FABRICATING ISRAELI
HISTORY
'New The Historians'
Karsh Efraim
Professor of Studies Mediterranean the at
of University London
CASS FRANK CO. & LTD
PORTLAND, LONDON OR
The Collusion that 3 Never Was
exist
history The
facts of do for historian not any
till he them. creates
CARL BECKER
One myths of the propagated by central the 'new
historio-
graphy'
explicit that 'in
is 1947
reached agreement an
was
between the Hashernites and the Zionists the carving
up on
following Palestine of the of termination the mandate, British
that and this laid the foundation for agreement mutual
during restraint continuing for 1948 and collaboration in the
aftermath According
myth, of alleged war'. this the to
agree-
reached meeting in
November ment 17
1947 secret
was
a on
between Acting the Head the Agency's Jewish of Political
Department, Golda King Meir, Abdullah and Transjordan,
of
'consciously
deliberately and
and frustrate intended
to
was
the will the
of international community, through expressed
as
the Assembly, United Nations General favour of creating in
independent Arab States Palestine'. of in 'The part an
ground
for
objection the mutual
agreement common
was a
a the Palestinian creation of state', myth. the 'The to
runs
Jewish Agency particular in abhorred possibility, such a
asserting that the of Palestinian creation would state
a
ideological the conflict perpetuate Palestine'2 in
forcefully by Most Shlaim's articulated Avi Collusion Across
Shlaim, Collusion,
1.
p.
Shlaim, of Partition, 2 Politics The
viii.
p.
PappG Making 3 The of Arab-Israeli Conflict, the 118. p.
Fabricating
History 70 Israeli The Collusion that Never Was 71
Jordan, myth the this
predicated
is
single the which episode
renders Shlaim's
collusion hollow. thesis There on
cannot
approach,
namely,
the allegedly identification
of half be
critical
there Either
there agreement.
is
is The an
an
one
or
none.
supposedly which has
affected history the
event of of
in
both personal the
agreement, and the at essence
course at an
profound
particular
this
in levels, collective understanding the
of the
is way binds that
a all involved
case n course
a
partids
Israeli-Palestinian conflict,
if of the Arab-Israeli
form in conflict.
by another not and
considered
is them
one
or
as
ostensibly dealing While
such, 30-yearolong
with the the if of record legal has
agreement full received yet not
even
intermittent
Transjordan's
formalization. between Whether King formal explicit covert
informal, contacts
tacit,
or
or
Abdullah the and
Zionist Shlaim's always written unwritten, book binding effec-
is movement, the
agreement in or
an
tively
focuses
period short the makers;
of minds between the otherwise its the would been have it
reached to on not
run-up
1947-49 place. the War first and specifically immediate its in aftermath.
More
clinching lea•g he alleged the of the But
'collusion' aside contradiction,
this traces the careful Meir- examination to
a
Abdullah of the conversation. documents by Shlaim used substantiate
two the
very to
abridged paperback
published claim of'collusion' In by Eliyahu edition Danin Ezra reports and Sasson,
two an
years
later, Shlaim alleged down watered officials Zionist the of the who attended the easily meeting Zionist- two will
nature
understanding Hashemite explicit that 'a reveal Meir's
clear Abdullah's and
if
territorial ambitions to to not response neces-
binding sarily
bypassing far less
the Palestinians committal
agreement.., Shlaim than believe. lets and Moreover was on us
peacefully dividing
territory the
Meir's of verbal the
British mandate the
conversation, which report Shlaim
own
on
between bring
fails themselves'. the also He despite removed pejorative his 'collu- book in his keen to
of its
awareness
though from title, the sion'
insisting book's (he existence alleged that the the of cites this which part does report
not
'did involve address least agreement the of
elements
the November meeting), proves-beyond at
1947 some asso-
a
published ciated with
collusion'.4
shadow
article In
of Shlaim
1995, doubt in that Palestine divided
17 not an
was
on
alleged watered down the the of November deal still further 1947. nature
to
'unwritten agreement',
while
praising least, 'a but Last it reasonable the Agency Jewish which with not Abdullah an
as
allegedly
and realistic for both
expressed he strategy sidesL struck Yet
the deal the 'division of regret Palestine'
on
was
changing
paperback
totally for the
of title the edition. 'Collusion the of
existence of is such for deal months unaware any
good
alleged after word
describe the
traffic its conclusion: between the
did to authorize to'divide it Meir
as any not a as
king
Hashemite during Palestine' Zionist and the period the King, with the Hashemite and did movement it
not approve
'forgetting' 1921-51', stated, he postfactum. unequivocally such his thesis that fact, action Meir's In with any conversation
alleged
Abdullah traced the collusion the bythe Abdullah-Meir discussed meeting,
Agency Jewish Executiv• to
was never
If and
the Meir
dear 'a explicit reached Hashemite-Zionist intermittent and necessarily binding if not to
contacts not as a
whole, King with bypassing Abdullah agreement
the Palestinians
on
peacefully dividing and Needless
the of territory notion that 'not the of the agreement is British to
mandate say,
an
binding' necessarily between
themselves
contradiction which constitutes bypassed she '•- in did also she terms not- a
her
movement. own
of Shlaim, The Partition, Politics 4 xdii, 99.
