, 71, 83 Mendoza, Daniel 11 Netherlands 152 Mexican altitude project 138, 155–6 News Chronicle 96 Mexico City Olympics (1968) 114, 155–6 News of the World 82, 83 middle-class sport 10, 19–23 Newton, Andrew 50 Middlesex Hospital 155 New York Athletic Club (NYAC) 24, 25 Mikkola, Jaako 67, 85 New York Times, The 37 Miles, Eustace 60 NFC see National Fitness Council (NFC) Mincing Lane Club 20 Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine 146 Ministry of Education 5, 83–4, 86, 88, Noel-Baker, Philip 48, 71 94, 107, 108–11, 169–71, 174, Northern Counties Athletics Association 178, 179 (NCAA) 63, 64–5 Index 205 Northern Rhodesia 105 physiology research 130, 146–7 Nottingham training camps, rowing 136 physiotherapists 129, 148, 149, 150, 151 nutrition, sports 138, 152, 153 Picture Post 132 Nuttall, Joey 36 ‘pocket money’ 133, 150–1 NYAC see New York Athletic Club Poland 103–4, 127, 157 (NYAC) politics and sport 124–5 Polley, Martin 5 Observer, The 25, 60, 65, 66–7, 68 Porritt, Arthur 148, 176 Olympic Charter 126, 137 press comment and debate 1, 3; 1950s/ Olympic Games 1, 4; 1950s/1960s 104, 1960s 132, 170; inter-war years 60, 65, 114, 118–19, 126–7, 131–3; 1970s/ 66–7, 68; nineteenth century 17–18, 21, 1980s 136–8; abolition of amateur 24, 25; post-1945 82, 91, 93; pre-First ruling 138, 193; inter-war years 60–9; World War 34, 35, 37–8, 41, 43, 44, medical services 148; post-1945 84, 86, 46, 47–8, 49, 51; reactions to Wolfenden 89–90, 91–6, 102, 125–6; pre-First Report 177–8 World War 36–46, 122–3; recent games Price, A.C. 153–4 186, 194–5; and sports science 147, Princeton University 24 153, 155–6, 160 professional athletes: eligible for Olympics Olympic Games Appeal (1964) 181 138, 193; working-class 10–12 Olympic Games Fund (1913) 44–6, 49 professional coaches: Decies Commission Olympic Medical Services 148 61–2; eighteenth century 10–11; Olympic tradition 20 nineteenth century 10, 12–19, 22, oral histories 5–7 27–8; pre-First World War 35–6, 39–41, organic intellectual concept 14 49–51; in United States 24, 25; see also OUAC see Oxford University Athletic Club master–servant relationships; national (OUAC) coaches overtraining 18, 21, 89, 130, 145, 155 Professional Golfers’ Association 27 Oxford University 20, 26, 35, 41, Professional Swimming Association 83, 86 (PSA) 15 Oxford University Athletic Club (OUAC) Pro-Nutro concentrated food 138 90–1 psychology: nineteenth century 19; sport 131, 138, 162 Page, Freddie 135 public perceptions of coaching 117–18 Paine, Ralph 36 public schools 20, 22, 27 Pamplin, David 15 pubs, urban 15 Paris Olympics (1924) 60–6 Pugh, Lionel 104, 107–8 Parker, F.W. 38–9, 42 pugilism 10–11, 12 Parker, James 13–14, 17 pulse rate 147, 152 Parrish, William James 39, 65 Puni, Avksenty Cezarevich 131 Patton, Melvin 92 purging 11, 12, 21 payment by results funding 185–6 pedestrianism 10, 11–12, 13–14 qualiﬁcations: coaching 136, 184, 191; –

Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 Peerless Pool 10 sports medicine 149 50; swimming Pelham, Sir Henry 71 teaching 61, 73, 74, 88 performance-enhancing substances see drugs Railton, Jim 135, 136 periodization 130–1, 136, 138, 157 Rammage, Charles 48 Periodization of Sport Training (Matveyev) Ransom, Harry 48 130–1 Read, Malcolm 150 Perry, Charles 50 ‘Ready for Labour and Defence’ personal coaching 70, 83, 84, 93–4, 112 programme, Soviet Union 123 Phelps, Eric 81 real-tennis 27 Physical Training and Recreation Act Reed, Henry 13 (1937) 69 relaxation techniques 151 206 Index relay running orders 90, 103 Soviet Union 4, 102, 122, 138–9; inter-war repetition training 18, 154 years 123–4; Moscow Olympics (1980) research, sports science 128, 130–1, 137–8; post-1945 124–31; sports 146–7, 152–3, 159–60 science 128, 129–31, 155; see also resignations of national coaches 87, Russia 91, 104, 105–8, 113–14, 136, Speak, Michael 128–30 137, 180 specialization 21, 23, 24, 35, 49, 138 resting pulse rate 152 Sperryn, Peter 149–50, 151 Road to Rome 134 Sport and Recreation White Paper 183 Rogers, Bob 24 Sport England 185, 192 Romania 157 ‘Sport for All’ policy 183 Rome Olympics (1960) 104 Sporting Future for All report 185 Rous, Sir Stanley 131–2, 172 Sporting Mirror 93 Rowe, Arthur 106 sport psychology 131, 138, 162 Rowell, Sarah 6–7, 158, 159, 161, Sport: Raising the Game policy 184 185, 192 Sports and Exercise Medicine degrees 149 rowing 10; 1960s/1970s 134–7; inter-war sports coaching diploma 184 years 59, 60; nineteenth century 22, 24, Sports Coach UK 184, 191, 192 26–7; post-1945 81; pre-First World Sports Council 1, 135, 155, 158, 171, War 34, 36, 39, 42, 47 173, 185; Advisory 180–2; Executive Royal Canadian Legion Sports Training 182–5 Plan 87 Sports Development and Coaching Rudd, Bevil 75 Committee, Sports Council 181 Russia 104, 122–3; see also Soviet Union Sports Development Council (SDC) proposals 177, 178–80 Sarsfield, Norman 112, 114, 156 Sportsman, The 38 Saturday Review 43 sports medicine 129–30, 135, 148–51 Savidge, John 86 Sports Ministers 173, 179–80, 181 Scientific Advisory Committee, Amateur sports nutrition 138, 152, 153; see also diet Swimming Association 154–5 Sports Schools, Soviet Union 125 ‘scientific’ coaching 17–18, 35; see also sports science 87, 122, 136, 145–62, 191; sports science athletics 156–7; formalization of 158–9; Scottish Amateur Athletic Association 45 inter-war developments 146–8; SDC see Sports Development Council resistance to 131–2, 138–9, 159–62; (SDC) proposals Soviet Union 128, 129–31, 138–9, 155; Second World War 80 sports medicine 129–30, 135, 148–51; Seward, George 13 swimming 151–6; see also ‘scientific’ ‘shamateurs’ 127 coaching Shearman, Montague 25, 27 Sports Science Education Programme Shimmin, Walter R. 66 (SSEP) 158 shooting 186 Sports Science Support Programme (SSSP) shot putting 86 158–9 –

Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 Shrubb, Alfred 50 sports scientist coach relationships 160, Sinclair, Archibald 40 161–2 Sinclair, Sir John 12, 14, 17 Sports Training Principles (Dick) 157 Skeet, J.G. 65 SSEP see Sports Science Education Skey, F.C. 21 Programme (SSEP) slow-motion ‘loop’ films 87 SSSP see Sports Science Support Smith, George 10 Programme (SSSP) Smith, Hamilton 6, 95–6, 110, 112, ‘stables’, athletic 13–14 113–14, 115, 128, 154, 184, 196 Stace, John 