64- 12,797
ALDRIDGE, Frederick Stokes, 1916- ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION OF THE MILITIA SYSTEM OF'COLONIAL VIRGINIA.
The American University, Ph.D.,, 1964 History, modern
University Microfilms, Inc., Ann Arbor, Michigan
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Copyright by
Fredcriok Stokes Aldridge
1965
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION
OF THE MILITIA SYSTEM OF COLONIAL VIRGINIA
by
Frederick Stokes Aldridge
Submitted to the
Faculty of the Graduate School
of The American University
in Partial Fulfillment of
the Requirements for the Degree
of
Doctor of Philosophy
in
History
Signatures of Committee:
. Chairman:
Graduate Dean:-y/^^y
, C -
Di
April 1964 -neiT A^CRiCAlM uNlVtRSll "■ The American University LIBRARY Washington, D. C. JUL311964 WASHINGTON. D. f
% 0 cl£
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. PREFACE
The information for this paper was
gathered largely from the material held by the
Research Library of Colonial Williamsburg and the
Sargeant Room Collection of the Norfolk Public
Library. I am highly appreciative of the co
operation of the Director of Research of Colonial
Williamsburg, Dr. Edward M. Riley, and his
assistant, Mr. John Selby, who established the
need for work* on the militia and who provided
ready access to the material in the Research
Library. For several years Dr. Arthur A. Ekirch
has been a source of guidance and encouragement
to me, and it was he who originally suggested that I
investigate the Virginia militia as a subject for
study.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER PAGE
I. INTRODUCTION ...... 1
Problem...... 1
Statement of the Problem ...... 1
Importance of the Subject...... 1
Review of Sources...... 3
British Organization for Colonial Affairs. . 10
British Militia Tradition...... 13
II. MILITARY SYSTEMS IN THE SOUTHERN COLONIES. . . 2 3
Militia of Neighboring Colonies...... 23
South Carolina ...... 23
North Carolina ...... 24
Maryland ...... 25
Concepts of Defense...... 27
Defense under the Virginia Comnany ...... 30
The Beginnings of the Militia...... 35
III. SEVENTEENTH CENTURY MILITIA...... 41
Organization for Defense until 1646...... 41
Service in the Militia ...... '...... 48
Liability for Service...... 48
Enforcement of Militia Regulations .... 52
The Costs of War . . ‘...... 53
Para-Militia Organization...... 56
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CHAPTER . PAGE
Militia under the Commonwealth...... 5 8
Bacon’s Rebellion...... 6 3
/' Militia Organization, 1660-1676 ...... 63
The Rebellion ...... 7 0
Culmination of the Seventeenth Century Militia 7 8
New Forms for D e f e n s e ...... 7 8 A The Intercontinental Threat ...... 8 3
The Century Summarized...... 8 7
IV. THE FIRST HALF OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY. . . 100
The Militia under Nicholson ...... 100
Governor Spotswood...... 106
The Era of Good Feeling ...... Ill
The Militia and S l a v e r y ...... 115
Exemptions from Militia Duty...... 122
Virginia Forces Outside the Colony. 124
The Readiness of the Militia, circa 1750. . 130
.. V. PERIOD OF THE FRENCH AND INDIAN W A R ...... 13 3
Dinwiddie and the Militia ...... 13 3
The Militia System— 17 5 5 ...... 147
Wartime Efforts to Improve the Militia. . . 153
The Post War Militia...... 18 2
VI. DEVELOPMENTS IN THE ORGANIZATION AND
ADMINISTRATION OF THE M I L I T I A ...... 19 0
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CHAPTER PAGE
Organization 19 0
Administration ...... 199
Military Justice ...... 200
Medical and R e l i g i o n ...... 204
Impressment.....207
L o g i s t i c s ...... , , 210
Financing the Militia...... 214
Compliance with Acts and Orders...... 217
Military Cooperation between Colonies...... 224
VII. CONCLUSION...... 229
Factors Affecting Effectiveness of the Militia . 230
Concept of Defense ...... 230
The Internal Security of the M i l i t i a ...... 231
Class Structure...... 233
The Effectiveness of the Virginia Militia. . . . 238
BIBLIOGRAPHY ...... 247
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
I. PROBLEM
Statement of the Problem. This paper will as its
major objective trace the organizational structure and
administration of the Virginia militia during the colonial
period until 177 5. The study will also seek to determine
the effect of certain factors on the efficiency of the
militia — factors sudh as the social structure of the
colonies, the concept of defense, and the mission of.the
militia to provide for internal security. Conclusions will
be sought on whether the Virginia Militia was organized and
administered to accomplish its mission - the defense of the
colony against its enemies.
Importance of the Subject. Traditionally the United fofl s States /subscribed to the concept of the "citizen in arms,"
who in time of national emergency would defend the nation.
Only before World War II was a system of conscription adopted
before war actually began. During most of our national
history it was assumed that a small standing army would
be augmented in time of war by larger forces of "volunteers",
national guard, militia,, or the like, to carry the major
burden.
This study will.not seek to evaluate what has been
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. right or wrong with this national approach, but, rather,
will study our colonial history when the "militia solution"
was developing. In fact, the militia tradition goes back
even further, to the British organizations of the Anglo-
Saxon period. The English colonists brought tradition and
ideas on organization to the new world and these were little
diluted in Virginia's formative years by large influxes of
other nationalities and particularized religious views—
a uniqueness ^further protected by geography.
The Virginia colonial militia is thus a relatively
pure example of the militia tradition and organization that
has remained a factor in our national life. A study of
the Virginia militia system is essentially that of its
organization and administration. This paper will confine
itself to these areas and will not attempt a discussion of
the tactics of the militia nor of its organization on the
battlefield. Detailed information on the colonial militia
has been gathered in the specific field of equipment and drill,
inasmuch as Colonial Williamsburg has had need for this
information in reconstructing the details of life in the
Virginia colonial capital. Information on organization and
administration of the militia is available in the laws and
other records of the period, but has not been gathered in one
place with vthe object of tracing its development. Philip
Bruce in his organizational history of Virginia discussed
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. problems of defense during the seventeenth ceijtury, but his
treatment was not in terms of the development of the militia
during the entire colonial period.
This paper will draw its information primarily from
the basic laws of the Colony, Acts of Assembly as supple
mented by decisions and orders •of the governor and Council.
Reaction to the militia system can be determined by review
of the material written at the time, particularly letters.
Following a discussion of sources, the paper will review the
English government, particularly as^it applied to the New
World, and its militia system. The militia systems of
Virginia’s neighbors and the Colony’s system of defense
under the Virginia Company will then be described. For
the body of the paper a chronological approach generally
will be pursued in portraying the organization and adminis-
tracion of the militia from Virginia's beginning as a royal
colony until 1775. The study will summarize major aspects
of the militia, such as organization of units and military
justice ,and conclusions will be sought on the combat
efficiency of the militia.
II. REVIEW OF SOURCES '
Finding aids are led by E. G. Swem's Virginia Historical
Index, a guide to the material in Hening's Statutes, and five
other sources, the most productive of these others being the
Virginia Magazine of History and Biography. The guide to
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. British held sources is Charles M. Andrews’ Guide to the
Materials for American History to 1783 in the Public Record
Office of Great Britain. Andrews’ work is valuable as its
indexing system is followed in part for transcripts and
microfilms of the British material held in the United
States. The Selected Bibliography of Virginia, 1607-1699,
by Swem and John Jennings is also useful. Lester
Cappon and Stella Duff's Virginia Gazette Index is essential
to a review of the Gazette, printed as it was by several
firms.
The records at colony level are excellent, although
there are gaps. British records, particularly those of
the Colonial Office, supplement those in the United States.
Documents held by the Virginia State Library, Richmond,
include both state papers and county records. Kcllwaine
has edited the official state papers and the following
volumes are in major libraries: Journals of the House of
Burgesses of Virginia, 1619-1776; Minutes of the Council
and General Court of Colonial Virginia, 1622-1632 i 1670-1676;
Executive Journals of the Council of Colonial’ Virginia,
1680-175U; Legislative Journals of the Council of Colonial
Virginia, 1680-177*1. These are not complete in themselves
as some of the state papers are elsewhere or were lost.
Fire destroyed in 17 81 much of the material in the State Library
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. for the period of the French and Indian War, i.e., the
journals and minutes of the Council for the period 1743
to 1768 are missing. A fire in the State Court Building
in 1865 also destroyed the minutes of the Council and
General Court, except for a total of approximately a
score of years. Missing elements of these records have
have been discovered, however. Selected documents of
the Draper Manuscripts are reproduced in Mcllwaine’s
Journals of the House of Burgesses, 1758-1761, and the
Virginia Magazine of History and Biography has periodically
printed documents not held by the Virginia State Library.
The Calendar of State Papers, edited by W. P. Palmer, covers
the period 1652-1781, but the documents included are only
quoted in part. W. W. Hening's Statutes at Large contain
laws, instructions, orders, charters, regulations, et al
for the entire period, except for the early years, and
is an outstanding source.
An entirely different type of source is the micro
film library of the documents held by various British
depositaries. The project is underway to place on
microfilm documents related to Virginia history that are
in the British Public Record Office, the British Museum et al.
Copies of this microfilm are held by both the Virginia
State Library in Richmond and the Colonial Williamsburg
Research Library. On microfilm are letters, copies of orders
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. issued, and acts of Assembly that Were sent to England;
conversely, there are copies of letters, or abstracts
from them, and orders sent to the New World. The correspon- .
dence is primarily between the governor and the agency in
England that provided guidance to the Crown's representatives
in Virginia. The method of detailed indexing varies between
Richmond and Williamsburg, but the use of Andrew's "BCP Class"
and "S.R." (Survey Report) numbers permits satisfactory cross
use of both libraries. The Library of Congress holds
transcripts of many volumes of Class 5 and a few volumes
of Classes 323 and 324 of material in the British Public Record
Office.
Other collections include Arthur Vollmer's volume
in the series published by the United States Selective
Service System, which includes many of the acts, or. parts
of acts, on the militia and places them in one volume.
Peter Force's Tracts contain papers on the founding and
development of the colonies for the entire period of this
study.
For the earliest period Susan Kingsbury's third and
fourth volumes of The Records of the Virginia Company of
London, 1619-1626, contain some material on early defenses
of the colony. Alexander Brown's Genesis of America contains
original documents on early America that are not found
elsewhere.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. The period of Charles I and the Commonwealth is less
well documented and Hening provides the best source. The
Sainsbury Papers, contain abstracts and transcripts of
many of the documents relating to Virginia held by the
British Public Record Office.
For the Restoration there are the collection of
letters of Berkeley, Chicheley and others held by the
British Public Record Office and on microfilm in Williams
burg and Richmond. The period has more material than did
the Commonwealth and includes Thomas Mathews’ narrative of
Bacon's Insurrection and the Report of the Commissioners,
both being found in Andrews' Narratives of the Insurrections.
County grievances are contained in Volumes I and II of the
Virginia Magazine and in the papers of the Colonial Office,
Class 1/37, Hening and Mcllwaine continue to be valuable
through this and the following periods.
For the militia the first half of the eighteenth
century was a period of relative inactivity. For the second
decade of the century the Letters of Alexander Spotswood pro
vide information similiar to that provided by the Dinwiddie
Papers for the period of the French and Indian Wars. The
Writings of George Washington (Fitzpatrick) are immensely
useful in conjunction with the Dinwiddie correspondence.
Supplementing all the sources noted above, in addition to the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Virginia Magazine, are the William and Mary Quarterly
Historical Magazine, Tyler’s Quarterly Historical and
Geneological. Magazine, and for the latter part of the
period of this study, the Virginia Gazette,
There is a great gap in the records of Virginia
caused by the burning of the records in 1865 held in the
General Courthouse in Richmond. Included in the loss were
the records of the Court of Appeals and those of a
number of county courthouses which-had been stored there
for safekeeping. There remains, nevertheless, a great
quantity of material in the county records, some of which
are complete. Such county records as are available are held
by the Virginia State Library, either as originals, as
transcripts, or on microfilm of the originals to be
found in the county courthouses. Copies of this microfilm
are held by the Colonial Williamsburg Research Library. The
county records are primarily coverage of wills,land titles
and court orders and are overwhelmingly of local interest,
concerned as they are with everyday legal matters relating
to the ownership of land, and the registering of vital
statistics.
The most valuable county records for this subject
are in the form of court orders. The records give general
indications of local conditions and details on individuals,
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. including the appointment of militia officers. Typical
of other information provided, and it was most voluminous
near the frontier, were claims allowed for patrolling, for
furnishing provisions to rangers and for guarding arms
and ammunition sent to the county. Court orders and
minutes tended to confirm the information gathered else
where as to the spirit by which the county complied with
laws and'orders of the Colony, the composition of colonial
society and the early importance of the militia leaders.
Beverly Fleet and L. 0. Duvall have compiled abstracts of
records from county records, of which the York County
records are more complete than most. None, however,
possess fundamental value for this work.
Of the older general histories, Beverley was most
useful. Philip Bruce has published a great deal in the
field of Virginia history, and his institutional histories
are both excellent, although confined to the seventeenth
century. Most recent of the Virginia histories is
Richard Morton’s Colonial Virginia. The majority of
colonial histories, of course, do not confine themselves
to Virginia, but cover all the colonies with a resultant
reduction of the scope of material on Virginia. From the
viewpoint of the student of Virginia history, Doyle's
work suffers from this broad approach as does Craven's
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 10 excellent The Southern Colonies in the Seventeenth Century.
Osgood has written perhaps the best of the general colonial
histories, providing an Empire viewpoint as well as a
colonial one. His two series encompass both the seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries. There are also a large number
of volumes devoted to a special period, such as Washburn's
The Governor and the Rebel and Wertenbaker's Torchbearer
of the Revolution for the period of Bacon's Rebellion.
Many local histories cover either a single county or a
geographical area-Kegley's Virginia Frontier, in this latter
category, provided some information. Useful county
histories were Waddell's Annals of Augusta County, Virginia,
Boddie's Seventeenth Century Isle of Wight County, Virginia,
and Carolina County by Campbell. Thwaite's Documentary
History of Dunmore; s War, 177M-, is confined generally to the
frontier and to the short span of c?n Indian campaign.
In sum, there is adequate material to develop success
fully a project of this nature.
III. BRITISH ORGANIZATION FOR COLONIAL AFFAIRS.
The militia system being a function of government, it
is valuable to review first the framework of government in
England insofar as it directly affected Virginia during
the period of the study. The political organization of
Virginia itself will be described, as required, with each
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phase of the study.
In 1606 the king granted a charter to the Virginia
Company of London, establishing in England a Council for
the Company. This Council was in turn to appoint a
second Council which was to reside in Virginia and
administer the colony in accordance with the laws bf
England and instructions from the king. Until 1624 this Lon
don Company directed the colony, trying various expedients
for the local management in Virginia. After that date,
when the Company was dissolved, control of the colony was
made more directly a function of the royal government with
a governor appointed by the Crown. Prior to 164 2 the Privy
Council was the primary British governmental body concerned
with the colonial affairs. If other committees or
commissions became involved it was as subordinates to or
as boards of inquiry for the Privy Council.^ Initially
only the. executive function was performed, until, as the
period progressed, the Council became high court of-
appeal for the Colony and also reviewed the Acts of Assembly.
During the period of Commonwealth, Parliament provided
■^Herbert Osgood, The' American Colonies in the Seventeenth Century (New York: Macmillan and Company, 1907T”Vol. Ill, p. 15.
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limited actual supervision over the colonies, although the
governmental mechanisms established were elaborate. With
the Restoration of 1660 the colonies were considered as
part of the realm and a factor in imperial greatness.
More interest was taken, therefore, in the colonies, and
a "comprehensive and symmetrical system regulating colonial 2 trade" was developed. In 1675 a new standing committee of
the Privy Council was established, the Committee for Trade
and Plantations (Lords of Trade), who were made responsible
for colonial matters. At the end of the century, in 1696,
a separcite board for colonial affairs was appointed. The
Board of Trade,, as the body is often termed, conducted
correspondence with the colonies, but it appears that the
basic decisions on colonial affairs were often made within
other elements of the royal government,having a more
specific interest,i_.e. the Treasury. Virginia was, of
course, but one of the outlying areas under the cognizance
of this body and under the control of king.and Parliament.
,From the viewpoint of the English authorities there was
nothing remarkable about the colonies and little difference
'from.the counties in the British Isles, other than distance
from London. Osgood makes the point that "throughout the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, a very large part
^George L. Beer, The Old Colonial System, 1660-1754 (.Gloucester: Peter Smith, 1958) Vol. 1,. p"» 224.
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of colonial business was done by the men who at the same 3 time were administering the affairs of the realm."
Thus the efficiency of the government in England with
relation to actions taken on colonial matters varied quite
widely, depending on where in the bureaucracy the matter
was administered.
IV. BRITISH MILITIA TRADITION
The Virginia militia system was, of course, greatly
influenced by the local situation in Virginia, i_.e. the threat
of war and the personality of the principals residing in the
colony. Basic, however, to the manner in which the colonial
militia was organized and administered were the traditions
and the precedents derived from the English militia.
Alfred the Great reorganized the militia system of England
to form the basis of al,l succeeding Anglo-Saxon systems.
Prior to Alfred all free landowners from sixteen to sixty had
been required to serve two months a year. Under the Great
King a militia, or "fyrd", was provided for by first dividing
the county into military districts. Each landowner
holding six hundred acres was made responsible for pro
viding and -supporting an armed man for the king's service.
The landowner, himself, if he possessed "five hides" of
3 Osgood, o£. cit., III, p.- 20.
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land, was also subject to service under his king. The owner
ship of land thus carried with it the responsibility or
privilege to bear arms for defense of .the state. During
the Anglo-Saxon period the sheriff was responsible for the
procurement and training of the militia of his shire, or
military district.
With Canute an additional body appeared, the personal
bodyguard.^ Under the Normans a major concept was
introduced with the primary obligation for military service
being based on the feudal relationship of "knight-service."
The division of England into ’'knights' fees" held within it
seeds of conflict not contained in the earlier fyrd systems,
and the value of the older "militia" was soon recognized by
the Norman kings, who retained the fyrd after superimposing fi the feudal system upon England. The fyrd, however, proved
of limited value to the Normans who put their primary
trust in the feudal system. An organization of feudal retainers
had the advantage of being jnore readily deployed overseas than
did the fyrd which was oriented to defense of nation.
Under Henry II the fyrd had a renaissance when the
Assize of Arms created in 1181 a national militia which
4J. W. Fortescue, A History of the British Army (London: Macmillan and Company, 1'9HT) 1, p. 5.
5Ibid.
6Ibid., pp. 7-8.
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was a return to the concept of the fyrd. The Assize was
legislation stipulating that all freemen should arm them
selves according to their ability to furnish equipment— the
act specifying the assessment by economic group. Since the
fyrd was to be for the service of the king alone, this act wa.
the instrument for creating a. national force that would 7 remain faithful to the king. The militia was based upon
the land as a whole, and was placed under leadership
of the sheriffs, functionaries who had already proven 0 to be loyal to their sovereign. This system was
selected by Henry over the feudal levee with its tendency
to follow loyalties other than national or royal, and
over a mercenary army that would be costly and could
be uncertain in its loyalty.
Edward I refined the Assize of Arms by the Statute
of Winchester C1285). This act specified that arms and
equipment were to be assessed according to wealth upon
all males between the ages of fifteen and sixty. To
insure compliance ‘with the statutetwo .constables were
to be chosen from each hundred to report on the equipment
7William Stubbs, The Constitutional History of England (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 168(0’, I. , pp. 587-588. 0 Ibid., p. 634; Fortescue, ££. cit., I, p. 12.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 16
of the individual. The constables made their report to
the king’s justices, and ultimately a report of ’’readiness"
was made to the king. The local commanders of the
fyrd remained the sheriff, in spite of the provision for 9 constables. The mission of the fyrd was not only to
defend the nation but also to keep the peace locally.^
This latter provision is antecedent to colonial laws in
America that were also to make some militia dual purpose
organizations with both external and internal security
missions.
The efficient militia of England, armed with the
longbow, was the planned weapon for Edward Ill's war
in France. He selected "by Commissions of Array addressed
to each shire, a picked host to wage war oversea." For
this purpose he resorted at first to conscription rein
forced by volunteers. But as the French war continued
"the Commissions of Array and the principle of compulsion
were abandoned in f a v o r ‘'of the system of hiring'private
companies'of professional warriors.
During the reign of Henry IV this concept was
reaffirmed as statute limited the king when he sought to
g Stubbs, 0 £. cit., I, p. 491.
10Ibid., p. 661.
^ G . M. Trevelyan, History of England, Anchor Books (New York: Doubleday and Company, 19^3) Vol. I, pp. 301-302.
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create a force that he could employ beyond the borders
of England. The solution adopted consisted of having
a loyal subject raise a force for such use as the king
might deem necessary, both home and abroad. This
individual, with the title of "commissioner of array,"
gradually absorbed the martial functions of the sheriff.
Eventually the new functionary, as "lord lieutenant"
of the county, had complete control of the militia, and 12 the sheriff was concerned merely with law enforcement.
The changing concept was formalized by a statute in 1557
which also permitted impressment of the militia into the
army with the resulting liability for overseas service.
This is noteworthy as ultimate control of the militia was
removed from civil authority and placed in the hands
of military representatives of the sovereign.
The local lieutenant had a staff, although not
in quite the modern sense of the term. His deputies—
and there were usually a minimum of two— among other
functions, mustered the able.men of the shire, selected
the soldiers for the trained bands, appointed the "captains 13 of the bands," and conducted the musters of the militia.
12 Fortescue, o£. cit., I, p. 124. 13 Edward P. Cheyney, A History of England from the Defeat of the Armada to the Heath o~r Elizabeth (New York: Peter Smith, 1§4&) II, pp. 366-367.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. "Muster Masters," and "provost marshals", as time went on,
conducted more and more of the technical part of the duties.
The provost marshal was not primarily concerned with
training but with keeping the peace when soldiers or
pretended soldiers roamed the countryside after a campaign.
The office of the lord lieutenant grew in power
when the counties were merged into military districts
during the reign of Elizabeth. The military district
was drawn to include more area than had the county system t in order to take strategic advantage of terrain. The cost
of supporting its militia was borne by the military
district through taxes on property for this purpose, and
only when local militia le'ft its parent district was 15 the cost a Crown responsibility. In 1595 England was
divided into seventeen military districts.
Until the time of the Stuarts the principle that
the King could control the militia was not seriously
challenged. When' Charles I attempted, however, to use
the militia overseas against Ireland, Parliament passed
a statute prohibiting the king from sending the militia
units beyond the borders of their parent counties.
1^Ibid.,. p. 367.
15Ibid., pp. 374-377.
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The king accepted this, but in the following year,
1642, a more limiting bill was passed that Charles could not
sign. The "Militia Ordinance,” passed without the king’s
approval, permitted Parliament to nominate lords
lieutenant and gave that body sole control of the army . 16 when it was deployed overseas.
With the Restoration the principles of the Statute
erf Winchester were reestablished. Acts of 1661 and. 1662
did permit "substitution” for militia duty, although
the duty of every man to defend his country was reaffirmed.
Substitutes for service could be provided at the rate of
providing a horseman, horse, and armor for each five
hundred pounds of annual income and a footsoldier,
properly armed, for each fifty pounds of income.
Near the end of the seventeenth century the king
appointed the lords lieutenant who could select their I7 deputies with the approval of the king. The king had
sole power over the militia as a whole, but the force
could not be sent outside the borders of England. The
only occasion for the muster of the militia other than the
IS Fortescue, ££. cit. , I, p. 199. 17 C. W. C. Oman, Article in Social England,-H . D. Traill and J. C. Mann (London: Cassell and Company, 1902), III, pp. 620-622.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 20
annual muster, was to be rebellion, insurrection, or
invasion, and in these events the militia was to be paid
wages. The lords lieutenant were responsible for drilling
and training the militia. For this purpose they had the
right to divide the militia, which was organized by
county, into such companies as considered necessary.
These companies were to be drilled but four times a year
and were not paid for this duty.
The British militia system,.both organization and
functioning, was more than a tradition; it remained a
constant influence. This overview of the English militia
is significant to a study of Virginia militia in that
the British experience contains problems and solutions * 18 similiar to those of colonial Virginia. The militia
of the separate colonies were to vary, of course, and the
colonial militia in general was to differ from the British.
prototype. Perhaps the greatest difference was that a viable
militia, as such, did not exist in England during’the.
Colonial period. -War in Europe did not require bodies of
militia, but needed instead professionals who could project
royal power within or well beyond national boundaries. The
] 8 Philip A. Bruce, Institutional History of Virginia in the Seventeenth Century (Mew York: G” Putnam's Sons, m UT7 TTT'pT ST87------
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. private men were, in the case of England, usually the
dregs of society, or hirelings from Hesse or Switzerland.
The officers were usually aristocrat's to whom the not too 19 dangerous war of the age was a way of life.
There was, however, pride in profession and organization,
allegiance to popular commanders, and rewards for victory,
all augmented by rigid discipline. Wars were planned,
fought as planned, and bloodshed was not excessive, with the ■
rules of war being scrupulously followed. The average
citizen was largely untouched by the play of war as there
was no desire to exterminate peoples. This was the type
of military situation England prepared for. This was not
the colonial problem, however - this being essentially the
defense of home against a ruthless enemy. The requirement
for defense in the colonies was thus closer to that of
England in the year 1000 when the northern hordes
threatened the entire border of the country.
19 Daniel J. Boorstin, The Americans, The Colonial Experience (New York: Random House, 19 58), p. 346. Even British drill was taught in Virginia, although Bruce con siders that ’’there is reason to think that a special drill, designed to meet the peculiar tactics of the savages in particular, was carefully taught in addition.”
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MILITARY SYSTEMS IN THE SOUTHERN COLONIES
I. MILITIA OF NEIGHBORING COLONIES
A synopsis of the organization of.the militia of
neighboring southern colonies provides a base of comparison
for study of Virginia’s militia.
South Carolina
Under the proprietors this colony sought to survive
in a hostile area, and the organization and administration
of the militia reflected this need, with evqry able-bodied
man between sixteen and sixty being required to aid in the
defense of the province. Control was placed in the governor
and his Council, creating a defense organization able to
respond well enough under central direction to ward off all
threats to the newly formed colony.
Rather than being called to active duty by company,
volunteers from the militia companies were sought for duty
against the Spaniards and Indians and for this service
they were paid. This method had its origins in the ’’ar r a y ”
of medieval England noted above. The organized militia was
thus left to defend the local area against Indians and
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later to protect the populace against the possibility of an
uprising of slaves. . Initially the militia was established
as the agency for defense of the colony, and the units for
slave patrol were separate. The Militia Act of 1721 estab-
, lished that both functions were to be performed by the
militia.^ In the eighteenth century a frontier community
had been replaced largely by a land of plantations needing
not so much protection from external enemies as from a
large labor force.
North Carolina
The separate designation "North Carolina" did not
receive official use until circa 1690 and the history of
that colony’s militia is shorter and less eventful than
that of South Carolina. The Agreement of the Lord Chan
cellor of England with the Lords Proprietor of the
Province of Carolina delineated the militia responsibilities
of the colony. By this pact the Assembly of North Carolina
was to have the power to establish forts and to constitute
companies sufficient for the "safety strength and defense"
of the counties and province; the governor would then
■■T 1 ,'■■■■■ " ^Verner W. Crane, The Southern Frontier, 1670-1732 (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1929) p"I T8 7, citing McCord (ed.), South Carolina Statutes, IX, Appendix, pp. 617, -625, 631.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 25 o assign to the forces their mission. Later, under the Crown,
the authority delegated to the governor for militia matters
was considerable. He had full power "to levy, arm, muster,
command, and employ all persons whatsoever" residing within . 3 the province.
Maryland
The presence of the Indian caused Maryland to pass a
military law as early as 1638 . A meSSber of the Council was
named "captain of the military band next under our lieutenant
general." His duty was to train and instruct "all the
inhabitants of our said colony [italics in the original] able
to bear arms (those of our council excepted), in the art and
discipline of war on holy days. ..." There is an early
parallelism of organizational experience between Virginia and
Maryland, and both colonies later adopted the county as the
administrative unit upon .which the militia was based. Maryland,
however, had little of the border fighting that plagued its
larger and more "western" neighbor, Virginia. "Perhaps it was
only the less serious nature of the Indian problem in
Maryland that explains the relatively few references
2W. L. Saunders (ed.), The Collected Records of North Carolina (Raleigh: Hale, Printer to-the Stats, 1886^T9l4), I , d o , 83-8M-. 3 Ibid., VI, p. 529. 4 J Thomas Scharf, History of Maryland (Baltimore: John B. Piet, 1879), I, pp. 132-133.
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in the records to military affairs. . . . "^ In any case,
"Maryland had less to fear from the savages than from internal C dissensions," as peace with the Indians was concluded in 16 52.
At the end of the eighteenth century the Maryland
"Act for the Ordering and Regulating the Militia," based on
a county organization, had a great similarity to the Virginia
acts of the period. All able males between sixteen and sixty
were eligible for enlistment in the militia, and failure to
muster required a fine of one hundred pounds of tobacco. The
officers, captains and higher ranks were appointed by the
governor, and it was their obligation, to muster the militia 7 as frequently as the governor should "Cause to Order." This
is a variation from the Virginia acts which specified the
frequencies of musters. Generally, the same-groups'were
exempt from musters as in Virginia, i_.e. ministers, con
stables and slaves.
Pay for a Colonel of Foot was two thousand, pounds
of tobacco a month and that of a private, three hundred
pounds. This is a variation from the pay in Virginia,
^Wesley F. Craven, The Southern Colonies in the Seventeenth Century (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University, 1 9 W j pp. 306-307. 6 John Andrew Doyle, English Colonies in America (New York: Holt and Company, 1883-1907), p. 302. 7 Maryland Historical Society, Archives of Maryland, Proceedings and Acts of the General Assembly (Baltimore: Mary land Historical Society, 1883-), XXII, p. 562.
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where the same ranks were paid about fifteen hundred pounds
and four hundred and fifty pounds respectively. It would
appear, in this case at least, that there was less difference in pay between the upper and lower ranks in Virginia.8 Other variations included the appointment of two "Pressmasters" in each county, whose function was to "press" goods or commodities from the inhabitants for military purposes.8 More use appeared to be made of the justices of peace and regular courts than of courts martial. From the discussion above it is apparent that there was considerable similarity among the militia of the southern colonies. The organization of the colonies of New England was also generally similar to those of the south - the colonies having, as they did, a common English background which included the implied obligation of all,, able-bodied males to have a weapon and to be prepared to use it in the common defense. Among the differences between northern and southern colonies was the method of selecting officers - in the north the officers were more likely to be elected by the men than in the south. Such variations as did exist were less significant in terms of organization than in the manner by which each colony reacted to a threat to its security. The Virginia reaction to the need for defense is part of the problem approached in this paper.
II. CONCEPTS OF DEFENSE
That the Colony of Virginia was a direct descendent
®Ibid., p. 564; William W. Hening, The Statutes at Large: Laws of Virginia (New York: R and W and G fiartow, 1823), ITTT p ~ 3 F 5 " T ^Maryland Historical Society, o£. cit., XXII, p. 565. 101 Ibid., XXII, p. 567.
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of the English homeland is apparent in its political organi
zation and concepts of government. The colony, like England,
had its aristocracy and its common people, its persons of
wealth, and those with less. Nevertheless, the society was
a changing one and movement between classes was less
difficult than in England. Moreover, the presence of the
frontier, albeit it moved farther.and farther from the
seacoast, was always present, providing an outlet, as a fact
or a symbol, for the dissatisfied or the individualistic
who might consider themselves fettered by the old forms of
society. The traditional was centered in the Tidewater, the
unconventional, nearer the frontier. In spite of a British •
tradition, the Virginia militia was influenced, both in
attitudes and organization, by these factors.
Further, the forest and the Indian colored not so
much the organization of the militia as how it fought
the enemy. This is not a study of frontier tactics and
thus it is sufficient to note that until the colonies
adopted what was best of the Indian style of warfare the
white men were at a disadvantage.
It was not until after the massacre of 1622 that the colonists as a body were to learn that the Indians were always to be distrusted, and that they were never so dangerous as when they seemed to be most amiable and conciliatory.H
•^Philip A. Bruce, History of Virginia, Colonial Period, 1607-1763 (Chicago! American Historical Society, T 5WT 7 p T T T . -----
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Indian methods of fighting included stealth, the exposure
of the body to the enemy as little, as possible by attacking
from behind cover, and indiscriminate slaughter of an enemy,
regardless of age or sex. The colonists adopted much from
the Indian and added their own frontier tactics, learning
to conduct campaigns during the winter, something the
individualistic Indian, under no military discipline as
such, preferred to avoid. The English also employed the
techniques of attacking at dawn when Indian outposts were
usually non-existent.
The colonial concept of defense was influenced by
the basic fact that, in general, the British left defense
against the Indians to the colonies, British troops were
likely to be introduced when the war involved other European,
powers, as during the French and Indian War and earlier for the
attack on the Spanish port of Cartha^ena. British forces
were also deployed to America when it appeared that the
authority of England was at stake, for: example, the Common
wealth was prepared to establish its authority in 1652 and
the Crown sent a force to Virginia in 1676, at the time of
Bacon's Rebellion. In the latter case the instructions
to Jeffreys, the designated commander in chief, provided that
all British soldiers were to obey his orders, but no mention 12 was made of compliance by the militia.
•^DeJarnette Transcripts, Letter from the King to Captain Herbert Jeffreys, October 7, 1676, II, pp. 380-383 (Virginia State Library)’. Since Jeffreys was later designated lieutenant-governor to replace Beverley this split authority is less important.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 2 9 a of defense The Colony'.s concept/was developed over the years Indian m response to the/threat. In the early Vxrgima settle
ments, as in the English villages of King Alfred, "every
homestead billeted one or more soldiers. In each little
settlement there was, at first, one train-band or company," 1 9 which in the beginning was to defend the stockade or homes;.
Initially all the colonists were subjected to approximately
the same sort of danger. The attack of 1622 was in depth
and the wide spectrum of the danger resulted in the passage
by the Assembly of such measures as "every dwelling house
shall be pallisaded in for defense against the Indians."
