Copyright by

Paul Elwood Weaver 1958 SOVIET STRATEGY IK IRAN 19*1-1-1957

by Paul Elwood Weaver

Submitted, to the Graduate Faculty of The American University in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Signatures of Committee: Chairman

'z'llAXj'J, d / j U - c t ^ Ju u

Date : A /£ /£

January 1958 \& ^be American University ' Washington, D. C. v \ ; %\ PREFACE

The subject of this study is Soviet strategy - not

Soviet military strategy alone but Soviet strategy in gener­ al. It concerns the development and employment of Soviet political, economic and military forces in Iran during peace and during war, to afford the maximum support to U.S.S.R. policies. Soviet strategy with respect to Iran is only the instrument of overall national policy. It represents a series of plans designed to produce a certain result.

This study assumes the Soviet Union seeks gain. It also assumes the men in the Kremlin are rational in seeking gain, that they are willing and able to come to terms, when necessary, with the conflicting desires and actions of others.

Thus, this study analyzes the twists and turns of Soviet political, economic and military activity in Iran as the

Soviet Union attempts to diminish the possibility of re­ sistance to gain.

I wish to express my appreciation to the distinguished and able committee who guided and directed the writing of this study. Dr. Samuel L. Sharp, Professor of International

Relations and Organization, The American University, served as chairman of my dissertation committee and was helpful with constructive criticism and valuable suggestions. My thanks are expressed to Dr. Mary E. Bradshaw, Chairman,

Department of International Relations and Organization, The iii

American University, for her assistance and encouragement in the completion of this dissertation. Also, I am grateful to

Dr. Kerim K. Key, Wear East Specialist, Department of State,

Dr. Charles W. Hostler, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Pentagon, and

Dr. Vladimir Katkoff, Associate Professor of Economics, The

University of Baltimore, who advised me in the research for this study.

I owe my greatest thanks to my parents, Mr. and Mrs.

Olney S. Weaver, for their patience and support, both in­ spirational and material, throughout all of my graduate studies.

Wone of the above-named persons is responsible for the form or the conclusions of this study or for any inter­ pretations or errors it may contain. TABLE OP CONTENTS

CHAPTER PAGE I. INTRODUCTION...... 1 II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND TO SOVIET STRATEGY IN IRAN ...... 7 III. SOVIET ANTI-IMPERIALIST ACTIVITY IN NORTHERN IRAN 19^1-19^7...... • ^ Soviet Economic Activity...... ^5 Soviet Political Activity ...... ^9 Western Reaction and "Democratic" Party Developments...... 57 Azerbaijan Revolt and Its Results ...... 6l Soviet-Iranian Actions at the United Nations. . 70 First Iranian Complaint ...... 71 Second Iranian Complaint...... 80 IV. SOVIET ANTI-CAPITALIST ACTIVITY 19*7-19*9 . . . . 106 Soviet Economic.Boycott of Iran ...... 107 Soviet Anti-feudalism and Anti-Americanism. . . Ill

V. SOVIET ANTI-ANGLO-AMERICAN ACTIVITY 19^9-1955 . . 128 Soviet Resumption of Trade with Iran...... 129 Soviet War of Nerves Continues...... 15*1- Nationalization of Iranian Oil...... 1^-6 The Pall of Prime Minister Mossadegh...... 169 VI. SOVIET POLITICAL APPEASEMENT AND ECONOMIC OFFENSIVE 1955-1957 ...... 185 CHAPTER PAGE Soviet Economic Penetration. - ...... 184

Soviet Political Concessions ...... 189 VII. CONCLUSION ...... 204 BIBLIOGRAPHY...... 210 APPENDIX A. THE THREE POWER DECLARATION CONCERNING IRAN (l'DECEMBER 1943). '...... 242 APPENDIX B. NOTE PROM THE IRANIAN MINISTRY OP FOREIGN AFFAIRS TO THE SOVIET EMBASSY, TEHERAN (17 NOVEMBER 19^5)...... 245 APPENDIX C. NOTE FROM THE UNITED STATES AMBASSADOR IN MOSCOW TO THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT

(24 NOVEMBER 1945)...... 249 APPENDIX D. NOTE FROM THE U.S.S.R. COMMISSAR FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS TO THE UNITED STATES EMBASSY, MOSCOW (29 NOVEMBER 1945). . . . 252 APPENDIX E. NOTE FROM THE IRANIAN MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS TO THE SOVIET EMBASSY,

TEHERAN (l DECEMBER 1945) ...... 255 APPENDIX F. NOTE FROM THE IRANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER TO THE AMBASSADORS OF THE UNITED KINGDOM, UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION AT TEHERAN (15 DECEMBER 1946)...... 258 APPENDIX G. COMMUNICATIONS FROM THE IRANIAN MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS TO THE SOVIET . EMBASSY, TEHERAN...... 260 vi

CHAPTER PAGE

APPENDIX H. IRAN: ESTIMATED WHEAT PRODUCTION, 1946-47, 1947-48...... 276 CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The dominant factors in the formulation of Soviet policy on the international scene have been Russia's strength or weakness in Europe and the Par East. Despite Soviet pre­ occupation with these two areas, the Middle East is just as important in a study of the strategy of the Soviet Union.

In the Middle East the Soviets tried to achieve their most ambitious goals during and after World War II. For example,

Soviet military control over the northern portion of Iran gave the Russians an opportunity to organize the politics and economy of the area in a way favorable to themselves.

Iran emerged as a laboratory sample and pilot plant for the development of Soviet strategy. It is a showpiece of Soviet technique; it demonstrates how a combination of external and internal pressures came close to achieving total success twice during the period 19*H to 1957* Given the basic simi­ larity of Soviet strategy throughout the non-Communist world, the techniques exposed in Iran have resulted in this case study of Soviet foreign policy. Hence, this case study is designed to show Soviet strategy, not only in Iran which is part of the Middle East, but on the broader International scene as well.

This study begins with the Soviet occupation of 2 northern Iran In August 19*H and ends with Iran's pledge to the Soviet Union in April 1957 that the West will not be al­ lowed to establish atomic bases in Iran. The Soviet occu­ pation of northern Iran resulted from the German invasion of Russia. Iran's pledge resulted from United States military bases in other Middle Eastern countries. While both of these events resulted from Instances of foreign initiative, they . make fitting points of departure and termination in that

Soviet action in each case was aimed primarily at the deflec­ tion of the so-called ’'imperialist" threat from the Soviet realm.

The major events of the period and area under consider­ ation were the occupation of Iran by Russian, British and

United States troops, the revolt in Azerbaijan and eventual withdrawal of Soviet troops from northern Iran, the nation­ alization of Iran's southern oil fields, and the opposition of Prime Minister Mossadegh to the Shah. On the internation­ al scene there was a rapid deterioration in relations between the Western Powers and the Soviet Union after Soviet troops were forced to withdraw from northern Iran. For the Western

Powers this change resulted in the Middle East treaty organ­ ization, commonly known as the Baghdad Pact, and in the

American doctrine for the Middle East, or Eisenhower Doctrine. For the Soviet Union it resulted in an attempt to have a voice in Middle East affairs, a renewed interest in exploiting 3 existing Middle East antagonisms and, in the case of Iran, an attempt to establish a political Gordon sanitalre in reverse' around the borders of Russia supposedly to protect the U.S.S.R. from foreign attack.

These events in the Middle East, even when fully un­ derstood In the light of Soviet policy on the International scene, do not indicate a "master plan" for the direction of

Soviet efforts. Rather, Soviet planners have pursued an essentially practical and realistic course which took full advantage of opportunities as they arose. The Soviets made the best out of the unenviable positions they found them­ selves in when they were forced to retreat from Iran In

19^6, and when Mossadegh's opposition to the Shah, allegedly supported by the Tudeh (Communist) Party, failed In 1953# But Soviet strategy in Iran has not been based solely upon opportunism. The main Soviet sources during the period

19^1 to 1957 - speeches, and articles in the press - would have us believe that Soviet actions are responses to the ag­ gressive acts of "imperialist" powers and that the Soviet

Union desires only "peace" and "freedom" for all people. Obviously these sources are insufficient for determining the motivation behind the twists and turns of Soviet stra­ tegies. Therefore, besides Russian, I have utilized Eng­ lish, French, and Persian material. There is much material on the period and area under consideration, but surprisingly 4

little has been done previously in the way of specialized

systematic and objective analysis of Soviet strategy in Iran

from 194-1 to 1957* Although the best reasoned deductions of

Soviet strategy made by interpreting the known facts might

lead to occasional speculation, only the Kremlin's archives

can decide the issue. At the outset my hypothesis is that the fundamental principles which guided Soviet strategy in Iran from 1941 to

1957 were expressed in 1920 at the Second Congress of the Third Communist International:

1. To use local Communist parties for the "subversion of the

capitalist structure and for Implanting communism." 2, To promote "the development of class consciousness in

the working masses under the leadership of the class conscious proletariat of progressive countries."

5. To work towards "the separation of colonies and the pro­

letarian revolution at home which will overthrow the

capitalist structure in Europe."■*■ --

Lenin urged the adoption of these principles. He also out­

lined tactical methods to be applied:

The more powerful enemy can be vanquished only by . . . using . . . every antagonism of interest among the bourgeoisie of the various countries and among the

1 Bela Kun (ed.), Kommunisticheskii internatsional v dokumentakh, 1919-1952 (Moscow: Partiinoe izdatei'stvo, 1955), pp. 1^0-52; Aleksandrov I. Tivel (ed.), 10 let kominterna v reshenilakh i tslfrakh (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel'stvo, 1 9 2 9), p. 5 ?« various groups or types of bourgeoisie within the various countries and also by taking advantage of every, even the smallest, opportunity of gaining a mass ally, even though this ally be temporary, vacillating, unstable, unreliable and conditional.

Lenin said it was necessary

. . . for the Communist Party to resort to manoeuvers, arrangements and compromises with the various groups of the proletarians, with the various parties of the workers and small masters. 2 From this it appears that the terms strategy - requiring the exercise of forethought - and tactics - any adroit manoeuver- ing for effecting an object - may be taken quite literally in the operation of Soviet foreign policy. It would be cor­ rect to say, too, that Soviet objectives remained the same while the methods (strategies and tactics) varied.

A study of Soviet-Iranian relations reveals four dis­ tinct patterns of activity pursued by the Soviet Union In the period and area under consideration which can be divided into four consecutive strategies. First, during 19^1 to

19^7> an anti-imperialist strategy was pursued which con­ cerned World War II cooperation against the Nazis and other

Fascists. The anti-imperialist strategy was carried on to

19^7 because of the war and postwar cooperation among the Allies. This is often referred to as the "right" strategy. Second, an anti-capitalist, or "left," strategy which embodied

2 V. I. Lenin, "Left-Wing" Communism., An Infantile Disorder (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 19^7)» pp. 70-Y4 . 6

a theme of hatred of capitalism and the native bourgeoisie

appeared in 19^7 -19^9 • It can be identified with the begin­ ning of the cold war* And third, beginning in 19^9* an anti-

Anglo-American strategy had Anglo-American "imperialism" as

its main propaganda enemy. This change each time an old strategy failed indicates the Soviet Union was on the defen­

sive in the balance of power struggle with the West. When

one strategy failed, the Soviets tried another, and then

combined the more successful points of each of these into a

third strategy. The fourth* strategy, which appeared in 1955,

represents a political appeasement and economic offensive by

the Soviet Union. It carries on an anti-American theme but

with a renewed emphasis on economic and cultural penetration.

In order to develop perspective and continuity in a

geographical application of Lenin's clairvoyant pronounce­ ments to later events, the following chapter will review briefly Russian and Soviet activities in Iran prior to the

19^1 occupation of northern Iran by the Soviet Union. Only with this brief review would events described subsequently

fall into a discernible and meaningful pattern. CHAPTER II

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND TO SOVIET STRATEGY IN IRAN

The history of Soviet-Iranian difficulty is not new.

For nearly three hundred years conflict has raged between

Russia and Iran over the land west and south of the Caspian

Sea. Historically, Iran (Persia until 1925) was a world em­ pire long before Russia. In fact, it was a world empire be­ fore Rome extended its powers beyond Italy.^ The Persians were one of the few peoples to defy and defeat the Roman armies. Russia and Iran had practically no relations until

1664 when the first Russian embassy was sent to Iran. This first diplomatic visit of the Russians to Iran was really a group of merchants pretending to be ambassadors in order to avoid payment of customs dues. Shah Abbas II disliked this duplicity and contemptuously dismissed the Muscovites. Tsar

Alexis I caused the Cossacks to raid Mazanderan in revenge.^ The result was a series of battles between Russia and Iran.

3 Christina P. Grant, "Test of Relations between Great and Small Nations," Foreign Policy Reports, April 15. 19^5, P. 31. A Frederic G. Coan, Yesterdays in Persia and Kurdistan (Claremont, California: Saunders Studio Press, 19:59), pp. 1-3. 5 Mary M. McCarthy, "Anglo-Russian Rivalry in Persia," The University of Buffalo Studies, June, 1925, pp. 28. A bad'Start was made at Russo-Iranian relations„

Russian trade with Iran flourished during the second

half of the 17th century, and a colony of Iranian merchants

was established in Moscow. Russo-Iranian relations became

strained during the time of Peter the Great, however, and

the strain resulted in a war. By the Treaty of 1723 which

followed that war, Russia controlled the western and southern

shores of the Caspian Sea. Since her interest was mostly of

an economic nature, Empress Anne, in return for certain com­

mercial advantages, returned to Iran in 1732 the provinces of

Gilan, Mazandaran, and the Russian-occupied parts of Azer- 7 baijan and Daghestan.

The modern phase of Iran's relations with the West

was heralded by Napoleon's ambitious attempt to break Bri­

tish power in Asia. The consolidation of British power over

India, and Russia's desire to reach the warm-water ports of

the Persian Gulf, caused Napoleon and Tsar Paul of Russia

to plan a joint invasion of India by way of Iran. The Rus­

sian troops had already started toward India when their ex­ pedition ended because of the assassination of Tsar Paul.®

M. S. Ivanov, Ocherk istorii Irana (Moscow; Gosu-. darstvennoe isdatel'stvo politicheskoi literatury, 1952), pp. 76-77.

^ Ibid., pp. 96-97. O The Middle East; A Political and Economic Survey (New York; Royal' Institute of International Affairs, 1950), Because of the rapid. Russian advances southward, in­ cluding the annexation of Georgia In 1801, Iran declared war on Russia in 1 8 0 6 . But the Persian Empire, exhausted by in­ ternal difficulties and already on the decline, was militar­ ily defeated in 1 8 1 3 . In the Treaty of Gulistan which fol­ lowed that war, the Shah renounced all titles to Georgia,

Daghestan, Mongrelia and Abkhasia. He also agreed to Russian 9 domination of the Caspian Sea. In an attempt to change the Treaty of Gulistan, Iran declared war on Russia in 1 8 2 6 . Again Iran was defeated, and the Treaty of Turkmanchai in 1828 caused Iran to cede the provinces of Erivan and Makhichevan to Russia. An in­ demnity equivalent to fifteen million dollars and capitula­ tory rights in Iran were also received by Russia, as well as a five percent preferential duty in favor of all Russian goods entering Iran and extraterritorial privileges for 1Q Russian nationals.^ Thus Russian influence filled the vacuum in northern Iran made by the collapse of Napoleonic

French influence in the early nineteenth century.^ This

pp. 205f; Henry Filmer, The Pageant of Persia (New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 193d ), p."T2¥I 9 E. L. Shteinberg, Pervye 1ssledoyatell kasplla (XVIII- XIX -vv.) (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel'stvo geograficheskol literatury, 19^9), p. 32; Ivanov, ojd. clt., pp. 131-35.

10 Ivanov, op.. cit., pp. 139f.

11 Alfred L. P. Dennis, The Foreign Policies of Soviet Russia (New York: E. P. Dutton and Company, 1924J, pp. 2^1-44. 10 split Azerbaijan into two parts, one controlled by Russia and one controlled by Iran. But Gfeat Britain wanted the

Persian Gulf as a link in its sea trade with the Indies.

The British had long enjoyed a strong position in southern 12 Iran uncontested by other European powers. The Russian i movement south toward the Persian Gulf caused an Anglo- 13 Russian rivalry in Iran.

The desire to find new outlets for Russian products as well as the desire to eliminate war-minded nomads from its boundaries were the principal reasons for Russia's con­ quering of the Turkoman territories of Bukhara, Khiva and

Kokand in 1868, 1873 and 1 8 7 6 . Russian troops conquered Krasnovodsk in 1869 , Geok-Tepe in l88 l, and Merv and Panjdeh in 1884. This created a long common central As ten frontier 14 between Russia and Iran and further alarmed Great Britain. Because of the impact of wars and internal strife, the Persian Empire grew weaker. In order to maintain peace and order, the Russians persuaded Shah Nasr Ed Din to create a Persian Cossack Brigade. This brigade, commanded by Rus­ sian officers, was the sole efficient military force in the

12 A. V. Baskirov. Ekspansiia anglilskikh i_ amerikansklkh lmperlalistov v Irane (1941^1353) (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel’stvo poli4icheskoi literatury, 1954), pp. 2-6 . 13 The Middle East, op. cit., p. 206. 14 Michael T. Florlnsky, Russia. A History and an Interpretatlon. Volume II (New York": The Macmillan Co., 1953), PP. 979-86. - 11

country. It furthered Russian influence in Iran during the ic last ten to fifteen years of the nineteenth century. ^ The

Russians built railways to the Iranian border, telegraph

lines between Russia and Iran, and continued to exploit a

profitable fishing concession on the Iranian shore of the

Caspian Sea. Iranian banking concessions to British citizens

were paralleled by banking concessions to Russia.'1'^ By the

start of the twentieth century the Russian-controlled bank

was financing Russian concessions in northern Iran. An Iran­

ian tariff in 1903 gave advantages to Russia over Great Bri- 17 tain.

Many attempts were made by both the British and the

Russians in trying to gain control in Iran. Each nation was trying to outdo the other. Russia's main interests re­

mained in the north, even though she attempted to move south- 19 ward. Russia avoided a division of Iran into Russian and

P. Kazemzadeh, "The Origin and Early Development of the Persian Cossack Brigade," The American Slavic and East European Review, 15:351f., October, 1956. 16 M. S. Ivanov, K istorii ogrableniia irana anglo- iranskoi neftianoi kompaniei," Voprosy istorii, May, 1952, p. 104; Ivanov, Ocherk istorii Irana. pp. 186 -0 8 .

Ivanov, Ocherk istorii Irana. pp. 198-99. l8 Vernon John Puryear, International Economics and Diplomacy in the Near East (Palo Alto, California: Stanford ^University Press, l9$5J, pp. 23ff. •*■9 Ivanov, Voprosy istorii. pp. 104f. 12

British zones prior to the Russo-Japanese War. But, as

Russia was weakened by.-her defeat in that war, and as Bri­

tish interests were hindered by German economic expansion

the Russians and British reached an agreement in 1907 concern- 20 ing Iran. One result of this agreement was to expose nor­

thern Iran to Russian economic and political expansion.

Russia acquired a monopoly in Iran of transportation and in- 21 surance of goods and postal service.

The British discovery of oil on the Persian Gulf made

Iran more than just an outpost for the defense of India. An

Australian, William Knox D'Arcy, was responsible for the

British exploitation and development of oil production in 22 Iran. By 1914 the Anglo-Persian Oil Company was one of

the largest oil producers in the world. 2-'5 Iran became

E. L. Shteinberg, Sovetsko-Iranskie otnoshenila i_ prolski Anglo-Amerikanskogo imperiallzma v Irane (Moscow; Izdatel*stvo "Pravda," 1947), pp. 5f; Ivanov, Ocherk istorii Irana, pp. 216-17; Esfandiar Bahram Yaganegi, Recent Financial and Monetary History of Persia (New York: Columbia University Press, 1934), p. 35. 21 W. Morgan Shuster, The Strangling of Persia (New York: The Century Co., 1912), pp. 2bB'f; Elgin Groseclose, In­ troduction to Iran (New York: Oxford University Press), pp. 3If; Rogers P. Churchill, The Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 (Cedar Rapids, Iowa: The Torch Press, 19^9), pp. lfjTf. 22 Bashkirov, ojd. cit., p. 6. Sir Arnold Wilson, South West Persia (London: Oxford University Press, 194l), pp. 8 lf.

25 H. Permia, A Short Survey of the Economic Conditions of Iran (Teheran: The Economic Information Bureau, 1945), pp. 84f; Economic Survey of the Middle East (Karachi: The Inter­ national Islamic Economic Conference,' 1948), p. 14. 15 Important because of her oil supply and her position as a 24 trade route on the way to India.

By the secret negotiations of 1915 with the Allied Powers, Russia was willing to grant Britain’s demands in Iran in exchange for a position on the Turkish Straits. Russia did not attempt to claim a position on the Persian Gulf. Ac­ cording to the agreement with the Allies, Great Britain was to include the neutral zone In her sphere of influence, while

Russia Received an enlarged northern zone with complete free­ dom of action. The front line between the Turkish and the

Russian armies ran through the northern provinces of Iran and resulted in much ill-will against the Russians.2^

Iran remained neutral during World War I, but the Bri­ tish forces introduced in the south and Russian forces intro­ duced in the north denied Iran to Turkish and German activity.2^ Later, because of the Bolshevik revolution, a British mili­ tary expeditionary force invaded Russia by way of northern

Iran. For all practical purposes the Anglo-Russian Agreement

Ivanov, Voprosy istorii. pp. 104-6; Great Britain Ministry of Information, Handbook on Persia (London: Govern­ ment Press, 19*14), pp. 9f; Helen M. Davis, Constitutions. Electoral Laws. Treaties, of States in the Hear and Middle East (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 194V), pp." 55Of. 25 Ivanov, Ocherk Istorii Irana, pp. 255-57. Sir Reader Bullard, Britain and tbe~Middle East (London: Hutchinson's University Library, 1951),pp. 78 f.

2^ Filmer, 0 ]d. cit., p. 524. 14 of 1907 lapsed in 1917 when the Bolsheviks came to power.2^

The Soviet state made an effort from the beginning to oft convince Iran that it would be a friend in the future. It emphasized the idea that Western imperialists should termin­ ate their influence in the Middle East. Faced with the neces sity of making friends, Soviet Russia abandoned the aggres­ sive policies of the Tsarist Government. Privileges that the old regime had acquired in Iran were renounced by the Bol­ sheviks. Propaganda and agitation were begun against the

"imperialist" powers. A basis was created for revolutionary 29 activity among the Moslem masses.

In December 1917 the Soviets appealed to all Moslems in the Middle East to revolt against their feudal chiefs and 50 rulers. In January of 1918 a note was sent to the Iranian Government by the Soviet F0relgn Office announcing the Soviet

Government's decision to annul, all the secret treaties that

”iran," V. Zashchltu mlra., September, 1955* pp. 91 9 6 ; Lawrence P. Elwell-Sutton, Modern Iran (London: George Routledge & Sons, Inc., 1941), pp. 66 f.

K. M. Troianovskli, Vostok i_ revoliutsila (Moscow: Vserossiiskii tsentral'nyi ispolnltel'nyl komibet sovetov R., S., R. IR. "deputatov," 1918), pp. 25ff.

29 Ibid.

5° Bashkirov, op.* cit.. pp. 15f; J. C. Hurewitz, ed., Documents of Wear East Diplomatic History (New York: School of Interna^Tonal Affairs, Columbia University, 1951)> pp. l8 lsf. 15 were concluded by the Tsarist Government with respect to Iran.

This action was.directed toward winning the friendship of Iran and undermining the position of the Western states. In March

1918 the withdrawal of Russian troops from northern Iran was provided for in the Brest-LItovsk Treaty. On June 26, 1919* all debts owed to the Russian state by Iran were canceled and the capitulations were declared null and void. Because of this, and the fact that Russian power and influence was at its lowest point in three quarters of a century, Iran sent a delegation to the Paris Peace Conference demanding certain Russian territories be given to Iran. The Iranian delega­ tion was not admitted to the conference table. It was not fear of the new Soviet state that deterred Iran, but the re- 31 straint imposed by the Western powers.

Through independent action Great Britain tried to de­ velop an Anglo-Russian agreement following World War I. Bri­ tish statesmen proposed an agreement to Iran which provided for recognition of the integrity and independence of Iran but, at the same time, made a provision for assuring the

British a controlling influence in Iranian affairs. This un­ popular treaty failed of ratification by the Iranian Parlia­ ment and caused the fall of the Iranian Government which had signed lt.^2

31 Ibid. 32 Ivanov, Voprosy Istorii, pp. 107f 16

Appeals to the workers and peasants of Iran to rise up against their rulers were, made during 1918 and 1919. Iran was considered the gateway to revolution in the Orient. Ex­ tensive 'use was made of Moslems living in Soviet Russia as the best contact and guidance to the Moslems of Iran. The

Tsarist, troops in Iran during World War I were evacuated in / 1918. But, in the spring of 1920, Soviet forces in Azer­ baijan pursued the defeated White Russians into Iran. Red units disembarked at Enzali, and the British garrison sta- 33 tioned there withdrew to Qazvin.

Within a short time the whole province of Gilan was occupied by Soviet troops. Iranian protests were ignored by the Soviets, who calimed a free and independent republic of 3 I1 Azerbaijan was not subject to influence from Moscow. An

Azerbaijani, Ja'far Pishevari, arrived in Gilan, and, after the proclamation of the Soviet Republic of Gilan, was made

Commissar of the Interior. Pishevari soon assumed supreme authority. But the Soviet Government ceased providing wea­ pons and ammunition and the Gilan uprising collapsed in 1921.55

33 Ivanov, Ocherk istorii Irana, p. 279; Jane Degras, Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy, Volume I (London: Oxford University Press, 1951)# pp. 161-o4; K. M. Troianovskil, Vostok It revoliutslla (Moscow: Vserossiiskii tsentral'nyi ispolni-fcel1nyi; komifcet-s ovetov R ., S., R., iR. "deputatov, " 1918. ^ Bashkirov, op. cit., pp. 2^f. 35 R. Abikh, "Katsional'noe i revollutsionnoe dvizhenie 17 As part of its economic activity during this period,

the Soviet Union formed the foreign trade monopoly in 1920

to control all Russian exports and imports. Six countries

of the East, including Iran, were exempt from the monopoly

rules and received favored-nation treatment. Although the

foreign trade monopoly was advantageous for Iran, the Soviet

Government participated in dumping produce on the Iranian

market and caused severe economic crises on some Iranian

products. This dumping of cheap goods by the Soviets brought

certain Iranian industries to the point of destruction, but

it was not necessarily uneconomic and undesirable since the purchasing power of the Iranian buyer was increased.

Meanwhile, in the political sphere, the Soviet Union

continued its efforts at spreading communism through revolu­

tionary movements abroad. At the Second Congress of the

Third Communist International in 1920, V. I. Lenin laid the foundation for a communist movement among the oppressed people in colonial areas. He stated that the route to com­

munism included various stages of development, one of them

v persii v 1914-1920," Novyi Vostok. No. 23-24. 1928. no. 234-67; No. 26-27, 1929, pp. 155-61; No. 30, 1950, pp. 8 8 - 107. Violet Conolly, Soviet Economic Policy in the East (London: Oxford University Press, 1955], pp."IT-12; pp. 55-75; Edouard Luboff, Soviet Dumping (London: Anglo- Russian Press Association, 1951), pp. 21f. being capitalism. This thesis titled "National and Colonial

Question" provided the basis for communist revolutionary thought in the East. It fought pan-Slavism and pan-Asiatic movements that also struggled against Western imperialism 37 but not for the benefit of Russia. Another thesis adopted at the Second Congress was the basic strategy for spreading the communist revolution. This thesis proclaimed the follow­

ing strategic principles for the advancement of communism:

1. To use local communist parties for the "subversion of the

capitalist structure and for implanting communism."

2. To promote "the development of class consciousness in the working masses under the leadership of the class conscious proletariat of progressive countries."

3. To work towards "the separation of colonies and the pro­ letarian revolution at home which will overthrow the capitalist 38 structure in Europe.

Some tactical methods for accomplishing the above principles were presented by Lenin in 1920:

The more powerful enemy can be vanquished only by . . . using . • . every antagonism of interest among the bourgeoisie of the various countries and among the var­ ious groups or types of bourgeoisie within the various countries and also by taking advantage of every, even

37 L. I. Mad1jar, "Lenin i problemy natsional'no- kolonial'noi revoliutsii," Revoliutsionnyi vostok, No. 1. 193^, p. 8. 19

the smallest, opportunity of gaining a mass ally, even though this ally be temporary, vacillating, unstable, tin- reliable and conditional.59

Lenin said it was necessary

. . • for the Communist Party to resort to manoeuvers, arrangements and compromises with the various groups of the proletarians, with the various parties of the workers and small masters.40

Also, at this Second Congress of the Communist International, the Comintern called for a "Congress of the Peoples of the

East" in Baku in September 1920.

At the Congress in Baku in 1920, an attempt was made by the Russians to incite revolution and advocate the Soviet system. Many Middle Eastern delegates attended who opposed imperialism but were more interested in national movements than in communism. Grigori Zinoviev, President of the Com­ munist International, called upon all Asiatics to join the 4l Soviets in an anti-imperialist struggle. Zinoviev and

Karl Radek, another high Comintern official, also attacked

Islam and monarchy. These attacks antagonized many Middle

Eastern delegates who left the Congress. Zinoviev emphasized

^9 v. I. Lenin, "Left-Wing" Communism. An Infantile Disorder (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1947), pp. 70-7^

^ Ibid.

^1 Kommunlsticheskii International i_ osvobozhdenie vostoka. Pervyi s'ezd narodov vostoka, Baku, September 1-b, 1920, Stenografichoskie otchety (Petrograd: Izdatel'stvo kommunistlcheskovo internatsionala, 1920), pp. llff. 20 that Middle Eastern countries must struggle to obtain the

Soviet system even though they had not passed through the k2 capitalist stage. The impulse given by the Baku Congress resulted in the establishmei.t of a Communist Party in Iran in 1921-22.^ It was a weak party. Soviet propaganda was aimed at undermining the "imperialists" and at promoting social revolution in Iran.

The Soviets, believing that capitalism in its last stage de­ pended entirely on colonial markets and raw materials, at­ tempted to expel the Western Powers from these areas in the first step toward the overthrow of the capitalist governments of the West. Concurrently, the Soviet system was supposed to 111. encompass the East in a world revolution led by the U.S.S.R.

Under the pressure of increasing revolutionary activi­ ties in Iran, on February 21, 1921, Reza Khan overthrew the

Government of Iran and soon assumed power. And immediately, through diplomacy, the Soviet Government concluded a treaty 46 with the new Iranian government on February 26, 1921. The

42 Ibid., pp. 15ff.

^3 Laurence P. Elwell-Sutton, Modern Iran (London: George Rout ledge 8s Sons, Ltd., 19^1), pp. bbf.

^ Kommunistlcheskli 1 nternats 1 onal i_ osvobozhdenie, op. cit.. pp. lf>ff.

^5 Bashkirov, op_. cit., pp. 25f. 46 A. Gomalov-Gomlib, "Persia," Bol'shala sovetskaia entsiklopedlia (1st ed.), XLY,.192. 21 treaty provided for a Russian guarantee of non-intervention in the internal affairs of Iran as well as a denunciation of all 47 previous Irano-Russian treaties. It also wrote off Russian 48 loans to Iran and cancelled Russian concessions in Iran.

But this Soviet-Iranian Treaty of Friendship did give the

Soviets the right to bring Russian soldiers into Iran:

. . . if a third party should attempt to carry out a policy of usurpation by means of armed intervention in Persia, or if such Power should desire to use Persian territory as a base of operations against Russia, or Federal Russia or those of its Allies, and if the Persian Government should not be able to put a stop to such menace after having been once called upon to do so by Russia . . . .49 The liberal treatment of the Iranians by the Soviet

Government in the 1921 Soviet-Iranian Treaty was in line with the general Russian foreign policy of that time which was to 50 seek favor with Asiatic neighbors. This Treaty of Friend-

^7 Shteinberg, Sovetsko-Iranskle otnoshennlia, pp. 5f•

N. Rubinshtein, Sovetskaia Rossila i_ kapitalis- ticheskie gosudarstva v gody perekhoda ot voiny k miru T1921- 1922) (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel^tvo politicheskoi literatury, 1948), pp. 54f.

^9 Davis, op. cit., p. 95; B» A. Vvedenskii, "Iran," Bol1shaia sovetskaia entsiklopediia (2nd ed.), XVIII, 4l6. /The 1st' edition' (1939) of Bol1 shaia sovetskaia entsiklopediia contained only a brief description of the Soviet-Iranian Treaty of 1921. Article Six containing the military defensive aspects of the treaty was omitted. The 2nd edition (1953) included more details of the Soviet-Iranian Treaty and an analysis of Article S i x ^

Filmer, op_. cit., pp. 532-34. 22 51 ship established mutual de? .jure recognition. It was an

excellent instrument of propaganda for the Soviets to use 52 among the other Asiatic people.

In 1921 Soviet Russia established its control over

the Central Asiatic regions formerly controlled by Russia.

This resulted in a long common frontier between Iran and the 53 U.S.S.R. As to the Western powers, the Soviet Union had a

trade agreement with Great Britain in March 1921, but the

Russians continued anti-British propaganda in Iran in a breach 5* of their trade agreement.

Also, in 1921, at the Tenth Congress of the Russian

Communist Party, Stalin proclaimed that a union between the

U.S.S.R. and the Eastern countries was a necessity. He said

that the Eastern countries had to adopt the Soviet system 55 first. ^ In response to Stalin's statement, in a report to

51 Shteinberg, Sovetsko-Iranskie otnosheniia, pp. 5f» 52 I. P. Ivashin, Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia i_ vneshniaia polltika SSSR v 1922-1924- godakh (Moscow: Ministerstva Kul'tury, 1953), pp. If. "Azerbaidzhanskaia sovetskaia sotslalisticheskaia respublika,n Bol'shaia sovetskaia entsiklopediia (2nd ed.. 1954), III, pp. W - 5 0 . 5^ Leonard Shapiro, Soviet Treaty Series, Vol. I, 1917-28 (Washington: The Georgetown University Press, 1950), p. 102; Degras, op_. cit., pp. 257-62. 55 E. G. Sarkishov, ’’Stalinskoe uchenie po natsional1 no-kolonial'nomu voprosu I narody vostoka," Vestnik Akademll nauk SSSR, December, 19^9, p. 6 7 . 25 the Fourth Congress of the Comintern in 1922, the executive committee stated that weak Communist parties would have to 66 join a United Front with nationalist parties.-^ The use of all available methods in attempting to achieve the final goal of world communism was authorized for Communist parties. The changes in Marxist ideas that Lenin and Stalin called merely interpretations, but used for their own advantage were: co­ operation with nationalist movements in colonial countries, cooperation between local communist parties and peasants, and the skipping of the stage of capitalism by the Eastern coun- tries.4- 4 5 7

During the early 1920's Iran became an area of con- > 58 flict between Great Britain and the Soviet Union. In op­ position to Great Britain, the Soviet Government supported an Iranian request in 1925 for representation at the Lausanne Conference. Similarly, the Soviet Government vigorously op­ posed an oil concession to any Western Power. Although several

American companies obtained oil concessions, Soviet opposi­ tion caused these companies to cancel their concessions.-^

58 Kommunisticheskii internatsional, ojd. cit., pp. 505 f.

Ibid.. pp. 521-25; I. Stalin, Marksizm 1 natsional1 no-kolonlaI1 nyl' vopros (Moscow: Partizdat Tsk VKP (b), 1957)» pp. 155-165• 68 Ivanov, Ocherk istorii Irana, pp. 501-12.

59 Laurence P. Elwell-Sutton, A Guide to Iranian Area Study (Ann Arbor: American Council of Learned Societies, 19PT, p. 155. 24-

In 1925 Reza Shah Pahlevi overthrew the last of the

Qagar dynasty. He was established as the Shah of Iran. His

formal assumption of royal and dictatorial powers caused fin both the Russians and British a great deal of concern. His

reforms hindered Great Britain’s desire to control the Iranian

Government and thus again use Iran as a buffer state between

Russia and the British Empire. He also curtailed the activities

of the Communist Party in Iran after he was established as

the Shah. One of Reza Shah Pahlevi’s reforms changed the 6 l official name of Persia to Iran.

After securing power at home Reza Shah Pahlevi turned

his attention to foreign affairs, and, on October 1, 1927., a

commercial agreement that implemented the 1921 Treaty of 62 Friendship was concluded between the Soviet Union and Iran. This commercial agreement provided that trade between the two

countries be conducted on barter terms. Iranian merchants

were required to offer 70 per cent of their goods designated

for the U.S.S.R, to Soviet State Trading Organs. But the

Iranian merchants could sell one-third of this amount to private buyers if these goods were not bought by the Soviet

Hans Kohn, A History of Nationalism in the East (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1929), p. 539; Mehdi Nakostan, In the Land of the Lion and Sun (Denver: The World Press, 19377, ~ W- ;

Bullard, 0 £. cit., p. 8 9 . 62 Ivanov, Ocherk istoril Irana, p. 315. State Trading Organs or if these Organs offered less than other buyers. A direct corollary to this agreement was the granting of diplomatic immunity to Soviet commercial delega­ tions. Because of this extra-territoriality the Soviet Union was able to further its propaganda activities in Iran. Iran gained the advantages of a definite quota of exports into the

Soviet Union and provisions for shipping produce through the 63 Soviet Union to a third country. The free transit through the territory of each party of arms and other war material 6}l was provided by a separate protocol.

The concession of the Caspian Sea fisheries, original­ ly granted by the Persian Government in 1867 to the Russian firm of Lianazoff Brothers, was not renounced by the Soviet

Government. Instead, shares in a joint fishing company were divided equally between Russia and Iran. J The agreement was more favorable to the Iranian Government, which was to receive an eighty thousand toman annual dividend for granting the concession plus 15 per cent of the remaining gross pro­ fits, the rest being divided equally between the Russian and

Iranian Governments. The lack of precise marketing provis­ ions of the produce, however, permitted the Soviet trade

65 Conolly, op. cit., p. 6 lf; Shapiro, op. cit., pp. 3^8ff. 6ii Shapiro, o^. cit.. pp. ;>48ff.

65 Ibid.. p. 5 ^9 . 26

organization to sell most of the caviar abroad without joint 66 accounting by the Iranians. An advantage of the 1927 com­ mercial treaty, together with the fisheries and customs agree

ment, was that the Iranians were assured a market for some of their goods.

In the political sphere, many important decisions

dealing with questions of colonial and dependent countries

were decided in 1928 at the Sixth Congress of the Comintern 67 in Moscow. As a result it was proposed that nationalist

movements and bourgeois movements fighting, against foreign

imperialism were to be utilized by the communist parties in

their drive for power, and then destroyed. The necessity of

passing through the stage of bourgeois democratic revolution

was accepted before the socialist revolution, and subsequent

dictatorship of the proletariat, could be enacted. While

the socialist revolution relied only on the dictatorship of

the urban proletariat, the bourgeois democratic revolution

provided for the dictatorship of both the peasantry and the proletariat. The possible utilization of heterogenous groups of petty bourgeoisie, students, and intelligentsia was

66 Conolly, o£. cit. p. 64.

67 Kommunisticheskii internatsional, op. cit., pp. 844ff. ’

68 Ibid, 27 69 proclaimed desirable. Also, the bourgeois democratic re­ volution was said to be organically connected with the fight 70 against foreign imperialism. Temporary alliances with na­ tional revolutionary parties were desired as long as they fought against the ruling power, and as long as the communist movement did not become fused with the bourgeoisie revolu- 71 tionary movement. Native communist cadres were ordered for help in the organization of propaganda, in agitation, and in translation of communist literature. Trade unions were to be infiltrated by the communists. Communist leadership of strikes and support of workers demands were emphasized along with methods of agitation, propaganda, and organiza- 72 tional work among the peasantry. The Theses of the Sixth Congress dominated subsequent communist theories. The possibility of skipping the capitalist state in the development of the communist state was empha­ sized since revolution was believed by some Soviet leaders to be closer in the East where the contradictions of colonial and semi-colonial countries were the greatest.

Meanwhile, the Commercial Agreement of 1927 between the U.S.S.R. and Iran expired in 1929« Without a commercial

69 Ibid.. pp. 847f. 70 Ibid.. p* 845. 71 Ibid.. pp. 844ff. 72 ibid.. pp. 853ff.

75 Ibid.. pp. 844-56. agreement with the U.S.S.R. the Iranians were at a disadvan­

tage, and in February 1951 Iran introduced her own foreign

trade monopoly. In October 1951* a commercial treaty was 7 lj. signed between the Soviet Union and Iran. Factory machinery

and spare parts from the U.S.S.R. were not entered into the

net balance of trade nor covered by-corresponding exports to

the Soviet Union from Iran. Thus, Soviet commercial organi­

zations "... obtained a margin of at least 6 ,1 0 0 ,0 0 0 rials trade ..." which was exempt from the net balance.^ A few years later, while the Seventh Comintern Con­ gress was assembling in Moscow In 1955* a general switch was proclaimed for International communism. Party members were directed to strive for a "United Peoples Front" in opposition to Nazi Germany. This united front was to include both socialists and social democrats and was an antl-iraperlallst front directed more against the German and Italian imper­ ialists than the imperialists of the West. This switch shows that Soviet security and national problems of the U.S.S.R. overshadowed the cause of world revolution. Cooperation by communist parties with groups willing to oppose fascism was 76 emphasized.

Conolly, ojd. cit., p. 65f.

75 Ibid., p. 70. 76 van Min "0 revoliutslonnom dvizhenii v kolonial* nykh i polukolonlal*nykh stranakh i taktike kompartii," Revoliutsionnvi vostok. Wo. 4, 1955* pp. 26ff. 29 While Reza Shah-Pahlevi pursued anti-communist policies

that deterred the Sovietization of Iran, the U.S.S.R, *s con- 77 tact with Iran was reduced to trade agreements. Neverthe­

less, in 1955 another trade agreement was signed between Iran

and the U.S.S.R. Prom this agreement the Soviet Union in­ creased its trade with Iran, and Soviet engineers and sur­

veyors who were in Iran as professional advisors were able to 78 advance the communist cause. But in Iran itself, many Com­

munists were arrested, and the conclusion of the anti-commun­

ist Sa'adabad Pact in 1957 between Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and

Afghanistan was a great blow to the Soviet Union. The

Sa'adabad Pact required each signatory to take measures against

subversion or intervention into its internal affairs by another 79 country.

In the inbrnational sphere, Reza Shah Pahlevi*s inde­

pendent course of action between W0rld War I and II included 80 a barter agreement in 1955 with the German Government.

This agreement provided that skilled German personnel and German materials would be used in Iran from 1955 to 19^1 in

an effort to industrialize Iran. In exchange, German companies

77 Bullard, o]s. cit.. p. 8 9 .

78 ’’Soviet-Turkish Tie Extended to Iran," New York Times, September 8, 1955, p. 52.

79 Hurewitz, oju cit;, pp. 263 -6 5 . 80 Bashkirov, op_. cit., p. 30

obtained certain privileges in relation to the sale of German

manufactured goods in Iranian markets. By 1941 German com­

panies dominated Iranian markets so much that a continuance 8 l of the German-Iranian Barter Agreement became unnecessary.

The Soviet Union, however, during the German-Soviet

friendship of the 1959 Non-Aggression Pact-, joined in a four- power mutual assistance pact with Germany, Japan, and Italy.

This four-power mutual assistance pact set the stage for re- 82 cognition of Soviet rather than German interests in Iran.

Ribbentrop stated, in a discussion between Molotov and

Ribbentrop in Berlin, in November 1940, that the most advan­ tageous access to the sea for Russia was in the direction of

the Persian Gulf. Molotov agreed. In a secret draft Proto­

col to the Four-Power Agreement, Ribbentrop stated that Soviet territorial aspirations would presumably be centered South

". . . o f the national territory of the Soviet Union in the 83 direction of the Indian Ocean." Molotov, at a later date, re-emphasized Soviet interest in Iran when he accepted Ribbentrop*s proposed draft, subject to several conditions.

81 Ibid., pp. 4pff. 82 Halford L. Hoskins, The Middle East (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1954), p. 1747 8^ Raymond James Sontag and James Stuart Biddle, Nazi-Soviet Relations 1939-1941, Documents from the Archives of the German Foreign Office (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1948), p. 257. 31 One of these conditions was:

• . . that the area south of Batum and Baku in the gen­ eral direction of the Persian Gulf is recognized as the center of the aspirations of the Soviet Union.84

The territorial aspirations of the Soviet Union in the di­ rection of Iran were emphasized by these German-Soviet dis­ cussions. Also during 1940, a trade and navigation agreement was made between the Soviet Union and Iran, which provided for an exchange of products, a most-favored nation treatment, and further regulation of Caspian Sea maritime traffic.^

Reza Shah Pahlevi elected to maintain neutrality when the Second World War broke out, but his support of economic cooperation with German companies gave Germany an influential position within Iran. Although the Germans were few in num­ ber they could be called a threat to the Anglo-Iranian Oil 86 Company and to transportation within Iran. The German invasion of Russia in June, 1941, created a crisis in Iran. With the British Government's declaration that Great Britain was an ally of Russia, the use of the

Persian Corridor as a supply route from the Western Hemisphere

Ibid.. pp. 258-59. 85 Jane Degras (ed.), Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy (London: Oxford University Press, 1953), III, p. 424f.