pp.
•
Shlaira, Shlaim, 'The Debate', The of 296, 5 Partition, Politics 298-9. 99. pp. p.
The Collusion that Never Was 87
that would
state include both banks of
the Jordan, with
me
head, its and at which in army the
the
the and economy,
legislature joint'. be will
Noticing
the by evoked this suggestion, unease
Abdullah that stressed the Hebrew Republic
would
be dominated by Transjordan not but simply
would
be
of Transjordanian the part
monarchy. He did
not
for
but simply explained press
that
the an answer in
of such republic being
formed, event
kingdom
his
a
THE ABDULLAH-MEIR
MEETING:
could be expanded
embrace Greater Syria to and
THE
DANIN-SASSON
REPORTS
Saudi Arabia. even
established Having
these Mrs. methodological Meir drew fact flaws attention two
the Shlaim's
that in to the Palestine
thesis,
let
the
question
Zionist under two
the of consideration meeting by
the accounts
used UN and that at
her was
Shlaim-
the hoping side for of Ezra reports Eliyahu Danin
and resolution
Sasson- that speak
would establish was
a two
for
themselves.
FirstDanin's
states,
Jewish
and
by Arab,
report, narrated Shlaim: and they that one wished as one to
speak
king only the
to
about
based
agreement
such
an In the
the
of on ensuing a
Abdullah
conversation
course
resolution.
Abdullah
he
said understood
that and
it
invited his join visitors
thinking him to
in
they
aloud:
would be
desirable
immediately again to
meet after
the
had discussed partition
the
in
he and past
inter-
was
UN
pronounced
decision
its
in order
discuss
how
to ested know
what
their to
thinking
current
they
was
might
light
the
in of co-operate
that
decision.
'Over
thirty
the
past
have
and
years
you grown
this At
point Abdullah
asked how
the
Jews
would
regard
strengthened
yourselves
and
achievements
your
are by
attempt
him
capture
the Arab to
of
an
Palestine? part
many" [he
said].
"It
impossible
is
ignore
and to
you,
Mrs. replied Meir
they
that
would
view
such
attempt
duty
it is
an compromise
with to Between
a
the Arabs
you.
favourable
in
light,
especially
if
he
did
interfere
a
not
with
and
there
quarrel. is
The quarrel
you between
is
no
the establishment
of
their
and
avoided state
clash
between
the
Arabs a and the brought
British who
here;
and
you
forces
his
and theirs and,
secondly,
if
he
could
declare
that
between
the and
British kept who have
their you
not
his sole
maintain law to purpose
and order
until
the was
promises
Now,
I
to
convinced that the
you. British
am
UN
could establish
that in government
was
Now
it
a
leaving,
area.
and
be will left
face
face. Any
are
clash to
we
king's
the
be
turn startled to
and
he sharply: answered
'But
between
will
be
disadvantage.
to
the In
us
our
own
I
this for
myself,
want
in
order
it area
to
to
annex
my
talked
past about partition.
I
partition
that we to
agree
kingdom
and
do
not
to want Arab
create State
which
a
new
will shame before
not the
Arab
world
when
I me out
come would
plansand
upset
the enable
Arabs
my ride
to
defend
on
My
me.
it. to
wish
is
take this opportunity
to
suggest to
I ride,
want be to
ridden!"
not
He to
also brushed
aside
for idea, a the future thoughL to
of
independent
you
an suggestion
that
he might
objective
his by
of
secure
Hebrew Republic
means of
in
part
Palestine Transjordan within
referendum a influence in which his a would be decisive.
