Taking back the city:
Citizen participation in Dublin, Ireland
Yutaka Kumagai
Housing and homeless rights protest, Dublin. (Source: author, 2019)
Department of Human Geography Master’s thesis 30 HE Credits Human Geography Globalisation, Environment and Social Change (120 HE Credits) Spring term 2019 Supervisor: Peter Kinlund
Taking back the city:
Citizen participation in urban planning in Dublin, Ireland
Yutaka Kumagai
Abstract
As we find ourselves in the midst of a planetary trend towards urbanisation, we must acknowledge that urban spaces are linked in a network of metabolic consumption and production that impact not only those recognised as ‘urban dwellers’, but are incorporated into a global structure. Ireland is no exception, with development centred around Dublin, a ‘primate city’ with a vastly larger population than others in the region. Dublin’s Inner City areas have in recent decades been marked by a series of large-scale interventions aimed at reconstituting a new vision of Ireland as a global, modern city home to a tech-savvy workforce. Yet as Dublin explores its post-recession identity as a hub for investment in tech and finance, its urban population continues to grow in ways that are seen to disenfranchise existing Inner City communities. This study explores the perceptions of residents of Inner City Dublin engaged in urban planning processes, in the hopes of making manifest the goals and desires driving participation through various channels, both formal and ‘radical’. A case is made for the city as a site of a post-political condition by questioning the role and efficacy of official consultatory channels, as well as in contrasting held imaginaries presented by interviewees and those presented by official planning documents. Attempts by Dublin City Council to market Dublin as a ‘creative’ city, intent on monetising aspects of cultural identity as a global competitor intent on drawing investment and foreign talent is considered representative of post-politics, contrasted by urban residents’ desires to safeguard the existence of vibrant communities within the Inner City who now risk exclusion.
Keywords: Citizen participation, urban planning, post-politics, revanchism, urban political ecology, gentrification.
1 Contents: List of Abbreviations 4 1. Introduction 5 1.1 Background: 5 1.1.1 The regeneration of East Inner City Dublin 5 1.1.2 Irish planning 7 1.2 Problem formulation 8 1.3 Research Questions 8 2. Theoretical Framework 9 2.1 Urban Political Ecology (UPE) 9 2.1.1 Beyond gentrification: Urban revanchism 11 2.1.2 The Post-political City 12 2.2 Citizen participation 13 2.2.1 Agonism 15 2.2.2 Citizenship and the construction of identity 16 3. Literature Review 18 3.1 Participative planning in praxis: Communicative action or neoliberal sensibilities? 18 3.2 Gentrification: Neoliberalism and the City 20 3.3 Competing Imaginaries: Loss of trust in entrepreneurial governance 22 4. Methodology 23 4.1 Research Design 23 4.1.1 Study site 24 4.1.2 Sampling 24 4.1.3 Semi-structured interviews 24 4.1.4 Texts: Public planning documents and development plans 25 4.2 Data Analysis 26 4.3 Ethical considerations 26 4.4 Limitations 27 5. Analysis of themes 28 5.1 Management of strategic participation 28 5.2 Gentrification and tech-sector growth 30 5.3 Community investment and loss of trust 33 5.4 Competing Identities 36 6. Discussion 38
2 6.1 Finding the political: from consensus to agonism 39 6.2 Identity in the Post-Political City 41 7. Conclusion 44 References 47 Document References 53
3 List of Abbreviations
ABP – An Bord Pleanála (Irish Planning Board)
DCC – Dublin City Council
DDDA – Dublin Docklands Development Authority
DPC – Dublin Port Company
HARP – Historic Area Rejuvenation Project
IGBHAG – Irish Glass Bottle Housing Action Group
NEIC – Northeast Inner City
NIMBY – Not In My Back Yard
UPE – Urban Political Ecology
SDZ – Strategic Development Zone
TBTC – Take Back The City
4 1. Introduction In this chapter the background of the studied case will be presented, beginning with contextual information regarding Inner City Dublin and the Irish planning framework. The problem formulation and aims of research will be described, and research questions stated.
1.1 Background: As we find ourselves in the midst of a planetary trend towards urbanisation, we must acknowledge that urban spaces are linked in a network of metabolic consumption and production that impact not only those recognised as “urban” dwellers, but are incorporated into a global structure (Swyngedouw & Kaika, 2014). These flows are expressed in patterns of uneven development, often spoken of in terms of inequalities between oppositional binaries, i.e. Global North vs Global South, Urban vs Rural. However, it is vital to consider how such uneven development can be witnessed within urban landscapes also. Prime examples of such inequalities can be seen in development projects aimed at “reclaiming” urban areas, often specifically those that are considered to have been in some sense corrupted by degenerate antisocial behaviour, as in the case of flagship projects such as Glasgow’s “revitalised” downtown or the gentrification Manhattan’s Lower East Side (MacLeod, 2002). Often these projects incorporate not just a redesign of space and architecture, but, through the marginalisation of groups and actions deemed undesirable, of the societal fabric that such places are woven from.
Ireland is no exception from the global movement towards cities, with nearly 63% of the country’s population living in urban areas and a rate of urbanisation that is only increasing (World Bank, 2018). This is centred around Dublin, a ‘primate city’ with a vastly larger population than others in the region. With funding focused around Dublin, it is worth considering who forms the imaginaries that are shaping the development of the city, and to what purpose. This is especially relevant to consider as the city finds itself experiencing a housing crisis, with increasing numbers of people left homeless in part due to a poorly regulated rental market and unaffordable housing costs (Focus Ireland, 2019). As new developments are planned within the Inner City it is vital to ask who will be the beneficiaries of these redefined spaces, and how will the public sphere be altered in order to accommodate them.
1.1.1 The regeneration of East Inner City Dublin Dublin’s Inner City areas have, in recent decades, been marked by a series of large-scale interventions aimed at reconstituting a new visions of Ireland as a global, modern city home to a technocratic workforce. Ireland has emerged from the decline of the Celtic Tiger, through the 2008 economic crisis, to become a European centre for foreign direct investment (FDI). The benefits of this, however, are not necessarily seen by all to be evenly dispersed (Kayanan, 2018), with development within the city holding the potential to act as a tool of gentrification, displacing communities and contributing to the housing crisis. Two sites of particular interest are the completed North Lotts and Grand Canal Strategic Development Zone (SDZ) (hereafter referred to as the Docklands SDZ) and the currently proposed Poolbeg West SDZ - a designation marking a development as being of “economic or social importance to the State” (ISB, 2019a). The Docklands are considered to represent a growing vision of Ireland as a tech-friendly ‘playground’, with many industry giants such as Facebook, Google and Airbnb basing European Headquarters within its boundaries, earning the area the nickname of the ‘Silicon Docks’ – an identity embraced by Dublin City Council (DCC, 2019). As a district which suffered decline under post-industrial conditions, the regeneration of the Docklands is seen as an injection into the economy as well as a move towards modernisation, comparable to areas such as London’s Canary Wharf. It has, however, also drawn criticism as thinly veiled
5 neoliberalism in planning (Kayanan et al. 2018), with the Docklands SDZ establishing technocratic enclaves for the rich, while excluding the communities who had existed previously.
Image 1.1 Map of East Inner City Dublin (Source: Google Maps, edited by author)
The inner suburbs of Ringsend (known colloquially as ‘Raytown’) and Irishtown lie adjacent to the Poolbeg West SDZ site. These historically working class areas have been shaped for generations by their proximity to Dublin Port, but are currently experiencing processes of gentrification due to the development of the Docklands SDZ. However, they pose an interesting comparison in that while the Grand Canal may be a post-industrial zone, Poolbeg is very much still an industry-focused area, in part due to the presence of Dublin Port, but also in that it houses both a water treatment plant and waste incinerator servicing the Dublin area. The Poolbeg Peninsula represents to some extent the paradox of the wider area; with the southern side containing stretches of water-front parkland separated by a ridge from the northern side, which hosts waste treatment facilities and heavy industry, it embodies a confusing duality. The development of high-end apartments is of interest in its proximity to a site that would, under normal circumstances, be considered to greatly reduce the desirability of an area. Poolbeg West thus presents a conflicting imaginary of a thriving, world-class settlement and a zone of heavy-industrial usage. The Poolbeg Chimneys, constructed in the 1970’s as part of an electricity generating station, capture this paradox, having been considered an eyesore at the time of construction, but slowly gaining a level of cultural significance within local communities as the last identifiable landmark seen when leaving Dublin by boat or plane (Meagher, 2014). The area therefore has a deeply symbolic imagery within the cultural landscape of the city.
While Poolbeg may invoke romantic notions of Ireland’s emigrant past, the successes of the Docklands SDZ in achieving growth may herald the arrival of a new symbol, one of a modernised, technified Ireland. Although such a vision may be inspirational to those captured within its lens, there are many who risk being left behind. Kayanan et al (2018) consider how 2016 census information highlights the differences in demographic between the Docklands SDZ and the wider city, with residents more likely to be adults of working age (20-44) without children, holding a third-level education. Given its proximity to the Docklands SDZ, it must be
6 considered that the Poolbeg West SDZ holds the potential to follow suit. Yet certain citizen groups within the city (and beyond) are committed to the cause of forcing government officials to recognise the housing emergency through displays of civic demonstration, as evident in the multiple protests and housing occupations taking place across city and country (McMahon, 2019).
One such group engaged in public happenings is the Irish Glass Bottle Housing Action Group (IGBHAG). Taking their name from the site of the former Irish Glass Bottle Company enclosed by the Poolbeg West SDZ, their objective lies in assuring the development of social and affordable housing within the area (IBHAG, 2019). The establishment of such housing has formed a central aspect of conversations happening regarding Poolbeg West SDZ, with Dublin City Council promising ~20% of total housing units for social and affordable housing, doubling the 10% allotment for social currently stated Irish development policy through the addition of 10% affordable units. With developers challenging the legal basis for this decision, concerns have been raised over how this new neighbourhood may act as a form of social engineering, effectively pricing out original residents due to its desirable location. Thus, locals are taking action based upon fears that the proposed Poolbeg West development will become a playground for technocratic elites as opposed to an integrated community within the area.
1.1.2 Irish planning Planning policy in Ireland is laid out in the Planning and Development Act, 2000 (ISB, 2019a), including aspects of legislation regarding statutory consultation processes. An actor of extreme importance here is An Bord Pleanála (ABP), a statutory body charged with overseeing the planning process. As described by Scott et al (2012, p.153), local authorities are required to advertise their intent to prepare draft schemes when planning new development projects in order to allow for public comments and submissions. Once a draft has been made it must then be publicly displayed for review and to allow for submissions for to be made, before being amended and ratified by councillors, with ABP providing final approval. Planning permissions are an iterative process, as appeals can be made to ABP regarding their decisions on whether to accept or reject planning submissions both by first- and third-parties, i.e. individuals submitting plans, as well as other individuals, community groups, organisations, etc. While this process must be adhered to by local authorities when devising area development plans, the introduction of SDZs changes the role of ABP in this. When an SDZ is approved it is done so after submitting a master plan. This master plan is intended as a holistic guide laying out development conventions – once a new build can prove they meet these guidelines they are then approved for fast-track planning. Fast-track planning is intended as a pro-growth strategy which facilitates circumvention of the normal appeals process in order to reduce the time necessary for approval pre-construction. Citizens intending to influence SDZ planning must therefore be present early in the early stages of consultation.
Part V of the Planning and Development Act, 2000 (ISB, 2019a) is of specific interest in legislating guidelines for planning authorities regarding housing supply. The provision of social and affordable housing was originally laid out as 20% of total units for developments meeting certain criteria (e.g. 10 or more units must be constructed) although this quota was later reduced to 10% following an amendment to the act in the wake of the 2008 recession. It should be noted that the exact provision of these units is agreed upon by the local planning authority and the developer when a plan is submitted. At the time that field work was carried out the IGBHAG were awaiting a decision regarding the provisions of social and affordable housing for the Poolbeg West SDZ, following an appeal by the receiver of the site regarding the increased number of units allotted to social/affordable housing. This appeal was overturned prior to completion of this study, with 875 of a total of 3’500 units designated as social and affordable.
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1.2 Problem formulation As Dublin explores its post-recession identity as a hub for investment in tech and finance, it’s urban population continues to grow in ways that are seen to disenfranchise existing Inner City communities. As working class areas adjacent to new development interventions begin to feel the impacts of this, it is important to consider not only how local communities experience changes in the urban fabric as a result of development, but how such changes might be managed in ways that contribute to their own goals and imaginaries. Groups within Dublin, and indeed on a national level, have gained attention in recent years for partaking in civil movements regarding various topics of debate within Irish policy and law-making, from the marriage equality movement to anti-water charge protest which saw over 100’000 people take to the streets (Hilliard, 2018). Presently, multiple action groups and coalitions have turned their sights towards the lack of affordable housing within Ireland and increasing rates of homelessness. At the same time, high-investment developments continue to be planned across the city - frequently causing tensions among existing communities.
With the North Lotts and Grand Canal area acting as a corporate enclave, and the Poolbeg West development plans criticised as a ‘bachelor’s paradise’ (Gartland, 2017), a disconnect appears to exist between native communities living within the boundaries of the Inner City and new communities centred around work generated by the rejuvenation of the Docklands via growth in tech and finance. This seems to fit with the image promoted by DCC of the ‘ideal’ resident of the area as young, tech-savvy and professional (Kayanan et al, 2018, p.59). By attempting to identify ways in which citizen participation is perceived by Inner CIty residents this study hopes to contextualise Dublin as a potential site for an emergent revanchism, through the creation of a technocratic, elite citizenry. The private-partnerships which have fostered such communities display a high relevance to concepts of urban entrepreneurialism, and a ‘reclaiming’ of spaces seen as degenerated. Added to this is the perceived withdrawal of the political from processes of urban planning due to hegemonic consensus politics as embodied by ineffectual consultation processes.
This study will aim to explore the perceptions of residents of Inner City Dublin engaged in some form with DCC’s planning processes, in the hopes of making manifest goals and desires regarding city-making. In doing so, one of the research objectives will be to understand the rationales that promote participatory action into urban planning. While other studies have considered the mechanisms of public participation within Dublin (Attuyer, 2015; Scott et al, 2012), this case will be developed with specific consideration of the city as a site of a post- political condition, one in which “consensual policy arrangement has increasingly reduced the ‘political’ to ‘policing’, to ‘policymaking’, to managerial consensual governing” (Swyngedouw, 2009, p.605). The role of citizen participation as both a tool of consensus production employed by post-politics, as well as a weapon with which to challenge its hegemony will be situated within existing literature, and with respect to the specific context of Dublin. Further, SDZ planning will be considered as emblematic of post-political approaches to urban development.
1.3 Research Questions The Poolbeg West SDZ planning scheme provides a timely setting within which to examine how certain groups and communities feel that their voices are heard in the planning of new urban developments. Considering claims that participatory planning is experiencing a crisis whereby the formal tools of participation are managed in order to minimise conflict while presenting an illusion of democracy (Monno & Khakee, 2012), now is a relevant time to ask how attempts are made to alter such plans according to the wishes of urban dwellers. SDZ
8 planning will be used as an example in order to consider aspects of participatory planning, alongside other initiatives from within Dublin’s East Inner City. One aim will thus be to uncover the ways in which certain voices are obscured or elevated in concerns of urban planning by accounting for urban residents’ experiences of participating in planning initiatives. The following research questions will be addressed: - What channels do residents use to participate in urban planning in Dublin’s Inner City? - What factors motivate the strategies employed by residents in managing participation? - What similarities and divergences exist between visions of the future of the city as described by Dublin City Council versus Inner City residents?