All Indians were officially considered to be hostile and
were to be treated as such.
But this approach-— that every house was a fort,
every Indian an enemy, and every colonist a soldier— was
uneconomical, primarily because little could be accomplished
toward developing the colony if everyone were to be a
soldier. As the colony expanded and the threat became more
localized to a segment of the colony, the frontier counties,
not all wanted to drop their plows or ledgers to go cam-
12a John McAuley Palmer, America in Arms (New Haven: Yal University Press, 1941), p. 18. 12b . . H e n m g , o£. c i t . , I, p. 127.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 29b paigning. The relaxation in defenses is apparent for,
although all able males were militiamen, the Indians were-
able in 1644 to slaughter a considerable percentage of the
whites , mostly along the borders of the colony.
The solution after this second great massacre was
to defend against and attack the enemy more vigorously, but
to be more selective as to who the defenders were. Direct
responsibility was placed on a few. For warning and
.defense, forts werq built high up the rivers and manned by
men selected from the local militia. To take initiative
from the savage it was soon found, however, that a better .
defense was to attack the Indian in his village; to do this
required more than the local militia and preferably utilized
those who were unemcumbered by family and who were interested
in the pursuit. Consequently, special organizations for the
march, or expedition, were formed after quotas were placed
upon the separate militia organizations of a sufficient num
ber of co.unties to provide the required men. It was con
sidered preferable to employ volunteers from the militia, 12c but militiamen were impressed to fill any shortage.
12cIbid., p. 2 92. In the campaign of 164 5 three counties were selected to carry the war to the Indians south of the James River. North of that river each fifteen tithables was made responsible for maintaining a soldier for the multi-county force carrying the war to the Indians in that area.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 29c
The raiding by Indians was not truly severe during
the years following mid-century, but it did reach a peak
in 1675-1676. Governor Berkeley's solution of forts and
garrisons on the border, manned by five hundred men from
"out of the midland and most secure parts of the country
. . satisfied neither the borderers, who feared Indian
infiltration between the forts, nor the Tidewater taxpayers 12d who paid for most of the program. The former apparently
took little comfort that the horse element of the garrisons
were to "range constantly between the garrisons till they
meet if possible, that a constant intelligence be maintained
1 A. between them. ..."
To ride out and destroy the Indian and raid his
settlements was the solution accepted by the followers of
Bacon— and this was attempted, with controversial results.
Without doubt the frontier defense of the colony suffered
during Bacon's Rebellion, for not only were many able-bodied^
men marching about the colony, but the forts at Chickahominy 12f and New Kent were "left without any forces. . . For the
remainder of the century the front line of the defense was
provided by a warning net of friendly Indians settled beyond
12dIbid., p. 327; Wilcomb E. Washburn, The Governor and the RebelT CChapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 19 57), pp. 32-33. 12e Hening, ££. cit., I, p. 331. 12f Winder Transcripts, Letter from William Sherwood to Privy Council, June 28, 1676, II, p. 12. '
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 29d
the border Virginia settlements and by the small parties of
rangers who kept under surveillance the entry routes repre
sented by the headwaters of the major rivers.
The system of a screen of rangers to alert and
volunteers from the militia to pursue was also the concept
of the first half of the eighteenth century. During the-
last years of Virginia as a Crown colony, if an expedition
of any size w~s to be launched, volunteers were to be
recruited from the local militia units, if possible; if
not, the force was brought to strength by drafting men from
various sources. Throughout the period the militia unit
retained responsibility for local defense.
From* the above it can be seen that the militia of
colonial Virginia had an active part to play in the defense
of the Colony at a time when A s forebearer, the English
militia, had fallen into disuse, Britain's wars being
fought at a distance from England and by professionals.
The Virginia militia system was generally similar
to that of England and was founded on the same key premise,
the military obligation of all able-bodied men. Both
militia were organized into local geographical units and
possessed a comparable rank structure. Both militia systems
were oriented primarily to providing defense for a short
period of time in an emergency. Further, there were similar methods
for raising troops from the body of the militia for a
special "march” and the regulations fo.v maintaining discipline
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. on such an expedition were essentially the same. Also
parallel in approach was the program of training conducted in
England and Virginia during a muster day. The great difference
between the two militia was the more serious purpose behind
the colonial organization, particularly century. In the case of Virginia the threat of attack was close enough for the obligation to bear arms to be taken more seriously than in England, possessing as it did a standing army and insulation from its external enemies. Since the opportunity to conduct active warfare had been largely lost to the English militia, its primary activity became show and entertainment. The purpose of military organization in Virginia, however, was defense, primarily against the Indians or a European enemy. The term "primarily” is used because the colony militia also played a part in the Insurrection of 1676 (Bacon’s Rebellion) and in the preparations against slave uprisings. It must be made clear at the onset that the militia was not a structure organized for combat, but was rather a grouping of all the able-bodied men of the colony who had been placed on the militia lists of each county. Though the militia was organized into units, it rarely fought that way. It was not intended to. The system was designed to arm and train men, not to produce military units for combat. Thus, it provided a trained and equiped citizen - soldiery in time of * crises. In this sense it was a local training center and a replacement pool. . . . ■^^Louis Morton, "The Origins of American Military Policy, Military Affairs, XXII (Summer, 1.958), p. 80. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 3 0 It is thus necessary during the description of the development of the Virginia militia to note other forms of military organization that lay outside the "pure militia." It is not intended to exclude discussion of military organi zations of the colony, i_. e. rangers and units organized for a "march," merely because they may not fall under a strict interpretation of the term "militia." On the other hand no attempt.will be made to describe the defense system based on forts - installations that were constructed periodically by the colonists, manned, and then allowed to fall into disrepair. Ill, DEFENSE UNDER THE VIRGINIA COMPANY During Virginia's early period as a proprietary colony defense was directed by the governor from his powers under.martial law. These laws were no longer effective after 1619 when the colony and its defense were permitted to develop under the more liberal provisions of a legislative assembly and under a governor specifically instructed by his T O sovereign to install a militia system. 12h„instructions to Yeardley, 1626, "Virginia Magazine, II (1895), p. 394. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 3 1 It is now appropriate to consider how the militia was organized and administered considering, among other factors, command structure, participation by the populace, and sanctions exerted for nonperformance of duty. During the first years of the colony there was no militia organization as such. The proprietors of the London Company selected those who were to go to Virginia and appointed and instructed the Council that was to administer and defend the colony locally. In the beginning there wera seven councillors, but death or removal to England reduced the number to one by 1608. This was Captain John Smith. The first Virginia settlers included experienced soldiers, such as Smith, and it was British tradition that every male capable of carrying arms would defend the community. The early charters of the colony provided for this defense, yet the traditional British limitations on the militiai that it was to be used for emergencies and not at a distance, were carried over to the colonies. In X England the militia was not to be used as a vehicle for the king's power and in the New World the militia remained as an agency for defense only. The question arises in the mind of the student of Virginia's early years whether the colony was a plantation, or Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 3 2 an armed camp in the wilderness seeking only to survive by expedients. The records of the London Company prior to 1619 have been lost, but the writings of and the instructions to participants reveal essentials of the situation. The instructions by the British Virginia Council to Governor Delaware, then resident in England, provided that the colonists should be divided into "several bands and companies of fifty or more when you think good and to commit the charge of them to several officers and Captains to be exercised and trained up in Martial manner and warlike 13 Discipline." This must not have been effected immediately and apparently the blame for the terrible events of the winter of 1609-1610 and for other evil days was placed upon the lack of individual discipline of the colonists and the 14 limited control exerted by the local administrators. To correct the situation a code was prepared for the colony that was a combined military and civil document - the stringent military provisions of Gates’ tenure later being reinforced by Governor. Dale.^^ As a'result of these 13 Susan M. Kingsbury, The Records of the Virginia Company of London, 1619-1626 (Washington: Government Printing Office, r§06-1935), III, P. 27. When quoting throughout this paper the original spelling will be modernized, but the capitalization will be retained. 14 Peter Force, "A True Declaration of Virginia", Tracts (New York: Peter Smith, 1947), III, pp. 18ff. ■^Force, "Lawes and Orders, Devine, Politique, and Martiall for the Colony of Virginia," Tracts, III, pp. 9-68. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 3 3 measures the colony was able to attain sufficient internal strength to survive. The matters covered by this early military code were to be repeated again and again in various forms throughout the legislative history of the Virginia Assembly. The '’laws'1 included rulings on absenteeism, mutiny, rights and obligations of officers, subordination of military inferior to superior, duties of the guard, conduct in the face of the enemy, an’d many others. The code was in effect, although applied with various degrees of stringency, for X 6 nine years. The rigid discipline and able leadership of Dale and Gates brought sufficient unity to the colony that it survived, and to these stern leaders must be given a measure of credit for ''obtaining the final success of 17 the colony." The-code was based on the concept of limited personal freedom, the colony being considered as a tightly organized unit. This unity-was enforced by the governor, and enforced by severe penalties for failure. The governor was both the political and military !”l6 “ Alexander Brown, The First Republic in America (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin and Gompany, 18§877 p"* 312. 17 Thomas J. Wertenbaker, Virginia Under the Stuarts, 1607-1688 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 19147,' pTTlZ Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 3 4 leader and the "commanders" of the plantation also functioned in the dual role of civil and military leaders, under the governor. The assistants to the. plantation overseer also bore military titles to emphasize the discipline required and the continuous threat to the community from outside. The individual colonist, although a tiller of the soil, was also a soldier in the sense that his gun was required to be ever near him; the beat of druihs regulated 18 his day; and he was marched to church to hear service. The mere tightening of regulations did not put Virginia immediately upon a sound basis for defense; there were too many weaknesses to be corrected. When Samuel Argali became governor in 1617, following George Yeardley, he found that of the population of four hundred only half were "fit for labor" and that the Indians were receiving "Ex perience daily in Firearms, and some of them were instructed therein by the English themselves, and employed to hunt and kill wild Fowl for them."19 An early titular military leader, formally appointed, was John Hudson, who was designated "provost marshal" for all Virginia. His tenure was short, however, he being banished by 18 Edward Arber (ed.), The Travels and Works of Captain John Smith (Edinburgh: J. Grant, 1910), II, p. 502; Force, ^Tawes Devine", op_. c i t . , p. 45. 19 Robert Beverley, The History and Present State of Virginia, ed,, Louis B. Wright (Chapel Hill: University or worth Carolina Press, 1947), pp. 44-45. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 3 5 Governor Argali. William Craddock was appointed by Argali as provost marshal of the corporation of Bermuda City and as such was empowered to summon the captains, soldiers and citizens,, in general, to assist him in suppressing what ever strife that arose in the part of colony subject to his 2 0 supervision. The office of provost marshal for the entire colony was assumed in 15 21 by William Newce, whose duties were similiar to that of high sheriff in England. The records, though meager, indicate that the provost marshal was ”a civil officer, a court official, and the predecessor 21 in early Virginia of the sheriff.” For his services, such . as having a culprit ducked or whipped, the provost marshal •was paid various fees in tobacco. With the reorganization of Virginia into shires in 163H the sheriff assumed these duties and after that "no more is heard of the provost- 22 marshal in association with the counties . . . .” The Beginnings of the Militia The term militia does not appear to have been used in the early years of the colony. When the leader needed men for a martial purpose he directed the required number 20 ”Proclamation by 'Admiral* Argali,” January 9, 1617. Randolph Manuscripts, Virginia Magazine, IV (1897), p. 29. 21 Cyrus H. Karraker, The Seventeenth Century Sheriff (Chapel Hill: The University of Jlorth Carolina Press, 1930),p.65. 22 ... Philip Bruce, Institutional History of Virginia in the Seventeenth Century (Mew York: FT Putnam*s Sons, T F W T i, p ." s w ; — Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 36 of colonists to proceed with the task. George Yeardley in 1616, to punish the Indians for insolence, "drew together one hundred of his best shot, with whom he went to Chicka- hominy."23 Basic to the future status of the militia, when it was established, was land. By 161** Governor Dale permitted the possession of land by a group known as the "farmers." The work of this group and that of the laborers was super vised by the "officers," who also had responsibility for 24 defense. The militia organization had its origins in a form of government based upon representation rather than arbitrary rule. YeardleyTs commission as governor in 1618 had directed him to set up representative government and his proclamation of April 1619, when he arrived in Virginia, provided for a Council of State and a General Assembly. Military respon sibility rested with the governor, although, as noted above, there had been delegation of responsibility, for a short period during the later days of the Company, to an individual known as the "marshal." In addition to functioning as sheriff, 23John Smith, "General History of Virginia," Narratives of Early Virginia, 1606-162 5, (ed.), Lyon G. Tyler (New York: Scribners, ISIO1/), p” 3T3. 24 Herbert Osgood, The American Colonies in the Seventeenth Century (New York"; Macmillan, 1§04T7 I» p. 75. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 3 7 his duties included care for the fortifications, the arms 25 and the troops of the Colony. The key billets in the actual defense organization were those occupied by the Commanders of the "Hundreds," or Plantations. When Sir George Yeardley had returned to Virginia with new instructions in 1619, they had permitted 2 6 the creation of free tenants and several large plantations. It was visualized that the country gentlemen, or the planta tion owners, should have the military powers of the English squire. In time of peace they shall be and have the authority of our lieutenants of shires in England, to appoint the commanders of our men at arms, see them trained, to look to their arms and watches. In time of war they shall be charged with what 27 number of men the council of state shall think fit. Each of these individuals was required to "take care that there be sufficient of powder and ammunition within the plantation under his command and their pieces fixed and ■2 8 their arms complete. The commander was directed to main tain strict economy in the use of munitions and was to insure that there was no unnecessary.expenditure of powder during 25 Conway Robinson (ed.), Abstract of Proceedings of the Virginia Company of London, 1619-1624 (kicKmond: Virginia Historical Society, 168$) ,1, p. Il9. 2 6 "Instructions to Yeardley, 1618, Virginia Magazine of History, II (1895), pp. 154-165. 27 Susan M. Kingsbury, ££. cit., IV, p. 422. 28 Hening, op_. cit. , I, p. 127. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 3 8 2 9 "drinking or entertainments." Provision was made by Yeardley for deputy-commanders and there are examples of the appointments of deputies or "lieutenant commanders" 30 during the colonial period. The holders of these patents for plantations had varied success, with Martin's Plantation, or Hundred, having the only true existence. Captain John Martin ran his plantation in a semi-feudal manner until the dissolution of the Virginia Company in 1624. Even prior to the Massacre of 162 2-162 3 there had been fear of an Indian plot and great interest in the readiness of the plantation militia. Sir George Yeardley, as governor, "himself in person went to every Plantation 31 and took a general muster of all the men and their arms." After.the muster the Indians denied any plot against the settlers and the colonists by degrees reduced their vigilance. Sir George Sandys noted in a letter to the Virginia Company that the colony could only mass one hundred and eighty militiamen against the Indians. He also wrote that the 29 Ibid. 30 Order to sheriffs from Nicolson, December 8, 1691, in H. R. Mcllwaine (ed.), Executive Journals of the Council of Colonial Virginia (Richmond: Virginia State Library, T§"2 5- T3WS>, I, p. 210. ^"Letter from Council in Virginia to Company in London, January 20, 1622/1623", in Kingsbury (ed.), op. cit., IV, p. 10. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 3 9 Governor had no guard and was protected only by his 32 councillors. Such was the situation when the Indians struck in 1622, surprising the settlers spread out in plantations on each side of the James River. Approximately four hun dred of the colonists' were killed out of a total population of twelve hundred. Beverley blames the massacre to a large degree on the bad habits of "sleepyness and security" permitted by Sir George Yeardley during both of his terms as governor. Governor Wyatt had arrived not long before the Massacre and the conditions continued under his regime by which the Indians, "Eating, Drinking, and Sleeping" among the colonists, "became perfectly acquainted with all our English Strength, and the Use of our Arms; Knowing 3 3 at all Times, when and where to find our People . . . ." Retaliation was taken against the Pamunkey Indians 34 and their allies for the part .they played in the massacre. Governor Wyatt, expecting little resistance, moved against the Pamunkeys with a force of but sixty men, only to find 32 Letter to Sir Samuel Sandys, March 30, 162 3, in Kingsbury (ed.), ojo. cit. , IV, p. 73. 33 Beverley, on. cit., pp. 49-50. 34 British Colonial Papers, Class CO 1/3, Letter from Governor and Council to Virginia Company, January 30, 1624, (Microfilm in Colonial Williamsburg Research Library— SR #702, Reel M-271). Henceforth the Colonial Williamsburg Research Library will be described as C. W. R. L. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 40 that eight hundred Indians were prepared to defend their crops and village from burning .by the colonists. Although the Pamunkeys "displayed unusual bravery" the Virginians 35 won the two day battle. Although revenged, the Massacre had caused great concern in England and this setback and, perhaps more important, the influence in England of the enemies of the Virginia Company caused the king to revoke the Company's Charter and to constitute Virginia as a colony of the Crown. 35 Thomas J. Wertenbaker, Virginia Under the Stuarts, 1607-1688, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1914), pp. 53-54. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. CHAPTER III SEVENTEENTH CENTURY MILITIA I. ORGANIZATION FOR DEFENSE UNTIL 1646 The system of defense that had developed under the Virginia Company continued when Virginia became a Royal Colony in 1624. The continuity of defense policies is understandable inasmuch as the Company's Governor Wyatt was retained by King James as the Crown's representative. Further, the practical solution for defense developed during the first seventeen years of the colony could not be radically altered when the total population in 1624 was about one thousand. The defense system was simple enough— each plant ation or hundred, had a "commander" responsible for the unit in all matters including defense. The able-bodied men, armed at all times, were to act as the military force, or militia, under the "commander.''. The confidence gained by the colonist after destroying several hundred Indians was soon reduced by a shortage of munitions, equipment, and supplies. Fear of the Indian led to a"plan to defend the colony being sent to England which established a requirement for a six mile palisade across the Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 4 2 peninsula.'1' Governor Francis Wyatt and his Council con sidered in 1626 that the work of suppressing the Indians and the construction of -fortifications would require ”500 soldiers '2 sent'over annually” from England. In May 1626 Governor Wyatt requested two hundred men to build fortifications and two hundred soldiers ”to go a.gainst the Indians,” a 3 plea repeated by Virginia in 1627 and 1629. This sort of support was not approved by the government of Charles I which initially did not .recognize the Colony's local problems nor provide for an Assembly. Yeardley was appointed governor in 162 6 and his duties and powers were outlined rather specifically. The governor was to issue the necessary decrees, with the concurrence of the majority of the Council and in the name of the king. During the period 16 23 to 1629 the governor and the Council appear to have exercised power by proclamation and to have enforced "laws of the 4 General Assembly previously enacted.” In 1626 detailed instructions to the commanders of plantations were issued ^"Affairs in Virginia in 1626 ," Virginia Magazine, II (1895), pp. 51-52. 2 Abstract of letter from Wyatt and Council to the Privy Council, April 6, 1626, in W. N. Sainsbury and others (eds.), Calendar of State Papers, Colonial Series, 1574-1660 (London: Longmans,-Sreen, Longmans, and Roberts, i860, p. ^9. 3 - Ibid., p. 80. 4 William W. Hening, The Statutes at Large (New York: R and W and G. Bartow, 1823TJ I, p. ITS". Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 4 3 concerning colonial reaction in the face of the enemy: . . . if the said Commander then does find the enemy to b-j of no great force than he may then be himself able to withstand, that he do not rashly give order for the firing of any houses .... On March 20, 16 29, the Governor issued a renewal of eighteen commissions to the "Commander or Principal Commander" of 6 plantations. The commission to one Edward Waters is illustrative of the authority that was vested in such individuals and reads in part: . . . granting unto him full power and authority to do, execute and perform all such matters and things as are incident and appertaining to the place and office of Commander there. *! The people in the plantation were simultaneously directed to obey the Commander— a sound provision without which no authority is firmly based. An act of October, 1629, stated that: every commander of the several plantations appointed by commission from the governor shall have power and authority to levy a party of men out of the inhabitants of that place so many as may well be spared without too much weakening of the plantations. . .® The act further indicated how these militia were to be used Conway Robinson, "Decisions of the Virginia General Court," Transcripts in the Virginia Magazine, IV, pp. 26, 156. ^Hening, Statutes, I, p. 130. 7Ibid., I, pp. 131-132. Elizabeth City. 8Ibid., I, p. 140. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 41+ to keep the Indians at a distance by clearing the woods of them, by engaging on three annual expeditions against the savages. For such "marches” against the Indians the Colony was divided into four divisions based on geography} and the divisions were given "missions" to. accomplish, such as to "go twice upon the Indians in Pamunkey River, viz. once 9 before the frost of Christmas. ..." Strong measures against the Indians continued in this period as when the General Assembly of 16 32 proclaimed all Indians to be "irreconcilable enemies." A law was passed that gave a commander added power if any Indians were con sidered to "molest or offend any plantations in their cattle, hogs, or anything else, or that they be found lurking about any plantation." In such cases the commander could raise a sufficient force and "fall out upon them, and perse cute’ them as he shall find occasion."1° This was broad authority to be given to a local commander of militia. Local government was placed on firm foundations. when the shire or county system was established in 1634. The office of county sheriff was established, and the-colony’s 9 Ibid., I, pp. 140-141. 10Ibid., I, p. 193. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 4 5 provost-marshal-general retained only military functions. The title of "lieutenant.," also created in 16 34 at the same time as that of the "sheriff," "had little existence out- 12 side the statute." The older title of "commander" survived, as it defined the true function of the office, but it applied now to county rather than plantation. As an example of the considerable political power of the commander, that officer and the commissioners (justices of the peace) of Accomack County were given the power to determine "all causes bet ween the inhabitants of the county not exceeding the sum of 13 twenty pounds...... Commanders were also responsible for custody of the powder supply of the colony, distributed at 14 the rate of "a barrel of powder" to each county. Increased responsibility was rewarded by an increase in pay: The commanders in chief receive for their year's salary as a reward for their service 6 00 0 pounds of tobacco. . . and either Sergeants 2000 pounds of tobacco yearly or so long as they serve proportionally. The same act provided that the choice of inferior officers was to rest in the commanders with the approval by the Governor 11Ibid., I, p. 224. 12 Wesley Frank Craven, The Southern Colonies in the Seventeenth Century (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University, T3V97, p.' 17 0. " 13 Conroy Robinson's notes for February 20, 1641, in H. R. Mcllwaine (ed.), Minutes of the Council and General Court of Colonial Virginia, 1622-16?2; 167 0-1676 (Richmond: Virginia State Library, 1924), pT 4"74™ Henmg, Statutes, I, p. 277. 15Ibid., I, p. 294. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 4 6 and Council. Interest in the militia was aroused by another massacre, that of 1644, which took the lives of nearly four hundred colonists in Virginia, primarily along the frontier. The Assembly vowed perpetual war and Captain William Claiborne was selected as "General and Chief Commander in this expedition” to punish the Indians. The lieutenants and inferior officers were directed t'o "follow such direction 16 and Commands as they shall receive from him.” The three exposed counties of Isle of Wight and Upper and Lower Norfolk were directed to defend the colony by making constant marches against the enemy. The "Lefts” or their deputies were to meet in council of war to manage the campaign, subject as always to veto by the Governor and his Council. The council of war was to levy such men, ammunition and equip= ment as the emergency should require. Abuse of trust by *L 7 "Lefts” was to bring punishment. The Assembly provided detailed directions about the preparations for an expedition. The body stressed that great care should be taken in the se lection of the three hundred men to be raised in the several counties, and advised that "some good Officers and ■^"Acts, Orders and Resolutions of the General Assembly of Virginia, Sessions of March.1643-1646," Virginia Magazine, XXIII (1915), p. 230. 17 abbreviation Ibid., I, p. 292. The "Left" (lieutenant) is the same as Commander. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 47 Persons of experience be sent to conduct the Men to the 18 several Counties unto the Rendevous." The act was in such detail as to nominate the guides that were to lead the militia forward. It was also realized that the commander- in-chief of the expedition would be subject to expenses, * and accordingly he was allowed a "competent quantity of tobacco" for such charges as he would find necessary. He was to keep an account of any expenses and render it to the next Assembly.^ The next year the militia again moved against the Indians. The counties north of the James River were to provide the people-;— sixty men to be raised to march under "the command of Lieutenant Francis Poythers." A peculiar facet of the command structure directed that the lieutenant follow the advice of Henry Fleet, who was not part of the military 20 organization, in matters of peace negotiations. It would appear that a political advisor was accompanying the military. As an example of the typical improved defense posture, the 18. Acts, Orders and Resolutions of the General Assembly of Virginia, Sessions of March 1643-1646," Virginia Magazine, XXIII (1915), p. 232. 19Ibid., p. 234. 20 Hening, ojd. cit., I, p. 318. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 48 inhabitants of each section of Northampton County, areas specifically defined by river and road, were directed to "submit" for matters of defense to a designated militia 21 officer. No doubt other counties, by necessity, were equally specific. The "command" organization of the militia by 1646 had developed- only slightly from its earlier form. In addition to the lieutenant (Commander) appointed for each county deputy lieutenants were to be assigned to the several subdivisions, or precincts, of the county. These officers now had the authority to "restrain all such persons" who should hunt or travel in areas considered dangerous due to the Indian menace. It is noteworthy that the General Assembly also delegated the power to "punish such as shall 22 offend therein according to the nature of the offense." II. SERVICE IN THE MILITIA Liability for Service The martial law of the eariy years was soon replaced by civil law that provided for military service, an obli- 91 ^Northampton County Record's, Court Order, April 30, 1644, pp. 303-304 (Virginia State Library). 22 H e n m g , ojn cit., pp. 300-301. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. gation that was never abandoned in the law. The question of liability for service in the militia of the Colony parallels the problem of who commanded the militia bodies. The General Assembly, as a result of the Massacre of 1622, passed an act describing the defensive measures expected of the inhabitants, stating that men were "not to work in the ground without their arms (and a sentinal 24 upon them.)" The same act stipulated that persons of quality should not be forced to undergo corporal punishment if delinquent in their military duties of proper defense of self and home. On the other hand persons of quality could be imprisoned by the coritmander or hailed to the monthly court to pay a fine. In spite of this separate treatment of the classes, the periodic militia musters were an opportunity after the military phase for the mingling of people of every 25 class xn the community above the servants and slaves. The king's instructions to Governor Yeardley in 1626 defined the responsibility of all males above seventeen and 23 Louis Morton, "The Origins of American Military Policy, Military Affairs, XXII (Summer, 1958), p. 77. 24 Hening, 0 £. c i t ., I, p. 127. 2^Philip Bruce, Social Life of Virginia in the Seven- teenth Century (Richmond: WKittet and Shepperson, ISO‘7), p. 242. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 50 under sixty for militia service. Respect was to be had for the "quality of the persons, that officers be not forced to go as private soldiers, or in places inferior to their degrees, 2 6 unless in cases of extreme necessity." The instructions on this matter to Berkeley in 1642 were in essence the same, except that the age of those eligible for militia duty was 27 lowered to include males of sixteen years of age. By an act of the Assembly of February 1632 the inhabi tants of the colony were directed to go under arms as they had been by the act of 162 3. This established a pattern for future acts, which included considerable repetition of what 2 8 had been legislated previously. The act also provided for penalties for failure to bring arms to church or to "obey private officers." For their part the commanders of "all the several plantations" were ordered to exercise the men under their command on "holy days." The commanders were further to take a muster of their men, "together with the women and children," as well as of the arms and ammunition, on the 29 first of December of each year. Failure to assemble to be 9 fi "Instructions to Yeardley, 1626," Virginia Magazine, II (1895), p. 394. °7 "Instructions to Berkeley, 1642," Virginia Magazine, II (1895), p. 283. ^^Hening, op. cit., I, pp. 173-174. 29 . Ibid., p. 175. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 51 30 mustered was to be "censured by the Governor and Council." The same act (1632) contained a provision for Captain Samuel Matthews to "leave six sufficient men" as a guard for the fort he built at Point Comfort, near what is the present site of Fortress Monroe. Although forts were frequently constructed by individuals at the behest of the colony, the militia of the local area was oftentimes made responsible for the manning of these installations. The 1632 militia instructions also provided for carrying weapons to church, and the requirement for each plantation to assist its neighbor "upon alarms." The penalty for failing to carry arms as directed was to pay two pounds in tobacco, if the' culprit was a master, and to be punished by the commander, if a servant erred. In 16 39 the Assembly stated that all persons except Negroes were "to be provided with arms and ammunition 31 or be fined at pleasure of the Governor and Council." During the same year indentured servants were mustered, but "it was decided to be unsafe to drill them."^ The master of a "family" was made responsible for compliance with militia acts by an 30 7 Ibid. 31Ibid., p. 226. 32 Philip Bruce, History of Virginia: Colonial Period, 1607-1763 (Chicago: American Historical Society, 1924), p. 289. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 52 act of the following year. This retention of responsibility by the head of a family for compliance with muster acts re mained part of the militia tradition at the end of the Colonial period, as an act of 17 57 demonstrates: The fines and penalties incurred by infants and servants for the breach or neglect of their duty in any particular service by this act required, of them, shall be paid by the parent, guardian, or master, respectively. Enforcement of Militia Regulations Failure to comply with the militia obligation defined by the General Assembly could result in heavy penalty, such as being "laid neck and heels twelve hours." By far the greatest problem of enforcement were the Quakers who were fined for not being under arms according to law. The Assembly referred the problem to the Committee of Grievances and Propositions, but the Quakers and militia duty remained 3 5 in conflict until the passage of the Toleration Act. To enforce regulations during the general muster of the militia a muster-master-general had been appointed— pro bably in 1631. Major George Donne had the titles of both Mus- 36 ter-Master-General and Marshal of Virginia. The Instructions 33Hening, o£. cl t . , VI, p. 539; VII, pp. 100-101. 34 Conway Robinson, "Decisions of.Virginia General Court, 1626-1628," Virginia Magazine, IV (1897), pp. 159-160. 35 H. R. Mcllwaine, Journals of the House of Burgesses, 1695-1696 (Richmond: Virginia State Library, 19F^-1^15), p. 78. 36 British Colonial Papers, Class CO 1/6, Memorandum from the King, [n.d.] (Microfilm in Colonial Williamsburg Re search Library— SR #705, Reel M-272). Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 53 to Governor Berkeley provided that, since "Arms without the Knowledge of the use of them are of no effect," there 3 7 should be a muster-master-general. Four times a year, and "oftener (if cause be)," he was to view the arms and "train and exercise the people, touching the use and order of arms and shall also certify the defects if any" to the Governor and Council. Captain John West was designated to carry out 38 these duties in 1641. The actual appointment appears to have been a political office vested by England and not the Governor. In actuality the responsibility for the presence of the militiamen and for their drill was the responsibility of command at both the county’and the company levels. The lieutenant (commander) of the county was required, by a decision in Council during May 1644, to submit to the Gover nor and Council the list of the persons who were obligated 39 to serve on the militia as well as the ammunition available. III. THE COSTS OF WAR Although in England a landowner traditionally had ■^"Instructions to Berkeley, 164 2," Virginia Magazine, II (1895),. p. 283 . 38 "Proceedings of the House of Burgesses," Virginia Magazine, VIII;(1901), p. 389. 39 Conway Robinson, "Notes from Council and General Court Records, 1641-1659," Virginia Magazine, VIII (1901), p. 70. “ Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 54 been required to support a man-in-arms, or even a horseman if his income were greater, the Virginians, being less affluent, were forced to pool their resources to equip a single man. Once a soldier had been armed it was also necessary to support him when he was on "active duty." The act of February 1645 defined the responsibility of the colonists for providing the force to press the attack beyond county boundaries. This was more than the normal * defensive militia mission and volunteers were preferred. The act stated that "every 15 tithable persons shall set forth, completely furnish and maintain, one soldier," for prosecution of the "war' on the north side of the river."1*0 For this purpose all men from sixteen to sixty plus Negro men and women were considered tithable. If no volunteers were found among the "fifteen" a county council of war was' to select the "volunteer," Naturally there was expense not only in costs of maintaining a soldier, but for his support were he to be wounded. An earlier expedition had been costly in casualties and consequently the Assembly required each county to take care of its soldiers left permanently incapacitated. The Act of 1645 was specific as to county responsibility for paying the annual salary of a slain soldier, or the doctor's ^H e n i n g , o p . c i t . , I, p. 292. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. bills of the wounded. The counties were also directed to pay for the transportation and the other logistical costs 42 • of the expedition. The counties most exposed to attack were required to pay the cost of the Pamunkey and Chicahominy march noted above. The costs varied by county and were levied upon "every tithable person" and paid to the sheriffs. The marches of 164 5 also required a levy on all the tithables of Isle Wight and Upper and Lower Norfolk— the sum levied on the individual being thirty one pounds of tobacco in the first two counties and twenty eight in Lower Norfolk. The total assessment of over thirty thousand pounds provided for the wages of the soldiers, as well as the powder and shot 44 and the supplies to feed the troops. The expenses for the expedition of 1646 were also raised by public assessment. The provision of supplies, including salt beef and pork, h 5 bread, sifted meal, and peas, was arranged by contract. Another cost of a march was the requirement that colonists who remained behind must care for the crops of 4i ; Ibid., I, p. 293. 42Ibid., I, p. 285. 43Ibid., I, pp. 287-288. 1 1 * 41+Philip A. Bruce, Institutional History of Virginia in the Seventeenth Century (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 191077 II, pp. 82-83, citing Lower Norfolk County Records, Orders, October 15, 1645. 45 Hening, ojo. cit- , I, p. 318. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 56 the members of the militia designated to accompany the expedition. The tenders of the crops were probably most often taken from the'"fourteen” remaining behind. The penalty for not fulfilling this obligation was a fine in tobacco to be paid to the absent militiaman. IV. PARA-MILITIA ORGANIZATION Turning to defenses other than militia as such, an early palisade was constructed in about the year 1630 by private contractors from Martin's Hundred to Chiskiack, a distance of about six miles between the James and York Rivers. Then, as the boundaries of the colony expanded, ferts rather than a continuous wall appeared to be the method for pro viding early warning and centers of defense. Typical of these forts were the three authorized in 16U5, to be built at Fort Royal, at the falls of the James, and on the high H 6 ridge overlooking the Chickahominy. The cost of forts came from the public treasury, but the method of manning the structures varied. Although the defenses of the colony by palisade or by fort were not a true function of the militia, there was a close association' between the militia and the responsibility for manning of the U6 Ibid., p. 293. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 57 forts. An act of 1645 provided that in case an expedition was required to move to the northern part of the colony the commanders of the expedition were enjoined to leave "a U 7 sufficient strength at each fort."^' The usual defense of these forts was provided by garrisons from the inhabitants of the areas normally responsible for providing the militia. A requirement for soldiers was established and within this limit the county lieutenants and deputies were authorized 48 to "press” or "otherwise" the inhabitants into service. This mission of the militia was more onerous than most, as it was a continuous requirement that lacked even the excitement of a march. The Indian war came to an end late in the year 1646 after the capture of Chief Opechancanough by Governor Berkeley himself. After the unfortunate murder of the Indian chief, when a prisoner, peace was concluded with the new chief of the Pamunkey Confederation. For a period after the active war the forts remained part of the defense system. An alternative solution to manning the forts with militia was to assign the responsibility for the defense of a fort to an individual, wh^, for an established sum, would agree to defend the fort with men 47Ibid. 48 Ibid., p . 315. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. equipped, trained, and maintained by him. Thomas Rolfe, for example, was given in 164 6 the fort on the Chickahominy called Fort James, and in return he was to "keep and maintain 49 six men upon the place for three years. Another such fort established by a group led by Captain Edward Hill, who was to receive a grant of land for maintaining an outpost manned by forty men at the head of the Rappahanock River. Membership in a fort garrison had at least one advantage— soldiers attached to forts were exempt for taxation.59 This system was primarily employed after peace was made with the Indians, and the manning of forts was to revert to a militia responsibility when the threat of Indian attack increased. V. MILITIA UNDER THE COMMONWEALTH At the end of the early Stuart period the power to raise "men, horses, arms, ammunition, or provision" rested in the Governor and Council to the extent that they saw "fit or expedient."51 There was- some disagreement over the power of the Governor to levy forces, for an act of Assembly in 1648 stating that "divers persons" had considered their t|9Ibid. , p. 327. 50 . Ibid. 51Ibid., p. 293. ' Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 59 "liberties" infringed upon when the militia was pressed into ■ CO service. The Assembly stressed that these defense acts were legal and followed instructions from the King whose power rested on the Crown's authority to make peace or war. Although the Indian war was over, the Assembly realized that a primary condition that led to Indian conflict was unrestrained movement of colonials beyond accepted boundaries. Thus,in a negative sense,a form of defense was to restrict this English expansion that could put the settler into close proximity with the Indians. The Assembly in Grand Meeting directed the colonists in 1646 to remove themselves within S3 the space of a year to the south of the York River. This action by the Grand Assembly reflected the strong beliefs of Berkeley that uncontrolled expansion was a cause of injustice, expense, and war. Until his first retirement in 1652, under pressure of the Commonwealth, Berkeley attempted to ameliorate the lot of the Indians within the boundaries of the colony - and to prevent clashes with those beyond the frontier. The governor was not long able to resist, however, the expansionist drive of the people and this was to be a cause of Bacon's 52Ibid., p. 355. 53 . Ibid., pp. 328-329. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. uprising of 1676. But Bacon was twenty-five years in the future and the rebellion of primary concern in 16 50 was the successful overthrow of Charles I by the forces of Parliament. Initially Virginia’s House of Burgesses, Council, and Governor Berkeley showed unanimity in their statements of loyalty to the king and traditional rights for the colony. The fleet sent from . England found the colony "had been put in a strong state of military defense" due to the governor’s "indefatigable efforts." Batteries were prepared on the banks of the James, the Dutch ships on the river were impressed and their guns trained on the British, and a large number of militia were called out by Berkeley, who placed himself in command. But both sides chose to negotiate rather than begin a struggle that, as Berkeley probably was aware, must end in defeat for Virginia. The Commonwealth permitted the colony to maintain its forms of government, apparently because it never had the time to deal with the problem in detail. The power of the governor declined during the period of the Commonwealth, as there was no reinforcement to his authority such as had been previously provided by the Crown. Concurrent with this decline of executive authority was the increase in the power of the 51+Philip Bruce, History of Virginia, Colonial Period, p. 170. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 61 Assembly. The representative body was generally in favor of expansion of the frontier— a view expressed not only by authorizing exploration and the seizure of land, which was oftentimes that of the Indians— but in the formation of new counties, i.e. Gloucester and Lancaster in 1652. The latter along with two additional new counties were assigned in 1654- the mission of moving against the Rappahannock 5 5 Indians. The control by the governor was still sufficient to hold this militia force from attacking the Indians, even though deployed, until it had reported the state of Indian affairs. Since the Indian towns appeared to the marching militia to be conciliatory, the Governor and the Council decided not to declare war. During the period of the' Commonwealth commissioners were appointed in the counties to administer the militia, the commissioners being selected by the General Assembly from the justices of the county courts. The suspension and relief of a county commissioner could also be effected by the General Assembly. This concentration of both judicial and military power in the same hands at county level is significant. The commissioners performed duties which had been largely in the hands of the county commander in the past, i_.e. selection of the junior officers, and insuring that all soldiers were drilled, militia equipment was in 5 5 Hening, o£. cit. , I, pp. 389-390. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 62 5 6 order, and the militia was properly employed. It was to the commissioners that the Assembly turned to insure that its orders were followed. The responsibility of the county commissioners for overseeing the activities of the militia is illustrated by an order of the House of Burgesses in March 1655: "Forasmuch as the security of this Country is intrusted into the hands of the Commissioners of the militia for the respective counties by virtue of several orders of Assembly. . ." the Commissioners of the militia for the counties were directed to make an inquiry into 57 the state of ammunition supply. In addition to the county system of militia super vision during the Commonwealth there was appointed a Major General of the Colony who was responsible for the overall administration of military affairs, still under the governor, 5 8 of course. Other elements of the militia system appear to have remained as in the past. General musters were held, and able men were eligible for militia duty. In small variation 5 6 Hening, op. cit. , ~ I ,- pp. 372, 376, 384, 387. Mary Stanard consideredthat for the period of the Common wealth there is little information except the acts and orders in Hening. Mary Stanard, The Story of Virginia*s First Century. (Philadelphia: Lippincott Company, 1^?8), p. 226. 5 7 "Extracts from the Proceedings of the House of Burgesses, 1652-1661," Virginia Magazine, VIII (1901), p. 388. 88Hening, ££. cit., I, p. 545. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 63 from the past the Act of 165 8 provided more detail and specified that each man subject to militia duty should have 59 for his gun two pounds of powder and eight of shot. •VI. BACON’S REBELLION Militia Organization, 1660-1676. By 1660 the Commonwealth had fallen in England and Governor■Berkeley had been returned as governor of Virginia. What his reinstallation meant has led to controversy. Some have evaluated it as a Cavalier attempt to sweep out the forms of government of the Commonwealth period. There is little evidence, however, of a Cavalier influx to the Assembly, as there was "a continuity of membership which extends from before the Parliamentary seizure of the colony until after the restoration of King Charles II."®0 The people had gained power during the Commonwealth that was to be a per manent advance and had simultaneously lost some of their earlier bonds with England. Nevertheless, the return of a Royal Governor meant to some degree the return to a more centralized government. Ibid., p. 525. 6 0 Wilcomb E. Washburn, Virginia Under Charles I and Cromwell, 1625-1660, Jamestown Historical Booklet Series No. 7 (Williamsburg:. Virginia 350th Anniversary Corporation, 1957), p. 61. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 64 That there was at least a partial move toward more executive control was demonstrated by some reorganization of the military. The colony was divided into four military districts, each under the control of a "major-general," except for the Jamestown district which was a province of ‘ the governor himself. Two adjutants assisted each major- general. In order to provide for immediate defense against .the Dutch in 1666, Major General Bennett, in command of such a district, was directed to . . . summon all the militia officers within the province, together with the several and respective justices of peace within the countries [the correct meaning is counties] committed to his charge. . . and so many men well armed to be ready to man the saidJboats • « • • ' It is noteworthy that these instructions for the conduct of defense were issued by the General Court, a body which con tained principal officers of .the colony including the governor. The militia of 166 6 contained in each county a regiment of foot, commanded by a colonel, and at least a troop of horse. Thomas Ludwell evaluated the state of training and the condition of the weapons as being "in so good order as an Enemy would gain little advantage by attempting any- "Decisions of Virginia General Court," Virginia Magazine, V (1898), p. 114. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 65 62 thing upon them.” The Commonwealth system, by which a county was administered by commissioners, was retained after the Restoration to at least 1674. The county commissioners possessed functions far exceeding that of overseers of the militia. Typical of these functions was the following: "The commissioners of each county court shall be hereby authorized . . . to order and give satisfaction "... to the party 6 3 injured by want of his . . . boats . . . ." Professor Wertenbaker stresses the military aspect of the Virginia government.of the Restoration. He states that Of the thirty members of the Houses of Burgesses of 1660, six were colonels of militia, two lieutenant- colonels, one a major, and fourteen were captains. The county courts also took on a military aspect. Among the York justices in the years from 1658 to 1676 were a colonel, a lieutenant-colonel, several majors, and many captains. There seem to have been no salaries attached to these offices except in times of war, but they carried great prestige. 4 Absence from muster became a problem in the 166 0's, a large measure of the cause probably being the decline of "A description of the Government of Virginia," Letter from Ludwell to [Arlington], September 17, 1666, Virginia Magazine,. V (1898), p. 58. firiris'h Colonial Papers, Class CO 1/2 0, Letter from Ludwell to Lord Arlington, September 17, 1666, (Microfilm in Colonial Williamsburg Research Library— SR #719, Reel M-304). 6 3 Hening, 0 £. cit., II, p. 126. 64 Thomas J. Wertenbaker, The Government of Virginia in the Seventeenth Century, Jamestown 350th Anniversary HTstorical Booklet, No. 16, (Williamsburg: Virginia 3 50th Anniversary Celebration Corporation, 1957), p. 15. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 66 the apparent threat from the Indians as the frontier moved west. Failure to muster resulted in a greatly increased fine of one hundred pounds of tobacco, to be "disposed of by 6 5 the militia to the use of the regiment." The legislation provided for excuse of the fine if the cause of distress was accepted by the commander. Although Indian war was not a problem of the 1660’s the long range effects of the English-Dutch war were felt in Virginia, as will be noted later in this paper, and con cern with the Dutch and the Indians caused Governor Berkeley to muster the militia several times during the next few years. In 1671 the governor estimated that eight thousand horsemen fi fi could be mustered. Two years later the same ratio of foot to horse was maintained, with twenty regiments of each being held on the rolls, but there were only enough arms for "every fi 7 other man." The General Court Records for 1674 show that the mustering of these forces was to be carried out during the Easter, Whitsuntide, and the Christmas holidays, should 6 8 the weather permit the event, fi fi Hening, o£. cit., II, p. 246. 66Ibid., p. 512. fi 7 British Colonel Papers, Class CO 1/30, Letter from Sir Henry Chicheley to Sir Thomas Chicheley, Petition for the King, July 16, 1673, (Microfilm in C. W. R. L., SR #730, Reel M-317). 6 8 Minutes of the Court, November 18, 1674, in Mcllwaine (ed.), Minutes of the Council and General Court of Colonial Virginia, 1670-1676, p. 391. ^ Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 67 The military cause of new Indian war came during the summer of 1675 when tribesmen, displaced the previous year from their traditional home, crossed the Potomac River from Maryland and raided colonial installations in Virginia. Retaliation by the Virginians was swift, but not alwsys just. These Indian attacks and colonial retaliations did not occur unheralded, as the expansion of settlers into Indian lands was continuous, and an outbreak was predictable. This movement was in the face of Berkeley’s attempt to control the expansion of the whites and an act of the General Assembly 69 forbidding infringement of Indian lands. Berkeley and the Council advocated moderation and in pursuit of this aim directed Colonel John Washington and Major Isaac Allerton to ’’call together the several militia officers . . . a full and thorough inquisition being made of the true Causes of the several murders." Thereafter, if they deemed necessary, 70 the militia was to be called out and punitive action taken. The local militia, under local captains tended, how ever, to respond to the local threat rapidly and without concern for the broad effects on overall colonial-Indian 69 Journal entry, March 1675, in H. R. Mcllwaine (ed.) Journals of the House of Burgesses, 1659-1693, op. cit., p. 64. 70 Tyler, Lyon G., "Washington and His Neighbors," William and Mary Quarterly, IV (1895), p . 86. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. relations— and this is understandable. The attempt by Berkeley to ’•investigate” actions by the Indians was immediately translated by the militia leaders into "summon the militia." In spite of Berkeley's moderate views he was forced to deal positively with a situation that was deteriorating. After taking the arms from the Indians within the Colony he caused an act to be pas'sed in the Grand Assembly of March 167 6 that declared a defensive war on those Indians who were "notoriously known or shall be discovered to 71 have committed the murders . . . ." “Eventually concern with Indian actions led Berkeley to cry to the Assembly of June 1676 that "if they had come to treat of Peace, they 72 ought to have gone m Peace." The act was the most detailed up to that time on ' the conduct of war by the militia. Included were thq size • of the force (five hundred men), the counties from which they were to be drawn, and where the units were to be stationed, i.e. primarily in forts. Also specified was how the ammunition was to be apportioned to the forts; what provisions, equipment and medical supplies were to be carried 71 Hening, ££. ci t ., II, p. 327. 72 Thomas Mathews, "Narrative," Narratives of the Insurrections, 1675-1690, Charles Andrews, editorTNew York: Barnes and Noble, 1915), p. 23. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 69 the pay scale for all ranks, and how the forces were to be 7 3 employed in case of "incursions and sudden assaults." The question of pay for the militia was solved in various ways over the years. Initially it was considered that defense of the colony and home was not only the duty of every able bodied man, and that he should not be paid for this responsibility. It was recognized, however, that the man leaving his untilled fields behind deserved consideration. Further, there had been an earlier*allocation of pay to 7 4 militia placed in forts at the head of the rivers. The act made clear the dominant position of the governor who retained control in such a way as to prevent 75 indiscriminat attacks on Indian forts and villages. He was also authorized to disband the "army” and, in conjunction with hi.s council, to "do, act, and command such further thing and things as to him and them shall seem most con- 76 venient and as necessity shall require." Also approved by. the Assembly were "Articles of War" for the conduct of militia, including such matters as penalties for swearing and dis- 73 Henxng, op_. cit. , II, p. 332. 7U Ibid. , p. 327. 75Ibid., p. 332. 7 6 Ibid., p. 333. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 70 7 7 obedience. A companion act of the same legislature pro hibited trade with the Indians and specified with few exceptions the death penalty for those who sold arms or ammunition to any Indian.^ The Rebellion Both of these acts held seeds of discontent and charges were made that Berkeley continued to profit from the Indian trade after passage of the Acts of 1676. More serious was the belief held by many on the frontier that the defense system based on forts provided an unsatisfactory response to an Indian attack employing infiltration tactics 79 and that the Act of March 1676. was inadequate. The forts established by the Act of March 1676 were part of the militia system in that they were manned by militiamen and supplied and administered^as militia. The forts were not part of . the organization of the Virginia militia but, as did earlier forts and others to come later, provided fortifications for the militia. The manning of the forts during this period was on the basis of the tithables in each county— the counties, as a group, supporting the forts. The general 77 Ibid.j pp, 333-335. 7®Ibid., p. 336. Thomas J. Wertenbaker, Bacon*s Rebellion, Jamestown Historical Booklets (Williamsburg! Virginia 350th Anniver sary Celebration Corporation, 1957), pp. 16-17. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. body of militia was held in readiness to march to the aid of beleaguered forts. The value of the forts as a defensive measure was later questioned by the Commissioners reporting to the Crown on Bacon's Rebellion. The people in the frontier area were not in favor of the policy by which the garrisons of the forts were enjoined "not to make any attempt upon the Indians until they should first give the Governor an account thereof, and receive orders from him therein. . . ." Further, the forts were considered too weak to be of value and the force in them did not always dare "to stir out to relieve any that were in danger and distress."®0 There were some losses to Indian raids, but Washburn points out that rumor greatly magnified the casualty figures, 81 which were moderate. Further, differentiating between friendly Indians, inside or near the frontier, and hostile tribes was a fine distinction to make for the nervous border colonel' in the face of rumor and occasional incidents. As a result there appeared "volunteers" who were impatient with the action of the "regular" militia, and who wished to take 8 0 "Narrative of the Commissioners," Narratives of the Insurrections, 1675-1690, op. cit., p. li2. 81 Wilcomb E. Washburn, The Governor and the Rebel, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Fress, 1957), p. 33. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 72 immediate and offensive action against Indians in general. It was to bodies of armed men such as these and to the attitudes held by them that the leadership of Nathanial Bacon appealed. Bacon accepted the role and sought authorization from the governor to lead a volunteer force and also to gain official recognition of extra-legal . military actions already taken. Governor Berkeley expressed his amazement that after his just period as governor any inhabitant could be seduced 8 2 by "so young, unexperienced, rash and inconsiderate person." This sort of irresponsible act was incomprehensible to others of the older generation, one being Thomas Bacon who prayed for the king's forgiveness for his son. The father Considered young Bacon to be "obnoxious to the Letter of the Law.T »»83" Berkeley, to appease the people, finally ordered the forts to be dismantled and Bacon on June 23, 1676, was made 8 4 commander m chief of the forces to fight the Indians. 82 . British Colonel Papers, CO 1/37, Declaration of Sir William Berkeley, May 10, 1676. (Microfilm in C.W.R.L., SR #737, Reel M-317). 83 British Colonel Papers, CO 1/37, Petition of Thomas ■ Bacon to the King [no date], oj). c it. 84 ■ . "Narrative of the Commissioners," Narratives, Andrews, o p . c i t ., p. 117. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. He was now an official— for the time being— within the ■ militia system and thus ’’fell heir" to the traditional organization as modified by the recent Act of June 5, 1676. The Act was largely written before Bacon's seizure of power, but the last part contains the designation of Bacon as commander in chief with power to raise and to fight the Indians with a volunteer force above and beyond the 8 5 militia forces provided by the Act. He also was authorized to reduce the regular militia called out for the Indian war, if he saw fit, due to the presence of the volunteer force. He was enjoined, however, to make this reduction proportionally to the tithables in each county. The details of the act were in general conformity with militia tradition and contained the following policy: 1. The county was responsible for the pay, equip ment, weapons and ammunition of the individual 86 - militiaman. 2. If it appeared that the campaign would last more than the two months originally planned then 87 the counties would replace the provisions. 85Hening, ££. c i t ., II, p. 349. 86Ibid., p. 344. 87-rv.Ibid. • j Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 7 4 3. Penalties were established for failure to perform an assigned duty, the most severe of those of a non-military nature being imposed on the sheriff for failure to summon the local justices and officers 8 8 whp administered the local militia. 4. A company of si&ty men was to; be staffed by a captain, a lieutenant and an ensign, two 8 9 sergeants and a corporal. 5. The field commander of either the southern or northern grouping of forces had the right to impress his wishes on the justices and militia officers of the counties to cause them to pro cure ammunition, horses, "or other necessaries 90 whatever" required .during the campaign. A variation from tradition was the inclusion in the act of the provision that company officers were' to be elected by the militiamen and confirmed by the Governor. The counties promptly complied with the requirements of the act, revealing, "not only the urgency of the impending danger, but also the existence of a general feeling that its several provisions, if 88Ibid., p. 345. q q Ibid., p. 348. 9 0 Ibid.t v * A Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 7 5 energetically enforced, were sufficient to ward off that ,,91 danger." "Bacon’s Rebellion" was a period when the militia ceased to be an instrument of normal responsible government, as its membership was torn by the divided loyalties. The Assembly had placed the militia under Bacon by the Act of 1676, although it is difficult to conclude what proportion were levied or were volunteers. As for Berkeley, he 92 apparently hired his force for pay or plunder. With the collapse of the rebellion in early January 1677, or even earlier at the death of Bacon in the previous October, the power of Berkeley grew until once again he controlled the military forces of the colony and the colonists under arms can be considered "militia" again. By the time of the arrival of a regiment of redcoats from England in February 1677, the Governor was in command of his.colony. The billeting of the British soldiers was directed by Governor Jeffreys in 1677, and to coordinate arrangements justices of the counties of Isle of Wight and Nansemond 91 Bruce, Institutional History, op. cit., II, pp. 89-91, citing Northumberland County Records, Orders, July 4, 167 6, and October 2, 1677, and Middlesex County Records, 1673-80, p. 57. 92 "Commissioners Narratives," Narratives, Andrews, op. cit., p. 135. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 7 6 were directed to meet at a convenient place between the counties to apportion the billets to each house according to the capacity for entertainment and convenience of soldiers and inhabitants— two shillings a week to be paid for each soldiers Accomodation.^3 The fate of the British regulars sent to Virginia is found in the correspondence of the Privy Council. Lord Culpepper, governor but still in England, proposed in 167 8 that three companies of British soldiers be kept in 9U Virginia. After learning that the Colony did not desire to support the regulars the Privy Council ordered that the two companies remaining in Virginia be disbanded, in spite- .95 of Lord Culpepper1s opposition. Culpepper's argument in 1681 for the retention of two companies was that the unsettled Indians still remained a menace; North Carolina was a source of constant trouble due to the poor caliber of its settlers; and that Virginians, too, could revolt out of displeasure for the low price of tobacco. Even after the decision had been made to disband 9 3 John Bennett Boddie, Seventeenth Century Isle of Wight County, Virginia (Chicago! Chicago Law Printing Company, 19 38, p! 165. 94- British Colonial Papers, Class CO 5/1356, Order of Privy Council, November 22, 16 81. (Microfilm in C. W. R. L., SR # 255, Reel M-227) 95 British Colonial Papers, Class CO 5/13 56, Order of Privy Council, November 22, 1681,. (Microfilm in C. W. R. L., SR #2 55, Reel M-2 27); Letter from Lord Culpepper to Privy Council, October 25, 1681. (Microfilm in C. W. R. L., SR # 254, Reel M-227). Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 77 some in the Colony considered that a standing guard of 150 to 200 soldiers would be useful for maintaining the security 9 6 of the government. The British Crown had also sent three Commissioners to discover the causes of the Rebellion. The commissioners being so instructed, sought to determine the "grievances" that had led to the rebellion. A review of the collected grievances of three of the counties reveals less displeasure with serving in the militia, than with abuses of the system. Gloucester County complained that after Major Robert Beverley raised sixty men to guard the governor he put them to work falling trees, which many of them refused to do, 97 so he "disarmed them." To deprive a man of his weapon in the face of Indians was a serious complaint. A complaint of a different nature was that of Gloucester, Lower Norfolk and Surry counties which considered that tobacco paid as duty to build and support a fort should be used that way and not retained by individuals. The grievances were primarily financial and dissatisfaction was evinced more on such matters 96 British Colonial Papers, Class 1/49, Letter of Nicholas Spenser to Sir Lyonel Jenkins, August 12, 1682. (wicrofilm in C. W. R. L., SR #749, Reel M-327). 97 "Causes of Discontent in Virginia, 1676," from the Winder Collection of MSS in the Virginia State Library, Virginia Magazine, II, 1895, p. 168. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 7 8 as the right to select vestrymen than on service in the 9 8 militia. The grievances that Isle of Wight County sub mitted to the British Commissioners included some directed at the militia, objection being made to large levies in a 99 time of relative Indian peace "for what we know not.1' There was also concern with what, happened to the fines the militiamen paid for failure to muster and to the ammunition that was purchased for county use. Not all the residents of the county subscribed to the grievances, however, and 100 instead submitted approving versions of the Berkeley regime. VII. CULMINATION OF THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY MILITIA New Forms for Defense Although the Indians had been defeated during the period of Bacon's Rebellion it appears that the victories had been over "friendly” Indians. By 1678 there was again sufficient unrest on the frontier for the governor to order out troops stationed in Charles City and Henrico Counties. In 16 80 an important development in the militia system occurred. The governor previously had been the only 98Ibid. , pp. 169-17.1. 9 9 Boddie, ojd. c i t . , p. 152. 100Ibid., pp. 158-161. 9^Washburn, The Governor and the Rebel, p. 76. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 7 9 ' * 4 individual authorized to call out the militia, yet in the face of rapid movement by a force of Indians the colonial reaction was likely to be too slow. To remedy this, key officers were authorized to call out the militia in an 102 emergency. During June of the same year the Assembly passed an act continuing the "several garrisons and fortifications at the heads of the four great rivers." Apparently the garrisons were ineffective against the Senecas, a fierce Northern tribe, who killed settlers during the summer of 1681. To combat the situation a new form of militia was adopted, "rangers," and the forts were dismantled and the 103 garrisons sent home. The rangers were to be mounted troops who every fourteen days were to travel over all the territory assigned to the unit— the headwaters of the four major rivers that passed through the frontier counties of 104 Henrico, New Kent, Rappahannock, and Stafford. Each of these counties was to furnish twenty men, procured' either from volunteers or by impressment. Command of each troop was vested in a captain, who was assisted by a corporal; and it is noteworthy that these officials were appointed, not 102 Hening, op_. cit., Ill, pp. 19-20. 103 Hening, ££_. cit. , II, pp. 498-499. 104 Ibid., p. 50 0. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 80 elected, as were the officers for militia during the Rebellion. The mission of the rangers was, in sum, to give "speedy advice" of the approach of the enemy to the chief officers _ .. . . . 105 of the militia, The rangers were perpetuated in 1684 by an act that continued most of the provisions of the earlier act, 1.06 but made several important changes. Each troop was raised to thirty men and a lieutenant was added to the organization as assistant to the troop captain. To improve surveillance of the enemy the frequency of ranging their territory was increased to once a week from once every two weeks. But the maintenance of this force was costly. The expense, not only for the pay and supplies of the rangers, but miscellaneous costs, including the hiring of boats and the replacements of horses, caused the House of Burgesses to ask Governor Effingham to disband the troops. This interest in economy was demonstrated by a resolution of that body providing that in time of invasion the militia was to 107 serve without pay. The same Assembly had previously agreed 105 ' Ibid., p. 501. 106 Hening, og_. c it. , IIIJ p. 18. 107 Resolution of the House of Burgesses, May 1, 1684, in Mcllwaine, (ed.), Journals of the House of Burgesses, 1659-1693, p. 205. . Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 8 1 that the Colony would pay the militia if duty lasted for more than six days. Over a period of years Virginia usually paid for duty of over two days duration. Two years later the Burgesses were successful in their efforts to keep defense costs low enough to be supported by regular taxes 103 and duties and the rangers were disbanded. The Governor and Council were disturbed, however, by what they termed the "unsettled state of the militia." To improve readiness all colonels and justices were directed to list every person who were "Qualified either in Estate or person to find and Maintain a Man and Horse. . . or go themselves 109 when Occasion shall require." Although the Indian threat was not as great as it had been in the past, the disbanding of the rangers had been preraattiBQ. Lacking good intelligence, the movement of a few Indians from Maryland to Virginia in March, 16 89, was exaggerated by colonists to the point that a considerable French-Indian threat ’was visualized. Accordingly, as a partial defense, the rangers were reestablished, although the size of’each troop was only eleven men. The ranger concept was 108 Hening, 0 £. cit., III, p. 38. 109Council Order, October 24, 1687, in Mcllwaine (ed.), Executive Journals of the Council of Colonial Virginia, 1680- 1754 CRichmond: vTrgTnia State Library, 1925-1945), I, p. 85. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 8 2 continued during 1691. In 1693 the ranger forces were to consist of eleven men and two Indians, in addition to a lieutenant leading the group.The number of rangers fluctuated with the apparent need, the appearance of strange Indians on the border being enough to increase the force. In 1694 the rangers at the headwaters of the Potomac were reinforced by eighteen men, as was the unit at the head of the James River.In 1697 the figure of twelve troopers was reported as being assigned to the head of each 112 of the four rivers. During this period one of the more unusual uses of the militia was to restrain the cutters of tobacco plants in Gloucester County, north of the York River. These people in 168.2 were destroying the tobacco plants in an effort to reduce the supply and thus to raise prices. The insurrection spread to other counties, and the.British soldiers of the companies remaining in Virginia threatened to side with the plant cutters ‘due to lack of pay. To restrain such a disturbance the "militia horse of Gloucester and New Kent "^■^Hening, op. cit. , III, pp. 82-85, 98-99,119. "'■^British Colonial. Papers, Class CO -5/1307, Letter of Sir Edmund Andros to Sir John Bromhard, July 21, 1694 (Micro film in C. W. R. L., SR #402, Reel M-234). 112 British Colonial Papers, Class CO 5/1309, Pamphlet by Hartwell, Blair, and Chilton to the Commission for Trade and Plantations, October 20, 1697. (Microfilm in C.. W. R. L., SR #404, Reel M-234). Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 8 3 are ordered to be in motion, by such means it’s hoped, the 113 peace of the government will be maintained." Order was restored. Later in the same decade (1688) William'Fitzhugh, commanding the militia of Stafford County, was ordered to surpress a threatened uprising due to the rabblerousing " 114 preaching of one John Waugh. The Intercontinental Threat This discussion has been concerned almost entirely with the organization of def.ense against the "local" threat— the Indians. Although against enemies from without there was little defense, planned or carried out, there did exist an international threat. That the struggling colony existed at all during its early years was more due to the inattention of England’s enemies— particularly S.pain— than to colonial defense. When the English Fleet arrived in Virginia in 1652, prepared to enforce the will of the Commonwealth, it appeared . that there would be bloodshed, as Berkeley had prepar’ed the colony to resist. About 1000 to 1200 militia were in Jamestown and Indian allies promised aid.^^^ Moderation Letter of Nicholas Spenser tor Sir Lyonel Jenkins, June 7, 1682. British Colonial Papers, Class CO.1/48. (Micro film in C. W. R. L., SR #748, Reel M-327). 114 Louis B. Wright, The First Gentlemen of Virginia, (San Marino, California: • Huntington Library, 1^40),pp, 171-172. 115 "Renort of the Commissioners," Virginia Magazine, XI (19 04), pp*. 33-34. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 8 4 prevailed, however, and the English commissioners with their fleet and Governor Berkeley managed to establish a middle ground that satisfied both British sovereignty and colonial liberty. Although the aristocracy and the small freeholders were overwhelmingly in favor of the Church of England, as opposed to Puritan tenets, the smaller planters could look 116 with some "sympathy upon the cause of the English Commons." This latter class of Virginians was being continually re inforced as the indentured servants completed their bondage and acquired their first fifty acres of land. After the Commonwealth there was no question of a threat from England, except to the rebels during Bacon's Rebellion, and any external menace to the colony came from other continental powers. The interest of the British Crown in the colonial militia waxed and waned according to the worldwide pressures of international conflict. Typical of British concern over the Spanish were the instructions to Yeardley, which warned of the possible presence of Spanish ships in the Chesapeake - a threat that never materialized. The Dutch, in fact, became a more dan- 116 Thomas J. Wertenbaker, Virginia Under -the Stuarts, 1607-1688, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, IHTTJ pp. 92-93. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 8 5 gerous enemy, and the King directed the governor to place the colony in the "best posture of defense he possibly could." Governor Berkeley therefore, in 1665, ordered "all colonels of regiments within this colony forthwith to draw their regiments together at their respective usual places and 117 there to survey their arms. ..." His order also directed that smiths be impressed to "fix" the weapons; that all troops be ready to march on two days notice; and that shore batteries be built by selected militiamen to. protect colonial ships at anchor. Defenses against men of war were primarily forts, although Berkeley called out fifteen hundred dragoons of the militia and placed an additional ’tw.enty-five ■I TO hundred foot soldiers on a two day alert status. In 1666 the command level of the militia system, officers and justices of peace, were alerted in order to establish surveil lance over a Dutch man-of-war. Two English merchantmen were sunk, and during the following year a Dutch fleet again caused considerable havoc in the roads of Chesapeake Bay. Berkeley, in an effort to stop the Dutch, called out the 117 Order of the Governor and Council, June 21, 1665, in Mcllwaine (ed.), Minutes of the Council and General Court. Robinson’s Notes, ppl! 484-48^7 118 British Colonial Papers, Class CO 1/19, Letter From Berkeley, August 1, 1665, (Microfilm in C. W. R. L., SR #718, Reel M-304). Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 8 6 militia and assumed direct command of the available merchant men reinforcing them with additional armament. His labors were in vain as the English captains refused to move against the superior Dutch fleet. In 1673 Berkeley once more took steps to repel the Dutch and directed that fifty militia be pre- 119 pared to board to protect English merchantmen. Most of the merchantmen were saved, but the results of the action were due to naval, not militia, factors. During the French and English war of 169 0 fear of French men-of-war arose and preparations were made to have English ships move to the shelter of a fort. The French never came. The Governor and Council at times were concerned with threats from sources other than the Indians and the European powers, namely, neighbors and pirates. In 1697 the militia and rangers of Stafford County were directed that none from the "Government of Maryland be suffered to 120 treat with the Indians" in Virginia. Two years later commanders of the militia of the counties were ordered to take "particular care" in order to seize Captain Kidd, who was then terrorizing the coastal waters. -*-2^ 119 Minutes of April 22, 167 3, in Mcllwaine (ed.), Minutes of the Council and General Court, p. 334. 120 Council Order of August 12, 1697, in Mcllwaine, Executive Journals of the Council, I, p. 371. 