86 Paiforce: The Official Story of the Persia and Iraq Command 1941-46 (London: His Majestyrs Stationery Of- fice, 194b}, p. 6 l, 52 to Russia became of great importance. The British and Russians regarded the German fifth column in Iran as a threat to the

vital Trans-Iranian railway — an effective means of trans­ porting war supplies from the Western Allies to R u s s i a . ^

When the Iranian Government continually ignored their re­ quests that the Germans in Iran be expelled, the British and 88 Russians occupied Iran.

According to the Russians, the entry of Red Army troops into Iran was specifically permitted in this case by Article 89 Six of the Soviet-Iranian Treaty of Friendship of 1921,

German spies in Iran were regarded as threatening the Baku 90 oil industry. The Russians told the Iranian Government that with the arrival of the German Secret Service . . . and with the close co-operation of the German Embassy at Teheran armed groups were formed in the fron­ tier region with a view to organizing sabotage activities in the Baku and other districts.

German agents at various points in Iranian territory have established dumps of arms and ammunition, especial­ ly in the northern provinces of Iran. In the neighbor­ hood of Mianeh they had prepared over 50 tons of ex­ plosives. In the Teheran district they gave military instructions to German residents to further their crimin­ al intentions.

^ Ibid., pp. 64-68.

88 The Middle East, op. cit., pp. 208f.

89 Vvedenskii, ojd. cit., p. 4l6.

90 Bashkirov, o]d. cit., p. 44. 55 . . . These German agents are trampling on the ele­ mentary rights of the Iranians and with a complete dis­ regard of Iranian sovereignty are preparing Iranian ter­ ritory as a base for aggression against the U.S.S.R.

This situation in Iran constitutes a grave danger, and, it imposes upon the Soviet Government the necessity of taking all measures which it is not only their right but also their duty to take for their self-defense in accordance with paragraph 6 of the treaty of 1 9 2 1 .9 1

While the small number of Germans in Iran were a definite threat to the Trans-Iranian railway, it is unlikely that they were preparing Iranian territory as a base for ag­ gression against the U.S.S.R. Dr. Schulze-Holthus, a German spy in Iran from March 19*1-1 until 1944 claimed the German 92 position in Iran in 1941 was extremely weak. The British Government, according to Sir Winston

Churchill, believed that the first objective for the occupa­ tion of Iran was

. . . the capture of the oil fields; the second, to advance into Persia and, with Russian co-operation, to control Persian communications and secure a route to the Caspian.95 The small number of Germans was not considered by the Bri­ tish to be strong enough to constitute a third party attempting

9-*- News item in The Manchester Guardian. August 26. 19*H, P. 8. ’ 92 Schulze-Holthus, Daybreak in Iran. Paul Weyman, editor (London: Staples Press Limited, 195*0, P» 7. 95 Winston L. S. Churchill, The Grand Alliance. Vol. Ill of The Second World War (Six Vol's'.)’ (New York: Houghton, Mifflin Company, 19*1-8-55), p. *1-81. 34

"to carry out a policy of usurpation" by means of armed inter­ vention in Iran, or a foreign power threatening "the frontiers ,,94 of Federal Russia or those of its Allies.

The final notes by the United Kingdom and the Union of

Soviet Socialist Republics assured the Iranian Government that the Allies had no intention of infringing on the inde- 95 pendence and territorial integrity of Iran. The Soviet ultimatum assured Iran that Russia would respect the sovereignty of Iran and that the withdrawal of Soviet troops would begin immediately after the elimination of the German danger. The following statements with respect to the sovereignty of Iran and of the Soviet intentions to withdraw Red Array troops in­ troduced at that time were made: The Soviet Government, guided by its friendship for the Iranian people and respect for the sovereignty of Iran ....

The basis underlying all the treaties and agreements of the Soviet Government with the Iranian Government is the inviolable principles of respect for the independence and territorial integrity of Iran.

After elimination of the danger in question, the Soviet Government undertakes immediately to withdraw its troops from the confines of Persia.

The Soviet Government has no designs on the terri­ torial Integrity and state independence of Iran. The military measures taken by the Soviet Government are directed solely and exclusively against the danger

^ Ibid., p. 485; Davis, loc. cit. 95 Groseclose, o£. cit., pp. 219-20. 35 created by the hostile activities of the Germans in Iran. As soon as this danger threatening the interests of Iran and of the U.S.S.R. has been removed, the Soviet Govern­ ment in discharge of its obligations under the Soviet- Iranian Treaty of 1921, will at once withdraw the Soviet troops from the confines of Iran.96

The Soviets promised to refrain from interference in Iran’s

internal affairs and to evacuate Iran when the hostilities

ceased. President Roosevelt, on September 2, 1941, noting

the Soviet statement of respect for Iranian territorial in­

tegrity sent a message to the Shah of Iran as follows:

My Government has noted the statements to the Iranian Government by the British and Soviet Governments that they have no designs on the independence or territorial integrity of Iran.97 The Allied occupation of Iran was completed within a few days after the initial entry of Allied troops. Russian forces quickly took over northern Iran while British forces

occupied the south. But adverse political developments of this occupation were so uncomfortable for Reza Shah Pahlevi that he abdicated on September 16, 1941, in favor of his son, 98 Mohammed Reza Pahlevi.

The United States decision in November 1941 that the Soviet Union was officially eligible for Lend-Lease aid, made the United States a partner of Great Britain in expediting

96 The Times ^London/, August 26, 1941, p. 3c. 97 New York Times, September 2, 1941, p. 1. 98 . Bashkirov, ojd. cit., p. 46. 56 the flow of materials through Iran to the Union of Soviet 99 Socialist Republics. Then, on January 22, 19^2, the United

Kingdom, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Iran con­ cluded the Tripartite Treaty of Alliance which formalized the stationing of Soviet and British troops in Iran. 100 The Tripartite Treaty pledged the Allies to respect Iranian ter­ ritorial Integrity, sovereignty, and political independence.

Some of the most important provisions of the Tripartitie

Treaty are as follows:

(1) Article 1. . . . the United Kingdom and U.S.S.R. jointly and severally undertake to respect the terri­ torial integrity, the sovereignty and the political in­ dependence of Iran ....

(2) Article III. . . . It is understood that the presence of these forces on Iranian territory does not constitute a military occupation and will disturb as little as possible the administration and the security forces of Iran, the economic life of the country, the normal movements of the population and the application of Iranian laws and regulations .... (5) Article Y. The forces of the Allied Powers shall be withdrawn from Iranian territory not later than six months after all hostilities between the Allied Powers and Germany and her associates have been sus­ pended by the conclusion of an armistice or armistices, or on the conclusion of peace between them whichever date is earlier.

(4) Article VI (l). The Allied Powers undertake In

99 T. H. Vail Motter, The Persian Corridor and Aid to Russia (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1951), p. W,

100 Kalender1 -spravochnik (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel'stvo politicheskoi llteratury, 19^3), p. 36; Shtelnberg, Sovetsko-Iranskie otnosheniia. p. 8 . 57

their relations with foreign countries not to adopt an attitude which is prejudicial to the territorial integrity, the sovereignty or the political independence of Iran, not to conclude treaties inconsistent with the provisions of the present treaty. 101

The Soviet-British agreement in Article V to withdraw from

Iranian territory six months after the war’s end is important in the light of later developments. Iran was a partner to the Tripartite Treaty of Alliance and not merely the object , of a treaty as was the case with the Anglo-Russian Agreement 102 of 1907. In November 1942 the first United States troops of the Persian Gulf Command landed in Iran in an effort to speed supplies through the Persian Corridor and over the Trans-

Iranian Railway. This use of the Persian Corridor as an

Allied supply route has been credited by United States Army standards with a major part in forcing the German armies 103 back from Stalingrad and out of Russia. The formal basis for the entry of United States troops into Iran in November

1942 was the fact that America was an ally of Great Britain and was helping in the common war effort. This entry of American troops without previous notification to the Govern­ ment of Iran brought requests from the Iranians for an ex­ planation of the presence of the United States Army in Iran.

101 Davis, 02 .. cit.. pp. 100-101.

102 The Economist /London?, March 9, 1946, p. 3 6 7 . 1°5 Motter, 0 2 . cit.. p. 6. 58

Attempts were made to get the United States to join in the

Tripartite Treaty or even to conclude a separate agreement with Iran, but all these attempts failed. The presence of

American troops was based on "nothing more substantial than a gentleman's agreement, but this proved, because of good faith on both sides, to be substantial enough. The de­ claration of war on Germany by Iran in September 1942 was a manifestation of Iran's desire to be on the winning side in the war.

The Russo-British-American Conference, which took place in Teheran in November 1945., resulted in the Declara­ tion of Teheran.10^ This Declaration reaffirmed Iran's inde- 106 pendence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity. It was signed by Marshal Stalin for Russia, President Roosevelt for the United States, and Prime Minister Churchill for Great

Britain. While the Teheran Declaration did not have the legal force of a treaty, it did morally bind the United

States, Great Britain, and the Union of Soviet Socialist

Republics to respect the maintenance of the independence of

*1'0^ Hotter, op. eft., p. 446. 105 Bashkirov, op_. cit.. p. 48.

I. P. Ivashin, Mezhdunarodyne otnosheniia i_ yneshniaia politika SSSR v period vtoroi mirovoi voiny (Moscow: Ministerstva kuT'tury, 1954), p. 62; Davis, op,. cit.. pp. 104-105; see Appendix A. 59

Iran.107

From the beginning of the occupation period in 19*H» when Russian troops moved into northern Iran, there had been 1 O friction between Russians and Iranians. The Iranian people feared Russia even though an attempt was made to un­ derstand its interference in Iranian internal affairs on the basis of military security. However, an incident in 1 9 ^ caused the Iranians to question Soviet intentions. This in­ cident was a move by the U.S.S.R, to obtain control of the oil and mineral rights as well as a large measure of the poli­ tical hegemony of northern Iran.10^

Certain British and American companies had been bid- 110 ding for oil concessions in southern Iran. These British and American bids prompted the Soviet Vice Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Sergei I. Kavtaradze, to visit Teheran and demand for the Soviet Union an oil and mineral concession with political rights in northern Iran. 111 Although the

107 "Iran,” V zashchitu mira, September 1955* pp. 91ff. 108 united Nations, Security Council, Official Re­ cords. 1st Year, 1st Series, Supplement No. 1 (London: Church House, Westminister), p. 59. 109 Jay G. Hayden, "iron Curtain on Iran," Forum, 62 (February, 19^6), pp. 555-5^.

110 United Nations, Security Council, Official Re- cords, Nos. 1-2, op. cit., pp. 102f; Shteinberg, Sovetsko- Iranskie otnosheniia, pp. 8 f ; Bashkirov, op. cit., p. 5b.

111 United Nations, Security Council, Official Re­ cords, Supplement No. 1, ojd. cit., pp. 210f. 40

Russians had obtained a northern Iranian oil concession from

Premier Sepahsalar on March 19* 1916* it was never submitted

to the Majlis for confirmation and was annulled in 1918 by 112 Premier Samsam-es-Saltanah's cabinet. This invalidated

any claims the Russians might have had to applying Article

Thirteen of the 1921 Soviet-Iranian Treaty where the Persian

Government had promised "not to cede to a third power or to

its subjects, the concessions and property restored to Persia

by the virtue of the present Treaty . . . . The Iranian

Government, in order to refuse the Soviet demand, took the

position that no new oil concessions would be given until

after the war. Accordingly, the Iranian Parliament (Majlis)

passed a law forbidding any Iranian cabinet minister to dis­

cuss oil concessions with foreign governments. The Iranian Government was afraid that the Russians might gain a general­

ly preponderant position in Iran's northern provinces if a

Soviet concession were granted on a government-to-government 114 basis rather than a government-to-company basis, When the decision of the Iranian Government was an­ nounced, negotiations were broken off with American and

IIP Ivanov, Voprosy istorii, p . 107; Bashkirov, 0 ]d . cit., p. 30. 113 Hurewitz, op. cit.. p. 211; Shapiro, op. cit.. p. 94.

H 1*' A. K. S. Lambton, "Iran," The Middle East, edited by Elizabeth Monroe (London: Royal Institute of Internation­ al Affairs, 1948), p. 210. 4l

British companies which had been bidding for a concession in

oil-producing northern Iran* However, Mr. Kavtaradze warned

the Iranian Prime Minister, Mohammed Saed Maraghei, that he 115 could expect trouble. Because of Iran's refusal to grant

the northern Iranian oil concessions sought by the Soviet

Union, Mr. Kavtaradze declared that high Soviet officials

had reacted '

. . . extremely negatively to Iran's decision not to grant the oil concession immediately, and that, while relations between the two countries remained as friendly as before, "the disloyal and unfriendly" position taken up by Premier Saed toward the Soviet Union excluded the possibility of further collaboration with him.ll6 This Soviet scolding of Prime Minister Saed started a series

of Soviet attacks which made political life so uncomfortable

for Mr. Saed that he was eventually forced out of office.

The series of Soviet attacks on Mr. Saed which started with

Mr. Kavtaradze's threat of trouble for Iran over his Govern­ ment's failure to acquire a northern Iranian oil concession

in 1944, also involved the evacuation of Soviet troops. Thus,

indirectly at first, the oil question affected Soviet action 117 for pulling out its troops.

At both the Yalta and Potsdam Conferences, the evacua-

ivar Spector, The Soviet Union and the Muslim World (Spokane: University of Washington Press, 1956), pp. Tl4f7

116 The Hew York Times. October 50, 1944, p. 5 .

117 The Middle East, op., cit., pp. 210f. 42

tion of foreign troops from Iran was discussed. At Yalta,

Mr. Anthony Eden, British Foreign Minister, stated that he

had inquired of the Russians when their troop withdrawal from

Iran would occur but had received no definite information.

Mr. Eden said, however, that the Russians reaffirmed their -q Q determination to stand by the Teheran Declaration.

As early as May 30, 1945, the Iranian Government sent 119 a note to the Allies requesting troop evacuation of Iran.

This note stated that the European war was ended and that all

foreign forces should leave Iran. This was the first of sever­ al times that the Iranian Government had asked the United

States, Great Britain, and Russia to withdraw their troops so 120 that a normal situation could be re-established:

The withdrawal of American, British and Russian troops from Iran was raised officially by the Teheran Govern­ ment after the close of European hostilities. The Iranians said, in effect, that since the purpose of the Allied occupation of their country was to protect the Allied flank, remove German penetration and, primarily, send supplies through the Persian Gulf to Russia, the need for occupation had been removed.121

At the Potsdam Conference it was agreed that all forces

should be withdrawn from Teheran immediately and that further

-*••*■8 Robert E. Sherwood. Roosevelt and Hopkins (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1948), p. 865.

Richard W, Van Wagenen, with T. Cuyler Young, The Iranian Case; 1946 (New York: Carnegie Endowment for Inter­ national Peace, 1952), p. 103. 120 See Appendix E, Appendix F, and Appendix G. The New York TimesAugust 5, 1944, p, 1. discussion should be held at the first meeting of the Coun­

cil of Foreign Ministers to be held in London. But,, before

the London meeting took place, Japan surrendered and the six- months period for the evacuation of all troops from Iran

started on September 2, 1 9 4 5 . The Tripartite Treaty of January 29, 1942, had given the British and Russians the right to keep their troops in Iran and use the communication systems

of that country until six months after the end of the war with

Germany'fend her associates." This meant that the evacuation

of Russian and British troops had to be completed by March 2, 1946.125

Sidney W. Morrell, "Iranian Checkerboard," Nation, Vol. l6l (December, 1945), pp. 733-35. •*•23 Richard N. Frye, Iran (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1953), p. 86. CHAPTER III

SOVIET ANTI-IMPERIALIST ACTIVITY IN

NORTHERN IRAN 19^1 - 19^1

It might be said that the occupation of northern Iran by the Soviet Union in August 19^1 marked the beginning of a

Soviet anti-imperialist strategy. At the beginning this strategy was concerned with the defeat of the Axis. It was typified by an alliance on the political front between the communists and the nationalist and religious parties. For instance, one of the areas occupied by the Soviet Union was the Iranian province of Azerbaijan. This province was a sam­ ple laboratory for cooperation with native tribes and other separatist movements. The so-called autonomous regime under

Soviet Influence was a precedent for the establishment of satellite republics in other Soviet-occupied areas after

19^5. In Iran, the Russians established "friendly" adminis­ trations in the provinces which they held. Officials of the

Iranian Government were hampered by Soviet agents and by di­ rect Red Army action. The fact that, when the Soviet troops were withdrawn, the "Democratic" Government of Iran collapsed, is indicative of the direct pressure needed by the Soviet

Union in order to establish "friendly" administrations. Eco­ nomic pressure included selling Russian products below cost 45

so that Iranian merchants lost business, non-payment of cus­

toms duties, and outright damage to Iranian produce and live­

stock. Before discussion of political questions, it may be

of interest to see specific illustrations of what Soviet

economy was doing in Iran.

Soviet Economic Activity

The Caspian Sea Fisheries Agreement illustrates Soviet-

Iranian contracts. Although the agreement itself was not

damaging, the course of action pursued by the Soviets after

their occupation of northern Iran violated the spirit of the

agreement. The Caspian Sea Fisheries Agreement of 1927 had

formed a Soviet-Iranian company which was obliged to market

its fish products at the highest possible price in Iran. But

the Soviets applied pressure to the Iranians to insure that

all products over the 10 percent level allowed for the Iranian market were shipped to Russia at a financial loss to the

Iranians, Even though the Iranians needed 50 to 40 percent

of the fish output, the Soviets prevented this during World

War II by refusing to purchase any fish if more than ten l ?4 percent were shipped to the Iranian market.

According to Dr. A. C. Millspaugh, an American who served as Administrator General of the Finances of Iran from

Arthur C. Millspaugh, Americans in Persia (Wash­ ington: The Brookings Institute, 1945}, pp.~T75f. 19*1-3 to 19^5j threats of reprisal were used by Soviet agents

to obtain a contract with the Iranian Government for the mann

facture of small arms and ammunition by Iranian factories. A

threat, at the time of the Soviet occupation of Azerbaijan,

that Red Army troops would remove all the machinery from the

Iranian munitions factories caused the Iranian Government to

sign a contract which did not specify the price to be paid

by the Soviets for the arms and ammunition ordered although

it did specify penalties to be imposed on the Iranians for late delivery. The Iranian Government suffered a serious 125 financial loss from the operation of this contract. The Soviet trucking agency in Iran, Iransovtrans,

charged less than the authorized Iranian fare for transport

operations. The Iranian people gained, but this practice

caused the Iranian Government trucking agency, Edareh Barhari

Rah, to lose business while the Soviets established effective

control over transportation in northern Iran. The Russians also operated a commercial air service without approval from 126 the Iranian Government.

The Allied operation of the Iranian State Railway is another example of Soviet financial operations which were

125 ibid., pp. 176f.

126 Robert Rossow, Jr., "The Battle of Azerbaijan," The Middle East Journal, Vol. X (Winter, 1956). no. 17-32:. Ibid., p. i r r r detrimental to the Iranians. While the American policy was to pay for capital improvements due to wartime traffic as is done on any commercial railway, the Russians either required the Iranians to make exceptional improvements or billed the

Iranian State Railway for improvements made by the Soviets themselves

The practice of avoiding customs duties by the Soviet

Government was so widespread that the Iranian Government had no control over goods entering Iran from the Soviet Union.

To the United Nations Security Council Mr. Taqizadeh, Iranian delegate to the United Nations, stated that

Soviet authorities had, from August 19^1* completely taken over the docks of Bandar-Shah and had totally dis­ rupted the work of the Iranian customs authorities in the control of merchandise and passengers.129 There are no figures available as to the amount of commercial goods brought into Iran without the payment of customs duties but it was generally known that the Soviets would bring in anything they cared to and sell it in the Iranian black mar­ ket. Sugar and cotton piece goods were two Russian products brought into Iran in large quantities without duty.^0 Such

127 Millspaugh, op_. cit.. pp. 176f.

^2® See Appendix G, Note 5 6 0 8 .

^2^ United Nations Security Council, Official Re cords, Supplement No. 1, p. 20.

150 Ibid., p. 28. importation of cotton without payment of customs duties caused serious competition on the open market with the Iranian Govern­ ment cotton monopoly. The importation of Russian sugar for sale in Iran disregarded Allied lend-lease understandings since the United States was supplying sugar to Russia under lend-lease.'^'*'

The Soviets were guilty of depleting Iranian supplies of foodstuffs and livestock at a time when they were needed by the local Iranian population.-^2 ’While the American troops in Iran imported their own foodstuffs, the Soviet troops lived off the country by taking supplies needed by the Iranians.

The prices paid by the Russians for livestock and grain often were below the fair market value. This was tantamount to a confiscation of Iranian products. The result of this Soviet action was a price rise in northern Iran and a shortage in southern Iran which depends on the northern area for much of its foodstuff.1^

131 Millspaugh, ojd. cit., p. 178.

United Nations, Security Council, Official Re­ cords, Supplement No. 1, p. 28; A. K. S. Lambton, "Some of the Problems Pacing Persia," International Affairs, 22:256, April 19^6. . . ;------133 See Appendix B; Appendix G, Note 5 608 ; Appendix H; George Kirk, The Middle East in the War, Survey of Inter- national Affairs 1939-19^6 (London: Oxford University Press, 1954), p. 4b6ff. ' 49 Soviet Political Activity Political activity in Iran by Soviet agents and by Red

Army troops was more serious than the economic disturbances.

For instance, a small group of men who had never resided in

Iran but whose ancestors were Iranian, were placed by the

Soviet Union at the heads of "friendly" administrations in

northern Iran.^^ Without elections,, and although represent­

ing only a small minority of the population, these persons

of Iranian descent — such as Mr. Ja'far Pishevari — organ­ ized the Tudeh Party and started the publication of several 135 newspapers. Soviet town commandants were appointed to

every town in northern Iran and, In conjunction with Red

Army troops and the Soviet Union’s trained leaders, the province of Azerbaijan, Iran, became Soviet-controlled, even 156 on a local level. In contrast to the rest of Azerbaijan, although the Kurdish Republic of Mahabad was to outside ap­ pearances free of Soviet agents, that miniature state had been built under the protection of the Red A r m y . ^ 7

134 Walter L. Wright, "Our Wear Eastern Policy in the Making," in H. H. Ehrmann, ed., Foreign Policies and Relations of the United States. The Annals"of the American Academy of Political and Social Science. Vol. 255 (Philadelphia: The American Academy Press,' 1948), p. 95; Rossow, 0 £. cit...p. 1 8 .

135 George E. Kirk, A Short History of the Middle East (Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1949), pp. 2d>9f.

United Nations, Security Council, Official Re­ cords, Supplement Wo. 1, pp. 25-45.

137 Archie Roosevelt, Jr., "The Kurdish Republic of 50

The presence of Red Army troops in northern Iran en­

abled the Russian authorities to intimidate the local popu­

lation as well as the Central Iranian Government. Soviet

officials and agents sponsored the formation of the Tudeh

Party in Iran. This party was an Iranian political party whose program was one of social and political reforms within

the framework of the Iranian Constitution. Local branches

of the Tudeh Party, however, took over the functions of local

government in some parts of Azerbaijan.-1-^

At its beginning the Tudeh Party consisted of left- wing intellectuals who may have believed it to be a truly national party with a broad program of reform and without l4o communist leanings. Its Influence over oil workers in the

south was resisted by British authorities but Soviet support helped to make the Tudeh Party powerful In northern Iran.

It was the largest party in Iran by 1943.

Mahabad," The Middle East Journal. Vol. I (July, 1947), 264ff. 158 See Appendix G, Note 5598; Ivar Spector, The Soviet Union and the Muslim World (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1958J, p. 213'.'

•*-^9 Roosevelt, o]D. eft., pp. 253f; Edwin Muller, "Behind the Scenes in Azerbaijan, The American Mercury, Vol. 62 (June 1946), p. 701. 140 Bashkirov, 0 £. cit., p. 46; Kirk, The Middle East in the War, op. cit., pp. 469-70. 141 L. P. Elwell-Sutton, "Political Parties in Iran," The Middle East Journal (January 1949)^ 3:45ff; Spector, op. eft., p. 1 1 3 . 51

The Tudeh Party dominated northern Iran's local poli­ tics and openly supported the Soviet authorities. It claimed to be a truly "democratic" party. A "Freedom Front" coali­ tion, supposedly for northern Iranian nationalism, was joined by the Tudeh Party in July 19^5* This "Freedom Front" turned into an outright Tudeh tool by 1 9 ^ after which time the

Tudeh was no longer considered to be a national party but a communist party. During World War II the Tudeh Party did not attack religion or the Shah, but it did attack "reaction­ aries" who were accused of collaboration with the fascists.

Generally, it supported the National Government of Iran as long as it cooperated with the Allies. This support was through nationalistic organizations, a temporary alliance being permissible under the Comintern thesis. Local nation­ alism was promoted among the Khrds and Azerbaijanis in nor- 1^-2 thern Iran.

Under the Anglo-Soviet-Iranian censorship created in accordance with the provisions of the Tripartite Treaty a veto by any one of the three censors was sufficient to bar news from publication. Thus, Soviet censorship officials prohibited any anti-Soviet news from being disseminated from

u. S, Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, National and International Movements, Supplement III B: "Com­ munism in the Near East," (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Offiee, 19^8), p. p: The Black Book on the Organiza­ tion of Communist Officers /in Persian/ (Teheran: Matboutat, 1958), pp. ^-25; Elwell-Sutton, "Political Parties in Iran," op. cit., pp. ^5ff. Iran. Because its headquarters were in the Russian Embassy, giving immunity from censorship as an official Russian Gov­ ernment Agency, only Tass News Agency reports were transmitted while Soviet authorities or Soviet censors stopped news un­ favorable to the Russians.1^

Soviet officials hindered the movement of non-Soviet officials in the northern zone of Iran. American employees of the Iranian Government were refused permission to enter Azer­ baijan in pursuit of their official duties. In some cases the Soviet town commandant took control over an Iranian com­ munity and Iranian officials who failed to follow his instruc- 144 tions were asked to leave. In Maku, Aberbaijan, the Soviet

Vice-Consul and the Soviet local commander obliged Captain

All Sanai, Director of the Police Department of that district, 145 to abandon his post and leave. Early In June, 19^5^

Akhtar-e-Shomal, the Tabriz newspaper, published a news item to the effect that the Allied foreign ministers had discussed the possibility of the evacuation of Allied armed forces from

-^2 Sidney Morrell, Spheres of Influence (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1946), pp. Pjff.

144 Millspaugh, op. cit., p. 184; see Appendix G, Note 39^.

1^5 United Nations, Security Council, Official Re­ cords, Supplement No. 1, p. 6l; see Appendix G, Note 27^7. 55 146 Iran. That same day the Soviet commander of Tabriz asked

that the editor of the Akhtar-e-Shomal be arrested. The edi­

tor of the newspaper could not be found, so his son, Mr. Seyed

Hoseyn, the assistant editor, was arrested and all copies of the day's paper confiscated. The following day several per­

sons who had obtained and read the forbidden paper in the town of Shahpour were arrested and detained for four hours.1^

Another example of the arbitrary arrest of private citizens who were not guilty of unlawful acts was that of Dr. i lift Saudi, Director of the Health Department in Shahpour. Dr.

Saudi was arrested by Soviet soldiers on August 8, 1945, and taken to the commander's headquarters where he was detained along with several other Iranian citizens in a stable, and left there without food until the following morning. Similar cases of Soviet illegal arrest of Iranian citizens ISO on Iranian soil were numerous. J Two other cases showing

Soviet interference with the exercise of judicial authority, are those of Mr. Mirfazali, Director of the Couchan Depart­ ment of Education, and Mr. Passih Khalatbari, judge of the

See Appendix G, Note 5598. United Nations, Sectority Council, Official Re­ cords, Supplement No. 1, p. 4l.

1^8 See Appendix G, Note 2884.

•*-^9 United Nations, Security Council, Official Re­ cords, Supplement No. 1, p. 4l.

See Appendix G, Notes 4829 and 4595. 54

Iranian Sari Court.^l Mirfazali was arrested at 3 a.m. on July 22, 1945, and taken to the Soviet garrison headquar­ ters at Gouchan. He was removed the next day to Mashad where he was forced, at the headquarters of the Iranian military police, to sign a document agreeing to leave Khorassan Province immediately. That same afternoon Soviet Army officials took 152 him to Teheran.

Even though it was a principle of Iranian law that no judge could be arrested or put under arrest unless he had been deprived of immunity by the Supreme Iranian Disciplin­ ary Court, Judge Khalatbari was detained by Soviet authorities in the Sari prison. Judge Khalatbari was kept tinder arrest in September 1945 by Soviet officials after official Iranian 153 protests had been made. This action by the Soviets showed disregard for the inviolability of judges and for the authority of Iranian laws. Interference by Red Army troops with Iran’s armed forces was one of the most disturbing factors of the Soviet occupation of northern Iran. Small Iranian security forces garrisoned In Azerbaijan were prevented from moving from one

151 See Appendix G, Note 4425. 152 United Nations, Security Council, Official Re­ cords . Supplement No. 1, p. 4l.

153 Ibid.j see Appendix G, Note 3944. 55 locality to another without prior permission of Soviet au­

thorities.*^ According to Miss A. K. S. Lambton, Press At­

tache at the British Embassy in Teheran from 1939-^5»

In the Caspian provinces disturbances of the peace have been fomented by the Tudeh Party, more or less openly supported by the local Russian officials, while the Persians have been prevented by the Russian military authorities from sending reinforcements to their secur­ ity forces in those provinces to restore order.155

This resulted in the impossibility of dispatching security forces to places where disturbances and unlawful disorders

occurred. Permission for the movement of Iranian security

forces either came too late or was not granted at all. On

one occasion the Soviet troops prevented Iranian gendarmes

from quelling a rebellion of twenty Iranian Army officers and men. In this case the Soviet Army authorities ordered the

gendarmes to return to their barracks and not to use their rifles and arms. The Soviets prevented the transport of the arms and ammunition which had been confiscated from the in­ surgent officers.***-^

The Allied armed forces were scheduled for an early

evacuation of Teheran in August 19^5 and seemingly the Rus­ sians complied with this agreement. But it was soon discovered

15^ See Appendix G, Note 57^8. 155 Lambton, "Some of the Problems Pacing Persia," op. cit., p. 2 6 1 .

158 Ibid.; United Nations, Security Council, Official Records, Supplement No. 1, pp. 27-42; see Appendix G, Note 3152. that the Soviets had merely exchanged uniformed soldiers for plainclothes agents who were estimated at two thousand in the city of Teheran. Many of these plainclothes agents were re­ ported to be the same Soviet troops who had previously ap­ peared in uniform. The possibility of Soviet military action in Teheran was not removed although British and American 157 forces had evacuated all of their troops.

In Tabriz, during August 19^5, the Tudeh Party was protected by Red Army troops while an armed uprising was 158 bring staged. Armed Iranians, who were led and encouraged by the Tudeh Party, forcefully took several government build­ ings. At this same time the Azerbaijan Tudeh Party made a demand for administrative and cultural autonomy. Demonstra­ tions and disturbances by the Tudeh Party, protected by Soviet 159 troops, were in evidence in Tabriz. Central Iranian Gov­ ernment attempts to send gendarmerie reinforcements into

Azerbaijan to secure order were prevented by Soviet officials and Soviet troops. The Iranian Government notified the Soviet Government of these disorders which had taken place in nor­ thern Iran, and warned that the disturbances would spread

•*•57 Muller, ojd. cit., pp. 696ff.

158 United Nations, Security Council, Official Re­ cords. Supplement No. 1, pp. 25ff; Bashkirov, op. cit., pp. 5bf.

159 Lambton, "Iran," 0 ]D. cit., p. 210. 57 unless reinforcements of Iranian troops and gendarmes were

sent to these localities.But Soviet troops continued to

keep Iranian gendarmes from entering Azerbaijan and telegraph 161 communications were cut between Tabriz and Teheran.

Western Reaction and "Democratic" Party Developments.

The immediate reaction of both the Iranian Government and

the Western Allies was to send notes of protest to the Soviet

Union. On September 9j 19^5* the Iranians sent notes to both

the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union requesting that all

Allied troops be withdrawn by March 2, 19^6. The notes

pointed out that the Tripartite Treaty provided for the evacu­ ation of all Allied troops from Iran six months after the

end of hostilities, which has been generally considered to

mean the September 2, 19^5 * surrender of Japan. Mr. Bevin, British Foreign Secretary, was also prompted to write to Mr;

Molotov, the Soviet Foreign Minister, on September 19 and

propose that most Allied forces be withdrawn from Iran by

the middle of December 19^5 • Secretary Bevin also suggested

that the minority of personnel then remaining could be with­

drawn by March 2, 19^5. The reply of Mr. Molotov on September

See Appendix G, Note 5281.

l6l See Appendix G, Notes and 59^5; The Middle East, op. cit., p. 210. 16? The Manchester Guardian, September 14, 19^5 j P» 5« 20 was that the Soviet Government did not want an early evacuation of Iran. Mr. Molotov stated that his government

. . . takes the view that this withdrawal should be effected within the period laid down in the Anglo- Soviet -Iranian Treaty.163

This reply of Mr. Molotov meant, of course, that no more troops would be withdrawn from Iran until March 2, 19^6.

The Council of Foreign Ministers which met in London on September 22 took note of the exchange of letters between

Mr. Bevin and Mr. Molotov. Since an informal bilateral un­ derstanding seemed to have been reached between the British and Soviet Foreign Ministers there was no necessity for dis­ cussion of troop withdrawal at the London Conference. Mr.

Bevin noted later that his colleagues were pleased at the complete Anglo-Soviet agreement that "the date by which allied troops should be withdrawn, that is, by March 2, 19*1-6, is six months after the signing of the Japanese surrender

-1 ^TJ| of September 2, 19*1-5 •" Mr. Molotov's reply expressed pleasure at Mr. Bevin1s apparent satisfaction and pointed out that

. . . I would like to tell you again that in the case of the Soviet Government the question of withdrawing troops from Iran did not in general constitute a specific problem inasmuch as there is a treaty which makes pro­ visions for it. I would ask you to bear in mind that

The New York Times, October 11, 19*1-5 > p. 9. 164 The New York Times, September 25, P» 6. 59 the Soviet Government attaches exceptional importance to the strict fulfillment of obligations undertaken.165

While the Western powers were reacting to the Tabriz uprising staged by the Tudeh Party, the situation in Azer­ baijan seemed to calm down. Just before the signing of the

Japanese surrender on the USS Missouri the Tudeh Party changed its name. It became known in northern Iran as the "Democratic" l66 Party. The organization of the new "Democratic" Party was the same as that of the Tudeh Party but the "Democrats" cham­ pioned a program calling for the establishment of an essen­ tially autonomous government in the Azerbaijan Province.

The sovereignty of the Central Iranian Government was to be only nominally recognized according to the propaganda put forth.167 When talks between the "Democratic" leaders, encour­ aged by the Soviets, and the Iranian Government leaders, failed to provide provincial autonomy for northern Iran, the

"Democrats" actively supported Soviet methods of revolt.

Arms and ammunition were supplied to the Azerbaijanis by the Red Army. Movements of the Iranian Army were obstructed.1^

165 The Times /London/, September 29, 19^5* P« ^a. 1(^ M. S. Ivanov, Ocherk istorii Irana (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel’stvo politicheskoi literatury, 1952), p. ^55; Lambton, "Iran," og.. cit.,, p. 210.

167 m . Sergeev,."Bor'ba demokratii protiv reaktsii v Irane," Bolshevik, June.19^6, pp. 57f«

166 See Appendix G, Note 5281. 60

The "Democratic1’ Party meetings were openly protected by Soviet soldiers. Iranian Government officials in Azerbaijan were arrested by Soviet authorities. When, in order to pre­ vent disorders in Maragheh, a military governor arrested the disturber, Mr. Kabiri, the Soviet authorities intervened and arrested the military governor while setting Mr. Kabiri free.

In the same town the Iranian soldiers were forbidden to leave their barracks and Soviet followers, depending for their power on the Russian authorities, took over control in the 169 town.

On September 50, 1945* policemen who had been ordered to arrest a disturber were disarmed by Soviet authorities and 170 removed to the Russian commander’s headquarters. When a dispute occurred between factory workmen and farmers in

Mazanderan, the Soviet military authorities intervened in contravention of regulations by arresting seven persons whom they accused of causing the disturbances. No reply was ever received to the Iranian note of September 9 which protested Soviet interference in Iranian internal affairs. Instead,

Soviet activity increased, and "Democratic" Party orators 171 threatened to set up their own government.

-*-^9 United Nations, Security Cornell, Official Re­ cords . Supplement No. 1, p. 6 5 .

Ibid., p. 67; see Appendix G, Note 4425. 171 Ibid., p. 26. 61 At the First Congress of the "Democratic’' Party in

Tabriz on October 2, 1945* both the Azerbaijan Turks and the

Kurdish nationalists were represented.The "Democratic"

Party tightened its control on the province of Azerbaijan during October and a drive for membership dues was made. The

Kurdish branch of the "Democratic" Party started disturbances.

At many towns in the western part of Azerbaijan Province and the Mahabad area, arms and ammunition were distributed to Kurdish tribal chieftains. Followers of the Iraq refugee,

Mr. Mulla Mustafa Barzai, were also provided with arms by the Soviets and a serious state of disorder and confusion 175 existed. The Soviets gave the headquarters of the Kurdish autonomous movement a printing press and newsprint in order to further their propaganda. New Red Army divisions were 174 stationed in northern Iran late in October. A Red Army marshal was said to have visited Azerbaijan and the tension in Iran increased beyond that which had existed since the 175 August and September disturbances.

Azerbaijan Revolt and Its Results. Just how far the

172 Millspaugh, op. cit., p. 194* Sergeev, op. cit., p. 57. 175 See Appendix B.

174 The New York Times, October 2 5 . 1945* p. 2.

!75 Millspaugh, op. cit., p. 19 5 . 62

Soviet strategy had progressed was shown in the fact that there was a revolt in northern Iran. The actual revolt in Azer­ baijan started on the night of November 14, 1945# when the

"Democratic" Party set up a road block just outside Mianeh and assaults were made on the Mianeh terminal of the Trans-

Iranian Railway. Soviet trucks appeared at Maragheh and

Mianeh and distributed arras to crowds. The towns of Maragheh,

Sareb, Mianeh, and Ahar were captured quickly although there was heavy fighting at Mianeh before that town was captured.

It took a total of eight days for the Soviet-inspired "Demo­ cratic" Party to subdue the nationalistic minded people of northern Iran. Shortly after Mianeh was attacked, Soviet cavalry established control over northern Iranian outposts. Telegraph wires from Tabriz to Zenjan were cut by the "Demo­ crats." The outside world could not know what was taking 176 place.

Disturbances occurred in northern Iran in both Azer­ baijan and Kurdish territory. Immediately, when the rebel­ lion broke out, Iranian troops were dispatched to Azerbaijan to help the small contingent already there to restore order. Soviet military authorities halted these troops at Sharifabad

See Appendix B; see Appendix G, Notes 5604 and 5 6 0 8 ; United Nations, Security Council, Official Records, Supplement No. 1, pp. 27f. and prevented them from proceeding. This Soviet action

left the northern rebels in a protected position from which

they could successfully carry out their rebellion and pro­

claim the autonomy of the provinces they controlled. The rebels

. . . besieged the army garrisons stationed in dif­ ferent sectors of Azerbaijan, forced them to surrender and disarmed them. Government offices and railroads were captured, and an illegal government was established in Tabriz in defiance of the constitution of Iran and the Central Government.178

The Azerbaijani and Kurds set up autonomous states, with the

protection and help of the Soviets, separate from;the Central 179 Iranian Government. The "Democratic" Party forces held

the key cities of Sarab, Mianeh, and Bukan which cut off the n An province of Azerbaijan from the rest of Iran. Because of Soviet support of these separatist move­ ments, the Government of Iran sent a note of protest to the 181 Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, on November 17, 19^5» This note specifically listed instances of alleged interference

177 United Nations, Security Council, Official Re­ cords, Supplement No. 1, p. 29.

178 united Nations, Security Council, Official Re- cords, Supplement No. 1, p. 2 9.

179 Ivanov, Ocherk istoril Irana, op. cit., p. ^55. -*-8 ° see Appendix B.

181 Ibid. 64

by Soviet agents and troops in the internal affairs of Iran The note requested that the Soviet Government respect its

obligations under the Tripartite Treaty of Alliance of Janu­

ary 29, 1942. 182

The list of alleged interferences in which the Soviets had been involved was transmitted by Mr. Hussein Ala, Iranian

Ambassador to Washington, to the United States Secretary of

State. Ambassador Ala asked that the United States use its

influence to protect Iran’s rights tinder the Tripartite

Treaty, the Teheran Declaration, and the United Nations Char- 183 ter. Mr. Taqizadeh, Iranian Ambassador to Loudon, made a similar request to the British Foreign Secretary, Mr. Bevin. ^■8i*'

Several other Iranian notes were sent to Moscow on November

22 and 23 in which the Iranian Government protested the Soviets halting Iranian troops on their way from Teheran to Tabriz.-*-^ The Soviet Foreign Commissar, Mr. Molotov, was reported to have expressed surprise to Mr. Ahi, Iranian Ambassador to

Moscow, when he was told that Soviet forces refused permission

l8e ibta.

183 United Nations, Security Council, Official Re­ cords, Supplement No. 1, pp. 29f. 184 See Appendix B.

185 United Nations, Security Council, Official Re­ cords. Supplement No. 1, p. 3 3 . 65 186 for Iranian troops to enter Azerbaijan.

It is difficult to believe that Soviet actions in

Iran were the result of a local Soviet policy in Iran unknown to the Central Government in Moscow because the Iranian Gov­ ernment directed twenty-four notes of protest to the Soviet

Embassy in Teheran between May 2, 19^5, and November 25, 1 19^5. The Soviet attitude of ignorance concerning the

Azerbaijan rebellion, as represented by Ambassador Ahi’s talks with Mr. Molotov, was followed by other Soviet officials. The

Soviet Ambassador to Iran absented himself from Teheran dur­ ing the uprising, and the Soviet Charge d'Affaires in Teheran 188 professed complete ignorance of the rebellion.

On November 20, 7 ^ delegates of the Azerbaijan Con­ gress which demanded an autonomous regional government from the Central Iranian Government met in Tabriz. The delegates were "elected" from those communities in northern Iran which were taking part in the Azerbaijan rebellion.1^ All of the delegates were connected with the Soviet-sponsored "Democratic"

Party of northern Iran. Soviet pressure had controlled the

Washington Post, November 26, 19^5, p. 1^* United Nations, Security Council, Official Re­ cords, 1st Year, 1st Series, Supplement No. 2, pp.' 4V-95; see Appendix B; see Appendix G, Notes 2085-560^.

188 Washington Post, November 26, 19^5, p. 1^.

Journal de Teheran, November 21, 19^5, pp. If. 66

elections of the delegates and no opposition to the "Demo­

cratic" Party was allowed. On November 23 the Central Committee

of the "Democratic" Party issued a proclamation defining its

aims as the complete autonomy of Azerbaijan. ^ 0

On November 2k, as a consequence of the Iranian com­ munication to the United States Government,, the United States protested to the Soviet Government concerning Russian inter- 191 ference in Iranian internal affairs. The United States

note recalled the Soviet pledge made in the Teheran Declara­ tion, and expressed confidence that the Government of the

Soviet Union was "... just as zealous as the Government of the United States meticulously to abide by the assurances

contained in this Declaration."'1'^2 The United States note further stated that these Soviet assurances given at Teheran required that the Government of Iran should have full freedom from Soviet, British, or American authorities to move its armed forces in order to maintain internal security. The

United States Government assumed that the Soviet Government was issuing instructions to its commanders abiding by the

Teheran Declaration but that as long as foreign troops

Ibid., November 23, 19*5, PP. If. see Appendix Cj U, S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Background Information on the Soviet Union in International Relations, H. Res. 206 (Washington: Govern­ ment Printing Office, 1950), pp. 21f. remained in Iran, incidents were likely to occur. The United

States’ note concluded with a proposal for the withdrawal of

all foreign troops from Iran by January 1, 19^6. This United

States suggestion was for the evacuation of all foreign troops two months earlier than the Tripartite Treaty date of

March 2, 19^6, which was six months after the end of the war with Germany "and her associates.

On the following day the British Government sent a note to the Soviet Government concerning Russian interference

1921- in Iran. In this note the British expressed to the Soviet

Union the Iranian desire for freedom to maintain order in their own territory. The British note referred to the Tripartite

Treaty of 19^2 and the Soviet pledges of respect for Iranian territorial integrity which were made there. The Soviets were also reminded of their promises made at the Teheran Declaration for the maintenance of the territorial integrity 195 of Iran.

The Soviet reply to the United States' note of Novem­ ber 2b asserted that the Iranian accusations were false and described the Azerbaijan rebellion as a normal democratic

W ibid; George Kirk, The Middle East 19^5-1950 (London; Oxford University Press, 195^77 p. 6'0.