2. Theoretical Framework The following chapter will expand upon the theoretical framework within which the study has been situated. An urban political ecology approach is considered as an appropriate lens with which to explore the ways in which the city is shaped by competing imaginaries, engaged in a complex network of relational power.
2.1 Urban Political Ecology (UPE) This study hopes to gain insight into the socio-political configuration through which the urban environment is transformed. A framework of urban political ecology (UPE) will be utilised as an approach in order to call into question the ways in which established power relations may act to limit the voices of community-organised groups seeking to take part in urban planning initiatives. Swyngedouw and Kaika (2014) make note of the potential of UPE to draw attention to the ways in which capitalist urbanisation produces and reproduces socio-ecological inequalities. Processes of economic neoliberalisation are considered to at hand in reproducing urban inequalities through government partnership with elites and selected experts and community representatives, with the ability to minority groups to access environmental goods and bads limited (Cook & Swyngedouw, 2012, p.1970). In this sense the considerations of UPE and close to that of environmental justice. Where they differ, however, lies in the environmental justice with the spatial patterns of occurrence of environmental ‘goods’ and ‘bads’, whereas UPE rather sets its sights on the reproduction of such injustices, situating them firmly within existing dynamics of power (ibid, p.1967).
The planning developments within the city of Dublin hint towards neo-liberal sensibilities in planning, albeit presented as technocratic solutions upheld as open and inclusive. In recognising the city as a ‘cyborg’ of human and non-human assemblage, UPE allows for the questioning of any ontological divide between what we designate as “human” vs “natural”, instead facilitating a shift towards a more nuanced analysis of the complexities of interactions that shape our environments, along with the ways in which they are inextricably married to societal practices (Swyngedouw & Kaika, 2014). Harvey’s (CITE) views on the production of nature therefore are highly influential in both political ecology’s consideration of the human/non-human relationship, but also in UPE’s exploration of the identity of the city. An acceptance of environments as produced is encapsulated by Harvey’s reflection that “there is nothing unnatural about New York City”. Yet traditional political ecology has a tendency to invoke some form of stand-in for ‘nature’, often in the form of natural resources such as minerals, water, etc., according to Huber (2015, p.487). This stand-in becomes the object of political struggle, in essence reproducing the construction of nature along lines of Western views of human/nature dichotomies, instead of working to break down such epistemological structures. UPE, however, works to deconstruct such narratives in envisioning the city as a
9 hybrid entity. This ‘hybrid city’ is presented as a cyborg, of sorts, embodying “a dense network of sociospatial processes that are simultaneously local and global, human and physical, cultural and organic” (Swyngedouw & Heynen, 2003, p.899).
The cyborg city is considered as a synthesis of organism and machine, a “series of interconnected life-support systems” (Gandy, 2005, p. 28) manifested in the connections between urban infrastructure and the human body. The urban ecology itself is shaped around the physical needs and limitations of its residents, with the home itself viewed as a metaphorical prosthesis linked on a scalar level to the city at large by a network of vessel-like pipes and wires. Given this biological reckoning of the city, and humanity’s place within it, it seems logical to extend this metaphor to the flows of materials, energy and even people that exists, as metabolic. This metabolic process is envisaged as a socio-ecological network of inequality that spans not only the city but the globe, with cities of the Global North major consumers whose waste products are exported to the Global South (Cook & Swyngedouw, 2012, p.1968). The city is not only an import locus in its draw of resources and people towards congregated urban centres from rural hinterlands and beyond, but in serving as the hub of political decision-making, becoming a site of “commodity consumption and political power structuring and shaping socio-spatial flows of materials” (Barca & Bridge, 2015, p.370). UPE re-centres the city as the focus of (re)producing power imbalances, in contrast to the wider body of work in political ecology which frequently takes a more rural, agricultural approach (ibid). Urban metabolic processes make manifest inequalities, with those in power dictating what is built, what materials are used and where such construction might occur– along with the ways in which identity is performed in these constructed spaces (Cook & Swyngedouw, 2012).
UPE’s concern with the flow of resources also provides a critique towards Malthusian theorists preaching absolute scarcity, rather promoting the consideration of inequalities in resource distribution to be socio-ecologically produced (Cook & Swyngedouw, 2012, p.1966; Swyngedouw, 2015, p.614). Such concerns relate to Harvey’s (2006, p.71-77) ideas of uneven development, whereby capitalism requires landscapes of inequality in order for growth and accumulation to occur, with those in power exploiting those less privileged. This can be seen in the export of dirty industry from wealthier nations to poorer. In this way spatial distributions of environmental ‘goods’ and ‘bads’ mirror the geographic layout of political and economic power. Environmental change is considered to produce an unequal distribution of costs and benefits, with the lion’s share of ‘bads’ becoming the burden of vulnerable communities. Political ecology is thereby recognised as a useful framework in exploring how existing power dynamics produce social and environmental outcomes creating winners and losers, but also in its potential to explain how such dynamics are (re)produced by facilitating a multi-scalar approach to research (Robbins, 2012, p.20). It states that ecological is inherently a political matter, both in that the extraction of resources is often dictated by elites and market influences, and in its criticism of dominant narratives surrounding environmental change. A challenge is made to the central ideas underpinning the regulation and management of the environment by elites as filtered through political-economic systems, with alternative explanations offered. Political ecology seeks to provide both a “hatchet” with which to critique existing norms, and a “seed” to encourage the growth of more equitable practices (ibid). In stemming from Marxist roots, it is not surprising that political ecology also allows for the criticism of trends towards the ‘neoliberalisation of nature’ (Bakker, 2015) in the form of the commodification of resources in the service of private benefactors facilitated by practices of dispossession in favour of accumulation, i.e. land grabbing. Political ecology offers a response to proponents of a market- led approach to environmentalism, considering it as a flawed attempt at sustainability (ibid, p.450). Furthermore, Purcell (2009, p. 144) observes that the production of winners and losers in in fact inherent to the logic of neoliberalism, with liberal democracies masking a widening divide between rich and poor under the guise of political equality, while simultaneously transferring power from the polis to private corporations. This is also present in the creation of
10 techno-managerial ‘fixes’ as a stand-in for governance, as embodied in smart city initiatives, and other attempts at place branding.
2.1.1 Beyond gentrification: Urban revanchism Smith (1996, p.43) introduces us to the idea of gentrification as a mechanism of the revanchist city, taking the name from the French fin de siècle right-wing movement against increased liberalism and the rise of the the working-class. Revanchism turns on the idea that the urban can be “reclaimed” by the vengeful middle-class under the banner of populist nationalism. Gordon MacLeod (2011; 2002) examines urban development as emergent from trends in entrepreneurialism combined with the politics of revanchism. He makes use of David Harvey’s conceptions of entrepreneurial urbanism as led by economically powerful business elites, with trickle-down economics supplanting wealth distribution as the generator of societal benefits - manifested physically in the development of flagship developments such as tourist and investor friendly convention centres, or “public” spaces. Private investment navigates its way through partnership with public influence in order to reshape urban areas in order to enact a physical and social cleansing, with harsh lines drawn between winners and losers—those who are included and those who are excluded from these areas. With the case of Glasgow’s redevelopment MacLeod highlights spatial injustices in the redevelopment of the city, asking exactly who such projects are undertaken for in review the expulsion of homeless citizens from the downtown area. This is observed in the transformation of areas within post-industrial cities engaging in the service-based economy, such as London’s Canary Wharf or Dublin’s Grand Canal Dock. Industrial lands, now fallen out of use, become the prime locations for FDI and revitalisation. This can involve the mobilisation of the police order to exclude those within these spaces who are regarded as ‘undesirable’. An example is Mayor Rudy Giuliani’s cleansing of public spaces in New York from those engaged in informal means of income generation in order to protect upstanding citizens from the “enemies within” (MacLeod, 2002, p607-608). Such strategies are consistent with those called for in the presentation of Glasgow’s beggars and homeless community as damaging to the success of the redeveloped Downtown project and shopping centre (ibid, p613-614). More than this, they were cast as elements creating a dangerous environment, so that criminalisation of any threats to economic performance is invoked in order to protect the flows of capital. A sterilisation of apparent public, civic spaces can thus be enacted in order to create landscapes of unequal access in the service of citizenship defined by consumerism.
Smith’s depiction of urban revanchism is grounded in the ‘reclaiming’ of the city by the white middle class from deviant groups, and emerges from their economic insecurities to create landscapes of gentrification. These groups are then dispossessed through policing of the public sphere via the establishment of what actions are permissible, and what actions are deemed antisocial. Such narratives tend towards neoliberal economic insecurities, with visible homelessness being blamed for scaring away shoppers and reducing tourism. Gwen van Eijk (2010) notes how such calls for ‘safety’ hide demands for a social order, in essence a control of these marginalised in order to safeguard economic interests. Revanchism thus becomes a class war as born from a capitalist system— although this may take on different forms driven by different criteria dependent on context.
In response to the capital-centric analysis of the politics of exclusion depicted by urban revanchism, van Eijk uses Rotterdam as a case study to attest that such processes are not solely brought about as a product of amassing capital. van Eijk focuses on inclusionary policies aimed at increasing a sense of national unity in the face of immigration and the development of non-ethnic minority communities as products of a safeguarding of the social order. Such insecurities are not based within economic sphere, thus are not inherently neoliberal. She provides an account of how Dutch urban policy paradoxically attempts to integrate minority
11 groups by excluding them from certain places, with these policies observed as originating from cultural insecurities regarding immigration and multiculturalism. As revanchist theories do not sufficiently account for forces beyond the economic, a looser, adaptive conception is thus required. Perhaps this stresses the need for a broader approach in considering gentrification and exclusion in the urban environment, and a contextual understanding of the neoliberal city. In any case, van Eijk calls for greater complexity in the analysis of the forces shaping urban futures (ibid, p.831).
2.1.2 The Post-political City
“If politics is the negotiation of conflict, the post-political formation is defined around its antithesis, that politics is a managerial task involving the identification of consensus” Paddison, 2009, p.12
Dublin’s development will be analysed via the concept of the ‘post-political city’, an urban area governed by techno-political processes based upon socio-scientific consensus (Swyngedouw, 2009). Environmental and social politics are informed via a scientific consensus, subsequently creating a political consensus around certain values. ‘The political’ thereby withdraws, replaced by a policing of socio-environmental change based upon these models of consensus, with observations based upon the idea that nature itself exists as separate from the human society. Chantal Mouffe (1993, 2013) clarifies ‘the political’ as a dimension of antagonism inherent to the very ontological condition of human society, and ‘politics’ as the assembly of practices and institutions through which society is constituted, i.e. those involved in the production of order. Since the political is inalienable to this social order, politics becomes marked by the conflicts of human coexistence— accepting conflicting desires is seen by Mouffe to be necessary in a pluralist democracy, wherein antagonism is transformed into agonism (as will be expanded upon in section 2.2.1). Swyngedouw (2009) also draws upon Dikeç and Ranciére to establish ideas of the ‘police order’, comprised of all bodies and activities which impose a “natural order” of things, an enforcement of norms that label certain traits as permissible and others not, and which dictates the distribution of spaces along with who can exist within them. This lies closely to Foucault’s concept of governmentality, whereby governance is enacted through the “conduct of conduct”. Such behaviours are observable in the semi-privatised nature of the Docklands SDZ, a grey-zone of contradictions with regards to individual rights to the public sphere, as epitomised by accounts of photography being restricted on certain “private streets” within the SDZ (Thomas, 2017).
The denial of the political manifests in the formation of techno-managerial fixes designed to promote certain idealised goals, such as sustainability, while also satisfying movement towards economic progress (Swyngedouw, 2009). The post-political condition is facilitated by the mechanisms of populist rhetoric, through which the demands of a unified city or people are maintained. Thus, contesting groups and ideologies are silenced and positioned under a blanket opposition to an outside force as an embodied common threat, i.e. environmental issues. By shaping this shared enemy populism does not delineate or allow for an underprivileged group, instead proposing a common condition under which all are subject to the same rules, espousing the need for a collective action. Swyngedouw (2015; 2009, p.605- 606) prompts the use of UPE to allow for a critical response to these tactics, calling for a return to the political in matters of environment. The police order is rejected, along with the disruption of the spaces that it creates. Through challenging the status quo, as enforced through post- political strategies, the political produces spaces for inequalities to become visible, to demand ‘egaliberté’, as defined by the right to the absence of both inequality and discrimination (ibid, quoting Balibar, 1993). Swyngedouw holds that the political is thereby constituted through the right to egaliberté by those seen as less equal by the socio-political order. UPE is also relevant
12 in its dismissal of the human-nature binary as presented by post-politics, rather viewing ‘nature’ as non-existent, a fabrication which obscures the many intricate links between human and non-human systems, with environments shaped by variety of socio-ecological processes.
Swyngedouw expands on the retreat of the political and the rise of neoliberal governmentality and the post-political condition. Dissensus and debate, or ‘agonistic pluralism’ as Mouffe would have it, are replaced with techno-managerial ‘fixes’ based upon populist rhetoric. While the political is transformative in that it sheds light on obscured dynamics of power by challenging such frameworks, post-politics tactically masks power dynamics and ensuing conflicts by broadly painting entire groups as united under a single banner, with a single, focused demand or concern. Those brought to the table are labelled ‘stakeholders’, agents endowed with recognised speech who are already known to—and accepted by—the police order, who do not dissent or disrupt. Debates are managed through selective channels, while any voices that are raised in opposition are removed from the political arena through a process of radical exclusion, labelled as “extremists and terrorists” (Swyngedouw, 2009, p. 610). Post- politics thus invokes populist tactics in its creation of a universal ‘enemy’, positioned as an externalised threat, allowing social and ecological problems to be conceived as independent issues rather than ones inherently caused by the mechanisms of neoliberal consumption and production. It is in this sense that Swyngedouw perceives even more radical forms of participation to lack the ability to undermine existing hierarchies. He draws on Slavoj Žižec in contrasting this with a “genuine politics” emergent from demands that are conceived as more than simply negotiating interest but partaking in the restructuring of “the entire social space”.
While Mouffe conceptualises the post-political condition, Wilson & Swyngedouw (2015, p.13) also make note of Rancière’s equivalent concept of ‘post-democracy’, a diminishing of the political through ‘disavowal’ of the political in favour of consensus. The strategies of post- democracy include: presenting communities as an “organic whole”, from which nothing remains (anti-immigration nationalism), power distribution based in competitive, hierarchical structures (representative democracy), and the submission of politics to an underlying structure (the market). However, it is Mouffe’s post-political condition which will be used as a lens in the analysis of Dublin’s urban planning ecosystem and the modes of participation adopted by citizens.