121 Council Order of April 18, 1699, Executive Journals of the Council, I, p. 422. ' Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 87 The Century Summarized. The problems of defense of Colonial Virginia were based primarily on land, for as it was seized from the Indian it became something to be defended. More colonists meant more land cleared, more contact with the Indian, and finally relaxed vigilance. After the massacre of 164 4 there was anger and retaliation, but also a recognition of the need for the Indian to have a guarantee of his rights to land. In spite of agreements with the Indian, by the time of / Bacon's Rebellion the English planters had more land than 12 2 "they were safely able to hold," and a major problem for the colony for the next few years was how to best de fend these lands. Centralized control of the militia was not fully 12 3 developed until the time of the Restoration. The governor of the province, in addition to his political function, had concurrent duties as the commander in chief of all the military forces. His responsibilities included attending such musters as was feasible, settling disputes among the militia officers, and designating the colonels of 122 British Colonial Papers, Class CO 1/36, Letter from Berkeley to [n. n.], April 1, 1676. (Microfilm in C. W. R. L.,’ SR #7 36, Reel M-317). 123 Philip A. Bruce, History of Virginia, Colonial Period, 1607-1763, p. 289. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 8 8 the militia regiments and usually all officers above the 124- rank of lieutenant. Vacancies in the officer ranks were filled after recommendations were made by the 125 commander in chief of the counties. Even the very great authority of the governor had its limitations, of course, such as that imposed by the distance and poor communications to parts of the colony from the capital. A reflection of this certain freedom from central authority is found in Nicholson*s concern over offices with "strange and unusual powers” such as the "Ranger General" of the 12 6 Northern Neck. Direct control of the militia initially rested in the "commanders of the plantation" who beginning in 1629 were to raise such men for the militia as could be 12 7 spared "without too much weakening of the plantations." Later the county fulfilled this function. 124 Philip Bruce, Institutional History of the Seventeenth Century, II, pp. 27-28. IT. H . Gipson, The British Empire Before the American Revolution (Caldwell, Idaho: I’he Caxton Printers, Ltd., 1936-1561), II, p. 27. 125 Council Order, June 7, 1699, in Mcllwaine (ed.), Executive Journals of the Council, I, p. 448. ■*"^British Colonial Papers, Class CO 5/1306 , Letter from Nicholson and the Council to the Committee for Trade and Plantations, April 27, 1691. (Microfilm in C. W. R.L., SR #401, Reel M-233). 127 Hening, ££. cit., I, p. 140. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 89 The system of financial support for the militia was a county system and so it remained until 1672. The counties raised money by special taxes and from the proceeds purchased powder and ammunition for distribution to the militia. In case the public service required "many hands” the governor with his council could levy manpower, although in the face of "sudden incursions of the Indians" no such TOO formal action was required. The militia of one county could not be directed to send its forces to the assistance of another county, unless the Assembly so authorized by statue. In this case the county receiving aid was to pay the expenses of the succouring county. When war was declared 12 9 the cost was borne by the entire colony. As the end of the century approached the relationship of the people with their governor was better than it had been before the Glorious Revolution of 1688. Nevertheless, the cost of maintaining the border force would have been considered more onerous were not the adventurous- duty popular with the rangers themselves and the cost borne not only in part by a levy on the tithables, but supported to a degree 128Ibid., p. 172. 129 Hening, o£. cit., II, p. 327. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 9 0 13 0 by an import duty on tobacco. In 1695, for example, the pay for the thirty-six extra rangers raised the 131 previous year was solved by a levy on tobacco. The Virginia militia included the freemen of the province. This membership excluded both slaves and indentured servants, although the latter were used if their period of in denture was nearly terminated. The general exclusion of slave and servant was based on the need to use both groups 132 * in the fields and on the fear of their loyalty in combat. It was considered, however, that the servant about to be released would identify his interests with the free com munity and could thus be trusted. In spite of fear of the Negro there was no formalized provision for slave patrols before the eighteenth century. , The backbone of the militia system was the militia itself, on which lay the responsibility and power to defend the colony once the warning had been given. The efficiency of this body was suspect at times, or in any case, succeeding governors usually found reason for reorganization of one 130 Herting, o£. c i t ., III, p. 124. 1 31 British Colonial Papers, Class CO 5/1308, Letter from Governor Andros to the Committee for Trade and Plantation, June 4, 1695. (Microfilm in C. W. R. L. , SR #403, Reel" M-234'). 132 Bruce, Institutional History, II, p. 6. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 9 1 sort or another. Effingham, for example, considered that efficiency could be improved in the militia by appointing Council members as commanders in chief of the counties. The Present State of Virginia, written in 1697, stated that although the command of county forces was given to the "Gentlemen of the Council, with the Title of Colonel," if "the command of any County lies very remote from all the Counsellors, then the Governor gives that to some other Person, under the Title of Major. Proficiency was to be maintained for the unit as a whole by annual regimental exercises to be conducted by 134 ,the colonel. The company commander or commander of a cavalry troop was expected to train his command every quarter. This was the system that was standard among the counties. The sanctions for failure to report for drill or to obey commands were severe, as the Act of 1675 was still in effect at the end of the century and its Articles of War included as punishment severing of the hand that was ■ 13 5 raised against a military superior. 13 3 Henry Hartwell and others. The Present State of Virginia, (ed.) H. D. Farish, (Williamsburg: Colonial Williams- burg, Incorporated, 1940), p. 64. 134 Hening, og_. cit., III, p. 14. ^^ H e n i n g , o p . cit. , II, p. 334. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 9 2 Appointing Councillors as county commanders and meting out harsh penalties did not lead automatically, however, to a proficient militia. A communication by Nicolson to the county sheriffs reveals that new inhabitants were failing to register in the militia— to the Governor’s X 3 6 great displeasure. As he toured the colony immediately after the Glorious Revolution, Nicolson found ’’the militia poorly organized, badly disciplined, and ill-armed because 137 of poverty.” Andros in 1693 also complained that the X 3 8 militia was poorly armed. There apparently were those in command who were not equal to their responsibilities. Extracts of a letter to the governor from Colonel John Thornton of Spotsylvania illustrate, if not accurate charges, at least the type of objection one officer of the militia could have toward another, in this case toward the county lieutenant, Colonel Spotswood. Communication by governor to sheriffs, December 2, 1690, in Mcllwaine (ed.), Executive Journals, I, p. 155; Order to sheriffs, December 8, 1691, in Mcllwaine (ed.), Executive Journals, I, p. 210. The county sheriff was often the means of executive communication to county officials. 137 Richard L. Morton, Struggle Against Tyranny, and the Beginning of a New Era, Virginia, 1577-16*99, Jamestown 350th Anniversary“'Historical Booklet, No. 9 (Williamsburg: 350th Anniversary Celebration Corporation, 1957), p. 50. X 3 8 British Colonial Papers, Class CO 5/1308, Letter from Andros to Commissioners for Trade and Plantations, July 22, 1693. (Microfilm in C. W. R. L., SR #403, Reel M-234). Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 9 3 . . .Spotswood has given a Captain’s Commission to Aaron Bledsoe, a person that has neither Slave nor Land in the County. . . . the said Colonel Spotswood gets often in Liquor and Acts much out of Character . . . particularly at the Musters. . . .-*-3 There were also factors that can lead to the conclusion that the Virginia militia at the end of the cen tury was satisfactory. The important, respected, and most capable men of the colony officered the mi'litia, as rosters demonstrate. ’’The chief magistrate and the colonel were more often than not the same man, and everywhere a majority of the commissioners of militia held place in the county court. The great planters were ’’the commanders of the militia in their respective counties. . . had the respon sibility of insuring their localities against Indian attacks 14-1 and of protecting outlying regions in time of danger.” Craven states that "The title of 'commander' disappeared after the middle of the century, when separate militia commissions were issued for each county to a board of officers whose head usually carried the rank of colonel, but the basic administrative principle of the earlier system 13 9 William P. Palmer (ed.), Calendar of State Papers (Richmond: State Library, 1875), I, pp. 140 Craven, The Southern Colonies in the Seventeenth Century, p. 277. 141 . . • Wright, First Gentlemen of Virginia, p. 65. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 9 4 continued in effect." 1 4 2 The lessened use of the term "com mander" was paralleled by greater acceptance of the title "lieutenant." By the end of the colonial period this latter term had full acceptance. Another factor leading to a viable militia organization was that the governor was not only the head of the political government, but as the military commander in chief provided 143 a centralized command over all the militia. Host governors accepted this responsibility for martial matters. Nicholson, for example, ordered that the sheriffs were to require the captains of "Horse, Dragoons and foot within your County, to return . . . an Exact List of the Names of the Soldiers under their Command. ..." This report was also to include a des cription of orders, received and the names of able-bodied men 144 not on the militia list. Further, the people considered there to be a need for a militia to defend their homes, and, therefore, they generally supported the system. The interest in the militia of the average citizen seemed to be in proportion to what he considered to.be the need. ' At the time of Bacon’s Rebellion the 142 ■ Craven, The Southern Colonies in the Seventeenth Century, pp. 2 76-27T7 143 Alexander Brown, The Genesis of the United States (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin and Company, 1890)7 I, p.—77". 144 British Colonial Papers, Class CO 5/1306, Order by the Lieutenant Governor of Virginia to the Sheriffs of the Counties, December 8, 1691. (Microfilm in C. W. R. L., SR #401, Reel M-233). Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 95 People of Charles City County (near Merchants Hope) being denied a Commission by the Governor . . . begin to beat up. drums for Volunteers to go out against the Indians...... The Rout being got together now wanted nor waited for nothing but one to head and lead thein out on their design. It so happened that one Nathaniel Bacon Junior . . . v.l45* The principle of effective leadership wa's applied at both colony and county level during the period and county response to the colony's directives appears to have been satisfactory. An example of county action taken after receiving a directive (Act) from the Assembly is found in 146 Northumberland County records. . . .Captain James Brereton moved the Court that the militia under each of the said respective Gentle men's command might be supplied with arms and ammuni tion according to direction of an Act of Assembly. . . . The county court records reveal that militia unit commanders would purchase special items of equipment, such as musical instruments, and then be reimbursed by the '".ounty. The militia acts were to be read to its members twice a year (1690) at which time the militiamen were to be told what was the disposition of the fines collected locally. "Narratives of the Commissioners," Andrews, op. c i t ., p. 109. A "Rout" is a body of men. 146 "Captain William Lee of Northumberland County," Virginia Magazine, XXXVIII (1930), pp. 80-81. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 96 This last was a precaution lest the troops consider the proceeds were being kept by officials and not used for the 14? paraphernalia of war. Another example of how a county reacted to orders by the Assembly to raise militia is contained in a letter from the county lieutenant of Stafford County to Governor Nicholas Spencer in 1688 in which the former states that he prefers to send fewer, well trained men from the county than a large number of rabble ”... conceiving that a full number with a soldier like appearance is far more suitable and com mendable than a far greater number presenting themselves 14 g in the field with clubs and staves. ..." A rationale for the ill-armed troops was that many of the inhabitants were so poor and "Indigent that the officers cannot Compel them to Equip themselves as by Law they are obliged." England 149 was asked to provide arms, swords, bayonets and ammunition. As to the overall efficiency of the militia, the historian Beverley considered that 147 Meeting of October 23, 1690, in Mcllwaine (ed.), Executive Journals, I, p. 134. 148 "Letters of William Fitzhugh," Virginia Magazine, II, p. 264. 149 British Colonial Papers, Class CO 5/1306, Letter of Lieutenant Governor and Council to the Committee for Trade and Plantations, April 27, 1691. (Microfilm in C. W. R. L., SR #400, Reel M-233). Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 97 The People there are very Skillful in the use of Firearms, being all their Lives accustomed to shoot in the woods. This, together with a little exer cising would soon make the Militia little inferior to Regular Troops.”150 Nicolson in his travels of 1690, was dissatisfied with the conditions of the militia, not evaluating the militia as either '’well armed or disciplined. His Council, however, considered that there was nothing wrong with the current militia act (16 84) that could not be 152 remedied by "Effectual Execution." And proper execution depended on the interest of the people in defense as of a given moment. Lacking an Indian war to prepare for, there was probably a considerable decline in efficiency at the end of the century. Robert Quary considered the militia lacked training and discipline in spite of the Governor's efforts. He also noted a shortage of arms and ammunition and stressed the difficulty of defending Virginia from the sea 153 due to its geography. At about the same time Andros, Robert Beverley, The History and Present State of Virginia, (ed.), Louis B. Wright (Chapel^ hill: University of North Carolina, 1947), p. 269. 151 British Colonial Papers, Class CO 5/1305, Letter of Francis Nicholson to the Committee for Trade and Plantations, August 20, 1690. (Microfilm in C. W. R. L., SR #400, Reel M-2 33). 152 Meeting of Council, July 24, 1690, in Mcllwaine (ed.), Executive Journals of the Council, op. cit., I, p. 120. 153 British Colonial Papers, Class CO 5/1312, Report Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 98 as governor designate, requested not only arms and other war stores, but "humbly prayed" that one hundred grenadiers 154 be sent from England. The same Sir Robert Ouary stated, however, in his report to the Board of Trade in 1703 that "the militia of this province is under far better regulation than any other government in the main." He ascribed this relative efficiency to the fact that the militia was in "the hands of very good officers, and his excellency doth by himself exercise the men very frequently when time can be best spared without the least injury to the planters." This statement by Ouary, the British surveyor-general of the customs, was made 155 after having visited several British colonies. Beverley, writing his history in 17 05 described the militia problem of the Virginians: from Robert Quary to Commissioners for Trade and Plantations, March 1702. (Microfilm in C. W. R. L., SR #407, Reel M-2 36). 154 British Colonial Papers, Class CO 5/13 58, Letter from Andros to Commissioners for Trade and Plantations, [n.d.l. (Microfilm in Virginia State Library, SR #2 57, Frame 142). 155 British Colonial Papers, Class CO 324/8, Quary's Report to Board of Trade, December 1, 1703. (Microfilm in C. W. R. L., SR #943, Reel M-439). Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 99 They have the Indians round about in Subjection, and have no sort of Apprehension from them; And for a Foreign Enemy, it can never be worth their while to ca.rry troops sufficient to conquer the Country; for the scattering Method their Settlement, will not answer the charge of an Expedition to plunder them. 5 There being a need for defense during the period, and since command in general rested in responsible individuals, the result was at least satisfactory during a greater part of the seventeenth century. The system appears to have been a practical solution tailored to the primary threat, the Indian. Response to the threat was usually swift enough and in sufficient force that the defense of the colony was assured - at least for the time being. 156 Beverley, o d . cit., p. 268. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. CHAPTER' IV THE FIRST HALF OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY I. THE MILITIA UNDER NICHOLSON The first half of the eighteenth century provided Virginia fewer problems of defense than had the previous century. The Indian threat had moved from the settled areas of the east and the French, for their part, concentrated their efforts elsewhere on the continent. King William’s War, which ended in 16 97, was supported by Virginia with limited funds, but not with troops. Although the governors of the Colony were instructed by England to assist, if need be, any other British colony, cooperation between colonies was spasmodic.^ A reason given for the failure of the House of Burgesses to provide a force to assist other colonies is found in the belief of the legislators that troops would 2 "quit" the colony for fear of being sent to New York. Upon hearing dissents to the plan for aiding New York with 240 militiamen, Nicholson declared he would "lend a thousand '*’H. R. Mcllwaine (ed.), The Journals of the House of Burgesses, 1700-1702 (Richmond! virgima"STtaTfe Library, T?T05-i915, pp. 318-319. ^British Colonial Papers, Class CO 5/1312, Minutes of the House of Burgesses, September Cn.d.], 1701. (Microfilm In (TT”W. R. L., SR $407, Reel M-236). Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. . 1 0 1 3 pounds'* for the enterprise. After 1700 there is more evidence of mutual assistance. The next war, Queen Anne’s (17 01-1713), was fought again primarily in the north, although South Carolina felt the impact of a naval attack on Charleston by a French-Spanish fleet. Virginia provided its former governor, Francis Nicholson, as commander of the joint force from England and New England that seized Port Royal. Then international peace lasted from 1713 to 17 39, when England and Spain began a war that became the European-wide War of the Austrian Succession - a war in which Virginia was to again become involved in a limited role. During the early years of the eighteenth century the Colony of Virginia was favored with such good governors as Francis Nicholson and Alexander Spotswood. The Burgesses and the governor were not always in agreement, however - many times due to the reluctance of the Assembly to spend money on defense in spite of colonial fears of French expansion and Indian incursions and the urgings from England to improve the militia. The guidance to Nicholson.was that ^Council Meeting, April 2*+, 1696, in Mcllwaine (ed.), Executive Journals of the Council, 1680-1754 (Richmond: Virginia State Library"! 1925-19^5), 'I "P* 343 . Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 102 the militia should be "duly regulated and frequently exercised, Li so as to render them useful whenever there maybe Occasion*" Governor and Council in 1701 ordered that the county commissioners report the status of arms and ammunition and its location in the counties.^ The Council’s proclamation also warned that the militia should be ready for muster on an hour's notice and that coast watchers should be positioned. The Assembly passed an act for ’’strengthening the frontiers, and discovering the approaches of an enemy." The act pro vided encouragement to settle on the frontiers, settlers being exempt from taxes for twenty years and from military g obligation, except for their own defense. To provide defense a completely equipped man was ordered to be made available for each five hundred acreas of land granted in pursuance 7 of the act. The act also stipulated that a fort be built on land so acquired. In the same act, but unrelated to frontier defense, was the requirement for the maritime counties 4 British Colonial Papers, Class C.O. 5/1360, Letter from Board of Trade to Nicholson, December 4, 170 0. (Microfilm in Virginia State Library, SR #829, Frame 60). 5 Herbert L. Osgood, The American Colonies in the Eighteenth Century (New York: Macmillan"^ 1904-1977)7 p. 170. 6 William W. Hening, The Statutes at Large (New York: R and W and G Bartow, 1823)7 I’ll , pp. 204-209. 7Ibid., p. 207. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 103 to call out the militia upon receiving notice of the approach 8 of an enemy. The militia was to be paid for its service if it remained "out above four days." By 1701 frontier duty had changed sufficiently that a recommendation was made in Council that the militia be "all horse and dragoons."^ The militia in 1703 was divided into 2,363 light horse and 7,159 foot and dragoons - a ratio of approximately one horse to three foot/dragoons generally maintained in all the counties. The consistent proportion seems to indicate that the variations in terrain and pros perity of the people did not cause a change in the proportion of horsemen. Beverley did believe, however, that the availability of horses to the planters made it a simple matter for foot soldiers to be converted to dragoons. Following the passage of the Act of 1701 the governor received his reports of the status of the militia, and they were not, in general, satisfactory. Nicholson considered that the militia was not well-equipped, trained, or disciplined.^ 8Ibid., p. 209. Q Council Minutes of April 25, 1701, in Mcllwaine (ed.) Executive Journals of the Council, II, p. 138. ^Robert Beverley, The History and Present State of Virginia, (ed.) Louis B. Wright (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1947), p. 269. "^British Colonial Papers, Class CO 5/1360, Letter from Nicholson to Lords of Trade, December 2, 1701. (Microfilm in C. W. R. L., SR #829, Reel M-228; British Colonial Papers, Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 104 He was concerned over slow reaction time, considering that it would require a fortnight to field a force of a thousand men. The governor pointed out to his superiors in London that the militia leadership lacked experience, many years having passed since a body of men of any size had served against an enemy. It is pertinent to extract from the report by Robert Quary (1702) on the state of the defense of the colony. He considered that the militia was "so undisciplined and unskillful and in such great Want of arms and ammunition proper and fit for action, that not one fourth of the militia is fit to oppose an Enemy." In order to obtain strength Quary stated that the "militia must be drawn from all parts 12 of the country." Apparently in reply to Nicholson’s report of the state of defense, the Board of Trade proposed that the governor consider the solution adopted by Maryland where the number of serviceable weapons was increased by obliging all masters ". . .to furnish their men Servants with a gun of Class CO 5/1312, Abstract of Militia Lists, October 1701. (Microfilm in C. W. R. L., SR #407, Reel M-236). Review of the list of county troops and arms indicates there was a sufficient number of muskets, but their condition is not indicated on the report. The same list reveals what appears to be a great excess of officers considering the number of enlisted personnel. ■^-British Colonial Papers, Class CO 5/1360, Report from Quary to the Lords of Trade, March 17, 1702. (Micro film in Virginia State Library, SR #829, Frames 107 and 111). Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1 0 5 1 3 20 shillings value" at the end of their period of servitude. The concern over the state of defense apparently had its effect on the Assembly, for in 1705 a detailed militia bill was passed which stressed the responsibility of command and the obligation to serve. This legislation, the most complete for twenty five years, listed as exceptions to those eligible for militia service high officials of the colony, justices, clerks of the court, overseers, slaves, and inden tured servants. Officials, however, were required to provide themselves with arms, and to serve as "gentlemen" in case 14 of invasion or rebellion. The colonel, or chief officer of the militia, of each county was directed to have a new list prepared that assigned all male, persons to troops and companies. The general muster and exercise was to be annually, and the musters of companies were to be quarterly--both 15 types to be held "oftener if there be occasion." A great part of the act was devoted to the fines that could be levied- and how they were to be collected. The act was clear in the provisions that there would be a sale of the goods and chatties of the militiaman if he defaulted in the payment of 13 British Colonial Papers, Class C.O. 5/1360, Letter from Board of Trade to Nicholson, November 4, 1702. (Microfilm in the Virginia State Library, SR #8 29, Frame 320). 14 Hening, op. cit., Ill, t>. 337. 15 Ibid., p. 3 39. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. his fines. Turning to the logistics side of militia administration, powder was distributed to the counties based on need— four barrels to the frontier and coastal counties, and two to those in the interior. The issue of the powder was controlled 16 as powder was to be sold to only militiamen. There apparently was a degree of credit extended to finance the common defense, as those buying arms from county stores were 17 given time to pay for them. II. GOVERNOR SPOTSWOOD Between 1706 and 1710 there was no governor in Virginia and the General Assembly did not meet. In the absence of a governor the president of the Council performed the former’s duties. Accordingly, Colonel Edmund Jenings, in the face of possible raids by the French, alerted the militia and 18 took preparatory action. When the new governor, Alexander Spotswood, assumed his office, he felt that there was much to do, his philosophy being that of a strong executive. In the second decade there were several possible threats to the 16 Order of Council, November 26, 170 5, in Mcllwaine (ed.), Executive Journals of the Council, III, p. 57. 17 Order of Council, April 27, 1704, in Mcllwaine (ed.), Executive Journals of the Council, II, p. 3 60. 18 British Colonial Papers, Class C.O. 5/1316, Letter from Colonel Jennings to Commanders for Trade and Plantations, March 21, 1708.. (Microfilm in Virginia State Library, SR #409, Frame 66). Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. ,107 security of Spotswood*s colony, the most dangerous probably being the Tuscarora War in North Carolina and the presence of a French naval squadron in the West Indies. Spotswood*s program for defense was based primarily on the construction of forts and the improvement, of the militia. He proceeded to .build forts along the James River, using the authority of the Act of 170 5 noted above, and although his progress was initially slowed by the legislature and Quaker opposition, Spotswood was finally partially successful. He continued the attempts of his predecessors to gain arms and supplies from England and made one rather unusual request for "300 Soldiers Tents," as he considered that his people could not pursue the Indians 19 "through the woods and deserts" without suffering "fatigue." During the "emergency" of 1711 the county militia was to exercise once a week and three units were to be prepared to meet at a point of general rendevous decided by the commanding 20 officer of each county, who was to keep the governor informed. In the summer of 1711 Spotswood called out the militia from the southern counties due to an uprising of a part of the 21 Tuscarora nation. The governor felt that a return to the 19 British Colonial. Papers, Class CO 5/1316, Letter from Spotswood to Commissioners for Trade and Plantations, February 8, 1711. (Microfilm in Virginia State Library, SR #409, Frame 342). 2 0 Order of Council, August 16, 1711, in Mcllwaine (ed.) •Executive Journals of the Council, III, p. 282. 21 Osgood, American Colonies in the Seventeenth Century, II, p. 249. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1 0 8 * old ranger system was advisable in order to protect the frontier settlements in the south from a sudden descent by 22 the Indians. In the late fall of 1712 the Burgesses received an urgent plea for aid from North Carolina, suffering from a series of massacres by the Tuscaroras. The Assembly responded only in part to what the Governor considered to be a great need. A force of one hundred men, divided into two companies, was authorized* and a bounty of forty shillings a man was allocated to encourage volunteers. The Tuscarora problem was actually solved by South Carolinians who administered a military defeat on the Indians after North' Carolina had shown little military initiative and Virginia considerable parsimony. Virginia soon had Indian incursions of its own along the southwestern border. Although the frontier people would clamor for some course to be "taken to.cut off the Indians," upon hearing of a possible incursion, when Spotswood arranged for tents and provisions for a march their "warmth Letter from Spotswood to Lord Dartmouth, November 11, 1711, in Virginia Historical Society, The Official Letters of Alexander Spotswood (Richmond: Virginia Historical Society, 18 84), I , pp. 123-124. Henceforth to be entitled Spotswood Papers; 2 2 * Herbert L. Osgood, The American Colonies in the Eighteenth Century * II, p. 2 29. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1 0 9 was so much abated,” that the governor could not get to- 23 gether his planned forces. After noting the response of the militia to calls to active duty Spotswood evaluated the militia officers as inefficient and the rank and file 2 4 as lacking in enthusiasm to go far from their homes. Spots wood solved this threat by employing a combination of rangers, treaties, and the establishment of new settlements. Then, in February 1715, the governor, apparently tired of improvision, proposed, that a standing force of three thousand footmen and fifteen hundred horsement be substituted for the traditional militia system of universal obligation. This plan was abused by the Burgesses as a device to centralize power in the gover- 2 5 nor. There was mistrust on the part of the governor, as well, and, in an effort to swing support to his side, he cited the nepotism present in the Council and hoped that the Board 2 6 find his recommendation "less interested." 2 3 British Colonial Papers, Class CO 5/1317, Letter from Spotswood to Commissioners for Trade and Plantations, November 16, 1713. (Microfilm in Virginia State Library SR #412, Frame 92). 24 British Colonial Papers, Class CO 5/1316, Letter from Governor Spotswood to. Commissioners for Trade and Plantations, September 14, 1713. (Microfilm in Virginia State Library SR #409, Frame 66). 25 Letter from Spotswood to the Lords Commissioners of Trade and Plantations, February 7, 1715, Spotswood Letters, o p . cit., II, p. 211. o c British Colonial Papers, Class CO 5/1370, Abstract of Letter of Spotswood to the Board of Trade, July 26, 1712, (Microfilm in Virginia State Library, SR #849, Frame 43). Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 110 In August of the same year the governor again pleaded 2 7 for the Burgesses to give more attention to defense. This time he was thanked by the Burgesses, who requested that the 2 8 governor present details on how to improve the militia. Among Spotswood's defense plans was a scheme to build a forts at the mountain passes, each to be garrisoned with one hundred men supported out of the Virginia quit rents, or 29 in some similiar fashion from the royal exchequer. The King, for his part, did not see the need to support the militia - which meant in essence "royal” troops on the frontier - when the French and Indian threats were small. He did, however, exempt settlers in the new frontier counties from the payment of quit rents for seven years after a county was formed, * acknowledging the inherent cost of defense along a border. An act of 172 3 stimulated that the inhabitants of the city of Williamsburg, although subject to mustering as militia, were not to be sent beyond the confines of the capital. The logic behind this legislation, as outlined in the act, was that their absence could "render the governor's house, public magazine, and capitol, in the said 27 Journal for August 4, 1715, Mcllwaine, Journals- of 'Burgesses, 1712-1726, p. 122. 28 Ibid., p. 129. ^90sgood, Eighteenth Century, II, p. 252. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. HI 30 city, defenceless in times of danger." Only the governor could send the inhabitants outside the city. As time passed the Burgesses-appeared more and more / reluctant to support elements of the governor's defense program. When the cost of prosecuting a war against the Tuscarora nation was debated by the Burgesses, the governor criticised that body for planning to shift the cost to Great 31 Britain by taxing imports from the mother country. Spotswood, writing to the Council of Trade on the miserliness of the Assembly, stated that "no arguments either of mine 3 2 o r .the Council could obtain the least allowance for them." Spotswood1s policy for the defense of Virginia was not accepted by the Burgesses until near the end of his term, when it was in part, including the placin g of batteries at 3 3 the mouth of the James River as defense against pirates. III. THE ERA OF GOOD FEELING With the departure of Spotswood from the official scene 30 Hening, ££. cit., IV, p. 14 0. 31 Letter from Spotswood to the Council of Trade, December 28, 1711, in Spotswood Letters, I, p. 131. 32 Letter from Spotswood to the Council of .Trade, February 8, 1711, in Spotswood Letters, I, p. 140. Spotswood is referring to militia expenses and the cost of outfitting a "spy boat." o q Letter from Spotswood to the Board of Trade, May 31, 1721, in Spotswood Letters, II, p. 349. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 112 there was an "era of good feeling which was to continue 34__ __ until near the outbreak of the last'colonial war." This period of relative quiet was due to the peaceful conditions beyond Virginia's borders, and the non-controversial nature of William Gooch, who governed Virginia for two decades. Porter considers that "only a few changes" were made in O C the military system during the early eighteenth century. Examples of these changes was an addition to the duties of the sheriff, requiring him in 1738 to collect the fees levied 3 6 by courts martial. There was a sanction placed upon the sheriff to the extent that he was to be penalized for not collecting the fines; this principle was reiterated in 1755 37 and again in 1757. Stress on the use of rangers varied during the period. Four companies had been organized by the Assembly and were kept in being by the Governor. Originally small companies of fifteen men had been established, but on occasion the units grew in size to a body of fifty men. 34 Osgood, Eighteenth Century, IV, p. 83. 3 5 Albert 0. Porter, County Government in Virginia, A Legislative History, 1607-1914 (New ^ork: CoTumbia university Press, 1947), p. 62. 3 6 Hening, ojo. cit., V, p. 22. 37 Ibid., p. 22; Hening, o£. cit., VI, p. 539; VII, p. 101. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 113 Anew development of the period was the Assembly sponsored "lookouts.” The maritime counties, Northhampton, Princess Ann, Elizabeth City and Accomac, appointed lookouts to watch for ships of the enemy. These officials were * appointed by the commanding officer of the militia with pay of two hundred pounds of tobacco a month, a sum that remained consistant in three acts that outlined this duty (1701, 1727, 3 8 and 1748). • There was periodic interest in the readiness of the militia, but not to the degree evinced by Spotswood and Nicholson. Governor Drysdele complained that the militia was ill armed, "notwithstanding the strict penalties inflicted by Law" for not complying. The principal rationale for a low state of readiness was the poverty of the "Planters who compose the body of the militia" - due to the low price of 39 tobacco. The function of the militia as an agency of law en forcement was demonstrated during the 17 32 riots along the Potomac River— the trouble arising from a British statute forbiding planters to "strip, stem or cut" their tobacco 38 Henning, on. cit., VI, p. 115. 3 9 British Colonial Papers, Class C.O. 5/1320, Letter from Drysdele to the Commissioners for Trade and Plantations, June 29, 1726. (Microfilm in C. W. R. L., SR #415, Reel M-241). Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 114 before shipping it abroad. The Caroline County militia was mustered by Governor Gooch and "placed on guard along the south bank of the Rappahannock to keep the rioters from crossing that stream . . . Gooch reported in 1742 that the militia comprised 17 5 companies of foot and 102 troops of horse. The foot com panies were of sixty men and the horse, fifty, totaling about 16,000 men, "above twenty-one years of age and under sixty." Gooch described the county organization as including a county lieutenant, a colonel, a lieutenant colonel and a major, with some large counties having two majors. He also made the point that for some time there had been an Adjutant "whose business it is to instruct the Officers and Soldiers in the use and exercise of their Arms. And he has made a good progress therein." Gooch'considered that * . 41 the "ordinary people" required a "good deal of polishing." The lack of major change in the organization of the militia can be laid to several factors, primary being that Virginia was not facing any acute defense problems during the first half of the century, and, therefore, the traditional ^ T . E. Campbell, Colonial Caroline (Richmond: The Dietz Press, 1954), pp. 7 3-74. 41 British Colonial Papers, Class C.O. 5/1325, Letter from Colonel William Gooch to Board of Trade, August 11, 1742. (Microfilm in C. W. R. L., SR #788, Reel M-242). Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 115 system was neither tested nor questioned. Further, the militia system was based on the realities of the social structure of Virginia and on long standing English traditions. The position of importance the militia at the beginning of the period, and particularly of the militia officers, is demonstrated by "Loyal Addresses" to the King made by groups of county officials in 1701. Two groups, justices of the peace and the officers of the militia apparently considered their support a matter of sufficient importance that many letters were written to the monarch attesting to continuing 42 loyalty. If there had been any tendency to change the organization radically it was most unlikely to have occurred during the long tenure as governor of William Gooch. Amiable by nature, he sought harmony rather than attempting to press personal programs. He left the governorship, greatly beloved, in 1749, after serving for twenty two years. IV. THE MILITIA AND SLAVERY During the period of the first half century the most significant change in the militia concept was the placing of more emphasis on internal security, in the sense of protection against an uprising of the Negro. In spite of the general 42 British Colonial Papers, Class C.O. 5/1312, Addresses from County Officials, 1701-1702. (Microfilm in. C. W. R. L., Part II, SR #407, Reel M-236). Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 116 docility of the Negro slaves there were a few examples of plotted insurrection that assisted in keeping alive the harsh penalties to Negro wrongdoers and prompted the legis lation on "patrol” duty for the militia. As early as 1687 the Northern Neck was saved from a slave insurrection by the timely discovery of the plot. The first law to protect against servile insurrection appears to be that of 1702 listed in the Calendar of State Papers. In the same year Quary considered that "an Insurrection from our own Servants and Slaves is greatly to be feared," as he expfected them to 4 5 "Join with the Enemy." Hening reports the reward of free dom to the slave "Will" for having revealed the plot of an 46 insurrection in Surry County (1710). Campbell notes that, about 1718, a group of fugitives from justice, "native •Indians who dared defy their chiefs’ truces with the colonial government" and "recently imported Negro slaves who had run away from their masters," formed a band and spread terror along the fall line in the northern part of Virginia. "All • 4 3 John Daly Burk, History of Virginia from Its First Settlement to the Present Day (Petersburg: Dickson and Pescud, 1805), II, p. 3 W . 44 Gerald M. West, The Status of the Negro in Virginia During the Colonial Period (New York: William Jenkins, l889(?)T7~p. 38. ' 4 5 British Colonial Papers, Class CO 5/1360, Letter from Robert Quary to Lords of Trade, March 17, 1702. (Micro film in Virginia State Library, SR #829, Frame 111). ^Hening, op_. cit. , III, p. 537. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 117 the able-bodied men among the settlers who lived in the region to be Caroline, not needed to protect homesteads, joined 47 a posse which pursued these brigands night and day. ..." The matter was of sufficient consequence for the Commissioners of Trade to refer to the matter in correspondence with the gov ernor of Virginia expressing their hopes that the punishment of the Negro conspirators would serve as an "example for the rest. . . . In September 1722 another plot for a slave insurrection was uncovered and an Act of May 172 3, and subsequent acts reflect the fear of colonials and the steps taken to control this potential menace. The slaves, of course, were exempt from militia duty in order to keep arms from them. In addition, overseers of four slaves or more were exempt, that they might remain with their charges. Free Negroes, mulattoes, and Indians were "to attend and march with the militia, and to do the duty of pioneers. . ." 