United Nations, Security Council, Official Re­ cords, Supplement No. 1, p. 56. ^95 ibid. 68 desire of oppressed people. The Soviets claimed that they adhered to the principles of the Teheran Declaration but that the Teheran Declaration did not affect the entry or removal of Soviet troops from Iran. According to the Soviets the re­ moval of their troops from Iran was fixed by the Tripartite

Treaty and the original right of introduction of Soviet troops was envisaged by the Soviet-Iranian Treaty of February 26, 197 1921. Thus, the Soviet Government refused the United

States request for an early troop withdrawal from Iran.

The Soviets did admit, however, that they had

. . . opposed the dispatch of Iranian troops to the northern district of Iran and informed the Iranian Gov­ ernment that the dispatch of further Iranian forces to northern Iran could cause not the cessation but the in­ crease of disorders and likewise bloodshed, which would compel the Soviet Government to introduce into Iran further forces of its own for the purpose of preserving order and of assuring the security of the Soviet gar­ rison. 198 This statement by the Soviet Government was a direct admis­ sion by the Soviets of their interference in the internal affairs of Iran. It was contrary to the Tripartite Treaty and to the Teheran Declaration'that the Soviet Government should decide what forces were necessary for Iranian internal security in any particular portion of Iran.

196 See Appendix D. ■*•97 see below, Chapter II. 198 See Appendix D. On December 12 the National Government of Azerbaijan 199 was set up in Tabriz by the "Democratic" Party of Azerbaijan.

Although the nevr government of Azerbaijan was supposed to be

conducted on a democratic basis., it resembled a police state.200

A land distribution program was started and all banks in

Tabriz holding three million tomans or more were nationalized.

Soviet agents, many of them Persian exiles who fled from Riza

Shah Pahlevi, infiltrated into the ranks of the northern 201 Iranians and furthered the progress of the revolution.

The Iranians sent notes on December 15 to the Soviet

Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States, requesting

that the Moscow meeting of Foreign Ministers decide upon the

immediate evacuation of foreign troops from Iran. This re­ quest, the Iranians said, was based upon many factors, in­

cluding the disturbance caused by the presence of foreign forces in Iran, the restrictions placed upon Iranian Govern­ ment reform, the suppression of freedom in the Iranian Gov­ ernment, and the obligations undertaken in 19^2 by the signers

•*•99 Ivanov, Ocherk istorii Irana, p. ^-55; Journal de Teheran, December 14, 19^5, pV lj Rossow, op., eft., pp. l8f; Roosevelt, op. oit., pp. 255ff.

200 Millspaugh, op. pit., p. l82f; Journal de Teheran, December 19, 19^5, p. 1.

2°1 m . Philips Price, "Soviet Azerbaijan," Journal of the Royal Centra1 Asian Society, Vol. XXXIII (April, 19^6), p. 195; Muller, op. cit., pp. o96ff; Rossow, op. cit., p. 18. 7° of the Tripartite Treaty.202

But the Moscow meeting of the Council of Foreign

Ministers in the middle of December 1945 did. nothing to re­ lieve Soviet pressure on Azerbaijan. The Iranian question remained unsolved, since Russia refused to remove its troops from Iran before March 2, 1946. The British desire to settle the Iranian problem resulted in a British proposal for setting up a Tripartite Commission for the handling of the Iranian questions. This proposal was defeated by the Soviets.20^

Later the British proposed another three-power investigating commission to investigate the Iranian situation, but the Iranians vetoed this suggestion before it ever reached formal western ,. , 204 discussion.

On December 31* 1945* the last of the American troops left Iran. Thus, only strong Red Army troops in the north and a weak British force in the south were left in that coun-

t r y . 2 ° 5 ■

Soviet-Iranian Actions at the United Rations

The events in Azerbaijan during the Soviet occupation,

202 See Appendix F. 203 The Manchester Guardian, December 28, 1945* pp. 4f; James J. Byrnes, Speaking Frankly (New York: Harper and Brothers. 1947)* pp. 119ff. " 2°4 Journal de Teheran, January 10, 1946, p. 1: Kirk.. The Middle East 1945-1950, p . 64. 205 Spector, o]d. cit., p. 114. 71 the revolt and other violations of Iranian sovereignty, led

Iran to make the first complaint to come before the Security

Council of the United Nations.20^ The procedure for filing

a complaint was not clear since the Security Council was

just being organized and had not yet adopted rules of pro- 207 cedure. The Second Iranian complaint was made after the Soviet Government failed to evacuate its troops from Iran

and continued to interfere in Iran’s internal affairs.2®®

First Iranian Complaint. On January 19, 19^6, the

Iranian delegate to the United Nations, Mr. Seyed H. Taquizadeh,

made a complaint to the United Nations Security Council re­

garding the interference by Soviet forces in the internal affairs of Iran.20^

Mr. Taqizadeh had been instructed to make a complaint 210 by Prime Minister Hakimi of Iran. In a letter to the

Executive Secretary of the Security Council, Mr. Gladwyn :

20^ Robert Rossow, Jr., "The Battle of Azerbaijan," The Middle East Journal. Vol. X (Winter, 1956), p. 18. 207 Byrnes, op. cit., p. 125.

20^ United Nations, Security Council, Official Records, 1st Year, 2d Series. Supplement No. 2 (New York: Hunter College, 19^6), p. 44. 209 United Nations, Security Council, Journal of the Security Council, January-March 19^6 (London: Church House, Westminister, 19^6), p. 15; "UNO Confronted with very Adult Problem," Nation, Vol. 162 (January 26, 19^8), p. 8 5 . 210 "Iran: Help! Help!" Newsweek, Vol. XXVII (January 28, 19^6), p. 5 0 . Jebb, Mr. Taqizadeh complained of Soviet interferences and re­

quested that the Security Council investigate the situation 211 and recommend terms of settlement.

The Security Council immediately started to debate the

procedural aspects of the Iranian accusations but before any

action was decided upon Prime Minister Hakimi resigned. Pre­

sumably, the Soviet pressure exerted on Prime Minister Hakimi

after he ordered the complaint to the United Nations had been

too much for him to handle. The Shah of Iran appointed Mr.

Qavam Salteneh, who was famous for his pro-Soviet leanings, 212 as the new Prime Minister. Prime Minister Qavam’s first

acts were to dismiss high ranking Iranians from public office 213 who had pro-British tendencies. ^ On January 24 the Soviets replied to the Iranian ac- 2i4 cusation by saying that the Iranian charges were untrue.

Mr. Andrei Vishinsky, Chief of the Soviet delegation to the

United Nations, in a letter to the President of the Security

Council, stated that there was no basis for Security Council consideration of the Iranian charges under Article 34 or 35

211 "World Document: Soviet-Iranian Dispute," Current History. Vol. X (March, 1946), pp. 258ff. . 212 Ivanov, Ocherk istoril Irana, pp. 455f. 21"3 Journal de Teheran, January 27, 1946, pp. if; Kirk, The Middle East 1945-1950, op. cit., pp. 65f.

21^ United Nations, Security Council, Journal of the Security Council, op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 17. 73 of the United Rations Charter.2^5 jjp# Vishinsky further de­

clared that the Iranian Ministry on December 1, 19*1-5* had

expressed its satisfaction with the actions of Soviet author­ ities in Iran. He stated that bilateral negotiations had

been carried on and that Red Army troops were legitimately

in Iran by rights granted under the Sovlet-Iranian Treaty of

1921 and the Tripartite Treaty of 19*1-2. Mr. Vishinsky denied that the presence of Soviet troops had anything to do.with

events in Azerbaijan. His final words were charges that anti-Soviet propaganda had been coming from Iran and that 216 this adverse propaganda could not be tolerated. The Iranians rebutted the Soviet denial when Mr.

Taqizadeh, in a letter to the President of the Security Council on January 26, 19*1-6, stated that the Soviets had 217 already admitted a breach of the Tripartite Treaty. Mr. Taqizadeh pointed out that Soviet notes of November 26, 19*1-5, to the Iranian Government, and of November 29, 19*1-5, to the

United States Government, had admitted that Soviet authorities were unwilling to allow the passage of Iranian reinforcements into northern Iran for the purpose of suppressing the revolt

215 "Iran Forces the Issue," New Republic, Vol. 114, (January 28, .19*1-6), p. 109.

The Manchester Guardian, January 2 6 , 19*1-6, p. 5 .

217 "UNO Confronted with Very Adult Problem," Nation, Vol. 162 (January 2 6 , 19*1-8), p. 8 5 . 74 218 in Azerbaijan. Mr. Taqizadeh stated that the refusal of the Soviet Government to allow Iranian security forces to move freely within Iran was clearly a breach of the Tripartite . 21Q Treaty of Alliance of 1942 and the Teheran Declaration.

It was also noted by the Iranians that they had never made a statement that no interference on the part of the Soviets had ever occurred in Iran. Instead, the Iranians, according to Mr. Taqizadeh, had merely stated that they were satisfied that Soviet interference would not be repeated in the future. Furthermore, the Iranians reiterated that bilateral negotia­ tions with the Soviet Government had all failed. The Iranian

Government claimed that the 1921 Soviet-Iranian Treaty did not apply in this dispute and that no anti-Soviet propaganda had occurred in Iran. Again the Iranian Government requested the Security Council to investigate Iranian charges of Soviet 220 interference in Iran's internal affairs. Mr. Taqizadeh was invited to sit at the Security Coun­ cil on January 30 in order to present any other information OOl which he might have pertaining to the Iranian complaint.

218 United Nations, Security Council, Journal, of the Security Council, Vol. 1, o]c. cit.. p. 31; Maurice Hindus, In Search of a Future (London: Victor Gollancz, Limited, 1 9 4 9 ), P. 109. "— “ 219 The Manchester Guardian, January 28, 1946, p. 6.

220 United Nations, Security Council, Journal of the Security Council, Vol. 1, ojo. cit., p. 32.

221 Ibid., p. 47. ■

75 It was at this meeting that Mr. Taqizadeh introduced an Iran­

ian memorandum into the Security Council record which spe­

cifically presented the facts of alleged Soviet interferences 222 in Iran’s internal affairs. Mr. Taqizadeh clearly empha­

sized that the Iranian complaint was not directed at the

presence of Soviet troops, nor was a request being made for

their withdrawal, but that the Iranian dispute with the

Soviet Government arose out of the fact that the Iranian au­

thorities were prevented by the Soviets from carrying out their official duties.22-^

Mr. Vishinsky continually refused to debate the Iranian 224 issue except as to its procedural aspects. He claimed

that successful bilateral negotiations had taken place be­

tween Iran and the Soviet Union. Mr. Vishinsky concluded that there were no grounds for considering the complaints of 225 Iran under the United Nations Charter. In a continuance

of this Security Council debate on January 50, 1946, Mr.

Vishinsky did admit, however, that the Soviet Government had

opposed the wishes of the Iranian Government to move additional

222 - Ibid., p. 55. 223 The Times /London/, February 2, 1946, p. 4f. op4 ^ United Nations, Security Council, Journal of the Security Council, Vol. 1, ojd. cit., p. 55*

225 The Manchester Guardian, January 31j 19*1-6, p. 5; The Economist /London/, February 2, 1946, p. 168. 76

Iranian troops into Azerbaijan. Mr. Vishinsky said that

. . . The Iranian Government states that it wished to bring in additional troops, but that the Soviet Government had opposed this. This is true.226

Thus, the Soviet delegate to the Security Council admitted that the Soviet Government had opposed Iran’s freedom to maintain order within its own boundaries. This was an im­ plicit admission by Mr. Vishinsky that the Soviet Government had violated the Tripartite Treaty of 19^2 and the Teheran

Declaration of 19*K3. Mr. Bevin, Security Council representative from the

United Kingdom, stated in the general discussion which en­

sued at the January 20 meeting that the Soviet-Iranian Af­ fair was an open dispute since there had been an admitted 228 violation of the Tripartite Treaty. He asked What there was to negotiate about since the Tripartite Treaty had been 229 infringed upon. Mr. Stettinius, United States representa­ tive to the Security Council, then suggested that the matter be placed on the Security Council agenda while the two parties

226 united Nations, Security Council, Journal of the Security Council. Vol. 1, op. cit., p. 6 7 .

u. S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Af­ fairs, Background Information on the Soviet Union in Interna­ tional Relations, H. Res. 206 ^Washington: Government Print­ ing Office, 1950), pp. 2If. 228 Th,e Times /ihn&on/, February 2, 19^6, p. 4f. 229 United Nations, Security Council, Journal of the Security Council, Vol. 1, op. cit., p. 6 9 . 77 involved negotiated the problem. A resolution embodying Mr. Stettinius’ suggestions was made by Mr. Van Kleffens, the

Netherlands delegate to the Security Council. Mr. Vishinsky

opposed this resolution on the basis that the United Nations

Charter did not allow this Iranian complaint to be retained 230 on the agenda. His argument was that the Charter required

members to attempt to settle disputes by negotiations and

that the Soviet Union was willing to resume direct negotia­

tions with the Iranian Government. However, the Security

Council adopted Mr. Van Kleffen*s resolution after it was

redrafted by Mr. Bevin without the inclusion of the phrase "the question remains on the agenda. ,|221 The resolution

noted the documents and statements of the Soviet and Iranian delegates and the willingness of both states to seek a solu6

tion of the matter by bilateral negotiations. The resolution

also requested the Iranian and Soviet Governments to inform

the Security Council of any results achieved from the nego­

tiations. Furthermore, the Security Council retained the

right at any time to request information on the progress of the negotiations.2^2

2^° The Manchester Guardian, January 31, 19^6, p. 5« 231 United Nations, Department of Public Information, Yearbook of the United Nations 19^6-7 (Lake Success, N. Y.: United Nations Publications, 19^7), p. 329* 252 Ibid. 78

In an attempt to carry out the negotiations called for by the Security Council resolution of January 30, Prime Min­ ister Qavam left Teheran for a Soviet-Iranian conference in

Moscow. He arrived in Moscow on February 19 while it was still impossible for Iranian officials to enter Azerbaijan.

Prime Minister Qavam remained in the Soviet capital until

March 11. During this time he conferred with Mr. Stalin and 234 Mr. Molotov but no agreement was reached. ^ The Soviet leaders presented impossible proposals to the Iranians which included the following:

(1) Soviet troops could continue to stay in some parts of Iran for an indefinite period. (2) The Iranian Government would recognize the in­ ternal autonomy of Azerbaijan. If the Iranian Govern­ ment acquiesced in this request,.the Soviet Government offered to take steps to arrange that: (a) The Prime Minister of Azerbaijan, in rela­ tion to the Central Government, would bear the desig­ nation of Governor General. (b) Azerbaijan would have no Ministry of War or Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (c) Thirty percent of the Azerbaijan revenue would be paid to the Iranian Central Government. (d) All correspondence with the Central Govern­ ment would be in Persian. (3) The Soviet Government would anandon its demands for an oil concession. Instead it proposed that an Iranian-Russlan joint stock company be set up with 51 percent of the shares owned by the Soviets and 49 percent by Iran.235

Journal de Teheran, February 20, 19^6, p. 1.

23^ journal de Teheran, March 15, 19^6, p.

235 United Nations, Security Council. Official Records, 1st Year, 1st Series, No. 2, op. cit., pp. 64-65. During Prime Minister Qavam’s stay in Moscow the dead­

line arrived for the evacuation of all Allied troops from

Iran. Since the American forces had already departed, only

the British and Soviet forces were affected by the March 2

evacuation date set by the Tripartite Treaty of 19^6. The 236 British Government withdrew its troops by March 2. The

Soviet Government merely informed Prime Minister Qavam that

some Soviet troops would be evacuated from peaceful areas while in other districts Soviet troops would remain.2-^ This failure of the Soviet Government to evacuate Iran on March 2 was another serious violation of the Tripartite Treaty of Alliance.

On March 3 Prime Minister Qavam sent a note to the Soviet Union protesting the presence of Soviet troops in

Iran. He declared the Russians had committed a breach of their obligations. The British and the United States also 238 protested to the Soviet Government. Ho replies were re­ ceived on the subject. Then, on March 9, the United States requested the Soviet Union to answer whether or not it was

236 The Times /London/, March 1, 19^6, p. 4d. The Manchester Guardian. March 2, 19^6, p. 5 . 2^® The Manchester Guardian. March 4, 19^6, p. 5i and March 6, 19^6, p. 5> U. S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, The Strategy and Tactics of World Communism. Supplement II: Official Protests of the United States Gov­ ernment against Communist Policies or Actions (Washington: Government Printing Office, 19^8), pp. 3'4f. 80

sending additional troops into Iran as rumored. Here again 239 no reply was received.

Since Prime Minister Qavam1s mission to Moscow had

ended in a stalemate with the Soviets, he returned to Teheran

on March 11. The Fourteenth Majlis expired on March 11 and,

under Iranian Law, no new elections could take place as long

as foreign troops remained on Iranian soil. Just at the time when the Fourteenth Majlis should have been voting to pro­

long its own term the Tudeh Party of Teheran staged a violent demonstration which barred the deputies from entering the parliament building until after March 11. Thus, Prime Minister

Qavam, without the support of a parliament, became a dictator.

The Soviets evidently believed that Prime Minister Qavam1s lack of support would make him more susceptible to Soviet designs.21*'0

Second Iranian Complaint. Before the March 2, 1946, evacuation date, U. S. Secretary of State Byrnes and other Western leaders had already made public speeches against the ?4i Soviet threat in Iran. On March l4, 1956, after Soviet troops had remained in Iran beyond the treaty date, an official of the U. S. Department of State announced that the United

239 Kirk, The Middle East 1945-1950, op., cit., p. 67f. 240 Ibid.; Millspaugh, op. cit., p. 195.

241 Byrnes, o£. cit., p. 126; Jones, 0 £. cit., pp. 53f. 81

States would bring up Soviet-Iranian differences before the 24p Security Council if Iran did not. But Prime Minister

Qavam proved to be more of a statesman than some had expected.

He instructed Ambassador Hussein Ala to submit the second 243 Iranian appeal to the United nations. In his letter of

March 18, 1946, to the President of the Security Council,

Ambassador Ala accused the Soviet Government of failing to remove Soviet troops from Iran on March 2, 1946, and of con- 244 tinuing to interfere in the internal affairs of Iran. Pur­ suant to Article 3b, paragraph 1, Ambassador Ala claimed the dispute between Iran and the Soviet Union continued and would be likely to endanger international peace and security. In describing the Soviet-Iranian dispute Ambassador Ala said: . . . Furthermore, the Union of Soviet Socialist Re­ publics is continuing to interfere in the internal af­ fairs of Iran through the medium of U.S.S.R. agents, officials.and armed forces.245

242 The New York Times, March 15, 1946.

Journal de Teheran, March 20, 1946, p. 1; The Manchester Guardian, March 20, 1946, p. 5; Joseph M. Jones, The Fifteen Weeks,"February 21 - June £, 1947 (New York: The Viking Press, 1955), pp.~55ff• United Nations, Security Council, Official Re­ cords^ 1st Year, 2d Series, Nos. 1-29, o]d . cit., pp. 104^105; The Middle East, p. 211.

245 United Nations, Security Council, Official Re­ cords, 1st Year, 1st Series, Supplement No. 2, op. cit., - p. 44. 82

The Soviets tried to stop the hearing of the Iranian 246 case. On March 19., Mr. Andrei A. Gromyko, Ambassador of

the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, sent a letter to the

Secretary-General of the Security Council requesting a post- 247 ponement of the Iranian question from March 25 to April 10.

But the United States representative wrote to the Secretary-

General on March 20 that he would request immediate consider­

ation of the Iranian complaint when the Security Council met

again. He also stated that he would request an accounting of

the discussions between Iran and the Soviet Union as required by the Security Council resolution of January 50. In a March

20 letter to the Secretary-General of the Security Council,

the Iranian Ambassador stated that his Government earnestly hoped that consideration of its complaint would not be de­ layed.^® At the twenty-fifth meeting of the Security Council

on March 26, the Soviet representative made an effort to re- 249 move the Iranian case from the agenda. ^ Ambassador Gromyko

246 The Manchester Guardian, March 20, 1946, p. 5.

247 United Nations, Security Council, Official Re­ cords. 1st Year, 1st Series, Supplement No. 2, op. cit., p." 44.

Ibid., p. 44f; The Times /London/, March 22, p. 4d. 2^9 united Nations, Security Council, Official Re­ cords, 1st Year, 1st Series, No. 2, op_. cit., pp. 10-16; Kirk, The Middle East 1945-1950, op. cit., p. 6 9 . 85 contended that the Iranian question could not be placed on

the Security Council Agenda because negotiations between the

Soviet and Iranian Governments had resulted in an understand­

ing regarding the evacuation of Soviet troops still in Iran.^O

The evacuation had begun on March 24 according to Mr. Vishinsky

and was supposed to be completed six weeks from that date un­

less unforeseen circumstances arose.

The United States Secretary of State, Mr. Byrnes, pointed out that the Iranian letter of March 18 referred to

the new fact of the S0viet failure to evacuate Iran which oc­

curred after the Security Council resolution of January 50. 2^2 He stated that both Governments sholild inform the Security

Council of any agreements or understandings they might have.

Secretary Byrnes concluded that there was still a need for

the Iranian charge on the Sectority Council agenda since the 2tV3 Iranian Government had not withdrawn its complaint. In his second statement before the Security Council

Ambassador Gromyko contended that Articles 54 and 55 gave no

United Nations, Security Council, Official Re­ cords. 1st Year, 1st Series, No. 2, pp. 10-16.

251 Ibid.

252 United Nations, Department of Public Information, Yearbook of the United Nations 1946-7. op. cit.. p. 550. 255 united Nations, Security Council, Journal of the Security Council, Vol. 1, ojd. cit., p. 569. 84

basis for placing the Iranian letter on the agenda.2^ j£e be­

lieved that the situation in Iran could not be considered of

sufficient nature to be included under these articles which

require that the dispute must threaten the maintenance of

international peace and security. Ambassador Gromyko's pro­

posal that the Iranian question be deleted from the Security

Council agenda was defeated by a vote of nine to two at the

twenty-sixth meeting on March 26, 1 9 4 6 .2^5

Immediately after the Iranian question was adopted by

an affirmative vote of nine to two, Ambassador Gromyko re­ quested that the Security Counc.il postpone further discussion of the subject until April 10. 2^8 jytr». Gromyko said that negotiations between Iran and Russia had not failed since

Prime Minister Qavam had stated on March 23 that the nego­ tiations were continuing and they might achieve happy re- 257 suits. The United States representative opposed postpone­ ment on the basis that the Security Council could not judge the Soviet request until it had heard from the Iranian delegate.2^

254 United Nations, Security Council, Official Records, 1st Year, 1st Series, No. 2, 0 £. cit., pp. 19-22.

255 United Nations, Security Council, Official Records, 1st Year, 1st Series, No. 2, 0 £. cit., p. 27.

256 Ibid., pp. 27-30; Kirk, The Middle East 1945- 1950. op. cit., p. 70.

257 United Nations, Security Council, Official Records. 1st Year, 1st Series, No. 2, 0 £. cit., p. 28.

258 Ibid., pp. 30f. After a lively debate in which the Soviet representative was

supported by the Australian and Polish delegates, Ambassador

Gromyko declared that he could not participate in the dis­

cussion of the Iranian case if the Security Council decided

to deal with the substance of the complaint prior to April

10. At the twenty-seventh meeting of the Security Council,

however, the Soviet postponement proposal was defeated by

a vote of nine to two. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 259 and Poland were the only nations in favor of it. The

Soviet representative left the Council Chamber shortly prior

to the next vote which was on the Egyptian delegate’s pro­

posal to invite the Iranian Ambassador to the Security Coun­ cil table.On this proposal the vote was eight to two 261 with Poland and Australia against it. Following this resolution the Iranian Ambassador took

his seat at the Council table and presented the Iranian views 262 on postponement. Although Secretary Byrnes told Ambassador

259 united Nations, Department of Public Information, Yearbook of the United Nations 1946-7, op. cit., p . 550.

united Nations, Security Council, Official Records, 1st Year, 1st Series, No. 2, 0 £. cit., pp. 5 8 -6 I; "UNO Lets Russia Walk Out," The Christian Century, Vol. 63 (April 10, 1946),. p. 451. . ------

261 "Russia’s Shift in Policy: Concession to World Opinion," U. S. News, Vol. XX (April 5, 1946), p. 20f.

2^2 United Nations, Department of Public Information, loc. cit. 86

Ala that he should restrict his comments to the question of postponement, the Iranian delegate occasionally failed to 2 63 follow this injunction. He reported that no agreement had been entered into between Iran and the Soviet Union concern- 264 ing the matter of this dispute. Ambassador Ala said, in reporting on Prime Minister Qavam1 s mission to Moscow, that the Iranian delegation had requested the Soviets to evacuate their troops from Iran and to stop interfering in Iranian in­ ternal affairs.2^5 Instead of agreeing to these requests,

Ambassador Ala said the Soviet officials proposed: (l) the continued indefinite stationing of Soviet troops in Iran;

(2) autonomy for Azerbaijan; and (3) a Soviet-Iranian joint stock oil company.2^ Mr. Ala stated that these proposals could not be accepted by Prime Minister Qavam since they violated the laws and sovereignty of Iran.2^ He then informed the Security Council that no positive results had been

263 United Nations, Security Council, Official Records, 1st Year, 1st Series, No. 2, op_. cit., pp. 62-66'.

264 United Nations, Security Council, Journal of the Security Council, Vol. 1, ojd. cit., p. 425.

2^5 United Nations, Security Council, Official Records, 1st Year, 1st Series, No. 2, o]D. cit., p. 6 5 .

266 "iran and Russia Answer UN," Scholastic, Vol. 48 (April 22, 1946), p. 20.

267 "Council: What Price Soviet-Iranian Accord?" Newsweek. Vol. 27 (April 15, 1946), p. 38f. 87 achieved by Soviet-Iranian negotiations since January 50, '268 1946. In describing the Soviet-Iranian negotiations Am­ bassador Ala said:

The U.S.S.R. authorities, while receiving the Iranian delegation with cordiality and respect, would not agree to withdraw U.S.S.R. troops from Iran or to refrain from interfering in the internal affairs of Iran.269

Mr. Ala also stated that a postponement of the Iranian complaint would damage Iran internally and that he had no instructions to agree to it. 2^0

At the twenty-eighth meeting of the Security Council on March 29, Mr. Byrnes suggested that the Soviet Union and

Iran report on their negotiations to determine whether or not the reported withdrawal of Soviet troops was conditioned by the conclusion of an oil agreement between the two Govern­ ments on April 3 .2 7 1 ij^q soviet report stated that the Soviet and Iranian Governments had reached an understanding to the effect that Soviet troops would be completely withdrawn from

Iran during the period of one and a half months after March

United Nations, Security Council, Official Records. 1st Year, 1st Series, op. cit.. No. 2, p. 6 6 .

269 Ibid.. p. 64.

Ibid., p. 6 6 ; "Council: What Price Soviet-Iranian Accord?" Newsweek, op. cit., p. 40. 2^1 United Nations, Security Council, Official Records, 1st Year, 1st Series, No. 2, ojd. cit., p. 84; "Iran and Russia Answer UN," Scholastic. op. cit., p. 20; "Council: What Price Soviet-Iranian Accord?11 Newsweek, op. cit., p. 40.

1 88

24, 1946. 2^2 Ambassador Gromyko's letter concluded

Thus, the question regarding the evacuation of the U.S.S.R. troops which was brought before the Security Council on 18 March by the Iranian Government was settled by the understanding reached between the U.S.S.R. and Iranian Governments.

As regards the other questions, they are not connected with the question of the withdrawal of U.S.S.R. troops. It is well known that the question of an' oil concession or of a mixed joint stock company arose in 1944 inde­ pendently of the question of the evacuation of the U.S.S.R. troops.273 The Iranian report, dated April 2, stated, however,

that there had been no negotiations concerning Soviet troop with- 274 drawal from Iran. With respect to the existing state of

negotiations between the two Governments where interference

in the internal affairs of Iran were concerned, Ambassador Ala said:

The negotiations pursuant to the resolution of 30 January 1946 have achieved no positive results, and U.S.S.R. agents, officials, and armed, forces are con­ tinuing to interfere in the internal affairs of Iran.275 In the same letter, the Iranian delegate reported that on

March 24 the Soviet Ambassador called on Prime Minister

272 "Limited Victory," Time, Vol. XLVII, (April 15, 1946), p. 27.

273 United Rations, Security Council, Journal of the Security Council, Vol. 1, p. 451; "Council; What Price Soviet- Iranian Accord?'" Newsweek, op. cit., p. 3 8 . 274 The Manchester Guardian, April 5, 1946, p. 5 .

275 United Nations, Security Council, Journal of the Security Council, Vol. 1, p. 452. 27 89 Qavam and handed him three memoranda.The first dealt with

the evacuation of the Red Army from Iran, the second related

to the formation of a joint Iranian-Soviet corporation for

the extraction of oil, and the third dealt with Azerbaijan

and suggested a form of autonomous government.277 The Iranian

letter continued: Three days later the Iranian Prime Minister again re­ ferred to this proviso and said that the evacuation of the U.S.S.R. troops must be unconditional, and that he could not agree to the U.S.S.R. proposals on the subjects of oil and Azerbaijan. To this the U.S.,S.R. Ambassador responded that if agreement could be reached on these other two subjects, there would be no further cause for anxiety and no unforeseen circumstances would take place. This statement has not been further clarified.

With respect to the other two memoranda, the Prime Minister has outlined his views to the U.S.S.R. Ambassa­ dor. His position is: (a) That as the status of the province of Azerbaijan, like that of all the other provinces in Iran, is regulated by the Iranian Constitution and the law on Provincial Councils, it is an internal matter, with which the Iranian Government will deal; (b) That the formation of a stock company with joint participation by Iran and the U.S.S.R. is a matter to be submitted for approval to the next Parliament after the U.S.S.R. troops have been withdrawn from Iran and elections can be held lawfully for the organization of the Fifteenth Legislature.

This is the present state of discussions on the sub­ ject of oil and the future status of Azerbaijan.278

2?8 United Nations, Security Council, Official Records. 1st Year,- 1st Series, No. 2, 0 £. cit.. p. 8 5 . 277 Ibid.

278 Ibid. I

90

On the basis of these replies a resolution was adopted

by the Security Council which took note of the fact that the 27 9 Soviet troops were expected to withdraw from Iran by May 6 .

It also resolved that the Council defer proceedings until

May 6 at which time another report from the two-Governments

regarding the completion of the withdrawal was expected.^ 80

The resolution took specific note

That the proposals under negotiation between the Iranian Government and the U.S.S.R. Government are not connected with the withdrawal of U.S.S.R. troops.28l Steady Soviet pressure on Prime Minister Qavam, as

well as Soviet promises of troop evacuation, caused Qavam to p Q p comply with Russian demands for a Soviet-Iranian agreement.

On April 5 the Iranians announced that on April 4 an agree­

ment had been concluded with the Soviet Union which included

a Soviet promise to evacuate its troops from Iran within one

and a half months after March 24, a joint stock Irano-Soviet

oil company to be;set up and ratified by the Fifteenth Majlis

within seven months, and a settlement of the Azerbaijan situ­

279 "Iran and Russia Answer UN," Scholastic, op. cit., p. 10; United Nations, Security Council, Official Records, 1st Year, 1st Series, No. 2, ojd. cit., pp. 88-90.

280 "Limited Victory," Time, Vol. XLVII (April 15, 1946), p. 27. 28^ United Nations, Security Council, Journal of the Security Council, Vol. 1, op. cit., p. 458.

282 "Ever the Problem, Inscrutable Iran," Newsweek, Vol. XXVII (June 5, 1946), p. 42. 91 285 ation to be made according to existing laws. The oil com­ pany agreement, subject to ratification by the Iranian Majlis, was to give the Soviets 51 percent of the company's stock

while Iran received only 49 percent. This was a poor agree­ ment for the Iranians. It was an oral understanding later

approved by the Iranian cabinet and confirmed by letters be- 284 tween Qavam and the Soviet Ambassador. Although it was

necessary for the Fifteenth Majlis to consent to the oil agree­

ment, the next elections were expected to be highly pro-Soviet which would insure that the oil concession was ratified.2®^ Because of the continuing alternating pressure on

Prime Minister Qavam by Mr. Sadchikov, Soviet Ambassador at

Teheran, and by Mr. Murray, United States Ambassador, the in­

structions sent to Ambassador Ala at the United Nations were varied. These instructions alternated according to which of the two ambassadors at Teheran had most recently talked with

Prime Minister Qavam. Thus, when the American Ambassador be­ came ill and was confined to his bed the continuous Soviet

"Limited Victory," Time, op. cit., p. 27; "K voprosu o Sovetsko-Iranskom neftianom obshchestve," Novoe Vremla, October, 1947, P« 18; Shteinberg, Sovetsko-Iranskie otnoshenlia, pp. l4f.

284 Millspaugh, op. cit., pp. 198f; The Middle East (1954), p. 584f; Kirk, The Middle East 1945-1950, op.' citTT pp. 70f.

285 "Iran and Russia Answer UN," Scholastic. op. cit., p. 10; "Limited Victory," Time, op. cit., p.' 27'. 286 92 286 pressure was too great for the Iranian Prime Minister.

The result of this pressure was the previously mentioned

April 4, 1946, Soviet-Iranian Agreement and a reversal took place on April 15 when Ambassador Ala informed the Security

Council of a telegram from his government which ordered him to ask for the withdrawal of the Iranian complaint from the 287 Security Council agenda. The contradictions in the in­ structions received by Ambassador Ala have been shown by the following statement he made to the Security Council: Yesterday, 14 April, my Government instructed me to make the following statement to the Security Council:

"As a result of the signature of the agreement between the Iranian Government and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, it has been agreed that the. Red Army evacuate all Persian territory by May 6 , 1946. The Iranian Government has no doubt that this agreement will.be carried out, but at the same time has not the right to fix the course the Security Council should take."

This morning I received a further telegram from my Government reading as follows:

"in view of the fact that the U.S.S.R. Ambassador has again today, April 14, categorically reiterated that the unconditional evacuation of Iranian territory by the Red Army will be completed by May 6 , 1946, it is necessary that you immediately inform the Security Council that the Iranian Government has complete confidence in the word and pledge of the U.S.S.R. Government and for this reason

286 "Ever the Problem, Inscrutable Iran, 11 Newsweek, Vol. XXVII (June 5, 1946), p. 42; The Economist /London/, April 15,-1946, p. 577. Ibid.; United Nations, Security Council, Official Records, 1st Year, 1st Series, No. 2, p. 125. 95 nOO withdraws its complaint from the Security Council.'

During the ensuing debate the Soviet Ambassador de­ manded the withdrawal of the Iranian complaint while the 289 United States delegate opposed this removal. At the in­

sistence of the United States delegate the Security Council

kept the Iranian case on the agenda, despite the withdrawal

by the Iranian Government of its complaint. The Security

Council took cognizance of the fact that the sudden reversal

by Iran of its position occurred while Soviet troops were still in Iran. 2^0

On April 23, 19^6, Mr. George V. Allen replaced the ailing Ambassador Murray as the U. S. Ambassador to Iran at a time when the United States was taking an increasing in­

itiative in world leadership.Ambassador Allen was ener­ getic and outspoken in backing Prime Minister Qavam to resist

Soviet pressure. He convinced many Iranians that the Western world was determined to support Iran in its fight against

Soviet aggression. 2 ^2

288 United Nations, Security Council, Official Records, 1st Year, 1st Series, No. 2> ojd. cit., p. 123. 289 The Manchester Guardian, April 16, 19^6, p. 5»

29° United Nations, Security Council, Journal of the Security Council. Vol. 1, 0 £. cit., p. 555*

291 United States Department of State, Register of the Department of State, April 1, 1950 (Washington: Government Printing Office,' 1950), pp. 10f. 292 Statement by Mr. Victor Robsman, native Russian, 94

Meanwhile, on May 8 the Security Council resumed its

consideration of the Iranian c a s e . ^^5 reports called for

in the Security Council resolution of April 4 were unsatis­ factory since the Soviet Government failed to submit a report and the Iranian Government had been unable to verify officially the withdrawal of all Soviet troops.2^ Because of the ab­

sence of satisfactory reports the Security Council adopted the United States suggestion to defer further proceedings until May 20 when the Iranian Government would furnish such information as was available. After the Soviets had acquired their oil agreement from Iran on April 4 they were interested in bringing about peaceful relations between the Central Iranian Government and the Government of the Azerbaijan r e b e l s . 296 This can be ex­ plained by the fact that the ratification of the Soviet-

Iranian oil agreement depended upon the election of a Fifteenth

Majlis from all of Iran. But the holding of elections was

who lived in Iran at this time.

29^ United Nations, Security Council, Official Records. 1st Year, 1st Series, op. cit., No. 2, p. 245.

294 ibid.. pp. 246-47. 295 ibid.. pp. 247-48.

296 LeV vasil'ev, Putisovetskogo imperializma (New York: Chekhov Publishing House, 1954J, p. otJ; Ivanov, Ocherk istorii Irana. pp. 455f. 95 dependent upon the nominal submission of Azerbaijan to the central government.2^ Thus, Prime Minister Qavam announced a seven-point program which would give autonomy to Azerbaijan 2q 8 within a central government framework. ^ On April 29 Premier

Pishevari and his Azerbaijan commission arrived in Teheran for a conference on Azerbaijan autonomy. While he was con­ ferring, however, Soviet troops evacuated Iran and Premier

Pishevari hurried back to Tabriz very much on the defensive.

For the first time he had to act alone since he now lacked the close backing of the Red A r m y . 2 9 9

As late as May 20 Ambassador Ala reported to the Secur­ ity Council the inability of his government to ascertain the extent of the Soviet Union's evacuation of Azerbaijan.'500 The Iranian Ambassador stated that Soviet interferences in the in­ ternal affairs of Iran had not ceased and that it was, there­ fore, impossible to determine the withdrawal of all Soviet troops from Iran.^0-1- On May 21, however, in another letter

297 Kirk, The Middle East 19^5-1950, 0 £. eft., pp. 7^f. 298 The Manchester Guardian, April 23, 19^6, p. 5.

299 Kirk, A Short History of the Middle East, op. cit., pp. 270-71.

•^00 United Nations, Security Council, Official Records, 1st Year, 1st Series, Supplement No. 2, pp. 52fj ’’Ever the Problem, Inscrutable Iran,” Newsweek, op. cit., p. 32.

-501 The Economist /London7. May 2 5 , 19^6, p. 833; The Manchester Guardian, May 22, 194o, p. 5. 96 to the Security Council, Ambassador Ala reported the receipt of a telegram from Prime Minister Qavam which confirmed the complete withdrawal of all Soviet troops from Iran, including

Azerbaijan, by May 6.202

At the forty-third meeting of the Security Council on

May 22 Ambassador Ala was invited to the Council table to clarify the Iranian situation.In his statement the Iranian representative declared that the Iranian Government was not in control of Azerbaijan; that Soviet interferences had not been stopped; that Russia was the only power interfering; and that the recent discussions between Prime Minister Qavam and

Premier Pishevari had taken place in the continuous presence of Soviet Ambassador Sadchikov.'^ The Security Council then adjourned the discussion of the Iranian question until such a time as something further from the Government of Iran could be submitted.^0^ Even though all uniformed Soviet troops were now out

united Nations, Security Council, Official Records, 1st Year, 1st Series, Supplement No. 2, pp. 53f; 71 Ever the Problem, Inscrutable Iran," Newsweek, op. cit., p. 32; Legis­ lative Reference Service, Trends in Russian Foreign Policy Since World War I, A Chronology of Events from March 15, 1917, to January 1, 1947 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1947), p. 43. 2®2 united Nations, Security Council, Official Records, 1st Year, 1st Series, No. 2, pp. 291-292.

50lf Ibid., pp. 293-98. 205 "Ever the Problem, Inscrutable Iran," Newsweek, op. cit., p. 32. 97 of Iran the Security Council did not remove the Iranian com­

plaint from its agenda. A general dislike for the Soviet

methods used in the Iranian dispute was expressed by some

members of the Security Council. There was consideration

of a resolution condemning Soviet tactics and conduct in the

Security Council.

Since relations between the Azerbaijan and Iranian

Governments were still strained, the Security Council had

not removed the Iranian question from the Council Agenda.

There were street fights in Tabriz between the Azerbaijan 307 and Iranian Government troops. An agreement was reached

in Tabriz on June 13 between Premier Pishevari and Prince

Firuz of the Central Iranian Government on a program similar to the one previously proposed by Prime Minister Qavam,

Beginning in June the Tudeh Party organized a series of strikes by oil workers and revolts by peasants. In July 1946 the Tudeh Party led a general strike in Abadan. Thus, Tudeh activities extended from Azerbaijan to the Persian Gulf.

Prime Minister Qavam formed a new cabinet on August 1 includ­ ing three members of the Tudeh Party and pro-Tudeh Muzaffir

United Nations, Security Council, Official Records, 1st Year, 1st Series, No. 2, o]3 . eft., pp. 287-94. 307 Journal de Teheran, May 23, 1946, pp. If.

Journal de Teheran, June 16, 1946, p. 1. 98

Firuz, Vice-Premier and Minister of Labor and Propaganda. On

September 8 , 19^6, Firuz claimed to have unearthed an anti-

Government plot among the Bakhtiari leaders. Later in Septem­ ber a number of southern Iranian tribes revolted and demanded the cabinet resign, except for Qavam; autonomy similar to that

of Azerbaijan; and release of the Bakhtiari leaders being held by Firuz. Prime Minister Qavam resigned on October 17 and reformed his cabinet without the three Tudeh ministers. 30Q Muzaffar Firuz was appointed Ambassador to Moscow. ^ Fin­ ally, on November 5* very much encouraged by the forceful at­ titude of the United States in its policy with respect to the Middle East, and especially on the whole problem of Azerbaijan,

Prime Minister Qavam announced that national elections would take place on December 7« On November 17 the arrest was re­ ported of one hundred prominent Tudeh Party members in Teheran.

Prime Minister Qavam announced plans to send government troops to all parts of the country to keep order during the elections.

Accordingly, on November 25, the order was given for troops to move into Azerbaijan.Ambassador Allen, by way of encouragement, stated that the action of the Central Iranian

Government in sending security forces into Azerbaijan was

5°9 The Middle East (195*0, p. 585; Kirk, The Middle East 19^5-1950, op. cit., p. 77ff; Jones, o£. cit., p. 5Yf. 310 Ibid; Journal de Teheran, November 26, 19^6, p. 1. 99 entirely normal and proper.311 0n December 7 Acting United

States Secretary of State Dean Acheson endorsed Ambassador

Allen's statement

On December 5> the Security Council was informed that

Soviet Ambassador Sadchikof had advised Prime Minister Qavam

not to send troops into Azerbaijan. Nevertheless, in contin­

uing his letter to the Secretary-General of the United Nations,

Ambassador Ala told the Security Council of Iran*s definite

plans to move troops into northern Iran.-^13 The Security

Council did not do anything else about the Iranian complaint.

War broke out in Iran when government troops supported

by armor and airplanes entered Azerbaijan on December 93 19*1-6.

For one day the Azerbaijan "Democrats11 resisted while Premier

Pishevari called for a struggle against the reactionary forces of Teheran.31*^ The Azerbaijan resistance collapsed quickly,

however, as the government forces continued toward Tabriz.

Premier Pishevari ordered his troops to lay down their arms

and he fled to the Union of Soviet Socialist R e p u b l i c s .315

3 H Rossow, o£. cit., p. 32.

312 The New York Times, December 7, 19*^6, p. 1.

515 United Nations, Department of Public information, Yearbook of the United Nations 19*1-6-7. op. cit., pp. 335-56. 31*j. Journal de Teheran, December 9, 19*1-6, p. 1.

315 Kirk, The Middle East 19*1-5-1950. op. cit., p. 82. /Mr. Pishevari was reportedly killed in an automobile accident in Russia^ 100

On December 11 the Tabriz radio reversed its stand by praising 316 Prime Minister Qavam where previously it had criticized him.

When the Central Iranian Government forces entered

Tabriz on December 12, demonstrations broke out in Teheran

against the Tudeh and "Democratic" Parties. The Tabriz popu­

lace welcomed the Iranian Army, and order was quickly restored

in all of Azerbaijan. The "Democrats" were dispersed and the

province of Azerbiajan was reunited to the rest of Iran.-'^

Parliamentary elections were finally held in January

and February of 19*1-7 But the newly-elected Fifteenth

Majlis did not meet until July. On October 3, 19**7* the Majlis gave Prime Minister Qavam a vote of confidence. Later

in October Qavam presented the Soviet-Iranian oil agreement for ratification.On October 22, 19*1-7* the agreement promising the Soviets a 25-year controlling interest in nor­ thern Iran oil was denied by the Majlis when Prime Minister

Qavam presented it for ratification.-^20 Just prior to the

316 journal de Teheran, December 11, 19*1-6, p. 1; and December 15* 1946, pp. l-*f’. ^-*-7 Byrnes, op. cit., p. 304; Bulletin de presse iranienne. January 51, 19*1-7* p. 1*1-; Rossow, op.. cit..* pp. j50f.