2.2 Citizen participation
“The right to the city is not merely a right of access to what already exists, but a right to change it after our heart's desire” (Harvey, 2003, p.939)
In an editorial expanding upon Henri Lefebvre’s idea of the right to the city, Harvey (2003) recognises the urban landscape as both structured and chaotic, fashioned after our own desires, yet incapable of capturing the sheer volume of competing imaginaries existing within it. To this end he asks “whose rights and whose city?” (ibid). When all rights are considered equal, how do governing bodies decide upon the futures of cities? Harvey observes such decisions to be the product of power imbalances; given that most cities identified within the ‘developed’ world exist under the yoke of capitalism, so are cities dictated according to the gospel of accumulation. This necessitates scarcity to function, either naturally occurring or socially produced, with cities providing landscapes in which both extreme excess and deprivation exist side by side. The guiding image under which city development occurs is therefore called into question by Harvey, who advocates for a new, more equitable urban commons in which the right to the city is duly respected.
13 The mechanisms by which urban citizens can take ownership of their lived environment through participatory processes must therefore be examined. Sherry Arnstein (1969, p.24) defines participation in the following way:
“citizenship participation is a categorical term for citizen power. It is the redistribution of power that enables the have-not citizens, presently excluded from the political and economic processes, to be deliberately included in the future. It is the strategy by which the have-nots join in determining how information is shared, goals and policies are set, tax resources are allocated, programs are operated, and benefits like contracts and patronage are parceled out. In short, it is the means by which they can induce significant social reform which enables them to share in the benefits of the affluent society”
Participation is presented as a clear positive—that is until the “have-nots”, those Arnstein observed to be from marginalised or underserved communities, attempt to partake in the redistribution of power. Without such a redistribution, participation is recognised as a frustrating experience for the powerless, achieving little more than allowing those with power to make claim to legitimacy. She describes a spectrum of possibilities that engagement by the public can take in her ‘Ladder of Citizen Participation’ (fig. 3.1). The bottom rungs describes forms of nonparticipation, such as ‘Manipulation’, in which citizens’ goals are circumvented by rubber-stamping exercises where officials attempt to ‘educate’ participants in order to engineer support. This ranges to ‘Citizen Control’, at the top rung of the ladder, involving citizen-led committees with the power to control both their own budget and decision-making processes. At the bottom rung information passes only one way—from officials to citizens— with greater levels of a return flow of information occurring at higher rungs. Consultation occurs at the middle of the ladder, and is regarded as representative of tokenism.
Fig. 3.1: Arnstein’s Ladder of Participation. (Credit: Arnstein, 2019)
Citizen participation within urban planning initiatives can take varied forms, with an equal variance of efficacy. Frantzeskaki & Rok (2018) note that literature on public participation in sustainability is characterised by tokenism - whereby formal means of participation in public planning through government or officially mediated channels such as consultation are
14 considered as performative, rather than truly legitimate processes of engagement (Monno & Khakee, 2012). This is compared alongside radical planning, a more insurgent form of participation through social demonstrations, advancing the rights of civil society through mobilisation in order to challenge social elites’ control of a system that is perceived as exclusionary. Such conditions exemplify post-political circumstances regarding city planning, whereby governance, or police, with the goal of limiting possibilities in order to produce an apparently undivided consensus replaces the political, i.e. the space wherein heterogeneous groups experience egalitarian public encounter (Swyngedouw, 2009). The political as emergent from social relations is held separate from ‘politics’, which relates rather to how policy-making and managerial processes within institutions is resultant from an ensemble of social and political practices and discourses (McAuliffe & Rogers, 2018).
In contemplating the ways in which urban planning can be made open and equitable, it is necessary to explore the adoption of Jürgen Habermas’ ideals regarding planning theory. Habermasian communicative action theory, now believed by some (Purcell, 2009) to be hegemonic with urban planning, stems from a modernist approach to how discourse should be conducted, with those occupying a seat at the table asked to set aside individual motivations in pursuit of the common good. Concerns are in this way explored through deliberative and transparent discourse. In a criticism of these ideals, Mark Purcell vouches for Habermas in conceding that it is likely his intentions were not to enforce existing power dynamics, but rather to provide an alternative to capitalist regimes of planning. In observing power as something which an agent can hypothetically set aside, however, Purcell condemns Habermas as lacking a deeper sense of the nature of such relationships. Drawing on Foucauldian ideas of power as relational, Purcell thus accounts for the nature of relationships as dynamically produced via the power dynamics existing between individuals. Furthemore, he invokes Chantal Mouffe and Jean Hillier in noting that language is inherently distorted through bias, and thus cannot embody any true neutrality. Communicative theory built upon speech as an unbiased unitor of disparate actors becomes, in this case, untenable. This study specifically critiques the ways in which Habermasian approaches to urban planning might be employed as a tool of the post-political as a means of masking adversarial worldviews and desires through the generation of consensus.
Mouffe (1993, p.8) critiques Habermas specifically in observing that, from the standpoint of “radical and plural democracy”, communicative theory and consensus building, in aiming for an ultimate, universal resolution to conflict do not pursue democracy so much as endanger it. Instead, she calls for the pursuit of a pluralist democracy as an impossible horizon1, strived for through the acceptance a politics of agonism.
2.2.1 Agonism As mentioned previously, Mouffe (1993, p.3) holds that ‘the political’ is “a dimension inherent to every human society and that determines our very ontological condition”. Identity is conceived as relational, defined by difference to ‘the other’; it is unsurprising, therefore, that many relationships develop as antagonisms, hinging upon ‘us vs. them’ mentalities. Yet rather than accept the prevalent structures of antagonism Mouffe advocates for a movement towards a pluralist democracy. As such, planning should embrace the friction that exists between actors via the transformation of such antagonisms into what she deems ‘agonistic’ relationships. Agonism holds that certain aspects of conflict in politics can be mobilised for good, with decision-makers accepting the many paradoxes and contradictions of governing heterogenous citizenry bearing competing imaginaries for the city. This involves shifting the relationship between antagonistic ‘enemies’ to that of ‘adversaries’. McAuliffe & Rogers
1 Such a pursuit is paradoxical, in that a pluralist democracy is achieved through conflict and antagonism, but its realisation would mean the ultimate end of both (Mouffe, 1993, p.8).
15 (2018), in dealing with resident action groups in Sydney, Australia, account for multiple ways in which this transition towards agonism can be enacted—rigid, soft and strategic antagonism. Rigid antagonism accounts for positions often labelled as NIMBYism (Not In My Back Yard), with participants resolute in opposing developments occurring within their areas, while soft antagonism, although accepting of the plurality of held views, is not afforded political power (i.e. taking part in formal consultation processes with no impact). Of these, strategic antagonism is closest to a true agonism, with participants making use of both formal and more radical means of participation to engage in politics. Rigid antagonism by this group is employed as a tool when needed, thus a level of fluidity is achieved.
In contemplating how the voices of community groups can be made evident in contexts of post-political planning regimes McAuliffe & Rogers (ibid) build upon Mouffe’s concept of agonistic pluralism - a take on the political that transforms antagonistic relationships between entities seen as ‘enemies’ into an ‘agonistic’ relationship, whereby political adversaries can engage in ways that are not only equitable, but cognisant of the complexity and plurality of alternating worldviews and objectives. This is seen as a critique to Habermasian communicative theory and consensus politics, wherein conflict is eliminated through rational argumentation. Consensus building in governance, however, is considered in this case to be based on a platform of excluding those who do not fit within certain ideals through a process of othering, thereby establishing such groups as a threat (Swyngedouw, 2011). The process by which those things that do not fit neatly within the defined consensus are externalised and rejected is characteristic of the post-political, with such challenges upheld as the challenge that must be faced, e.g. climate change, while at the same time masking divisions in ideology within (Swyngedouw, 2009). Neoliberal, market-led planning processes and techno- managerial policy leads in shaping cities, as opposed to equitable participation via the political– fostering relationships defined by agonism may thus provide a challenge to the post- political condition.
2.2.2 Citizenship and the construction of identity In meditating upon the role of citizenship, Mouffe (1993, p.7) states that “[it] is vital for democratic politics, but a modern democratic theory must make room for competing conceptions of our identities as citizens”. This reflection is linked to the establishment of a pluralist democracy, one in which the intersections of identity are considered as embedded within relational power dynamics. Mouffe calls for a recognition of the political as inherently complex and non-essentialist, with identities positioned as non-fixed constructs, constantly and discursively produced. In accounting for the pursuit by various groups of a ‘radicalisation’ of democracy via confrontation of existing hierarchies of power in social relations, Mouffe (ibid, p.70-71) notes the potential for the adoption of similar political identities– that of “radical democratic citizens”. Groups existing in the margins meet in coalition in order to construct a ‘we’, a unity of interpretation of the meaning of egaliberté in the political arena that goes beyond simple alliance of comparative interests via a modification of existing identities. While liberalism preaches inclusion into citizenship, Mouffe considers this merely an extension of the existing sphere of rights to enclose previously external groups, rather than a true reconfiguration. Mouffe believes such a collective identification is prerequisite in achieving a democratic hegemony, yet in considering how collective identities are established, we must also account for the establishment of what identities are not, i.e. the categorisation of the ‘other’, whereby establishing ‘we’ necessitates determining ‘they’. Mouffe (2013, p.45-46), in rejecting essentialist approaches to identity, does not put faith in such divides as representative of some inherent essence, but are rather products of continual construction. In accepting this, the question becomes one of managing such identities in ways that are characterised by agonism rather than antagonism.
16 Mouffe’s reflections are expanded upon by a reformulation of the public/private dichotomy as observed through a feminist lens. While noted to have been instrumental in assertions of individual liberty, the private is dissected as aligned with the subordination of women by relegation to the domestic. In line with the spirit of UPE (and the deconstruction of binary narrative) the private and public are observed to be inextricably entwined and embodied in each and every encounter. In other words:
“The wants, choices and decisions are private because they are the responsibility of each individual, but the performances are public because they are required to subscribe to the conditions specified in respublica2” Mouffe, 1993, p.72
Mouffe clarifies this further by noting that we cannot draw a line between our “duties as a citizen” and our “freedom as an individual” (ibid). The divide between the private and public is central in many aspects of urban planning, with the city itself becoming a battlefield upon which they are contested, as performed in processes of urban revanchism. In recognition of the home, i.e. the domestic sphere, as part of a vast network in which even the city itself is considered to have no defined boundary separating urban from non-urban, we are forced to reckon with the ways in which these concepts are iteratively renegotiated.
MacLeod (2011) writes on the privatisation of space in the form of various redevelopment projects configured through an entrepreneurial approach to revitalisation, such as downtown areas and shopping districts. Such spaces become the site of a localised governmentality in the policing of behaviours within their boundaries, to the extent that it becomes difficult to decipher between what constitutes the private and what constitutes the public. Examples include prohibiting street vending or distribution of leaflets (ibid, p.2646) as a means of eliminating informal economies perceived as unappealing to potential investors and consumers, an invocation of the strategic exclusions of revanchism. It follows that citizenship here is marked more by inclusion in a demographic engaged in consumership than by personhood. Lawton (2018) takes note of the implementation of surveillance technologies such as CCTV in the regulation of public spaces, prompted by insecurities regarding public safety and antisocial behaviours. Such regulations are seen not only as economically-driven in goals of policing central spaces, but as stigmatisation of certain inner city areas populated by diaspora communities.
2 In reference to Michael Oakshott, respublica denotes the public consideration of societas, a civil association defined by agents who are bound together by loyalty, rather than in pursuit of a common goal. This association is marked by a recognition of the authority of certain conditions which dictate the ‘practice of civility’.
17 3. Literature Review In the following chapter the study will be situated within existing literature, with specific reference made to concepts outlined in the previous chapter regarding the post-political condition and an emergent urban revanchism, both in Dublin and beyond. To this end, urban planning and governance are considered as existing within a hegemony of neoliberal rhetoric.
3.1 Participative planning in praxis: Communicative action or neoliberal sensibilities? In the previous chapter, the concept of participation was introduced alongside the various forms in which it is made manifest, from ‘tokenistic’ consensus building, to more equitable processes of agonism. This section will introduce these concepts into the urban context as embodied by existing writings. The research discussed will aim to specifically situate such conditions within an existing hegemony of neoliberal logic as a global force shaping the landscapes of cities. Such a perspective is essential, given the ways in which capital and information within the global market have become untethered, with ‘global cities’ frequently pursuing strategies of city-modeling after apparent success such as London, San Francisco and SIngapore. This mobility itself is seen as a driver of inter-city competition for investment, with the desire for growth and development shaping urban governance (MacLeod, 2009, p.2633)
Monno and Khakee (2012) undertake case studies of urban planning initiatives in Stockholm, Sweden and Bari, Italy in describing the ways in which participatory planning can be shaped by both tokenism and radical activism. Tokenism in this sense is close to what McAuliffe and Rogers (2018) would consider soft antagonism, wherein citizens are included in planning by governing bodies as a means of securing legitimacy. This is achieved via consultation processes embodying Habermasian ideals to pay lip-service to democracy, with the efficacy of such consultations being decided upon by formal actors in ways which contribute to the disempowerment of citizens (Legacy, 2017, p.430). They also make note of planners within Stockholm expressing the view that representative democracy renders participation obsolete, with consultation disregarded as costly in both time and money. The shift from state-mandated planning and development to market-led housing thus becomes transactionary, with citizens participating through a “willingness to pay” (Monno & Khakee, 2012, p.86). Citizens are in this way transformed into consumers, with even consultation superseded by market research. This falls under the purview of late neoliberalism, in which housing provision is made the responsibility of the market and capitalist home ownership becomes a universal good (Rolnik, 2013). Radical planning, as described by Monno and Khakee (2012, p.89), concerns itself not with conventional forms of civic engagement, but “with the mobilization of civil society in order to challenge powerful elites, enlarge the democratic action space and advance citizens’ rights.”
Radical planning is separated from Habermasian communicative theory and consensus- building in its ability to transform power relations through insurgent civil action. Crystal Legacy (2017) writes on the blocking of Melbourne, Australia’s East West Link tunnel through the efforts of mobilised citizen groups as an example of successful participation in planning in the face of post-political attempts to remove the polis from the political via the creation of an undemocratic system marked by consensus governance. Legacy contemplates Monno and Khakee’s (2012) claims of participatory planning as being in crisis by reflecting on informal, or radical, participation as specifically able to challenge dominant trajectories in planning. While formal channels are recognised as palatable forms of community engagement by political elites attempting to avoid or reduce antagonism and manage conflict, recognition of insurgent civil movements as a tool of engagement circumventing government-established mechanisms is due. The Poolbeg West SDZ case can be linked to Legacy’s description of the planning of
18 the East West Link tunnel, in that public submissions were accepted, the efficacy of which were decided upon by government officials. The strategies of neoliberal planning practices can be weaponised in order to further reduce the ability for citizens to engage, through policies designed to reduce participation, with managerial forms of governance replacing a true commitment to tokenistic consultation. Legacy (2017, p.434) observes this in the closing down of avenues for citizen participation in order to expedite construction. A similar tactic can be observed in the fast-tracking planning presented by Ireland’s SDZs, with future planning applications covered broadly under guidelines set by an approved Masterplan allowing a circumvention of the standard appeal process facilitated by An Bord Pleanála and a stifling of citizens’ voices (Kayanan et al, 2018). This perceived dichotomy in methods of engagement in planning is, however, called into question by Eric Swyngedouw (2009) as falling within the established police order and thus being relegated to either ineffectual, un-political participation, or outright exclusion from the political.