49 upon any invasion, insurrection or rebellion. Passed in the same session (172 3) was, another act devoted to the control and trial of- slaves. Groupings of more than five 47 Campbell, ojo. cit. , p. 44. 48 British Colonial Papers, Class CO 5/1335, Letter from Commissioners of Trade to Spotswood, August 28, 1710, (Microfilm in C. W. R. L., SR #798, Reel M-245). 49 Hening, ojs. cit., IV, p. 119. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 118 slaves which should conspire to rebel or make insurrection were to be adjudged guilty of a felony and be subject to the death penalty. This act was in great detail and included punishment by "dismembering” in case of "incorrigible" 50 runaways. Some exceptions to the rule that Negroes would not be permitted to possess arms existed in the frontier, plantations. The passage of the Act of 172 3 "arose from the need of arming the militia as a protection against the Indians and against what was coming to be the more dreaded peril of 51 slave insurrections." Raising money for militia expenses by placing duty upon slaves met opposition from both Virginians and British, as it reduced profits, and the British govern- 52 ment disallowed the colonial measure. The requirement to raise money continued, however, and the measure, modified to the extent that the buyer of the slave rather than the shipper was to pay the tax, passed the Assembly in 1732 and finally the review of the British authorities. During 17 2 7 an act for "making more effective pro- 50 Ibid., pp. 12 6,13 2. ^Osgood, Eighteenth Century, IV, p. 85. ^Ibid. , p. 86. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 119 vision against invasions and insurrections” described how possible slave insurrections were to be controlled. The Christmas, Easter, and Whitsuntide holidays were considered to be danger periods due to the large numbers of Negroes 53 free of their accustomed labor. To provide protection the commanding officer of each county militia was authorized to call out the militia and to conduct a patrol ”, . . for dispersing all unusual concourse of Negroes, or other slaves, and for preventing any dangerous combinations. ...” The parties on patrol were to have full authority to take up any slaves which they found gathered together and deliver them to a constable. If the militia remained out for more than two days on patrol duty they were to be paid for their time. To make the .militia more ready an Adjutant was appointed, primarily to teach the "officers in those Counties most exposed to danger.” The enemy to Gooch was "the Indians or 5 5 ■ the intestine insurrections of Slaves” or convicts. Gooch showed apprehension over the slave problem, citing cases of house burnings by Negroes and of "a young white Woman' burnt in her bed.” » 53Ibidi, IV, p. 202. Ibid. 55 British Colonial Papers, Class CO 5/1321, Letter from Gooch to Commissioners for Trade and Plantations, March 26, 1729. (Microfilm in C. W. R. L., SR #416, Reel M-241). Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 120 The apprehensions of Virginians were fanned when a group of runaway slaves in 1729 attempted to establish an independent settlement in the Blue Ridge. The militia speedily brought back the malcontents, eliminating what could have been a rallying point for runaways and a base for 56 attacks on plantations. When reporting to Whitehall on the recapture of the fifteen runaway slaves, Gooch also advised the militia was in a better state of training due in part to the efforts of the Adjutant: "It is to this new Regulation of the Militia, and the good disposition of the * * officers I have now appointed to instruct those under their Command in the exercise of arms that we owe the present Peace." During the following year talk of being set free be came widespread of Negroes in "several Parts of the County," causing the speedy appointment of parties of the militia which were sent out to patrol. Gooch notes that this caused fatigue to the militia and "some loss to their crops" 5 8 due to the absence of the planters. As concern over possible Negro uprising continued, Governor Gooch in 17 36 charged the Philip A Bruce, History of Virginia: Colonial Period, 1607-1763 (Chicago: American Historical Society^ 1924), pp. 323-324. 57 British Colonial Papers, Class C.O. 5/1322 Letter from Gooch to Commissioners for Trade and Plantations, June 29, 1729. (Microfilm in C. W. R. L., SR #417, Reel M-241). 58 British Colonial Papers, Class C.O. 5/1322, Letter from Gooch to Commissioners 'for Trade and Plantations, Septem ber 14, 1730. (Microfilm in C. W. R. L., SR #417, Reel M-241). Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. members of the militia to go armed to church during holy 59 days in order to be prepared in case of slave insurrection. Two years later the Acts of Assembly relating to surveillance and control of slaves were made more detailed, although by 1738 the penalty to the slave for being disorderly appears to have been reduced to "any number of lashes, not exceeding twenty," in place of the death penalty cited in an early 6 0 law. Each militia colonel was-authorized to direct his militiamen to go armed to church. Further, if he felt the need he was to appoint an officer, and four men "to patrol, and visit all negro quarters, and other places suspected of entertaining unlawful assemblies of slaves, servants, or other disorderly persons." The patrol could "take up" any such slaves, and servants and also "any other, strolling about from one plantation to another, without a pass . . . ." If a company of patrollers for the county was deemed insuf ficient the chief officer of the county militia was authorized 61 "to order more companies, consisting of the same number." In 1748 concern over the presence of Negroes, mulattoes 5 9 . Proclamation of Gooch, October 29, 1736, in Mcllwaine Ced.), Executive Journals of the Council, IV, p. 471. 60 Kening, op_. cit. , V, p. 19. 61 . Ibid. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 122 and Indian slaves took a new form when, due to war with Spain, the freeing of slaves was restricted. Freedom could be awarded only for meritorious service when agreed to by the Governor and Council, and slaves freed under any other 62 * circumstance were to be taken up. The patrol laws were continued by reenactment, the Act of 1754 stipulating that a patrol, of not more than four men, would visit every month all Negro quarters and other suspected places. Any slaves considered to be involved in an unlawful assemblage were to 63 be delivered to a justice of the peace. V. EXEMPTIONS FROM MILITIA DUTY Just as the provisions for patrols to control slaves tended to grow more detailed with the passage of the years so did the laws relating to exemptions from militia duty. The men on slave patrols received a reward for their efforts to the extent that they were exempt from attendance at "private musters," i_«£* » 'those held by the local captain of militia for training purposes, and "from the payment of all public, county, and parish levies," for the period when 6 2 Hening, o d . cit., VI, p. 112. ^Ibid. , p. 4-21. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1 2 3 6M- they served on patrol duty. Mention has been made of other groups and individuals exempt from normal militia duty, i.e., the inhabitants of Williamsburg and certain occupations. A further exemption from the requirement for militia duty was later granted to ironmongers. "All persons whatsoever, which . . . shall be employed in and about the building and carrying on such 6 5 iron work . . . be exempted from serving in the militia." This exemption applied, as it did to the inhabitants of Williamsburg, to general musters, not to musters called in the face of insurrections or invasions. In November 1736, the Assembly applied the privilege extended earlier to Williamsburg to the inhabitants of Norfolk. As in the capital, it was felt that for the militia to leave the city would be 6 6 to leave it "defenseless in time of danger." Accordingly, only the governor or the county lieutenant could compel the local militia to go out of the "borough," and the latter could do this only in time of invasion or insurrection. The same act provided that "a sailor or seaman, on board any ship ^Hening, o d . cit. , V, p. 19. 6 5 Hening, ojd. cit. , IV, p. 298. 6 6 Hening, op_. cit., V, p. 81. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. or vessel, within this colony” was not to be compelled 67 to serve in the militia of any county, city or borough. VI. VIRGINIA FORGES OUTSIDE THE COLONY The extent to which the colonies aided each other■is documented as to number of troops sent and received, but there are differences of opinion among historians on the value of the actual support provided. Using a s an example the Tuscarora War, early in the eighteenth century, Bruce interprets Governor Spotswood1s actions in the light of his desire to cooperate: ”Spotswood promptly dispatched a trained body of troops to intercept” movement of the Tuscaroras, already risen in 1711 against the North Carolinians. Spotswood was always ready to respond to every appeal for help that he received from the adjacent colonies .... In 1715, when the Indians were striking relentlessly at the settlers beyond the Virginian borders, he emptied the magazine at Jamestown of its store of powder and mu.skets, along with a large body of trooos, to the rescue of his hotly pressed neighbors.69 A Carolina view of the Virginia effort is less glowing. 67Ibid., p. 82. ^Philip Bruce, The Virginia Plutarch (Chapel Hill: The University of North' Carolina Press, 1929), p. 127. 69Ibid., p. 128. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1 2 5 Virginia, certainly, played less than a generous part in the Tuscarora rising of 1711-1712. In the end the royal province furnished only a loan of clothing for three hundred non-existent North Carolina troops. 0 Although Crane admits that Virginia's governor was forced to deal with a House of Burgesses that "quarreled hopelessly over raising requisite funds," he stresses that, while Virginia talked about assistance, it was South Carolina that actually provided the forces that defeated the Indians 71 in the North Carolina Tuscarora War. Crane concludes that, in spite of some mutual aid during the,crises of 1711 and 1715, "these episodes increased rather than diminished the prejudices and suspicions which were the normal atmos phere of intercolonial relations in the South." Assistance to northern neighbors was even less dramatic. A request by the Queen of England to assist New York with up to "240 72 men" was never implemented. The Council, upon being asked by Maryland in 1742 for militia assistance against the Indians, replied that it would be "very difficult to persuade them to pass over Potomac River or Chesapeake Bay . . . ," but that if a bounty was offered for volunteers ^Verner W. Crane, The Southern Frontier (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1^2?), p. 158'. 71 . Ibid., pp. 158-161. "^British Colonial Papers, Class C.O. 5/1358, Letter from the Queen to the Governor, August 21, 1694. (Microfilm in C. W. R. L., SR #257, Reel No. M-228). Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. "a good Number of Men might be raised.” Maryland turned 74 down similiar requests by Virginia a few years later. Turning to military assistance on the international scene, war was declared by England against Spain in 1739 and this "War of Jenkin's Ear" was supported by Virginia to a greater extent than any previous British colonial war. The first attacks were to be directed against Spain's Caribbean possessions and, accordingly, England asked for volunteers from the American colonies to augment the British regulars for an attack on Carthagena on the northern coast of South America. The first step in this enterprise was to announce the "instruction" of the British government at a general muster held in,each county. Pay was'provided by England from the day of enlistment and supplemented by a small bounty of 5,000 pounds voted by the Assembly. This bounty money was raised by an additional duty of five percent placed upon Minutes of the Council, July 26, 174-2, in Mcllwaine (ed.), Executive Journals of the Council, V, p. 95. 74 . . . Maryland Historical Society, on. cit., L, pp. 408- 409; Ibid., pp. 533-534; Herbert L. Osgood, Ihe American Colonies in the Eighteenth Century (New York: Columbia University Press'^ 1924) IV, p. 3SI. At mid-century and during the French and Indian War the Maryland Assembly received pleas from Dinwiddie for men to support Virginia's struggle. In spite of voicing sympathy Maryland did not support her neighbor. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1 2 7 . 7 5 the slaves and paid by the buyer. Inasmuch as recruiting was slow the Burgesses in an effort to fill a quota and rid itself of undesirables came to the conclusion that ”... there are in every county, within this colony, able-bodied persons, fit to serve his majesty, who follow no lawful 7 6 calling or employment." Accordingly the Burgesses authorized the justices of the peace to direct the sheriffs and constables to find such men; the justices were to enlist them, and the recruit then was to be passed from constable to constable to Williamsburg. The Carthagena expedition (1740-1741) started well enough, but the Virginia volunteers and Governor Gooch, who was in command of the land forces of the colonies, suffered from the rigors of war and disease— Gooch was wounded and 77 most of the volunteers failed to return to Virginia. Apparently the troops awaiting the departure for South America had begun to have apprehensions as to the outcome of the tropical expedition, as desertions became quite prevalent, For many years after the costly expedition dependents of Hening, op*, cit., V, p. 92; British Colonial Papers,. Class CO 5/1325, Letter from Major William Gooch to Commissioners for Trade and Plantations, August 29, 174 0. (Microfilm in C. W. R. L., SR #788, Reel M-242). ' 76 Henxng, ojo. cit., V, p. 95. 77 Osgood, Eighteenth Century, op. cit., III, p. 500. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1 2 8 veterans and the survivors were awarded relief by act of 7 8 Assembly. The unsuccessful expedition to Carthagena was outside the militia system* as such, yet it had its influence for in the same year as the expedition the Assembly recognized continuing international war as a threat to the colony by increasing the frequency of musters. All captains of militia were directed to muster, train, and exercise their troops or companies at least every two months.79 The war with Spain developed into conflict with France (King George's War). Virginia's participation, as in the War of Jenkin's Ear, was peripheral to the militia system as such and consequently volunteers to enter His Majesty's service were sought. No one was to be pressedand a bounty was offered. When publishing the proclamation requesting volunteers for the expedition to Canada the Virginia Gazette expressed an excuse in advance why Virginia would have more difficulty in raising men than the northern provinces: There's no doubt but this most Ancient and Loyal Colony will exert itself as far as is in its Power; 7 8 Osgood, Eighteenth Century,IV, p. 100. 79 . Hening, o d . cit., V, p. 91. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1 2 9 considering the great Difficulty in raising men, in a short Time, where our Settlements are so widely scattered. There were two forces involved, one the.famous expedition that captured Louisburg; the other an expedition which was to rendevous at Albany and proceed under Governor Gooch to capture Montreal in 1746. Gooch was replaced due to illness but he sent Captain Beverley Robinson’s company of 136 officers and men, all that he could raise, to join 81 British and other continental troops at Albany. The expedition waited in vain for the British regulars. Finally, 8 2 the attack on Montreal was called off. There was a great reluctance to send the money, militia units or individual men to the assistance of other British colonies. It was not readily apparent to colonial Virginia that defense of New York was indirectly defense of Virginia. The long coastlines, the far flung frontiers, the isolated farms - all these appeared to Virginians to have a higher defense priority for the colony's not un limited resources than external requirements. ^ Virginia Gazette, April 17, 1746; July 3, 1746; Hening, o]o. cit. , V, p. 401. 81 Morton, Colonial Virginia, II, p. 53 5. 8 2 Osgood, Eighteenth Century, III, p. 535. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1 3 0 VII. THE READINESS OF THE MILITIA, CIRCA 1750 There was a realization during the period of "good feeling" within Virginia and limited threat from without that, although the militia laws appeared satisfactory upon the reading, in practice there was an untrained militia. The efforts to improve the state of readiness of the units were caused as much for fear of slave uprising as of Indian incursion. Evidence of this dual emphasis is found in the text of the acts,where it is the Negro who is most mentioned whereas during the previous century the Indian clearly described as the threat. Spotswood, as noted above, had difficulty in interesting the Burgesses in spending money v * . to improve the readiness of the militia. His complaints were numerous and in one such letter to England he illustrated the poor use of existing militia resources: . . . By order.of former Governors the arms and ammunition sent hither by her Majesty, some years ago, were distributed through the several Counties, to be more ready for the service of the-Militia upon any Emergency, but either through the negligence or death of some of the officers to whom they were entrusted, there has been great Embezzlements made therein. . . .83 ^Letter from Spotswood to the Council of Trade, July 26, 1712, in Snotswood Letters, op. cit., I, pp. 166- 167. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1 3 1 Arms distributed for the defense from magazines were not always returned, but fell instead into the hands of the 84 Indians. Carelessness with the weapons they possessed was coupled with a lack of urgency in procurring more arms. The Acts of 1723 and of 1738 allowed the militiamen eighteen months to procure his weapon after being listed on the muster roll. This delay was probably permitted as it required 85 time to obtain weapons that were m short supply. There was apparently awareness on the part of the Assembly itself that the militia system, outlined in great detail in Acts of the Burgesses, was weak in its execution. The preamble of the Act of 17 3 8 for "Better Regulation of the Militia" states that the laws previously made "have 8 6 proved very ineffectual." A correspondent of the London Magazine reporting on conditions in America has this to say of the militia in Maryland, Virginia and Carolina: . . . Your Ears are constantly astonished at the Number of Colonels, Majors, and Captains that you hear mentioned: In short, the whole Country seems at first to you a Retreat of Heroes; but alas! to behold the Musters of their Militia, would induce a Man to nauseate a Sash and hold a Sword forever Q h British Colonial Papers, Class C.O. 5/1316, Letter from the Earl of Dartmouth to the Lords Commissioners of Trade, April 22, 1712. (Microfilm in Virginia State Library, SR #409, Frame 317). 85 . Hening, o d . c i t . , IV, p. 120; V, p. 21. 8J3 Hening, oj}. cit., V, p. 16. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1 3 2 in derision. Diversity of Weapons and Dresses, Unsizeableness of the Men, and Want of the least Grain of Discipline in their Officers or them, make the whole Scene little better than Drvden has expressed it . . .'then hasten to get drunk the business of the day.1’ The author continues by hoping that the return of a few veterans from the expedition sent to Carthagena in South 8 7 America might leaven the masses of the untrained. Un fortunately, the losses to the expedition prevented this remedy, evfen if feasible. Trouble in Augusta County with the Indians reflected a militia reaction that was to repeat itself in the future, some willingness to fight when aroused, but no enthusiasm to pursue the Indian into the "Thicket.The militia by 175 0, although larger than that of fifty years before, does not appear to be as well motivated, as well trained, or as practiced in war as its predecessors at the end of the previous century. "Observations in Several Voyages and Travels in America," from the London Magazine, William and Mary Quarter ly, XV (1906-19-7), pp." "147-148 . 8 8 British Colonial Papers, Class CO 5/1325, Report enclosed with letter from Governor Gooch to Commissioners for Trade and Plantations, February 14, 1743. (Microfilm in C. W. R. L., SR #788, Reel M-242). Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. C H A P T E R V PERIOD OF THE FRENCH AND INDIAN WAR At•midcentury Virginia and England's other colonies in North America entered a new phase. Preoccupation with internal affairs was to end, as the movement of the French on the great perimeter of British Colonial America could only mean eventual conflict between the armed forces.of these two European powers, reinforcement of both sides by the Indians, and colonial involvement. Before Dinwiddie's arrival in November 1751 members of the Virginia Council filled the gap in the executive left by the retirement of Governor Gooch two years previously. . These "governors” pro tern conducted considerable correspon dence concerning the French and French-Indian menace.with the Board of Trade and with the governors of other colonies. New York, for example, had requested aid in 1750— help that was not forthcoming after Virginia made an inventory of its munitions and, not unexpectedly, found them wanting. I. DINWIDDIE AND THE MILITIA Dinwiddie's first speech to the Burgesses made clear his awareness of the defense problem of the colony and the place of the Indian in this problem. His first address stressed somewhat the same point made by Berkeley a hundred years Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1 3 4 previously: ”1 recommend to your particular Regard. . . the Cultivating a good Correspondence with the Neighboring' Nations of Indians. He was well aware of the part the Indian would play in any border war between the English colonies and the French and (or) the Spanish, and the advis ability of gaining and keeping the friendship of as large a percentage of the Indian tribes as feasible. The instructions to the governors made clear that they were not considered by the Crown to be impowered to declare war against an enemy except the Indians; and even in this latter case the chief executive was to inform England . immediately after taking emergency action. The military relationship of the governor with Britain included appointing British regulars as officers in a regiment to be composed of British regulars and colonial militia. Dinwiddie had requested that he be able to "regiment,” or put together, the 2 two types of forces, and that he receive "blank commissions." The governor also functioned as a British vice-admiral receiving his instructions from the lords of the admiralty in Whitehall. As such he performed several duties peripheral to the subject H. R. Mcllwaine (ed.), Journals of the House of Burgesses, 1752-1758 (Richmond: Virginia State Library, 1905-1915), p. 5. 2 Letter from Dinwiddie to Sir Thomas Robinson, October 25, 1754, in Virginia Historical Society, The Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie (Richmond: Virginia Historical Society,“T8§4), 1, p. 355. Referred to henceforth as Dinwiddie Papers. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1 3 5 of this paper. This was traditional- other governors, as was 3 Culpepper in 1681t having been confirmed in this office. Dinwiddie had arrived in the colony with specific in structions to prevent expansion by the French, if it were to result in the loss of Virginia territory. The Assembly, however, did not initially support his defense plans with appropriations and Dinwiddie’s efforts only irritated the Burgesses with their limited concept of "empire." Dinwiddie’s task was to be doubly difficult as he was brought to the Virginia scene as a crisis was developing,.and, further, was •unfortunate in having no military experience. But he was not alone in lacking experience, as the populace of Virginia had not engaged in warfare for two generations, except for groups of volunteers. The interest of the people was slow in rising and Dinwiddie, a civilian, had the problem of developing in the people both an awareness of a military threat and a willingness to do something about it— both in terms of colonial money and colonial time spent in training. The same Assembly in which Dinwiddie made his maiden speech (February 27, 1752) continued the Act of October 3 British Colonial Papers, Class CO 5/1356, Culpepper’s Commission, January 27, 1681. (Microfilm in C. W. R. L., SR #255, Reel M-227). Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1 3 6 1748 providing against invasions and insurrections. This law had weaknesses and during the second session of the Assembly the governor advised the Assembly that: The militia law is deficient in some points . . . As our militia, under God, is our chief Dependence, for the Protection of our Lives and Fortunes .... I doubt not you will think it a proper Step to look into that Law, and make such Alteration and Amend ment as to you may be thought necessary.4 Prior to his speech to the Burgesses Dinwiddie had, in order to make the "militia more efficient," divided Virginia into 5 four districts, and appointed an adjutant in each. Washington was one of these adjutants. At colony level, an "adjutant," or, as he was sometimes termed, the "muster-master-general" established standards of training.^ Apparently in existence only part of the time, the adjutant was regularized in 17.3 3 when a royal order established the salary of 150 pounds a year. The deficiency of the militia became more apparent when George Washington reported to his superior the results of his conversations with the French at Fort Le Boeuf, who were building forts in territory claimed by Virginia. It was obvious that the French intended to control the Ohio and 4 Mcllwaine (ed.), Journals of the House of Burgesses, 1752-1758, p. 105. 5 Ibid., p. XV; Dinwiddie Papers, II, p. 344. 6 Philip A. Bruce, Institutional History of Virginia in the Seventeenth Century (New York-: 5 T F~i £>utnamrs Sons, 1917), TT7 p. 323.------^ Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1 3 7 Dinwiddie reported the French danger to a new Assembly, but received only ten thousand pounds for the defense of the colony. The Assembly also revised the law governing the militia, but made little significant change. Not only was limited improvement made in organization, but the Governor's independence of action was reduced by an act providing * that defense appropriation's should be reviewed by "directors,” who would, "for the time being, direct and appoint how the said money shall be applied.” This allocation of expenditures 0 was to be with the Governor's approval, however. Before the third session of the Assembly met Dinwiddie, acting under his authority as governor and commander in chief, had dispatched (February 17 54) a Captain Trent to build a fort at the forks of the Ohio. Another group, commanded by Colonel Fry but under actual command of Lieutenant Colonel George Washington, was recruited to assist Trent's force. These bodies of troops were not militia forces but were recruited, in the first case, largely from trappers and* in the second, from those available, i_.e. those who were Washington's 7 Mcllwaine (ed.), Journals of the House of Burgesses, 1752-1758, p. XVIII; Dinwiddie Papers'] T, pp. 98-9TV 8 Hening, og_. cit. , VI, p. 418. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1 3 8 q words, “loose, Idle persons.” The act stated that". . . the justices of the peace of every county and corporation . . ." were authorized; upon application by recruiting officers to "raise and levy such able bodied men, as do not follow or exercise any lawful calling or employment, or have not some other lawful and sufficient support and main tenance . . . ." The expeditions utilizing these troops resulted in disaster for Trent and surrender at Fort Necessity in the summer of 1754 for Washington. When the Assembly met in August. 1754 and later during October to November, money was voted to combat the developing threat to the western part of Virginia; this act is indefinite, however, as to the size of the force to be raised.^ This legislative action was the most encouragement Dinwiddie had received and he obtained further support when ten thousand pounds for the war were sent from England.^ He also learned of the plan to dispatch Braddock and two regiments of regulars from England. Dinwiddie's enthusiasm carried him to the point of wishing to take immediate steps to drive the French from Fort Duquesne. This plan appeared ^Letter from Washington to Dinwiddie, March 9, 1754, in John C. Fitzpatrick (ed.), The Writings of George Washington, 1745-1799 (Washington: Government Printing^ff ice7llFcRT) I, p. 32. Henceforth noted as Writings. "^Hening, _op. cit., VI, pp. 435-439. ^Address of Spotswood to Burgesses, October 17, 17 54, in Mcllwaine (ed.), Journals of the House of Burgesses, 1752-1758 , Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1 3 9 foolish to Washington and Dinwiddie did not direct that the campaign be executed. More active prosecution of the border war was heralded with the arrival of Braddock in America. At a conference in Annapolis he explained the plan of campaign to the governors of Virginia, New York, Maryland, Pennsylvania and Massachusetts. Virginia's support of Braddock1s campaign was made possible by the appropriation by the Assembly of 20,000 pounds, which provided about 450 men to Braddock’s 12 enterprise. Part of the previous slowness of the Burgesses in awarding money for defense can be ascribed to the feud over the "pistole fee." When this disagreement was settled requests for money by the governor met with somewhat better success. Braddock*s force moved against the enemy, met them near the objective, Fort Duquesne, and was defeated. The casualty rate of Braddock's people was high and "the Virginians, placed as flank guards, were sadly decimated, not only by the fire of the enemy but, also it would appear by that of the British regulars ....", p. 209. 12 H. J. Eckenrode, List of Colonial Soldiers (Richmond: Virginia State Library, 1917), p. 1~. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 11+0 Washington wrote, "Our poor Virginians behaved like men, and like soldiers; for I believe that out of three companies 13 that there that day scarce thirty were left alive." Who were the Virginians that fought with Braddock? The act raising the men to fight the Indian stated that the recruiting officers should seek out those able-bodied men in the counties that did not have a regular livelihood. There were to be volunteers, if possible, but failing this the less prosperous persons in the area were to be pressed into service. The militia, as such, provided no part of this force and no mention is made of the militia list as a first start for obtaining soldiers. Following*Braddock’s defeat the situation on the frontier deteriorated as the hostile Indians, now encouraged, swept through the gaps in the mountains.. Dinwiddie took immediate action by calling out the militia in three fron tier counties and placing others in an "on call" status. The unit from Caroline County was assigned to the fron tier in Frederick County where it built a small fort.^ 13 Lawrence H. Gipson, The British Empire Before the American Revolution (New York: Alfred A, Knopf, 1936-1961), VI, pp. 96-97. 14 Hening, o£. c it., VI, p. 43 8. 15 Campbell, Colonial Caroline, pp. 149-150. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1 4 1 He also sent powder and shot in quantity to Fredericksburg 16 for further transportation to the frontier. After the defeat on the Monongahela the Burgesses in August 1755. authorized "raising the sum of forty thou sand pounds, for the protection of his majesty's subjects 17 on the frontiers of this colony." The money to support the defense was raised by a poll tax of one shilling on every tithable and paid to the sheriff of the county of residence. In addition, a land tax of one shilling and three pence was 18 paid for every hundred acres of land. A group of Directors were to stipulate how the money was to be applied towards the "raising, maintaining, arming 19 and providing" for the defense force. This body was not to exceed twelve hundred men, "including the soldiers now in the pay of this colony, the fifty men appointed to garri son Fort Cumberland, and the three companies of rangens 2 CJ formerly directed to be raised." In addition to the regiment *1 C Letters from Dinwiddie, July 14 and 16, 1755, in Dinwiddie Papers, II, pp. 98-101. 17 Hening, op. cit., VI, p. 521. 18 . Ibid., p. 522. 19 Ibid., p. 52 5. 20 . Ibid. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1 4 2 being raised by Washington the border counties were to dispatch companies of rangers to seek out any enemy approach- ing and were to place the militia under arms. The rangers were supported by the colony as a whole and paid eight pence 21 a day, less two pence deducted for clothing. Those who were to be recruited for Washington's regiment were actually outside the militia system being, it was hoped, volunteers. These men were to be protected from legal action in minor cases and to be exempt from "pay- 2 2 ment of all public, county, and parish levies." If the required number of men could not be recruited within three months, then the field officers and captains of militia, after being directed by the governor, were to "draft out of the militia of their counties, respectively, such and as many of their militia, who have not wives or children, as will make 2 3 up the said number, to be employed in the said service. ..." The act appears logical, attempting, first, to gain recruits and then, if this failed, to draft members of the militia. This represents a change in approach from the act of the pre vious year which did not specify drafting members of the militia. Dinwiddie directed that the total number under arms Letter from Dinwiddie to Captain William Preston, September 15, 1755, II, p. 200. 22 Hening, op_. c j t . , VI, p. 52 5. 23 Ibid., p. 527. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 143 24 be 1200 and on August 14, 1755, placed them under Washington. With companies of seventy-five men, there was to be a total of sixteen companies. The governor appointed Washington "Colonel of the Virginia Regiment and Commander-in Chief of all the Forces now raised and to be raised for the Defense of this His Majesty’s Colony, and for repelling the unjust 25 and hostile Invasions of the French and their Indian Allies." This appointment gave to Washington considerable power and even greater responsibility, in the broad sense he 'was made responsible for the defense of the colony. He was told to raise the authorized troops, to select his key officers and 2 6 to administer to J:he needs of his force. The clothing for the Regiment was to be provided by the colony and delivered to the "effective men" of each company. The matter of the term "effective," had been a point of contention between Dinwiddie and his officers for some time. The governor had written to the "Captains of the Virginia Forces" on August 25, 1755, stating that it gave him "a good deal of Concern to 2 4 Letter from Dinwiddie to Governor Sharpe (Maryland), August 25, 1755, and Washington’s Commission, August 14, 1755, in Dinwiddie Papers, II, pp. 171-184. 2 5 Ibid., p. 184. ^Fitzpatrick, Writings, I, pp. 169-170. Detailed responsibility for supplying the Virginia Regiment rested in the Commissary Officer. He was directed to provide for provisions, powder, barracks, and fuel for the latter; Ibid., p. 180. He had the further responsibility of keeping an account of the status of supplies, including clothing for enlisted men, tents, provisions, weapons, ammunition, equipment, for the horses et_. al. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1 4 4 understand that you insist on the Pay of Your different 2 7 Companies as if complete . . . .11 This concern with false muster appeared in the instructions to Washington. It is necessary at this time to differentiate between the "militia," defined in the pure sense, and the Virginia Regiment, which was to become the single major element in Virginia's defenses during most of the remainder of the Colonial period. The militia was to continue as in the past, based on the county muster, although various relatively minor changes in its organization and administration were to take place. The Virginia Regiment, on the other hand, was to be a semi-professional organization in that it remained together for a considerable period under more strict military discipline. There was, however, a close relationship between the two types of organizations. First, their organization at company level was of the same general nature. Second, a large number of the personnel who manned the Regiment were, in part, former militiamen, either volunteers, or drafted from the militias of the counties. Further, elements of both organizations often "conducted operations" in the same area and were, for the purpose of "operational control" in the area 9 7 Dinwiddie Papers, p. 177. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 145 of actual hostilities,under command of Washington. There were dissimilarities, however, and these were to become more apparent as the war progressed. Because of their close relationship and since the war was carried on by both forces the discussion will embrace both types of organization. Washington's success in raising a force was less than satisfactory, as correspondence shows. The Colonel of Virginia's forces,, writing on the day of his appointment, reveals awareness of his problems to come: ". . . .No Man can gain any Honor by conducting our Forces at this time, but rather lose in his reputation."^® The recruiting system under which Washington labored provided for a recruiting service to be established with area offices under field officers at Winchester, Alexandria and Fredericksburg. Company officers were to recruit under these three headquarters. Washington also directed that recruiting be conducted in the back parts of Maryland and Pennsylvania, as well as in 3 0 the more populous parts of the former. By September 175 5, the Governor was also aware that the recruiting would not be easy and wrote the following to Colonel Washington: 28 Letter from Washington to Warner Lewis, August. 14, 1755, in Fitzpatrick (ed.), Writings, I, p. 162. 29 Dinwiddie Papers, II, p. 185. . 30 Letter from Washington to Captain Joshua Lewis, Sep tember 18, 1755, in Fitzpatrick (ed.), Writings, I, p. 178. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1 4 6 I dread the recruiting, though the Officers, be fore they had their Commissions, were very sanguine that they cpuld raise their Companies. Some Drafts out of the Counties have been refactorv.31 The alternative to a full strength regiment of semi-professionals was to employ the militia as units. Washington wrote Dinwiddie in October 1755, on the problems of handling the frontier populace and the local militias • based upon that source of manpower. His account of events ,in Winchester is especially revealing and demonstrates part of the problem of colonial defense. Washington found that from fear of the Indians the inhabitants on the frontier w e r e : . . . flocking in and those of the Town removing out, which I have prevented, as far as it was in my power. I was desirous of proceeding immediately at the head of some militia . . . but was told by Colonel Martin, who had attempted to raise the militia for the same purpose that it-was impossible to get above 20 or 25 men, they having absolutely refused to stir, as they say, to die with their wives and families. . . . I see t"he growing insolence of the soldiers, the indolence and inactivity of the officers. . . . Washington’s partial remedy was better discipline: "I would again hint the necessity of putting the Militia under a better Regulation; had I not mentioned it twice before, 31 Letter from Dinwiddie to Washington, September 17, 1755, Dinwiddie Papers, II, p. 201. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. ! U 7 3 2 and a third time may seem Impertinent. . . ." II. THE -MILITIA_SYSTEM— 17 55 It is appropriate to review what was the militia system and then to note Washington's specific objections to it. In August 17 55, an act, directed toward regulating the militia itself, was passed; its provisions were quite similar to those of militia acts passed by the Assembly for over a century. The command organization provided for the succession of ranks from county lieutenant, or commander in chief, colonel, lieutenant-colonel, and inferior officers, who should reside in the- county in which they held a militia commission. Persons above eighteen and under sixty years were to be listed in the militia. The exemptions were traditional, and included servants, slaves, and overseers, as well as special exemptions, due to rank and occupation, contained in previous acts. The musters were to be held every three months - actually less frequently than in some earlier acts. The penalty for failure to muster with proper arms was small, the fines being up to ten shillings for private soldiers, and failure to pay a fine could result in 33 three days in jail. Court martials were empowered to Letter from Washington to Dinwiddie, October 11, 1755, in Fitzpatrick (ed.), Writings, I, p. 202. 33 H e m n g , ojo. cit. , VI, p. 5 36. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1 4 8 inquire into claimed exemptions, and could adjudge heavier penalties, although these, too, were relatively light. The exemptions awarded to residents of Williamsburg and Norfolk and the instructions relating to "patrollers" were 34 similiar to those of the Act of 173 8. The most significant difference from earlier acts is that penalties for disobedience appear to have been far less stringent in the first phases of the French and Indian War, than early in the political life of Virginia. Even as late as 1738 an offender who.refused to perform the commands 35 of his officer would be "tied neck and heels." Washington stressed that officers and men were "all Sensible how con fined their punishments are, in regard to what they ought to 36 be." It was this lack of adequate penalty and particularly the failure to enforce sanctions already available that disturbed Washington. He reported to Dinwiddie that "no orders are obeyed, but what a party of Soldiers, or my own 37 drawn Sword Enforces." In this case Washington was referring to the lack of cooperation of the populace in general. That 34 Hening, on. c i t . , V, p. 19; VI, p. 543. 3 5 Hening, 033. c i t . , V, p. 18. 3 6 Letter from V/ashington to Dinwiddie, October 11, 1755, in Dihwiddie Papers, II, p. 237. Ibid. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1 4 9 local sentiment was often on the side of those avoiding military service was reported by the counties as well as by Washington. As an example, a certain Catlett deserted from his post at a frontier fort in 1755 and was pursued by his militia officers in order to be returned to his duty station for trial by court martial. But the fugitive after his arrest managed to get his case before the local civil court, and at the ensuing trial the magistrates exonerated him of desertion and ordered his release From the militia on the grounds that further service imposed an undue hard ship upon him and his family.38 Other primary weaknesses of the militia acts were•that the provisions both for raising the forces and for its regulatio'n were limited, and, as in the past, its use was restricted to the occupied areas,i_.e. "five miles beyond where the O Q inhabitants of this colony, shall be settled. . . Washington outlined his remedies for the militia and the populace at large. For the first, he would put them under "better Regulations," and "unless the Assembly will enact a Law to enforce the Military Law in all its 40 parts," Washington considered that he must resign. He would have also made the populace "liable to certain heavy 3 8 T. E. Campbell, Caroline County (Richmond: The Dietz Press, 1954), pp“ 1^2-153. 39 Hening, ££. ci t ., VI, p. 54 8. 40 Letter from Washington to Dinwiddie, October 11, 1755, Dinwiddie Papers, II, p. 237. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 150 Fines, or corporal Punishments for Entertaining of Deser- ters.">.41 Dinwiddie backed his Commander in Chief's plea by- addressing the House of Burgesses: I therefore recommend to You to put the Forces raised under the Military. Law as the Troops in His Majesty's immediate Pay are subjected to. Without this the Money You have voted . . . will prove abortive unless the Commanding Officer be Enabled to keep them under strict Discipline. . . . Dinwiddie, on the matter of military law, was referring to the fact that the Virginia Regiment was on a different standard of discipline than the militia. He had given this special authority to Colonel Joshua Fry in March 17 54, when the Regiment was formed: "... I order You after You have chose Your Court Martial to read over the Articles of War, and select out of them such as You think proper for the 43 regular discipline of Your small Regiment." This authority 41 Ibid., II, p. 238. 42 Address of Dinwiddie to House of Burgesses, October 27, 1755, Dinwiddie Papers, II, p. 254. 4 3 Letter from Dinwiddie to Colonel Joshua Fry, March 18, 1754, in Dinwiddie Papers, op. cit., I, p. 109; Fitz patrick, Writings, If, pi 1?9. Violations of the Articles of War, such as swearing or becoming drunk, were "severely Punished, without the Benefit of a Court Martial." Soldiers absent without leave were to be immediately confined and either tried by court martial or "punished at the Discretion of the Commanding Officer." Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 151 was to be a strong factor in leading to the greater effectiveness of the Regiment as compared to the militia forces. Dinwiddie also stressed to the Burgesses the need to "encourage the detecting and taking up of deserters." The Assembly responded in October 1755 by amending the militia act, tightening the regulations for the militia, particular ly for disobedience, and placed penalties on the inhabitants who harbored deserters.1*4 But the same act that tightened some regulations again prevented the militia from marching more than five miles beyond where the inhabitants were settled on the western frontier. Not only was the militia restricted to the Colony by law, but Washington was uncertain in mid-1756 whether the Regiment itself could leave Virginia, even if the men 45 drafted from the militia were left behind. Certain logistical aspects of Virginia's militia system require a brief summary— specifically, matters of pay, billeting and supply. The pay scale of the militia in late 1755, when compared with a similar scale passed by the u li. Hening, op. cit., VI, pp. 560-563. 45 Letter from Washington to John Robinson, August 5 , 1756 , in Fitzpatrick (ed,.), Writings, p. 429. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 152 Assembly fifty years previously, during the reign of Queen Anne, shows almost identical pay, one variation being that a captain of horse was paid thirty-five pounds of tobacco kg per day in 1705 and five pounds less m 1755. The pay for the footsoldier of the Regiment was one shilling a day— U7 the same as for the militia men when on actual service. The billeting of the militia was determined by the justices, ■ who were in 1762 empowered to quarter troops in taverns and M- 8 ordinaries, but not in private homes. Supply of the county militia was a local problem until the militia was called out, then the costs for provisions, as well as pay, could be claimed as a cost to the Colony. Provisions for the Regiment were to be purchased by a "commissary” or "commissaries” appointed 4 9 by the governor or commander in chief. It was under authority of this act that Washington appointed Charles Dick and other commissaries. Their functions included the procurement of all types of supply, from ammunition to clothing. ^ H e n n i n g , 0 2 _. c it. , III, p. 365 ; VI, p. 549. 47 Fitzpatrick, Writings, I, p. 2 39. Tardiness in receipt of pay caused a mutiny m one company in November 175 5. At times the money received by Washington was insufficient to pay all the Regiment. His advice in such a circumstance was to pay those in most need to keep them "quiet." 48 Hening, op_. cit., VII, p. 507. 49 Ibid., pp. 30-31. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1 5 3 III. WARTIME EFFORTS TO . IMPROVE THE MILITIA In spite of a tightening of regulations and even with authority to act against lack of cooperation on the part of inhabitants, recruiting for the Regiment "proceeded very slowly and supplies were always behind the need."^ In December Dinwiddie wrote to Sir Thomas Robinson, the British Secretary of State, stating that "We are extremely backward in raising of Men . . . the Officers have not yet been able to recruit half that number." (1000) Dinwiddie also complained that "our Militia Law restrains me from 5 marching them out of the Confines of this Government . . . ." Part of the problem lay in the lack of cooperation of the settlers on the frontier. The "new settlers," many of them from Germany, and in a sense fugitives from a military system, were slow to comply with edicts from Williamsburg. Another problem for Washingt> ri arose from an unusual aspect of the intercolonial command system. A Captain Dagworthy, holding a royal commission, disputed Washington's right to command at Fort Cumberland, which was in Maryland. 50 Osgood, Eighteenth Century, IV, p. 356. 51 Letter to Sir Thomas Robinson, December 24, 1755, Dinwiddie Papers, II, p. 307. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1 5 4 This was not Washington's first experience with the dual standards of colonial and royal "rank." When South Carolina "regular” troops arrived in Virginia in 1754, commanded by officers who had received "their appointments directly from the King," Washington found that they would not accept 52 . his orders. To solve the impasse with Dagworthy Washington went to Boston to see Governor Shirley, who held the top military command in the Colonies upon the death of Braddock. This matter of command was resolved in Washington's favor and he returned to his task of defending the frontier. The primary Virginia action during the winter was the expedition of Major Lewis, who had been sent to attack the Shawnees on the Ohio River. Bad weather and terrain, a lack of supplies, and desertions contributed to the failure of this "Sandy Cre"ek Expedition." After the winter of 1755-1756 the major emphasis of the war shifted from Virginia. The same difficulties in recruitment and defense remained,however, and the Indians continued to raid the frontier with the result that during the spring of 17 56 the Assembly provided a further sum of 53 twenty-five thousand pounds for the defense of Virginia. The body also revised the method of drafting the 52 Gipson, 0 £. cit., VI, p. 33. 53 Hening, ££. cit., VII, p. 9. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. militia in order to procure more men for the Regiment. The new system provided for lists being made of all able-bodied, single men on the muster rolls of the county militias from which it was hoped volunteers for "the Virginia regiment” would be found. The inclusion of all the counties, including 5 ii those in the east, was a provision desired by Washington. Lacking sufficient volunteers, lots were to fill the county quota, which was one for "every twentieth man" of the militia. The act also made it clear that the regulations governing- the Virginia Regiment would apply to men from the militia. This meant that not only would the men enlisted from the militia receive the same pay and Rewards, but would be subject to the same discipline as the troops already in the n • 4- 56 Regiment. The act stipulated that a chain of forts should be erected in "such a number, and at such distance from each other, as shall be thought necessary and directed by the 57 governor." This was a vicrory for Governor Dinwiddie, whose defense program had long visualized a series of forts on the frontier. Washington, for his part, considered that 54 Letter from Washington to John Robinson, April 7, 1756, in Fitzpatrick (ed.), Writings, I, p. 305. 55 Hening, 0 £. cit., VII, pp. 1^-15. 56Ibid., p. 16, 57Ibid., p. 18. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 156 a few large forts would better serve the dual purpose of protecting the people and providing a base for a sizeable force to be employed effectively against the enemy. Koontz, view of this divergence is that, "there were- some differences of opinion between Washington and Governor Dinwiddie as to the number and location of forts, but in the. main they 5 8 were together in the scheme as a whole." In the spring of 1756 the Burgesses provided for the impressment of boats and boat crews by field officers of the militia— this power had been voted previously, the last time in 1748. The same act outlined for the first time the pay scale in shillings for all ranks— the listing previously having been made in pounds of tobacco. The pay of smiths, carpenters, and other artisans was also listed in currency. The terms of the acts gave the governor more of what he wanted for defense, but at the same time retained con siderable control in the Burgesses: the troops were limited in period of service and to the colony itself; appropriations were monitored by the committee of Directors; and the militia act was given an expiration date. ^Louis Koontz, The Virginia Frontier, 1754-1763 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1925), p. 88. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1 5 7 Washington wrote Dinwiddie in April 1756 that he had information of the Assembly's approval of an increase in the size of the Virginia active forces to two thousand* In the same letter Washington proposed that the organization for a 2000 man force be based on one large regiment of two battalions rather than forming two regiments. His argument was that the British, through long experience, followed such a plan and, further, that it was less expensive to administer, 5 9 fewer noncommissioned officers being required. In fact, the Burgesses had increased the force, but only to fifteen GO « hundred. The size of the Virginia Regiment remained a problem during the rest of Dinwiddie's term as governor. Although Dinwiddie wrote hopefully to Washington and Innes of reaching an authorized size of two thousand, he portrayed pessimism during the same month to Governor Shirley who desired G 1 help from Virginia. The Assembly "thought it imprudent to part with any Hen, as we have too many Negroes in this Dominion. . . indeed, I cannot recruit Men to augment . 6 2 our Forces to one thousand." It is noteworthy that the ^Letter from Washington to Dinwiddie, April IP, 1756, in Fitzpatrick (ed.), Writings, I, pp. 312-313. 60Hening, op. cit. , VII, p. 13; Letter from Washington to John Robinson,“AprIT“24, 1756, in Fitzpatrick (ed.), Writings I, p. 332." 61 Letters from Dinwiddie to Washington and Innes, April 23, 1756, in Dinwiddie Papers, II, pp. 388-389. ^Letter from Dinwiddie to Shirley, April 28, 1756, Dinwiddie Papers, II, p. 394. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1 5 8 threat of a possible Negro uprising is mentioned at a time when there was a threat from outside the borders of the colony. The source of manpower tended to come from the less affluent, as anyone with ten pounds could buy exemption from being 6 3 drafted into the Virginia Regiment. Morton cites Maury who considered that the failure of Braddock had left such resentment that no person of "any property, family, or worth” enlisted in the Regiment. The rangers were largely»foreign born, i.e. from Ireland or England, and of thos.e who were born in the colonies Virginia was ill represented. 1756 proved to be a difficult year on the border and Washington's description of the conditions in late April is revealing* The Blue Ridge is now our frontier, no men being left in this county, except a few that keep close with a number of women and children in forts, which they have erected for this purpose. There are now no militia in this county; when there were, they could not be brought to action. If the inhabitants of the adjacent counties pursue the same system of disobedience, the whole must fall an inevitable sacrifice; and there is ggom to fear, they have caught the infection. . . . Hening, o d . cit., VII, p. 15. ^Richard Morton, Colonial Virginia (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press'^ i960), II, pp. 687-688. ^Letter from Washington to Dinwiddie, April 27, 17 56, in Fitzpatrick, (ed.), Writings, I, pp. 340-341. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 359 The only forces present on the border to oppose the Indians were elements of the Virginia Regiment. When the men of the Regiment made contact with the enemy the losses to-the 6 6 soldiers seemed to exceed greatly those of the savages. Dinwiddie augmented Washington’s force by calling to duty for brief periods several thousand men of the county militia and directed the county lieutenants of ten counties to muster the militia in order to draft men to 6 7 fill the Virginia Regiment. The arrival of the militia units of the counties in the general vicinity of Winchester appeared to be coincidental with the departure of the Indians. The militia fell under Washington’s command and his memoranda, written during April and May, are indictments of the conduct of these county militia. Units from the counties had varying numbers of deserters, from a few up to so many that only six men remained of the Louisa County 6 8 force of about 130 militiamen. Besides deserting, the militiamen were in some cases quarrelsome, ill equipped (of 200 men from Culpepper only 50 had :firelocks), lacked discipline, and were insolent to officers and men of the ^Douglas Southall Freeman, George Washington, 7 vols, (New York: .Scribner's Sons, 1948-)"^ II, pp^ 181-182. 6 7 British Colonial Papers, Class CO 5/1328, Letter from Dinwiddie to Commissioners for Trade and Plantations, June 11, 1756. (Microfilm in C. W. R. L., SR #791, Reel No. M-243). 6 8 Washington's "Memorandums Concerning the Militia," April and May 1756, in Fitzpatrick (ed.),Writings,I, p. 351. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1 6 0 6 9 Virginia Regiment. There was a case of "mutiny" ;when an officer and members of the Prince William detachment forceably released a comrade from the custody of the Virginia Regiment. This outbreak was quelled in an unofficial, unexplained 70 m anner. The complaint of the militiamen, for their part, was that, having marched to Winchester, they had performed a sufficient tour of duty. Further, they did not care for the food provided by the commissary of the Virginia Regiment, whose headquarters was at Winchester. Washington considered that employment of the militia, at least under the circum stances, was not worth the expense to the government. Worse, the presence of the militia harmed discipline in the Virginia Regiment, wasted its time bringing back militia deserters, and delayed, in Washington's view, the drafting of militia- 71 « men into his regiment. Gipson's evaluation of the value of the militia approximates Washington's . . .the Assembly drafted men from the militia to 6 9 . Ibid., pp. 344-352. 70 Freeman, ©£. cit. , II, p. 184. i 7 T Ibid., pp. 352-35 3;Letter from Washington to Dinwiddie, May 3 , 1756, in Fitzpatrick (ed.), Writings, I', p. 355; Letter from 'Washington to Dinwiddie, May 2TJ 1756 , in Fitzpatrick (ed.), Writings, I, p. 385. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1 6 1 assist the regiment in fort-construction and in the defense of the areas most infested by the enemy. But the enlistments were for very brief periods, and when the time of the enlistment had expired the draftees would return home-leaving the refugees from the frontiers, and also the forts without any proper protection.. Many did not wait for the end of their term of service.72 Washington considered the Acts of Assembly relating to military discipline ’'insufficient," except in the case of mutiny and desertion. He recommended an act to enforce 7 3 the Articles of War, then dormant in the militia. For his own forces he directed heavy punishments without courts martial with penalties up to five hundred lashes— the • • 7 Ll using of an oath merited "twenty-five lashes immediately." Apparently a great problem for Washington was the insuring of strict supervision by the officers. Washington adopted the solution of administering prompt discipline to the militia when they were under his command - using militia rules, of course, and with lesser penalties than were exacted in the Regiment.7^ Another view of the value of the militia was expressed by James Maury who, commenting on the spirit of patriotism, felt that it had diffused itself through "every rank of men. 7 9 Gipson, op. cit., VII, p. 37. 73 Letter from Washington to Dinwiddie, May 3, 17 56, in Fitzpatrick (ed.), Writings, I, p. 357. 7 U- Orders of Virginia Regiment, May 1 and July 7, 1756, in Fitzpatrick (ed.), Writings, I, pp. 353-396. ^Letter from Washington to Dinwiddie, August 4, 1756, in Fitzpatrick (ed.), Writings, I, p. 421. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1 6 2 The common people have lately given proof of it.” Upon the call by the governor .to make a ’’draught upon the militia of ten counties, contiguous to the three frontier counties,” although needed for the erops, ’’great numbers voluntarily of fered themselves.” The militia marched to a point of rendevous, but the rumor of French and Indians proved "false..” Maury was "fully convinced, had there been occasion, they would have followed their own officers with the utmost 76 spirit to Duquesne, or any other place." By the middle of May 1756, a council of war in Win chester, consisting of the colonels commanding the militia units, and Washington, as president, advised the governor that since "we have no certain advices of the enemy being now down. . . . It was judged advisable to discharge all of the Militia, except what was absolutely necessary to 7 7 resist a second invasion upon this Quarter." The commanding officers of the ■'small militia units left behind at Winchester were directed by Washington to 7 8 occupy forts and localities along the frontier. Instructions to individual commanders described what was expected of them. In general the militia was "to protect the people," and "^Letter from James Maury to John Fontaine, June 15, 1756, in Ann Maury (ed.), Memoirs of a Hugenot Family (New York: George Putnam and Company, 18 537, p. 406. 77 Council of War, May 14, 1756, Fitzpatrick, Writings, I, p. 370. 7 ft Orders for the militia, tMay 15, 1756], Fitzpatrick (ed.), Writings, I, pp. 371-372. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1 6 3 7 9 - to prevent surprise. To accomplish the latter scouting parties of considerable strength were to range the "hills and waters" to find any evidence of the enemy. Washington’s primary concern, however, was focused on building and maintaining his Regiment, considering as he did the militia to be inadequate for the type of war Virginia had to face, i.e. a long conflict fought over large areas. Washington described this warfare as constant and conducted by elements of his regiment dispersed to defend along the frontier. He reported one hundred casualties during a nine month period of 17 56. To continue the defense and replace his losses Washington made a plea to Dinwiddie that the enlistment of the troops be extended past December, stating that only after training did troops become valuable and that the men would "almost as soon have entered the service for seventeen months, as for seven." He compared the militia with the men of the Regiment: "... our poor and ragged soldiers would kill the most likely militia in five days marching, so 8 0 little are the latter acquainted with fatigue." 7 9 Letter from Washington to Captain Woodford, May 16., 1756, Fitzpatrick (ed.), Writings, I, pp. 374-375. 8 0 Letter from Washington to Dinwiddie, May 23, 17 56, in Fitzpatrick (ed.), Writings, I, p. 387. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 164 ' Washington suggested as a source of manpower the enlistment of servants, citing that Parliament permitted this, and that if Virginia didn’t enlist servants the 81 recruiting officers for the British Regulars would. The use of servants, to Washington, would compensate, to a degree, for the loss of the men drafted from the militia 82 whose term expired in December 17 56. The rangers, tOo, were apparently far under strength and Washington requested Dinwiddie to inquire into the matter, the administration of the rangers being outside the normal province of the Com manding Officer of the Virginia Regiment. The■suggestion that they enlist in the Regiment was not received with 8 3 enthusiasm by the rangers. 81 Letter from Washington to Dinwiddie, August 4, 1756, in Fitzpatrick (ed.), Writings, I, p. 417; Letter from Washington to the Earl of Loudoun, January 17 57, in Fitzpatrick (ed.), Writings, II, pp. 14-15; Dinwiddie Papers, II, p. 470. The recruiters for the Royal American Regiment invited even deserters from the Virginia Regiment to enlist. Recruiting was made more difficult by the small allowance of eight pence for the daily maintenance of a soldier, particularly when a meal cost one shilling. This meant that the more men he recruited, the more likely was a recruiting officer to pay expenses from his own pocket. 82 Hening, 0 £. ci t . , VII, p. 16; Letter from Washington to Captain Waggener, September 6, 17 56, in Fitzpatrick (ed.), Writings, I, p. 4 58. In September the governor gave his approval to enlist servants. 8 3 Letter from Washington to Captain David Bell, September 6, 1756, in Fitzpatrick (ed.), Writings, I, p. 459. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1 6 5 A trip to inspect the progress of the construction of the frontier forts elicited further comments by Washington •on the conduct of the militia. The militia of Augusta County would not assist in building forts unless Washington would agree to ’’engage to see them paid forty pounds of tobacco per day, which is provided by act of Assembly for 84 militia carpenters.” Washington felt that he lacked authority to determine this militia matter, probably con sidering that these forces had not been assigned to his command, nor was there an Indian incursion in the area that could have led him to assume emergency powers. Upon his return from the trip Washington summarized his views to Dinwiddie* First, he considered the calling to active duty of the militia for short periods to be wasteful because most of the time was spent on the march to and from the place of duty. Often the groups coming to active duty were too small to be of much use, and had a preponderance of officers and noncommissioned officers. Another cost-of this system was the tendency, when ’’breakfast is wanted” to kill indiscriminately the first beef cattle in sight; even 8 4- Letter from Washington to Dinwiddie, October 10, 1756, in Fitzpatrick (ed.), Writings, I, p. 479; Hahing includes an act that provides for athree shillings or thirty pounds wage, op_. cit. , VII, p. 28. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1 6 6 when cattle were impressed the valuation placed on the animals was usually too high. Washington summed up his views: For the want of proper laws to govern the militia . . . they are obstinate, self-willed, perverse, of or no service to the people, and very burthensome to the country. This distaste for the militia did not prevent Washington from asking that they be called up, however,, as he knew that the Virginia Regiment at its present strength * * 8 6 was insufficient to defend the entire frontier. To Washington the best course of action was to have on active duty a regular force "in lieu of the militia and ranging companies" which to Washington provided less service for 87 more cost. Morton describes the mission of the Virginia Regiment as follows: "Acting as rangers in little groups scattered along the mountain frontier, they .continually searched the forests for the enemy, sometimes fighting des- 8 8 perately for their lives." Nor was Washington alone disturbed, for Dinwiddie’s continuing concern over the readiness of the militia is reflected in three letters written over the period of a year and a half. In a report to the Lords Commissioners for Trade 8 5 Letter from Washington to Dinwiddie, November 9, 1756, in Fitzpatrick (ed.), Writings, I, p. 493. 8 fi Letter from Washington to Lord Fairfax, August 29, 1756, in Fitzpatrick (ed.), Writings, I, pp. 447-448. 87 Letter from Washington to Dinwiddie, November 9, 1756, in Fitzpatrick '(ed.), Writings, I, p. 495. 8 8 Morton, Colonial Virginia, II, p. 693. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1 6 7 and Plantations in January 1755, Dinwiddie described the organization of the militia of 2 7,000 men stating how the dominion was divided into four military districts with experienced adjutants appointed to teach the officers and "the private Men their Exercise, which I hope, will in Time 8 9 bring the Militia into good Order and Discipline." The "Blair" Report of July 20, 1756, to the King recapitulated Dinwiddie's views that the militia upon his arrival was 90 "in very bad order." In August 17 56, the militia in the governor's opinion was still not satisfactory. The dastardly Spirits of our lower People and the want of proper Rule in the Officers of the diff erent Counties has been of very bad Consequence to our Affairs .... I am sorry for the Behavior of the ^jlitia that were with Lieutenant Rutherford • • • t Washington had.earlier reported the Rutherford incident to Governor Dinwiddie describing how the militia had run off "without one half of them having discharged their pieces. . . ." Washington blamed much of th.e militia mishehavior in 92 this instance on the "passive behavior" of the officers. p Q. Report from Dinwiddie to the Lords Commissioners for Trade and Plantations, January 1755, in Dinwiddie Papers, I, p. 387. 9° Papers of John Blair in the Huntington Library, cited by Koontz, o£. cit., p. 166. 91 Letter from Dinwiddie to Washington, August 19, 1756, in Dinwiddie Papers, op. cit., II, p. 480. 92 Letter from Washington to Dinwiddie, August 4, 1756, in Fitzpatrick (ed.), Writings, op. cit., I, pp. 416-417. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1 6 8 Adequate support for the Virginia Regiment or gaining dependability in the militia were never completely solved, as the basic problems that made voluntary recruiting difficult, drafting necessary and left the militia an uncertain instru ment remained throughout the war. Another factor affecting Virginia'a defenses cannot be discounted: Even the governor failed in the emergency. Poor judgement in the appointment of subordinates to Washington, delay in carrying out measures for de fense voted by the assembly, lack of scrutiny of administrative details, and want of courage in the enforcement of the draft law marked Dinwiddie's conduct of the defense. 3 This is a broad indictment that should be accepted with caution, and is cited to stress that the governor did have a strong voice, for good or bad, in the administration of the militia system. The Burgesses, for their part, varied in their enthusiasm for supporting a border war and exhibited an even greater reluctance to appropriate funds to invest in the security of the other colonies. By 1756 the faith of the colonies in general that they couid oust the French, or, for that matter, perhaps save great areas of colonial territory, had declined. The capture 93 Hayes Baker-Crothers, Virginia and the French and‘Indian War (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, T578), p. 1T5T7 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1 6 9 of Fort Duquesne was something ". . . that could be success fully accomplished only by regular troops brought from the mother country." This belief existed even after Braddock's defeat and the assemblies -still had more "faith in the performances of- troops trained in the regular method of war- 94 fare than in irregulars fighting in Indian fashion." England formally declared war on France in mid-17 56, and the active prosecution of the war received further impetus with the appointment of William Pitt as Secretary of State for the Southern Department in November 17 56. During April of the following year the defense posture of the colony was improved by an Act of Assembly that provided a reward of five pounds for those who would enlist voluntarily 95 before being drafted. This act provided for a force of twelve hundred and seventy-two men to be formed into twelve companies. The force was to have a command structure of a colonel, lieutenant-colonel, major, nine captains, twenty- four lieutenants, and twelve ensigns, and a "special staff" » consisting of a chaplain, a paymaster, three surgeons, a 96 surgeon’s mate,' and adjutant and a quarter master. 94 . •. - Gipson, 0 |>. cit., VI, p. 13. 95 . Hening, ojo. cit., VII, p. 72. ^ I b i d . , pp. 74-75. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 170 Apparently the administration of this relatively large force was a considerable chore to the Dominion govern ment; therefore, the Act of April 1757 ’’appointed commissioners to examine, state and settle such accounts relating to the expenses of the said officers and men, as shall from time to 97 time be referred to them by the governbr. . . ." This practice of employing commissioners was employed at times during the remainder of the period to settle accounts of militiamen primarily from Augusta, Bedford and other western counties. It is noteworthy that claims for^pay by a company commander were paid on the basis of. the size of his.command, 98 i.e., half pay for an organization at half strength. Many claims were accepted as legitimate, but there was also swindling including that connected with the bounty system established to encourage recruiting. An individual who had previously been convicted for selling ’’gold bricks” in t Port Royal was investigated by the House of Burgesses for his failure to prove his claim ’’for expenses and bounties” as a 99 recruiter. Another form of cheating the government was 97 Hening, ojo. c i t . , VII, p. 75; VIII, pp. 9,124; IX, p. 61. 98 Hening, 0£. c i t ., VII, pp. 120-121. 99 T. E. Campbell, Colonial Caroline (Richmond: The Dietz Press, 1954), p. 151"! Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1 7 1 for innkeepers to claim meals served to soldiers without military authorization. 1757 was a year when the frontiers were reported by the governor as being relatively quiet. This was fortunate as the readiness of the militia in 1757 still was a source of dismay to Washington: I think myself under the necessity of informing your Honor, of the odd behavior of the few Militia that were marched hither from Fairfax, Culpepper, and Prince William counties. Many of them unarmed, and all without ammunition or provision. Initially Washington had been heartened by the unexpectedly rapid response to his request (June 17 57) for troops to the county lieutenant of Fairfax County. Washington's rare enthusiasm for the militia soon received a setback after the poor showing of the Culpepper.. group that proved refractory. Speaking of the militia in general, Washington considered that "they are often egged on by the officers, who lead 1 02 •them to . acts of disobedience. . . The Quakers also remained a problem to such a degree that' in the middle of the French and Indian war all those serving in the miiitia of Caroline County or with the Virginia 1 0 0 Ibid., p. 167. 1(^Letter from Washington to Dinwiddie, June 27, 1757, in Fitzpatrick (ed.), Writings, II, p. 78. 102 Freeman, ££_. c i t ., II, p. 254. ' Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1 7 2 Regiment were ordered by their Meeting to ’’lay down their 103 arms" immediately. There were incursionsjhowever, by the Indians, probably Cherokees, in the southwest during the spring of 1757 and a force of rangers was authorized by the Assembly to protect this frontier. It is unclear whether these companies of one hundred men were part of the force authorized for the i04 Virginia Regiment or an addition to the total force. Two of the companies of the Regiment were sent to the assistance of South Carolina, and one was to garrison a fort built to the southwest in Cherokee country. Dinwiddie was relieved of his office as governor late in 1757 and was replaced by Francis Fauquier, who actually did not arrive in Virginia until June 1758. It is appropriate at the time of changing of chief executives to summarize the powers of the- office of governor in 1757 in relation to the defense of the colony. He had the power to: 1. Levy, raise, arm and muster such a number of forces out of the militia of the colony as he thought necessary to repel invasion or suppress insurrection. 10 3 Campbell, Caroline County, op. cit., p. 162. 104 Hening, op. c i t ., VII, p. 76; F. B. Kegley, Kegley1s Virginia . Frontier TSoutKwestern ..Virginia Historical Society, 1938), p. 249. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1 7 3 2. March this force to any place within the Dominion. The act describing this authority also envisaged that two- thirds of the County militias were to march against the enemy leaving one-third behind for defense of the county, until this force received further orders by the governor, or commander in chief. The Burgesses had been specific in the initial assignment of missions to the militia, but, in general, had left the remainder of the direction of the defense to the governor, even eliminating the Directors' control of the spending. Although the interest of the Crown in the defenses of Virginia against the Indian alone had been limited, England was emphatic that Virginia and the other colonie.s assist,in the international war against the French. This British interest was demonstrated by the size of the forces involved. "It is, in fact, probably accurate to state that there were several times as many British soldiers pro tecting the continental colonies during the winter of 17 57-8 as there were provincials actually under arms during the same period ."106 Pitt's letter to Virginia's governor in 1758 "'"^Hening, o£. c i t ., VII, pp. 106-107. 106 Gipson, o£. c i t ., VII, p. 1*4-1. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 174 demonstrates this increased interest. I am commanded to signify to you the King's pleasure that you do forthwith use your utmost Endeavors and Influence with the Council and Assembly of your province, to raise with all possible Dispatch within your Government, at least as large a Body of Men as they did for the last Campaign, and even as many more as the Number and Situation of .the Inhabitants may allow.' . . . Britain initially loaned Virginia 20,000 pounds, and after protesting, the colony received in 1757, another approxi mately 30,000 pounds for costs incurred supporting four expeditions— Braddock's and those to Niagara, Nova Scotia 108 and Crown Point. Other appropriations were made by Parliament throughout the war. Supplies were another pro blem and one of John Blairs' last official acts, when acting for the yet to arrive Governor Fauquier, was to complain to ••the Commissioners for stripping the colony of the last of its war supplies in order to outfit the Second Regiment. Failure of his Majesty's stores to arrive as "promised” caused this depletion in stocks. The attempt from 1755-1757 to ensure the safety of the border by defensive measures alone proved to be a failure. The British were now to turn to the offensive and during 17 58 the tide of the war turned, beginning with the 107 Letter of Secretary Pitt, December 9, 1758,"Virginia Committee of Correspondence," Virginia Magazine, XI(1904),p. 5. 10 8 Hening, op. c i t ., VII, p. 37 3. ■^^British Colonial Papers, Class CO 5/1329, Letter from John Blair, President of the Council to Commissioners for Trade and Plantations, June 20, 17 58. (Microfilm in C. W. R. L.-, SR #792, Reel M-243).' Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. occupation of Fort Duquesne at the forks of the Ohio. This expedition was commanded by General Forbes, of the British regulars, and the colonial contingent was - led by Washington In 175 8 two thousand men on active duty were authorized and two Virginia regiments were formed, the second being under Colonel William Byrd. Virginia had finally decided to raise, pay, and clothe two entire regiments and to place militia in the forts as the regiments moved against the enemy.Forbes had, in addition to the colonial troops, including the Virginians, "thirteen companies of Montgomery' Highlanders and four companies of the first battalion of the 112 Royal Americans. ..." Unlike the militia forces the regiments could now be employed "in such manner and on such service" as the governor should judge "most conducive to his 113 majesty's interest and the safety of this colony." Not all problems had been solved, for continuing difficulties arose, particularly under the recruiting system. An amusing sidelight of this system is found in Mcllwaine: "... Cap 1 1 0 Ibid., p. 373 ; Kegley, 0£. cit. , p. 264. 111 Hening, op_. cit. , VII, pp. 172, 173, 178. 112 Gipson, o£. cit., VII, p. 254. 113 Hening, op_. c i t . , VII, p. 2 52. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1 7 6 tain Cocke tho* a good Officer was considered as having only 26 Men,” and a command of this size only merited the rank of a lieutenant. Finally, to resolve the delicate problem, this officer and two others were awarded the title of "Captain- 114 Lieutenant." This particular problem of command was the result of the recruiting law providing that worthy men bringing in fifty recruits for the Regiment at Winchester would receive a commission as captain.Since twenty recruits merited a lieutenant’s commission, it is easier to understand what twenty-six recruits rated. In spite of initial enthusiasm for the campaign against Fort Duquesne, the ardor of the colonists decreased rapidly with the slowness of the march to the forks of the Ohio. Disenchantment with General Forbes, as road building through the Pennsylvania woods continued all the summer into the fall, almost led to the withdrawal of all support from the expedition before its objective was reached. In November 1758, however, the Assembly provided that both regiments were to continue in the pay of the colony until 1 January 17 59. ■^^Draper MSS (4ZZ41), Letter to Colonel William Byrd, Second Virginia Regiment, June 19, 17 58, in Mcllwaine (ed.), Journals of House of Burgesses, 1758-1761, pp. 261-263. "^^Morton, Colonial Virginia, II, p. 712. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1 7 7 This provision was timely as the provisions of the previous act were written in such a way that the pay for the First Regiment would cease while still on the march' to Fort Duquesne. This act unwisely stipulated that the men of the Second Regiment could "quit" the service on 1 December 1758, if they so choose, but they were asked to remain with the Regiment, This appeal to patriotism to retain men in service in the midst of a campaign was a serious defect and represented an error that was to be repeated in later wars of the United States, i.e_. ,the Mexican War. The Fort was successfully occupied after a creditable performance by the First Regiment as advance guard for the movement. The precise method by which the columns advanced demonstrated "an excellent grasp of military technique, and 117 reads almost like a school exercise in order writing." Virginia considered that with the reduction of the French-Indian base of operations at Fort Duquesne her .greatest problems were over. After the campaign Washington left .the service, Byrd assumed command of the First Regiment, ^■■^Hening, 0£_. c i t . , VII, pp. 252-253. 117 Oliver Lyman Spaulding, The United States Army in War and Peace (New York: G. P. Putnam* s, r937), p. 13. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1 7 8 and the Second Regiment was disbanded. Governor Fauquier ordered home the militia that had been occupying the forts, leaving the Regiment with the responsibility of manning the forts and posts on the northwest frontier with detach ments. Rangers were to cover the frontier further to the 1X8 south in Bedford and Halifax Counties. The forces on active duty remained at approximately the same authorized strength during most of the remainder of the war, although the actual size varied with the emphasis 119 placed on recruiting and the availability of bounty money. In 1759 the Assembly provided for a regiment of.a thousand 120 men, plus two companies (two hundred men) of artificers. Recruiting obtained one thousand men, then it slowed to the point that Fauquier "directed Coll. Byrd to buy up the Convicts Two Ship loads of which are come into our Rivers, Who he says are as good as any fresh Recruits when got into 121 the Field." England’s interest in support of the war was obviously greater than that of Virginia, particularly by 1760 when the threat was more from the Cherokees in the 118 Morton, Colonial Virginia, II, p. 727. 119 British Colonial Papers, Class CO 5/1329, Letter from Francis Fauquier to Commissioners for Trade and Plantations, April 14, 1759. (Microfilm in C. W. R. L., SR# 792, Reel M-243). •^^Ibid., Letter dated July 14, 1759. ^•^Kegley, o£. cit., pp. 264-267 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1 7 9 southwest near the Carolinas. It thus took persuasion by Fauquier to influence the Assembly to "keep up the Regiment 12 2 now on foot." Fauquier considered the Burgesses, when charged to act upon a premeditated plan, "mean honestly," 123 but were "Expedient Mongers in the highest Degree." There was also little enthusiasm at county level for fielding militia forces. If there had been difficulty in fielding an effective militia when there had been considerable need we have reason to believe that the militia would be reluctant to move at a time when even the records of a frontier county, such as Augusta, reveal no Indian massacres 124 or raids. In Caroline County the local court decided to raise a company for an expedition, but this decision to go to Cherokee country was not popular'nor could the ruling be enforced to support a campaign beyond the boundaries of the county. Some troops did enlist for the bounty, although many were "too small and unfit for military duty," or deserted.- The cost of bounties "and expenses for this recruitment were Letter from Fauquier to Pitt, March 14, 1760, Ban croft Transcripts, in Mcllwaine (ed.), Journals of the House of Burgesses, 1758-1761, p. 282. 123 British Colonial Papers, Class CO 5/1330, Letter from Fauquier to Commissioners for Trade and Plantations, June 2, 1760. (Microfilm in C. W. R. L., SR #793, Reel M-244). 124- Joseph A. Waddell, Annals of Augusta County, Virginia from 1726 to 1872 (Bridgewater, Virginia: C.J~ Carrier Company, lT5"8), p . 162. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 180 125 sent to the Secretary of the Colony.for payment. Even the Regiment, under a tested leader, Colonel William Byrd, was not always considered a certain military instrument. In 1760 Fauquier's lack of faith in the short time soldier was reflected in a letter to England agreeing . *» with Byrd's decision not to take his troops into Carolina Indian country: . . . It was not thought advisable to let Colonel Byrd with a 1000 Men mostly New levies, march into the Enemy's Country with our Convoy of provisions which we had purchased for the relief of the Garrison." (Fort Loudoun)126 If this war grows furious, it will be impossible for the Carolinas to defend themselves without assistance from. Mr. Amherst, I daresay this Colony will do all in their power . . . but I am of the opinion the security and safety of part of His Majesty's Colonies cannot be prOcurred by Pro vincial Troops o n l y . -^7 After the signing of a treaty with the Cherokees in December 17 61, the Regiment was disbanded, only to be re activated in March of 1762, due to a possible threat from Spain. Governor Fauquier was surprised that the Assembly overwhelmingly maintained the Regiment and authorized 12 5 Campbell, Colonial Caroline, op. cit., p. 168. 126 Letter from Fauquier to Lords of Trade, September 17, 1760,.Bancroft Transcripts, in Mcllwaine (ed.), Journals, p. 289, 127 Ibid., p. 290. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1 8 1 12 8 recruiting for the British Regiments in America. In May 1783 the Virginia Regiment was disbanded, Under proclamation of the King land was granted as a reward to the soldiers as follows: To every person having the rank of a field officer, five thousand acres; to every captain, three thousand acres; to every subaltern or staff officer, two thou sand acres; to every noncommissioned officer, 'two^29 hundred acres; to every private man, fifty acres. The war was over but not forgotten by thosa who considered the militia had been ill-used during the war, or by those who filed a claim for losses. In 1764 Colonel Adam Stephen was charged by Thomas Rutherford, a member of the House of Burgesses, with such misdoings as ordering militia outside'of Virginia and selling his own flour to 130 these forces. The Assembly exonerated Stephen. The number of cla.ims presented to the Burgesses was considerable, and usually derived from the impressment, of articles by the militia or from work performed to support militia on active duty. If no satisfactory fee had been paid a claim for payment oftentimes reached the House of Burgesses. The 128British Colonial Papers, Class CO 5/1330, Letter from Fauquier to Commissioners for Trade and Plantations, April 8 , 1762. (Microfilm in C. W. R. L., SR #793, Reel M-244.). 129 Hening, ojo. cit., VII, p. 6 6 6 . 130Report of Committee of .Propositions and Grievances before the Assembly, December 15, 1764, in Mcllwaine (ed.), Journals of the House of Burgesses, 1761-17657 pp. "296-2W.------ Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1 8 2 slowness of the awarding of claims is demonstrated by the actions taken by the Assembly on March 7, 1767, when that body, among other claims, allowed William Graham one pound' three shillings, for smith's work performed in 17 57. Rejected was Moses Ashbrooke's claim for reimbursement for a horse 131 hired by the militia in 1761. IV. THE POST WAR MILITIA Even though the war with the French was over, in 176 3 the Indians had united as never before, "laying waste the 132 settlements of New York, Pennsylvania, Maryland and Virginia." Defense of the frontier this time was provided by one thousand militia, called out from Hampshire and other western counties. The weight of Pontiac's Conspiracy did not fall upon Virginia, but the forts were manned against this contingency. Of short duration the uprising was defeated by Colonel Bouquet, who carried the war to the Indian in the Ohio country. Finally the border was .quiet; militia matters were again no longer of a great interest; and in 1764 the House refused to provide 131 Resolutions of the Assembly on county claims, March 7, 1767, in Mcllwaine (ed.), Journals of the House of Burgesses, 1766-1769, p. 96. 132 Eckenrode, 0£. cit., p. 13; British Colonial Papers, Class CO 5/1331, Letter from Fauquier to Commissioners for Trade and Plantations, December 15, 1764. (Microfilm in C. W. R. L., SR #7 94, Reel M-244). Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1 8 3 even five hundred troops, based on an unwillingness to 133 impose further taxes. Murders' and counter murders by Indians and whites in 1765 left the Council, in essence, powerless to take action. That body feared that if the militia were called to enforce law and, "if they should do their duty," it would "set one part of the Colony against the other. . .," as whites would have to.be taken into * 1 0 11 custody as violators of the law, as well as Indians. The tendency of the land hungry to cross into Indian land was the principal cause of this conflict, but Fauquier also noted that the "late increase of pay to the Militia on actual. Service" was another cause for border strife. He considered the pay for "active duty" was a factor in encouraging the 135 border people to seek out trouble. This lawlessness of the Virginians on the frontier continued and is reflected in Major General Thomas Gage's comments that there was a failure on the part of the civil government to prevent settling on Indian land and a disinclination of the militia to control ' .. ... 136 the settlers. British Colonial Papers, Class CO 5/1330, Printed copy of House's views and the Governor's reply, January 19, 1764. (Microfilm in C. W. R. L., SR #793, Reel M-244). 134 British Colonial Papers, Class CO 5/1331, Minutes of Meeting of the Council of Virginia, July 29, 1765. (Microfilm in C.' W. R. L., SR #294, Reel M-244). 135 British Colonial Papers, Class CO 5/1331, Letter from Fauquier to Commissioners for Trade and Plantations, May 26, 1765. (Microfilm in C. W. R. L., SR#794, Reel M-244). 136 British Colonial Papers, Class CO 5/86, Letter Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1 8 4 The acts that were passed in support of the system reflect the lack of urgency, the next act (1766) continuing and making minor amendment to the acts of 1762. The later act devoted itself to provisions for listing the Quakers on the muster rolls and to‘ the penalties to be exacted against 13 7 them for failure to muster. In 1771 the House again maintained the established organization of the militia. The decline in interest after the French and Indian war had its effect in a weakened militia, and the governor, fearing new Indian depredations, informed the Assembly of his fears in January 1768: ". . . the laws of the province are insufficient for the purpose . . . I must earnestly 13 8 recommend to you the framing of a law." A new border war did commence in 1774 and Governor Dunmore1s response was to call out elements of the militia. Dunmore planned to move out of Virginia to.the Ohio with western troops, ordering Colonel Andrew Lewis to rouse the militia of the 139 southwest counties and meet him near Wheeling. from Gage to the Earl of Shelburne, January 22, 1768. (Micro film in Virginia State Library, SR #452, pp. 17-28. 137 Hening, op. cit., VIII, pp. 241-243. 138 ' Virginia Gazette (Rind), March 3, 1768. 13 9 Letter from Dunmore to Lewis, July 24, 1770, in Rueben Thwaite (ed.), Documentary History of Dunmore*s War, 1774 (Madison: Wisconsin Historical Society, 1905 ), op. 57^ 8. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1 8 5 As in the past the militia could be called out for local defense and movement beyond the border required that the individual agree to such extended service.1 4 0 The county lieutenants summoned their militia, and the men 141 responded with alacrity. The enthusiasm with which the militia fought "Lord Dunmore1s War" offers some contrast to their reported actions during the French and Indian conflict. Gaining recruits for the expedition was apparently less difficult than procuring the necessary supplies, some men professing an "anxiety to go on the Expedition without loss 1 M- 2 of time.” Concerning the enthusiasm of the Virginians in battle, Thwaite makes the analysis that Dunmorefs War. was I in a sense a focal point in Western history. Here were gathered in either wing of the army the men who by dint of daring enterprise had made their way to the frontier, and had carried American institutions across the Appalachian barrier. Here, in a pitched battle, they met and subdued nearly an equal number of the most redoubtable of their savage foes.^3 This enthusiasm for the volunteer Indian fighter of the Virginia border was apparently shared by Eckenrode. "In the twenty years of.frontier warfare in Virginia, from 1754 to 1774, the efficiency and reputation of the Virginia 140Circular letter from Dunmore to county lieutenants, June 10, 1774, in Thwaite, ojo. ci t ., pp. 33-34. 141 Thwaite, 0£. c i t ., pp. 170-171. 142 Letter from Major Campbell to Colonel Preston, August 28, 1774, in Thwaite, o£. cit. , pp. 170-171. 143 Thwaite, 0£. ci t ., p. XXVI. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 186 borderers grew apace.” But border war was about to become secondary to a new principal theater, the^strife with England. With the mounting crisis between England and the colonies the functioning of the Assembly in relation to the governor became more and more difficult. In March 1774 the Governor signed the last acts produced by the Virginia House of Burgesses. After the Burgesses was dissolved in May 1774, an extralegal legislature was begun and formalized by the meeting of the August Convention of 1774. In June Dunmore left the colony to go aboard H. M. S. Fowey in the York River, and in July the Convention assumed de facto the reins of government. Ordinances of that body passed on 17 July 177 5, provided for the "raising and embodying a sufficient force 145 for the defense and protection” of the colony. Prior to this there had also developed a local system of "independent companies, equipped at their own expense, having their own peculiar uniform, and electing their own officers, though holding themselves subject to military TU fi law." Each independent' company was to protect its county 144 Eckenrode, o£. cit., p. 14. 145 Hening, op_. cit_., IV, p. 2 55. 1 U R Washington Irving, Life of George Washington (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1855), 1+ p. 448. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1 4 7 Committee of Safety and obey its orders. The selection of the county committees was by "mass meeting of the freeholders" who generally chose "known and trusted leaders x4oi. rt of the planter class." The Continental Congress had approved the formation of these companies, many of which had their beginnings before the Convention. Training was conducted in small units in the home communities rather than in larger units, as did the militia. With war with Britain drawing close these companies abandoned some of their inde pendence by seeking Washington's advice at Mount Vernon. Washington was chosen to command the companies of Prince William 149 Richmond, Fairfax, Albemarle, and Spotsylvania Counties. He evaluated them as "very good" companies in "excellent training" in a letter to George Mercer, but it is difficult to say that this was an estimate of their true military value or words of encouragement."^^ The militia, as such, still functioned and the presence, therefore, of two military organizations caused difficulty. 147 Letter from Washington to Captain Robert Mackenzie, October 9, 1774, in Fitzpatrick (ed.), Writings, III, pp. 247-249 n. 148 Albert Porter, County Government in Virginia (New York Columbia University Press, 194"/), p. 102. 149 Letter from Washington to John Augustine Washington, March 25, 1775, in Fitzpatrick (ed.), Writings, III,p. 276 and n 150 Letter from Washington to George Mercer, April 5, 1775, in Fitzpatrick (ed.), Writings, III, p. 288. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. In Caroline County the militia and the "independent" companies were merged, but after the reorganization two problems remained two sets of officers and the presence of Tories in the ranks. As a solution, militia officers were given precedence, and natives of Great Britain unless "patriots," were purged from 151 the new Caroline County "Minute Men." To reduce the effectiveness of these units Governor Dunmore in April 1775, removed the ammunition and arms’ stored in Williamsburg to H. M. S. Fowey - and for Virginia the Revolution was not far away. It is not within the scope of this study to describe the organization of the forces of the colony during the American Revolution; yet to close the description of the organization of the Virginia militia there follows a brief summary of the act under which the militia of Virginia began the Revolutionary War. The Act of July 1775, noted above, prescribed that all free white males over sixteen and under fifty should be mustered with the traditional exceptions, i.e. ministers and overseers. The officers were the county lieutenant and a colonel, a lieutenant-colonel, a major and junior officers for each regiment, whose companies could ^^Campbell, Colonial Caroline, pp. 243-244. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1 8 9 vary in size from thirty-two to sixty-eight men. The senior officers, as in the past, were men nominated by the county court and appointed by the governor. The tradition of the value of gentlemen as military officers carried over to the War of the Revolution. Washington advised a colonel of cavalry that he should ’’take none but gentlemen as officers”; and John Adams considered that a general ’’ought to be a gentleman 152 of letters and general knowledge. ...” As in the French- Indian War, a system of drawing lots from the list of the general muster was used to select those to serve and replace- 15 3 ments were also determined by lot at the initial drawing. "As the war continued the administration of the militia tended to become more a state function and less of a county one."^51t The salient point is that the militia did not do well in the War of the Revolution or, for that matter, the War of 1812. 152 Louis Clinton Hatch, The Administration of the American Revolutionary Army (New VorF; Longmans, Sreen and Company, 1304), p. 1 . 153 Hening, 0£. c it., pp. 10 ff. A later act of 1775 partly withdrew the exemption to overseers. 154 Porter, 0£. c i t ., p. 113. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. C H A P T E R V I DEVELOPMENTS IN THE ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION OF THE MILITIA It is now appropriate to note the high points during the development of the Virginia colonial militia and to decribe its final form. This chapter will consider the organization of the Virginia militia particularly in terms of command structure for ’’operations" and system for the conduct of training. There will follow a description of those aspects of the militia system usually categorized as "administrative" or "logistical" — including military justice, logistics, impressment, financing, medicine and religion. I. ORGANIZATION The top command of the militia was the governor, whose actual presence with the colonial troops was rare, although such governors as Berkeley and Nicholson did fre quently lead or inspect the militia. There was no military staff as such, but the governor often sat with his Council as a war planning staff or council of war. The Council also * Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1 9 1 sat as the General Court and as an upper house; while acting in the latter category recommendations on militia acts were often introduced by the Council.^- The Council at times presented detailed changes, an example being a 16 99 "Act for the Better Regulation of the Militia" "After the Word [Slaves] strike out the Word [and] near the beginning of the twelfth line and instead thereof insert [Servants and other 2 disorderly Persons]." After the issuance of an Act of Assembly the Governor and Council could reinforce the act by issuing a supplementary order and direct the "Commander in . Chief of the Militia in the several Counties do give notice to all Persons under their command. . . ."of the terms 3 of the Act of Assembly. The Council was aristocratic in character and for "generation after generation the leading families of the council intermarried, and from every point of view they formed a powerful and well compacted clique." It will be recalled that a Council member was often a colonel of militia Entry of September 12, 1701, in Mcllwaine (ed.), Leg islative Journals of the Council, 16jK[-1774 (Richmond: Virginia State Library, 19181*, I, p . 3 08 ;- Entry of June 18, 1723, o p . cit., II, p. 700. 2 Amendments recommended by Council to militia act (1738), in Mcllv-aine (ed.), Legislative Journals, III, p. 1566. 3 Council order, October 24, 1699, in Mcllwaine (ed.), Executive Journals of the Council, 1680-1754 (Richmond: Virginia State LfFrary, 1925^X945), II, p. lTI 14. H. .L. Osgood, The American Colonies in the Eighteenth Century (New York: Columbia University fress, 1924),I, p . 336. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1 9 2 for his county or district. An example of the continuity of this class control was the Byrd family, which had members in the Council from 1670-1775. William Byrd's appointment as colonel to both the Virginia Regiments is typical of the military influence of the leading families.; The position of the Burgesses had grown stronger and then, as now, the legislative branch of government controlled the,-purse. The House of Burgesses even invaded the area of responsibility of the governor, assuming, more than once, part of the executive power, including the direction of marches (campaigns). In the 1640's the Assembly outlined in detail the conduct of campaigns and during the French and -Indian War the Burgesses involved themselves directly in military affairs, including the appointment of officers. That body not only allocated or withheld funds, but dictated the purposes for which specific funds were to be used.^ In 1756 Directors appointed by the Burgesses were 6 to provide a committee to advise on military expenditures. The governor, nevertheless, retained control of disbursing of money by issuing warrants authorizing the Treasurer of 5 Letter from Dinwiddie to Lords of Trade, Hay 10, 1754, in Virginia Historical Society, The Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie (Richmond: Virginia historical Society, T O 4 5, X, p".“ 161.— 6 Hening, 0 £. c i t ., VII, p. 13. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1 9 3 the colony to pay the militia through the county lieutenants, and to pay such officials as the commissary, whose duty it 7 was to purchase and store provisions for the militia. The county lieutenant (commander) was the officer who appears to have provided the most continuity in the militia organization, being responsible for maintaining the required standards in each county militia. The officers within the developed county system usually included a colonel, lieutenant- colonel, major, captains, and lieutenants, all commissioned by the governor. The lower officers were nominated by the g colonels or the county lieutenant, most usually the latter. A primary reason for the appointment, rather than the election of officers, was to improve discipline, for with election of officers there came informality, weakening of command relation ships, and the greater probability of desertions under enemy fire. In early Virginia the title of "County Commander” represented actual power, not only military but political, and, in addition, he often presided over the county court system.® A letter to the editor of the Virginia Gazette ^Ibid; Ibid. , pp. 29-3P. g Dinwiddie Papers, op. cit., II, p. 110. 9 Norfolk County Minute Book, 16 35-1647, Minutes of the Court', February 1644, p. 223. (Records Office, Chesapeake Civic Center).; Craven, Southern Colonies in the Seventeenth Century, p. 276. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 191+ in 1774 reveals that not all were satisfied with the traditional role of the county lieutenant (formerly the commander). The writer questioned, "whether the absolute power given by the militia law to the lieutenant of every county, to appoint all- the officers under him, is not productive of too great influence?" His solution was to have the officers chosen by the courts martial where a majority rather than an individual made the decisions .^-0 This attack on the power of the commander yiss made long after his total power had actually waned. With the reduction of the military threat civic action predominated and it was the sheriff who represented this aspect of county government. As the com mander lost his special position, the status of the sheriff r o s e . ^ Nevertheless the number of civil leaders who used their military titles remained high to the end of the period. € Even in the protected Tidewater area, six out of the seven members of the Norfolk County Court, meeting in 17 54, held the rank of captain through colonel.Once military rank was obtained it doesn't appear to have been relinquished — thus the proliferation of titles throughout county and colony. The function of the colonels, who often were members of the Council, was to lead the troops in an actual emergency, as opposed to training the militia for contingencies, a function which fell to the company officers. There had been change's over the last one hundred years of the period •^Virginia Gazette, Hay 12, 1774. ^•“Cyrus Karraker, The Seventeenth Century Sheriff (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, HT30), pp. 84, 158, 159. ^ aNorfolk County Court Orders, Order Book, November 1753— July 1755, p. 95, (Chesapeake Civic Center Records Office). Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1 9 5 that permitted a more rapid reaction to counter an actual threat to the colony. The Act of 167 5 reveals considerable need for improvement, stating that: . . . If any discovery shall be made of any fort, habitation or number of the enemy settled or forti fied, that an account thereof shall be forthwith sent to the governor, and that no attempt be made upon them by any commander whatsoever until order shall come from the governor .12 This slow reaction time to the alleged Indian incursions was a cause of irritation among .the frontier populace at the time of Bacon’s Rebellion. In 1684 there was a change in the policy of 1675, to the extent that if the Indians were to make the first overt hostile action the militia commander could 13 "engage and destroy" them. The emphasis was still on the requirement to receive orders from the governor, if this were possible. By 17 01 the trend toward freedom of action had progressed to the point that when a chief officer of militia received notice of the "approach of an enemy" he was authorized to raise the militia and together with the advice of the commissioned officers who shall meet him to march the said Hening, 0£. c it., II, p. 332. This curtailing of immediate action by the militia commander on the scene was not imposed without forethought, however, as ill con sidered action in a county had previously caused the colony grief. 13 Hening, ££. cit., III, pp. 19-20. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. militia against the enemies and to embattle, re pel, subdue, take, kill or destroy them until further order to be given by the governor or commander-in-chief for the time being. The last complete militia act of the colonial period (17 57) was the clearest in its provisions on how the militia and its commanders would react in an emergency. First, upon receiving information of an invasion or insurrection, the county militia itself, not volunteer^, was to be pre pared to march, leaving behind under arms in the county a minimum of one third of its strength awaiting the governor's orders. Second, special bodies of troops, preferably volun teers, were raised to fight outside the home counties or even beyond Virginia's borders. Each militia officer having a command, in the absence of orders from higher authority, or orders to the contrary, was to march to "oppose the enemy, reporting his action to higher authority.15 It will be recalled that at even the end of the colonial period the passing of laws directing "rapid response was somewhat futile. Washington considered that the militia units, as a whole, -had neither the capability nor the desire to comply with the law. Turning to the training side of the militia, the mechanics of conducting the musters were retained largely unchanged throughout the period, i_.e. the men on the local muster list were ordered to report, were checked as present or absent, and the body drilled by the captain of the troop or company. The training would include close order drill and the manual of arms, both to the beat of drums. Often the militia units was given target practice and trained in extended order drill followed by a sham battle. 1 4 Ibid., III, p. 209. ^ H e n i n g , oj>_. c i t ., VII, pp. 70-74, 107. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1 9 7 The number of company musters varied, although four times,a year was usually the requirement of the Assembly. The annual general musters were staggered at least two days apart during the latter years of the colonial period so that higher officers inspecting or attending the meetings would have sufficient time to travel and reach 16 the muster in an adjacent county. As noted previously certain of Virginia’s governors showed great interest ) in the. state of the militia and attended many musters. William Byrd visited several with Governor Spotswood, noting little in his diary on the details of training, but reporting that the- hogshead of punch he had donated to the muster 26a crowd had "made them drunk and fighting all the evening. . . ." The size of the infantry companies and cavalry troops that "fell in" on militia muster days, apparently varied with the period. Beverley’s history of 17 05 states that a troop of "Light-Horse" or dragoons would contain from thirty to forty men, while an infantry company would have about fifty soldiers. This was a considerable decline.in size from 16b earlier organization. Forty years later Governor Gooch reported that his infantry and cavalry units contained sixty and fifty men respectively. ^ Virginia Gazette (Rind), March 12, 1767. 16aLouis B. Wright, and Marion Tinling (eds.), The Secret Diary of William Byrd of Westover, 1709-1712 (Richmond! Dietz Press,- T941), p. 234. l6b Robert Beverley, The History and Present State of Virginia, (ed.) Louis B. WrTflrt (Chapel Hill: University oT HortE-Carolina Press, 1947), pp. 269-270. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 197a Throughout the period the total number of men in the the Virginia militia increased as the population of the colony grew, although it is difficult to estimate with certainty the strength of the militia for a specific year. Those who have reported strengths have not always used the same criteria — reporting at times maximum potential forces and on other occasions using a less all-inclusive approach by counting those actually on muster lists. Further, the militia was based on the number of "tithables" and the definition itself varied over the years. Of the tithables a larger proportion was considered as being available during the early years of the colony than later when the luxury of exemptions could be better afforded by the growing colony. The proportion- of those on the militia rolls to total tithables and to the entire population varied. Beverley estimated there to be approximately 9500, 35,000 and 60,000 Virginians in these three categories during the year 17 0 3 .^ ° Berkeley in 1671 considered that with great effort he could field eight thousand horsemen. Ten years later Culpepper reported a potential force of 15,000 men who could carry a weapon, although the militia itself contained about 8500. In 1697 Beverley reported that out of a potential of 18,000 there were 8300 in the militia, organized into forty troops'and eighty-three companies. Governor Gooch considered in 1742 that the militia had 16,000 on its rolls and Dinwiddie reported in 1756 that there were 35,000 males eligible for militia duty, although he doubted his ability 1 6 c Ibid., p. 2 5 3... Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 197b to place this entire number in the field. A ready availability of thousands of combat troops actually did not exist for individual militia units were not employed in the field as organizational entities. Instead, as noted earlier, expeditions against the Indians were composed of men from those counties which had been directed by the governor to support the "march”. The county "quota" of men was filled by various methods: from volunteers, % from those in militia units who were selected by a board of officers or commissioners, or, from those designated as "idle, vagrant" fellows by the governing group of the county. Before establishment of the county system the commander of the plantation had been directed not only to exercise his men as militia, but to keep an a'ccurate record of those attending, including record of status of arms, family 17 history, and principal possessions. Commencing with the 1640's and after the organization of the colony into counties a report of muster to the governor by the county lieutenant usually was required. The decision as to whether the militiamen was to serve in the cavalry or with foot troops was at the discretion of the colonel or chief militia officer : X 8 of the county after he considered the ability of each person. An act of 1723 notes that the chief of militia could assign 19 the militiaman to "such captain as he shall think fit." 1 7 Hening, o d . c i t . , I, p. 200. 18 Hening, op_. c i t . , III, pp. 335-336. 19„ . Hening, op. cit., IV, p. 118. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1 9 8 The same act required that those exempted from muster should produce at the muster a substitute white man, together with a horse, arms, and equipment. This was a more strict version of the act of 1705, which did not require the substitute for those exempted at the musters, but did require that the horse, arms, and equipment be produced annually at the 2 0 general muster. Throughout the period the philosophy of special treatment' for '’gentlemen'’ prevailed, the act of 170 5 providing that, during a rebellion or invasion designated persons would be required to "serve in such stations as are suitable for gentlemen, under the direction of the colonel or chief officer of the county. . . ." Eligibility for the militia remained almost uni formly over the years as all able-bodied males "sixteen to sixty," although there were variations, i.e. the Act of 1723 defined eligibility as from "twenty-one to sixty."21 Those exempt from military service, in addition to Virginians outside the established age bracket, were, among others, coroners and millers. Those exempt (whites) in 17 56 numbered 8000, which left a body of colonists of 35,000 who were 22 liable to be mustered for military duty. Before leaving the subject of eligibility of the militia it is useful to note the rules for "eligibility" to "join" the Virginia Regiment in 17 57. The age limits were less 20 Heningj 0£. cit., III, p. 337. ^Hening, 0£. cit., IV, p. 118. 22 Dinwiddie Papers, II, p. 474. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 1 9 9 inclusive than the militia, being eighteen to fifty for the Regiment. "Able-bodied persons" were to be found by examination of the muster rolls or "by such other methods of enquiry as 23 . . , shall seem expedient." Those eligible were to be men who shall be found loitering and neglecting to labor for reasonable wages; . . . who run from their habitations, leaving wives or children without suitable means for their subsistance, and all other idle, vagrant, or dis solute persons. . . . This quotation seems to support John Shy’s thesis that: As the militia companies tended in the eighteenth century to become more social than military organizations, they became the hallmarks of respectability or at least of full citizenship in the community. Evidence gathered so far is not full nor does it admit of any quantitative conclusions, but it does indicate that a growing number of those who did the actual fighting were not the men 214. who bore a military obligation as part of their freedom. The other military obligation, patrolling, was apparent ly accepted with more enthusiasm by the average colonist than going to the frontier to fight the Indians. Much more detail on patrolling was included in the later militia acts than those early in the century and until the end of the colonial period the acts of Assembly continued to stress the • • 2 M- 3. patrol organization within the milxtxa system. It appears that part of the small response to pleas to volunteer for frontier duty in the French and Indian War was a result of "dread of servile insurrection."^4^ II. ADMINISTRATION The militia, once organized into companies and ^3Hening, ££. cit., VII, p. 70. 24 John W. Shy, "A new look at Colonial Militia," William and Mary Quarterly, XX (April 1963), p. 18 2. 24a Hening, ojd. cit 1 , VI, p. 543. By 1755 the acts in cluded articles on payment for patrol duty and penalties for failing either to appoint patrollers or to muster with the patrol. As an example of this increased detail, specific provision was made that the City of Williamsburg, and Borough of Norfolk, exempt though they were from certain militia responsibilities, should patrol inside the cities and "within half a mile" of the city limits; op. cit.,VII, pp. 104, 539; VIII, pp. 241,514. A h V .. _ John A. Doyle, English Colonies in America (New York: Holt and Company, 1889-1907), V, p. 428.------~ Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 200 placed under a hierarchy of command extending from non commissioned officers to the governor, required a consider able administrative system. Military justice, financing, and logistics were among the problems of the colonial militia just as they are inherent to any military organization. Military Justice A review of the administration of military justice is particularly revealing colonial mores. It will be recalled that under the middle period of the administration of the Virginia Company strong governors employed harsh penalties under what was martial law. The relaxation of this "dictatorship” and the beginnings of colonial repre sentative government ameliorated penalties meted out by both military and civilian justice. Nevertheless, in 1632, the Assembly made the dangers of disobedience clear to the colonists and warned ’that authority was not to be flaunted o c "at their utmost perils." The power that was vested in the commander of a plantation, or "hundred," was great in terms of both military and judicial functions. Indicative of this’ position of authority was the fact that no one was permitted to wear gold lace except the governor and his Council and 2 6 the commanders of hundreds. When the county system was established in 1634 the county lieutenant exerted the military functions of the former "commander," retaining the same type of authority. The commander of a militia unit in the mid-1660's could present a list of those failing to muster to the county sheriff, who could then proceed to collect a fine from the 2 5 Hening, o£. cit., I, p. 174. 2 6 John Fiske, Old Virginia and Her Neighbors (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin and Company7 1k97), I, p. 244. ” Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 201 delinquent in accordance with the penalties established by 27 the Assembly. The severity with which military crimes were dealt can be measured by the terms of the Articles of War adopted in 1675, which were, in general, to apply to mustered militia both when in "garrison,” or in the "field." Any officer was empowered to punish, for any of the offenses listed in the Articles of War, with penalties "not extending to life or member." "Capital and great crimes," however, 2 8 were to be judged by a council of war. The fine for not attending a muster was the same in 172 3 as it was in the 1660's— one hundred pounds of tobacco, a penalty that could not be exacted more than five 29 times in a year. If during a muster disobedience was exhibited, the senior officer present at the muster could direct a miscreant "to be tied neck and heels, for any time 30 not exceeding twenty minutes." An offender who repeated could be committed to the "county goal" for any time not exceeding ten days. Militia captains of troops or companies were required to keep an "exact account in writing" of every ^Hening, o£. cit. , II, pp. 246-24-7. 28Ibid., p. 352. 29 Hening, on. cit., IV, p. 121. on Ibid., p. 122. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 202 default or offense committed by members of their command, submitting it to the "field officers and captains, at their 31 next meeting for the fining offenders." This meeting was termed a "courts martial" and met yearly at the county court house. The fines that could be exacted were limited by the act of the Assembly and the system suffered the weak ness that military justice was slow in its application. These were peacetime penalties; in time of invasion a heavier fine, ten pounds in currency, was to be exacted for failure to muster, with higher fines being placed upon officers. For disobedience a militia captain could place an offender in jail without bail for up to three months. In spite of immediate punishment being ordered for disobedience, by 172 3 the overall severity of penalties had declined sharply since the 1670’s. The proceeds of fines exacted on the members of the militia and collected by the sheriff were used for the benefit of the county militia as a whole for "drums, colours, trumpets, leading-staffs, partizans, and halberts, and after all these, for providing arms and ammunition for the 31Ibid., p. 123. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 2 0 3 3 2 county’s use.” Failure to pay a fine could, in aggravated cases, result in the sale of the offender's goods, after the chief commanding officer of the county directed his warrant. By Act of Assembly in 17 5 5 the penalties for refusal to obey an officer at a muster, or for misbehaving at a • 33 courts martial, were not in excess of ten shillings. This act at mid-century reflects the continued trend of weakened power for commanding officers and courts martial. The-law, however, was revised in 1757, due to the advice of Washington and others, to the extent that disobedience and misbehavior could be awarded more severe penalties, and, most important, 34. could be levied at the time of the violation. An improve ment in the administration of military justice was effected by the scheduling of a meeting of the courts martial immedi ately subsequent to the annual general muster— this made 3 5 possible the imposition of timely penalties. The general tightening of the system of military justice appears to be a factor that led to improvement of the Virginia defense 32Ibid.,,IV, p. 12 5. It will be recalled_that^the individual had been made responsible for providing his own arms and ammunition. 33 Hening, ojo. cit., VI, pp. 533-534. 34 Hening, ££. cit., VII, p. 96. 