Fabricating
88
History Israeli
The Collusion that Never Was 89
principles
of
possible
Hashemite-Jewish
understanding,
a
Asked
if
he Abdullah] [i.e.,
would be
prepared
designed
to
not
reach
to one as
concrete Hence
agreement.
a
a
sign
written
the in
agreement of
his
event avoiding
of
pressing a
common for
preferred his
to an
answer
denominator being
identified political,
in
economic option;
hence
concluding his
remarks
that
concrete
no
and defence
replied he
affirmatively matters
and.
issues
could be
discussed after until the
UN
General
asked them
[i.e.,
his Jewish
interlocutors]
produce Assembly
to
had
made
decision. its
bringing
draft.
In
the meeting a
end he
to
an
re-
iterated
that discussions
concrete
only could
take
In Abdullah's thinking,
partition
'that
will
shame
not
place
me
after
the
UN
had
made decision its
that and
before the
Arab world' 'an independent
meant
Hebrew
they
again
must
meet the
decision
Republic
soon as Palestine in of
as
part Transjordan within was State that
a
known.
•
would
include both
banks of the Jordan
with its
at
me
head'.
This
basis the
his of acquiescence
the
in partition was
Sasson's
by
Shlaim,
cited report,
reads
follows:
as
plan
as
of the Peel Commission 1937 in the and thrust
his of
his Zionist interlocutors,
to
message both
before
and
the in
[Abdullah]
will allow
his
forces
collide
not
with
to
us
wake the of Second
World
War.
And
this
idle talk;
was no other with co-operate forces
against nor Belittled
us.
Abdullah
truly
believed
that
Jewish autonomous
military
an
[of] Arab
States. Believed power would
not
province would
greatly
benefit kingdom,
his
mainly
dare break
Palestine. into
In he
will
decide
[to]
case
through
the influx of Jewish
funds technological
and
invade Palestine
will
[on]
Arab
concentrate
areas
knOw-how.
his
As
Prime
Minister, al-Rifai, Samir
told
with
view bloodshed,
keep
to prevent
law
and a
Brigadier
Clayton I.N.
of the British Middle
East Office
order, forestall
Mufti.
Prepared
.[to]
with co-operate
(BMEO)
Cairo in
11 December 'the enlarged 1947:
on [in] this
Believe
position matter Mufti
weakened. us
Transjordan
State
with
the
of
Jewish
support
Not be expected
economy head to
of
Arab provisional
govern-
would
become
the influential
State
most
the in
Arab
with [of] ment
Arab support world. Abdullah ready
Middle East'P
[to] sign
written
with
provided agreement
us
we
It only
realizing
that this
solution
upon was totally
[to]
assist attach was
Arab
Transjordan. agree
part
to
unacceptable
the
Jews that to Abdullah
opted
for the lesser
Replied
prepared
[to] give
assistance
within we
every
choice
incorporating
of
the
Arab Mandatory of
[of] frame
Charter. areas UN
Agreed
after
25th this
of
meet
Palestine
kingdom. his into even
But
then
he did
view
not month
after
UN decision.
•7
the borders by never
the United set
Nations
final and
as
of trying tired
the Jews convince to either
give
him
to
Between
them
the
some following
the two reports
points:
prove
of
the territory
awarded by them
the
UN to
to or
even
forego
the
idea
independent of
State,
the
last
such
an
by As
stated Abdullah
the
•
the
at outset,
conversation
was
being
attempt
made his in
meeting second
with
Golda
joint in'thinking
exercise
aloud'
about seen the general
as a
Meir
May
11 1948, days three before the establishment on
Shlaim, 26 Collusion, 112-13, (emphasis added). 115 pp.
Ibid.,
27
115-16.
pp.
Clayton 28
Foreign
Office, to December 1.2 telegram 1947, 67, FO 371/62226/El1928.