Much as residents’ groups are shown by McAuliffe and Rogers (2017) to employ a strategic use of rigid, antagonistic standpoints, and by Legacy (2017) to manage both formal and informal approaches as strategies of influencing planning, active citizenship in Ireland is seen to follow similar channels of participation. Scott et al (2012) reflect upon the ways in which residents’ groups in the Greater Dublin Area contribute to urban development through citizen action aimed both in- and outside of formal, state-mediated channels. They make note of a loss of trust held by communities with regards to top-down approaches to policy-making and development enacted by the Irish government, with statutory provisions for public engagement and third-party appeals to planning called into question. Local residents are also observed to specifically distrust politicians and planners, and preferentially lobby local councillors in order to make their voices heard. A trend in government of ‘clientelism’, with local councillors portraying themselves as ‘local fixers’ with regards to issues brought to them by constituents pursuing lobbyist techniques outside of formal consultation procedures (ibid, p.164). Councillors therefore feel that they must invest and build social capital if they are to retain their seats during elections. They note that certain strategies displayed by residents’ groups were particular to areas of greater privilege, such as consulting experts with technical knowledge, or increased access to decision-makers and public officials. This allows for the potential that areas that are already underserved may become more vulnerable to unwanted developments due to a lack of such advantages.
While Scott et al’s (ibid) residents’ groups displayed diversity of results in their attempts to impact planning, participation in the regeneration of the Smithfield area within Dublin by community groups as described by Katia Attuyer (2015) shows clear signs of tokenism. The case described shows a desire on Dublin City Council’s (DCC) part for public engagement, through the inclusion of community actors in the Historic Area Rejuvenation Project (HARP), centred within the Northwest Inner City. In controlling allocation of a levy fund intended for ‘community gain’, however, DCC displayed vastly different interpretations of what this would mean in comparison to representatives of the community, by intending to use the levy to fund physical infrastructure such as road repairs and lamp post installations. This rather literal reading of the term excluded the community’s vision of “crèches, a youth hall, [and] educational and recreational facilities” (ibid, p.814), amenities which would serve the needs of existing neighbourhoods. Tokenism in this way is used for the purposes of projecting equitability in shaping the city, yet any inclinations towards power-sharing or polycentricity in governance are apparently withdrawn when conflicts arise. Such falls within the logic of neoliberal planning, with senior officials considering the marginalisation of community activist and councillor concerns regarding the zoning of a mixed-use space within Smithfield justified in the pursuit of development goals. The ‘Celtic Tiger’ boom of the early 2000s also saw a move towards private-public partnerships as commonsensical tools in urban regeneration, despite claims that they provided minimal social housing or community gain with calls for improved amenities dismissed as a drain of public funds (ibid, p.818-820). This echoes the
19 conditions of MacLeod’s (2011, p.2636-2637) movement towards regimes of urban entrepreneurialism, as will be expanded upon in section 3.3.
3.2 Gentrification: Neoliberalism and the City As seen above, approaches to urban development are shaped by neoliberal forces as actioned through the development of the post-political condition. This is often realised in the form of public-private partnerships, or entirely market-led developer-based projects, shaping the futures of cities on a global level. A recent example of this is New York’s Hudson Yards, a $20 billion prestige project on Manhattan’s West Side referred to by the New York Times (Kimmelman, 2019) as “Manhattan’s Biggest, Newest, Slickest Gated Community” and the Guardian as “an ultra-capitalist Forbidden City” (Nolan, 2019). As Manhattan’s newest, and potentially grandest, development project, Hudson Yards has drawn criticism for establishing what an apparent billionaire’s playground, with luxury apartments, shopping and office space available for those with the capital to afford them. This mega-development is crowned with a $200 million tower-like structure composed of a series of staircases named ‘the Vessel’ (image 3.1), dubbed an “Instagram friendly-panopticon” by CityLab (O’Sullivan, 2019) due to visitors essentially signing away usage of all photographs depicting it to Hudson Yards upon entry.
Image 3.1 ‘The Vessel’ in Hudson Yards, Manhattan. (Source: Dipasupil, 2019)
Although by no means uniquely so, New York may be examined as a city deeply shaped by the ebb and flow of capital. Neil Smith (1996) writes on gentrification as the “urban cleansing” and “modernisation” of city central locations, capturing the contrary viewpoints held by those who might position themselves as “pioneers” making claim to space and progress, and those who experience displacement due to rising rental prices. During the suburbanisation of America between the 1960s to 1990s, gentrification became the subject of a fraught contestation as both a source of hope for the future of cities, and of fear of displacement for communities without the agency to partake in this new wave of city-making. He notes that gentrification, a little known word coined by Ruth Glass in the 1960s, had become “ubiquitous in the central and inner cities of the advanced capitalist world” by the 1990s. The widespread “reclamation” of urban lands coincides with the decline of industry in wealthy nations and the transition towards service-based economies. Smith thus considers gentrification to be highly
20 linked to processes of globalisation and the economic, political and social restructuring brought about by the modernising global market .
One of the strengths of neoliberalism lies in its ability to further its own goals both during times of economic growth and downturn (McAuliffe & Rogers, 2018; Purcell, 2009). The battle between displacement and emplacement in Chicago, the birthplace of neoliberal thinking, as a result of the American subprime crisis is presented by Ananya Roy (2017) in a paper on housing rights and dispossession. In the wake of an increase in federal funds by the Federal Reserve which sent subprime mortgage holders spiraling into debt (thus creating the 2008 financial crisis), homeowners in Chicago’s black neighbourhoods found themselves engaged in a struggle not simply against dispossession, but for possession. She reflects upon the politics of emplacement, i.e. of setting and defending places in the face of displacement by eviction and repossession, with groups such as the Chicago Anti-Eviction Campaign utilising strategic illegalities, such as the occupation of foreclosed houses, as setting morality against conceptions of legality. Such occupations are reframed as “liberations”, with group members invoking the tactics of careful illegality pioneered by the civil rights movements of the 50s and 60s as a moral good. The intersections of class and affluence with colour are incorporated into geographies of racial banishment within the urban environment, with Roy (2017, p.A9) referencing Cheryl Harris in order to invoke the connections between whiteness and status within the context of liberalism’s prescription to personhood via property. Banishment in this sense is characterised by a reconfiguration of space through the exclusion of that which undermines socially produced “civil order” defined by the abjuration of, quite often, poor, non- white communities.
Ilan’s (2011) depiction of an underserved, inner-city Dublin shows how even within communities an enforcement of “respectability” as defined by the police order can contribute to processes of othering, with those at the fringes of society likely to be even further marginalised. He compares the experiences of two comparable groups of young men, one embodying a perceived “respectable” identity while the other, labelled “rough”, is alienated, despite the likelihood of both engaging in informal—if not outright illegal—practices of income generation. This is seen as coinciding with a state focus on partnerships with communities in an effort to curb crime and redevelop the urban centre. By partnering with communities, governing institutions are able to promote ‘good governance’ through citizen participation, with the intended outcome of actually foreclosing dissenting voices within tokenistic structures (MacLeod, 2011, p.2649). The performance of consensus is thusly perceived as a method of distancing political debate. This is entangled with a entrepreneurial approach to governance and market-led home building, and a mobilisation of the poor to fall in line with the needs of private capital. Partnerships with certain established community leaders allows for the separation of “deserving” and “undeserving” poor based upon normative assumptions of certain groups as aspirational, while others are further polarized into entrenched exclusion.
Capitalist urbanity is preserved by the mechanisms of market-led city building. Technocratic solutions to the problems faced by contemporary trends towards global urbanisation present solutions that fit within this existing system, gaining popularity under the premise of preserving current lifestyle modes. Kayanan et al (2018, p.63) make note of Dublin City Council’s approach to technocratic urban management in their creation of seed funds for start-up style social entrepreneurship as a means of broadening their portfolio. This embrace of tech culture is also closely affiliated with the advertised lifestyle of the Docklands population as a young, educated body committed to progress (ibid). This is aligned with the spirit of gentrification, in such cases where place identity is co-opted into a branded lifestyle, often framed within a proximity to danger and a claim to ‘realness’.
21 3.3 Competing Imaginaries: Loss of trust in entrepreneurial governance Over twenty years have passed since Smith wrote on the revanchist condition, and once again America finds itself grappling with the rise of populist rhetoric uplifting capital and a backlash against liberal ideals, with similar political climates observable in many Western nations. While the rhetorics of neoliberalism and populism might hold certain diametric oppositions, Ronan Paddison (2009, p.8-9) contemplates the parallels that exist between them. Conventionally, he notes, liberalism and populism hold vastly incongruent positions regarding the role and position of state, agency, market and society; this is especially so given liberalism’s exaltation of the elite and accumulation, and populism’s appeal to the ‘the people’ and redistribution. However, Paddison (ibid, citing Weyland, 2003) comments on the usage of populism as a means of achieving neoliberal governance by conceptualising two parallel, yet interdependent, spheres: one political, i.e. neo-populist, and one economic, i.e. neo-liberal, with the tactical weakening of democracy employed as a means of strengthening both state and market. This deployment of populism as political strategy is inherently post-political, with city government’s policies treated as the commonsensical—if not the only—logical option, with the illusion of democracy upheld through ineffective participation. Paddison specifically considers trends in the urban development in Glasgow, Scotland, as indicative of a post-political condition, with city officials adopting empty place marketing and managed forms of participation in order to promote economic interests. Yet conflict cannot be fully obscured, as observed in friction between city government and citizens engaged in protesting the establishment of a ‘pay to use’ activity zone in one of the city’s parks– an endeavor upheld as contributing to a healthy active city, but criticised for financialising important shared green space within the city. A tactical use of marginalisation through “active presence” is employed, with councillors allowing the presence of protestors, yet constructing rules under which their presence would be tolerated (such as forbidding questions), in order to both figuratively and literally silence the voice of dissent. This is an example of post-political managerialism and the strategic enforcement of rules and guidelines.
Gordon MacLeod (2011) writes on a ‘new urban politics’, one defined by “boosterism”, “place marketing” and “entrepreneurialism”, wherein Keynesian ideals of social service provision are usurped by goals of economic growth produced through neoliberal consensus. One of the primary concerns of this is manifested in projects to rejuvenate downtown areas, with such districts taking on a form of local managerial governance concerned with enforcing the ‘police order’, with an example seen in the UK’s Business Improvement Districts. These bodies proclaim an “apolitical” status, rather aligning themselves with promoting solely economic interests. In doing so, governmentality is affected regarding who these downtown areas are established for via enforcement of a sterilised, ‘safe’ environment, i.e. one from which those regarded to exist outside developers’ targeted class and culture are excluded. Similarly, we see this in the rejuvenation of downtown Glasgow (MacLeod, 2002), and the banishment of the homeless population, problematised as detrimental to a competitive shopping district. This is also closely linked to the city as a site for entrepreneurial forms of governance, wherein the city as a ‘growth-machine’ draws in certain actors in politics via partnership, such as those engaged in construction and finance, professional law practitioners and city councillors seeking sponsorship (MacLeod, 2011). The formation of coalitions of such actors is perceived as a powerful force impacting upon the shape and identity of the city. MacLeod draws on Harvey to present the conditions of the ‘entrepreneurial city’ as one in which government is weakened in the face of economic interests, with competition for investment and industry facilitating relaxed planning regulations, lowered taxes and direct subsidies. This is also observed in the appointment of private bodies and quasi-autonomous non-governmental agencies (quangos) as overseers of development projects within the city. An example of this is the Dublin Docklands Development Authority (DDDA).
Charged with the development of the Docklands, the DDDA was established as the successor of the earlier Custom House Docks Development Authority in 1997, which had previously
22 overseen the area with a limited focus on economic growth without concern for the area’s social development (Kayanan et al, 2018). The DDDA was charged with oversight the Docklands area, including sites that would become the North Lotts and Grand Canal Dock SDZ in 2012, at which point they were dissolved, with ownership transferred to DCC. This transfer is faulted with leaving the Docklands area as a grey-zone of intersecting public and private spaces, with multiple areas perceived to be within the public realm actually falling under private ownership (Thomas, 2017). This has sparked certain controversies over permissible behaviors, with even photography banned in specific ‘private’ streets, as enforced by private security. Under SDZ planning, the Docklands area has been specifically marked by entrepreneurialism, with the interests of Dublin’s growing tech and finance sector impacting upon the identity of the Docklands. A reliance on entrepreneurial approaches to urban management can be seen in DCC’s ‘smart city accelerator’, a seed funding project to allow social entrepreneurs to receive investment in projects with the potential for social good. DCC is thus seen to not only adopt the culture of the start-ups homed within the SDZ, but, by endorsing a structure of venture capitalism, to vindicate such forms of governance (Kayanan et al, 2018, p.63).
While the DDDA and DCC are seen as successful in attracting FDI and boosting the city and national economy, certain strategies are regarded as working towards furthering developer goals. For example, the enforcement of fast-track planning regulations under SDZ masterplan procedure is posited as a social good, allowing for expedited construction and a transformation of older structures into a more ‘desirable’ environment for investment. However, it also acts to silence local objections by reducing the ability of residents to voice their concerns (ibid). The advancement of the Docklands identity as a technology sector hub in Dublin is argued by Kayanan et al (ibid) to be a direct result of a post-recession void in the Irish capital, and its success is placed within the boundaries of neoliberalisms ability to mutate and adapt without changing its core logic. An apparent focus on the desires of developers and tech companies within the city is observed as a condition of a pursuit of competitiveness. This, however, is seen to disenfranchise certain communities, with the investment of resources into the technology sector reproducing the spatialisation of class divide via real estate within the city (ibid, p.61), a battle especially visible within divise opinions regarding the construction of high- rise office and apartments within the area (Deegan, 2019;McEnroe 2019;McNeive, 2019;O'Faolain & Managh, 2019). Considering the lack of trust in higher political representatives described by Scott et al (2012) and prioritisation of Dublin’s economic goals, it is vital to examine the forces at play in shaping the future of the city.
4. Methodology In seeking to explore the motivations, goals and desires shaping urban imaginaries, a qualitative approach was used to rationalise research design in order to answer the research questions. The following chapter will expand upon the methodology, means of data collection and analysis that were utilised. Ethical concerns and the limitations of the study will also be addressed.
4.1 Research Design Data collection was multifactorial, with a qualitative mixed methods approach undertaken. Semi-structured interviews were carried out with targeted respondents in order to gain insight into the perceptions of urban dwellers regarding the redevelopment of the Inner City. These were then paired with a text analysis of public planning documents. Results from interviews
23 and text analysis were used for comparison, in line with Robbins (2016, p.140) advice that research within political ecology “should seek methods that assure the symmetry of inquiry between official knowledges...and local ones”.