318 Donald N. Wilber, Iran: Past and Present (Princeton: Princeton University Press. 19W ) , p. 106; Bulletin de pres3 e iranienne. February 28, 1947, pp. 2f; Shteinberg, Sovetsko- Iranskieotnosheniia, op. cit., pp. 15f. 319 J. 0. Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East, A Documentary Record: 1535-1950 IPrinceton: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1956"), II, p. 26l; Ivanov, Ocherk istorii Irana, pp..Il4f. 320 Lambton, The Middle East, op. cit., p. 212; 101

October 19^7 rejection of the Soviet-Iranian oil agreement, a

Soviet tank paraded up and down the frontier across the Aras

river. A panic in Teheran was caused by wild rumors of plans to assassinate the Shah and overthrow the government.^21 soviet

Ambassador Sadchikov made a direct demand to Prime Minister 522 Qavam for ratification of the Soviet-Iranian oil agreement. American Ambassador George Y. Allen had convinced

Qavam, however, that the United States would support Iran in

its firm stand before the Russians. According to Mr. Robert

Rossow, Jr., former Political Officer at the United States Embassy in Teheran,

Soviet pressure and propaganda again reached a cre- sendo, and once again U. S. Ambassador Allen spoke up. In a memorable speech before the Irano-American Cultural Relations Society, he declared in unequivocal terras that Iran was free to choose its own course of action, and that if it chose to reject the proposed oil agreement it could count on the United States support in resisting Soviet pressures.525 The United States policy of "containing" the Soviet Union, known as the "Truman Doctrine" and first announced in March

Journal de Teheran. October 2k, 19^7, p. 1.

"Close the Door Majlis," Newsweek. Vol. XXX (November 19^7)* P» 32; Vasil'ev, 0 £. cit.. p. 260. E. L. Shteinberg, Sovetsko-Iranskie otnosheniia jL proiski Anglo-Amerikanskogo imperlarizma v Irane (Moscow: Izdatel1 st v o P r a ' v d a , 1947), p. lb; Vasil'ev, op. cit., pp. 258 f. .

323 Rossow, 0 £. cit.. pp. 17-32. 102

1947, gave American foreign policy a more forceful aspect.

The United States, just before Iran’s repudiation of the Soviet-

Iranian oil agreement, had concluded a new agreement extend­

ing the life of American advisory missions to the Iranian

Army.^2^ The Russians were openly provoked about the failure

of their oil plans but one phase of Soviet activity in Iran was closed and nothing but direct Soviet aggression could re­

open it. Soviet policy during the period 1941-1947, in summary, was concerned with World War II cooperation against the Nazis and other fascists. It had the following factors: a top al­ liance of the Communist Party, nationalist groups, and other parties of power; a hatred of the main propaganda enemy, im­ perialism; and the presence of Red Army troops in Iran. Once

Soviet forces occupied northern Iran they refused permission for Iranian troops to operate in the area and brought in a number of Moscow-trained Iranians to organize the politics and economy of the area in a way favorable to themselves.

Although the Soviet delegate to the Security Council admitted only one definite interference in the internal af­ fairs of Iran, there is little doubt that the many Soviet treaty infractions were the result of orders from Moscow.

The Soviet activity had to be part of an established Soviet

324 Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East, op. cit., pp. 275 f. strategy since the infractions could not have occurred if the individuals involved had been acting entirely on their own initiative. It is also improbable that the Soviet activity was the result of a local Soviet policy in Iran unknown to the Central Government in Moscow before November 24, 1945, because the Iranian Government directed twenty-four notes of protest to the Soviet Embassy in Teheran between May 2, 1945, and November 25, 1945 The Soviet anti-imperialistic activity in Iran during

1941-1947 was designed to make the Iranian people more willing

"to fall for Communist promises of security and improved living conditions. This activity included the establish­ ment of "friendly" administrations in the northern provinces of Iran which the Soviets controlled, and placing Iranian

Communists who had been trained for years in Russia at the head of puppet governments. Other factors were the Soviet troops, which by their nearness acted as a threat to the cen­ tral government, taking over local governmental power without elections through leaders who cooperated closely with the

United Nations, Security Council. Official Records. 1st Year, 1st Series, Supplement No. 2, pp. 44-95; Washington Post. October 15, 1945, p. 11; See Appendix B; See Appendix G, Notes 2085~5604.

526 "-what is the Communist Pattern of Aggression?" Contact, A Report prepared by the USAP Institute of Technology, September 1950, p. 2 9. 104

Soviet Union, and the adopting and echoing of Soviet propa­

ganda against free nations by these puppet leaders.

After attributing Soviet actions in Iran to be the re­

sult of an established Russian policy it becomes evident that

Soviet interferences in Iranian internal affairs bore a pat- •328 tern of external pressure and internal subversive action. The aim of this Soviet combined action was to organize the

politics and economy of the area in a way favorable to them­ selves.

The fundamental principles which guided Soviet strategy

in Iran during the period 1941-1947 were expressed as early

as 1 9 2 0 : to use local communist parties for the "subversion

of the capitalist structure and for implanting communism."

Tactically, Lenin said it was necessary "... for the Com­ munist party to resort to manoeuvers, arrangements and com­ promises with the various groups of the proletarians, with the various parties of the workers and small masters."^29

The Tudeh Party, a failure even though aided by Soviet military

527 Walter L. Wright, "Our Near Eastern Policy in the Making," Foreign Policies and Relations of the United States. The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science. Vol. 255, H. H. Ehrmann, editor (Philadelphia': The American Academy Press, 1948), p. 90.

W. H. Hindle, "The Trouble Isn’t Over in Iran," Harper’s Magazine. February 1946, pp. 136-144. 329 Kun, loc. cit.,* Lenin, loc. cit. troops, achieved a large measure of discontent within northern

Iran. There still remained in Iran an organized and active

Tudeh Party which encouraged strikes and other disorders.^0 Soviet tactics — economic, political; diplomatic and military employed in attempting to attain the strategic objective were flexible and complex. But they had failed. Obviously, a change was needed for Soviet policy in Iran at this time.

550 ’William Reitzel, Morton A. Kaplan and Constance G. Coblenz, United States Foreign Policy 19^5-1955 (Washington: The Brookings Institution,”195^77 p. 210. CHAPTER IV

SOVIET ANTI-CAPITALIST ACTIVITY IN IRAN 1947 - 1949

Soviet activity In Iran from 1941 to 1947 was a failure from the political point of view. Now, a new phase of Soviet

strategy occurred. This strategy breaks down into economic and political activities. First, the Soviet economic boy­ cott of Iran will be discussed and then Soviet anti-feudalism and anti-Americanism.

Despite the setback to the cause of communism resulting from the withdrawal of Soviet troops and Iran*s repudiation of the Soviet-Iranian oil agreement, developments in Iran re­ mained of interest to Soviet leaders. Occupation of northern

Iran during World War II had helped build a strong Tudeh

Party which, though a failure so far, still maintained many of its members and much of its strength. The formation of the Cominform in October 1947 coincided with a change in the fall of 1947 away from the cooperation and semi-cooperation with the Western Allies which the Soviet Union had pursued in Iran since 1941. Soviet policy became firmer and more aggressive, not only in Iran but all over the world. The cold war had started. Specific changes in this "turning point" of Soviet strategy toward Iran, included increased direct and indirect economic and political activity against the capitalists and 107

the ruling class, Tudeh Party agitation against American

"influence and aid" to Iran, and a reliance upon the working

people, peasants, and rank and file followers of the communist

line for the basis of Soviet support, a "united front from

below." Soviet activity grew harsher from 19*1-7 to 19*1-9 • Poli­

tical pressure was applied to all of Iran. Internal subver­

sion increased through local communist parties. On the inter­

national scene, instead of the flexible balance of power of

unreliable alliances, now two great powers, the United States

and Russia, opposed each other. "While the Soviet strategy

now included an anti-capitalist theme, this inflexible two-

bloc balance of power had the effect of developing anti-

Americanism as a secondary propaganda'enemy.

Soviet-Economic Boycott of Iran

The occupation of northern Iran by Soviet troops dis­

turbed Iran’s economy. But the Soviet Union could make little

use of foreign trade as an instrument of power during World

War II. Between 19*1-1 and 19*1-5* Soviet Russia was under heavy military pressure and was a suppliant for aid. Soviet economic

activity was generally limited to disrupting the economy of northern Iran.-'^

551 Willis C. Armstrong, "Soviet Use of Trade as a Weapon," The Threat of Soviet Imperialism, Charles Grove Haines, editor (Baltimore: TEe Johns Hopkins Press, 195*1-), Part II, p. 72. I

108

After Soviet troops evacuated northern Iran and the

Majlis refused to ratify the Soviet-Iranian oil agreement,

the Soviet Union continued to export goods into Iran without

paying customs d u e s . 552 imports to Russia from Iran during

World War II had laid the foundation for future economic dis­ turbances in Iran. The structure and aims of Soviet political

strategy were to be reflected in Soviet foreign trade. Political, not economic, consideration determined Soviet

activities. Iran's small agricultural surpluses from the

northern areas went to the. S0viet Union in exchange for sugar,

iron rails, cement, paper, and lumber. It was obvious there

would be a real problem of adjustment if Soviet markets and these Soviet goods were lost.55^

In 19^8, the Soviet Union launched a boycott of normal

trade with I r a n . -^55 p or eighteen months the Russians applied economic pressures to Iran in an attempt to re-orient Teheran's

policy. During the boycott the Soviet Union bought virtually

nothing from Iran. Requests for trade conversations were

332 Journal de Teheran, May 7, 19^7# p. 1. 333 Armstrong, o]o. cit., p. 70.

55^ J. M. Letiche, "Soviet Foreign Economic Policy: Trade and Assistance Programs," Report on the Soviet Union, Joan Pennar, editor (Munich. Germany: Institute for the Study of the U.S.S.R., 1956), p. 172.

555 "Developments of the Quarter," The Middle East Journal. Vol. IV (July 1950), pp. 332f. 109 ignored although the Caspian Sea Fisheries agreement continued

unchanged. This illustrates how the Soviet Union may be a

good customer or supplier, and then suddenly change for poli­ tical reasons.55^

The Soviet foreign trade monopoly sought a position of

minimum liability and maximum flexibility, and unilaterally

voided contracts or made changes if the communists decided

that such an action served their needs. Iran represented a

fertile ground for use of the Soviet foreign trade monopoly

to attain economic as well as non-economic ends. Iran’s de­

pendence upon the sale of raw materials involved wide swings

in price and irrational unemployment. This made Iran suscepti­

ble to Soviet economic manipulations. For example, the Soviet

Union, using dummy purchasers, bought Iranian Airways stock.

The Iranian Government caught on to this trick and disgorged 557 some of the puppet buyers. Corresponding to the direct use of trade for economic

interference in Iran was an indirect use of trade as a tool.

Communist organizations in Iran talked about trade, implying

that large orders would develop, and persuading illiterate peoples that their economic problems would be solved if they would enter into close trade relations with the Soviet Union.

556 Armstrong, ojd. cit,., p. 71f. 557 ibid.; The New York Times,, April 4, 1950, p.17. 110

This was a Soviet tool aimed at building good will that cost nothing.^^ During this postwar period the Soviet trade mission in ■33Q Iran made a profit by manipulating the Iranian sugar market. ^

The Soviet Union had go-betweens buy thirty thousand tons of sugar in Iran and hold it off of the Iranian market. This raised sugar prices and caused much discontent in Iran. Later, when the local sugar market was depleted, the Soviets sold the sugar at a considerable profit. Then, in 1949, Soviet holdings of Iranian securities were dumped onto the Iranian stock market which made stock prices drop disastrously and seriously disrupted Iran’s economy.- ^ 0 According to Mr. Lev

Vasil’ev, a Russian economist on duty with the Soviet Embassy in Teheran from 1944 to 1949, U.S.S.R. Ambassador Sadchikov told Vasil1 ev his job was to do everything possible to create economic turmoil in Iran. Vasil’ev said he was supposed

". . . t o try to bankrupt the government and the people, and to make everyone dissatisfied with the way things were going.”34l

338 Armstrong , op. cit., p. 74. 339 Congressional Record. 8j5d Congress, 1st Session, V&lume 99: Part l'O (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1953)j PP. A2l44ff £Lev Vasil'ev, as told to Donald Robinson^ 340 J Ibid. 341 Ibid. During the early part of 1949 the Soviets continued a

boycott of Iranian exports which resulted in minimizing Iran's 342 program of economic development. Also the Soviet Union

violated the Caspian Sea Fisheries Treaty by obstructing the

appointment of an Iranian director.-^''5 The treaty for the

Russian-controlled (but jointly-operated) caviar fisheries 344 required that Iranians be placed in high positions.-' The

Soviet Union refused to appoint an Iranian director. They refused, too, to repay the more than eleven tons of gold plus nearly nine million dollars in United States currency, and about eleven million dollars worth of Iranian rials owed to

Iran since World War II. This large quantity of gold and currency had been deposited with the Soviet Union for safe­ keeping during the war. It appeared that the Soviets did not want to repay this amount, partly because they hoped to force the Iranians to take out this debt in purchases In Russia at

Russian prices or probably were short in it.-^^

Soviet Anti-feudalism and Anti-Americanism

Politically, the Soviet pattern of activity which had

The New York Times, March 16 , 1949, p. 1.

Journal de Teheran, April 12, 1946, pp. 1-4.

^ George Kirk, The Middle East. 1945-1950 (London: Oxford University Press, 1954), p. 100.

The New York Times, May l6, 1949., p. 1. been pursued in Iran from 19*1-1 to 19*17 changed in the fall of

19*17 to an anti-capitalist strategy. This change in Soviet

strategy was indicated in the propaganda lines used by the

Soviet Union broadcasts to Iran. The themes of the treachery

of Iran's landlord class, American, imperialism, together with

internal reaction in Iran, and a lack of Soviet interest in

expansion into Iran were the main lines followed throughout

19*1-8 and 19*1-9 in Soviet propaganda. In one such broadcast on

November 28, 19*1-7> E. L. Shteinberg, a Moscow professor, told the Iranians that Iranian Governments were serving the wealthy bourgeoisie, persecuting political organizations, such as the

Tudeh Party, and oppressing national minorities. 346 He claimed the Iranians were tolerating American military mis­ sions which threatened the security of the Soviet Union in exactly the same way the Nazi's did in 19*1-1.Professor

Shteinberg's speech, entitled "All-Union Society for the Dissem­ ination of Political and Scientific Knowledge," stated that the rejection of the Soviet-Iranian oil agreement on October

22, 19*1-7* was counter to progressive circles of the Iranian population.„ It weakened the Soviet-Iranian relations and could not be considered as anything but an open demonstration

5*1-8 shteinberg, Sovetsko-Iranskie otnosheniia proiski Anglo-Amerikanskogo imperlalizma v Irane (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo "Pravda," 1947), p. 12. 347 Ibid., p. 16. 115 of hostility of the ruling circle of Iran toward the Soviet

Union. Professor Shteinberg reviewed the history of Iranian oil and of "imperialist" penetration into the oil of Iran.

He stated that the Soviet-Iranian Treaty of 1921 might be a

"legal basis" for the future invasion of Iran by Russia.

Furthermore, he emphasized that the treaty of 1942 between the Soviet Union and Great Britain gave Russia the right to keep troops on Iranian territory but that the United States had no such agreement with Iran. Nevertheless, he said,

American troops were brought into Iranian territory.Pro­ fessor Shteinberg accused the United States of constructing railroads, highways and airports in Iran under the pretext of helping the movement of supplies to the Soviet Union. He claimed that, in reality, the United States was being imper­ ialistic and was making Iran a military base against Russia.

He said Russia could not permit the existence of a government on her borders that was trying to change Iran into a military base for attacking the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Professor Shteinberg also said that America was trying to get hold of northern Iranian oil and wanted to make Iran a 349 second Greece. ^ In contrast to the so-called imperialistic policies

•5lf8 Ibid.. p. 8 . 3^9 ibid., p. 7 . 114

of the United States the Soviet Union was presented by Pro­

fessor Shteinberg as the savior of Iran. Professor Shteinberg

stated:

During the most difficult time in 1943-44, the Soviet Government helped Iran to overcome a food shortage, by sending there a considerable amount of grain. Soviet scientific expeditions played a considerable part in the fight against locusts, and in matters related to betterment', of medical facilities in northern Iran.350

Professor Shteinberg also mentioned the progress in the "Demo­

cratic" movement in Iran. He claimed that Azerbaijan, where

he said the Soviet Union had not interfered in the internal

affairs of Iran, gave the democratic movement much more sup­

port and asserted that all Iranian Governments after World

War II opposed democracy in I r a n . ^ 5 1

On December 22 information was released that an agree­

ment between the United States and Iran had been signed on

October 6, 1947, which would send a United States military 352 -mission to raise the efficiency of the Iranian Army. This agreement was for eighteen months with the possibility of

extension. Since the agreement was signed before the October

22, 1947, rejection of the Soviet-Iranian oil agreement by

550 Ibid.’. p. 11.

551 Ibid., p. 12. 552 United Hations Treaty Series, Volume 11, Ho. 171, Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Iran relating to a military mission to Iran /Signed at Teheran, on 6 October 19477(Wew York: Columbia University Press, 1949), pp. 303-23. 115 the Majlis, it indicated a greater interest of the United

States in Iran's affairs and rising United States influence in Iran. Early in 1948, Trud, a Soviet Union newspaper, said it appeared that U. S. Ambassador George V. Allen had given the Iranian Parliament instructions to reject the Soviet-

Iranian oil agreement.

During 19*1-8 Soviet diplomatic notes alleged that the presence of American military advisers in Iran and the im­ provement of Iranian air fields and ports under the Seven

Year Plan, With or without American advice, constituted a threat from partisans of the regime which had been overthrown.

This is another example of a Soviet attempt to make a case for the invasion of northern Iran under the 1921 treaty. The

Soviet Union sent a note to Iran protesting the American mili­ tary mission as constituting a threat to the Soviet frontiers.555 Both the United States Ambassador and the Iranian Government denied the charge. Counter-charges were made against the

Soviets in an Iranian reply. The Iranian Government

555 Trud /Moscow7, January 12, 1948, p. 4.

554 Georgians G. Stevens, "Reform and Power Politics in Iran," Foreign Policy Reports, Vol. XXVT (February 15, 1951), p. 25l. Journal de Teheran, February 4, 1948, p. 1.

556 Kirk, The Middle East 1945-1950, op. cit.. pp. 90f; The Middle East (1954), p T 5 8 6 T ^ --- 116 accused Russia of

. . . aiding Iranian rebels on Iranian soil, of har­ boring rebel leaders in Russia, of.permitting them to use a secret Russian-based radio for propaganda and of maintaining an "unfriendly" attitude by conducting "constant" array- maneuvers on the Iranian frontier. Iran demanded the surrender to It of the rebels now in Russia.557 Soviet protests against U. S. military activity in Iran appeared to be directed toward frightening the Iranian Parliament into rejecting a ten-million dollar American arms loan offer and 558 keeping the Iranian Army weak.

Early in 19^8 a Soviet clandestine raio station began operating in the name of the "Azerbaijan Democratic Party."

This station could not be traced directly to the Russian net­ work but It was obviously a Soviet propaganda source. It promised freedom to the Azerbaijanis and Kurds if they rose against the Iranian Government. The station criticized the Shah and the Iranian Government, called for revolt, and made many threats. Although the Shah was not attacked directly, he was called a tool of "Anglo-American Imperialists."259

Tension increased in Iran over continual charges by

Russia that United States representatives were engaged in

557 The Hew York Times, February 5, 19^8, p. 8 ; Journal de Teheran, February 7, 19*l-8, p. 1.

358 Economist /London/, February 7, 19^8, p. 217; J ournal de Teheran, March 51, 19FEo, p. 1.

^59 journal de Teheran, March 16, 19^8, p. 1. 117 military preparations that were unfriendly to the Soviet

Union.The Soviet radio charged- that the United States 561 was building airports in Iran. Professor Shteinberg, in

another .Moscow Radio broadcast, accused Iran of providing a military base for attacking the U.S.S.R. American military advisers were compared to Nazi agents in Iran in the Summer

of 19*1-1.In retaliation, the Iranian Government accused the Soviet Union of repeated violations of the Russo-Iranian

Treaty of Friendship of 1921. They claimed that Soviet ef­ forts to influence Iranian Government decisions were Inter­ ferences in Iran’s internal affairs. In an effort to halt the Soviet propaganda attacks, the Iranian Government asked the United States, British, and Soviet Embassies to stop publishing their daily news bulletins.^ ^ As a follow-up to both Professor Shteinberg1s speech and the Iranian Govern­ ment's request, the Soviet Embassy formally demanded that the Iranian Government suppress anti-Soviet articles and

b . A. Vredenskii, "Iran," Bolshala sovetskaia entslklopediia (2nd ed.). Vol. XVIII, p. 420; The Manchester Guardian, February 3, 1948, p. 5. 38l (j. Akopian, "Ekspansiia amerikanskogo imperializma na blizhnem i srednem vostoke," Voprosy ekonomikl, June 19^9> pp. 5Of; I. Korobeinikov, "Ekspansiia amerikansklkh monopolii v stranakh blizhnego I srednego vostoka," Vneshniaia torgovlia, February, 1951j PP* 20f. 562 Kirk, The Middle East, 1945-1950, 0 £. cit., p. 91. Journal de Teheran, April 2, 1948, pp. If. 118 ■zf, ji cartoons in the Iranian press.

Additional tension developed when Iranian authorities

made mass arrests of Tudeh members in the northern provinces,,

and the Soviet Union stopped shipping services in the Soviet-

controlled Caspian Sea shipping lines. The Soviets continued

to compare the 19*1-8 situation of American military missions

in Iran to the situation in 19*1-1 when German agents were re- 565 ported active in Iran.

These propaganda attacks were part of the war of nerves

and tension that the Soviet Union was waging against the Iran­

ian Government and the United States, and that Iran was waging

against the U.S.S.R. Soviet press reports pictured northern

Iran as ready for rebellion in June 19*1-8.This Soviet

pressure on Iran increased in August 19*1-8 apparently in an

effort to get the Iranian Government to ratify an oil agree­

ment and to resist United States military aid. During the

19^7-19^9 period, the Soviet Army staged troop maneuvers on

Iran's northern frontier. Minor border incidents were staged and served as a counterpoint in the war of nerves. The Soviet

Union kept constant pressure on Iran with Soviet expansionist probing. The Tudeh Party instigated a series of riots and

?8*1- Journal de Teheran, April 9, 19*1-8, p. 1.

3^5 fjrhfi T?f*nnnm1 st /Tnnrtnn"7. Ar>-M 1 . 1Q48. pp* 538fj The Man______.. „ __ .. „, , „ „

•^ 6 journa 1 de Teheran, July 2, 19*1-8, p. 1. 119 agitation against American "influence."567

Before the end of 1948 the Soviet spokesmen and press

organs were claiming that Americans were trying to dislodge the British in Iran. Armed clashes with Red Army troops along Iran's borders were accompanied by threats of Soviet invasion under warrant of the Treaty of 1921. The Soviets claimed that Iran was being transformed into a hostile Ameri­ can base. Soviet attacks on American aid to Iran grew into a systematic campaign of invective in 1949.^^ It is inter­ esting to note that on February 3, 1949, one thousand students including communists of the Tudeh Party, nationalists and religious extremists, demonstrated outside the Parliament building with banners demanding the cancellation of the Anglo-

Iranian Oil Company's concession and the suppression of the 369 British-owned Imperial Bank of Iran. On February 4, 1949, the Shah, Mohammed Reza Pahlevi, was supposed to speak at the University of Teheran. Before the ceremony began, a man among the press photographers fired

367 Journal de Teheran, February 15, 1949, PP. 1-4; Kirk, The Middle East 1945-1950, op.. • * P • 92. 568 Halford L. Hoskins, The Middle East (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1954), p. 178 ; Vvedenskii, loc. cit.

569 The Manchester Guardian, February 5, 1949, p. 5; Pravda /Moscow'/, February 10. 1949. p. 4. 120 a gun which had been concealed in his camera. The Shah was wounded.^7° Police shot Arai, the Shah’s would-be assassin.

Some witnesses claimed that Arai was killed by the crowd as­ sembled around him.571 According to Mr. Lev Vasil'ev, Soviet

Ambassador to Iran, Ivan V. Sadchikov, and the Soviet Consul

General, Christopher G. Oganessian, planned the assassination of the Shah. Hundreds of illegal communist cells were alerted to take over the country on February 5, 1949, the day after 372 the scheduled speech. The Russian radio took the position that the assassin was deliberately killed on the spot in order to cover up the Anglo-Americans who were responsible for the plot.575

The Soviet Government waited several days before making its first diplomatic representation in connection with accusa­ tions of Soviet complicity in the Tudeh plot.'^ Ambassador

Sadchikov lodged a formal protest on February 12th with Iranian

Foreign Minister Ali Asghar Hekmat. The following diplomatic move was reported in a Pravda communique:

570 Kaiendar1 - spravochnik (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel’stvo politicheskoi literatury, 1952), p. 696; Pravda Moscow/, February 7, 1949, p. 2.

571 Journal de Teheran,.February 5* 1949, p. 1.

572 Congressional Record, loo, cit.

575 journal de Teheran, February 9, 1949, p. 1; Pravda j/Mos co wT, February 7# 1949, p. 4.

574 journa1 de Teheran, February 15, 1949, PP» 1-4. 121

In connection with the attempt on the life of the Shah of Iran the other day, the Majlis was called into session where a new trick was played against the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics by official circles. The temporarily deputized Minister of Internal Affairs of Iran, Igbal, in the Majlis, read extracts from a mythical "notebook," purported to be selections of the rogue Aral, the one who attempted to assassinate the Shah, and the correspondent of the reactionary newspaper Parchem i_ Islam. In the "extracts" from Aral’s notebook," presented by Igbal, there were references to the alleged support by the Russians of the People's Party of Iran.

In this connection, the Ambassador of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in Iran, comrade Sadchikov, on February 12, visited the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Hekmat, and informed him of the following:

"On the sixth of February, the temporarily deputized Minister of Internal Affairs, Igbal, presented certain materials in.the Majlis, which.contained references to so-called Russian interference in the activities of Iranian political parties. The Soviet Ambassador considers that the presentation in the Majlis of these materials of doubtful origin, con­ taining evidence of slanderous fabrications, as a false and provocative act, directed against the Soviet Union and designed to aggravate Soviet-Iranian relations in order to please certain foreign circles."

Hekmat promised to convey the information of the Soviet Ambassador to his government.375 Mr. Lev Vasil'ev recalled that a directive issued early in 19*1-9 ordered an increase of the propaganda in favor of the

Tudeh Party. Mr. Vasil'ev stated that he believed this was connected with plans for a communist seizure of the Iranian 376 Government. On the day of the attempted assassination,

375 Pravda ^oscow/, February 1*1-, 19*1-9* p. *1-.

Lev Vasil'ev, Put! sovetskogo imperializma (New York: Chekhov Publishing House, 1954), pp. 2t4f. 122

all of the members of the Soviet mission In Iran were ordered

to be present In the Embassy. They were kept there throughout

the assassination attempt. When a messenger arrived with the

news that the assassination attempt had failed, Soviet Ambassa­

dor Sadchikov announced to the Soviet mission members that an

assassination attempt had taken place and that it was possi­

ble that the Soviet Union would be blamed for it. The mem­ bers of the Soviet mission were ordered to remain at the Em- 377 bassy until the end of the excitement.

As a result of an attempt to assassinate the Shah on

February 4, the Tudeh Party was outlawed by the Iranian Gov­

ernment on the following day. Fourteen Tudeh leaders were arrested. The Tudeh Party, suspended in 1946 following the settlement of the Azerbaijan crisis, was linked with the assassination. -^8 The fourteen Tudeh Party leaders went on trial in March, 1949* for anti-Government acts and for spread- 379 ing Marxism. Because of the assassination attempt many newspapers were banned, and their editors and writers were 380 arrested.

377 ibid. 378 Journal de Teheran, February 6 , 1949, p. 1; Journal de Teheran. PebruaryTo, l'949, p. 1; Pravda /Moscow/, February B7 1949* p. 4; February 10, 1949* p. 4; Izvestia /Moscow7. February 17, 1949* p. 4.

579 Journal de Teheran, March 4, 1949, p. 1; Pravda Moscow/, March 7* 19^9, p. 4'.

Journal de Teheran, February 9* 1949, p.l* 125 Nevertheless, the Soviet press and radio continued its attack on the Iranian Government. The Soviet Government asked

Iran to close its Consulate in Baku. In a border incident

Red Army troops killed one Iranian solider and wounded and captured two others. This Soviet action was intended to scare

Iran into surrender or into a hands-off policy toward the 581 United States. It raised the threat of a new war. The Russians continued their pressure on Iran by clos­ ing four more Soviet consulates at Rezavieh, Ardebil, Maku, and Tabriz, and by making another foray into northern Iran, killing two Iranians and wounding several others. The Rus­ sians claimed that the Teheran Government was suppressing the

Tudeh movement and that the territory of Iran was being con­ verted into an atomic bombing base by the United States.3^2

The Soviet Union threatened again to invoke Article 6 of the

1921 Russian-Iranian Treaty, which gave Soviet forces the right under certain circumstances to enter Iran's soil.

Russian planes flew over the Iranian frontier and were fired

February 18, 19^9, PP. 1-4; Pravda /Moscow7, February 8. 19*9, P. *• 581 The New York Times, March 15* 19*9, p. 16; March 17, 19^9', p. 15; March 26, 19*9, p. 582 Journal de Teheran, March 29, 19*9 i p. lj Journal de Teheran, March 5l, 19^9, p. 1. 124 ■58'3 upon by Iranian anti-aircraft. ^

According to Lev Vasil’ev’s perhaps exaggerated state­ ment in which some unreliability may be found, Soviet spies worked within the Illegal Tudeh Party of Iran and had five methods of activity: (l) infiltration of Soviet agents into

Iranian Army, Government and business life (Iranian boys trained

in Moscow were sent back to Iran as Russian agents to spy and run the country in event of a coup d ’etat); (2) bribing and blackmailing of all possible Iranian public officials; (3) disrupting Iran's economy through the nationalization of the

Abadan refinery and any other measures that might create economic turmoil (United States Lend-Lease supplies were sold on the Iranian black market); (4) breaking down law and order by a concerted campaign of terror (this campaign included riots and assassinations. Riots by the most extreme nationalists were really planned inside the Soviet Embassy. The Soviet subsidized press and a few well-trained agitators would whip up the public. All riots were planned to serve Soviet ends and were used chiefly to sap the Iranian people's confidence in their government); and (5) conducting a religious press propaganda campaign (Soviet Azerbaijanians were taught to be Mohammedan priests, and were sneaked into Iran as Russian propagandists when their training was completed. Only

382 Vvedenskii, ojd. cit., p. 421. 125 communist priests were assigned by the Cathileos of Soviet

Armenia to the Iranian parishes of the Gregorian Church of

Iran. These activities were financed from smuggling through ,384 the diplomatic pouch.)

Meanwhile, increased tension along the Soviet-Iranian border was indicated by Red Army occupation of three Iranian border posts. Fifteen Iranian soldiers and one peasant were kidnapped in Red Army raids in April 1949. During the summer of 1949, the Red Army made frequent forays onto Iranian soil.

Because of these raids, the Iranians reinforced their Soviet frontier. Russian and Iranian troops exchanged fire along the border.

The Soviet war of nerves caused the Iranians to require that all religious group leaders concern themselves only with religious matters. This measure, emphasized in a decree of

July 27, 1949, also required that religious leaders be sub­ jects of Iran.'5^ At the same time as this Russian activity was occurring, shipments of surplus arms from the United States were being delivered in Iranian ports. The first shipment of arms

384 Congressional Record, loc. cit.

5^5 journal de Teheran, May 20, 1949, p. 1; August 12, 1949, p. 1; August ~2bj 1949 , p. lj September 4, 1949, p. 1.

Journal de Teheran, July 27, .1949, p. 4. 126

arrived in Iran at the Persian Gulf port of Bandar Shahpur on

February 9, 1949. This shipment, a twenty-six million dollar deal, included more than fifty planes and some light tanks.^ 7

Even with this United States support it is surprising that

the Iranians did not give in to the Soviet display of direct

and indirect pressure during 1949. But the Iranian Govern­

ment gained a new stimulus and determination out of the Russian attacks.

During the period 1947 to 1949 the Soviet Union pursued

an anti-capitalist strategy which had the following factors; a bottom alliance of the working people, peasants, and rank

and file followers of the communist line; a hatred of the

main propaganda enemy which included capitalism as well as

American "imperialism"; political pressure from the Soviet

Union on the Government of Iran; and internal subversion

through a militant aggressiveness from the Tudeh Party. Na­

tionalist leaders and their followers were denounced as trai­

tors and servants of capitalism.

This was a period of Increased internal subversion.

Apparently the Soviets attempted but failed to create both

economic and political chaos in Iran. It is true that com­

munist-inspired interference caused widespread anti-Government

reaction among the Iranian people. Nevertheless, the Teheran

387 Vvedenskii, on. cit., p. 420; Pravda /Moscow7. February 11, 19^9* p. 4. Government was capable of meeting this reaction with strong

resistance and the Soviets had to change their strategy again.

The 19^7-t0-19^9 Soviet strategy illustrates the prac­ tice of the Comintern's and Lenin's advice of 1920: "To pro­ mote the development of class consciousness in the working masses under the leadership of the class-conscious proletariat, and

The more powerful enemy can be vanquished only by . . . using . . . every antagonism of interest among the bourgeoisie of the various countries and among the various groups or types of bourgeoisie within the various countries . . . .3 8 8

When these forces failed, the U.S.S.R. started devis­ ing new tools.

Kun, loc. cit.; Lenin, loc. cit. CHAPTER V

SOVIET ANTI-ANGLO-AMERICAN ACTIVITY 19^9-1952

Politically, Soviet activity in Iran from 19^7 to 19^9

was a failure. The new phase of Soviet activity which re­

sulted from this failure again breaks down into economic and

political activities. But the political activities include

the nationalization of Iran’s oil and the fall from power of

the main force behind the oil nationalization: Dr. Mossadegh.

This was the second period between 19^1 and 1957 that Soviet strategy came close to achieving total success.

Bitter experience and postwar changes in warfare's

concept had taught the Soviets that their continued militant,

aggressive strategy would not gain for them a position of in­

fluence in Iran. Instead, the Iranians stiffened their re­ sistance to Soviet intimidations. Hence, after the Shah's

announcement of his intention to visit the United States in

the fall of 19^9j the Soviets changed their militant strategy.

The new strategy had characteristics of both the anti-imperial­

ist and anti-capitalist strategies. It was typified by a top alliance of anti-imperialist party leaders as well as a bottom alliance of peasants, workers, and other "exploited" classes. Anglo-American "imperialism" was the main propaganda enemy. According to Lev Vasil'ev, the Soviets began:

. . . a change in operations; they began to speak of 129 an orientation to national circles concerning the neces­ sity regardless of anything else to weaken the contact of Iran with the western countries, to hinder the realiza­ tion of the project of the Seven Year Plan, and to force the English from their Iranian Petroleum saddle. 989 The Soviet appeal included an effort to win Iran

through smiles and peace campaigns. Despite these peace

feelers, however, the Soviets maintained a firm position in their demands. The war of nerves continued. The Russians

merely attempted to ease tension between the Soviet Union and

Iran by not applying direct political pressure on Iran. In­

stead, more emphasis was placed upon militant activity by the

Tudeh Party which joined a National Front group and conducted

internal pressure through strikes and riots not directly at­

tributable to the Soviet Union.

Soviet Resumption of Trade with Iran In the fall of 19^9 the Soviet Union abandoned its boycott of trade with Iran. The U.S.S.R. sold one hundred thousand tons of wheat to Iran, Issued instructions to its frontier officials to be more courteous to Iranians, and agreed to the appointment of an Iranian director for the

Soviet-Iranian Caspian Sea Fisheries.These were evidently attempts by the Russians to ease the tension between the

•380 Lev Vasil’ev, Puti sovetskogo imperlallzma (New York: Chekhov Publishing House, 195^), p. 2o0. 590 George Kirk, The Middle East 1945-1950 (London: Oxford University Press, 1954), p.’ 100. 120

Soviet Union and Iran and to compete with the United States.

Direct Soviet pressure on Iran’s economy ceased and peaceful 391 economic cooperation was emphasized.

Meanwhile., although the Export-Iraport Bank advanced a

loan of twenty-five million dollars to Iran in October 19*1-9,

for the purchase of agricultural and road-building machinery,

the Iranians wanted much more. In addition, President Truman's

pronouncement of the Point Pour program for immediate urgent

minimum need resulted in only haIf-a-million dollars being

allocated for improving health, agriculture, and education

in Iran. This was another severe disappointment to the Iran­ ians.

The Soviets, taking advantage of Iranian dissatisfaction with Britain and the United States, offered a new trade agree­ ment to Iran.'^ This agreement (implementing the Treaty of Trade and Navigation of 19*1-0) was to have a value of commercial 394 exchanges expected to reach eight million pounds sterling.

Anthony T. Bouscaren, "Stalin Looks at Iran," Catholic World, Vol. 17*1- (January 1952), p. 26^.

Izvestia /Ivfoscow/, August 19, 1950, p. 4; Peter Calvacoressi, Survey of International Affairs 1951 (London: Oxford University Press, 1954), P* 229.

Bouscaren, loc. cit.; "Chronology," Middle Eastern Affairs, Vol. I (December 1950"), p. 58l.

The Economist, November 11, 1951, p. 7*1-8; Journal de Teheran, November 5, 1950, pp. If; November 6 , 1950, p. 1. I

151 It was signed at Teheran on November 4, 1950* by Ambassador

Sadchikov of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and

Prime Minister Razmara, of Iran, Included with the agreement

was a supplement of the list of trade goods for twelve months

beginning November 10, 1950.-^ Iran was to exchange such

commodities as cotton, tobacco, rice, dried fruits, and hides

for Russian textiles, cement, sugar, glass, machinery and

other manufactured g o o d s . -^ 6 This created a change in the

Iranian attitude^Znd Iranian opinion shifted so much in favor

of the Russians that the whole Teheran press, whether anti-

Soviet or pro-Soviet, gave extravagant congratulations for the

signing of the trade agreement and the re-establishment of 398 trade relations between the two countries. The concluding of the trade agreement was delayed be­

cause the Soviet Union wanted to deal directly with the Iran­

ian merchants and the Iranian Government did not want the

395 Izvestia /Moscow7, November 7, 1950, p. 6 ; Vneshniaia politika sovetskogo soiuza, 1950 (Moscow: Gosu- darstvennoe izdatel’stvo pollticheskoi literatury, 1955 -)-* p. 255; Ivanov, op.. cit., p, 457.

398 Journal de Teheran, November 6 , 1950, p. 1. 3 9 7 Journal de Teheran, November 7* 1950, p. 1. 398 y. Bashkirov, Ekspansiia anglilskikh i amerikan3kikh imperialistov v Irane (1941-1955)(Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel'stvo politicheskoi literatury, 1954), p. 185; Pravda ^ioscow7, November 7* 1950, p. 6 ; Izvestia ^Moscow/, November 19* 1950* p. 4. 152

Russians to have access to Iranian individuals. ^99 Although

Prime Minister Razmara reportedly stood firm and Soviet Am­

bassador Sadchikov apparently dropped this demand, there is

nothing in the pact to indicate that the Russians would deal

only with official Iranian agencies under Governmental con­

trol and not with Iranian individuals.1^ The Soviets failed to follow this condition. According to Mr. Philip Toynbee who was in Iran at this time,

The signing of the treaty had been delayed because Razmara had wisely insisted that the Russians should trade only with official Iranian agencies under Govern­ mental control. This was an obvious measure of security intended to prevent Russian agents from having:'free access to private Iranian individuals. "When the agreement was finally signed, the press was given to understand that Razmara had at last overcome the stubborn resistance of the Russian Ambassador on this point. But we soon dis­ covered that the clause had been accepted only by "verbal agreement" — and soon after that we discovered, without surprise, that the Russians had begun to trade where and with whom- they chose.401

This trade agreement enabled the Soviet Union to make in­ dividual negotiations and transactions but did not stimulate li.02 much trade. Talk of more trade between Iran and the Soviet

•5" Dad /Teheran7. May 24, 1950, pp. If. 400 The Economist /London/, November 18, 1950, p. 801.

1*’01 Philip Toynbee, "Iran is Important because It is Weak," The New York Times Magazine, March 18, 1951* p» 44. 402 Armstrong, ojd. cit., pp. 75ff; Developments of the Quarter," The Middle East Journal, Vol. V (Spring, 1951), p. 197; Journal de Teheran, January 2, 1951, p. 1; January 4, 1951, p. 1; January 8 , 1951, p. 1. 153 Union continued during 1951 and 1952 but very little trade developed.

The Soviet Union, by way of showing itself more fav­ orable to Iranian nationalism than the British, dissolved the

Iranian-Soviet Caviar Fisheries Company in early 1953* and was unusually accomodating when helping the Iranian manage­ ment look for new markets. Nevertheless, later in 1953* the Soviet press raised disturbances in Iran against Prime 4o4 Minister Mossadegh's new agricultural reform policy.

At the same time that new Soviet diplomatic moves began in the summer of 1953* involving a settlement offer to Prime Minister Mossadegh of Soviet-Iranian disputes, the U.S.S.R, negotiated trade agreements with Iran. The exchange of Iran- iran rice and cotton for Soviet agricultural equipment, textiles and sugar was doubled. Iran's entire year's production of its National Fisheries Company was sold to the Soviet Union.

V In general, it can be said that Soviet economic policy evolved during 1949-1953* from direct external pressure against

Iran's economy to an obvious awareness of the political and

Journal de Teheran, April 7* 1952, p. 1; April 28. 1952, p. 1; June 1, 1952, p. 1; "Developments of the Quarter, The Middle East Journal. Vol. V (Finter, 1951)* p. 78. 404 __ Pravda /Moscow/, December 24, 1952, p. 3; February 3* 1953* p. 2; New York Times, February 21, 1953* p. 3.

^05 "Developments of the Quarter," The Middle East Journal. Vol. VII (Autumn, 1953)* p. 5091 "Chronology,11,1 Middle Eastern Affairs. Vol. IV (August-Sept., 1953)* p. 30o. 13^ economic benefits to be derived from foreign trade.

Soviet War of Nerves Continues

After two years of intensive anti-capitalist activity and continuous tension, during which the Soviet Union tried to undermine the Iranian Government, the Russian line switched to a relaxation of tension.An indication of this shift in the Soviet attitude came on September 25, 19^9> when the

Soviets released eleven Iranian soldiers who had been captured koi by the Russians in a border incident. Although border incidents did not cease immediately, they gradually faded away. Instead, the Tudeh Party exploited Iranian unrest and continued the war of nerves through unremitting internal pressure against the Iranian Government. According to C. L. Sulzberger, who was in Iran at this time, Soviet

Profits from commercial sales to Iran have been em­ ployed for subversive propaganda here. Probably founded on a base of no more than four or five thousand real Communist militants, the underground Tudeh Party of many thousands has been built among discontented elements.

The present Moscow tactics seems to be to give the vague impression to Teheran that it is about to adopt a somewhat less hostile attitude — while simultaneously economic and subversive political pressure continues. And the worried regime appears helpless to hoist the

Journal de Teheran, August T, 1950., p. 1.

'^°7 Kirk, The Middle East 19^5-1950, ojd. cit., p. 1 0 0 . 155 408 country out of its rut.

In conjunction with this new strategy a massive propaganda campaign was launched by Iran's underground Tudeh Party which attacked the Shah, the United States, and Britain. Anti-

Anglo-American posters and literature appeared. Two clandestine newspapers, one with a circulation of 10 ,000 , published daily 409 pro-Soviet articles.

However, officially the Soviet Union stepped up its campaign for Iranian friendship by agreeing to discuss their long-standing border disputes which had revolved around the supposed United States flights along the Soviet-Iranian bor­ der in early 1950. This move apparently was intended to block negotiations under way with the United States for a loan to bolster the Iranian economy against communist pressure The Soviets had protested against United States air surveys 411 for the third time in a year. They accused Iran of using

American experts to take aerial photographs along the Soviet-

C. L. Sulzberger, "Moscow Pressure Worries Teheran," The New York Times, April 5* 1950, p. 17. ^09 Kalendar'-spravochnik (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel'stvo politicheskoi literatury, 1952), p. 6 9 6 ; Izvestia ^oscow7, May 19, 1950, p. 5j Edward Weintal, Red Menace Revived/' Newsweek, Vol. XXXV (March 15, 1950), p. 40. Ibid.

^ Pravda ^oscow7, May 5* 1950, p. 4; Vneshniala politika sovetskogo soiuza, pp. l68 ff; "Chronology," Middle Eastern Affairs, Vol. I (June-July 1950), p. 207. 136 ki2 Iranian border. These aerial photographs were claimed to

be of military significance. This called, the Soviet Govern- 413 ment said, for possible Soviet invasion of Iran.