Fabricating History 90 Israeli The Collusion that Never Was 91
subsequent
of the State of by and Abdullah's Israel invasion the that would its establish the Arab in
supremacy
Arab States. Mandatory Palestine, of both Palesti- of the parts in
its
eyes
population large, legi- world and the nian and would at
Contrary
claim, Shlaim's prepared timize Abdullah his claim rule this distance But the this
from to to not
to
was area.
writing' 'commit approval himself Mandatory position of Abdullah's division of the in of this annexation to to
Palestine kingdom by himself between Jews. territory his and the shown As indeed. is great 29 to
very
by above, Shlaim!s Abdullah Jewish representative asked words other his the In the
it
not text
at
own was was
Jewish political sign meeting interlocutors rights, by defended who the division Palestinian agreement
to
on an
ephemerality of Transjordanian insisting Palestine but either of rather the the of the
in agreement seizure
on an
political,
spheres Mandatory 'in of defence the of the Arab faci- of Palestine economic
parts
event to or
means a as a
being legitimate identified' denominator there; the establishment of these litate
of in
government any
common a
political madness, would have It been sheer if annexing Arab who insisted and the leader the it
matters. not
was on
kingdom for writing committed himself suicide Abdullah have his 'create State rather than Arab in
to
to a area new
plans Mandatory the division of Palestine between himself which would enable the and Arabs ride upset to to my
Jews. and the me'. on
shape importantly, form did Golda
Most Meir in
conclusion
Jewish Shlaim's that'in November the
1947 Hence way,
no or
'green light'
give Abdullah
the Arab of part
reaching explicit to Agency if
succeeded clear and in
a annex
not
a
Mandatory kingdom.
Quite
his Palestine the in
necessarily binding King to with Abdullah
agreement
reverse
on
possible by While quiescent fact. his but in bypassing capture dividing peacefully the Palestinians and the no
"especially of this if he did
annexation!
territory not of British themselves the mandate between both is
area, '3° means
of their avoided interfere with the establishment and misleading: state and
wrong
crystal theirs', dash between his forces and she made it
a
speak
only a) clear that she wished about
agreement
to
an
by First, Shlaim's Abdullah shown
it
account,
own as was
b)
Resolution; based the the
imminent UN Partition
on bypass sought
and who the Palestinians Meir and
not to
Transjordan's
Palestine 'was sole of
intervention in
purpose
all, Jews, territory. their The after about seize be
to
were
law and order until the could establish
UN
maintain to
granted Mandatory by of Palestine the
their United
part
namely,
area', that short-lived law-
in government
a a
had less weeks within than and need
Nations
two to
no
facilitating enforcement of operation the establishment
aimed
at
posse•s
territory this from who did
receive
party
not
a
legitimate
little doubt that Palestinian There government.
is
wanted a place. they the first All
it in
to avert
was an
preferred
Abdullah the head the Zionist
to at
movement
see key neighbour
with this and
coexist
to
unnecessary war
Palestinian of this rather than the
extremist
government
peacefully Mandatory
of with whoever ruled that part
al-Husseini, Hajj leader, the Mufti he Amin
as was com-
or Palestine.
suggestion monly
known; referendum hence Meir's for a
of Partition, Politics Shlaim, Shlaim, 30 99. The Collusion, 29 116. p. p.
Fabricating 92 History Israeli
The Collusion that Never Was 93
Second,
above,
noted after the Meir
had UN passed
resolution, her its as and
that said
consent
gave never
we
the
of to annexation the Arab
Transjordan again immediately part afterwards', but must to meet u
insisted
solution
with concomitant the UN Partition on a
Resolution.
In Danin's words: 'We explained that
our
being
discussed
matter the UN, hoped
that
that at was OVERLOOKED THE DOCUMENT:,
we
would it
be decided
there
MEIR'S establish
to two states,
VERBAL
REPORT
one
Jewish
One and Arab,
that and speak
wished
to
we
now
about how But did
him herself [i.e., with Meir interpret Abdullah] understanding agreement
based her these
with
an
on
resolutions'. Abdullah?
She
In presented Sasson's 'Replied 31 official words:
prepared her [to]
report
no
on we conver-
give the JAE sation [the] assistance the within the of time to the] frame which [of at indicates every that event, UN
Charter'.