4.1.1 Study site Dublin was chosen as a study site due to the author’s familiarity with the city, as an Irish citizen and former Dublin resident. Although other areas within Ireland are experiencing similar trends in development, Dublin is of particular interest as the capital due to the frequency of civic demonstration and the concentration of finance and tech-sector companies acting with the potential to intensify social inequalities. Poolbeg West SDZ and the Docklands SDZ, both located within the East Inner City, are considered to be main areas of focus within this study. However, in seeking to understand the wider experiences of citizens impacted by efforts at urban regeneration, respondents were sampled from areas adjacent to these zones (i.e. falling outside formal SDZ boundaries). These surrounding communities stand to experience change on varying levels due to the presence of SDZ planning, and such perspectives are specifically sought out in this case in order to provide insight into the reproduction of spatial inequalities that may otherwise be masked by the potential economic successes of the wider area.
4.1.2 Sampling Sampling was purposive in nature, with a judgement selection of respondents utilised in order to generate data. The individuals spoken to were considered to have relevant insight into processes of urban planning within Inner City Dublin specifically relating to urban regeneration. Three respondents were identified through the author’s own network, while others were contacted through publicly available channels (i.e. email and Facebook), or via snowball sampling. Respondents were composed of multi-generational Dublin residents familiar with the Inner City, with all but one engaged in a variety of activities pertaining to involvement in urban planning. Those selected were knowledgeable of Ringsend and Irishtown, or were individuals from the Northeast Inner City (NEIC) who were considered to contribute outsider viewpoints. This was deemed relevant due to varying socio-economic conditions, and for comparative experiences with local governance. The NEIC is itself of particular interest, and experiences unique challenges, due to a government funding partnership aimed at “social and economic regeneration” within the area (Dublin NEIC, 2019).
4.1.3 Semi-structured interviews Within the framework of urban political ecology, semi-structured interviews were deemed an appropriate method to facilitate understanding of the experiences of specific urban citizens in the redevelopment of areas within the inner city. Sections of the East Inner City were selected as the location for this study, with the majority of interviews collected from residents of the Ringsend/Irishtown area due to its proximity to the Poolbeg West SDZ and the Docklands SDZ. Added to this were two interview samples taken from the North Strand area. Formal, semi-structured interviews were carried out with 6 participants, with recording times ranging from 40 to 70 minutes, on site at various locations around Dublin City, although most interviews carried on beyond the point of recording. Interviews were conducted as described by Bryman (2016, p.468-475), with an interview guide of questions regarding interviewee experiences with government planning processes pre-prepared. Based upon influence from grounded theory, these questions altered as interviews were completed, in order to accommodate the researcher’s own response to the information provided. Reflexivity in research is also promoted by a political ecology approach, with an understanding the ways in which political and economic power shape both the environment and our perceptions of it
24 (Robbins, 2012, p.20). An epistemologically appropriate approach to research within this framework is therefore a form of knowledge co-production (ibid, p.128-130).
Formal interviews were offset with short conversations recorded in a field notebook during a civil demonstration taking place in Dublin (image 3.1). Furthermore, recordings did not capture the full length of all interviews, with one participant providing a walking tour of the the Ringsend area off-record. Interview locations were selected by participants, both for ease of participation (as they were not required to travel) and also to ensure comfort. Interviews were recorded and transcribed.
Respondent profiles: Individuals ranged in age between 40-80, and were all from multi- generational Inner City families (or having married into one). The majority of respondents were women, however, there is no attempt to perceive a gendered viewpoint within data. Interviews were supplemented with field notes containing responses from multiple Irish Glass Bottle Housing Action Group (IGBHAG) members present at the Homeless and Housing March. All names and genders have been removed.
● I1: Member of a community garden. ● I2: Lifelong resident of Ringsend engaged in a local history group. ● I3: Urban planning advisor to multiple inner city development groups. ● I4: Employee of an NEIC community recycling project. ● I5: Employee of an NEIC community recycling project. ● I6: Active member of IGBHAG.
Image 3.1: Housing and homeless rights protest, Dublin 9/3/2019. (Source: author, 2019)
4.1.4 Texts: Public planning documents and development plans Analysis of planning proposals of both the Docklands and Poolbeg West SDZs as well as the wider city was conducted. Dublin Port Company’s Masterplan, outlining development and outreach initiatives for the port was also considered due to its location within the East Inner City. Documents are readily available online through DCC and DPC websites. Comparison of planning proposals with currently existing structures allows for evaluation of the imaginaries offered by DCC to the public. These documents were central in providing a comparison to the views held by interviewees and were also used to inform interviews, and to allow a historical perspective of urban planning and management of the areas in question.
In drawing information from publicly available documents it is important to consider four criteria as described by John Scott are referenced by Bryman (2016, p.546) in his description of how
25 documents of quality might be identified: Authenticity, credibility, representativeness and meaning. In utilising government documents, however, he notes that while they may he authentic and meaningful, their credibility and representativeness require deeper consideration (ibid, p.552-553). The fact that they are produced by official bodies however, means that the potential for bias becomes subject to the researcher’s understanding of wider contexts, with bias in fact holding the potential to unlock deeper layers of meaning. In undertaking qualitative research it should also be recognised that representativeness cannot be conveyed in a statistical sense, therefore this is of lesser importance. In using documents as a source of information, researchers are advised to account for the fact that simply because something is set in text does not mean that it is truly representative of “an underlying social reality” (ibid, p.560-561). Documents are prepared with a certain prospective audience in mind, often with the potential that it will be open to wider public access. Such documents also do not occur alone, instead falling into a connected network of other documents, as in the case of the documents analysed in this study – this is referred to as inter-textuality. Thus, while analysis of documents can reveal a reality of their own, it is recommended that this forms part of multi-factorial research drawing on other sources.
Documents: All documents were public in nature, and were retrieved from online sources hosted by governmental bodies.
● DCC 2014: North Lotts and Grand Canal Dock Draft Planning Scheme 2014 ● DCC 2016: Dublin City Development Plan 2016-2022 ● DCC 2017: Poolbeg West Draft Planning Scheme ● DPC 2018: Dublin Port Company Draft Masterplan 2011-2040 (Reviewed 2018)
4.2 Data Analysis Content analysis of transcripts was employed in order to extract both latent and manifest content from interview data gathered, as described by Drisko & Maschi (2015). This analysis yielded a selection of categories present across interview data. These categories were then considered in relation to each other, in order to present overarching themes within data. A similar process was undertaken for governmental planning documents. The themes observed were organised by the researcher into a narrative form for the purpose of providing answers to the research questions posed, with lessons observed from approaches to coding described in Drisko & Maschi (ibid).
4.3 Ethical considerations In undertaking a study in which generated data is gathered from semi-structured interviewing methods, ethical consideration is extended to participants who are volunteering their time and information without recompense. As all participants were legal adults, and there was no contact made with individuals who might be considered as falling within a ‘vulnerable’ group. In this sense, although due consideration was given to the rights and well-being of respondents, there was no apparent need for extensive ethical vetting. However, given that one of the sites considered in this study is currently involved in development processes of some controversy to local communities, the potential for this study to contribute to existing tensions with the potential of instigating conflict will be acknowledged - although this is considered unlikely. Effort will be made to accurately portray contexts, histories and sentiments with as much efficacy as possible.
26 Fisher and Anushko (2008, p.96) consider the necessity of informed consent - whereby participants are provided with information which might influence their willingness to take part in a study. All participants gave consent for interviews to be recorded, and permissions were given for recordings to be used in the generation of transcripts for analysis. All requests for comments to be made off-record were complied with. Audio recordings will be held for the purposes of ensuring accountability and accuracy, but will be used solely for stated purposes. While anonymity has been assured to the greatest of the author’s ability (in accordance with university ethical guidelines), there is a chance that certain individuals, due to affiliation with specific local groups, may be identifiable. However, such individuals have both spoken publicly about the topics contained within interview data, and maintain a relatively visible presence regarding the issues considered the remit of their respective groups. Given the topics included in interviews are not considered of a sensitive nature, there is little risk that respondents’ views and statements hold the potential to cause harm.
The author’s own position and biases were acknowledged to the greatest extent possible during this study, however, given the nature of the topic, the purposive sampling of respondents and the interpretive nature of data analysis a level of subjectivity must be recognised. To this end all participants were encouraged question the author’s background and the intent behind the research in which they were taking part. Brinkmann and Kvale (2015, p57-59) consider the role of the researcher as that of a traveler, with knowledge constructed through the combined experiences of the researcher and their participants. In this study the nature of research questions being considered has changed during the process of interviewing, with responses causing a shift in focus. This shift is not, however, considered to be of a magnitude that would require participants to be informed.
4.4 Limitations The limited scope of empirical data obtained is recognised as a result of the small sample size of interview respondents. Due to the restricted time available for field work to be completed within the framework of a master’s thesis, a period of three weeks was spent in the field. Considering the author’s residence outside of Ireland, the option of extending field work or returning to Ireland was not possible. As such, it is advised that the reader bear in mind that any results are not intended to be fully representative of the diverse communities living with Inner City Dublin. Although attempts were made to contact city planners and representatives of DCC, due to a lack of response within the timeframe this was not realised. As such analysis of documents is given additional weight in portraying the future city as envisioned by DCC. It should be noted, however, that the statements made within these documents may find their own meaning in how they are interpreted by city planners, who, as individuals, will have their own unique perspectives which are not accounted for here. Additionally, the goals of developers are recounted solely via the opinions of interviewees, although this is considered within the boundaries of research questions presented.
Given that interviews were conducted with a limited pool of targeted individuals from Inner City Dublin communities, results indicated will not be used to represent any form of population- level generalisability (Fisher & Anushko, 2008). While insights here are framed as the experiences a limited number of people, Bryman (2016, p.399) draws attention to the role of qualitative studies as existing within a network of research. Hence, it is possible to achieve a level of “moderatum generalisability” by drawing connections and making comparisons to existing bodies of work. Additionally, in using interview data as a basis for this study it is important to account for the individual credibility and trustworthiness of respondents as reporters of their own experiences (Drisko & Mashi, 2015, p.92). Qualitative data is this way is regarded as bearing a contextual, rather than universal, significance, and readers are
27 encouraged to consider these accounts as part of a greater discourse within Irish urban planning, and the future of the city of Dublin.
5. Analysis of themes Based on information gathered from interview participants, coupled with planning documents, four core themes emerged through analysis of empirical data: 1) Management of strategic participation, 2) Gentrification and tech-sector growth, 3) Community investment and loss of trust, and 4) Competing identities. These themes were seen to have relevance across research questions, however, channels of participation are focused upon in section 5.1, while the factors motivating management of these channels are described across sections 5.2 and 5.3. Section 5.4 presents data linked to residents’ imaginaries and city council visions for the future.
5.1 Management of strategic participation The future of Dublin city, as envisioned by the City Development Plan 2016-2022 (DCC, 2016, p.18) is one constructed “through the shared vision of its citizens and civic leaders”, creating “a beautiful, compact city, with a distinct character, a vibrant culture and a diverse, smart, green, innovation-based economy”. Such utopian visions are marked by language depicting a harmonious urban community, active in equitable city-building processes. Yet are the City Council’s invocations of active citizen engagement practiced in daily governance, or do they fall flat in praxis? There are multiple mentions of statutory participation in the development of urban futures (DCC, 2014, p.8, 2016, p.18, 2017, p.5-6;DPC, 2018, p.15), so it is clear that to some extent that participation is accounted for; the weight that citizens’ engagement in such procedures is given, however, must be called into question.
Those involved in groups whose objective is to impact planning decisions at some level were seen to pursue various channels in order to have their voices heard, with strategies ranging from lobbying local councillors to organising civil demonstrations. An Bord Pleanála’s (ABP) consultation process is presented as an official channel provided to the public in order to facilitate intervention in planning projects; however, its efficacy is decided upon by officials and processes were regarded with a lack of trust by interviewees. This is especially true considering that it relies upon early stage engagement - something that is further compounded by the establishment of SDZs and fast-track planning. Once an SDZ is established it facilitates planning under broad guidelines which planning applications must comply to. If these conditions are met, this allows a submission to move forward without the standard community appeals process. Per the above quote provided by one interviewee, communities must thus act quickly in order to have their say in such matters. While several interviewees did mention making use of this appeals process, it appears to be incorporated into wider strategies of managing engagement. When asked about her experiences with the wider consultation process, I1 responded that while it is city council policy to include citizens’ consideration in urban planning, such processes were considered to be box-checking exercises.
“they try to get people involved. But they like them to do what they want them to do, if you know what I mean, so they do sometimes give lip service. But there's public participation forums and all that kind of stuff, but it's, they still want you to do what they want you to do” I1
28 The consultation process itself appears to be a function set up to lend legitimacy not only to official bodies but also civil groups, in that engagement may be undertaken partially as an exercise to illustrate that formal channels have been addressed, despite a lack of faith in the system. I1 did note later on, however, that she had experienced some positive aspects of consultation too, specifically regarding inclusion of her committee in a public brainstorming session of urban green spaces.
“So they did have public consultation, but they were like open to anybody. But they would have you know, I would have had a phone call and ‘I hope you're going to be there’. Because they would have seen us as having something to say” I1
This may suggest a more nuanced approach to criticism of the consultation process, or at the least an understanding of the different contexts in which consultation may occur. Alongside usage of consultation, a direct lobbying of local officials and politicians appears to be utilised in order to maximise impact, with on respondent noting:
“When we call some of our meetings and sure we invited all the local politicians 3 and councillors that were elected in the area to come in and we called on them to help us. We pointed out always we're a non-political group. And they have helped us in any way they can and they've been terrific, most of them, you know."...."We couldn't go through the normal way [the consultation process], no. I don't think so" I6
This approach to pursuing specific local representatives was widespread amongst respondents, with all participants mentioning specific councillors by name, both as individuals with whom they had developed relationships with in the course of their work, but also as visible members of their communities. Councillors and DCC officials especially appear to be seen as effective channels for manifesting community will into action, with one person stating:
“I’d rather actually deal with the officials then the politicians, to be honest with you. Because your problem is with the politicians, they're all trying to outbest each other”...“Where I find more with the officials if they go down the road with you they'll stick to it”. I4
This engagement seems to be distributed across levels of office, and, although perhaps most immediately focused on local elected representatives, can be affected to the highest level, with more than one group engaged with government ministers. Such meetings at the ministerial level are potentially more symbolic than effectual however, and appear to be signs of a more general support or engagement with a cause, rather than a specific commitment. There appears to be a sense that public participation in aspects of planning in Ireland have improved over time, with at least one respondent considering this change as instigated by communities as opposed to officials, invoking an elevation in the Irish people: “as we've become an Ireland more educated, I think we don't accept things as much now and we question them more” (I2, interview).
However, these tactics appear to be considered as more diplomatic channels of engagement. These are apparently managed in association with organised protests and civil action, with groups connecting and partaking in large demonstrations. One group member (interview) in attendance at a housing rights and homelessness march (March 9th, 2019) in Dublin’s city
3 It was noted that although councillors might be considered politicians in their own right, several respondents used the term specifically to denote representatives higher up in political hierarchies. While this itself poses an interesting semantic consideration, it is not dissected within this study.