The Shah of Iran, Mohammed Reza Pahlevi, stated that

the 1921 Irano-Soviet Treaty of Friendship provided for Soviet

intervention only in the event of warlike activities on the part of counter-revolutionary White Russians. Under Article

103 of the United Nations Charter, any complaints of the

Soviet Union should be directed to the United Nations rather than to Iran directly. But, after the Russians had complained,

Iran pledged that no foreign photographers would be allowed to take photographs on the Soviet-Iranian border and foreign klk correspondents were barred from visiting the Azerbaijan area. Shortly after the Soviet-Iranian trade agreement was signed on November k, 1950* other pro-Soviet gestures were made by the Iranian Government: the banning of the Voice of

America programs over the Iranian State Radio System because of Russian protests against them; the expulsion of American technical experts; the escape from prison with little "official

Izvestia ^oscow7, May 10, 1950, p. 2: Journal de Teheran, May.17, 1950, p. 4; May 18, 1950, pp. 1-4.

pravda /Moscow/, June 22, 1950, p. 2; Vneshniaia politika sovetskogo soiuza, pp. l85f; "Developments of the Quarter," The Middle East Journal, Vol. IV (July, 1950), p. 3 3 7 . ink 1 Journal de Teheran, July 2k, 1950, p. 1; July 30, 1950, p. 1; 11 Chronology,Middle Eastern Affairs, Vol. I (August-September 1950), p. 2fe2. 157 dismay of previously arrested Tudeh Party leaders; and the

rejection of the British Oil Company agreement

But even while the Russians were conducting a friend­

ship campaign officially, the "Azerbaijan Democratic Station,"

a Soviet Radio Station, urged the Kurds to attack Iranian of­

ficials in defiance of the Teheran government. The "Democra­

tic Party of Azerbaijan" openly called for revolt against the

Shah and to throw out Anglo-American imperialists. Propa­ ganda against the Shah became increasingly harsh. Kurdish

tribesmen revolted on September 2, 1950, a revolt which un­

doubtedly was stimulated by broadcasts from the secret radio An fi station on the Soviet side of the Azerbaijan border. During the period under consideration the Iranian Com­

munists conducted several peace campaigns. These peace cam­

paigns appealed to Iranian idealism and contrasted sharply

with the military policies and collective security system of A17 the United States. In December 1950, over 500,000 Iranians

signed the Stockholm Peace Appeal which was sponsored by the

Izvestia /KoscowJ, November 2, 1950, p. 4; Journal de Teheran, November 25, 1950, p. 1, citing L ’Ettelaat, November 22, 1950; "Chronology, Middle Eastern Affairs, Vol. I (December, 1950), p. 382.

^-*•6 Journa 1 de Teheran, September 8 , 1950, p. 1.

417 Frederick Barghoorn, "The Ideological Weapon in Soviet Strategy," The Threat of Soviet.Imperialism,"Charles Grove Haines, editor (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1954), p. 90. 138 4l8 "Partisans for Peace." Because Soviet propaganda used a wide range of means once the end of communism was assumed, almost any means were permitted. Propaganda is an ever- 419 changing instrument of ideology.

The pattern of Soviet intrigue became more and more

evident during the winter of 1950 and 1951. While the Tudeh

Party continued to agitate, its agents infiltrated into other parties which were used as instruments of nationalistic fer­ ment. Iranian Communist workers fanned the flame of nation­ alism within the other parties and weakened the authority of the government. Although the Russians were not applying di­ rect pressure, either political or economic, on the Iranians, the Soviet Government was doing its utmost to bring Iran un­ der communist control without the use of armed forces other 420 than the combat troops of the Tudeh Party. These troops included trained native personnel to carry their ideology to each political, cultural and social group, for the com­ munists realized the importance of direct personal agitation

Ivanov, Ocherk istorii Irana, p. 457; Bashkirov, op. cit., p . 1 8 6 .

^•*■9 Barghoorn, loc. cit. 420 "Iran," V zashchitu mira, September 1955> P* 95; Journal de Teheran, January 22, 1951, p. 1; Jules Menken, ''The Role of Force in Soviet Policy," The Threat of Soviet Imperialism, op. cit., p. 125. 421 and propaganda. Another Soviet technique for infiltrating

into Iran's government and economy was to educate distinguished 422 local citizens sympathetic to the Moscow regime. Non­

sympathizers knew what life was like in Western society and

so competition started between communism and the West. The

victories of communism were based upon the failures of sta­

bility of the present administration.^^ The discontent of 4p4 many Iranians with the West and its allies aided the Russians.

The anti-imperialist front which the Tudeh Party in­

filtrated from 1949 to 1955 was an alliance of groups that 42R espoused the cause of nationalism. J Included in the alliance were students, religious fanatics, Iran's intelligentsia and

a specific group of rabid nationalists. In the absence of

a democratic structure of the government, their union was

possible because nationalism and communism grew up together

421 United States Department of State, Iran: Point of World Interest, Department of State Publication 4628 ^Washington: Government Printing Office, 1952), p. 7; Barghoorn, op_. cit., p. 91.

Gunnar.D. Kumlien, "All Foreigners are Alike," Commonweal, Vol. LTV (August 51, 1951), p. 499. ^25 Antonio Micocci, "Discussion," The Threat of Soviet Imperialism, Charles Grove Haines, editor (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1954), p. 9 8 . 424 Nathaniel Peffer, "Lenin and the Course of Colonial Communism," Yale Review, Vol. XLVT (September 1955). P. 17. ' " ~~ 425 Bashkirov, 0 £. cit., p. 268. in Iran. Iranian nationalism was a social and cultural

phenomenon. Its rapid rise since the end of World War II had

been due partly to the destitution and despair of most Iran- 426 ians. It stood for independence, home rule, and evacua­

tion of foreign forces. The dislike and distrust of foreigners

and the strong awareness of their own national aspirations 427 have characterized nationalism in Iran. It might be said that the Iranian Communists have made political capital 428 within this nationalistic movement for their own ends.

The union of communists and nationalists in Iran was designed to promote an improvement of the existing outmoded adminis­ tration. But Iranian Communists used the national, anti­ imperialist front as a stepping stone toward the establish- 429 ment of a Mossadegh and later of a pro-communist regime.

4 26 United States Department of State, Iran: Point of World Interest, Department of State Publication 4628 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1952), p. 5«

Philip Toynbee, "Behind Iran's Seething Nationalism, Crisis in the Middle East,- Edward Latham, editor (New York: The H. H. Wilson Company, 1952), pp. 38ff.

A. Y. Bashkirov, Bkspansiia angliiskikh i amerikanskikh imperialistov v Irane (19^-1-19^5) (Moscow: Gosudar st vennoe i zda tel * stvo politicheskoi literatury, 1954), pp. l86 ff.

Walter P. Laqueur, Communism and Nationalism in the Middle East (New York: Frederick' A. Praeger', 1956'), p. 295. / pETs volume does not include a discussion of Iran. However, several references to Iran are in the conclusion^/ The Iranian Communists claimed they fought against im­ perialism and social injustice just as the nationalists. The simplest grievances and poverty or bad working conditions, and dissatisfactions of the intellectual middle and upper classes, were used to gain sympathy for the popular front with local communism. The Iranian Communists also held out thebope of a national regeneration to Iran. Their claims promising national and cultural fulfilment hid their exploita­ tion and colonization.^0 This false nationalism was the most powerful weapon of the pseudo-religious appeal of communism in Iran. In fact, communism had the same appeal as a religion. The revival of Islam was perverted and exploited by the Iranian Communists for their own ends. The Iranians are almost all "... Shi’ah Moslems, a branch of Islam which is more fanatical and more exacting than the dominant Sunnis of

Egypt and the Arab world." When the Iranians demonstrated against the imperialists it was "... against a group of im- ^32 pious barbarians who have no respect for the Koran." Ac­ cording to Philip Toynbee, who was in Iran during this period, communists appeared

Barghoorn, oju cit., p. 90.

^51 Robert Nigel Carew Hunt, The Theory and Practice of Communism (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1957), p. 6. ^ 2 Philip Toynbee, "Behind Iran’s Seething National­ ism," The New York Times Magazine, October 7, 1951, p. 56. 142

. . . in the guise of extreme and fanatical nation­ alists, and many of their cover organizations have such skillfully misleading titles as "The Brotherhood of the Koran." They have far more sense than to preach dialecti­ cal materialism to starving peasants, or to harp on the strength of the Soviet Union. To most poor Iranians who have come into contact with the Tudeh Party, that party represents merely a more drastic and extreme form of na­ tionalism. Tudeh propagandists outdo Mossadegh in their vituperations against the British; in fact they condemn u the Prime Minister as a tool of the Western imperialists. ^

The existence of a religion is not an automatic guarantee

against communist penetration. One aspect of communism in Iran is that perhaps it

. . . represents the inversion of faith by the dis­ illusioned .... Communism permits the believing person to reject his faith and keep it, too. He rejects the faith which he considers has failed him, usually because its leaders fail to practice it, at least in his eyes, and replaces it with a new set of ideas and symbols into which he infuses the content of his old sentiments.4^4

The Marxists were able to employ successfully for their own purposes in Iran the ideals, symbols and principles of men and movements which were opposed to them. Hence, Iran's authoritarian Islamic society, in a state of disintegration, made cooperation with communism in a National Front a dis­ tinct possibility. Reactionary groups who refused to take cognizance of anything new collaborated with the Iranian communists. Mob rule and emotionalism resulted in demonstra-

Philip Toynbee, "Behind Iran's Seething Nationalism," The New York Times Magazine,,October.7j 1951j P» 5d» 4?4 ibid., p. 54. 1^5 tions and political adjustments.^55

The communists' combined strategy in Iran of anti-

imperi&list and anti-capitalist themes had the advantage of

appealing at the same time in two different directions. The

nationalism of the land-owners, officers, state employees, and intellectuals, was aroused by the Tudeh Party's anti-

imperialist appeals. The desire for better living conditions among the peasants and lower middle class was aroused by the appeal of the local communist democratic movement. Iranian communism profited from this latter group's bitter feeling against the landlords of Iran as well as from the nationalism of the anti-imperialist groups. But there were some legiti­ mate grievances against both foreigners and landlords. The landlords diverted popular bitterness from themselves by centering it upon the foreigners.^36 r^g landlords then joined Iran's extremist forces, - the communist and Moslem fanatics - in anti-imperialist agitation since they were the most militant and dynamic parties promising innumerable im­ provements in economic conditions. ^ 7 However, the peoples of Iran were

^35 Laqueur, o]d. cit., pp. 278, 280, 2 8 5 . ^ 6 Hall, op_. cit., p. 1.

*K57 Robert Payne, "Pour Shots in Teheran," United Nations World, Vol. V (May.1951)> P» 17. l44

. . . duped by the cunning and fraudulent use against themselves of their own ideals, principles and symbols. General awareness that the Kremlin uses democracy against democrats and capitalism against capitalists has come tragically late.458

While the Iranians made up their minds, the Soviets attempted to convince Iran, and the West that the Soviet Union llXQ had no aggressive designs on that country. The Russians in Iran were careful not to appear anywhere during a crisis, but rather to show an official tt lack of interest. «44o The first step of Soviet diplomacy was to convince the local Iran­ ian Government that the Soviet Union had no intention of spon- 44l soring a communist seizure of power. The Soviet plan was to wait patiently and be ready for the inevitable opportun- 442 ity. Political instability and recurrent disorder were certain to give the local communists their opportunity. Com­ munism intended to win by default after the local government had lost its control.

^38 Barghoorn, op_. cit., p. 97• ^39 c. E. Black, "The Role of Diplomacy in Soviet Imperialism," in Haines, ojd. cit., p. 106.

Kumlien, op. cit., p. 199; The Economist, June 9, 1951, pp. 1360f. Black, o]3. cit_., p. 105.

E. Day Carman, Soviet Imperialism: Russia's Drive Toward World Domination (Washington: World Affairs Press, 1950), p. 155.

^ 3 Peffer, op. cit., p. 28. In summary, Soviet strategy during 1949-1953 was to

arouse the entire peasantry and working class against the

landowners, to strengthen the alliance between the peasantry

and workers, and to develop a broad nation-wide "united front"

of all anti-imperialist classes. Great caution was exhibited

by the Russians, however. The Iranians had become sus­

picious of the Soviet motives. Therefore, Soviet propaganda

no longer emphasized a class struggle to revolutionize Iranian

society and an effort was made to promote antirWestern feel­ ings and mistrust of the Iranian Government .^ 5 ^he local

communists worked to create such economic and political chaos

in Iran that the government would collapse. At the same time

they exploited the nationalist sentiment of the Moslems and

of the rabid nationalists, affording local communist agents 446 an opportunity to seize power when the time was right. The most significant changes in local communist tac­ tics were away from the policies of civil and guerilla war­ fare, sabotage, terror, and class struggle. Communist policies changed to an emphasis on peaceful co-existence between classes, as well as between nations. Instead of fighting the

444 The Economist. June 9j 1951, PP» 1360-61.

445 Vasil*ev, Put! sovetskogo imperializma, op. cit., p. 262; United States Department of State, Iran: Point of World Interest, op. cit., p. If; Pravda /Moscow/, February 2 8 , 1951 , p." 4; March 19, 1951,. p. 3. ^ 6 Congressional Record, loc_. cit. 146

nationalist parties, the Iranian Communists made peace with

them and drew them into other anti-foreign, anti-imperialist

forces. The Tudeh Party switched from attacking the nation­

alists to joining them in a National Front.

Nationalization of Iranian Oil

The nationalization of Iran's oil was not only a

crippling blow to the Iranian economy, but also a significant

inroad to political dominance by the communists. The campaign

to nationalize Iran's southern oil fields began with Soviet

propaganda which stirred up bad feeling against the British.

Since 1948 the Iranian Government had been negotiating for a

larger royalty return from the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company.

The publicity from these negotiations caused groups opposed to the government to extend their emotional opposition to all 448 foreigners. w

On June 26, 1950, General Razmara was appointed Prime 449 Minister of Iran. In the same month Dr. Mossadegh,,became chairman of a Special Oil Committee of the Majlis. Thus, on

December 26, 1950, when a supplemental agreement to the Anglo-

Bashkirov, 0 £. cit., pp. l86f.

Hall, 0 £. cit., p. 12.

449 izvestia Moscow/, June 29, 195°, p. 4; Ivanov, Ocherk istorii Irana, p. 457; The Economist, November 11, 1951, p'. 748. 147

Iranian Oil Company's concession was to have been debated in

the Majlis,, Dr. Mossadegh's Oil Committee had already reported

in favor of immediate nationalization. Prime Minister Razmara withdrew the supplemental agreement.. This was an obvious vic­

tory for Dr. Mossadegh and his supporters who wanted to evict 450 the British from Iran and to nationalize Iranian oil. Hence,

the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company faced a difficult situation in

the beginning of 1951 .^ 1

On February 10, 1951* the British offered to negotiate

a new supplemental oil agreement with Iran. But they were ifcp too late with this offer. Popular emotional opposition

to the oil negotiations gained momentum by the first week in

March and Prime Minister Razmara was assassinated after he

announced his support of the new agreement with the Anglo- 453 Iranian Oil Company. The oil industry was officially na- 454 tionalized by the Majlis on March 20, 1951* Dr. Mossadegh

450 "Developments of the Quarter," The Middle East Journal. Vol. V (Spring, 1951), pp. 197f• 1 451 Journal de Teheran. January 28, 1951, pp. 1-5; Febryary 5, 1951, p. 1. 452 Journal de Teheran, February 25, 1951, p. 1; as quoted in Telu, February 24, 1951; February 28, 1951; Dad, February 27, 1951; February 28, 1951; Izvestia ^oscow7, February 28, 1951, p. 4. '

^53 Pravda ^oscow/, March 18, 1951, p. 1.

^54 Vvedenskii, op. cit., p. 420. l48 455 was appointed Prime Minister of Iran soon afterward. ^ On

May 2, 1951# the Shah confirmed the nationalization of the petroleum industry in I r a n . ^ 6 According to a U, S. State

Department publication: In 1947 the Majlis enacted legislation designed to prevent the granting of new oil leases. At the same time it declared its intent ion:: of securing higher royalties from the British company. By mid-1949 a revision of the original 1955 concession had been negotiated, giving considerable royalty increases to Iran. This agreement was never ratified, however. Instead, it was followed by growing demands in the Majlis for the nationalization of the industry.

By March 1951 a number of events had occurred which bore so directly upon the situation that calm negotia­ tion and agreement became virtually impossible. One of these was the assassination of the Iranian Prime Minister by a fanatic who claimed that his motive for the crime was the Prime Minister's attempt, at British urging, to obtain ratification of the supplementary agreement.

The day following the assassination a parliamentary committee voted for nationalization of the oil industry, and soon afterward this recommendation was confirmed by the Majlis. It was on the strength of this parliamentary victory that Mohammed Mossadegh became the new Prime Minister.457

The assassination of Prime Minister Razmara on March 7# 1951# indicated that stability in Iran depended on the personality of the leader. In the case of Razmara a single pistol shot changed the stable Iranian policy to one of chaos and in-

455 Ivanov, Ocherk istorii Irana, p. 457*

456 Kalendar1-spravochnik (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel'stvo politicheskoi literatury, 1 9 5 2 ), p. 6 9 6 . ^ 7 United States Department of State, Iran: Point of World Interest, op. cit., p . 7 . 149 decision. On March 26* 1951* the Iranian Communists called for JiCQ a general strike in Iran's oil region. College students

supported the strike and demanded expulsion of foreign inter­ ests. Some of the slogans used were "Death to the Imperialists*"

"Throw the Pirates into the Sea*" and "Give Us Our Oil." Dur­ ing these disturbances the Soviet Literary: Gazette said that

United States Ambassador Grady was preparing a blood bath for 460 Iran and turning that state into another Greece.

Just as the Iranian Government regained control after one strike* the Iranian Communists called another strike. It appeared that the outlawed Tudeh Party wanted conflict and not a peaceful solution to the oil dispute.^l One of the most striking features of the Iranian oil crisis was the enormous growth of communism it uncovered.

The local communists had helped to block reform in Iran* spurred the nationalists to oust the British* and pressed for nationalization of Iran's oil. Now* in the midst of the

^ 8 Kalendar'spravochnik (1952)* p. 6 9 5 ; Edward A. A. Bayne* "Crisis of Confidence in Iran*" Foreign Affairs, Vol. XXIX (July* 1951)* p. 584. ^59 Ivanov* Ocherk istorii Irana, p. 457. 460 , " Vvedenskii* 0£. cit.* p. 421; Literaturnaya gazeta /MoscqmJ, March 27* 1951, p. 1.

461 "Developments of the Quarter," The Middle East Journal, Vol. V (Spring, 1951)* p. 198. 150

Iranian oil nationalization unrest the Soviet Union exploited the situation for its own benefit, through the communist- controlled Tudeh Party. The Tudeh Party agitated and mani- 462 pulated propaganda adding to further confusion in Iran. 463 Iranian Communists led riots in the Anglo-Iranian oil fields.

On May Day 1951, thirty thousand demonstrators of Iran's out­ lawed Tudeh Party held a pro-Soviet rally in Teheran. It was an orderly meeting, but the dominant theme was ridicule of

Mossadegh. The world peace movement of the communists was hailed.11'611'

One of the dangers in this volatile Iranian nationaliza­ tion situation involved the possible intervention of the S0viet

Union. While there were no signs of Russia entering the pic­ ture, there were indications that the Soviets might gradual­ ly step into Iran if the Iranians had any difficulty in oper- 465 ating their oil properties. According to George C. McGhee

Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian

**■62 United States Department of State, Iran: Point of World Interest, op. cit., p. 1.

463 "Iran-Good Pishing for Russia," U. S, News & World Report. Vol. XXX (April 6, 1951), p. 22: ’"Violence Spreads in Iran," Life. Vol. XXX (May 7, 1951), p. 49. ^64 "Developments of the Quarter," The Middle East Journal. Vol. V (Summer, 1951), pp. 242f. ^6^ izvestia Moscow/, April 26, 1951, p. 5; Trud ^Moscow/, April 24, 1951, p. 3 j The Economist, May 5, 1951, pp. lOlff. 151

and African Affairs, the Kremlin was "... losing no oppor­

tunity to fish in the troubled oil of Iran, for Iran would be

a great and strategic prize quite apart from oil."^^ Dr.

Laurence Lockhart, an official of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Com­

pany, said in 1951: The Tudeh Party, although it had no love for Dr. Mossadegh, encouraged him to take more and more drastic action against the British, made vicious attacks.on the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, and continued its subversive activities amongst its workers.467 The Tudeh.Party gained from this Iranian-Western split and the extension of Soviet power southward appeared increasingly 468 likely.

At first, the Iranian Communists cooperated in making temporary agreements with the nationalists; then, they made demands bent on capturing power.Although originally ap­ pealing to the desire for emancipation from foreign control, the communists maintained this appeal only until they were strong enough to proclaim their own purpose and attempt a communistic program.

466 ^DD The Department of State Bulletin. Vol. XXV (July 25, 1951* p. 1^1. ^ 7 Laurence Lockhart, "The Causes of the Anglo- Persian Oil Dispute," Royal Central Asian Society Journal, Vol. XL (April, 1955). P.' l48:

**•68 Anthony T. Bouscaren, "Soviet Policy in Iran," Current History. Vol. XXII (May, 1952), p. 2 7 6 . ^69 Peffer, op_. Cit., pp. 25f.

^7° Andrew Roth, "Iran: Unrecognized Revolution," Nation, Vol. 175 (August 11, 1951)* pp. 112-15. 152

Hence, the Tudeh Party began to have conflicts with

Prime Minister Mossadegh and his National Front followers.

Communists and nationalists began a battle in the streets.

The Tudeh Party spurred the National Front to ruinous efforts and was ready to step in if the Mossadegh regime went sour.

The Tudeh Party, being the more militant and better solidified of the two, threatened to ruin the Iranian Government and attempted to outbid the National Front In anti-foreign "im­ perialism." They used intimidation and labor agitation in the industrial centers of Iran where the Tudeh Party had strength and ridiculed Mossadegh.On May 8, 1951# the Tudeh Party made numerous demands in an open letter to the

Prime Minister of Iran. These were that the Iranian Govern­ ment should:

1. Expel the U. S. military mission. 2. Recognize Communist China. 5. Align itself with the Soviet Union. 4. Nationalize the Bahrein oil fields. 5. Legalize the Tudeh Party. ^ 6. Abolish martial law 'forever.' '

Then, on May 11, 1951, the Tudeh Party organized demon­ strations in Teheran as the "Partisans of Peace." Ten thousand demonstrators hailed Stalin and denounced "Anglo-American

^71 Journal de Teheran, July 25, 1951# p. 4, citing Le Sedaye Mardom, July 24, 1951. 472 "Developments of the Quarter," The Middle East Journa1, Vol. V (Summer, 1951), p. 245. 153 warmongers."1^ The Iranian Communists whipped a huge Iranian crowd into a frenzy with anti-United States slogans. They 474 also shouted greetings to the Soviet Union. ' Riots and strikes continued through May, June, and July of 1951* A breakdown of the Iranian Government would have resulted in a state of chaos. This could have led to a coup d'etat by the Tudeh Party and the installation of a communist-controlled 47p> government in Teheran. 1 ^ The Tudeh Party members were ready if the Iranian Government had come to grief on the oil issue.

The two main fronts of the Tudeh Party, which had been banned in 19^9* were the "Partisans of Peace" and "Association to Fight Imperialist Oil Companies. In June 1951 Tudeh agitators were successful in organ­ izing their strike against the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company re­ finery at Abadan. Border incidents continued and one Iranian soldier was killed by the Russians who claimed he strayed on the Soviet side of the border east of the Caspian S e a . ^77 In

July 1951 the Iranian Government proclaimed martial law and began a roundup of Tudeh Party activists to halt the bloody

Journa1 de Teheran, June 9, 1951» pp* 1360f. W "You Can't Do That," Time, Vol. LVII (May 14, 1951)j p. 28. **■75 Mazandi, o£. cit., p. 33•

^76 Bashkirov, og_. cit., pp. 266f.

Ibid. rioting in downtown streets of Teheran. Iranian officials

said Iranian Communists attempted to attack the headquarters

of the Toilers Party of the National Front. The nationalists

and the police entered the fight in pursuit of the local com­

munists, who were using long poles with anti-American slogans

on them as weapons. By July 15> 1951,, the oil nationaliza­

tion dispute had caused the suspension of all loading and ex- 478 porting of Iran's oil. The combination of the anti-imper­

ialist and anti-capitalist strategies, the top alliance of

cooperation with other parties and the bottom alliance of constant tension against the ruling class, had worked well for the Iranian Communists. By applying this formula the

Tudeh Party was not only the party dedicated to the leader­ ship of the peasantry and workers in their struggle against the bourgeoisie but also the party dedicated to the leader­ ship of the bourgeoisie against the foreign imperialists.^79 On May 26, 1951» the British Government and the Anglo-

Iranian Oil Company submitted the oil dispute to the Interna­ tional Court of Justice for arbitration or an arbitrator. An interim judgment was rendered in favor of the British. This was ignored by the Iranians who claimed the Court did not have

"Developments of the Quarter," The Middle East Journal, Vol. V (Autumn, 1951)* p. 487.

479 "Moscow's Master Plan for the Middle East," United Nations World. Vol. VI (September, 1952), pp. 6t7. 155 jurisdiction in the dispute.**’®® Meanwhile, Great Britain re­ ferred the dispute to the United Nations Security Council in

September 1951. The Security Council voted by nine to two

(Yugoslavia and the U.S.S.R. claimed the dispute was a domes­ tic affair) to consider the British appeal to recognize the

Court’s judgment that nationalization should not occur, pend- 48l ing a hearing of the case. On October 15* 1951* Great Britain submitted a revised proposition calling for further negotiations. But Dr. Mossadegh made a personal appearance at the United Nations and violently attacked the Anglo-Iranian

Oil Company. On October 19, 1951* the Security Council sus­ pended further consideration of the dispute, pending a juris­ dictional decision of the International Court, by a vote of eight to one (Great Britain and Yugoslavia abstained; the

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics opposed) ,**’®2 Dr. Mossadegh stayed in Washington hoping to receive financial aid. His attempts ended in failure, however, and seriously lowered 483 his prestige among the Western Powers.

480 The Middle East (1954), p. 3 8 8 . United Nations’ Security Council, Official Records, 559th Meeting, October 1, 1951 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1951)* PP* 1-50, Izvestla ^oscow/, Oct. 2, 1951* p. 4. 482 United Nations, Security Council, Official Records* 560-565th Meetings, October 15-19* 1951* ojd. cit_., pp. Iff; Harry N. Howard, "The Development of United States Policy, in the Near East," The Department of State Bulletin. Vol. XXV (November 19* 1951)* P • 8l4; The Economist* October 27* 1951* p. 965. ... 483 "Developments of the Quarter," The Middle East 156

Tudeh Party agitation continued throughout 1951. In

an attempt to gain support in a "united front from below,"

Following the nationalization of oil, the Tudeh in­ tensified its efforts to acquire members from the petty bourgeoisie, the peasants and the armed forces. Infil­ tration and agitation are the methods used.484 In schools, offices, and among the Mohammedan priests there was underground as well as open activity. But the Teheran police continued to arrest persons distributing communist handbills. The headquarters of the Tudeh Party was raided and secret documents, a printing press and radio transmitter were seized.This raid, on October 26, 1951, revealed a detailed plan for a swift invasion of northern Iran by the

Soviet Union if British troops landed at the oil refinery town of Abadan. It resulted in the arrest of three top Tudeh

Party leaders. The secret documents showed that elaborate instructions had been distributed to each Tudeh cell in nor­ thern Iran. These instructions ordered Tudeh members to rise in revolt against the Teheran Government as Russian troops rolled into the area. Also, the secret documents showed that local communist leaders at Abadan had been ordered to stir up rioting and bloodshed, to bait Britain into landing troops

Journal. Vol. VI (Winter, 1952), pp. 74f.

^64 Henry C. Atyeo, "Political Developments in Iran, 1951-195^ 1 11 Middle Eastern Affairs. Vol. V (August-September, 1954), p. 256 :

Ettelaat ^eheran^, October 28, 1951, p. 8 . 157

at Abadan, and give the Soviet Union an excuse for the in­

vasion of northern Iran.1*-88 Five thousand persons demonstrated in Teheran on

November 2, 1951* They hailed the Soviet Union and assailed

the British and the United States "imperialists." They ac­

cused Prime Minister Mossadegh of making deals with Americans.

Some of the communist rioters, students from the university

in Teheran, tried to carry their agitation to Teheran's secon- 487 dary schools.

The Iranian Government's reactions to this activity

was to challenge the display of force. Anti-communists of

Dr. Mossadegh's National Front, after breaking up with the

Tudeh Party, demonstrated against the communists who had been rivals in denouncing imperialism. Some of the demonstrators who came and left In buses appeared to be hired ruffians, paid by the Tudeh Party. At about this same time Teheran police raided another printing shop that was printing Red literature and closed a theater that was the home of an al- JiOO legedly communist acting company.

About five thousand leftist students of Teheran

^86 Ibid.

487 The Manchester Guardian, November 5, 1951, p. 6; November 5* 1951/ p. 6; "Developments of the Quarter, The Middle East Journal. Vol..VI (Spring 1952), pp. 2l4f.

488 ibid.; The Manchester Guardian, November 22, 1951, p. 6. " 158

University rioted in downtown Teheran on December 5* 1951* They shouted "Death to Mossadegh," and fought for five hours

with the nationalists .^ 9 This friction between the students,

only a few of whom were communists, and the nationalists in­

dicated that the leftist elements:

. . .have become bolder as non-Communlst opposition to Dr. Mossadegh has become more outspoken as a result of his Government's failure thus far to pull out of oil and financial difficulties.490

On December 12, 1951* the communists, a few of them students,

had a rally of ten thousand in Teheran. They roared "Death

to Mossadegh" and violated general rules barring such demon­

strations. The clandestine Tudeh Party had gained considera­

ble freedom during the oil crisis and it was now making a show of strength.^"1'

United States Ambassador Henry P. Grady said, in Decem­

ber 1951* that Iran was in immiment danger of economic dis­

tress which could deliver it into the hands of the communists.

He believed a communist coup could seize control of Iran in

an economic crisis brought on by Iran's oil dispute with 492 Britain. In fact, the Iranian Government's nationalization

^®9 Et tela at ^eheran/'* December 5* 1951* p. 1} December 7* 1951* p. 7.

^90 The Hew York Times, December 7* 1951* p. 7. ^91 Ettelaat /Teheran/, December 12, 1951* p. 8. 492 Henry P. Grady, "Oil and the Middle East," Foreign Policy Bulletin. Vol. XXXI (December 15, 1951)* p. 1. 159 program took Iran to the brink of bankruptcy.^93 Regardless

of the outcome, the Soviet Union stood

. . . to gain both from Britain’s loss of the oil and from increased poverty in Iran. Moreover, if an agree­ ment had been reached in spite of the agitation, the Communists could have capitalized on the inevitable pub­ lic resentment concentrating its efforts on the most vulnerable sections of the country. No one thinks the Soviet Union has ever given up hope of annexing Iran's border province of Azerbaijan, which narrowly missed being swallowed up in 19^6 .4-9*1- With the beginning of 1952 Tudeh Party members took advantage of the British-Iranian oil issue to escape the ban placed on their political activities in 194-9* They emerged as nationalists by forming the "Association to Combat Im­ perialist Oil Companies" in Iran and some candidates for the

1952 Iranian elections appeared under that label. Others ran as members of the "Partisans for Peace" organization.

Jamal Emani, leader of the parliamentary opposition, charged that certain aides of Prime Minister Mossadegh in the National

Front were supporting leftist Tudeh candidates in the elec- tions. ^ 5

The Tudeh Party detailed a reform program for the

January elections which included the

4 93 "Iran: Pinched for Pennies," Newsweek, Vol. XXXIX (January 7, 1952), p. 2 8 . 494 Hall, o]d. c i t ., p. 2.

4-95 T. Guyler Young, "The Social Support of Current Iranian Policy," The Middle East Journal, Vol. VI (Spring, 1952), pp. 14-Of; Journal de Teheran, January 10, 1952, p. 4; The Economist, February 16 , 1952, p. 385; The Manchester Guardian, January 2, 1952, p. 5 . l6o

. . . expulsion of the United States military advis­ ory missions from Iran, the rejection of United States Point Four aid, the closing of the British Bank in Iraai, the distribution of private land holdings among the peasants, universal obligatory education and of course lineompromising nationalization of oil.496

This nationalistic-type election manifesto contained other

demands for reforms of the income tax, the status of workers,

and the protection of industry. These were meant to appeal to the Iranian workers and peasants. But, as the communists

distributed their pamphlets they clashed with the nationalists

who were supporting Dr. Mossadegh.^?

Prime Minister Mossadegh’s Government also was attacked

by the Baku radio and the so-called "Democrat" transmitter,

located north of Azerbaijan, which alleged the Central Govern­

ment in Teheran was interfering in the elections. A call was

issued to the people of Iran to rise against their govern­

ment, and again Kurdish tribesmen were urged to create an autonomous republic

Because of his anti-British position, all British Con­

sulates were closed by order of Prime Minister Mossadegh on

January 22. On the following day, when elections started in

Teheran, the outlawed Tudeh Party dropped its concealment

^96 The New York-Times, January 9, 1952, p. 6 .

^97 Ettelaat /feheran7, January 12, 1952, p. 5; January 22, 1952, p. 7 .

Moshe Leshem, "Soviet Propaganda to the Middle East," Middle Eastern Affairs, Vol. IV (January, 1955), pp. 8 f. l6l

and issued its election manifesto in the name of its Central

Committee. Thus, the elections emerged as a duel between

Prime Minister Mossadegh's National Front and a rejuvenated

fighting Tudeh Party, no longer hiding behind aliases which

it had used since its nearly successful attempt to assassinate

the Shah in 19^9. The balloting ended on January 25 with the

charge of fraud by both the Tudeh and the National Front 499 groups. The National Front won the elections.

On February 5> 1952, because of alleged disturbances,

the Iranian cabinet forbid the "cultural institutions" of the

United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union from oper­ ating outside Teheran. Only the information centers attached to the foreign embassies in Teheran were allowed to continue functioning.The U.S.S.R. House of Culture in Tabriz re­ mained open despite this order, however. Also in February, an army investigation disclosed a Tudeh Party wing inside the

Iranian Army. Eight ringleaders among the army officers were arrested. Officials reported an unspecified number of air force officers also held on charges of supporting the

499 Ettelaat /Tehevan^j January 29, 1952, p. 5; Journal de Teheran. January 2 5 , 1952, p. 1; January 29, 1952, p. 1 .

500 The Manchester Guardian, February 5j 1952, p. 5; Journal de Teheran, February 5 , 1952, p. 1; Developments of the Quarter," The' Middle East Journal, Vol. VT (Spring, 1952), p. 215. 162

Tudeh Party.'*®'*'

In March It appeared that Soviet Ambassador Sadchikov

was conferring with Iranian P0reign Minister Kazemi for the

purpose of keeping Iran from signing an oil agreement with the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

At the same time representatives of the World Bank presented

their latest proposals for an oil agreement to the Iranian 502 mixed oil commission. But, on the home front, clashes between communists and 503 nationalists continued during March. Communist rioting

was amid Soviet charges that the United States was using germ-

warfare in Korea. In the face of these disturbances, the Iranian Government decreed martial law for Teheran in order

to prevent further riots. Forty-five communists were seized

by Iranian police in a raid on a Teheran Tudeh Party meeting

m• April.a 4-, 504

While the Iranian Government tried to stabilize its

powers, the U.S.S.R. charged, in May 1952, that U. S. aid to

501 The New York Times, February 13, 1952, p. 4; Febru­ ary 24, 1952, p.~5T February 2o, 1952, p. 4. 502 Journal de Teheran, February 20, 1952, p. 4; Febru­ ary 24, 1952, p. 4.

5°3 "Developments of the Quarter," The Middle East Journa1, Vol. VI (Summer, 1952), p. 355*

504 "Chronology," Middle Eastern Affairs, Vol. Ill (April, 1952), p. 130; Journal de Teheran, March 30, 1952, p. 2; March 31, 1952, p. 1; April 20, 1952, p. 4. 163

Iran violated the 1921 Soviet-Iranian Treaty and aided the

aggressive plans of the United States against the Soviet Union.

The Soviet note declared that Iran's agreement to accept U. S.

military aid placed the Iranian Army under the effective con- 505 trol of the United States. The U. S. State Department

saw the Soviet protest as an attempt to intimidate Iran and

claimed that the 1921 Soviet-Iranian Treaty was superseded

by the United Nations C h a r t e r . 5°^ On July 3j 1952, Prime

Minister Mossadegh's Government formally rejected the Soviet 507 note. In spite of this, however, the Tudeh Party offered

an alliance to Prime Minister Mossadegh and his National

Front in an effort to oust U. S. military advisors and Point 508 Four aides. Because the Shah would not allow him to become his

own Minister of War, Dr. Mossadegh resigned as Prime Minis­

ter on July 16. The Majlis nominated Ahmad Qavam on July 17 509 and the Shah named him Prime Minister on the following day.

5^5 Pravda ^oscow/, May 23, 1952, p. 2; Journal de Teheran. May 2 5 , 1952, pp. 1-4; "Documents: Soviet Note to Iran." Middle Eastern Affairs. Vol. Ill (June-July, 1952), pp. 198fjIran," Time, Vol. LIX (June 2, 1952), p. 22. 506 "Developments of the Quarter," The Middle East Journal, Vol. VI (Summer, 1952), p. 355; Vol. VI (Autumn, 1952), p. 458. 507 Journal de Teheran, July 4, 1952, p. 1; July 7, 1952, p. 1; The Manchester Guardian, July 18, 1952, p. 7. Ibid* ? "Chronology," Middle Eastern Affairs. Vol. Ill (August-September, 1952), p. 2 5 8 . Ibid.; Journal de Teheran, July 18, 1952, p. 1. But the Tudeh organization did not want Qavam as Prime Minis­

ter of Iran. They called him a "servant of the British" and 510 demanded that Dr. Mossadegh be made Prime Minister again.

They offered another alliance to Dr. Mossadegh and the Nation­

al Front for a common fight against "imperialism." The com­

munists insisted, however, that the National Front also come

out against "American imperialists." At this time the Tudeh

Party United with Ayatollah Kashani, leader of the ultra-

nationalistic Moslems, in opposition to Prime Minister Qavam.

Thus, it appeared that the Tudeh Party, ultra-nationalistic Moslems, and Mossadegh supporters were unified in their opposL

tion to Prime Minister Qavam. On July 21 Ahmad Qavam resigned

as Prime Minister because the Majlis refused his request for

full powers to use the police and army to suppress the strikes

and riots occurring among the Mossadegh supporters.-^11

On July 22 the Majlis voted for Dr. Mossadegh as Prime

Minister and Ahmad Qavam fled for his life. Now Dr. Mossadegh was both Prime Minister and Minister of War. This lowered the prestige of the Shah. During June 1952 the International

510 izvestia ^oscow/, July 25, 1952, p. 3; Journal de Teheran, July 21, 1952. p. 1; "Lesson for U. S. in Iran- Good Deeds Aren't Enough, U. S. News & World Report, Vol. XXXIV (August 8 , 1952), p. Ifr.

511 Ibid.; "Developments of the Quarter," The Middle East Journal, Vol. VI (Autumn, 1952), p. ^59j The Manchester Guardian, July 21, 1952, p. 7; July 22, 1952, p. 7. 165

Court had held hearings on its jurisdiction in the Anglo-

Iranian Oil Company case. The Court ruled on July 22 that it had no competence in the matter. This also strengthened Dr. Mossadegh’s position.^-*-2

Meanwhile, on July 22, 1952, Dr. Kashani pledged the alliance of his organization of Fadayan Islam with the Tudeh

Party in an anti-imperialist drive. Also, a "united front" with the communists was declared in the'name of Prime Minister

M o s s a d e g h . This meant the formation of an alliance which embraced parties ranging from the rabid nationalists and

Moslem Combatants to the communists. A rift soon occurred between these groups, however, when the communists tried to deface a statue of the Shah. Tudeh Party groups were traveling about Teheran shouting slogans against the Shah, Britain and 514 the United States. Already they were trying to take con­ trol of this "united front" with a campaign against the moder­ ates, Shah and the "American imperialists." Thus, Dr. Mossadegh was at the same time the creature and the prisoner of the groups which put him back in off ice.

512 The Middle East (1954), p. 589j Calvocoressi, Survey (1952), p7 "256 ".

515 Albion Ross, "Mossadegh is Back as Premier of Iran; Order is Restored," The New York Times, July 25, 1952, pp. 1-5. 514 Journa1 de Teheran, July 24, 1952, p. 1.

515 The Manchester Guardian, July 25, 1952; July 24, 1952, p. 1; The Middle East"Tl954), p. 5«9. 166

Tudeh efforts to gain power under the guise of nation­ alism continued throughout the summer of 1952. For example, the Tudeh Party demanded a constitutional change to a republic.

In line with this demand, Tudeh members concentrated on tear­

ing down loyalty to the Shah. This caused friction between the nationalists and the Tudeh members. When a reported Tudeh coup was quelled by Prime Minister Mossadegh1s National Front, the Tudeh Party attacked Dr. Mossadegh as the “tool of Amerl- .,516 can imperialism.

Dr. Kashani, however, continued to hold a position be­ tween the National Front and the Tudeh Party.He, at 5l8 least partly, accepted a "united front" with the communists.

But he could not stop the clashes that still occurred between the nationalists and the communists who attacked the Shah and associated themselves with nationalist riots with that end in view. The Tudeh also attempted to weaken the army so Iran- would be dependent on Dr. Mossadegh and his National Front. If the army and Shah had been sufficiently weakened, and if

Prime Minister Mossadegh and his National Front had reached

516 "Stalin's Fifth Column Ready If Iran EruptSjV U. S. News & World Report. Vol. XXXIII (September 12, 1952), pp. jETf; "Egypt, Iran Quiet Down But - Red Coup, Civil War Threaten," Newsweek, Vol. XL (August 11, 1952), pp. 56-59. 517 Journal de Teheran, August 8 , 1952, pp. 1-4. 518 "Chronology." Middle Eastern Affairs, Vol. XXX (August-September, 1952),. p. 2 5 9 . 167

a dead end and collapsed, the communists, as the only party 519 left, could have become the leading party of Iran.

On August 11, 1952, Prime Minister Mossadegh was granted full dictatorial powers over economic, judicial, administra- 520 tive and military matters for six months. One of his first

executive acts was to propose land reforms and to decree in­

creased benefits for peasants. This angered the communists

who wanted full credit for proposing agricultural reforms. 521

Clashes between the communists and nationalists con­

tinued as the Tudeh Party accused Dr. Mossadegh of "protecting" 522 certain fascist groups. The communists stoned U. S. mili­

tary personnel on August 21 and were angered at the reimposi- 523 tion of martial law the next day. Demonstrations were planned by both nationalist and communist groups commemora­ ting the fortieth day of the communist-nationalist alliance

519 "Moscow’s Master Plan for the Middle East," op.- cit., p. 7. 520 "Developments of the Quarter," Vol. VI, The Middle East Journal (Autumn, 1952), p. 459; The Manchester Guardian, August 4, 1952, p. 4; August 5, 1952, p. 4; August 12, 1952, p. 7.

"Revolt in the Middle East," The Nation, Vol. 175 (August 23, 1952), p.143.

"*22 Journal de Teheran, August 21, 1952, pp. 1-4; August 27, 1952, p. 1; The Manchester Guardian, August 20, 1952, p. 5.

523 The Manchester Guardian, August 21, 1952, p. 5; August 22, 1952, p. 5J Journal de Teheran, August 22, 1952, p. 1. 168

of July 21, 1952, that overthrew the Qavam Government. The

National Front Workers Party barred Tudeh Party participants

in nationalist memorial services for the riot victims. Na­

tionalists were determined to demonstrate that they were not

commemorating the fortieth day as guests of the communists.52 ^

Even though, during the fall of 1952, the Tudeh Party made an

effort to ally itself and reconstitute the "united front" of

the July 21 rioting, the Iranian Communists continued to agi­

tate against the Shah, demanding "Death to the Shah" and

"Down with Pahlevi."'^ Some other clashes that occurred

were between communists and military students at a birthday

party for the Shah in October 1952, and when Teheran police

fired on a communist crowd celebrating the October 1917 52 6 Bolshevik revolution. Meanwhile, Dr. Mossadegh continued to emphasize the

communist threat unless the oil dispute ended favorably for

Iran. He said Iran would surrender itself to probable future

events which would be to the detriment of world peace if the

nation did not get oil revenues to improve its economic

524 journa1 de Teheran, August 51':, 1952, pp. 1-4; The Manchester Guardian, August 50, 1952, p. 7« 525 "Chronology," Middle Eastern Affairs, Vol. Ill (November, 1952), p. 54b. 526 "Developments of the Quarter," The Middle East Journal, Vol. VII (Winter, 1955)., p. 65; Journal de Teheran, October 28, 1952, pp. 1-4. 169 527 situation. On October 17, 1952, Dr. Mossadegh broke diplo­ matic ties with Great Britain. The U.S.S.R. gained from this 528 break. But the Russians remained officially in the back­ ground except for protests against U. S. military aid and pressure on the Soviet-Iranian border.