114 Smith, Jacky 12 staleness 18, 21; see also overtraining social reform 80 Stampfl, Franz 67, 70, 82 somatotyping 155 Star Grounds, Fulham 27 Index 207 Starkey, Robert 65 undergraduate coaching programmes 184 Stender, Jan 152 underwater filming 154 Stockholm Olympics (1912) 1, 38–43, United States 4; British resistance to 122–3 American coaching system 24–6, 44, strength exercises 152 46–9, 51, 59, 60, 66–7, 175; Helsinki ‘Strength through Joy’ movement 69 Olympics (1952) 126; inter-war years sunlamps 151–2 59, 68; London Olympics (1948) 92; sweating 12, 21 Moscow Olympics (1980) 137; Sweden 46, 60, 68; Dyson’s visit 86–7; nineteenth century 23–6; pre-First Stockholm Olympics (1912) 1, 38–43, World War 34, 37, 46; public 122–3 perceptions of coaching 117 Swedish Olympic Committee 41–2 ‘university athlete’ ideal 23 swimming 4–5; 1950s/1960s coaching urban pubs 15 108–14; inter-war coaching 59, 60–1, 66, 71–4; London Olympics (1948) 92; Valste, Armas 67, 85 Lottery Funding 185; nineteenth Viljoen, Johannes 67 century 10, 14–15; payment by results volunteerism 19, 44, 75, 94, 173–4, 182, funding 186; post-1945 coaching 186, 196; and sports medicine 149–51; 88–90, 95–6; pre-First World War see also amateurism coaching 40, 42, 45, 46, 51; sports science 151–6, 160, 162 Wadmore, J.F. 65 swimming strokes 61, 155 Walker, Donald 12 Swimming Times 88, 152 Walker, Reggie 27 Switzerland 136, 156 Walker Cup 82 Sydney Olympics (2000) 186 Wallis, C.W. 15 Sykes, John 39 Walsh, John Henry 19, 21 Warburton, James ‘Choppy’ 27 talent identification 45, 86, 185; nineteenth Warner, Glen 35 century 18; Soviet Union 128–9 Warre, Edmund 26, 51 Taris, Jean 68 Watkins, Harry 48 Taylorism 35 Watts, Dennis 84, 104, 106 team spirit building 89, 92 Webster, F.A.M. 43, 65, 66, 67, 81, 85 tennis 3; 1950s/1960s 111, 118; inter-war weight 22–3 years 66; nineteenth century 21, 27; weight training 153, 154 post-1945 81; pre-First World War Westhall, Charles 22 42, 50–1 White, Anita 171, 173 Thatcher, Margaret 137 White, Belle 40 Thomas, Bill 39, 41, 51, 62, 66, 83 White, Jack 27 Thomas, Ray 84 Whitney, Caspar 35 Times, The 34, 35, 37–8, 43, 44, 46, 47, Wilkinson, Henry Fazakerley 22 51, 91, 132, 177 Williams, Charlie 41 topical histories 5–7 Williams, Jack 59

Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016 trainer, use of term 2 Wilson, Charles 114 training manuals 16 Wilson, Harold 180 training programmes: eighteenth century Wilson, Harry 196 10–11; nineteenth century 12–19, 24, Wimbledon 81, 118 27–8 winter training 62 Truelove, Les 103, 104 Wisdom, Sam 27, 47–8 Wolfenden, Sir John 173 UK Coaching Certiﬁcate 191 Wolfenden, Thomas 13 UK Sport 1, 151, 185, 192 Wolfenden Report (1960) 169, 171–7; UK Sports Council 185; see also Sports reactions to 177–80 Council Wolffe, Jabez 50 ultra-violet radiation (UV) 151–2 Woodgate, Walter Bradford 26, 51 208 Index Wootton, Carl 95 World Cup 118 working classes: physique 22; professional wrestling 40, 45,126 athletes 10–12; professional trainers 10–11, 12–19 Yale University 24, 35 World Championships 4 Yallop, John 135 Downloaded by [New York University] at 12:06 30 September 2016