29 centre mentioned that these groups had been galvanised by civil movements to protest the introduction of water charges by the Irish government. This appears to have maintained a certain momentum in the passing years, with demonstrations occurring regularly. Members of the Irish Glass Bottle Housing Action Group (IGBHAG) appear to make use of all of these methods of actualising goals, from meeting with various stakeholders, from elected officials to representatives for the receiver of the IGB site, to civil demonstrations. As I3 stated, “they have engaged with senior civil servants. They have engaged which universities. They have engaged at hearings. They have presented to strategic policy committees. Nothing fazes them”. One such protest involved creating a gallery of pillowcases bearing messages which were attached to the the fence surrounding the site (images 5.1-5.3). These pillowcases bore various messages, united under an appeal to the viewers emotions, invoking a right of all children to a place to lay their head. Thus, multiple strategies appear to be employed strategically in order to maintain visibility.
In the case of the IGBHAG and Poolbeg West SDZ there appears to be an interesting level of engagement from official representatives across levels of influence. While this surely speaks of the work done by the group in attracting such attention, it may also be contributed to their own specific identify.
“They have engaged at every level. They have been legendary, those individuals. You know...they have an advantage in Ringsend. They have an inner confidence and that's partially because of the constituency that they're in. The Southeast will always have a minister at the table. It is one of the wealthiest constituencies. This [Ringsend/Irishtown] is considered a poor area of the constituency. They are 10% of the electorate. What is that because of the PR [proportional representation] voting system, they are very important"..."We have Taoiseachs [Irish prime minister], we have high ranking ministers. It's normal for us.” I3
This then ensures that the Ringsend community maintains a certain level of clout, as an underserved area within a zone of greater wealth.
5.2 Gentrification and tech-sector growth Participants in interview research expressed concerns over the future of communities faced with Ireland’s ongoing housing crisis. This was especially linked to rising house prices and the loss of integrity of multi-generational neighbourhoods. Frequently this was seen as connected to the increasing presence of multinational tech companies within Dublin’s inner city area. These communities are seen to be changing as a result of this, coupled with interest from developers. This is seen as being at odds with existing populations, with I6 (interview) stating that “[the area] has got out of the reach of ordinary, what I call... ordinary middle-class, working-class people. They can no longer afford to live in it, which with Google coming in and now Facebook”, and others echoing similar sentiments. When asked who new developments in the area were being designed and built for, I5 (interview) declared “young hipsters!”, although the ability of such a group to not only purchase homes, but to do so with the potential of maintaining a growing family was later questioned. Perhaps a more accurate accounting of the idea that a young, technified population is the intended demographic of new builds lies in the perceived development of accommodation for a population of transient workers. These sentiments are not ungrounded, when compared with the content of planning documents, which frequently invoked images of a young, technified population. The North Lotts and Grand Canal Dock Planning Scheme (DCC, 2014, p.19) frames this multiple times in their description of the existing community, with “over 1,500 persons from a population of 6,366...classified as
30
Image 5.1-5.3: Pillowcases attached by IGBHAG members to Poolbeg West SDZ perimeter fence bearing messages as part of a protest event. (Source: author, 2019)
31 professionals, indicating the strong economic functions of the area and the attraction of young professionals to live in the area”. The Docklands area is presented firstly as a zone defined by its contribution to the national economy.
“The strategic focus on economic development has been a key driver to date and has led to a critical mass of niche service sectors locating in the area. The concentration and clustering of this activity is of increasing importance to the Dublin region, to the national economy, and impacts significantly in a competitive global context” DCC, 2014, p.24
The Dublin City Development Plan 2016-2022 (DCC, 2016) paints a portrait in envisioning a city characterised by “innovation” and “creativity”. As observed by Kayanan et al (2018, p.62- 63) urban governance has subsumed the logic of start-up culture in order present a modern brand. The large multinational tech powerhouses based within the Docklands are seen as problematic, however, in that they are shaping the rental markets in the vicinity of the North- and South-East inner city. Yet they are also considered beneficial in that they are providing a boost to the economy. While respondents expressed concerns over the negative impacts that this was causing to existing communities they were also aware of this. One individual expressed a need for greater community intervention, citing the ability of multinational companies to skew rental prices via housing subsidies for staff members.
“it's putting up the rents around the area"...."they're able to subsidize, or give their workers some subsidy towards rent and then it's putting up the price of the rent around but then the government need to do something about it if it wants to attract in these companies into Ireland" I2
The government is therefore criticised for wanting to attract greater capital without providing homes for a growing workforce. These sentiments are echoed regarding the development of the Docklands and the construction of a new office block dubbed the Salesforce Tower, with residents distressed by the potential of an influx of a new population of tech workers (Finnan, 2019). These worries are in no way abetted by estimates of a doubling of the Docklands workforce by 2021, along with rental prices projected to increase and an under-supply of apartments (McNeive, 2019). Coupled with this is a desire to attract more international students, as stated in the Dublin City Development Plan 2016-2022:
“to promote Dublin as an international education centre/student city, as set out in national policy, and to support and encourage provision of necessary infrastructure such as colleges (including English language colleges) and high-quality, custom-built and professionally-managed student housing” DCC, 2016, p.98
The provision of this “high-quality, custom-built and professionally-managed student housing” is later represented as a “need”— yet one word that is notable in its absence is ‘affordable’. Ireland’s population of international students is thereby commodified, pushed towards expensive temporary housing in lieu of more economically viable options. Students are thus expected to pay a premium for accommodation, with a single room in a dormitory style residence priced around €1’000/month (Dublin Student Housing Report, 2017). Such developments are seen as profitable, being supplied with a constant flow of young, transient occupants, housed in gated enclaves detached from local communities.
Multiple respondents commented on the likelihood that communities would suffer a death if such trends continued. The accumulation of capital is considered as a driving force shaping the landscape of the inner-city and its communities. However, it was noticed that while respondents from both areas expressed concerns over the potential for the increased
32 gentrification of the area, there was a general acceptance that communities were not static, and that not all changes would be for the worse. A general openness towards immigrant communities was expressed by respondents, tempered with a level of caution regarding where such communities would find accommodation4.
“I wouldn't believe in segregating off communities because we have to live in the now and at the end of the day multicultural is what this city is becoming.” I4
Further, respondents were not inherently anti-development—rather development is considered to be part of the fabric of urban life. As one respondent stated, “you can’t stop progress” (I6, interview), yet progress occurs in ways that can either benefit or disenfranchise communities. In the case of Poolbeg West SDZ, community action in campaigning for the inclusion of social and affordable housing appears to be a form of mitigating the negative aspects of progress. In this case, it should be noted that public planning documents do recognise the importance of providing mixed-housing for the area.
“The population of the area is expanding and there is a need to engage young people and provide appropriate support for them. It is necessary to actively engage in social inclusion measures to strengthen the resilience and opportunities for more vulnerable members of society” DCC, 2017, p.15
The scheme notes that “a key local concern is the escalating cost of accommodation which is having an impact on those people who wish to reside longer term in the area” (ibid, p.9), and makes commitments to “facilitate agencies and organisations, particularly those engaged in employment and training initiatives in Poolbeg, to work together with a view to maximising employment, volunteer and training opportunities for residents of Poolbeg and the surrounding area” (ibid, p.23). Such considerations appear to be manifested in the landmark decision to mark 25% of the units built as social and affordable.
5.3 Community investment and loss of trust There was a prevailing sense among respondents that the inner-city communities had suffered as a result of gangland violence, the economic recession, developer greed and a lack of consistency from political figures. These communities were considered to have borne the brunt of these negative effects, and were thus deserving of some level of gain or investment. Ringsend and Irishtown residents specifically made reference to the construction of the Covanta incinerator in 2014, despite years of protest by groups such as the Combined Residents Against Incineration (O’Sullivan, 2000). Acceptance of such ‘bads’ are seen as the payment for the development of future ‘goods’, however they also serve as a warning to communities.
“Most groups at this length, I mean when you're dealing with planning, you're dealing at a three to five-year system and then you're dealing with ten years to get it built. They haven't...gotten worn out. And they're used to the feat because of the incinerator. They, you know, they know they can lose stuff” I3
4 There is the possibility that such responses might have been generated as a response to the researcher’s own positionality (i.e. mixed Irish heritage)
33 Feelings of betrayal were expressed, with long-suffering inner-city residents denied what has come to be viewed as due benefits. Regarding a meeting between the IGBHAG and former Minister for the Environment Simon Coveney, one member said:
“we met him at the site and we pointed out to him that there had to be something in it for the local community because this was a huge development in the area, it was going to change the whole area and he agreed with us that it would be have to be something in it” I6
Residents appear to manage a balance between accepting certain changes on the grounds that there is a beneficial trade-off to be expected. This is represented within documents, with certain efforts made to acknowledge such community investments, for example Dublin Port Company (DPC) make the concession of “granting access or use to local communities of the small areas of potentially surplus port lands that might be available at the margins of the Port estate” (DPC, 2018, p.56). In most cases this appears to be manifested as social and affordable housing, though the prospects of a developing job market and increased cash flow have also been invoked. For example the Poolbeg West Draft Planning Scheme (DCC, 2017, p.22) states:
“there may be opportunities for both employment of local residents and provision of training. This can greatly benefit the community. The council will facilitate agencies and organisation particularly those engaged in employment and training initiatives in Poolbeg, to work together with a view to maximising employment, volunteer and training opportunities for residents of Poolbeg and the surrounding area.” (p.22)
The focus of the Draft Scheme’s chapter dedicated to prospective Economy and Employment within Poolbeg West SDZ is the potential for increased office space servicing the needs of “key growth sectors”, i.e. Information and Communication Technology, Financial Services, Consumer and Business Services. It seems reasonable that locals may question the legitimacy of claims that this new development will provide employment, given the area’s historically working-class populace. The Draft Planning Scheme is also interesting in that it does not mention the closure of the Irish Glass Bottle Company in this section, rather invoking the “success” of the Docklands rejuvenation, as opposed to the site’s industrial past (although it does place emphasis on the importance of Dublin Port). How successful this project has been is likely a matter of perspective, however. The below guiding principle for the regeneration of the Docklands aims “[to] ensure that all proposals for residential development meet the obligations under Part V and Dublin City Council’s housing strategy”.
“The City Council will proactively seek the delivery of social housing units on site within the Docklands area, where appropriate having regard to the range of options for delivery of social housing available to applicants under Part V; the need to counteract undue segregation in housing between persons of different social backgrounds; whether the proposal would constitute the best use of resources to ensure an adequate supply of housing and the financial implications for the Council in its functions as a housing authority; as well as government policy on the provision of social housing” DCC, 2016, p.266
This is a promise which has not, in the strictest sense, been upheld, given the council’s recent strategies of removing social housing to more remote corners of the city due to the inflated premiums of the Docklands (Kelly, 2019; McNeive, 2019; Reddan, 2018, 2019a, 2019b). The council’s commitment to social inclusion and mixed-income communities has been traded in favour of the procurement of a larger number of housing in off-site areas. While more social housing within the city is always viewed as a positive thing, locating promised housing in different areas ensures the continued displacement of the working class from the inner city
34 area–in such cases where social housing does not immediately go to existing local residents on the list for assisted accommodation.
“They're telling the people of this area that they're no good enough to live in this area” I6
While Part V of the Planning and Development Act 2000 (ISB, 2019a) lays out guidelines for the provision of social and affordable housing, a 2015 amendment facilitated the rise of off- site development in areas deemed too expensive, such as the Docklands. An example of this can be seen in the recent removal of social housing from the Docklands flagship Capital Dock development to the Rialto area, located in the South-west inner city.
“The requirement that has happened under the capital docks has been the 25 units are being moved from that site to be put down in Rialto. Why? Because there is a cap in this area around the cost for what they can pay for social units is considered too expensive so they will get 25 units somewhere else"...."There's a benefit to the city as a whole but this then comes back to, and again remember people have lived here through 20 years of the Dublin Docklands Authority, which was, one of the premises was we are going to, you are going to have a difficult 10 to 20 years, but we will make it better. We will make it a better area, but we'll make it better area for your community as well” I3
In this way community investments are made, but benefits are granted to other areas of the city. Sentiments regarding the likelihood of planning being upheld was called into question on several occasions. Considering the lack of trust placed within the consultation process (as described in 5.1), this seems unsurprising, especially given the potential impact of changes to height restriction regulations introduced by Housing Minister Eoghan Murphy (Department of Housing, Planning and Local Government, 2018). By altering planning restrictions in an effort to attract higher-density developments in cities, this alternation to urban development guidelines has also facilitated the possibility of developers to force changes to approved SDZ masterplans.
“In some cases, statutory development plans have tended to set out overly restrictive maximum height limits in certain locations and crucially without the proper consideration of the wider planning potential of development sites and wider implications of not maximising those opportunities by displacing development that our wider society and economy needs to other locations that may not be best placed to accommodate it. “ (Department of Housing, Planning and Local Government, 2018, p.8)
Considering that SDZ consultation processes and masterplan development are intended to allow for fast-track planning under a set of approved criteria, this amendment has destabilised conditions within areas such as the Docklands where high-rise development is already considered as a negative by certain residents (Finnan, 2019). The alteration to height restrictions goes on to specifically targets SDZs:
“the preparation of development plans, local area plans and Strategic Development Zone (SDZ) Planning Schemes and their implementation in city, metropolitan and wider urban areas must therefore become more proactive and more flexible in securing compact urban growth through a combination of both facilitating increased densities and building heights” (ibid)
35 With the potential for new guidelines to supercede SDZ masterplanning, this runs the risk of further marginalising residents, as fast-track planning still works to ensure that decisions cannot be appealed to An Bord Pleanála (ABP) by the public. It undermines the values provided by DCC regarding the logic of SDZ planning, wherein “the SDZ as a fast-track planning mechanism provides an appropriate balance between investor certainty and community involvement” (DCC, 2016).
Interviewees indicated a level of mistrust towards politicians (section 5.1), with a strong preference for lobbying councillors, or engaging with local officials. Politicians are seen as fickle, focused on appearance and maintaining support, with promises described as “all spin” (I6, interview). Some respondents extended this sentiment of mistrust to planners and developers, with doubts cast on planners’ considerations of specific community needs. Developers were generally viewed as a group motivated by economic gains, desiring to “fit in as many places, apartments and houses as they [could]” (I2, interview). Developer interests were also regarded by some as taking preference over local people’s voices. Planners were also considered to be lacking in their consideration of the needs of communities, specifically in designing mixed-use spaces for multi-generational communities. I4 (interview) expressed a level of (self-described) “tribalism” in stating that “most of them weren't born in Dublin. They have no love for the city”. She went on to reflect on the impact of developing infrastructure without a redefined set of guiding criteria noting “It is about building a community. It's not just infrastructure. It's also community infrastructure".
5.4 Competing Identities Both official planning documents released by DCC and information gained from interviews with inner city residents illustrate a concern with the changing identity of the city. In the case of the strategies outlined in public documents, DCC appear to present a branded urban future upheld by various core values.
“The design and maintenance of an attractive and generous public realm is fundamental to city identity and fostering pride in citizenship. ‘Your City, Your Space’, Dublin City Council’s Public Realm Strategy recognises the critical role of public space in facilitating a rich public life” DCC, 2014
Such visions invariably present equitabiability in city-making, as captured by the slogan “Your City, Your Space” – clearly an invocation of Lefebvre’s ‘Right to the City’. Citizens’ rights to public participation and democratic urban planning are considered to be guiding principles, the importance of which is frequently made mention to throughout documents. All documents reviewed appeared to maintain core tenants built around principles relating to economy, environment and social development.