The Fall of Prime Minister Mossadegh

The year 1955 started with street fights and public chashes between the Tudeh group on one hand and the nationalists and religious bands on the other. There were signs of struggle between left and right on Teheran's streets. Border incidents continued. =*20

But, in January 1955, a serious rift developed between Prime Minister Mossadegh and Ayatollah Kashani. Dr. Mossadegh's request for a year's continuance of his full powers was op­ posed by Dr. Kashani. It resulted in a split of the coalition

Tke Manchester Guardian, September 1, 1952, pp. 6 f; September 2, 1952, p. 7; Journal de Teheran, September 26, 1952, pp. 1-4; September 21, 1952, p. 2. 528 "Chronology," Middle Eastern Affairs, Vol. Ill (November, 1952), p. 54b, The Manchester Guardian, October 17, 1952, pp. 1-7.

529 "Egypt, Iran Quiet Down But - Red Coup, Civil War Threaten," Newsweek, Vol. XL (August 11, 1952), pp. 56-59.

55° Atyeo, loc. cit.: The Manchester Guardian, January 2, 1955, p. 5; M. Pearlman, Middle East - Review oif Events," Middle Eastern Affairs, Vol. IV (February, 1955), pp. 51f,- The Manchester Guardian, January 6 , 1955, p. 5 . 170

of religious and nationalist groups, called the National Front,

that had joined forces in the 1950 elections, brought Dr.

Mossadegh to power and nationalized Iran's British-owned oil industry.5^1 pr. Kashani, supported by the Moslem Combatants

and the communists and near-communists, campaigned bitterly 532 against an extension of Dr. Mossadegh's power. However,

the Majlis approved the bill extending Prime Minister Mossadegh's powers for a year beginning February 9, 1953. Five days later

Dr. Mossadegh imposed controls on the Iranian press in order to curb the leftists.-^ As the Kashani groups clashed with the Mossadegh mobs during March 1953, the communists tried to climb on the

Mossadegh bandwagon. They were quickly rebuffed. Prime Min­ ister Mossadegh was in a struggle for power with the Shah and, although Tudeh members bitterly denounced the Shah and

Western imperialism, they were not pro-Mossadegh. The Prime

Minister continued to suspend Tudeh newspapers and to quell communist demonstrations. At the same time the United States offered to provide a loan repayable in oil if Iran would

531 "Iran, Mossadegh Loses Friends," Time, Vol. LXI (January 19, 1953), pp. 29-30. 532 "Developments of the Quarter," The Middle Bast Journal. Vol. VII (Spring, 1953), pp. 200f j "Chronology, Middle Eastern Affairs, Vol. IV (February, 1953), p. 74.

Ibid.j The Manchester Guardian, January 19, 1953, p. 1; Calvocoressi, Survey 1953, op. cit., p. 1 7 6 . 171 accept a British oil proposal. This offer was rejected by

Dr. Mossadegh.53^

Then, a new face appeared on the political scene when

General Fazollah Zahedi, a retired pro-Shah military officer,

accused Dr. Mossadegh of using Tudeh Party members to bolster

his own support. Foreign Minister Hussein Fatemi denied this and stated that his government was not leaning toward Russia

because of dissatisfaction with American support of British

oil proposals and United States failure to increase economic

aid to Iran. The issue between the Prime Minister and the

monarch was over who should have control of the military.

Nevertheless, General Zahedi threatened an army revolt against 535 Dr. Mossadegh.

Meanwhile, Tudeh Party attempts to stage a mass demon­

stration against the Shah in Teheran were thwarted by police and soldiers. Both active and retired army officers threatened mutiny and implied the government was opening the country to communist domination.-^^ Even though Iranian police found a

534 "Iran: New Problems," Newsweek, Vol. XLI (March 30, 1953), p. 45; "Confusion Brings Conflict, Blood to Iran," Life. Vol. XXXIV (March 16, 1953), pp. 32-33; The Economist, March 7, 1953, p. 622; The Manchester Guardian, March 2, 1953, p. 1; March 3, 1953, pp. 1-6;' March 4,' 1955, p» 1. 535 "one Time American Aid Paid Off," U. S. News & World Report, Vol. XXXV (August 28, 1953), PP.^0^47~Tfran," Time, Vol. LXI (March 30, 1953, P. 29; The Manchester Guardian, April 14, 1953, p. 1. 536 "Chronology," Middle Eastern Affairs, Vol. IV 172

cache of Russian-made weapons on the Teheran-Caspian Sea road,

Tudeh Party members were still at liberty to join the nation­

alists in an attack on the United States Point Pour office

in support of Prime Minister Mossadegh. It might be said

that both Dr. Mossadegh and the Tudeh Party were seeking to

destroy the position of the Shah as the symbol of stability

and unity in Iran. Thus, Tudeh members were permitted to

join nationalist demonstrations.-^ • By June of 1953, however, the nationalists disliked

the communist pro-Mossadegh supporters and again barred Tudeh

members from their ranks. On July 6 Ambassador Sadchikov was

recalled to Moscow with nine members of the Soviet Embassy.

The new Soviet Ambassador was expected to follow a more con­

ciliatory policy in settling long standing disputes with

Iran: Iran's claim for eleven tons of gold, eight million

dollars in United States currency, territorial claims at

twelve points along the border and a revision of the 1921

Treaty.

On May 28, 1953, Prime Minister Mossadegh had' sent a

letter to President Eisenhower intimating that Iran might be

(May, 1953), p. 198.

537 "Iran: Reds Taking Over," Newsweek, Vol. XLII (August 10, 1953), pp. 36-37.

"Developments of the Quarter," The Middle East J our na 1 . Vol. VII (Autumn, 1953), pp. 509f,* "Chronology." Middle Eastern Affairs, Vol. IV (August-September, 1953), pp. 5o6f. 173

compelled to turn elsewhere, presumably the Soviet Union, for economic aid if the United States did not give aid at once.^59

On June 23 President Eisenhower wrote Dr. Mossadegh not to

expect any large-scale economic aid from the United States 540 until Iran reached an oil agreement with Great Britain.

The United States was disturbed by the freedom allowed com­

munist activity in Iran. Because of President Eisenhower’s

reply, Prime Minister Mossadegh's political standing in Iran

decreased because he had previously given the impression that

he had the backing of the United States. Iranian Government

officials were stunned by the Eisenhower note. It meant that

Dr. Mossadegh’s attempts to get the United States to compete 541 with the Soviet Union in aid to Iran had failed. Because of the friction between Tudeh members and the nationalists, troops were moved into Teheran to keep order during the demonstrations for the first anniversary of the return of Dr. Mossadegh to power. One hundred thousand Tudeh members and sympathizers demonstrated their anti-U. S. feelings.

539 Selden Chapin, "Iran: An Appreciation," Depart­ ment of State Bulletin, Vol..XXXVI (May 13. 1957). p. 751: Vol. XXIX (July 20, 1953), pp. 74-76. 540 »jj0 for iran," America, Vol. 89 (July 25, 1953), p. 409.

541 Pravda /Moscow7, August 9, 1953, p. 8 ; "Iran," Time, Vol. IXII (July 20, 1953), p. 28; "Developments of the Quarter," The Middle East Journal, Vol. VIII (Winter. 1954), p. 6 9 . 17^

Only five thousand nationalists demonstrated. The Tudeh mem­ bers supported the sale of oil to the Soviet Union in order 5^2 to break the economic blockade of Iranian oil.

In the face of criticism* Prime Minister Mossadegh denied that his government had been increasingly tolerant of the Tudeh Party. He said* however* that his government would continue de facto recognition of the Tudeh Party. His govern­ ment’s approval of Tudeh Party meetings was the first such approval since the party was outlawed in 19^9. Tudeh pro­ paganda organs supported Dr. Mossadegh and endeavored to limit the powers of the Shah and the Majlis. Tudeh members had been allowed to swell the dwindling nationalist demonstra­ tions during 1953. The Justice Ministry* the Education Min­ istry and the Public Health Ministry were all strongly in­ filtrated with Tudeh members. The Government appeared to be tolerating Tudeh members in Government departments in return ell's for political support. ^ On July l4* presumably at the direction of the Prime

Minister* twenty-seven pro-Government members of Dr. Mossadegh’s

National Movement faction resigned, permanently ending the

5^2 ibid.j "Iran: Red’s Taking Over*" Newsweek* Vol. XLII (August 10* 1953), pp. 36-37. . 5^3 Atyeo. op. cit.* pp. 250f; "One Time American Aid Paid Off*" U. S. News & World Report* Vol. XXXV (August 28* 1953)j p. ^31 """Developments of the Quarter*" The Middle East Journal, Vol. VIII (Winter* 195*1-), PP* 69f. 175

ability of the Majlis to form a quorum of sixty-nine members.

Prime Minister Mossadegh issued a decree to have a plebiscite

over whether he should have full powers. But the plebiscite

was not to be by secret ballot. This meant that Iran’s voters

would be intimidated into voting for Dr. Mossadegh since they

did not have the privilege of a secret ballot. Dr. Mossadegh

indicated he would also decree the dissolution of the Majlis,

despite a constitutional amendment reserving that right to the 544 Shah.- In the plebiscite Dr. Mossadegh received more than

ninety-five per cent of the votes as the Iranian people voted

him full powers. A large part of the credit for Dr. Mossadegh's

victory belonged to the Tudeh Party whose members were active 545 at the public voting places.

This was reflected in Washington where both President

Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles voiced concern over the Iranian Government's toleration of growing Tudeh activities. Prime

Minister Mossadegh was scored for ending parliamentary rule

with the aid of the Tudeh Party. President Eisenhower stated

that the United States must block the spread of communism in 546 Iran. But the Soviet Union was ready to abandon its

ibid.; "Iran: Powerful 'Imbecile'," Newsweek, Vol. XLII (July 27,.1955), p. 55- .

The Economist, August 25, 1955, pp. 550f; The Manchester Guardian, August 4, 1955, p. 1; "Iran: Reds Taking Over," Newsweek, Vol. XLII (August 10, 1955), pp. 56-57-

The New York Times, July 29, 1955, p. 6; August 5, 1955, p. 1. 176

previous recalcitrance to further its own propaganda in Iran.

The new Soviet Ambassador to Iran, Anatoli Iosifovich Lavrentiev, 547 moved to settle border and financial issues with Iran.

Premier Malenkov stated that he hoped for a settlement of

Soviet-Iranian disputes and noted the recent trade pact. The

Teheran press hailed Malenkov's speech and hoped that it would change United States policy to one of more financial aid.

Iran and the U.S.S.R. set up a joint commission to settle 548 their problems.

Dr. Mossadegh dissolved the Majlis after his plebis­ cite victory. He asked the Shah to order new elections as 54 9 some of the die-hard deputies refused to quit. But the

Shah feared the increasing power of the Mossadegh Government after the gigantic July 21, 1953, Tudeh demonstration was held with governmental approval. Therefore, on August 13, he issued a royal decree dismissing Dr. Mossadegh for illegal acts and usurpation of the Shah's prerogatives and, at the same time, the Shah decreed Major General Zahedi as the

547 "Revolt Collapses in Teheran; Will Iran Enter Russian Orbit?” Newsweek, Vol. XLII (August 24,.1953), p. 34.

Pravda /Eos co m/, August 10, 1953, p. 3; The Manchester Guardian, August 10, 1953, p. 5; Atyeo, loc. cit.

549 M. Perlman, "Middle East - Review of Events," Middle Eastern Affairs. Vol. IV (August-September, 1953), p p . 293f. 177

rightful Prime Minister. ^

Dr. Mossadegh defied the royal decree and staged a

rebellion., refusing to accept Major General Zahedi as his re­

placement. Strongly in support of Dr. Mossadegh was the

Tudeh Party, waiting to take over power from him. The Shah

fled to Rome after the move to dismiss Dr. Mossadegh had

failed. The contest between the Prime Minister and the mon- 551 arch appeared to be moving in Dr. Mossadegh's favor.

After the flight of the Shah on August 16, 1955, the

nationalists clashed with Tudeh followers in Iran. Statues

of the Shah and his late father had been toppled in Iran.

These agitations had created uneasiness among the Iranian

people. On August 18, alarmed at the growing strength of the

Tudeh Party, Dr. Mossadegh ordered his adherents to use force

in breaking up Tudeh demonstrations. Thus, at a critical

moment, Dr. Mossadegh lost some of his most prominent demon-

strators. ^

The clashes between the nationalists and the Tudeh

550 Tins Economist, August 29, 1 955 , p. 551.

551 Pravda /|floscow7, August 17, 1955, p. *0 August 18, 1955, p. *0 The Manchester Guardian, August 18, 1955, p. 1; "Developments of the Quarter,11 The Middle East Journa 1, Vol. VTI (Autumn, 1955), p. 510.

552 Pravda /Mo s c o w 7. August 18 , 1955, p. **•; "Iran," Time, Vol. m T l X u g u s t 51, 1955), pp. 1^-15; S. Yin'am, The Middle East in 1955 - Annual Political Survey," Middle Eastern Affairs, Vol. V (January, 195*0, pp. Ilf. 178

members were overshadowed by Major General Zahedi's Royalist

forces who quickly defeated both factions and took over as

Prime Minister on August 19, 1953."^ Soviet newspapers charged that the United States aided the Royalist group with

intrigues and finances. The Soviet press claimed that the

U. S. Congress had appropriated funds for Iranian subversive work. American agents were supposed to have hatched diver­

sionary plans directed toward the overthrow of the Mossadegh 55^ Government. However, the Shah returned to Teheran on

August 21 and expressed his dislike for the U.S.S.R., Tudeh

Party methods and the Mossadegh rebellion. An anti-Russian feeling was rising among the people. Tanks guarded the streets of Iran against Tudeh and nationalist outbreaks while 555 Dr. Mossadegh was imprisoned.

After his return, the Shah announced the need for economic aid if Iran’s Government were to survive. No con­ cessions were to be granted in return for the aid, however, and the Shah did not rule out aid from the U.S.S.R. The

Izvestia /W oscovJ, August 20, 1953, P* The Manchester Guardian, August 20, 1953, PP« 1-5-.

_ 55^ Izvestia /Moscow/, August 19, 1953, P* Pravda Moscow/, August 19, 1953, p. August 21, 1953, p. ^

555 The Economist. August 22, 1953, p» ^97; August 29, 1953, p. 500fj Perlman, op. cit.; Pravda /Mo s c o w7, September 5, 1953, p. 179 immediate reason for the dismissal of Dr. Mossadegh was his violation of the Iranian Constitution in dissolving the Majlis.

Only the Shah had dissolution powers according to a constitu­ tional amendment. Dr. Mossadegh was to be tried for resistance to the Shah's decree ousting him and for the deaths of the demonstrators against him."^

The strongest element supporting Dr. Mossadegh for some time before his rebellion had been the Tudeh Party. He had allowed the Tudeh members great freedom in return for their support. On August 24 Prime Minister Zahedi opened a drive against the Tudeh Party. He harassed Tudeh members, raided their hideouts and arrested many of their top leaders. Soviet

Ambassador Lavrentiev was rumored to have attempted suicide because of the setback in communist prestige due to the

Zahedi coup.^^ With Mossadegh out of the government, the United States granted forty-five million dollars to Iran in economic aid.

This amount was not as much (three hundred million dollars) as the Shah had hoped for but it was enough to supply the

556 The Manchester Guardian, August 22, 1955, p. 5; August 25, 1955, p. 1; Perlman, pjd. cit. 557 "How Iran Fights Communism,” U. S. News & World Report, Vol. .XXXV. (October 9, 1955), pp. 42-44;"^lran,'T1 Time, Vol. LXII (October 5, 1955), p. 59, "Chronology,” Middle Eastern Affairs, Vol. IV (August-September, 1955), pp~. 546f; The Manchester Guardian, September 2, 1955, p. 5. 180

Iranian Treasury until March 195^• The United States was openly pleased by the change in Iran’s leadership.558

In balance, the beginning of the anti-Anglo-American strategy coincided with the end of the United States monopoly of the atomic bomb since the Soviets exploded a nuclear device in 19^9. .The previous strategy's militant activity in the form of violence and propaganda by the Soviet Union was re­ placed with propaganda for peace and an anti-Anglo-American theme — all of this contrasting greatly with the United

States program for building military bases in nearby areas.

Moscow gained much by letting Iran alone and by lulling the vigilance of public opinion in Iran and in Western countries.

The Tudeh Party served the Soviets with militant activity in the form of propaganda, riots and sabotage. Despite their peace campaign and lack of direct political pressure, the Soviets maintained a very firm position toward the Iranians.

More emphasis was placed on cooperation with nationalistic groups, weakening Iran's contact with the West, and expelling the British from Iranian oil.

The combination of the anti-imperialist and anti­ capitalist strategies, and the alliance of cooperation with anti-imperialist party leaders and the alliance of peasants,

558 The Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XXIX (September 14, 1953), pp. 3%9-50; The Economist, November 7’, 19551 The Manchester Guardian, September 3, 1953* p. 1. l8l

workers and other "exploited" classes, worked well for the

Iranian Communists. In this way the Tudeh Party worked to

create possible chaos in Iran so that the government would

collapse. For example, the Tudeh spurred Dr. Mossadegh's

National Front group into ruinous efforts while, at the same time, they criticized his agricultural reform policy. Since

Dr. Mossadegh's policies favored a deterioration of Iran's

internal situation and brought chaos to Iran's Government, he accepted Tudeh Party support at the critical moments. But, when the Tudeh party tried to displace the nationalists in the National Front group, they were met with stiff resistance from the nationalists who were supported by a forceful United

States policy. The fall of Dr. Mossadegh was due partly to his leaning more and more heavily upon the Tudeh Party, and the excesses of his Tudeh supporters during July and August of 1953. The cause of the Soviet Union failed again to achieve success with its strategy in Iran.-^-^

As direct Soviet external pressure on Iran's economy ceased and peaceful economic cooperation was emphasized, tension was eased between the Soviet Union and Iran. Trade agreements that were completed during 19^9-1953 allowed the

Russians to deal directly with Iranian merchants. Soviet influence in Iran was enabled to advance by propaganda among

559 David J. Dallin, The Changing World of Soviet Russia (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1955), p. 474. 182 individuals as well as by increased Soviet-Iranian trade.

The fundamental Soviet tactics for the period and area under consideration were expressed by Lenin in 1920:

The more powerful enemy can be vanquished only by . . . using . . . every antagonism of interest among the bourgeoisie of the various countries and among the various groups of bourgeoisie within the various countries . . . .

He also said it was necessary:

. . . for the Communist Party to resort to manoeuvers, arrangements and compromises with the various groups of the proletarians, with the various parties of the workers and small masters.56 0 Similarly, the fundamental strategic concepts used in Iran during 19^9-1953 were expressed at the Second Congress of the

Third International:

1. To use local communist parties for the "subversion of the

capitalist structure and for implanting communism."

2. To work towards "the separation of colonies and the pro­

letarian revolution at home which will overthrow the 561 capitalist structure in Europe."

560 Lenin, loc. clt.

561 Kunj ioc, Git, CHAPTER VI

SOVIET POLITICAL APPEASEMENT AND

ECONOMIC OFFENSIVE 1955-1957

As noted in Chapter V , Soviet economic activity had

taken a decisive turn toward increased trade with Iran by

mid-1955. After the death of Stalin, the Soviet Union showed a willingness to trade in larger quantities with Iran. ... The

Russian economic offensive which started in 1955 was part of

an overall pattern of events favorable to the new Soviet

strategy.

This new strategy represented a political appeasement

and retreat from previous ruthless political, economic and military activity. The Soviet Union relaxed its very firm position by a mellowing of Soviet behavior and a softer pro­ paganda approach. There was a world-wide emphasis on "peace­ ful co-existence."

This change in Soviet strategy to political appease­ ment did not stop Iran from joining the Baghdad Pact, a de­ fensive alliance precipitated by previous Soviet activity.

It did encourage more friendly relations between the U.S.S.R. and Iran, however. The official Soviet policy was one of improving relations with Iran with a view to strengthening mutual confidence, extending trade and expanding contacts and cultural cooperation. Anti-Americanism was the main Soviet 184

propaganda theme but there was more emphasis now on co-existence

and trade. The down-grading of Stalin coincided with this

Soviet economic offensive since the Russians emphasized that

there were no longer any risks in dealing with Russian com­ munists — Stalin was gone.

Soviet Economic Penetration

The Soviet campaign of economic penetration, which

started in 1953, involved an increase in the quantity of con- 562 sumer goods exchanged between the U.S.S.R. and Iran. In addition, satellites of the Soviet Union began negotiations 563 with Iran. ^ On September 3, 1953, a new barter agreement supplemented the June 1953 trade pact between the Soviet

Union and Iran. Under this agreement the U.S.S.R. was to send Iran increased quantities of sugar, cotton goods, iron and steel products, plus increased amounts of chemical and electrical equipment. In exchange, Iran's exports to the

Soviet Union were to include rice, tobacco, unginned cotton, lead ore, oil seeds and foodstuffs. This trade pact meant that Soviet-Iranian trade would increase by almost 100 per 564 cent over the previous year.

562 pravda Moscow/, September 6 , 1953, p. 4; H. G. Martin, ’’The Soviet Union and the Middle East, Middle Eastern Affairs. Vol. VII (February, 1956), p. 49. 563 "Developments of the Quarter," The Middle East Journal, Vol. VIII (Winter, 1954), p. 76. 56^1* Izvestia ^oscow7, September 6, 1953, p. 3; The Washington Evening Star, September 5, 1953, P» 8. 185

During the year ending March 20, 1954, imports from

the U.S.S.R. to Iran reached their highest level since 1946-

47 and exports reached a record high in value. Especially

heavy imports of Soviet sugar and cement were evident. Iran exported a heavy volume of dried fruit, wool, animal skins

and an increased amount of rice and lead ore. Opium was ex­

ported to the U.S.S.R. for the first time since World War II.

Satellite countries provided only a small amount of the trade

between the Soviet bloc and Iran.

With this willingness to trade in larger quantities

came, in June 1954, quota lists for barter exchange that re­ flected the increased value of trade between the two countries.

The new quota lists were for the period April 1, 1954, through

March J>1, 1955* Iran’s exports to the Soviet Union involved a small quantity increase over the previous year while the lists for export by the U.S.S.R. to Iran reflected little 566 change over the year ending March 20, 1954. A new Iranian-Soviet protocol establishing the con­ ditions for the purchase by the U.S.S.R. of products of the

Iranian fisheries during the 1954-1955 season was signed on

July 18, 1954. Prom the nationalization of the Caspian Sea

565 American Embassy Teheran, Foreign Service Dis­ patch. Number 858 , June 29, 1954.

566 American Embassy Teheran, Foreign Service Dis­ patch. Number 859 , June 21, 1954. 186

fisheries until 1954-1955., most of the Iranian fish catch had

been delivered to the U.S.S.R. as compensation to indemnify 567 the Soviet Government as a former partner in the fisheries.

On February 15* 1955* in view of the poor grain crop

harvested in Iranian Azerbaijan and the general food shortage

in the country* the Soviet Government satisfied an Iranian

request and signed an agreement providing for the sale of

10*000 tons of wheat to be delivered by the end of March

1955."^ Another agreement was reached between the Soviet

Union and Iran on May 4* 1955, for the mutual deliveries of

goods for the year 1955-1956. This agreement provided for a

further increase of trade between the two countries. The

Soviet Union would deliver cotton fabrics* rolled ferrous

metals* automobiles* agricultural machines* chemical goods*

timber and cement. Iran would deliver rice* unginned cotton*

wool* raw hides* fish products* dried fruit* oil-bearing

seeds* ores and other goods. But a Soviet offer of technical aid was merely studied by the Iranians.^69'

While Soviet economic activity did not increase as

markedly in Iran as in some of the other Middle Eastern coun-

567 Ettelaat /Teheran7, July 19* 1954* p. 8 .

568 pravda ^Moscow7* February 17* 1955* p. 4.

Pravda /Moscow/. May 6 * 1955j p« 4; Ettelaat ^eheran/* May 5* 1956* p. 1; American Embassy Teheran* For- Service Dispatch* Number 546, June 6 * 1955; The New York Times* July 12* 1955 * p. 4. 187 tries, Iranian-Soviet trade continued to increase. On Septem­ ber 5, 1956, the U.S.S.R. and Iran reached an agreement con­ tinuing a high level of trade between the two countries. The barter quotas for the period April 1, 1956 - March 51, 1957, were set at this time. The Soviet Union was to deliver in­ dustrial equipment, automobiles, farm machinery, metals and other goods. Iran was to deliver rice, wool, unginned cotton, 570 fish products and ores, 1

During January 1957 the Soviet Union offered economic and technical aid to Iran, the amount being left to Iran’s judgment. Since the United States was giving fifty-two million dollars annually, not counting military assistance, the Iranian Government did not want to jeopardize this grant.

The Soviets expressed a desire to help Iran establish a Moscow-

Teheran air service and to build dams. In this way Soviet technical and financial experts would be brought into Iran.'^'1' A new trade agreement, signed in Teheran on April 16,

1957 ., specified the commodities for mutual deliveries by the

Soviet Union and Iran for the periods 1957-58, 1958-59,

1959-60. A considerable increase from year to year in the

Izvestia ^oscow7, September 7, 1956, p. 5; "Treaties and Agreements," Foreign Commerce Weekly, January 7, 1957j p. 11; December 17/ 1956, p. 9. 571 "Chronology." Middle Eastern Affairs. Vol. VIII (March, 1957), p. 121; Developments of the Quarter," The Middle East Journal. Vol. XI (Spring, 1957), p. 179; The" New York Times, January 15, 1957, p. 2 5 . 188 volume of trade between the U.S.S.R. and Iran was envisaged by this agreement. Also, a wider range of commodities was 572 to be mutually delivered. Shortly afterward, on April 27.,

1957, a new Soviet-Iranian transit agreement was signed in Moscow. It accorded reciprocal rights to the free transit of goods across their territory without restrictions relating to 573 their category or country of origin.

The new Soviet-Iranian trade agreement of April 16,

1957 , was the first time since the basic commercial treaty between the U.S.S.R. and Iran was signed in 1940 that quota lists were drawn up for three years in advance. Although this step may have been initiated by the U.S.S.R. largely for propaganda purposes, the Iranians succeeded in making the quotas subject to renegotiation each year. The Soviets ap­ peared to be accelerating their campaign to weld closer ties with Iran. This was evidenced by the conclusion of the transit agreement and the recently signed trade agreement. The Iran­ ians, aware of the hazards involved in expanding economic re­ lations with the Soviet Union, appeared to be following a policy of cautious cooperation.-^^ Although the Soviet

572 izvestia Moscow/, April 18 , 1957, p. 4; "Develop­ ments of the Quarter. The Middle East Journal. Vol. XI (Summer, 1957), p. 295.

573 American Embassy Teheran, Foreign Service Dispatch, Number 1046, M a y -13, 1957. ---- 5 7 4 Ibid 189

Government again offered economic and technical aid, the Iran­

ians did not appear eager to accept technical experts from

the Soviet Union. They continued to carry on extensive trade

with the U.S.S.R., however.^75

Soviet Political Concessions

Prime Minister Zahedi continued to press his ban on *576 Tudeh members during September 1955* More than 100 Tudeh

members were arrested in the first serious effort to root out

the .communist infiltrators since the founding of the Tudeh

Party. Anti-communist demonstrations; occurred in the streets

of Teheran as more and more communists were arrested. Three

thousand government employees were dismissed or suspended.

The anti-communist drive spread to the armed forces where air

force and army members of the Tudeh Party were arrested. To

provide some assistance, the Soviet press protested the pro­

vocative nature of the Teheran press as aimed at disrupting 577 friendly Soviet-Iranian relations. Dr. Mossadegh was formally charged on October 4 with

575 The New York Times, April 20, 1957* p. 5. 576 "zahedi Fights Communists, So U.S. Overlooks His Past," U.S. News & World Report, Vol. XXXV (September 11, 1955)* pp. 61-55; "Zahedi: How Iran's Strong Man is Taking Over*" Newsweek. Vol. XLII (September 7* 1955)* p. 59• c77 Pravda ^oscowT”, September 5* 1955* P» 1; October 10, 1955* p. 5; "Chronology," Middle Eastern Affairs, Vol. IV (November, 1955)* p. 581. 190

rebellion against the Shah and the Iranian Constitution, and 578 with toleration of the rise of the Tudeh Party. In sup­

port of Dr. Mossadegh’s defense of these charges, communist

and nationalist sympathizers among the shopkeepers closed

Teheran’s bazaar. The Zahedi Government arrested six bazaar

leaders for their role in the closing of the shops. Tudeh-

sponsored sabotage was also discovered in the Iranian Wavy

and three Wavy men were executed. By the end of October a

two-month drive on the Tudeh Party had rounded up 1200 sus­

pected Tudeh members. About 170 of these Tudeh leaders were 579 to face trial and execution or exile. 1

On November 1, 1955* the Zahedi Government resumed negotiations with the Soviet Union on frontier and financial

disputes. At these negotiations, Iran emphasized its World

War II claims against the Soviet Union.Meanwhile, the drive against the Tudeh Party continued throughout Wovember

and December 1955* Tudeh sponsored strikes and demonstrations

578 Pravda Moscow/, Wovember 11, 1955, p. 4; The Manchester Guardian. Wovember 6, 1955, p. 7; October 5, 1955, p . 1j "Developments of the Quarter," The Middle East Journal, Vol. VIII (Winter, 1954), p. 77.

579 "Iran, The Plot That Failed," Time, Vol. LXII (Wovember 25 , 1955* pp. 4l-2j The Manchester Guardian. September 15* 1955, p. 1; September 14, 1955* p. 1* September 15* 1955* p. 1; "Chronology,' Middle Eastern Affairs, Vol. IV (December. 1955), p. 425; Vol. V(January, 1954), p. 57. 580 "Developments of the Quarter," The Middle East Journal. Vol. VIII (Winter, 1954), p. 77. 191 were quelled by the Iranian Government. Tudeh Party members

and rabid nationalists were blamed for inciting Teheran Uni­

versity students to demonstrate against Iran's renewing dip­

lomatic relations with Britain. But diplomatic relations S8 l were resumed with Great Britain on December 25, 1953* anyway.

In the forthcoming elections for the Majlis, martial law was

instituted in Teheran and other centers to prevent the Tudeh Party and its allies from instituting demonstrations and to prevent violence. All political parties except the Tudeh were authorized to enter the new elections.- ^ 2 While the Iranian police continued to arrest Tudeh Party members during■January

1954, Iran and the U.S.S.R. resumed their negotiations on the 585 border and financial disputes. However, the Teheran press doubted Iran would get the badly needed money from the Soviet

Government. The U.S.S.R. could not have a very great interest in prolonging the life of the strongly anti-communist Zahedi regime.The Iranian Government's crack-down on communists cut the Tudeh strength in half between August 1955 and January

5^1 "iran, Relations Resumed," Time, Vol. LXII (December l4, 1955), p. 40.

Ibid.; The Economist, December 12, 1955, pp. 800f; llGrhonology,'Tr~MTddle Eastern Affairs, Vol. V (January, 1954), p. 57j Vol. V (February, 1954), p. 6 9 . 5^3 Journal de Teheran, January 7 , 1954, p. 1; January 11, 1954, p.~T.

5^4 Journal de Teheran, January 10, 1954, p. 1. 192

195*1-• Although the communist presses had been destroyed, the

Tudeh Party was still able to publish leaflets and to inspire

whispering campaigns urging the Iranian Government to play

the United States and Britain against each other.

Dr. Mossadegh received a three-year sentence for having

opposed the Shah but he was running again for the Majlis in j-G /T the January elections. Although Tudeh members demonstrated

at the balloting, the Majlis elections resulted in a victory

for the Shah and the parliamentarians who were backed by the 587 royalists.

Meanwhile, the Iranian Government asked the Teheran

press to stop criticism of the U.S.S.R. while negotiations

with the Soviet Union on border disputes and war debts were

in progress. On February 9 Soviet Ambassador Lavrentiev re­

turned from a Moscow conference on the war claims. Finally,

on July 1, 195*0 the U.S.S.R. agreed to settle the war claims with 1 1 .2 tons of gold and $8 .6 million and rials 10 million

in Soviet goods for the Iranians. Mr. Hamid Sayah, former

Iranian Ambassador to Moscow and head of Iran's delegation

585 Atyeo, o£. cit., pp. 257fj "Developments of the Quarter," The Middle East Journal. Vol. VIII (Spring, 195*0, pp. 192f.

586 ibid.j "Iran Untangling," Newsweek, Vol. XLII (December 28, 1953), P« 33J The Manchester Guardian, December 2 2, 1953 , p. 1 .

587 Dan Kurzman, "Kashani of Iran, Master of Intrigue," Nation, Vol. 178 (April 3, 195*0, P* 275; "Chronology," Middle Eastern Affairs, Vol. V (April, 195*0, pJW. 195 to negotiate with the Russians, did not indicate whether the 588 goods would be priced in rubles or in dollars.

The Soviet settlement of Iranian war claims on July 1,

1954, was the third conciliatory gesture by the Soviet Union

to Iran within a week. The other conciliatory gestures were:

the return to Iran of three hundred Iranian nationals, held by

the Soviet Union since the 1941-46 occupation of Azerbaijan;

and the return of the Iran-Soviet Oil Company installations,

an Inactive distribution network, at Pahlevi and other northern

Iranian cities. A Soviet Government demand for a pledge that Iran not

join any pro-Western military alliances in the Middle East was

strongly rejected by the Iranian Government in July 195*0 The

Iranians reasserted their readiness to join regional military pacts if they served to safeguard Iran's integrity and inde­ pendence. The Iranian Government, known at this time to be considering entering the Turkish-Fakistani pact, denied the

Soviet charge that Iran was being drawn into aggressive mili- gqo tary blocs directed against the Soviet Union. The Soviet

rOO "Chronology," Middle Eastern Affairs, Vol. V (August-September, 195a), p. 2 9 8 ; ''Developments of the Quarter," The Middle East Journal, Vol. VIII.(Autumn, 195*0, pp. 451f.

589 Ibid.; The New York Times, July 2, 1954, p. 4.

590 "Siding with the West," Time, Vol. LXIV (August 9, 195*0, P. 27. ---- 19^ demand appeared to have two objectives: to keep Iran out of

the Turkish-Pakistani alignment, and to sabotage an agree­

ment being negotiated with a consortium of eight internation­

al oil companies for reactivation of the nationalized petroleum 591 industry in Iran. On August 5, 1954, Iran and eight international oil

companies initialed an agreement ending the long dispute over Iran's oil. These oil companies were to operate Iran's oil

industry for which Iran was to receive $420 million during the

first three years and to pay $70 million each year for ten

years as compensation for nationalization of the Anglo-Iranian 592 Oil Company's assets in 1951*

Also in August 1954, a drive was started by the Iranian Government to rid the military of commmunists. A large spy network was smashed and more than four hundred Iranian mili­ tary officers, members of communist espionage rings, were 595 arrested. Some were executed. The communist ring had infiltrated Iran's defense and was linked to the Soviet

591 pravda ^oscow/7, July 2, 1954. p. 5; August 9, 1954, p. 5; ’'Developments of the Quarter, The Middle East Journal. Vol. VIII (Autumn, 1954), pp. 451f. 592 "Agreement Between Iran and International Oil Consortium," The Department of State Bulletin, Number 790, August 16, 1954, pp. 2j50f. 595 i Teheran Journal, February 5, 1955* pp. 1-4; February 4, 1955j pp. 1 - 4 ; The Manchester Guardian, September 8 , 1954, p. 7. 195 military attache, Brigadier General Alexander I. Rodinov. The

Soviet Government protested the disclosure of this link as a hostile act by Iran against the Soviet Union. It appeared, however, that the Soviet Union regarded espionage in Iran as a routine action. It was evident that thousands of persons and many thousands of dollars were expended in Soviet espionage . T 594 in Iran. On December 2, 1954, a pact was finally signed in which the U.S.S.R. agreed to pay the World War II claims of the

Iranian Government. In addition, the agreement provided for the setting up of a mixed Soviet-Iranian commission to carry out the demarcation and redemarcation of their border 596 along its entire length. The Majlis approved of this financial and border agreement on February 24, 1955* At this same time the Majlis approved loans from the United States

($150 million) and Britain ($28 million) to meet budgetary deficits and to finance public works.

594 "Iran, Inside Ali’s Suitcase," Time, Vol. LXIV (September 20, 1954), p. 42; "Iran," Time. Vol. LXIV (November 1, 1954), p. 5 6 ; The Economist, September 25, 1954, pp. 986 -8 9 .

595 "iran," The Atlantic, The Atlantic, The Atlantic Report on the World Today, Vol. 195"TApril, 1955)* p. 17; Chronology," Middle Eastern Affairs, Vol. VI (January, 1955)» p. 50. 596 pra vda /Moscow/, December 4, 1954, p. 4; Et tela at /Teheran/, December 2, 195% p. 1 0 . 597 journal de Teheran, February 24, 19553 pp. 1-4. 196

In keeping with its policy of appeasement the Soviet

Government agreed to return 73 Iranians who had been detained

after illegally crossing the Soviet bordern. It was also an­

nounced that the Shah of Iran would make a personal visit to

the Soviet Union during June and July 1956.

The Iranian Government announced on October'11, 1955*

that it had decided to accede to the defense alliance signed

by Turkey and Iraq in Baghdad on February 24, 1955 Great

Britain and Pakistan had joined the pact on April 4 and September

23* 1955* respectively.The Soviet Union declared Iran's

actions contradicted certain of Iran's treaty obligations.

On October 13, 1955* an editorial in Pravda charged that the

1927 treaty between the Soviet Union and Iran was the one that was violated by Iran's adherence to the Baghdad Pact. This treaty, which does not include a clause permitting the Soviets to move troops into Iran, was an extension of the 1921 Soviet-

Iranian Treaty which promised each party would shun alliances and agreements directed against the other.

598 Journal de Teheran, October 5* 1955* pp. 1-4; "Developments of the Quarter* The Middle Bast Journal, Vol. IX (Autumn, 1955)* p. 43.

599 journal de Teheran, October 11, 1955* pp. 1-4.

600 "Middle East, Tiered Up," Time. Vol. LXVT (October 24, 1955)* p. 22.

601 pravda ^oscowT, October 13* 1955* p. 4; See Chapter II. 197

In a speech on October 12 Mr. Molotov charged that the

Baghdad Pact was an aggressive military grouping not interested

in the consolidation of peace and international security. He

said its aim was to preserve and reestablish the colonial de­ pendence of the Middle Eastern countries belonging to it. The

United States was concerned over these Soviet protests and noted that the Baghdad Pact was a defensive military grouping, not aggressive as charged by the Soviet Union. Iran rejected the Soviet Government's protest against her joining the Baghdad

Pact.602

As 1955 came to a close, the Soviet Union again charged that Iran had violated her treaty obligations by joining the

Baghdad Pact. This time Mr. Khrushchev accused Iran of serving the policy of the colonial powers and acting against peace and security. The Soviet press denounced the Iranian Government and its foreign policy.But, during February 1956, both

Mr. Khrushchev and Mr. Molotov urged friendly relations with

Iran. The official Soviet policy was one of improving rela­ tions with Iran with a view to strengthening mutual confidence,

602 Ibid; The Manchester Guardian, October 15, 1955, pp. 1-7; December 7, 1955, p. 7; Journal de Teheran, November 2o, 1955, p. 2; December 1, 1955,' PP • 1-4; December 7, 1955, pp. 1-4; "Chronology." Middle Eastern Affairs, Vol. VII (January, 1956), p. 45; Pravda /Moscow/7 October 15, 1955, p. 1 .

Pravda ^^/Moscow]/, December 50, 1955, p. 4; Teheran Journa1, January 1, 1956, p. 1; January 2, 1956, p. 1. 198

extending trade, and expanding contacts and cultural cooper­

ation.^0^ In spite of these, the Assistant Military Attache

at the Soviet Embassy in Teheran, Major Anatol I, Kuznetsov,

was ordered expelled as a spy, after he was arrested with an

Iranian Air Force Officer who confessed to giving him secret

data. The Teheran radio charged that the Soviet Union had

stepped up its espionage operations since Iran joined the 605 Baghdad Pact.

On June 8 , 1956, Iranian troops seized the Soviet oil

concession in Khurian, in northeastern Iran about 165 miles

east of Teheran. The Iranian Government nationalized this

small oil industry concession under the 1951 nationalization

law. Later, the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. adopted

a decision renouncing Soviet rights which ensued from partici­

pation in the Soviet-Iranian joint stock company "Kavir-

Khurian," which was established in 1925 for the exploitation,

refining and sale of oil products in the Kavir-Khurian region.

A formal statement proposing aid for Iranian development and

construction projects was issued by the Soviet Embassy in

— Teheran on June 25, 1956. An appeal for closer commercial

604 Pravda /U oqcowJ, February 153 1956, pp. 1-4.

605 "Developments of the Quarter," The Middle East Journal. Vol. X (Summer, 1956), p. 285: Chronology," Middle Eastern Affairs. Vol. VII (April, 1956), p. 163.

606 Tass news report, July 2 9, 1956. and social ties, without military or political strings., be­

tween the two adjoining countries was made by the Soviet

Union.6°^

The Shah of Iran visited the Soviet Union during June

and July 1956. While he was in Moscow he was told that Iran’s

membership in the Baghdad Pact was a hindrance to good rela­

tions. The Shah defended his country’s participation in the

Baghdad Pact as a defensive measure dictated by the needs of

state on the basis of past experience and the general situa­

tion. It seemed that no new friendship was established by 608 the Shah.

In September 1956 another Soviet Army Major was held

for espionage. He was under orders to carry out espionage

in Iran and then move on to Beirut, Lebanon.But, the

local communists were weeded out and the last of 1956 found

Iran subversion-free: The Tudeh Party was considered to have been liquidated; Dr. Mossadegh had served his prison term and was living in seclusion on his estate ninety miles from Teheran

607 pravda /Woscow7, June 25, 1956, p. 1; "Developments of the Quarter,11 The Middle East Journal, Vol. X (Autumn, 1956), p. 415.

608 Ibid; Izvestia /Woscoyf/, June 24, 1956, p. 1; Pravda /Moscow/. June 29, 1956, p. 1; June 50, 1956, p. 1; The Economist, June 50, 1956, pp. I266f; July 21, 1956, p. 211; December 15, 1956, p. 956; "Chronology," Middle Eastern Affairs, Vol. VTI (August-September, 1956), p . 525•

609 "Developments of the Quarter," The Middle East Journal, Vol. XI (Spring, 1957). p. 77. 200 and Dr. Kashani was just another religious leader. Nobody , paid any attention to Dr. Kashani any more.^®

With the beginning of 1957, an Iranian soldier was killed by U.S.S.R. border guards at Atrek, a post east of the Caspian

Sea. But on February 26 the Soviets reported that the border dispute had been settled and the joint commission, originally established in December 1954, had completed the transfer and 611 acceptance of tracts of land over a 1 ,250-mile stretch.

On March 17, 1957, the Soviet Union gave a twin-engine

Ilyushin-14 transport plane to the Shah of Iran. This was evidence of the Soviet efforts to win favor with Iran.^^ The

Russians had worked to clear up friction with Iran. Thus, on

April 19, 1957, in Teheran, the Deputy S0viet Foreign Minister,

Vasily V. Kuznetsov, obtained a promise from Iran not to allow the West to establish atomic bases in Iran. He said the Soviet

Union had offered economic and technical aid to Iran, including the building of hydro-electric plants on the Iranian-Soviet border and the establishment of a Moscow-Teheran airline.

610 "Developments of the Quarter," The Middle East Journal, Vol. X (Autumn, 1956), p. 415; Vol. XI (Summer, 1957), p. 295; "Chronology," Middle Eastern Affairs, Vol. VII (October, 1956), p. 370.

6 11 "Developments of the Quarter," The Middle East Journal, Vol. XI (Spring, 1957), pp. 179f; Pravda /Moscow/ February 27, 1957, p. 6 .--- -

612 "Developments of the Quarter," The Middle East Journal, Vol. XI (Spring, 1957), pp. 179f. 201

Iran confirmed its pledge to the Soviet Union not to permit

the United States or any other foreign country to establish

military bases in Iran. American military aid would continue

to be accepted, however. Iran said that no military aid had

been offered by the Russians. An agreement for the establish­

ment of direct air service from Teheran to Moscow was reached.

The construction of hydro-electric power projects was turned

down by the Iranians because the Soviet Union did not propose

that Iran have an equal share in the building and operating

of the plants. Later, the U.S.S.R. and Iran agreed to the

joint use, on a basis of equal rights, of the rivers Aras and

Atrak along the Soviet-Iranian border. In summary, the U.S.S.R. displayed serious weaknesses

in its Iranian strategy in mid-1955. It was for this reason

that Moscow retreated from a very firm position to one of

blandishments and economic assistance. The Russians even paid,

their World War II debts, after nine years, to a government

in Iran that was a strong supporter of the West. However,

the resulting improvement in the Soviet Union’s position was

reflected in Iran's pledge to the U.S.S.R. not to permit the

United States or any other foreign country to establish mili­

tary bases in Iran. This appeared to be part of a Soviet

attempt to eliminate Western influence and neutralize the

Ppavfla Moscow/, August- 13, 1957, p. The Hew York Times, April 20, 1957, p. 3. 202

area.

The Soviet trade offensive, a campaign of economic

penetration, was not designed to improve the Soviet economy,

but for its political value to the U.S.S.R. It was part of

the Soviet drive to win Iranian goodwill and to clear up

friction between the U.S.S.R. and Iran. For example, the

joint boundary commission had completed its work and Iranian

gold and foreign exchange claims had been paid. The Caspian

Sea fisheries and northern Iranian oil concessions, both

Soviet-controlled, had been terminated. There had been ex­

changes of visits by the press, Parliament, and the Shah.