she deemed that
32 it contained that
agreement concrete
no
be needed discussed approved and by highest to this decision-
making
Third,
the of institution Jewish Agency the
Zionist only could
It reaching succeed six movement. in
not
was
later, months May 1948,
a
12 with
Abdullah verbal in agreement the the division
Provi- report of Palestine to an
on
on
sional State simple Council the for her
meeting
second
officially that did with Abdullah it
seek
such reason not on
an
(held
the day) previous
and did she which in agreement failed
earlier, it. noted As
convince not Meir's on to approve
him
meeting join
the Abdullah with
imminent attack Arab the Jewish not to by State,
discussed
JAE, the was never on
that
Meir therefore and her she
of the authorized November
strike 1947 account gave not
to own was concrete
a
meeting:
deal with
Abdullah. She Chairperson the
of the not
was
JAE merely but acting head of the Political Department,
'standing
do
I know
whether
for all in Moshe here not Sharett present conducting who
the
are aware
was
diplomatic that
several struggle months days about for before partition the the
UN's ten
temporary ago, at
headquarters Resolution, UN meeting King
with Lake Abdullah in took Su.ccess'2 this In capacity
she could
a
place
with the participation
do little
than Sasson, of
try part Abdullah violently convince
to
more on notto our
Danin, myself. and impending The meeting
the
Transjordan, UN in Partition Resolution
oppose
and
was to
though
Jewish
territory, acquaint him
that
he the gist thinking is of from Zionist to
-which
on is came
Amman conducted precisely The meeting
what
she to did. the
see us. was
on
basis there that
and under- arrangement
was an
an
standing
what both
of Finally, wanted
that to and
both Danin's and Sasson's as us unequi- reports
our
state
interests did collide.
vocally not
that decisions
during reached concrete the no
were
meeting. Danin: the In words of 'At the [Abdullah] he end
For
told
then him
that part
could
that reiterated our only not we could be discussed concrete
we
matters
help promise his incursion the [i.e., to into
country
Mandatory Palestine],
obliged be would since
to we
Dan.in, 31 Ezra "Siha Abdullah, hn (Conversation 17.1.47'
Abd•llah), CZA, with
$25/4004.
Sasson
Shertok,
32
November 20 CZA, 1947, to
$25/1699. Danin,
'Siha 34 Abdullah'. Im
Shlaim, Collusitm, 33 110. p.
Fabricating
94 History Israeli
Collusion The that Never Was 95
observe the
UN Resolution
which,
already
hension,
thought and as that
we
due in
we
course we
reckoned the time,
provide
would for at the
estab-
discuss would
the 3s matter.
lishment
of Palestine. in We two could states
not
therefore
give said
active
the support to so clearly we
As is
from evident
Mandatory Meir's
account,
violation of this
resolution.
If
he prepared
and
Palestine
was divided
November in not
There 1947.
was
was
willing
confront
the
world to
and fait
with
mutual recognition of the
us lack enthusiasm
of a
either side
on
accompli-the
friendship tradition of
between
would
military
for confrontation
and of us the
of existence
certain
a
continue
and
certainly would
find
of we interests. But definitive common a
the convergence agreement
no on
language
settling
those
that
of
matters
future
of on Palestine reached.
To the were contrary, Meir
was
as
saw
both interest
parties.
to
it,. Abdullah made that
understand decision the to
was
on
whether confront afait by the with world accompli annexing to
then
He promised
friendship that his
towards
Arab the of kingdom
exdusively Palestine us his parts his, us to
was
still
and existed there that could be confrontation
and that he Jewish could
for such
expect no support
no
a move.
between spoke
He
his friends
and
other the
This gist by us. also borne is
Sasson's on
and Danin's on out reports:
[Arab] especially
and Mufti;
the states
he
dis- 'Replied prepared [to]
give [the] on
assistance within
every we
strength
the missed
neighbouring
the of other the] [of frame Charter';
states replied UN 'Mrs. they that Meir would
agreed
and
with
that if
by
attacked
Arabs
such light
view favourable us in we were attempt
if he could declare
an a
without saying it
that
had respond.
went
to his that
sole
law we order until and maintain the to purpose was
UN could establish that area.' in
government
a
The meeting
conducted amicably
with-
and narrates Shlaim was very relating the of Meir's her part
report
to
During the out arguments. he conversation any
Abdullah; meeting second significantly enough, with he
yet,
by said,
if passing, things
that
raised
two
fails as
point mention critical namely its his for some
to most
case,
suspicion,
apprehension.