“The vision of the plan is to grow and sustain the city based on principles of equality, social justice and environmental sustainability where the needs of thriving, active and engaged local communities are served by a strong local economy” DCC, 2017
The Poolbeg Case is perhaps one in which social justice is more evident, as witnessed in DCC’s commitment to providing social and affordable housing. The site’s proximity to ‘environmental bads’ in the form of the Covanta incinerator, water treatment plant and heavy industries may work to take away from this achievement, however, with the provision of housing considered to be only what the Ringsend and Irishtown communities are due.
36 In some ways the very identities of communities have been commodified as part of DCC’s vision for the future of the city as elements lending Dublin its air of “vibrancy” and “creativity”. References to Ireland’s romantic past are frequently used to captivate tourists and investors, as observed in Fáilte Ireland’s (Ireland’s National Tourism Development Authority) successful “Wild Atlantic Way” campaign aimed at re-branding the West Coast as a tourist destination (Fáilte Ireland, 2019).
“Dublin’s built and natural heritage is the core determinant of the city’s character and is a unique cultural asset, invaluable for our collective memory and identity, to be enjoyed by all the communities of the city, all Irish people and visitors. The role of the city’s heritage in providing an authentic urban landscape is important for city marketing, investment and tourism and is acknowledged as a key social, cultural and economic asset for the development of the city” DCC, 2016, p.35
Cultural identities become a branded commodity, utilised to produce a desirable sense of place within the city. It is the vibrancy and spirit of these areas that one respondent pinpointed as one of the attractors for investors and developers.
“the international investors want the docklands-style developments...They want the lively nightlife to be able to sell their product, but they all want it on their own campus...But yet they want this lively wonderful city. But the two are conflicting" I3
The identities of communities have become part of the very reason why they are now being threatened with potential displacement. Creativity as a central value inherent to the city is espoused multiple times in documents, present even within the more economically minded Dublin Port Masterplan, which states “cultural and artistic initiatives remain a key element of [their] soft values strategy” (DCC, 2018, p.70). With even increasing rental prices within the inner city it is remains to be seen how Dublin’s artistic communities will be able to survive, however. One aspect of the Poolbeg West SDZ development which has been recognised is its commitment to the construction of “40 artist studios of varying size” (DCC, 2017, p.18). While this appears as a step in the right direction at a time when multiple creative venues are losing premises (Costello, 2019), how these studios will be managed and allocated remains to be seen.
Other branded identities which appeared throughout official documents included the “Age Friendly City” (DCC, 2017), with a commitment to “multi-use, fit-for-purpose community facilities which are suitable for all ages and all abilities”, as well as a commitment to social and environmental resilience, setting the lofty ambition of attaining “an established international reputation as one of Europe’s most sustainable, dynamic and resourceful city regions” – especially considering Ireland’s lacklustre performance regarding sustainability goals as Europe’s worst performer (CCPI, 2019). Such sentiments are also called into question by I4, citing the lack of facilities for older people, stating “they don't do old people well in this city”. The City Development Plan (DCC, 2016) states three perceived differentiators providing the city with a “competitive edge” in comparison to other capitals: its attraction for international talent, a sense of place marked by vibrancy and innovation and a connection to a world-class research system. The Docklands is perhaps the most defined by a fixation upon providing for a population defined by employment, with a landscape shaped by private development. DCC’s strategic plan for creating sustainable communities and neighbourhoods is defined by “partnerships with strategic stakeholders and the private sector to deliver social infrastructure” (2016, p.215). This approach, steeped in the logic of neoliberalism, has produced less than 1% of total build space dedicate to social infrastructure, in the form of premium gyms, crêches and medical centres (O’Brien, 2019), a figure which calls into question DCC’s claim that “the
37 regeneration of Docklands is about people, it is not just physical and economic aspects” (2016, p.266).
There is an apparent divide between the desire for an environmentally-conscious, socially equitable urban landscape on one hand, and a will to attract a growing workforce population from both home and abroad on the other. While the case might be made for both to occur without inhibiting the other, what is seen in DCC’s planning visions is a market-led approach to both social and environmental security, with the emphasis placed upon the creation of jobs and an upskilling of existing communities. This goal to provide education and training to the people of the inner city was a common thread among documents, hinting not only at a continued influx of high-earners, but also a conversion of the existing community fabric towards an idealised urbanity marked by gainful employment. Again, we find a fixation upon a technified, modern city, with “Innovation in all its dimensions [continuing] as the central driver of wealth creation, economic progress and prosperity in the coming decades” (DCC, 2016, p.89). It should be noted however, that the same consideration is given to those outside the realm of tech and finance, with “ensuring that a range of employment options and skills needs become available, creating opportunities for the local community” (DCC, 2017, p.20) recognised as a core challenge for the local community. There is clearly some level of nuance present in such considerations, although this does not appear to temper DCC’s preoccupation with economic growth.
Innovation appears sanctified across documents, deeply enmeshed in the presented vision of the city’s future, with even DPC claiming that “Dublin Port is a conduit for innovation and new ideas – the Port is a gateway for innovation and creativity” (DPC, 2018, p.51). In setting its sights upon a future inner city marked by a strong, ‘innovative’ economy, DCC creates an idealised ‘workforce’ citizenry engaged in service-based industry. Yet in reference to the Urban Regeneration and Housing Act 2015 it also makes clear that certain “anti-social behaviour” poses a similar threat to city development as “urban blight and decay” (DCC, 2016, p.31). This suggests that action (i.e. development) must be taken in order to protect the city and its residents.
6. Discussion
“We live in a world in which there are indeed many perspectives and values, but due to empirical limitations, we will never be able to adopt them all; however, when put together, they could constitute an harmonious and non-conflictual ensemble” Mouffe, 2013, p.3
In considering Chantal Mouffe’s vision of a pluralist democracy, marked by the acceptance of divergent world-views within the political, we are provided with an ideal with which to critique the hegemony of Habermasian conflict avoidance which characterises modern urban planning initiatives. This project set out to explore citizen participation within urban planning, and the ways in which development and revitalisation projects within Dublin’s inner city reflect the competing imaginaries of residents and the city council. The following chapter will situate the findings of chapter 5 within the theoretical framework of UPE, while drawing on Mouffe’s concept of agonism. An argument for the case of an emergent post-political condition will be made with reference to participation within urban planning and the impacts of Ireland’s growing tech and financial sectors as drivers of inner city gentrification. Given that strategies and motivations regarding participation are closely linked to the realisation of held imaginaries, research questions are touched upon across this chapter; however, channels of participation,
38 along with underlying perceptions motivating their selection, are more specifically addressed in section 6.1, with section 6.2 focusing upon the competing visions for the future of the city.
6.1 Finding the political: from consensus to agonism Arnstein’s Ladder of Participation (1969) categorises consultation as a form of citizen participation that, when occurring in isolation, may allow for citizens to be seen and heard, but one that ultimately does not guarantee that their voices will be truly listened to by those in power. As such, it falls within the ranks of tokenism. As seen in other accounts (Legacy, 2017; McAuliffe & Rogers, 2018; Monno & Khakee, 2012; Scott et al, 2012) of citizen engagement with public planning through official channels, consultation processes within Inner City Dublin appear to be approached cautiously. Interview participants appear to lack trust in the outcome of such endeavours, as was observed in comments such as: “there's public participation forums...but...they still want you to do what they want you to do“ (I1, interview) . This supports the idea that consultation forms a method through which legitimacy is achieved, upheld by those in power as a badge of honour– this might be witnessed in the many references to consultatory planning made by DCC throughout public documents. These exercises are not, however, considered to be totally without merit, with at least one interviewee maintaining that inclusion in such a consultation meant that they were recognised as “having something to say” (I1, interview), although often end results may already have been decided upon. While other respondents also indicated a mistrust towards government-led consultatory mechanisms, there was a sense that their existence was seen as a positive, or at least a movement in the right direction. Yet the outcome of this, as embodied in public planning documents, appears to be incorporated into an approach closer to consensus governance than agonism, as it was also noted that “there's public participation forums...but...they still want you to do what they want you to do“ (I1, interview).
Habermasian ideals in urban planning are applied in the pursuit of an un-antagonistic mode of decision-making through building consensus– this can promote the city as a homogenous entity, masking the needs of those less served by development. We see this, for example, in the City Development Plan (DCC, 2016), with references made throughout to a “shared vision”, “active citizenship” and of “harnessing the resources and capacities” of the community. Although espousing values such as social justice and equality are seen as positives in abstract, in this case it works to reduce the diversity of the city’s many varied communities under a single banner. Although Habermasian communicative action holds that power dynamics can be set aside in the discussion of social and environmental change, such an approach has been criticised (Purcell, 2009, p.150) as blind to the political realities of self- interest and inequality. This appears especially relevant in the case of the North Lotts and Grand Canal SDZ, in the wake of Housing Minister Eoghan Murphy’s updated guidelines on height restrictions (as discussed in 5.3). In this case SDZ planning was introduced as a holistic approach towards urban regeneration, and early-stage consultation was the means by which citizens might make themselves heard. With fast-track planning already limiting the scope for participation in the development of significant projects within the city, the minister’s decision to overrule the restrictions on building height has been seen as a betrayal (Finnan, 2019). In this sense, even decisions upheld as consensus-based are susceptible to be revoked in the face of pro-development interests, not dissimilar to the case of Smithfield’s regeneration under HARP as described by Attuyer (2015) and the limitations set upon citizen representatives. It therefore becomes vital for community groups to manage participation strategically.
Results in this case supported Scott et al’s (2012) findings that residents’ groups tactically employ a mixture of formal and informal participation in order to achieve their goals, as seen in I6’s (interview) recounting of IGBHAG’s rapid mobilisation of a protest demonstration in the wake of the receiver of the Poolbeg West SDZ site’s appeal regarding social and affordable
39 housing. Much like their findings suggest, participation in government-led consultation and civil demonstration are also augmented by direct engagement with local councillors, who take on clientelist roles regarding development. As described by interviewees, local councillors appear to be held in much higher regard than politicians higher up in the political hierarchy, likely due to existing community ties, coupled with a need to appease the desires of a smaller constituency. The management of tactical engagement observed in this study relates to that described by McAuliffe & Rogers’ (2018, p.223) modalities of antagonism, in the transition from antagonism to agonism. Members of the IGBHAG appear to make use of a form of strategic antagonism, itself considered a modality of agonism, by simultaneously managing both participation in consultation while displaying a willingness to take to the streets in civil demonstration. This indicates a strategic use of ‘playing the game’, without placing blind faith in consultatory processes. Yet residents were resolute on the fact that they were not ‘anti- development’, and so avoided being labelled as simple NIMBYs– in fact they appear to be pro-development, urging the government forward in the provision of housing. In this sense a pluralist recognition of differences is perhaps achieved, united by a shared goal of housing provision. An agonistic approach to engaging in the political might be seen in the alliance of multiple associations affiliated with The National Homeless and Housing Coalition, a conglomerate body organising demonstrations in protest of Ireland’s housing crisis. This coalition harks back to Mouffe’s (1993, p.70-71) “radical democratic citizens”, drawn together in constructing similar political identities. One member group which provides a certain counterpoint to the IGBHAG is Take Back the City (TBTC), themselves an umbrella organisation with multiple members (image 6.1).
Taking a strong activist approach, they engage in strategic illegality by occupying vacant properties, much like Roy’s (2017) Chicago housing ‘liberations’. The inclusion of multiple groups with varied adherence to antagonistic engagement within this coalition holds true to the “politically powerful moments or events of action” (McAuliffe & Rogers, 2018, p.226) described within resident groups in Sydney collectivised in an agonistic, pluralist assemblage. The activities of TBTC fall closer to a rigid antagonism, considered by Mouffe to hold the potential for violent confrontation, as witnessed in an explosive eviction of demonstrators from a property in Dublin’s North Frederick Street in September of 2018 (McDermott, 2018). This clash between occupiers and police was notable not only in that members of the Garda (Irish police force) public order unit concealed their faces, but also because of the presence of a privately hired company leading the eviction. The tension between police order, private partnership and civil movement in this case might be seen as synecdochic to the trends in housing experienced in the wider Dublin city area, as seen in interviewees’ questioning of the value afforded to citizens’ desires versus those of private developers and planners, for example “the [planners] who are drawing up these are living out in the nice leafy suburbs...I just don't think they do enough” (I4, interview). Perhaps a more egalitarian approach to planning for urban spaces is seen in IGBHAG’s collaboration with architects and students from Dublin Institute of Technology in order to produce a ‘New Concept in Urban Living’, a holistic approach to planning for the needs of existing communities.
This lack of trust has been earned through a deficit of community development which residents feel they have earned by suffering through multiple waves of regeneration. DCC appear to circumvent major discussion of the losses of these communities by invoking the necessity of urban rejuvenation for the good of all urban residents, embracing the tactics of populism by externalising enemies, i.e. urban blight, and promoting a vision of the future where ‘everyone’ benefits. This mass accounting of ‘goods’, however, works to mask the goals and desires of smaller groups. In the case of Poolbeg West SDZ it remains unclear whether this is a site of transformative political action, in that it is difficult to say with certainty that the existing power regime has been altered. Rather, given one interviewee’s reflection on the importance of the
40
Image 6.1: A masked TBTC protestor hangs a flag demanding “Homes For All” from an occupied house. (Source: Twitter [@TBTCDublin])
Ringsend/Irishtown support within their constituency (I3, interview) there is the potential that the level of political ‘clout’ afforded to them can be accredited to the preservation of the existing system. The decision to provide increased affordable housing is perhaps more closely related to ‘placation’ (an aspect of tokenism) within the framework of Arnstein’s (1969) ‘Ladder of Citizen Participation’, as decision-making power has not been redistributed. This observation is not intended to reduce the commitment and dedication displayed by the IGBHAG, but to draw attention to their positionality within the political landscape of Dublin. It remains to be seen whether this indicates a new trend in urban development, with the results of Poolbeg West SDZ replicated in other high profile inner city projects, or if this is an anomaly in a city on its way to becoming a new San Francisco.
6.2 Identity in the Post-Political City Although the sentiments expressed by respondents indicated acceptance that the fabric of inner city communities was bound to experience change over time, this did not prevent them from experiencing concern regarding the forces of gentrification. As discussed in section 5.2, the growth of Ireland’s tech sector is considered to play a major role in driving such changes, in alignment with the interests of private developers. Dublin is apparently pursuing a strategic modeling after the perceived successes of San Francisco, America’s hub of tech-based industry, going so far as to dub the Docklands with the moniker of the ‘Silicon Docks’. In doing so DCC may have had the opportunity to address the inequalities in San Francisco’s housing market (Opillard, 2016), yet the patterns of gentrification as embodied by the Bay Area appear to be reproduced within Dublin (albeit to a lesser extent). The developments of the North Lotts and Grand Canal Dock may draw some comparison to San Francisco’s partitioning of existing communities from gentrified tech enclaves, with the establishment of ‘Google buses’— privatised shuttle services carrying corporate employees between their homes and tech campuses—seen as synecdochic of city-level divisions by anti-eviction activists (ibid, p.11). Graham & Marvin (2001, as cited in MacLeod, 2011) make reference also to insulated corporate downtowns connected to affluent suburbs through privatised infrastructure networks, circumventing marginal areas in the process. While such transit networks serve as one method of partitioning communities through the spatialisation of gentrification, this might
41 also be perceived in a burgeoning divide between a young, technified workforce and excluded residents might also be perceived in the Docklands area, considering the demographic differences between the neighbourhood and the wider city. Dublin’s branded vision of becoming an innovation-fuelled smart city is a likely indicator of the post-political condition within urban governance.