But the Shah continued to defend his country’s participation

in the Baghdad Pact and crackdown on the Tudeh Party. Only three-and-a-half years previously, Iran had been on the brink

of Soviet control, but, by April 1957., the Tudeh Party had been stifled and Iran was improving economically. The Soviet

Union was still incensed about Iran's participation in the

Baghdad Pact, however, but not as vehemently as before.

Soviet strategy during the period 1955-1957 was one of compromise, retreat and appeasement. The Tudeh Party was still involved in "subversion of the capitalist structure and for implanting communism." The political tactics of this period were expressed by Lenin when he suggested it was neces­ sary "... for the Communist Party to resort to manoeuvers, arrangements and compromises ..." and that: "The more powerful enemy can be vanquished . . . by taking advantage

of every, even the smallest, opportunity of gaining a mass ally, even though this ally be temporary, vacillating, un­

stable, unreliable and conditional."^^

Kun, loc. cit.; Lenin, loc. cit. CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION

The fundamental principles which guided Soviet strategy

in the Middle East during the period 19^1-1957 were clearly

expressed as early as 1920 by the Second Congress of the

Third Communist International: the "subversion” of existing

capitalist states and the "implanting" of communism through

local Communist parties. This strategic concept included the

"development" of internal class conflict within capitalist

countries, and the "separation of colonies" from "the capitalist

structure of Europe." Soviet tactics applied in attempting

to accomplish strategic objectives were multiple and complex.

Soviet political, economic and military forces in Iran were

adroitly manoeuvered with a great degree of flexibility.

Thus, as this paper has tried to show, the terms strategy and tactics may be taken quite literally in the operation of

Soviet foreign policy as conceived and conducted by Moscow.

The U.S.S.R. sought to establish a political ♦cordon sanltaire

in reverse* around the borders of Russia supposedly to pro­ tect the U.S.S.R. from foreign attack, found it necessary at times to retreat, politically speaking, and used a wide variety of tactics in attempting to exploit existing Middle

East antagonisms and gain a voice in Middle East affairs.

Prom the outbreak of the Soviet occupation of northern 205

Iran in August 19*1-1 to the withdrawal of Soviet troops and

the failure of the Soviet--Iranian Oil Agreement to pass the

Majlis in 19*1-7, Soviet policy vis-a-vis Iran and the Western

Allies was essentially one of war and post-war cooperation.

Hopes of effecting an understanding and maintaining normal

relations between the U.S.S.R. and the Western Allies dimin­

ished rapidly after Soviet troops were forced to withdraw

from northern Iran.

The Soviet Union’s strategy changed in 19*1-7 from co-

operation to a firmness and aggressiveness soon known as the

cold war. This Soviet strategy was not based on cooperation

with national groups but, instead, upon a "united front from

below." The working people, peasants, and rank and file

followers of the communist line were relied upon to develop

a class consciousness that would subvert the ruling structure

in Iran.

The third strategy, beginning in 19*19, was negative

in its anti-Anglo-American theme. It included, however, a

combination of the anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist stra­

tegies, a top alliance of cooperation with anti-imperialist party leaders and a bottom alliance of peasants, workers and

other "exploited classes." In this way the Tudeh Party worked

to create chaos in Iran. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union main­

tained a very firm position toward Iran even though it did not apply direct political pressure upon the Iranian Govern­ ment during 19*1-9-1953• Instead, more emphasis was placed 206

upon militant activity by the Tudeh Party which joined a Na­

tional Front group and conducted internal pressure through

strikes and riots not directly attributable to the Soviet

Union.

The death of Stalin coincided, generally speaking, with

the fourth strategy: political appeasement and an economic

offensive. This strategy,, which appeared in mid-1955.> was

a retreat from external pressure applied by the Soviet Union.

Instead, the Russians pursued an economic offensive designed

to increase their political strength. This change in Soviet

strategy was represented by a friendlier Soviet behavior and

a more peaceful propaganda approach even though the Soviet

Union continued its anti-American theme. It was based upon

the hope of gaining a position along with the United States and Britain in the making of decisions on Iranian problems.

These are the four strategies corresponding to four manifestations of Soviet activity in Iran. They present an

interesting study of Soviet pressure methods on a neighboring country long an object of Russian imperialism. The Soviets found themselves in unenviable positions when they were forced to withdraw their troops from Iran in 19^6, and when Mossadegh’s opposition to the Shah, supported by the Tudeh Party, failed in 1955* The changing of strategies by the Russians each time an old strategy failed, as in 19^7 * 19^9 and 1.955, shows the Soviet Union was then on the defensive in the balance- 207

of-power struggle with the West. The Russians were squirm­

ing in an effort to outbid the Anglo-American bloc and place

Iran on Moscow*s side in the bi-polarization of the world.

The fact that Iran is still outside the "orbit" of the Soviet

Union proves the failure of Soviet strategies in Iran.

These four strategies were alike in that they bore a

pattern of external pressure, in terms of economic or politi­

cal techniques used by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.,

and internal subversion, in terms of infiltration of the

Iranian Government. They differed in the degree and type of

external pressure and internal subversion applied. All four

strategies consisted of alliances between native groups or

classes, but the groups accepted as allies of communism dif­

fered in each strategy. Three of the four strategies em­

bodied violence, but the degree thereof with its external

and internal application helps distinguish between the pat­

terns of Soviet activity.

But why did these Soviet strategies fail? Why did

Iran stay outside the "orbit" of the Soviet Union? It is

obvious that nothing in Iran coujd have stopped the Soviet military might from taking over. Also, the most ideally anarchic conditions existed. The answer must be, as this paper has tried to show, that Russian planners did not neces­

sarily want to take over Iran but, rather, wanted to gain a position of influence that would neutralize the area and 208

give the Soviets a voice in the making of decisions on Iranian

problems. Also., the United Nations, led by the United States,

supported Iranian resistance to blatant Soviet activity in

Iran.

This study of Soviet strategy does not reveal a "master

plan" for the direction of Soviet efforts. On the contrary,

remarkable tactical agility and flexibility are observed

steering a shrewd course with the security and self-interest

of the Soviet Union foremost in mind. The Soviets adopted

a realistic course which took advantage of opportunities made

available by occasional lapses of both Western determination

and Iranian resistance.

In conclusion, during 19^1-1957 the Soviets undoubtedly

learned that blatant political pressure would not win for

them a position of influence in Iran. The United States

learned the lesson that we must keep up our support of Iranian

resistance to Soviet pressure methods. Basic to this Soviet

pressure strategy is the idea of probing for weak spots.

Since Iran is chronically weak this may be one of the reasons

the Soviets probe there. The future would seem to hold the

promise of more Soviet activity in Iran, either through eco­

nomic and political pressure, or through internal subversion

in terms of minority groups and infiltration of the Iranian

Government. If the West kept an eye on the Azerbaijanis and

Kurds as well as the Tudeh Party and the Soviet Embassy in 209 Teheran, we might receive some key to future Soviet activity

in Iran. . Applying the lessons learned in Iran to the broader

international scene, It would seem wise for the West to keep an eye on minority groups everywhere, upon Soviet Embassy activities, and upon the infiltration of local governments by the local Communist Party. Watching these groups may give us some key as to the time and place when Soviet strategy, similar to that applied in Iran, may be tried elsewhere. BIBLIOGRAPHY BIBLIOGRAPHY

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Bagirov, M. D. Lz Istorii bol'shevistskol organizatsli Baku i Azerbaidzhana" /History of the Bolshevik Organization of Baku and Azerbaljan/7 Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel'stvo politicheskoi literatury, 1946. Bashkirov, A. V. Ekspansiia angllisklkh i amerlkansklkh imperiallstov v Irane (1941-1953). Expansion of English and American Imperialists in Iran, 1941-1953./ Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel'stvo politicheskoi literatury, 1954.

Glezerman, G. Sovetskoe sotslalictlcheskoe gosudarstvo. Soviet Socialist Government/ Moscow: Molodaia gvardiia, 1953.

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Vneshniaia politika sovetskogo soiuza, 1950. Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel'stvo politicheskoi literatury, 1955. Vyshinskii, A. IA., Lozovskii, S. A. Diplomatlcheskli slovar'. /diplomatic Dictionary^/ 2 vols., Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel'stvo politicheskoi literatury, 1948-1950.

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5. Collected Documents in English Davis, Helen M. (ed.). Constitutions, Electoral Laws, Treaties, of States in the Near and Middle East. Durham, NortE Carolina: Duke University Press, 1947. 217 Degras, Jane (ed.). Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy. Vol. 1:1917-1924. Vol. 111:1953-1941. London: Oxford Uni­ versity Press, 1951, 1953. Hurewitz, Jacob 0. (ed.). Documents of Hear East Diplomatic History. New York: School of International Affairs, Columbia University, 1951.

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Farman, Halfen F. Iran: A Selected and Annotated Bibliography. Washington: Library of Congress, 1951.

Hlckerson, John D. "The Phony 'Peace' Offensive," The De­ partment of State Bulletin, May 7, 1951. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1951.

Howard, Harry N. "The Development of United States Policy in the Near East," The Department of State Bulletin, 25:814, November 19, 1951. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1951. ______. The Development of United States Policy in the Near East, 1945-1951. Department of State Publication' 44457 Washington: Government Printing Office, 1952. Motter, T. H. Vail. The Persian Corridor and Aid to Russia (The United States Army in World War IIj. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1951. 218 Sontag, Raymond James, and James Stuart Beddie. Nazi-Soviet Relations 1939-1941. Documents from the Archives of the German Foreign Office. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1948.

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Churchill, Winston L. S. The Grand Alliance. Vol. Ill of The Second World War, 6 vols. London: Houghton, Mifflin Company, 1948-1953. Millspaugh, A. C. The American Task in Persia. New York: The Century Company, 1925*

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Schulze-Holthus. Daybreak in Iran. Edited by Paul Weymar. London: Staples Press Limited, 1954.

Sherwood, Robert E. Roosevelt and Hopkins. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1948"!

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Robsman, Victor. A native Russian who was living in Iran at the time of the 1946 Soviet-Iranian Affair, (interview.)

Roosevelt, Archie, Jr. "The Kurdish Republic of Mahabad," The Middle East Journal. 1:247-69, July, 1947.

Rossow, Robert, Jr. "The Battle of Azerbaijan," The Middle East Journal,, 10:17-32, Winter, 1956.

______. American Foreign Service Officer in charge of the United States Consulate in Tabriz from December 1945 through June 1946, and Chief of the Political Section of the United States Embassy in Teheran from July, 1946 to January, 1947. (Interview.) Togan, Zeki Velidi. A Bashkirian professor at Istanbul Uni­ versity, and one of the emigre leaders of minority groups from Russia, (interview.)

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Bengston, Nels A., and Van Royen, Willem. Fundamentals of Eco­ nomic Geography. New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 19W. Ben-Horin, Eliahu. The Middle East Crossroads of History. New York: W. W. Norton and Company, Inc., 19^3. Benjamin, S, G. W. Persia and the Persians. Boston: Ticknor and Company, 1 8 8 7 . Bonne, Alfred. The Economic Development of the Middle East. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner and Company, Ltd., 19^5* ______. State and Economics in the Middle East. London: Kegan, Paul, Trench, Trubner and Company, Ltd., 19^8. Bouscaren, Anthony T. Imperial Communism. Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1955*

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Ebon, Martin. World Communism Today. New York: McGraw- Hill Book Company, Inc., 1948. Ebteha.i, G, H. Guide Book on Iran. Teheran: Pharos Press, 1957• ~ Elwell-Sutton, Laurence Paul. Modern Iran. London: George Routledge and Sons, Ltd., 1941. 221

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Fatemi, Nasrollah Saifpour. Diplomatic History of Persia 1917-1923. New York: Russell F. More Company, 1952.

______. Oil Diplomacy; Powderkeg in Iran. New York: Whittier Books, Inc., 19547

Filmer, Henry. The Pagea nt of Persia. New York: The Bobbs- Merrill Company, 1938« Fischer, Louis. The Soviets in World Affairs♦ London;: Jonathan Cape, 1930. Fisher, W. B. The Middle East: A Physical, Social and Regional Geography. London: Methuen and Company, 1950.

Florinsky, Michael T. Russia, A History and an Interpretation. Vol. II. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1953.

Frye, Richard N. Iran. New York: Henry Holt and Company. 1953. ______. (ed.). The Near East and the Great Powers. Cambridge:. Harvard University Press, 1951. ______, and Lewis V. Thomas. The United States and Turkey and Iran. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1951. Gibb, PI. A. R. Modern Trends in Islam. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1947".

Gowen, Herbert H. Asia, A Short History. Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1936.

Groseclose, Elgin E. Introduction to Iran. New York: Oxford University Press, 1947. ______. The Persian Journey. Indianapolis: The Bobbs- Merrill Company, 19377 Grant, Christina Phelps. Iran: Test of Relations between Great and Small Nations. Vol. 21. New York: Foreign Policy Associations, 1945. 222

Haas., William S. Iran. Hew York: Columbia University Press, 19^6. Haines, Charles Grove, (ed.). The Threat of Soviet Imperial­ ism. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 195^.

Hall, Harvey P. Iran. Chicago: Karr Publication Service, 1952. Hamzari, Abdal H. Fersia and the Powers, An Account of Diplomatic Relations, 1941-19^5*^ London: Hutchinson and Company, Ltd., 19457

Harcave, Sidney Samuel. Russia A History. New York: J. B. Lippencott Company, 1955*

Hassman, Heinrich. Oil in the Soviet Union. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1953.

Hayes, Carlton J. H. The Historical Evolution of Modern Nationalism. New York: Richard R. Smith, Inc., 1931. Hearst, William Randolph. Report on Russia . . . Uncensored. Boston: The Hearst Corporation, 1955*

Hilger, Gustav, and Meyer, Alfred G. The Incompatible Allies. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1953.

Hindus, Maurice. Crisis in the Kremlin. Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1953.

. In Search of a Future. London: Victor Gollancz, Ltd., 1949.

Hoskins, Halford L. The Middle East. New York: The Mac­ millan Company, 1954•

___. Middle East Oil in United States Foreign Policy. Washington: The’ Library of Congress, Legislative Reference Service, 1950-.

Hostler, Charles W. Turkism and the Soviets. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1957.

Hurewitz, Jacob C. Middle East Dilemmas. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1953.

Huszar, George B. de. Soviet Power and Policy. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1955. ' 225 International Islamic Economic Conference. Economic Survey of the Middle East. Karachi: International Islamic Economic Conference, 1948.

Iqbul, Mohammad. Iran. London: Oxford University Press, 1956.

Ireland, Philip W., et_. al_. The Near East. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1942.

Jackson, A. V. W. Persia Past and Present. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1 9 0 6 .

Jones, Joseph M. The Fifteen Weeks, February 21-June 19^-7* New York: The Viking Press, 1955*

KaHjarvi, Thorsten V., at. al. Modern World Politics. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1947'.

Kautsky, John H. Moscow and the Communist Party of India. New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1958.

Khadduri, Majid. War and Peace in the Law of Islam. Balti­ more: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1955* Kirk, George E. A Short History of the Middle East. Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1949.

______. The Middle East in the War. Survey of International Affairs. London: Oxford University Press, 1952'.

______. The Middle East 1945-1950» Survey of International Affairs. London: Oxford University Press, 1954.

Kohn, Hans. A History of Nationalism in the East. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1929*

______. Western Civilization in the Near East. London: Rutledge and Company, 1958.

Kolarz, Walter. Russia and Her Colonies. London: George Philip and Sons, Ltd., 1952.

Krausse, A. Russia in Asia. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1899 , Lambton, A. K, S. The Middle East. Edited by Elizabeth Monroe. London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1948. 224

Lhnger, William L., and S. Everett Gleason. The Undeclared War 1940-1941. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1955*

Laqueur, Walter Z. Communism and Nationalism in the Middle East. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 195^".

Latham, Edward (ed.). Crisis in the Middle East. New York: H. W. Wilson Company, 1952.

Lenczowski, George. The Middle East in World Affairs. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1956.

______. Russia and the West in Iran 1918-1948. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1949.

Lengyel, Emil. The Middle East. New York: Oxford Book Company, 1951. Lincoln, George A. International Realities. 2 vols. West Point, New York: United States Military Academy Press, 1949. Luboff, Edouard. Soviet Dumping. London: Anglo-Russian j Press Association, 1951* Masanij Minochcher R. The Communist Party of India* London: Adlard and Son, Ltd., 19541

Mattison, Frances C. (ed.). A Survey of American Interests in the Middle East. Washington: The Middle East Insti­ tute, 19531

Mazour, Anatole G. Russia Past and Present. New York: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1951.

Mirza, Youel B. Iran and the Iranians. Baltimore: Williams and Wilkins Company,- 1915*

Moore, Barrington, Jr. Soviet•Politics The Dilemma of Power. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1950.

______. Terror and Progress U;S.S.R. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954.

Morgenthau, Hans J. Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace. New York: Alfred A. Knopf,' 1955. Morrell, Sidney. Spheres of Influence. New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce,' 1946. <►■••• ... 225 Nakostaen, Mehdi. In the -land of the Li on and Sun. Denver: The World Press, Inc., 1957.

Nuseibeh, Hazen Zaki. The Ideas of Arab Nationalism. Ithaca New York: Cornell University P-ress, 195b.

Nweeya, Samuel K. Persia and the Moslems. St. Louis: Von Hoffman Press, 192k,'

Olmstead, A. T. History of the Persian Empire. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 19 W. “

Pares, Bernard. A History of Russia. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 19*1-7. Pirmla, H. A Short Survey of the Economic Conditions of Iran. Teheran: The Economic Information Bureau, 1^5.

______. The Present Situation in Iran: A Survey of Politi­ cal and Economic Problems Confronting the Country. Wash­ ington: Middle East Institute, 195*+-

Puryear, Vernon John. International Economics and Diplomacy in the Near East. Palo Alto, California: Stanford Uni­ versity Press, 1935.

Rajput, A. B. Iran Today. Lahore: Lion Press, 19*1-5.

Richards, Fred. A Persian Journey. London: Jonathan Cape, 1931. Ross, Sir E. Dennison. The Persians. Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1931. Royal Institute of International Affairs. The Middle East: A Political and Economic Survey. London: Oxford Uni­ versity Press, 1950, 1951.

Schuman, Frederick Lewis. Soviet Politics at Home and Abroad. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 19*?57

Shabad, Theodore. Geography of the U.S.S.R. New York: Columbia University Press, 1951. Sharp, Samuel L. Poland-White Eagle on a_ Red Field. Cam­ bridge: Harvard University Press, 1953. Sheean, Vincent,. The New Persia. New York: The Century Company, 1927. 226

A Short Hi story .of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. London: Anglo-Irani an Oil Company” 1948'.

Shuster, W. Morgan. The Strangling of Persia. Hew York: The Century Company, 1912.

Simmons, Ernest J. Continuity and Change in Russian and Soviet Thought. Cambridge: Harvard Universit?/- Press, 1955.

Spector, Ivar. The Soviet': Union and the Muslim World, 1917- 195p . Spokane, Washington: University of Washington Press, 1956.

Speiser, E. A. The United States and the Hear East. Cam­ bridge: Harvard University Press, 1947.

Sykes, Sir Percy. A History of Persia. London: Macmillan and Company, 1950.

Van der Vlugt, Ebed. Asia Aflame. New York: The Deris- Adair Company, 1955.

Vernadsky, George. A History of Russia. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1949.

Vinder ^Giselher Wirsing/\ Stalinism, Soviet Policy in the Second World War. Paris: Graphis-Verlag, 1944.

Warriner, Doreen. Land and Poverty in the Middle East. London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 194$.

Westerner ,/john P. Donovan7» Communism Revolution and War. London: The Conservative Political Center, 1949.

Wilson, Air Arnold. South West Persia. London: Oxford University Press, 1941.

Wilber, Donald N. Iran; Past and Present. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 19487

Wright, Quincy (ed.). A Foreign Policy for the United States. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1947’.

Yaganegi, Esfandiar Bahran. Recent Financial and Monetary History for Persia. New York: Columbia University Press, 1954.

Yakhontoff, Victor A. U.S,S,R. Foreign Policy. New York: C owa rd -Me Ca nn, Inc. j 1945. 227

Zarchin, Michael M. Social and Economic Development of the Near East. San Francisco: City College of San Francisco, 195?.

2. Publications of Learned Societies and other

Organizations

American Council of Learned Societies and the Social Science Research Council. Current Digest of the Soviet Press. Vol. I, II, and III: February 19^9-February 1952. Washington: The Joint Committee on Slavic Studies, 1949-1952.

The Black Book on the Organization of Communist Officers /in Persian/T* Teheran: Matboutat, 195&• Condliffe, J. B. "The Power Struggle and the Middle East," Behind the Headlines, Vol. XII, No. IV, January, 1952. Toronto: Canadian Association for Adult Education, and Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1952.

The Economic Research Institute. A Selected Bibliography of Articles Pealing with the Middle East 1939-1950. Jerusalem: The Hebrew “University, 195^*

Ehrmann, H. H. (ed.). "Foreign Policies and Relations of the United States," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences, Vol. 255* Philadelphia: The American Academy Press, 194b.

Elwell-Sutton, Laurence Paul. A Guide to Iranian Area Study. Ann Arbor, Michigan: Published for the American Council of Learned Societies by J. W. Edwards, 1952.

Ettinghauser, Richard. A Selected and Annotated Biblio­ graphy of Books and Periodicals in Western Languages Dealing with the Near and Middle East with Supplement. Prepared under the auspices of the Committee on Near Eastern Studies, American Council of Learned Societies. Washington: The Middle East Institute, 1954. 228

Goldwin, Robert A., and Marvin Zetterbaum (eds.). Readings in Russian Foreign Policy. 5 vols. Chicago: American Foundation for Political Education, 1955.

International Islamic Economic Conference. Economic Survey of the Middle East. Karachi: The International Islamic Economic Conference, 19^8.

International Statistical Bureau. Russian Plans for War. New York: International Statistical Bureau, Inc., 1950.

The International Studies Group. The Security of the Middle East. Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1950.

Krout, John A. (ed.). Proceedings of the American Academy of Political Science. Vol. XXIV, Wo. W. New~York: The American Academy of Political Science, 1952.

Mosely, Philip E. (ed.). ’’Russia Since Stalin: Old Trends and New Problems," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science. Vol. 505* Philadelphia: The American Academy Press, 1956.

______. "The Soviet Union Since World War II," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science. Vol. 2 6 5 . Philadelphia: The American Academy Press, 19^9 .

Pennar, Joan (ed.). Report on the Soviet Union. A symposium of the Institute for the Study of the U.S.S.R. Munich: Institute for the Study of the U.S.S.R., 1956.

Reitzel, William, Morton A. Kaplan, and Constance G. Coblenz. United States Foreign Policy 19^-5-1955. Washington: The Brookings Institution,' l95o.

Rustow, Dankwart A. Politics and Westernization in the Near East. Princeton: Center of International Studies, March 1, 1956.

Van Wagenen, Richard W. The Iranian Case 19^6. In consulta­ tion with T. Cuyler Young. New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1952. 229

2.* Periodicals in Russian

Abik, R. "Natsional'noe i revoliutsionnoe dvizhenie v persii v 1914-1920" /Nationalist and Revolutionary Movement in Persia in 1914-19207, Novyi Vostok, No. 25-24, 1923, pp. 254-64, No. 26-27, 1929, pp. 125-61, No. 50, 1950, pp. 88-107.

Akopian, G. "Ekspansiia amerikanskogo imperializma na blizhnem i srednem vostoke" /Expansion of American Imperialism in the Near and Middle East/7, Voprosy ekonomikl, June, 1949, pp. 42-59*

Bagirov, M. D. "K voprosu o kharalctere dvizheniia miuridizma i shamilia" /i?he Nature of Muridism and Shamil/., Bolshevik, July, 1950, pp. 21-57.

Dallin, D. "iranskaia neft1" /Iranian Oil/, Sotsialisticheskii vestnik, October, 1947, p. 15.

"Iran," V zashchitu rnira, September, 1955, pp. 91-96.

Ivanov, M. S. "K istorii ogrableniia irana anglo-iranskoi neftianoi kompaniei" /Eistory of the Robbery of Iran by the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company/, Voprosy istorii, May, 1952, pp. 105-116.

"K voprosu 0 Sovetsko-Iranskom neftianom obshchestve" /Soviet- Iranian Petroleum Society/, Novoe Vremia, October, 1947, pp. l8f.

"K sovetsko-iranskim torgovym otnosheniiam" /Soviet-Iranian Trade Relations/, Vneshniaia torgovlia, June, 1955, p. 46.

Korobeinikov, I. "Ekspansiia amerikanskikh monopolii v stranakh blizhnego i srednego vostoka" /Expansion of American Monopolies in Countries of the Near and Middle East/, Vneshniaia torgovlia, February, 1951, pp. 27-59.

Mad’iar, L. T. "Lenin i problemy natsional*no-kolonialfnoi revoliutsii"./Lenin and Problems of National and Colonial Revolution/, Revoliutsionnyl vostok, No. 1, 1954, p. 8.

Malenkov, G. M. "Otchetnyi doklad XIX s"ezdu partii o rabote Tsentral’nogo Komiteta VKP (b)" Report to the 1 9 th Party Congress on the Work of the Central Committee of the All- Union Communist Party (bolshevik)7, Bol'shevik, October, 1952, pp. 5-65. 230

"Novaia zhertva fashistskoi provokatsii" /New Victims of Fascistic Provocation/, Molodezh* mira, September, 1952, p. 11.

Popov, M. V. "Amerikanskaia finansovaia missiia v Irane (1943-1944)" Rmerican Finance Mission in Iran, 1943- 1 9 4 4 7 , Voprosy istorii, August, 1953» pp. 74-93.

Sarkisov, E, G. "Stalinskoe uchenie po natsional‘no-kolonial* nomu voptosu i narody vostoka" /Stalin Theory bn the National-Colonial Problem and the Peoples of the East/, Vestnik Akademii nauk SSSR, December, 1949, pp. 6 0 -8 5 .

Sergeev, M. "Bor’ba demokratii protiv reaktsii v Irane" R h e Struggle cf Democracy Against Reaction in Iran/, Bolshevik, June, 1946, pp. 51-69.

Van Min, "0 revoliutsionnom dvizhenii v kolonial’nykh i polukolonial’nykh stranakh i taktike kompartii Revolu­ tionary Movement in Colonial and Semi-Colonial.Countries and the Tactics of the Ommunist International/, Revoliut- sionnyi vostok, No. 4, 1935, pp. 5-39.

4» Periodicals in English

Ala, Hussein. "Soviet-Iranian Pact," Vital Speeches of the Day, 12:408-10, April 15, 1946.

Aliabadi, A. "Education in Iran, Now and in the Future," Royal Central Asian Society Journal, 3 6 :6 2 -6 6 , January, 19497

Allen, George V. "Summary of the Speech Delivered to the Iran-American Society by the American Ambassador," September 11, 1947, Iran and the USA, September, 1947, pp. 1-3.

Atyeo, Henry C, "Political Developments in Iran, 1951-1954," Middle Eastern Affairs, 5:256, August-September, 1954.

Bayne, Edward A. "Crisis of Confidence in Iran," Foreign Affairs, 29:584, July, 1951.

Beijan, A. "Relations Between Iran and the United States," Iran and the USA, February, 1946, pp. 6f.

Bouscaren, Anthony T. "Soviet Policy in Iran," Current History, 22:271-77, May, 1952. 231

Bouscaren, Anthony T, "Stalin Looks at Iran/1 Catholic World, 174:262-67, January, 1952.

"Chronology," Middle Eastern Affairs, 1:207, June-July, 1950, 1:262, August-Septeraber, 1950; l:38lf, December, 1950; 3:130, April, 1952; 3:258f, August-September, 1952; 4:74, February, 1953; 4:198, May, 1955; 4:306-46f, August- September, 1953; 4:38.1, November, 1953; 4:423, December. 1953; 5:11**37, January, 1954; 5:69, February, 1954; 5:1^4, April, 195*1-; 5:298, August-September, 1954; 6:30, January, 1955; 7 :43, January, 1956; 7:163, April, 1956; 7:323, August-September, 1956; 7:370, October, 1956; 8:121, March, 1957.

"Close the Door Majlis," Newsweek, 30:32f, November 3, 1947.

"Confusion Brings Conflict, Blood to Iran," Life, 34:32-33, March 16, 1953. ----

Corbett, P. E. "Can the UNO Keep the Peace?" Nation, 162: 336-39, March 23, 1946.

"Council: What Price Soviet-Iranian Accord?" Newsweek, 27: 38-41, April 15, 1946.

Dallin, David J. "Soviet Policy in the Middle East," Middle Eastern Affairs, 6:337-44, November 6, 1955.

Davies, Raymond A. "A Picture Mostly in Oil," Asia and the Americans, 46:l6l-63, April, 1946.

"Developments of the Quarter," The Middle East Journal, 4: 332ff, July, 1950; 5:78, Winter, 1951; 5:197f, Spring, 1951; 5:242f, Summer, 1951; 5:486-89, Autumn, 1951; 6: 674-76, Winter, 1952; 6:2l4f, Spring, 1952; 6:333, Summer, 1952; 6:458f, Autumn, 1952; 7:200f, Spring, 1953; 7:509f, Autumn, 1953; 8:69-76f, Winter. 1954; 8:192f, Spring, 1954; o:451f, Autumn, 1954; 9:43, Autumn, 1955; 10:285, Summer, 1956; 10:413, Autumn, 1956; ll:77-179ff, Spring, 1957; 11:295, Summer, 1957.

"Egypt, Iran Quiet Down But - Red Coup, Civil War Threaten," Newsweek, 40:36-39, August 11, 1952.

Elphinston, W. G. "Kurds and the Kurdish Question," Royal Central Asian Society Journal, 35:38-51, January, 1948.

Elwell-Sutton, L. P. "Political Parties;.inl lra?i; " Middle East Journal, 3:45-61, January, 1949. I

232

"Ever the Problem, Inscrutable Iran," Newsweek, 27:32, June 1946.

Grant, Christina P. "Iran: Test of Relations Between Great and Small Nations," Foreign Policy Reports, 21:30-35, April 15, 1945.

Grady, Henry F. "Tensions in Iran," Vital Speeches, 18:370- 75, April 1, 1952.

. "Oil and the Middle East," Foreign Policy Bulletin, 5l:l, December 15, 1951.

Gruevara, Edith. "The Struggle for Iran’s Flowing Gold," Travel, 85:26, March, 1946.

Hayden, Jay G. "iron Curtain on Iran," Forum, 105:553-54, February, 1946.

Hindle, W. H. "The Trouble Isn’t Over in Iran," Harper * s Magazine, 178:135-44, February, 1946.

"How Iran Fights Communism," U. S, News and World Report, 3 5 :42f, October 9, 1953-

"Iran," Life, 20:20f, April 8, 1946.

"Iran," Time, 61:29, March 30, 1955; 62:28, July 20, 1953; 62:l*Pl5, August 31, 1953; 62:39, October 5, 1955; 64:36, November 1, 1954.

"Iran," The Atlantic, Report on the World Today, 195:17, April, 1955.

"Iran and Russia Answer UN," Scholastic, 48:48, April 22, 1946.

"Iran Forces the Issue," New Republic, 114:109, January 28, 19^6 .

"Iran - Good Fishing for Russia," U. S, News and World Report, 30:22, April 6, 1951.

"Iran: Help! Help!" Newsweek, 27:30-32, January 28, 1946.

"Iran, Inside All's Suitcase," Time, 64:42, September 20, 1954.

"Iran, Mossadegh Loses Friends," Time, 61:29-30, January 19, 1953.

"Iran: New Problems," Newsweek, 41:45, March 30, 1953.

"Iran: Pinched for Pennies," Newsweek, 39:28, January 7, 1952. 255 "Iran; Powerful 'Imbecile'," Newsweek, 42:55, July 27, 1955*

"Iran: Reds Taking Over," Newsweek, 42:56-58, August 10, 1955.

"Iran, Relations Resumed," Time, 62:40, December 14, 1955.

"Iran, The Plot That Failed," Time, 62:41-42, November 25, 1955.

"Iran Untangling," Newsweek, 42:55, December 28, 1955.

"Iranian Interlude: Struggle over Control of Oil," Business Week, December 2, 1944, pp. 115-14.

Kazemzadeh, F. "The Origin and Early Development of the Persian Cossack Brigade," The American Slavic and East European Review, 15:551-64, October, 1956".

Khalili, Parvis Khan. "Red Star Over Iran," American Mercury, 79:77-81, July, 1954.

Kirchway, Freda. "Old Game: New Rules," Nation, 161:725-26, December 29, 19^5*

Kumlien, Gunnar D. "All Foreigners Are Alike," Commonweal, 5 4 :4 9 8 -9 9 , August 51, 1951.

Kurzman, Dan. "Kashani of Iran, Master of Intrigue," Nation, 178:275, April 5, 1954.

Laqueur, Walter Z. "The Appeal of Communism in the Middle East," The Middle East Journal, 9:17-27, Winter, 1955.

Lenczowski, George. "The Communist Movement in Iran," The Middle East Journal, 1:41-49, Winter, 1947.

Leshen, Moshe. "Soviet Propaganda in the Middle East," Middle Eastern Affairs, 4:8f, January, 1955.

"Lesson for U.S. in Iran - Good Deeds Aren't Enough," U. S_. News and World Report, 55:54, August 8, 1952.

Levine, Isaac Don. "The Anatomy of a Red Spy Ring," Life, 29:172-174f, November 21, 1955.

Liddell, Hart, B. H. "The Defense of the Middle East," Harper's Magazine, 192:65-70, April, 1955.

"Limited Victory," Time, 47:27, April 15, 1946. 2?4

Lockhartj Laurence. "The Causes of the Anglo-Persian Oil Dispute," Royal Central Asian Society Journal, 40:148, April, 1953*

Martin, H. G. "The Soviet Union and the Middle East," Middle Eastern Affairs, 7:49, February, 1956.

Mazardi, Joseph A. and Edwin Muller, "The Hunch that Saved Iran," Reader's Digest, 6 7 :57-60,.September, 1955*

McCarthy, Mary M. "Anglo-Russian Rivalry in Persia," The University of Buffalo Studies, June, 1925*

"Middle East, Tiered Up," Time, 66: 22, October 24, 1955.

Morgan, Edward P. and Harrison E. Salisbury, "Oil Troubles Iran's Waters," Colliers, 117:21-24, April 4, 1946.

Morrell, Sidney W. "Iranian Checkerboard," Nation, 164:514- 16, May 3, 1947.

"Moscow's Master Plan for the Middle East," United Nations World, 6:6-7, September, 1952.

Muller, Edwin. "Behind the Scenes in Azerbaiajn," The American Mercury, 6 2 :6 9 6 -7 0 3 , June, 1946.

"Murder in Iran: Worry for West," United States News and World Report, 30:24, March 16, 1951.

"No Aid for Iran," America, 89:409, July 25, 1953.

"One Time American Aid Paid Off," U. S. News and World Report, 35:43, August 2 8 , 1953.

Patai, Raphael. "The Dynamics of Westernization in the Mid­ dle East," The Middle East Journal, 9:1-16, Winter, 1955.

Payne, Robert. "Four Shots in Teheran," United Nations World, 5:17-19, May, 1951.

Peffer, Nathaniel. "Lenin and the Course of Colonial Com­ munism," The Yale Review, 45:17-30, September, 1955.

Perlman, M. "Middle East - Review of Events," Middle East Affairs, 4:51, February, 1953; 4:293f, August-September, 1953 •

Price, M. Phillips. "The Borderlands of the Middle East," The Contemporary Review, 173:21-24, January, 1948. 235 Price, M. Phillips.- "The Present Situation in Persia," Royal Central Asian Society Journal, 33:102-111, April-July, 1951.

______. "Soviet Azerbaijan," Royal Central Asian Society Journal, 32:195* April, 19457^

"Recent Events in Persia," Royal Central Asian Society Journal, 37:81-87, January-March, 1950.

"Revolt Collapses in Teheran; Will Iran Enter Russian Orbit?" Newsweek, 42:34, August 24, 1953.

"Revolt in the Middle East?" Nation, 175:143* August 12, 1952.

Roth, Andrew. "Iran: Unrecognized Revolution," Nation, 173: 112-13, August 11, 1951.

"Russia’s Shift in Policy: Concession to World Opinion," U. S_. News and World Report, 16:20-21, April 5* 1946.

Rubinstein, Alvin Z. "Soviet Policy in South Asia," Current History, 32:97* February, 1957.

"Russia Trouble," Newsweek, 24:58, November 20, 1944.

"Sabotage," Time, 62:39* October 5* 1953.

Sayre* Joel. "Persian Gulf Command*" The New Yorker, 21: 26-30, January 13* 1945; 21:40f, February 17* 19%*' 21:52f* March 24, 1945; 2l:46f, April 7* 1945.

Sharp, Samuel L. "The Soviet Position in the Middle East," Social Science, 32:225-31* October* 1957.

"Siding with the West," Time, 64:27, August 9* 1954.

Sylces, Edward. "Economic Problems of Persia," Royal Central Asian Society Journal, 37:262-72, September-December, 1950.

"Stalin’s Fifth Column Ready If Iran Erupts," U. S_. .News and World Report, 33:38-39* September 12, 1956.

"Standing Up to Stalin," Newsweek, 31:36, April 26, 1948.

Stevens, Georgians G. "Reforms and Power Politics in Iran," Foreign Policy Reports, 26:231ff, February 15* 1951.

Swearingen* Rodger. "A Decade of Soviet Policy in Asia," Current History, 32:89* February, 1957. 236

"Tabriz and Teheran*" Time,, 46:30, December 31, 1945.

"Treaties and Agreements," Foreign Commerce Weekly, December 17,-1956, p. 9; January 77 1957, p. 11.

"UNO Confronted with Very Adult Problem," Nation, 166:85, January 26, 1948,

"UNO Lets Russia Walk Out," The Christian Century, 63:451, August 10, 1946.

Valyi, Felix. "Iran Between Two Worlds," Asia, 46:158-60, April, 1946.

"Violence Spreads in Iran," Life, 30:49, May 7, 1951.

Visson, Andre. "Trouble. Over Iran," Reader*s Digest, 45: 69“72, November, 1945.

Weintal, Edward. "Red Menace Revived," Newsweek, 35:40, March 13, 1950.

"What is the Communist Pattern of Aggression?" Contact, September, 1950, p. 29.

"World Document: Soviet-Iranian Dispute," Current History, 10:258-64, March, 1946.

Y i n 1am, S. "The Middle East in 1955 - Annual Political Survey," Middle Eastern Affairs, 5:llf, January, 1954.

"You Can't Do That," Time, 57:28, May 14, 1951.

Young, T. Cuyler. "The Problem of Westernization in Iran," The Middle East,Journal, 2:47-59, January, 1948.

. "Recent Books on Iran," The Middle East Journal, 4:106-8 , January, 1950.

______. "The Social Support of Current Iranian Policy," The Middle East Journal, 6:125-43, Spring, 1952.

"Zahedi Fights Communists, So U. S. Overlooks His Past," U. S, News and World Report, 35:61-63, September 11, 1953.

"Zahedi: How Iran's Strong Man Is Taking Over," Newsweek, 42:39, September 7, 1953. 237 Essays and Articles in Collection

Armstrong, Willis C. "Soviet Use of Trade as a Weapon," The Threat of Soviet Imperialism, Charles Grove Haines, editor. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 195^* Pp. 69-78*

Barghoorn, Frederick. "The Ideological Weapon in Soviet Strategy," The Threat of Soviet Imperialism, Charles Grove Haines, editor. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 195*1, Pp. 82-96.

Black, C. E. "The Role of Diplomacy in Soviet Imperialism," The Threat of Soviet Imperialism, Charles Grove Haines, editor. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 195^. Pp. 100-115.

Beglar, N. "Panel Report," Report on the Soviet Union, Joan Pennar, editor. Munich: Institute for the Study of the U.S.S.R., 1956. Pp. 22-25.

Browne, Louis E. "Will the Soviet Union Co-operate with the United Nations?" Making the United Nations Work, Ernest M. Patterson, editor. The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 246. Philadelphia: American Academy Press,’19^6. Pp. ^2-^8.

Byrnes, Robert F. "Soviet Policy toward Western Europe Since Stalin," Russia Since Stalin: Old Trends and New Problems, Philip E. Mosely, editor. The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 303. Philadelphia: American Academy Press, 1956. Pp. 1 6 6 -7 8 .

Dudlin, Leo V. "Panel Report," Report on the Soviet Union, Joan Pennar,.editor. Munich: Institute for the Study of the U.S.S.R,,.1956. Pp. 25-28.

Ferguson, John H. "Discussion of ’Soviet Use of Trade as a Weapon'," The Threat of Soviet Imperialism, Charles Grove Haines, editor. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 195^. Pp. 79-81.

Fisher, Harold H. "Soviet Policy in Asia Since Stalin," Russia Since Stalin: Old Trends and New Problems, Philip E. Mosely, editor. The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 303. Philadelphia: American Academy Press, 1956. Pp. 179-91.

Goldman, Ilya J. "Panel Report," Report on the Soviet Union, Joan Pennar, editor. Munich: Institute for the Study of the U.S.S.R., 1956. Pp. 192-94. 238

Grady, Henry P. "Tensions in the Middle East with Particular Reference to Iran," Proceedings of the American Academy of Political Science, John A. Krout, editor. Vol. 24. New York: The American Academy of Political Science, 1952. Pp. 114-21.

______. "Real Story of Iran," Crisis in the Middle East, Edward Latham, editor. New York: The H. ¥. Wilson Company, 1952. Pp. 45-51*

Harvey, Mose L. "The Basic Tactical and Strategical Concepts of Soviet Expansionism," The Threat of Soviet Imperialism, Charles Grove Haines, editor. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1954. Pp. 42-62.

Hightower, John. "Discussion of 'The Basic Tactical and Strategical Concepts of Soviet Expansionism,1" The Threat of Soviet Imperialism, Charles Grove Haines, editor. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1954. Pp. 6 3 -6 5 .

Kennan, George. "The Soviet Union and the Noncommunist World in Historical Perspective," The Threat of Soviet Imperialism, Charles Grove Haines, editor. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1954. Pp. 3-19*

Laskovsky, N. S. "An Analysis of the Twentieth Party Con­ gress," Report on the Soviet Union, Joan Pennar, editor. Munich: Institute for the'Study of the U.S.S.R., 1956. Pp. 13-22.

Letiche, J. M. "Soviet Foreign Economic Policy: Trade and Assistance Programs," Report on the Soviet Union, Joan Pennar, editor. Munich: Institute for the Study of the U.S.S.R., 1956. Pp. 172-94.

Menken, Jules. "The Role of Force in Soviet Policy," The Threat of Soviet Imperialism, Charles Grove Haines, editor. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1Q54. Pp. 120-32..

Micocci, Antonio. "Discussion of 'The Ideological Weapon in Soviet Strategy,'" The Threat of Soviet Imperialism, Charles Grove Haines, editor. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1954. Pp. 97-99*

Moore, Barrington, Jr. "The Outlook," Russia Since Stalin - Old Trends and New Problems, Philip E. Mosely, editor. The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol.' 5 ’03'. Philadelphia: American Academy Press, 1956. Pp. 1-10. 259 Mosely., Philip E. "Concluding Remarks," Report on the Soviet Union, Joan Pennar, editor. Munich: Institute for the Study of the U.S.S.R., 1956.. Pp. 205-7.

______. "The Soviet Union and the United States: Problems and Prospects," Russia Since Stalin: Old Trends and Hew Problems, Philip E. Mosely, editor. The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 505. Philadelphia: American Academy Press, 1956. Pp. 192-98.

Nasar, Rusi. "Soviet Asian Policy," Report on the Soviet Union, Joan Pennar, editor. Munich: Institute for the Study of the U.S.S.R., 1956. Pp. 129-57.

Nitze, Paul H. "The United States in the Pace of the Communist Challenge," The Threat of Soviet Imperialism, Charles Grove Haines, editor. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1954. Pp. 572-79.

Reshetar, John S. "Panel Report," Report on the Soviet Union, Joan Pennar, editor. Munich:. Institute for the Study of the U.S.S.R., 1956. Pp. 28-51.

Schwarz,. Solomon M. "Panel Report," Report on the Soviet Union, Joan Pennar, editor. Munich: Institute for the Study of the U.S.S.R., 1956. Pp. 201-5.

Thurston, Ray L. "Discussion of 'The Role of Diplomacy in Soviet Imperialism, '" The Threat of Soviet Imperialism, Charles Grove Haines, editor. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1954. Pp. 116-19.

Timoshenko, V. P. "Soviet Agricultural Policy and the Nation­ alities Problem in the U.S.S.R.," Report on the Soviet Union, Joan Pennar, editor. Munich: Institute for the Study of the U.S.S.R., 1956. Pp. '51-50.

Toynbee, Philip. "Behind Iran's Seething Nationalism," Crisis in the Middle East, Edward Latham, editor. New York: The H. W. Wilson Company, 1952. Pp. 57-40.

Wilson, John A. "The Near East," A Foreign Policy for the United States, Quincy Wright, editor. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1947. Pp. 1 7 8 -8 7 .