But the meeting
ended
Meir's
of her November general,
1947
on conversation in account
understanding
the
that
would again
after the
meet
help and her
refusal
we solution that
non-concomitant to
a
was
Resolution.
things UN
The
that
suspicion
raised two the particular. with UN Resolution
because Is in this would it
the pulled were: have from his absurd under that claim the rug
seeking Zionist subvert the
UN movement
to
was very
a) He know
thought
wanted
what
about to
Resolution which
assiduously bring trying we it
about?
to
was so
possible
the
inclusion Jewish
of (the the
State Shlaim's
abstention using from Meir's his excIu- and
report
'Jewish
Republic'
he it) called within
the
Trans-
reliance sive
as though Danin's and Sasson's accounts, not
on
jordanian Kingdom;
overlooking
without their points, critical all the is
most more
incomprehensible
particular
this in
after since it
Meir
case was
b) hoped
He
have
partition that
would
to
allegedly all
who not
'green light'
Abdullah a the the
to gave
annex
disgrace [in him Arabs]. front of the
Meir's Golda
verbal the
report Council's Provisional State
meeting May of
12 1948. at
Ha-am, May April Protokolim, Minhelet (Provisional 18 Protocols,
Council, State 1948 13
things raised, already
These
noted,
two appre-
as
our
April May 1948) 18 (Jerusalem: 13 Archives, Israel 1978), State vol. I, 40. p.
History Fabricating Israeli 96
kingdom. if Even his Mandatory Palestine of Arab to parts
meeting November 1947 of her Meir's Shlaim deems account
introduce obligation still unreliable, is his minimum be to
to
discounting for explain
it. his and
readers his it to to
reasons
Meirys particular that suspect
then there But is to reason
no
'government' less is in Yishuv's the given account, to camera,
only Shlaim Indeed, does her advisers. that of than reliable not
alsolauds authenticity he but of Meir's report question the
not
unflattering unsympathetic about and
'nowhere
it as as
her later in she the Abdullah's behaviour wrote account
as
meeting May of her 1948
Meir's memoirs'.•6 If
account was so
November relating the surely the fair-minded, then part to
the attended who reliable. Danin conversation less 1947 is
no
preferred Shlaim certainly believed meeting Yet not to so.
bring his book. it in
'REVISIONIST' HAT1 FEATHERS OLD
surprisingly, reply Shlaim's of Meir's Not distortion
to
been unanimously by fellow 'new has endorsed Abdullah his
doing Original Benny historians'. research Morris, without
any
subject, warmly that the Yishuv the endorsed the thesis on
early conspired 'had and the Hashemites from 1948 1946 to
impending bud', nip partition the the resolution UN in 5s to
(emphasis Ibid., added). 53 December 1948, 18 885
p.
Ibid., January 1949, 54 927. 4 p.
After, and Morris, 55 1948 10. p.
Fabricating
104
History Israeli The Collusion that Never Was 105
'forgetting' totally
February that
head until the of Political Department 1947 Britain the
of the Jewish Agency,
was
Mandatory
for King Power Palestine; and that until Abdullah. UNSCOP's majority
this
meeting At Abdullah
pre-
recommendation published partition
sented
August
vision 31
1947,
of
Palestine
which in Jewish on
was new a on
a
solution by republic this
in foregone vein
conclusion; integrated would
be
a newly-formed
into was means
no a
a
Hashe/hite that until Assembly the General kingdom passed the Partition Reso- consisting Transjordan of
lution
November 29 1947,
there and Palestine absolute
[as
certainty shown
earlier,
this
on
'a
no was
not
was
new
that UNSCOP's recommendation adopted but by vision' would be rather -long-standing Abdullah's the solution
United
Nations; that, and all, above the Palestine this problem Partition Resolution to E.K].
When,
not
sur-
what
the
prisingly, Zionist this consistently had
been rejected by hand of movement was the other out
was
fighting
for. side,
Abdullah
asked, for Jewish
the
to consent
Papp6 his For Ilan Transjordan further part, annexation than Shlaim in the UN-defined mis- of to
goes Arab
representing the States. record. Shlaim this brings While To the Jewish least Agency Danin's at
representative did
and Sasson's give
her
(though less
their entirety reports king's in for in the assent, promise return
more or
not
keeping
Papp6 Meir's attack report), the Jewish
makes to State the
mention in away
of
own event no
war
a
breaking
of significant
the reply, namely objec- Meir's in her part most •7 out.
tion with agreement the to non-concomitant Partition UN
any
That Resolution,
'new the ephemerality and her historians'
insistence the have of Trans- distorted
reply Meir's
on
to
occupation
jordan's Abdullah scarcely the surprising; of is Arab Palestine interesting
until the in the parts point
that is
'old historians' legal establishment
preceded of have doing Papp6
there. them
As government in put example, it: For
a
so.