Post-politics is expressed through a populist approach to governance, marked by an adherence to consensus, rather than agonism, or even antagonism. Dublin residents are apparently united in a shared desire for growth – both in terms of economy and housing. Such logic is difficult to argue with, given that Ireland is experiencing a housing crisis; as such housing must be provided as a universally accepted ‘good’, with those who challenge this goal marginalised. Communities must thus find ways in which to insert themselves within this: this is seen multiple times in interviews; for example, I1, I4 and I6 expressed sentiments that progress must happen, and make efforts to maintain positive relationships with councillors in order exert some level of lobbying ability. Enshrining development as commonsensical, however, can work to rid community actors of agency, with an example of this seen in the reaction to amendments to height restriction guidelines. The necessity for increasing density in this case was upheld by Housing Minister Murphy as the logical solution to meeting demand for housing, a sentiment strongly supported by developers (O'Faolain & Managh, 2019). In this way post-political rhetoric promotes the goals of neoliberalism within Ireland. In an attempt to establish some form of place marketing, Dublin makes use of slogans such as the ‘Age Friendly City’, the ‘sustainable’, ‘resilient’ city, and the ‘creative’, ‘innovative’ city (DCC, 2014, 2016, 2017;DPC, 2018). Paddison (2009, p.9) makes note of similar signifiers in the marketing of Glasgow as the ‘healthy city’, considering such language as post-political in its emptiness – in their bland inclusiveness they leave no room for dissensus. While an ‘Age Friendly City’ might be perceived as a positive in abstract, its ambiguity as a goal of development prohibits any true objection. Similar tactics are assumed in the identification of ‘issues’, such as the Housing Acts 2015’s targeting of “urban blight” and “anti-social behaviour” (ISB, 2019b). Much like objections to increased height restrictions, these are externalised from the common good, becoming obstacles in the way of development. This harks back to movements of urban revanchism and the production of ‘enemies within’, with social and infrastructural degeneration painted with the same brush as problems for revitalisation to solve.
From an ideological standpoint, such motivations for development are indicative of the post- political condition. City-building becomes a product of urban entrepreneurialism, with post- politics reducing the political to the economic (Wilson & Swyngedouw, 2015, p.8). The city becomes a business environment, embracing investment and promising a strong, supported market, with place identity commercialised by place marketing. Citizenship becomes a function of consumerism, with participation in housing development reduced to a ‘willingness to buy’ model (Monno & Khakee, 2012) and personhood defined by inclusion in the workforce, as indicated in DCC’s emphasis on the importance of attracting, and training, skilled professionals. This is evident in MacLeod’s (2002) revanchist Glasgow, with homeless populations banished from the revitalised downtown in order to cater to the production of an enticing shopping district. The needs of the public as consumers are perceived through concerns for safety due to the presence of beggars. Such individuals are thus positioned as the enemies of regeneration, and a threat to the ‘public good’. While DCC do not appear to pursue such zero-tolerance tactics in reclaiming the inner city, different strategies might be in place in efforts at sanitisation. Lawton (2018) notes the transformation of urban revanchism from a reclaiming of the city from “minorities, the working class, women, environmental legislation, gays and lesbians, [and] immigrants” as described by Smith (1996, p.43), to one that incorporates notions of equality and openness as a means of selectively drawing that which is positioned ‘outside’ into the mainstream. This also falls in line with Mouffe’s (1993, p.70) reflections on the potential for liberalism to extend the sphere of rights through redefining its boundaries rather than a true reconfiguration of rights. The Docklands SDZ notably has a much higher percentage of non-Irish residents in comparison to the city average (47% vs 20%)
42 (Kayanan, 2018), however, which itself presents an interesting setting. In this way the area appears as open, while concurrently suggesting an idea of a certain citizen being more welcome than others, i.e. young, educated professionals. In its evolution revanchism is theorised to become more than just the regulation of behaviour in public space, but also a revanchism of the domestic via the financialisation of public housing (Lawton, 2018, p.871- 872). Cooper & Paton (2017) argue the case of revanchism enacted by the state in austerity England, noting governmental policy changes as drivers of eviction. The state, coupled with market-forces, thus acts to reproduce and amplify inequalities, effectively freeing up space for more valuable tenants while also profiting from repossession based on partnerships with those involved in the industry of eviction (such as bailiffs, creditor companies, etc.) in a form of “accumulation by repossession” (ibid, p.146-147), rather than dispossession.
MacLeod (2002, p.617) argues that we must “acknowledge that ‘actually existing’ revanchist political economies will assume different forms in different contexts”, and thus require a certain “theoretical flexibility” in order to assess specific city mechanisms and structures. While the example provided by Dublin’s inner city does not bear the dystopian prospect invoked by MacLeod’s (2002) banishment of the homeless from Glasgow, or Cooper and Paton’s (2017) government produced evictions, DCC might be seen as leading with the carrot rather than the whip in the procurement of offset housing. By allowing developers to circumvent Part V policy regarding the provision of social housing units by relegating them from one neighbourhood to another—often farther removed—area, they are essentially engaging in the social engineering of the city, their own form of ‘banishment’ of those who do not suit the mould of capitalist value production, as echoed in I6’s (interview) claims that residents are being told “that they're not good enough to live in this area”. Considering the limitations imposed on political action by the logic of post-political governance, civic demonstration in this case becomes a necessary intervention, while simultaneously finding its efficacy reduced. Paddison notes that “the performance of resistance is itself an oxymoron to the post-political thesis” (2009, p.2), with protest existing outside of the manufactured consensus of populist managerialism.
The success of the IGBHAG to secure a minimum of social and affordable housing in the Poolbeg West SDZ case through the employment of various strategies, both formal and informal, should be considered within the context of other studies engaged in the performance of resistance in the face of public planning (Attuyer, 2015; Legacy, 2017; McAuliffe & Rogers, 2018; Scott et al, 2012). While this example illustrates the potential for transformative change in urban planning within the context of Dublin’s housing crisis and the large-scale redevelopment of the inner city, it forms a single event, and perhaps one made possible through the existing influence of the community, in comparison to areas that are even less well-served by DCC. Given its proximity to both environmental ‘bads’ (in the forms of the Covanta incinerator, water treatment plant and heavy industry) and ‘goods’ (being adjacent to multiple urban green spaces and coast), Poolbeg West SDZ is likely an easier concession to make than the premium residences of the North Lotts and Grand Canal SDZ. In making a case for Dublin as a site marked by the post-political, this study hopes to aid in the identification of such a condition as a means of limiting its scope. Although this case still presents a city marked by the interests of public-private partnerships and the will of developers, it is a step in the right direction. If it sets a precedent which can be replicated, it may lead to ways of achieving a more equitable power redistribution through effective citizen participation.
43 7. Conclusion
Dublin, as Ireland’s capital city and a European centre for tech and finance economies, is unlikely to break from its current trend towards increasing urbanism. This is apparent in the grand designs of the East Inner City, especially around the vicinity of the Docklands (i.e. the ‘Silicon Docks’), with development such as the flagship Capital Dock, Ireland’s tallest residential building, becoming increasingly common. Yet while this may signal an upwards trajectory for those engaged in such enterprises, it runs the risk of further marginalising the communities of the inner-city, who already feel like they have been underserved and unnoticed for too long. This thesis comes at a time when Ireland is experiencing a housing crisis, and so contributes to the discourse surrounding the redevelopment of the East Inner City through projects such as the NEIC Partnership, and the zoning of the Poolbeg West SDZ. It furthers a body of work on the theory of gentrification and urban revanchism, mostly in support of such writings, in situating Dublin as existing within a post-political condition. Specifically, the questions which this study set out to address aimed to: 1) identity channels of citizen participation, 2) explore the factors motivating selection and management of these channels, and 3) consider the ways in which future visions for the city as proposed by DCC may differ from those held by inner city residents.
Previous authors have considered strategies of participation within Dublin, but this thesis does so specifically in order to critique the tradition of Habermasian communicative action theory as post-political, by contrasting it with Mouffe’s agonism. Further, it aims to situate the case of Dublin specifically within a global revanchist framework as a force shaping cities through a selective inclusion (and exclusion) of a desirable urban future defined by capital. This was done by exploring the tactical use of protest and civil action alongside consultation in order to maximise the impact that certain groups have in the planning discourse. Groups displayed a strategic investment into building rapport with specific councillors and other local officials, with such relationships seen as more dependable than those with politicians higher up in the political hierarchy. Interview data suggests that this is motivated through an experienced loss of trust of residents towards national government, who, in alignment with the interests of private developers and capital accumulation, may actively be working against the will of certain communities. This outcome clearly supports results described by Scott et al (2012) in their study on Greater Dublin Area residents’ groups, as well as research presented by Legacy (2018) and McAuliffe and Rogers (2018), with interviewees revealing multiple channels which might be tactically employed.
By investigating the forces driving participation in the governance and planning of Dublin’s Inner City environments, there is the potential to gain insight into the competing imaginaries shaping the urban landscape. The perceptions provided by respondents regarding their experiences of participation within Irish governance will hopefully facilitate conversations around the efficacy of existing consultatory structures and their ability to account for the varied needs of communities in order to establish a sustainable urban future. The promotion of SDZ planning as an “appropriate mechanism to sustain the good work and significant achievements of Dublin Docklands in terms of...community engagement” (DCC, 2017, p.3) is called into question in light of changes to guidelines on height restriction superseding SDZ Masterplan commitments, yet retaining the benefits to developers of fast-track planning. This decision is considered to be exemplary of a tokenistic approach to participation, with Docklands residents now facing the potential of increasingly high-rise development, with no avenue with which to voice dissent via ABP’s appeal process. Despite DCC’s claims to the contrary, the sentiments revealed in interview data regarding state-mediated public engagement indicate a system which may in fact work to reduce urban participation in the political via absent presence (Paddison, 2009) and managerialism. As such, the use of SDZ planning is considered as a mechanism indicative of a post-political condition within Dublin.
44 By engaging with interview participants it was possible to unravel imaginaries held regarding a desire for a city characterised by equality, where intergenerational communities might continue to exist within the boundaries of the Inner City. Data gathered from policy documents alternatively provided a vision of the future marked by a commitment to mining innovation as a major source of economic growth by fostering a populace defined by their inclusion in a technified workforce. While there are references made to the ideals of social inclusion and equality, this somewhat utopian vision presented lacks recognition of the realities of urban residents who are not captured within its boundaries. The perspectives of interview respondents account for a different view of Dublin, one that the impacts of DCC’s focus on innovative industry might ultimately undermine. In this sense the post-political condition is considered to exist within the marketing of Dublin as a ‘creative’ city, intent on monetising aspects of cultural identity in the process of drawing FDI and foreign talent. Although these two imaginaries hold the potential for incompatibility, they are not necessarily inherently at odds, with interviewees indicating a need for development, especially in the provision of housing. The predicament we are faced with lies thus in reconfiguring existing power dynamics in order to ensure that development, when it happens, is undertaken in more equitable forms.
Image 7.1: A tweet by Minister for Housing Eoghan Murphy. (Source: twitter.com [@MurphyEoghan])
Considering the hazard civic movement poses to regimes of post-political governance, hope remains for public participation beyond consultation in the form of demonstration by the people. These performances of resistance may indicate, as stated by I2 (interview), “an Ireland more educated”, more willing to make its voice heard. To consider events taking place during the writing of this thesis, this might be seen in a recent trade union-led protest demanding action on housing reform be undertaken by the government (McMahon, 2019). In a response to criticisms of the state’s management of the housing crisis, Minister Murphy (2019) published an article maintaining a commitment to public housing provision by the government, dismissing claims that the existing approach is market-led. It is interesting to note that only two days after the publishing of this article Minister Murphy went on to proclaim the benefits of high density ‘co-living’ dormitory-style apartments for young workers as a means of ensuring choice in the rental market (image 7.1). Such claims were met with criticism in the media (Kelly, 2019b; Mullally, 2019), with comparisons drawn to “21st century bedsits” by Threshold, a housing charity. Despite claims that the co-living model will provide timely, high-density housing for those entering the job market (and are willing to make sacrifices), it is difficult not to consider this as a continued promotion of urban life as defined by inclusion into a transient workforce. This consideration of providing younger generations of workers with “choice” echoes back to the observation of ‘willingness to buy’ as a form of participation in market-led housing strategies (Monno and Khakee, 2012). Once again citizenship is defined by economic concerns such as ‘consumership’ and ‘productivity’.
45
One aspect of the urban planning process within Ireland which has not been fully addressed by this project is the role of An Bord Pleanála (ABP), itself an actor pursuing an agenda regarding development. Given its role as arbiter of the planning appeals process, further research regarding Dublin as a site of a post-political condition must examine the motivations of this statutory body in deciding upon the efficacy or certain claims. To draw attention to another event within the current news cycle, the potential for ABP’s interests to shape the urban environment have recently been questioned due to the rejection of an appeal by a well- known city centre pub and venue, The Bernard Shaw, to continue operation of a mixed-use outdoor area. Despite the planning inspector assigned by ABP to the case stating that “the existing use on the site is clearly a vibrant enterprise with its own unique character within an area notable for the extent of dereliction” (Maxwell, 2019, p.10), complaints by local residents on the grounds of noise pollution resulted in permission for continued use of the site being denied, with an ABP board member condemning current usage as “likely to delay or undermine the comprehensive regeneration of the subject site and adjoining lands, and...inconsistent with the emerging pattern of development in the vicinity” (McGarry, 2019, p.2), as outlined by the Dublin City Development Plan 2016-2022 (DCC, 2016). This has sparked an online petition in order to contest what is seen as an attack on the cultural landscape of Dublin at a time when multiple venues associated with the city’s nightlife have been demolished in favour of constructing hotels and temporary accommodation (Murray, 2019). ABP acts, in a way, as one of the battlegrounds upon which competing imaginaries of the city are manifested – a battleground with its own agency and goals.
This thesis holds that there is a need for a new phase of urban governance within Dublin, one which draws citizens into the political through agonism, transforming ‘enemies’ into ‘adversaries’ engaged in co-production of the city. Walker (2006) makes reference to Bebbington (2003) in regard to ‘theorising up’ as a means of building better theory, with a criticism of political ecology’s focus on individual cases. While there exist certain contextualities with Dublin’s tradition of urban planning, there is also the need to consider how the experiences described fit within the post-political condition as experienced within other urban centres. In this sense, Inner City Dublin forms a part of the mosaic of ‘planetary revanchism’, as described by Smith (2009, cited in Lawton, 2018). The challenge this study poses, therefore, is in identifying the ways true agonism might be achieved in praxis in order to reconstitute the political and reclaim the city.
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