Wright, Walter L., Jr. "Our Near Eastern Policy in the Making," Foreign Policies and Relations of the United States, H. H. Ehrmann, editor. The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science. Vol. 255- Philadelphia: American Academy PresFJ 1956. Pp. 95-104. 240

Zinner, Paul E. "Soviet Policies In Eastern Europe," Russia Since Stalin: Old Trends and New Problems, Philip E. Mosely, editor. The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. Philadelphia: American Academy Press, 195k. Pp. 152-65.

Encyclopedia Articles in Russian and English

"Azerbaidzhanskaia sovetskaia sotsialisticheskaia respublika," Bol'shaia sovetskala entsiklopediia (2nd ed.), Ill, 448-50. Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe nauchnoe izdatelfstvo, 1954.

Esposito, Vincent J. "Strategy,"The Encyclopedia Americana (1957 ed.), XXV, 712-15.

Gomalov-Gomlib, A. "Persia," Bol-shaia sovetskaia entsik­ lopediia (1st ed.), XLV, 180-96. Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe nauchnoe izdatel1stvo, 1959.

Haas,'William S. "Persia-Iran,11 The Encyclopedia Americana (1956 ed.), XXI, 615-25.

"imperialism," The Encyclopedia Americana (1956 ed.), XIV, 724-25.

Vvedenskii, B. A. "Iran," Bol^haia sovetskaia entsiklopediia (2nd ed.), XVIII, 4l8-52. Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe nauchnoe izdatel1stvo, 1954.

7. Unpublished Material

Sinclair, Angus. "Communism in the Middle East." Article copyrighted by Admiral Sinclair. Report Number 788, United States Department of State, June 8, 1951. (Mimeographed.)

8. Newspapers in French, Russian, Persian,.and English

Bank Melli Iran Bulletin /Peheran7, January, 1950 - December, 1951.

Bulletin de presse Iranienne /¥avls/} March, 1946 - May, 1947.

Dad /Teheran/, January, 1950 - January, 1952.

The Economist /London/, January, 1941 - January, 1957. 2kl

Ettelaat ^/Teheran/, January, 1951 - January, 1957*

Izvestia ^oscow/, January, 19^1 - May, 1957.

Journa 1 de Teheran ^eheran/, January,. 19^*1- - January, 1956.

Literaturnaya gazeta Moscow/, March 27, 1951, p. 1.

The Manchester Guardian, January, 19^1 - May, 1957.

The Hew York Times, September, 1955 “ January, 1958.

Fravda ^oscow/, January, 19^5 - September, 1957.

Ross, Albion. "Mossadegh is Back as Premier of Iran; Order is Restored," The Hew York Times, July 25, 1952, pp. 1-5*

Sulzberger, C, L. "Moscow Pressure Worries Teheran," The Hew York Times, April 5, 1950, p. 17.

Toynbee, Philip. "Iran is Important because It is Weak," The Hew York Times Magazine, March 18, 1951, pp. ^ f f .

______. "Behind Iran's Seething nationalism," The Hew York Times,Magazine, October J, 1951, pp. 56ff.

Tass news report ^Moscow/, January, 1955 - December, 1956.

Teheran J ourna 1 ^/Teheran/, January, 1955 - February, 1956.

Telu ^Teheran/^ January, 1950 - January, 1952.

The Times /London^ January, 19^1 ~ December, 1956.

Trud Moscow/, January, 19^^ - December, 1952.

The Washington Evening Star, September, 1955 - May, 1957.

The Washingt on Post, January, 1 9 ^ - January, 1958. APPENDIX A THE THREE POWER DECLARATIONS CONCERNING IRAN*

Issued at the Teheran Conference 1 December 19^3

The President of the United States of America, the Premier of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, having consulted with each other and with the Prime Minister of Iran, desire to declare the mutual agreement of their three Governments regarding their relations with Iran.

The Governments of the United States, the USSR and the United Kingdom recognize the assistance which the Iran has given in the prosecution of the war against the common enemy, particularly by facilitating the transportation of supplies from overseas to the Soviet Union. The three Governments realize that war has caused special economic difficulties, for Iran, and they are agreed that they will continue to' make available to the Government of Iran such economic assistance as may be possible, having regard to the heavy demands made upon them by their world-wide military operations and to the world-wide shortage of transport, raw materials, and supplies for civilian consumption. With respect to the post-war period, the Governments of the United States, the USSR, and the United Kingdom are in accord with the Government of Iran that any economic problems confronting Iran at the close of hostilities should receive full consideration, along with those of other Members of the United Nations, by conferences or interna­ tional agencies held or created to deal with international economic matters.

The Governments of the United States, the USSR and the United Kingdom are at one with the Government of Iran in their desire for the maintenance of the inde­ pendence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iran. They count upon the participation of Iran, together with all other peace-loving nations, in the establishment of international peace, security and prosperity after

United Nations, Security Council, Offlcial Records, 1st Year, 1st Series, Supplement No. 1 (London: CEurch House, Westminister), p. 49. 244 the war, in accordance with the principles of the Atlantic Charter, to which all four Governments have subscribed.

(signed) Winston Churchill J. V. Stalin Franklin D. Roosevelt APPENDIX B 246

NOTE PROM THE IRANIAN MINISTRY OP FOREIGN AFFAIRS TO THE SOVIET EMBASSY, TEHERAN*

26 Aban 1324 ( 1 7 November 1945)

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs presents its compli­ ments to the Embassy of the USSR, and pursuant to numerous notes and discussions concerning the freedom of action of the Iranian Army and security forces in the N0rthern Prov­ inces, wherein the non-agreement or Soviet authorities has placed the aforesaid forces in such a position that for a long period they have not been able to take the slightest step towards establishing law and order and preventing the activities of undesirable elements, the Ministry has the honour to state that reports received from the Ministry of War and Ministry of Justice indicate that:

1. A number of Kurds in the Fourth Province (namely, the western part of Azerbaijan including Rezaieh) and Maha- bad area have been actively engaged in obtaining arms and ammunitions by various means so as to threaten Iran’s integ­ rity.

2. The leaders of the Kurds have obtained a printing press and much newsprint for their purposes from Soviet Russia.

3. A number of the Kurdish chiefs, without following the legal procedure, have gone to Baku and returned.

4. Mustafa Barzani, who has fled from Iraq and entered Iran, now resides with his men in Kurdish dis­ tricts and, being armed, has created a state of disorder and confusion in the Fourth Province (western section of Azerbaijan).

5. The coming and going of ordinary travellers from Teheran to the Northern Province is being controlled and inspected by Soviet officials, no admission being granted by the latter without inspection.

6. The transportation of foodstuffs from the Northern Provinces to the capital and southern areas has been stopped. As a result prices have gone up, while the peasants in the Northern Provinces, lacking a market for their produce, are In distress.

7. The maintenance of order and security in the Northern

* Ibid., p. 50. 2h7

Provinces is jeopardized by inadequate garrison forces. It is, on the other hand, impossible to reinforce the troops already on the spot owing to the fact that the sending of even one gendarme requires the sanction of the Soviet auth­ orities. To secure this entails such protracted formalities that the object in view is defeated before anything can be done.

8. With.no Governor-General and local governors in the Northern Provinces, the administration is disturbed. Meanwhile, obstacles are placed in the way of Iranian officials who attempt to proceed to their respective posts to fulfill their duty.

9. On the Irano-Turkish border, Iranian officials are unable to exercise vigilance and make their authority felt because they are deprived of all freedom of action.

10. Due to interference on the part of Russian officials, the prosecution of individuals in the Northern Provinces has been rendered difficult. This Soviet attitude is in direct violation of Iran’s jurisdictional freedom. The Russians are sending into exile those whom they accuse of having created a state of unrest and confusion. Moreover, they have not allowed reinforcements to be sent in time to local­ ities where their presence was urgently required. The following are some of the reports received to-date: (a) On the night of 2J> Aban (l4 November) a number of villagers affiliated with the "Democratic Party" met in a locality situated at a distance of twelve kilometers from Moshad. Some fifty of them were armed. These men blocked the road to two army trucks, beat a warrant officer in the truck, disrobed him and then held meetings. Afterwards, they book possession of Mashad, disarmed all the local gendarmes and railway guards, and then took possession of government offices, interning all government officials.

(b) Kabiri (a local magnate closely in touch with Soviet officials) has distributed arms and ammunition to a large number of people in Maragheh. In Adjabshir,' the gendarmes have been surrounded, arrested, deprived of their weapons, and afterwards cast into jail. In Qolikandi the constabulary had arrested a number of insurgents and brought them to Maragheh, but Russian officials interfered and insisted that they be • set at liberty because they were communists. Kabiri is actively engaged in gathering men and arming them and is making preparations to attack Maragheh. Arms and ammunition are being distributed among members of the "Democratic Party" in Sarab. Armed groups pretending to take part in meetings want to go to Sarab and occupy government offices. 248

(c) Reports received from Tabriz state that Russian officials prevent the police from guarding the prisons; meanwhile, members of the "Democratic Party" are allowed to engage freely in arming people and inciting them to create disorder. Representations to the Soviet officials on the spot to not give fruitful and positive results. The same situation prevails in Khoy, Makou and Rezaieh.

Such being the state of things and because of the anxiety of the Government, instructions have been issued to the departments concerned to send out the Governor-General, governors and other officials as soon as possible to the posts which have hitherto remained vacant,for the reason already specified. At the same time, orders have been given for the dispatch of troops and gendarmes in sufficent number to cope with the situation and re-establish order and tranquility.

Consequently, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs requests the Soviet Government (which as a signatory to the Tri- Partit6 Treaty of Alliance of 29 January 19^2 undertook to respect the territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence of Iran and to abstain from dis­ turbing the administration and the security forces of Iran and the economic life of the country) to issue the necessary immediate instructions to the Soviet military authorities enjoining them to refrain from interfering with the freedom of action of the Iranian Army and con­ stabulary. If urgent attention is not paid to these mat­ ters, the situation in the northern regions is such that disastrous consequences might ensue which most certainly would be contrary to the wishes of the two Governments and to the expressed desire of the USSR to consolidate i.ts relations with Iran. Should the Iranian Government not succeed in preventing unfortunate incidents owing to the lack of freedom of movement of its armed forces, it will have the right of imputing responsibility for this failure to the Soviet military authorities.

In conclusion, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in­ forms the Soviet Embassy that the Iranian Government has decided to send for the moment two infantry battalions, one light tank battalion, and one gendarme battalion with arras and ammunition from Teheran to Mianeh and Tabriz via Knavin and Zandjan. It is requested that the Soviet authorities be notified of these decisions at the earliest possible moment so that they may be informed of the matter in advance. APPENDIX C 250

NOTE PROM THE UNITED STATES AMBASSADOR IN MOSCOW TO THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT*

24 November 1945

The Government of Iran has informed the Government of the United States that armed uprisings have taken place in areas of northern Iran where Soviet troops are stationed; that the Iranian Government has directed cer­ tain of its armed forces to enter those areas for the purpose of re-establishing internal security and its own authority; that Soviet military commanders have refused to permit these forces to proceed; and that consequently the Iranian Government has not been able to carry out its responsibility for the maintenance of peace and order in Iranian territory.

It will be recalled that on 1 December 1943., Marshal Stalin, Prime Minister Churchill and President Roosevelt signed in Tehran a Declaration in which they stated that their Governments were "at one with the Government of Iran in their desire for the maintenance of the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Iran." This Government has entire confidence that the Governments of the Soviet Union and Great Britain are just as zealous as the Government of the United States meticulously to abide by the assuranoes contained in this declaration. In view of this Government, the fulfillment of these assurances required that the Government of Iran should have full freedom, without interference from Soviet, British, or American military or civil authorities, to move its armed forces through Iran in such a manner as it may consider necessary in order to preserve its authority and to maintain internal security.

The Government of the United States realizes that any Soviet commanders in the areas concerned who may have prevented the free movement of Iranian forces may have been acting without the sanction of the Soviet Government. If the Soviet commanders have been acting without instructions in this matter, it is assumed that the Soviet Government is issuing to them instructions in keeping with the declaration referred to above.

In any event, the situation which has arisen has convinced the American Government that it would be in the common interest for all Soviet, British and American

Ibid., pp. 53ff. troops to be withdrawn immediately from Iran. As long as any of these troops remain in the territory of a friendly Government, incidents and misunderstandings are likely to occur. -

The Government of the United States has already reduced its forces in Iran during the present year from a maximum strength of approximately 28,000 to less than 6,000. There are no American combat troops in Iran. Those who remain are engaged in activities exclusively of a service nature connected with the liquidation and disposal of military supplies and the operation of certain important communica­ tions connected with demobilization. While the immediate withdrawal of these troops will cause considerable incon­ venience to this Government, nevertheless instructions are being issued to the American military authorities in Iran to take immediate steps to effect the complete with­ drawal of all American forces from Iran by 1 January 19*5-6.

This Government proposes that the British and Soviet Governments issue similar instructions to their commanders, and that arrangements be made immediately for the complete withdrawal of all foreign troops from Iran by 1 January 19*5-6. Immediate steps to effect such withdrawal would dispel any doubt regarding the intentions of the three Governments to carry out the assurances given by them. In making this suggestion, the Government of the United States is aware that no undertaking has been given that these troops are to be removed from Iran before 2 March 19*5-6. On the other hand, now that hostilitiesbave ceased, it sees no compelling reason for them to remain until that date. It is of the opinion that immediate steps to effect the withdrawal by 1 January not only would obviate possible misunderstand­ ings but would also be a fitting recognition of the notable contributions which Iran, a Member in good standing of the United Nations, has made to the common war effort.

Nations such as Iran were encouraged at the United Nations Conference at San Francisco to place full trust in the friendly intentions and good will of the permanent members of the Security Council. The Government of the United States is confident that the Soviet Union and Great Britain are no less anxious than the United States, in dealing with nations such as Iran, to follow a line of action which will make it clear that the trust of these nations in the permanent members of the Security Council has not been misplaced.

Similar proposals are being made to the British Government. APPENDIX D 253 NOTE PROM THE USSR COMMISSAR FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS TO THE UNITED STATES EMBASSY, MOSCOW*

Translation 29 November 19^5

The statement made in the communication concerning the armed uprising in northern Iran is not, according to information at the disposal of the Soviet Government, in accordance with the facts. The events which have taken place in recent days in Iran not only do not constitute an armed uprising but also are not directed against the Shah- inshah Government of Iran. Now that the declaration of the Popular Assembly of Northern Iran has been published it is evident that this is a matter of aspirations with respect to the assurance of the democratic rights of the Azerbaijanian population of northern Iran, which is seeking national autonomy within the limits of the Iranian State and which has its own language, different from the Persian language. It is also apparent from the con­ tents of the above-mentioned declaration of the Popular Assembly, which took place in Tabriz 20 to 21 November, that the Popular Assembly, basing itself on the Iranian Constitution, addressed the expression of its wishes to the Shah, the Majlis and the Government of Iran. The undesirable incidents which have taken place in conjunction with these recent events St various points of northern Iran have been caused by reactionary elements which have opposed the extension of national rights to the population of northern Iran, although there is nothing in these desires of the local population which is unusual for a democratic state. As far as the S0viet military command is concerned, it has not hindered and is not hindering the movements of the Iranian military forces and the gendarme police units which are in districts of northern Iran. According to information at the disposal of the Soviet Government, there are in these districts of Iran one infantry regi­ ment, two infantry brigades, two regiments of gendarme police units, the presence of which can secure order and calm in these parts. The Soviet Government opposed the dispatch of new Iranian troops to the northern districts of Iran and informed the Iranian Government that the dis­ patch of further Iranian forces to northern Iran could cause: not the cessation but the increase of disorders

* Ibid.. pp. 57f. 254 and likewise bloodshed, which would compel the Soviet Govern­ ment to introduce into Iran further forces of its own for the purpose of preserving order and of assuring the security of the Soviet garrison.

Inasmuch as the Soviet Government considers the further introduction of Soviet forces into Iran desirable, it took the position that the introduction of new Iranian forces into the Northern Provinces of Iran at the present time would serve no useful purpose. As to the reference in the communications of the Gov­ ernment of the United States to the Three-Power Declara­ tion of 1 December 1945 concerning Iran, the Soviet Government on its part must state that it adheres stead­ fastly to the principles of that Declaration. The Declara­ tion in question, however, does not affect the question of the number of Soviet armed forces on Iranian territory just as it does not affect the question of the period of the stationing of Soviet troops in Iran. The latter question is determined by another document, namely, the Anglo-Soviet-Iranian Tri-Partite Treaty of 1942, and in connection with the stationing of its troops in Iran, notwithstanding the fact that the right of introduction of Soviet troops into the territory of Iran was envisaged by the Soviet-Iranian Treaty of 26 February 1921.

Furthermore, as the Government of the United States is aware, the question of the time for the removal of Soviet and British troops from Iran was a subject con­ sidered by the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs in London as recently as two months ago, and was decided by an exchange of letters between -the Soviet and British representatives which was brought to the attention of the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs and did not meet with objection in any quarters. In connection with the above, it should also be noted that the British Government, in its note on the Iranian question received by the Soviet Government on 25 November, does not raise the question of the removal of Soviet troops from Iran. On the strength of the considerations set for the above with relation to Soviet troops, the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics does not see grounds for the renewed considerations of the question of the time limit for the removal of these forces from Iran. APPENDIX E 2 5 6

NOTE PROM THE IRANIAN MINISTRY OP FOREIGN AFFAIRS TO THE SOVIET EMBASSY, TEHRAN*

Translation 10 Azar 1524 (l December 19^5)

In answer to the communication in which you reply that the charges made concerning the interference of Soviet officials in our internal affairs, in the Northern Prov­ inces, are unfounded, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs does not wish at this time, to give further explanations in this matter and to throw more light on the antecedents of the case. It takes note with satisfaction of the purport of your statements to the effect that henceforth such inci­ dents will not repeat themselves.

Your assurance that the officials of the Soviet Union fully respect the provisions of the Tri-Partite Treaty and of the Declaration signed in Tehran by the three great Powers (which are the Allies of Iran), is also a source of gratification.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs hopes that, with the assistance of the Soviet Embassy, and with the immediate and complete evacuation of Iranian territory by the Red Army— and we expect the same of the two other friendly and Allied Governments— such actions on the part of the Soviet military authorities in the Northern Provinces will no longer take place. In this way the friendship between Iran and the Soviet Union will be increased.

As regards your statement that the Soviet Union cannot be held responsible for the grave consequences of the absence of Iranian officials in the Northern Provinces, we are compelled to point out that the presence of officials in those regions can only be useful and effective if Persian security forces are placed at their disposal and if it is possible to move those forces from localities where they are not required to places where their assistance is needed.

When the hands of government officials are tied whereas irresponsible turbulent elements move about freely, and when the security forces of Iran are deprived of liberty, of action and communication with the Central Government, it is not to be wondered at that the situation becomes troubled and that government officials share the lot of the inhabi­ tants of the Northern Provinces and are exposed to the

*Ibid., pp. 58f f . 257 danger of being assaulted, wounded and murdered. Such un­ fortunate incidents have in fact frequently taken place.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is hopeful that, in accordance with the assurance given by the Soviet Embassy, the interference in the affairs of the Northern Provinces will cease and that the security forces of Iran will be able to move about freely, only in this way can order and tranquility be restored in those regions.

At the same time the Ministry wishes to inform the Embassy that the strengthening and reinforcement of the security forces of the country in the provinces cannot, as would seem to be the contention of the Soviet Embassy, give rise to anxiety and should not in any way afford an excuse for bringing fresh troops from the Soviet Union to Iran. Indeed, the Iranian Government’s request and expectation are that the detachments of the Red Army still remaining in Iran, as well as those of other allied countries, shall evacuate our territory with the least possible delay and return to their respective countries so as to enable the Imperial Government of Iran to pro­ vide for the well-being and tranquility of all its people. The object of the security or military forces of Persia has not been, and is not, to quarrel or to resort to strife with the local inhabitants, but rather to prevent incitement to disturbances and indiscriminate shooting andabuses. The purpose of these forces is to exercise vigilance in maintaining lav; and order.

In this way it will soon be possible to bring about the appeasement of the northern regions of Iran and officials of the Government will be able to attend to and investigate the legitimate requests or grievances of any individual in conformance with the constitution and other laws of the land. In view of what has been said, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in conclusion, requests the Soviet Embassy to be good enough to inform it of the urgent steps which the Embassy will be taking to ensure freedom of movement for the military and civil authorities in the Northern Provinces as well as the unhindered transportation from one locality to another of the security and military forces of Iran In general.

It is requested, in particular, that all obstacles in the way of the detachment which has been waiting at Sharifabad with orders to proceed to the Northern Provinces be removed. APPEMDIX P /

259 NOTE PROM THE IRANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER TO THE AMBASSADORS OP THE UNITED KINGDOM, UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION AT TEHRAN*

Translation 15 December 19^5

In view of the fact that the presence of foreign troops in Iran has caused dislocation in all the affairs of the country, has prevented the Iranian Government from carrying out necessary reforms and repairing the damages sustained by Iran during the war, and has deprived the Government of freedom of action in the execution of its programmes and plans prepared for the welfare of the nation, it is most essential and urgent that the question of putting an sand to this situation should be discussed at the forthcoming Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs in Moscow.

As in accordance with article VT of the Tri-Partite Treaty of Alliance of 29 January 19^2, Great Britain and the Soviet Union have undertaken to consult the Iranian Govern-’ ment in all matters affecting the direct interests of Iran, the Government of Iran expects to be fully consulted during the aforesaid conference, and expects all decisions affecting Iran to be made in agreement with it.

In the opinion of the Iranian Government, the funda­ mental principle on which the deliberations of the con­ ference, in so far as they affect the interests of Iran, must be based, is that with due regard to the spirit of the Three-Power Declaration of 1 December 19*K3> on Iran, the conference should consider and decide upon the complete and immediate evacuation from Iranian territory of the forces of the three Allied Powers concerned.

The presence of foreign troops in Iran has weakened the sovereignty of the country, has caused regrettable inci­ dents and hardships, and has disturbed in a marked way the public opinion as well as order in the country and tran­ quility of the people, as witnessed by the unfortunate incidents in Azerbaijan, which are clearest evidence of the dismal results of the stay of foreign troops in the country. No military or non-military reasons exist any longer which justify the further stay of the three Allied Powers, even for one day, in Iran.

* Ibid., p. 6 0 . APPENDIX 261

COMMUNICATIONS FROM THE IRANIAN MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS TO THE SOVIET EMBASSY, ■ TEHRAN*

No. 2797 2 May 1945

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs presents its compli­ ments to the Embassy of the USSR, and has the honour to state that, according to information received from the General Administration of Police, the Governor of Makou (a town in northwest Azerbaijan) in compliance with the request of the Soviet vice-consul and commanding officer of the town on 29 Tir 1324 (20 July 1945) asked Captain Ali Sanai of the Makou police to leave the. town. The latter thereupon abandoned his duty and left for Rezaieh (a town in western Azerbaijan).

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs requests the Embassy to ascertain from the Soviet authorities concerned the reasons for asking Captain Ali Sanai to leave his post of duty.

Since such actions affect his civil service status, it is requested that this Ministry be informed as soon as possible of the results of the investigation.

No. 3598 2 Shahrivar 1324 (24 August 1945)

According to information received from the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of War, on 15 Kordad 1324 (5 June 194 5 )j when a report concerning the question of evacuating Allied troops from Iran was published in an extra edition of the Akhtar-e-Shomal, a Tabriz newspaper, the Soviet commander summoned the editor of the paper late on that afternoon.

As the editor did not appear, his son, Seyed Hoseyn, the assistant editor of the newspaper, was summoned. The commander also ordered that all issues of the newspaper be confiscated.

* Ibid., pp. 61-71. 262

No. 2085 6 Shahrivar 1324 (28 August 1945)

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs presents its compli­ ments to the Embassy of the USSR and begs to inform it that, according to a report of the Ministry of War and a telegram from the gendarmerie of Gorgan (town in western Esterabad), the situation of Gonbad-Qabus (a town in Western Esterabad) is such as to necessitate speedy measures in order to prevent the occurrence of probable and unfavourable incidents, and to necessitate the preservation of security. It seems imperative that effective means to this end should be obtained as soon as possible.

The Ministry of War is informed that gendarmerie officials in the town in question lack the freedom of action necessary for the performance of their duties in preserving security, and states that in Gonbad-Qabus Russian military authorities should order reinforcements that have reeencly reached them in return to their original station. Furthermore, the gendarmes in the said town have been informed that they should not fire their rifles no matter what happens. Such a declaration and instruction necessarily mean that, if any elements attack the small garrison stationed in Gonbad-Qabus, the latter will be unable to defend itself and to maintain security.

We, therefore, request you to issue instructions that:

1. The movement of gendarmes as dictated by the needs of the locality should not be hindered.

2. The gendarmes sent as reinforcements to Gonbad-Qabus should be able to remain there as long as their stay is considered necessary by the commander of the gendarmerie of the aforesaid town.

No. 2884 (Undated)

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs presents its compli­ ments to the Embassy of the USSR, and has the honour to state that, according to information received from the Ministry of Health, on. Sunday morning, 17 Kordad 1324 (8 August 1945), the Sovie': 'ommander sent several armed soldiers to arrest Dr. Sauui, the Head of the Health 26?

Department and Director of the Government Hospital in Shahpour (town in northwest Azerbaijan). He was arrested and brought to Soviet headquarters where the following men ted already been detained: Mr. Abdullar Waez-Zadeh, a business man; Mr. Lutfali Azar, an employee of the Finance Department; Mr. Mohammed Moini, chief of the police chancery; and Mr. Ali Behnla, technical inspector of education in Shahpour. Without any charges being preferred against him., Dr. Saudi was kept without food until 9 : 1 5 p.m. of the same day, when he was dismissed without any interrogation.

He was treated as an ordinary accused person. His pockets were searched; and the contents were held and returned to him after his release.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs requests of the Embassy that investigations be made by the Soviet mili­ tary authorities concerned, and that the Ministry may be informed of the reason for the occurrence of the incident. It is also requested that necessary assurances be given to the Ministry that such incidents will not take place in the future.

No. 2966 12 Shahrivar 1324 (3 September 1945)

The Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs presents it compliments to the Embassy of the USSR, and has the honour to state that the Ministry of War informs it that, according to reports received from Maragheh (a town south of Tabriz), on 29 Mordad 1324 (27 July 1945), Mr. Yakobov, Counsellor of the Embassy, speaking at the house of Adl-el-Dowleh, recommended to the Governor that certain taxes which landowners collect from peasants should be abolished. He also has emphasized that Razzagi, an employee of the Agricultural Bank, must immediately leave the town of Maragheh.

The Iranian Government considers these steps of the Counsellor of the Soviet Embassy an interference in the internal affairs of the country. The Embassy, is, there­ fore, requested to point out to Mr. Yakobov that such matters are solely the duties of the competent Iranian authorities. 264

No. 2999 19 Shahrivar 1924 (4 September 1945)

The Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs presents its compliments to the Embassy of the USSR, and with reference to discussions and correspondence of the last few days with that Embassy regarding the necessity for dispatching 200 gendarmes to Gorgan (town in Esterabad Province) and Shahsavar (township on the southern coast of the Caspian Sea in Mazandaran), the Ministry begs to state that reports received from the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Posts and Telegraphs intimate that, owing to the inadequate size of the security forces in Mazandaran and to their lack of freedom of action, distur­ bances have become widespread.

Irresponsible elements who had staged a strike and general holiday at Chalous (Caspian Sea port in Mazandaran) in order to create disturbances and opposition to the Government, have closed all the telegraph offices, and it is probable that they will cut the line to Tehran. These people have forced the investigating commission of the Government to leave Chalous; they themselves inspect the roads. Their unruly and rebellious activities have caused great consternation among the inhabitants of Kadjour and Kalarestagh (towns on the southern coast of the Caspian Sea in Mazandaran.)

If government security forces are not dispatched to these towns expeditiously, and with freedom of action to prevent disorder and establish tranquility, it is possible that events may become aggravated and that the extent of disturbance and conflict between the aforesaid elements and the peasants' of these districts may, further develop.

According to other information at hand, these unruly elements have organized posses from amongst their number to go up and down the streets and roads of Shahi (a town in Mazandaran south of Sari) and to go to the offices of Posts and Telegraphs and the railways investigating whatever goes on and preventing government authorities from carrying out their duties and establishing law and order. Because of this state of affairs, shopkeepers have shut their shops and factories are closed down.

The Ministry of the Interior, in accordance with the information received from Mazandaran, is convinced that 265

the outbreak of the disorder and disturbance is solely the result of the inadequate number of armed forces in the towns in question. Had there been no delay on the part of Soviet military authorities in agreeing to dispatch 200 gendarmes to these localities, undoubtedly, these unpleasant events would not have occurred. Even now, the greater the delay, the greater the possibility that the disorder and disturbances will spread; this may bring further grave consequences.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, therefore, requests and urges the Soviet Embassy to obtain and declare the agreement of the Soviet military authorities to the dis­ patch of reinforcements to the aforesaid localities with freedom of action so that this unpleasant situation in the towns of Mazandaran may be ended.

Ho. 5085

15 Shahrivar 132*1- (4 September 19**5)

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs presents its compli­ ments to the Embassy of the USSR, and has the honour to state that, as the Embassy will be aware, in view of recent occurrence of rebellion and disorder in Maragheh (town south of Tabriz), martial law was declared in that town.

According to the information received, to put an end to the disturbances, the military governor arrested an insurgent named Kabiri. But Soviet military authorities immediately intervened, ordered the arrest of the military Governor, who was detained for 12 hours, and released Kabiri, and his servant returning them to the arms which had been taken from them at the time of the arrest.

Soviet authorities have also maltreated Major Safvat and have issued instructions that Iranian soldiers must not leave their barracks. Consequently, police authori­ ties are unable to carry out their duties and to patrol the streets. Irresponsible elements relying upon Soviet armed forces have thus taken into their own hands the administration of the town.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs protests against the intervention of Soviet authorities in the affairs of the aforesaid town and in the arrest of the Iranian commanding 266

officer. It is requested that the Ministry may be informed, expeditiously of the results of the investigation, and that instructions be issued for the prevention of such steps, which are incompatible with the friendly and good-neighborly relations between the two countries.

There are other matters of which the Soviet Embassy will be informed at a later stage.

Wo. 5152

19 Shahrivar 1324 (10 September 1945)

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs presents its compli­ ments to the Embassy of the USSR. With reference to previous notes regarding the outbreak of disturbances by undesirable elements in the towns of Mazandaran Province, and with reference to the necessity for the immediate dispatch of 200 gendarmes to Gorgan (town in Esterabad) and Shahsavar (township on the south coast of Caspian Sea), the Ministry begs to state the Ministry of the Interior informs it that a couple of nights ago, at three o1clock in the morning, an escaped gendarme from the Pishkamar contingent reached Minou-Dasht and telephoned in­ formation that on the previous noon escaped officers, together with a number of Turkomans of Kokalan and their chiefs at Pishkamar, forced sergeant Kany and a number of gendarmes to surrender. They are using propaganda to persuade the Turkomans of the aforesaid group to join up with them and to participate in the nefarious activities of creating disturbances.

The chief administrator of Minou-Dasht reports that about 200 persons, mounted and on foot, have arrived in the outskirts of the city. Since Soviet forces have delayed notification of their agreement to the dispatch of 200 Gendarmes to Gorgan and Shahsavar, as a result of which the number of security forces is inadequate, these undesirable elements have become emboldened. The danger of attack to Minou-Dasht and Gonbad-Qabus (town in western Esterabad), and the scope of the disturbances are increasing hourly.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs requests and urges the Soviet Embassy to cause instructions to be given, in reply to relevant notes concerning the dispatch of 200 gendarmes, that the Soviet authorities concerned should give their consent to the freedom of action of the Iranian ..security forces and to the transport of arms and ammunition 267 confiscated from escaped officers, so that the necessary number of gendarmes may be dispatched and the spread of the disturbances in the vicinity of Gorgan and other localities of Esterabad Province, disturbances which are sure to result in bloodshed and the pillage of a number of innocent people may be stopped.

In the meantime, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs considers it essential to inform the Soviet Embassy that, in the event that unpleasant incidents occur as a result of these episodes, the responsibility for them will be that of the Soviet authorities who have not agreed to the dispatch of 200 gendarmes as reinforcements for the security forces of these districts.

Wo. 5281

24 Shahrivar 1524 (15 September 1945)

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs presents its., compli­ ments to the Embassy of the USSR and has the honour to state that, in accordance with information received from the Ministry of War, Soviet authorities in Azerbaijan have not so far agreed in any way to the dispatch of the Iranian Army to Mahabad (town south of Lake Urumieh) for the purpose of establishing law and order and quelling undesirable agitators who are threatening the security of Tabriz, is being threatened constantly by undesirable elements owing to the -la.ck_.of_security forces and to the restrictions placed by Sovief~authorities on the freedom of. action of Iranian security forces.

In view of the foregoing, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, pursuant to discussions and correspondence which have been carried out in Tehran with the Soviet Embassy and in Moscow with the Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs through the Iranian Embassy there, requests that the neces­ sary instructions may be issued to competent Soviet military authorities in Iran not to prevent the dispatch of armed forces to Mahabad, and generally to concede freedom of action to the Iranian army and security forces and, further, to enable them to carry out their duties, relating solely to the establishment of law and order in their area of juris­ diction and the quelling of undesirable elements.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs would be grateful to be informed of the result of steps taken. 268

Wo. 3945 7 Mehr 1324 (29 September 1945)

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs refers to its note Wo. 3190 of 21 June 1942 regarding the movement of units of the Eighth Army, and has the honor to state that, in accordance with the report received by the Ministry of War, the Soviet authorities concerned have not yet agreed to the dispatch from Birjand town in south-eastern Khorassan) to Mashad (seat of the Governor of Khorassan) of two infantry companies of the Eighth Army.

It is requested, therefore, that instructions be issued to Soviet military authorities not to prevent the transfer of the aforesaid companies, which wish to join their regiment,

Kindly advise the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the result of steps taken.

W o . 3748 ■

8 Mehr 1324 (30 September 1945)

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs presents its compli­ ments to the Embassy of the USSR and has the honour to state that, according to information received from the Ministry of the Interior, the Soviet military command in Azerbaijan has asked the gendarmerie there to collect all licensed military arms in possession of the people by 1 October 1945.

According to the internal regulations of Iran, the gendarmerie is not permitted to interfere in the affairs of the army. The regional commander of the gendarmerie has, therefore, referred that matter to Tehran, and is awaiting instructions in order that he may act in accord­ ance with the views of the Government and the Ministry of War.

It is further observed that Soviet authorities give no freedom of action to the Iranian Army and security forces; any movement of army or gendarmerie units in connexion with the performance of their duties has thus far met with the opposition of the Soviet authorities.

The fulfilment of such duties, necessitating the movement of the aforesaid units before giving any freedom 269 of action to the Iranian army and security forces., is rendered very difficult.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, therefore, requests the Soviet Embassy to issue telegraphic instructions to Soviet military authorities in Tabriz that, pending the official notice of the Government to the gendarmerie, they suspend their demand until necessary instructions on the matter be issued in this respect by the Ministry of War.

No. 394-4

11 Mehr 1324 (3 October 1945)

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs presents its compli­ ments to the Embassy of the USSR, and has the honour to state that, according to information received on Mon­ day, 19 Shahrivar (10 September 1945) from the Ministry of the Interior, the Counsellor of the Soviet Embassy, in the company of the Vice-Consul, visited the Governor of Ardebil (town in eastern Azerbaijan), and stated that they have received information of an increase in the numbers of military police.

They then explicitly expressed their disagreement with this step and their intention to limit the garrison, as in Maragheh (small town south of Tabriz).

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs requests the Embassy to draw the attention of the relevant Soviet authorities to the fact that an increase or decrease in the small number of police forces which is carried out in accord­ ance with the demands of time and locality, should not be objected to, or arouse anxiety. The military police is concerned merely with maintaining peace and order in the district under its control, purely a matter of internal affairs.

No. 4425 22 Mehr (l4 October 1945)

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs presents its compli­ ments to the Embassy of the USSR, and begs to state that, according to information received from the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Justice, during the month of Shahrivar when disturbances and disputes occurred between factory workers and peasants at Ghaidi-Kala in Mazandaran 270

Province, Soviet military forces intervened and, disregarding the laws and regulations of Iran* arrested seven persons on the charge that they had caused the disturbances and or­ dered them to be detained at police headquarters in Sari (seat of the Governor of Mazandaran). Among the arrested persons was Mr. F.assih Khalatbari, a judge of the Court of Justice, who is still detained. Apparently, Soviet military authorities refuse to allow the provisions of the law to be enacted in his case.

According to the laws of Iran, prosecution of a judge is contingent upon the withdrawal of his immunities by competent authorities. The arrest of this individual, in accordance with the wished of Soviet authorities, has no legal foundation, especially since no reasons have been advanced for the charge against him. Moreover, in accord­ ance with regulations, charges submitted are drawn up and the case must be submitted with the charge-sheet from the legal department of Sari to the appropriate court in Tehran, Unfortunately, reports received indicate that Soviet mili­ tary authorities oppose the sending of, this individual to Tehran, and are demanding the prosecution on the spot of Mr. Khalatbari and the others detained.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs regrets that, not­ withstanding numerous discussions and correspondence with the Embassy regarding the necessity of dispatching gendarmerie to Mazandaran Province and of presenting the outbreak of disorder, and regarding the refusal of Soviet military authorities to permit gendarmes to proceed to their assignments in Chouchan and Sari and other localities in the province, their requests have not been met, even though the incidents were internal affairs of Iran, As predicted, disputes and disturbances have occurred in the aforesaid districts, and resulted in murder, injury and panic among the inhabitants.

Wo. 4425 24 Mehr 1524 (l6 October 1945)

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs presents its compli­ ments to the Embassy of the USSR and has the honour to state that, according to a report received from police headquarters on Saturday 9 Mehr (l Octbber 1945)., when the police and gendarmerie of the city of Zandjan (town midway between Tehran and Tabriz) were attempting to arrest a person named Hoseyn, known to be the chief cause of the disturbances which took place in that city on 4 Mehr, the 271

Soviet commander intervened, disarmed the police and gendarmes., and conducted them to his headquarters.

On their way there, the police and gendarmes, who had already been disarmed, were attacked by a group of persons belonging to the Tudeh Party who stabbed a gendarme- named Vahi-al-Allah in the thigh and beat up a policeman named Nipon-Kar. Later these men received medical treatment at Soviet headquarters from Soviet medical officers.

The Chief of Police, on hearing of the matter, discussed the affair with the Soviet commander. As a result, the men were released.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs desires to thank the medical officer for the assistance he rendered to the injured men, but it regrets the. Soviet commander's inter­ ference in matters connected with the duties of the Iranian security forces, interference which leads to such occur­ rences and tends to weaken the authority of the Central Government.

The Ministry requests the Embassy to issue strict orders to the relevant Soviet authorities to cease inter­ fering in matters relating to the law and order of the country, which are solely the concern of Iranian officials. The Iranian Government registers in protests to this interference.

No. 4395

26 Mehr 1 3 2 4 (18 October.. 1945)

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs presents its compli­ ments to the Embassy of the USSR, and has the honour to state that, according to information received from the Ministry of Interior, a telegraphic report from Pol-e-Sefid (a small town in Mazandaran) indicates that Captain Samandari, commander of the gendarmes battalion of Sari (seat of the Governor of Mazandaran Province), together with two other officers and nine gendarmes arrived in Pol-e-Sefid on 23 Mehr (15 October) while pursuing a number of brigades.

Two hours after their arrival, the Soviet commander, together with a number of Soviet soldiers, had the commanding officer of the battalion and his group taken to his head­ quarters. There they disarmed and detained, up to 9 p.m.' 272

24 Mehr (l6 October), when, the above-mentioned telegraphic message was dispatched.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs requests the Embassy of the USSR to cause immediate telegraphic instructions to be issued to the Soviet military authorities concerned to release the aforesaid officer and gendarmes, to return their arms, and ensure their freedom of action so that they may be able to maintain order in the district-within their jurisdiction.

Furthermore, it is requested that strict orders be issued to the relevant Soviet authorities not to interfere in matters which are solely connected with the internal affairs of Iran, interference which the Iranian Government protests.

Kindly advise the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the steps taken in this respect.

Wo. 4421

28 Shahrivar 1324 (20 October 1945)

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs presents its compli­ ments to the Embassy of the USSR and has the honour to state that, according to information received from the Ministry of Interior, in the vicinity of the road between Shahi and Pol-e-Sefid (small town in Mazandaran), Soviet authorities have chosen a large plot of ground, put barbed wire around it and are excavating the ground.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs requests the Embassy to instruct Soviet military authorities to refrain from excavating sites temporarily put at their disposals since excavations on Iranian soil, without legal authority, are subject to protest by the Iranian Government.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs expects that the Soviet Embassy will kindly inform them of the object of excavations made by Soviet authorities, also of the instructions issued to put a stop to them. 273 Wo. 4829

1 Aban 1324 (23 October 1945)

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs presents its compli­ ments to the Embassy of the USSR and has the honour to state that, according to information received from the Ministry of Interior, Soviet authorities in Mazandaran (a province of northern Iran) have arrested Mr. Razmjoo, President of the Association of Peasants and Labourers, and taken him away to Babolsar (small port on the Caspian Sea).

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs requests the Soviet Embassy to ascertain from Soviet authorities stationed in Mazandaran Province the reasons for the arrest and the dispatch of the aforesaid person to Babolsar without any legal grounds, and it requests the Soviet Embassy to issue instructions for his release.

Kindly inform this Ministry of the result of the steps taken, Of course, if it is found that the person in question has committed an offense, he will be prosecuted by competent Iranian courts in accordance with the pre­ vailing laws and regulations.

Wo. 4749

5 Aban 1324 (27 October 1945)

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs presents its compli­ ments to the Embassy of the USSR andl has the honour to state that, according to information received from the Ministry of the Interior, reports from Mazandaran indicate that unexpected incidents may take place there, the pre­ vention of which is impossible without reinforcement of the security forces of that province.

It is understood that if no urgent steps are taken in this connexion and if adequate numbers of gendarmes are not dispatched there expeditiously, grave and unpleasant incidents by undesirable elements would be certain to occur. i The Ministry of Foreign Affairs draws the Embassy's attention to its repeated notes on the question of dis­ patching gendarmes to Mazandaran Province, and urges that i. the approval of Soviet military authorities be given to ' the dispatch of security forces to that province, and that their approval be communicated to this Ministry as soon as possible. 274

N o . 4922

8 Aban 1324 (30 October 1945)

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs presents its compli­ ments to the Embassy of the USSR,, and has the honour to state that the Ministry of War reports that the situation at Khoy (town about 90 miles north-west of Tabriz) neces­ sitates the dispatch of one battalion from the brigade at Rezaieh (town about 7 8 miles south of Tabriz) to maintain order and to establish a garrison there.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs requests the Embassy to cause instructions to be issued to Soviet military authorities of the Eastern and Western Provinces of Azer­ baijan to comply with the requirements of the Ministry of War and the Azerbaijan Army, along lines which will be brought to the notice of the Soviet military attache, and to agree to the dispatch of the aforesaid battalion.

Kindly advise this Ministry of the result of the steps taken to secure the above-mentioned agreement.

Wo . 5604

28 Aban 1324 (19 November 1945)

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs presents its compli­ ments to the Embassy of the USSR, and with reference to its note No. 5370, has the honour to state that the Ministry of War has reported that Mustafa Barzani, with 2 , 0 0 0 of his confederates, about 5 0 0 of whom are com­ pletely armed and own a cannon, have recently entered Iran.

As it is highly probable they may disturb law and order in Western Azerbaijan Province and the suburbs of Mahabad (town south of Lake Urumieh), the Ministry of War has therefore issued instructions to the Iranian Army to disarm the aforesaid person and his confederates.

In view of the reason set forth by the Ministry of War and its obligations towards the first friendly and neigh­ bourly Government of Iraq, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs requests the Embassy of the USSR to inform the appropriate Soviet military authorities in the Third and Fourth Prov­ inces not to interfere in the activities of the Iranian Army concerning the above-mentioned person and his con­ federates in order that no misunderstandings may arise. 275

No. 5 6 0 8 4 Azar 1524 (25 November 19^5)

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs presents its compli­ ments to the Embassy of the USSR, and has the honour to state that it will be recalled that since Shahrivar 13.20 (August 194l) Soviet military authorities have completely taken over the docks of Bandar-Shah (southeastern Caspian port of Iran and terminus of the Trans-Iranian Railway), and have totally impaired the work of the customs authorities at the aforesaid part; by controlling the traffic of merchandise and passengers.

During the war it was considered that military exi­ gencies necessitated such steps, and the Iranian Govern­ ment, with a view to complete' fulfilment of the Tri­ partite Treaty, and notwithstanding the fact that it sus­ tained losses and that the normal administrative work of the customs suffered, felt constrained to assent. But now that the war has ended, it is certainly no longer necessary that the above-mentioned state of affairs be continued.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, therefore, requests the Soviet Embassy to issue instructions to the respective Soviet authorities to remove any obstacles which may still stand in the way of direct control of custom admin­ istration over traffic of merchandise and passengers, so that administration of the customs may return to normal. Kindly inform the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the result of the actions taken to this end. APPENDIX 277

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