while citing Meir's
insistence
ephemerality the of
the
on
November King In Transjordanian 1947, Abdullah the head of seizure the of met Palestine, Arab of
parts Aharon
Department Political the Jewish of the Agency,
Klieman Golda
has
been
captive
misconception the of
Shlaim
same
as
Meyerson (Meir),
independent offered and Jews Papp6. the 'Thus', and
he study his
in Hashemite-Zionist of
wrote an
republic
Jewish
of monarchy Hashemite published
relations
part
before Shlaim's book, two as a
'an
years
Transjordan
covering ex-mandatory
and Palestine. authorized
representative [Jewish] the of Agency
and Ben-
on
When rejected, this
he
asked Jewish
for the Gurion's behalf
clear
explicit and was rather gave agreement
a
Agency's
annexing his the
the territories to consent Hashemite leader's
to
occupation of '•rab part" the
of
allotted Arabs plan. the the partition
UN in The to Western Palestine
according
the partition principle, to
on
Agency Jewish
representative
her in condition that he consent would
obstruct gave the establishment not
of the
king's for
the promise the future attack Jewish return State'. not to •
Jewish
State. s• According Morris, 'Shlaim's description to Yishuv-
of the
Hashemite relations
including down 1951,
the
premise to
of
that For
November meeting
in
took
1947
Israeli-Jordanian purpose tacit
during a 1948' by agreement been has
place Meyerson between (Meir), Golda acting the
PappG Making
of 57 The theArab-Israeli Conflict, Papp6, Arab-•r•raeli Conflict, 56 Ilan 119.
Britah• and the (London: Macmillan, 1988), 1948-51
p.
K]ieman,
58 Kium, Du 129-30. 10. pp. p.
Fabricating
History
106
Israeli
The Collusion that Never Was 107
large
accepted by and Abdullah historiographic 'the Israeli meeting,
with its influential leaders,
most David
commu-
nity'29
The of the by truth Ben-Gurion shown
Klieman's and above Sharett, matter,
disposed Moshe
former the as option. to
citation, least, following that Shlaim Not is who is it has been
foot- these the
in careful historians have
overlooked
even
more
historiographic
of "the Meir's Israeli steps community'
rather
of than focusing the meeting,
account instead own Danin's
on
the other round. report. •°
way
Interestingly
enough,
quintessential'Zionist' Klieman, brings This the in
back
turn
the
conclusion
that
to this
us
on
historian, particular further historical
Shlaim than censuring 'new; the episode in both 'old' goes and
even Israeli
Hashemite-Jewish historians 'connection'. have While Shlaim this unquest•oningly views
been recycling
old and
an
familiar
'reasonable
myth, connection realistic and
whose both for broad strategy
already delineated
as a
contours
were
politically
Klieman imprudent sides' deems 30
it while ignoring but avoids the only the
first-hand years
ago, of the account
high pious
ground by
moral taken provides involved. Shlaim. This
Shlaim being is 'new' person in not
even
wrong.
proof, further such if needed, all that difference the at were
nothing 'old' between 'new' and historians has do with
to
facts, necessarily
and with their
to not access new even
interpretation: for this 'old' 'new' both in historians and
case
(mis)interpreted have specific precisely episode historical in a
the
way. same
who
True, there been have of handful historians have a
highlighted the Meir's of restrictive nature to
response
they Abdullah. But fail recognize a) that decisions of •1 to
even
magnitude such be single made the of in
cannot course
con- a
b) versation; that Meir authorized decision make
not to
was a
kind; of this c) that the that bound Zionist agreement no
conceivably could reached be authori- without the movement
JAE of the d) which zation given; the Jewish that
was never
Agency
showed of the of
such
existence
any awareness no
that and distrust of Zionist Abdullah agreement remained
long for unabated after the meeting; Meir-Abdullah time
a
e) Jewish and that the Agency between remained undecided
independent the options Palestinian
State Trans- two j-an or
jordan's of well after the annexation We Pale Meir- stine stern
After, Morris, 39r 1948 and 59 p.
preceded who have 60 For other scholars historians' the 'new the of issue
on
Chapter1 relations Hashemite-Zionist fn.19.
see
of Sinister:Jewish-Transjordanian See, example, TheAlliance for
Gelber,
Relations, 61 Yoav Bars
forthcomJ.ng); (London: Strugglefor Sovereig•ty: Pundik, Cass, The 1921-1948 Frank Ron
Jordan, Relations between (Oxford: Blackwell, Great Britain and 1994). 1946-1951