35Hening, op. cit., VI, p. 534; VII, p. 96. Initially Washington had difficulty in applying prompt justice within Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 2 0 4 organization during the latter years of the French and Indian War. A tightening of penalties for military offenses in order to prosecute a war did not represent a return to the harsh criminal code that bound England. Bruce concluded that the English code had been modified in the New ..World, The penalties for theft, for example, were less stringent, inasmuch as all the necessities of life were "more abundant in the Colony.” Further, the colonial judges could not, like their British counterparts, transport convicts overseas, thus avoiding awarding the terrible penalties still demanded by British law, and consequently colonial penalties tended q c to be more lenient. Basic to any military system is not only fear of punishment (penalties), but hope of reward. It is thus not remarkable that the'Virginia militia system did provide reward to officers and "private men” for "gallant behavior," 37 as was the case during the Braddock Expedition. Medical and Religion. There is remarkably little reference in the militia the Virginia Regiment as approval to hold the court was required from Williamsburg. This delay, particularly in holding deser ters in camp unpunished, made discipline more difficult to maintain, Fitzpatrick, Writings, I, p. 287. 3 6 Philip Bruce, Institutional History of Virginia in the Seventeenth Century (New York: 5"! F. Putnam's Sons, 191077 I I, pp. 37 Hening, 0£. cit. , VI, p. 52 8 . Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 2 0 5 acts to matters of religion, moral standards, or medical treatment. On the last, there was some coverage of response ' dlities for pensioning the wounded and rare mention of medical services provided the militiamen on a march. During the general period of Bacon’s Rebellion authority was given by the Assembly to provide a surgeon for every fort and ’’medicines and salves” were authorized at a cost of five 3 8 pounds per hundred men. If no surgeon volunteered the chief commander was empowered to impress two doctors and pay them four hundred pounds of tobacco a month— this was the same rate as paid to a lieutenant of the line. The poor medical care that could be expected, even at the end of the colonial period, is revealed by an extract of a letter from John Blair sent either to the Commander of the Virginia Regiment or to the chief commissary officer. I have sent you a Chest of Medicines from Mr. Pasteur's Shop, with Instruments; but cannot yet hear of a Surgeon for you which gives me much concern. Concern with the religious life of the militiaman does not reflect itself frequently in the Acts of Assembly. Hening, 0£. cit., II, p. 329. 39 Draper Papers in Appendix to H. R. Mcllwaine (ed.), Journals of the House of Burgesses, 1758-1761 (Richmond: Virginia State Library, 1905-1915), p. 26l”j Fitzpatrick, Writings, I, p. 284. When soldiers were hospitalized and required nursing stoppages in their pay was instituted to provide for the expenses of the nurses. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 2 0 6 There are some instructions of a moral and religious nature in the Articles of War, passed in 1676, concerning bias- . phemy, swearing, drunkerness, and attendance at morning HO and evening' prayer. The greatest volume of legislation relating to the militia and religion was in connection with the Quakers. This group remained a problem throughout the colonial period and, even when drafted for the Virginia Regiment in 17 56, they would "neither bear arms, work, receive provisions or pay, or do anything that tends in any respect to self-defense." "They chose rather to be whipped HI to death than bear arms. . . ." This failure to legislate details of religious observance is in accordance with the philosophy by which Virginia’s Anglican Church was administered. There was no central religious authority and church practices were guided by local option at the vestry level. In religion local needs represented the highest authority - this local independence has a similiarity to the emphasis the local militias placed on home defense. The systems that the same social class administered, both military and religious, represents another HO Hening, o£_. cit. , II, pp. 333-33H. HI John Fitzpatrick, The Writings of George Washington , 17H5-1797 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1^30), T, pp. 3§H, H20. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 2 0 7 likeness. Impressment. Increasing detail is found in the Acts of Assembly throughout the period relating to imprest /snt of men and materials in support of the militia. Initially, eve., yone worked direct ly for the Colony and there was no need to impress. An early act (1632) prevented workmen from leaving their work under penalty of a month's imprisonment, if the work in which 42 • they were engaged was for the Common good. The term "press” was used in an act of 1644 and related to one soldier being "pressed" from each fifteen tithables, if volunteers were lacking. In 1665 -power, was given by the Assembly "to press 44 carpenters, laborers and other workmen to build a fort." The power to impress apparently became quite broad as Major General Robert Smith was empowered by Governor and Council to seize all the powder and shot in the possession of mer chants and planters that the ammunition might be better dis- 45 tributed— the cost was to be borne by the colony. By 167 5 42 Hening, op. cit., I, p. 193. 1+3Ibid. , p. 292. 44 Hening, 0£. cit., II, p. 220. 45 Order of the Council, July 10, 1666, m Mcllwaine (ed.), Minutes of the Council and General Court, 1622-1632; 1670-16?6 (Richmond: Virginia State Library, 1924), p . 4&9. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 2 0 8 the captain of every fort was authorized to press any 46 necessities "needful for the use of his fort." This referred primarily to the administrative needs of the fort and appears to be wider authority than those noted pre viously. The same act permitted the impressing of sloops, boats, or other methods of transportation in order to move men and material to the site of the forts. These services were to be paid for, but, lest a false muster be rendered of assistance provided, the county courts were M-7 to certify the "deservings of those persons so employed." By 1676 the power of impressment were even more broad, the acts providing the chief commanders or com manders with full power to impress what was required to advance the campaign, "whether ammunition, provision, arms, h g baggage horses or other necessities whatever. ..." To reinforce this power the local militia officers and the justices of peace were directed to "show ready obedience" to the leader of the expedition. The same philosophy continued to the turn of the century when the chief officer of the militia of any fron tier county could impress "horse and man and boat and hands ^Hening, on. cit. , II, p. 330. i)7TK., Ibid. **8Ibid., p. 348. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 209 . . as the occasion shall require,” to carry news of the enemy 4 9 to the governor or commander in chief. This power was 50 expressed in practically the same words m 17*18. The latter, act was detailed, stipulating that field officers could impress people or boats to cross the Chesapeake Bay, as well as all land transportation, carts and .animals-, in order to move guns and their ammunition.^ Included among those subject to impressment were sailors, smiths, wheelwrights, carpenters and any "other artificer whatso- <9 ever.” The pay of the smiths, wheelwrights, carpenters and other workmen remained about the same during the 18th century. These artificers, either employed or impressed to build boats, bridges, et al, were paid from three to five shillings a day, or its tobacco equivalent, both in 1705 and fifty years later, the smith receiving the highest pay . 5 2 of the artificers for his services. The Acts of 17 56 and 17 57 were painstaking in their detail. Not only did they embrace most of the provisions on impressment of the Act of 1748 but also provided for appraising the value of items impressed. "Provisions, utensils, tools u P Hening, 0£. cit., III, p. 209. ^Hening, ££. cit., VI, p. 114. 5L,., Ibid. ^Hening, 0£. cit., III, p. 366; VII, p. 28. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 210 or instruments” were not to be used after being impressed ''until appraisement thereof has been made in money, by 5 3 two good and lawful men upon oath*” One of the two men was to be chosen by the owner of the impressed items and the other arbiter selected by the commanding officer of the troops involved. The same procedure was to be followed for determining the "allowance in money by the day for the use” of equipment as for estimating the value of impressed boats and wagons. The concept of payment for loss of equipment was not new to the colony and earlier acts had applied the principle to horses or arms lost in "actual engagement against the enemy." If individual property was lost, the Colony was 54 liable for the loss. Logistics. The Assembly had repeatedly established what arms were required by the citizen soldier, and before the Burgesses existed as a branch of government the governors had done the same. Initially, when the commander of a plantation exerted almost exclusive local power, the instructions were directed more toward that official than toward the individual colonist. 33Hening, op_. cit. , VII, pp. 26-27 , 111. 54 Hening, on. cit., III, p. 20. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 211 In 1631 the commander of every plantation was ordered to "take care that there be sufficient of powder and ammunition within the plantation under his command and their pieces fixed and their arms complete."55 Eight years later an act directed "all persons except negroes to be provided with arms and c e ammunition or be fined. . . ,"3a This represented a trans fer of responsibility to the individual. By 1662 the militia act stipulated that every man able to bear arms should have "a fixed gun, two pound of powder and eight pound of shot 57 at least" at his house. In spite of the acts there was such a lack of equipment in 1672 that, although the colony was re ported to have twenty foot regiments and as many troops of horse, there was scarcely enough arms for every tenth man.^7a At the time of Bacon's Rebellion the requirement was the same, except that the individual was to have six pounds of shot instead of eight. But more important, the later act placed responsibility for procuring weapons on the county: "Each county . . . is required to furnish its particular soldiers ,.58 • • • • The provisioning of the militia were rarely made a detail of Acts of Assembly, although the Act of 1676 stipu lated that each man should be sent on an expedition against the Indians with "at least one pound of biscuit bread, and one-half pound of good dried beef, bacon or cheese for a day, 55Ibid., I, p. 127. 56Ibid., p. 226. 87Hening, 0£. cit., II, p. 126. 57aWinder Transcripts, letter .from Chicheley to the Privy Council, July 16, 1672, I, p. 277. 58Ibid., p. 344. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 212 and so to provide two months provision for their first going out.” In the Act of 1684 the responsibility for maintain ing individual arms again appears to have been placed upon the foot soldier, who was to supply himself with a ”sword, musket, and other furniture fit for a soldier." A "trooper" was to provide himself with "a good able horse, saddle, and all arms. ..." The usual amount of powder and shot was required and the militiamen were instructed to "continually keep their arms well fixed, clean and fit for the king’s service;" .although eighteen months was permitted to procure 59 personal arms. In 1705 more detail was placed in the law on what items of equipment militiamen should possess. A cavalry man, for example, was to have "a good serviceable horse, a good saddle, hostler, breast plate and crouper, a case of good pistols well fixed, sword and double cartouche-box c n and twelve charges of powder." A score years later the standard two pounds of powder and eight of shot, usually 61 required.of the footsoldier, was reduced in half. The same ^Hening, on. cit., Ill, pp. 13-14. 60Ibid., III, p. 338. fi 1 Hening, 0£. cit., IV, p. 120. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 2 1 3 general requirements remained well into the period of the 62 French and Indian War. The arms required by the various ranks of officers and noncommissioned officers was outlined in 1755, all ranks being instructed to possess a cutting swcrd, and some ranks were to have an additional weapon, such as 63 a pistol or half pike. In time of emergency elemenxs of the militia who had not adequate arms were to be armed from 64 "his majesty’s magazine, and other stores." This ammunition had been procurred previously, using the public funds, and 6 5 distributed by the governor. As long as the militiamen did not deploy far from home their logistical wants were relatively simple. Require ments of supply were placed in part on the individual, £.£. the providing of a rifle, and to a large extent on the county, which supplied the militia force. When the expeditions be came large, as in the French and Indian War, the Colony assumed the responsibility for the Regiment and for militia units on active duty in the area of operations. The flow of supplies was made difficult by the size and terrain of Virginia. As an example, the utility of horses, was reduced by the hilly, 6 2 Hening, ££_. cit. , V, p. 17; VI, p. 531; VII, p. 94. 6 3 Hening, o^. cit., VI, p. 537. 64 . Ibid., p. 118. ^Hening, ot>. cit., V, p. 90; II, p. 349. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. ZL4 forested land on the frontier and by the lack of forage. Also basic was the requirement to procure the majority of manufactured goods from Europe— a factor that’ slowed procurement of weapons. Financing the Militia. Colonial forces were small, but the concern of the taxpayers and their representatives in the Burgesses over expenses was ever present. Whenever an opportunity afforded, exDeditures for the militia, or other defenses, were reduced by deactivation of defense units, i_.e. forts, rangers and later, the Virginia Regiment. Money was raised largely by three methods: by cus toms, by quit rents, and by a poll tax. The financial sup port of the militia and of military operations varied widely with the situation, although generalizations can be made p p as to the pattern. The poll tax raised the money for the general expenses of running the colonial government, including the costs of impressment and the pay for the militia. Typical of this public levy was the ten pounds of tobacco, or one shilling, levied upon each tithable for several years com- 6 7 mencing with 17 56. The revenue from the poll tax bore an 6 6 Percy S. Flioben, The Royal Government in Virginia, 1624-1775 (New York: ' ColumFIa University, 1919), pp. 288-300. 6 7 Hening, op. cit., VII, pp. 9-10. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 2 1 5 ever increasing proportion of the charges upon the budget; it was "2 .4 times greater than the revenues of the land tax 68 in 1763. ..." Special levies on the tithables were also made for additional expenses, such as those incurred when raising a military expedition. On occasion, one of the two other major methods of supporting the-military was adopted. The quit rents from the land were normally sent to England, but the Crown did at time authorize use of these funds from this source for local defense. Even more • rarely money was directly appropriated -by England for colonial expenses. The other major source of funds for military expenses, broadly entitled "customs duties," included both export and import duties and included such diverse types as those imposed on slaves being brought into the province and the famous two shilling duty on every hogshead of exported tobacco. To help support the French and Indian War the latter tax was imposed and collected by "inspectors" at 6 9 designated warehouses. Among the expenses of a "military" nature of interest are the following salaries paid in 1673: the governor received' CO William Z. Ripley, The Financial History of Virginia, 1609-1776 (New York: Columbia College, 1893), p. 41. 6 9 Hening, op_. cit. , VII, p. 387; VIII, pp. '87, 89, 234. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 2 1 6 one thousand pounds a year; his deputy, six hundred; and a 70 major-general, three hundred. Strange to relate, considering the difficulty in raising money, there were instances of an excess of money after paying the militia. The treasurer was directed to apply all excess to a "fund established for 71 defraying the public charges" of the dominion. In general, the colony was more than self.supporting, certainly in the 72 second half of the eighteenth century. The purely local aspects of colonial finances were covered by a system of provincial revenues— taxes imposed at county and parish ievel. When a county was first formed and money appropriated to public use, such as for a church and a prison, a sum was often allocated for distribution of "arms and ammunition amongest such persons as shall here after go to seat the said counties . . . until the whole one 73 thousand pounds be la’d out." Another source of county income was the fines pai.a by militiamen, usually in con nection with failing to muster. These fines varied in 1755 from twenty pounds sterling for failure of the county lieute- 70 "Abstracts by Sainsbury, W. N., and copies of the McDonald and DeJarnette Papers," Virginia Magazine, XII (1905). 71Hening, VIII, p. 239. 72 Flippen, op. cit., p. 30^. 73 Merrill Jensen (ed.), English Historical Documents, American Colonial Documents to 1776 ( f a York: Oxford Uni versity Press, 195$), 1^, p.~?82. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 2 1 7 nant, or commanding officer, to call a general muster, to the minor penalty of three shillings forfeited by a footman who appeared at muster "without a cutting-sworcf, a- double 74 cartouche-box, and three charges of powder and ball." These fines were assessed by court martial and collected by the sheriffs, who also collected the poll and land taxes. The money, less six percent sheriff's fee, was used by the county to assist in outfitting the militia. In case of the failure of the responsible officer to order a general muster 75 half the fine was paid to the informer. III. COMPLIANCE WITH ACTS AND ORDERS t There appears to be little evidence that the counties failed to organize and administer the militia in accordance with the laws and orders issued from Assembly, governor,-and Council. How effective the militia organizations were when committed to action is another matter. Where there was tardiness or incomplete reaction to a law it usually can be linked to the basic problem that colonial Virginia was a political entity spread over a wide Hening, ££_. cit. , VI, p. 536. 7 5 Hening, 0£. cit., VII, p. 543. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 2 1 8 area and populated with men and groups with diverse needs and objectives, whose views as to what was important and necessary varied widely. Some early recognition had been made of the diverse problems of counties when authority was decentralized in 1662 to permit counties to pass their own ''by-laws" to satisfy a local situation. Such local laws were to be within the framework of the laws of the colony and were, to be binding only after approved by the majority of the voters in the district where the regulation 7 6 was to be applied. In order to obtain this approval the militia company was often called together and its members voted on the local by-law— often one devoted to fishing regulations, to the destruction of wolves, or similiar matters. Many times there must have been compliance, but only after much complaining. The displeasure of New Kent County is reflected in the following order of the General Court, sitting in James City in 1674: . . . The Militia on.horseback are Commanded to muster once Every month near the house of Lt. Colonel Collier to their Great vexation and much Loss of their time for which they have no public order and a fine of Two Hundred of tobacco imposed upon every person who absent themselves from such too frequent 7 6 Hening, 0£. cit., II, pp. 171-172. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 23.9 7 7 musters which is Contrary to Act of Assembly. . . . The General Court adjudged that both the Horse and Foot should meet at only convenient places, and but three times a year. The Court also warned Collier to "desist from selling Drink" or resign. The decision was to be conveyed to-Collier by the sheriff of New Kent County. There is the often quoted cas' of Cadwalader Jones, commanding a fort on the Rappahanock, who upon receiving a written order (1679), read the command to his troops, burned the paper, and made comments on what he thought of the governor. More serious was the mutiny of a company of militia, apparently upon...the reassignment to the organization of an 78 undesired officer. The affair had been aggravated by the open quarreling of two of the company officers. Compliance with the governor’s orders probably was not always complete, as Nicholson ordered the commanders in chief of the county militia to report to him what orders 77 Order of the General Court, November 18, 1674, m Mcllwaine (ed.), Minutes of the Council and General Court, p. 391. Instances o±J officers selling "by retail" reoccurs in the records of the Colony, as in Decisions of General Court, November 18, 1673, in Mcllwaine (ed.), Minutes of the Council, p. "518. 7 8 Council Meeting, July 22, 1680 in Mcllwaine (ed.), Executive Journals of the Council, I, pp. 10-11. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 220 79 they had received. Nicholson's order could also reflect the governor's concern with'tardiness of receipt of orders— this would involve the sheriffs of the counties who delivered the documents from the capitol. Information on these people is lacking in detail as "the county clerks kept the court records decidedly too official to give’ us the personal characteristics of any of the sheriffs or justices of 8 0 peace.” Karraker also points out the lack of diaries, journals, biographies, and letters that added color to the picture of English county officials. If the seventeenth century militia was generally characterized by serious purpose imposed by the Indian threat, the average eighteenth century unit was less moti vated for war. A threat to the colony as a whole being lacking most of the time, the muster of the militia became more of festivity than a training session for the defense of the Colony. As a result, when these people were marched toward the enemy during the French-Indian War, their effective ness was probably measured accurately in Washington's comments. A lax attitude arose from the looseness of their peace- 7 9 Order to Sheriffs, December 8 , 1691, in Mcllwaine (ed.), Executive Journals of the Council, I, p. 210. 80 Karraker, oji>. cit. , p. 106. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 221 time organization with the result that every mean individual has his own crude notions of things, and must undertake to direct. If his advice is neglected, he thinks himself slighted, abased, and injured; and,g£o redress his wrongs, will depart for his home. Of course, Washington was seeing the militia under war-time conditions, and what was actually a breakdown of individual militia companies was less a failure to comply with laws to'organize, et al_, than a failure to fight. An analysis was made by Charles Kemper of the Courts Martial Record of Augusta County (1756-1790) to determine the type of militia offenses committed: The records contain the names of many hundreds of militia-men and in nearly every case the offenses were simply failure to appear at general and private musters. Very few grave derelictions of duty appear in the record.82 No doubt this analysis is correct since it probably limited ■itself to matters of discipline arising from county musters, and performance of duty beyond mustering and drilling pro bably would not be a matter of county record. It should be recalled that Washington considered that both the officers and men of the militia were lax in their attitude toward 81 Letter from Washington to Dinwiddie, November 9, 1756, in Fitzpatrick, -Writings, I, p. 493. 8 2 ’’Valley of Virginia Notes," Virginia Magazine, XXX (1922), p. 398. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 222 8 3 duty. Further, it is doubtful that the more flagrant and widespread cases of lack of discipline and compliance with orders in the "field” were reported, particularly if large numbers were involved and the instances embraced both officers and men. Washington’s comments on the same Augusta County militia, that were studied by Kemper, and made after an inspection along the frontier, are thus noteworthy: The militia are under such bad order and discipline, that they will go and come when and where they please, without regarding time, their officers, or the safety of the inhabitants, but consulting solely their own inclinations. Basic to the matter of strict compliance with acts and orders was the general attitude of the people. That serious penalty was unlikely to imposed is illustrated in the haphazard manner1 by which a county reacted to a draft quota placed upon it by.an Act of Assembly: When Prince Edward was called upon to draft eight men from its militia for service in the war, a special court consisting of five magistrates and four militia captains . . . met June 20, 1757, to select the men. John Nash as county lieutenant presented the muster rolls to the court, showing 316 men in the five companies. . . . The Court listed eighteen men, whom it deemed . . . 'idle, vagrant, dissolute persons' and directed the Memorandums Respecting the Militia, April and May 17 56 , in Fitzpatrick (ed.), Writings, I, pp. 31+4-353. 84 Letter from Washington to Dinwiddie, October 10, 17 5'6, in Fitzpatrick (ed.), Writings, I, p. 479. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 2 2 3 sheriff . . . to bring those listed to a second session of the court called .for June 28. From this list the eight draftees were to be selected. Even more revealing is the disposition of the eighteen, men the Court had "nominated." Five of the eighteen secured bondsmen in their behalf, one who was in prison enlisted, six were classified as runaways, one appeared and 'proved himself an in dustrious man,' two were shown to be residents of adjoining counties, one was not found, and still another escaped. One of the men summoned bad al ready gone to a fort as a soldier .... The result of the entire county effort was to send two draftees and a volunteer to the point of rendevous in Fredericksburg for further transportation, to the Virginia Regiment. In spite of the poor results the county did go through the steps of complying with the act of Assembly; but since the objective (recruiting) was unpopular with the people as a whole, little of value resulted. There were al ways individuals, however, who performed various militia duties, and probably well, even in the Augusta County that had angered Washington. The County Court of Claims awarded nayment for such diverse services as: 8 5 Order Book, volumes 1:169-1:17 0, Prince Edward County Records, cited by Herbert Clarence Bradshaw, The History of Prince Edward County, Virginia (Richmond: The Dietz Press~Incorporated, 1^55), 'p. 42. 86 Ibid. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 2 2 4 . . . Samuel Wilson, for provisions delivered to John and William Woods, Captains of Rangers. James Bell, for going express to the Commanding Officer of Albemarle .... James Cull, for ranging.87 Even in the eighteenth century, when the spirit moved them,, the frontier counties during Dunmore’s War pro vided a large force to march far from their homes to attack the Indians. It can be stated with reasonable assurance that the county organizations, political and military, could be counted on to go through the form of compliance with laws, but that the spirit with which a mission or an order was carried out rested in the attitude of the people at the time and at the place. It does not appear that the militia units could be relied upon to fulfill assigned combat missions. IV. MILITARY COOPERATION BETWEEN COLONIES The political and military action taken by Virgini.a and other colonies during the French and Indian War led Koontz to make the judgement that the colonies "had their forces so well in hand, and their leaders-so ably developed that they could turn a united front to meet the forces of 8 7 Order Book No. V, Augusta County Court Records, April 14, 17 58, cited by Lyman Chalkely, Chronicles of the Scotch-Irish Settlement in Virginia (Roselyn, VirginTa: The Commonwealth Printing Company, 1912), I, p. 80. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 2 2 5 8 8 the Mother Country. ..." This statement of the ability and desire of the several colonies to cooperate in the military service is perhaps oversimplification and merits some discussion. The experience of the Virginia militia did little in a military sense to prepare Virginians for the War of the Revolution. For those relatively few men who fought on the frontier the experience appears to have been of limited value, inasmuch as the war on the frontier was fought in small groups whose discipline in formation under enemy fire was a secondary consideration. To Fateh the leaders of the military forces of the colonies in the Revolution were skillful or inept with no discernible correlation to their militia experience of earlier wars.^ The French and Indian War .demonstrated in some measure the degree of cooperation that could be expected between colonies in any international conflict. There was, of course, a vast difference between the two wars— in the first, members of the British Empire were fighting together, yet England’s prime concern was naturally its international ^Louis Koontz, The Virginia Frontier. 1754-1763 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1925), p. 97. 8 9 "Louis Clinton Hatch, The Administration of the American Revolutionary Army (New York: LongmansSreen, and Company, 1904), p. 3. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 2 2 6 enemy, France, whereas the Virginia colonist felt more acutely the problem of repelling savages from the border. The Revolution, on the other hand, although it presented a. conflict of loyalties to the colonists, touched the average Virginian more closely than did the French and Indian War fought as it was on the far borders of the' colony. It was basic to cooperation among the colonies that, as America developed out of the wilderness, the colonies were more able to cooperate, as transportation and communi cations facilities became more abundant. Further, there were more people with more time to cooperate, in contrast with the earliest societies, which, establishing a foothold, were unable to afford the luxury of much intercourse with another colony-also fighting for survival many miles away. Another factor leading to some increased communication was the instructions from the Crown to the governors. Com mencing with Nicholson at the beginning of the eighteenth century, these instructions provided for military cooperation 90 between the separate colonies. The governor was a royal officer ancl as such tended to look beyond the borders of the Colony; evidence of this increased cooperation is contained British Colonial Papers, Class CO 5/1359, Instructions to Nicholson from Commissioners for Plantations,January 4, 1700. (Microfilm in C. W. R. L., SR #258, Reel M-228). Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 2 2 7 in the correspondence of the Crown's governors. Dinwiddie's correspondence is filled with letters to other governors- understandable in war affecting the borders of several colonies. In spite of these factors leading toward increased cooperation between colonies there is little in the history of the defense of Virginia by its colonial militia forces that indicated a high degree of intercolonial cooperation for the future. "The capture of Louisbourg by New Englanders in 1745 was the only instance in the colonial period of a successful* large-scale military operation by provincial fighters - and even that was the product not of wise planning 91 but of lucky coincidence." Cooperation might loom as an objective for a governor, but was scarcely one for the individual colonist, particularly those of militia age. Sup port of any military force usually required the drafting of men and always entailed spending money for pay, bounties, provisions and the other costs of war. It had not been easy for the Virginia governors to arouse the interest of the Assembly in supporting the defense of Virginia itself, let alone to have the Burgesses volunteer local resources to assist 91 Daniel J. Boorstin, The Americans, The Colonial Exper ience (New York: Random House, 1958), p. 36 3. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 9 2 other colonies. It thus appears that not only was the organization of the militia responsive to the threat facing Virginia, but the manner of compliance with acts and orders and the degree to which the governor was heeded depended largely on the evaluation of this threat made by the individual colonist and by the Burgesses. 92 The "governor" in Virginia were most usually lieutenant-governors representing a titled principal in England. This tended to downgrade the position to a degree. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. CHAPTER VII CONCLUSION The most detailed and certainly a reliable source of information on the organization of the militia are the acts of Assembly of colonial Virginia. We have received, however, conflicting views of what occurred from those who were present, and the recorders and interpreters of past events do not agree. Just as John Smith had his admirers and opponents at Jamestown, there are differences among historians as to what was his role and how he played this role. This is true of Bacon, BerkeleV* Dinwiddie — to name a few. The militia acts covering a century and a half reveal a considerable sameness in certain aspects of the organization and administration of the militia, although the laws were refined t£> satisfy the needs of the colony and considerable detail was added. Major modifications of the militia acts were usually occasioned by a changing threat to the Colony. The Colonial Period began and ended with such threats to the colony’s existence: The first was the Indian menace and the last, following the French-Indian War, was a threat from England itself. This study has discussed the militia acts and the probable degree of compliance with militia acts and orders. In the appraisal of the functioning of any organization there comes the inevitable question — does it work? So with the Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 2 3 0 Virginia militia, an organization whose basic peacetime mission was to prepare for w a r — — was it ready for combat? Further, did the militia take an effective part in the defense of the colony? I. FACTORS AFFECTING READINESS OF THE MILITIA Combat readiness of a unit is measured by such basic yardsticks as the existence of a workable organization and a realistic training program, as well as the presence, or absence, of high motivation of its leaders and rank and file. There are also specific factors particularly applicable to the state of readiness of the militia, i_.e., the concept of defense for the colony, the "other" mission of the militia (internal security), and the influence of the upper classes on militia organization and functioning. Concept of Defense material Considerable/has been written adnnt on the concept of defense of the colony. In sum, the colonists placed in the militia system their "main reliance for defense," as augmented by volunteer/drafted forces for emergencies.^ The militia, in theory, could be called out en masse by the governor, but it never was in its totality. The militia was primarily a pool of partially trained men and the acts of . S. Department of the Army, American Military History, 1607-1953 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1956), p."28; Percy S. Flippen, The Royal Government in Virginia, 1624-1775 (New York: Columbia University, 1^19), p"I $36. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 2 3 1 the Assembly, after the early years of the Colony, provide for selection, by one way or another, of a relatively few from the large body of able males, usually from the militia, to march to where the crisis lay. During the colonial period many attempt, wo.re made to expedite the colony's armed response to attack or threat of attack. With a few notable exceptions, such as the marches conducted during the first decades of the colony and the expedition to the southwest in' Dunmore's War, Virginia's reaction to danger on its frontiers was rarely rapid enough to catch and eliminate the Indian attackers. The militia was organized and trained to implement the above concept of its mission of defense, and changes in organization and administration were generally made with this in mind. The great body of legislation was thus prepared to regulate militia organizations which were unlikely to be committed as units. Another large percentage of the later militia acts was concerned with how to select individuals who were to defend the colony. There is little in the legislation that would cause the militia units, as such, to be trained units that were ready for commitment. The Internal Security Role of the Militia. Also influencing the readiness of the militia to a degree, was the internal security role of the Virginia militia. A purpose for having the militia, as stated in acts Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 2 3 2 of the Assembly, was to provide patrollers to seek out and eliminate unlawful assemblies of Negroes. This concern over both uprisings and how slaves and servants would react in any emergency had appeared early in the life of the colony and remained throughout the period. During the Dutch wars of 1667 and 1673 the colonists were uncertain whether elements of these subjugated classes would cooperate with the enemy. Also influencing attitudes in Virginia was the experience of the several thwarted slave conspiracies, commencing with that of 168 7, minor though they were; The concern with keeping the Negro under control is more plausible when viewed in the light of the large proportion of blacks in the colony. By the end of the colonial period Negro slaves formed in Virginia nearly fifty percent of. the total population, and in South Carolina the percentage of slaves was over two-thirds. Further, severe punishment of wrongdoers, black and white alike, was normal in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Considering this, a policy directed toward aggressively seeking out and punishing the Negro slaves who broke the- rules was in general accord with the concept of justice then prevalent. Reinforcing this attitude toward punishment, the poorer whites, holding little of the paternalistic attitude of many of the upper class toward the Negro, were not adverse to monitoring closely the activities of the Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. blacks, a group but recently brought from a primitive African existence. It is thus apparent that colonial Virginia, particu larly during the eighteenth century, was aware that the pre sence of growing numbers of persons in a servile status created a situation that.was potentially dangerous, and accordingly the militia was organized and prepared to act against what was estimated to be a threat. The members of the militia were prone to assume that dissatisfied elements of the large body of servants Or slaves could take over their land and other possessions when the militia was deployed elsewhere. There was thus the tendency in.the areas where slaves were concentrated to look closely at the local "threat, at the price of placing'reduced emphasis in the militia as a defense against an external threat. Class Structure. The influence of the upper classes was another factor affecting the organization and effectiveness of the militia. The privileges of "gentlemen," or the upper classes, began with the founding of the colony and the instructions to early governors defined the special place of gentlemen in war very clearly. Admittedly during the early years of privation, when a hand on the hoe was most important for survival, the position of "gentleman" was less important, but when the stability of the colony seemed assured the social structure Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. developed rapidly. By 1700 the pattern of Virginia life had been set and the planters held the key to how the colony administered its finances, courts, churches, and militia. The control of colony and county affairs by' a few is quite clear. If the county contained a single parish, it was quite possible that eight men appointed by the governor administered justice; twelve men, elected by their predecessors, were responsible for welfare and religion; and one man, the county commander (lieutenant) or the colonel, appointed by the governor, con- 2 trolled the militia. The chief planter in each county was usually the chief military officer and responsible for the local militia in peace and wars. Members of his family and his fellow planters held the key billets in the militia structure, although some yeomen of exceptional ability did 3 enter the various hierarchies. The "men who bore these military titles were the foremost in all the various depart- ■ ments of action represented in the Colony."1* This held true for all the higher military ranks, as a roster of the holders of the rank of lieutenant-colonel and major was also a list of 2 Edward Channing, Town and Country Sovernment (Balti more: Johns Hopkins University, 1884), pp. 51-52. 3 Louis B. Wright, The First Gentlemen of Virginia (San Marino, California: The Huntington Library, 1940), p. 52. 4 Bruce, Seventeenth Century, II, p. 24. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 2 3 5 the prominent citizens. Two aspects of the relationship of the social structure to the organization and administration of the militia merit review. One was the influence that the wealthy landowner class exerted on the militia by possessing key billets within the system. Another facet was the privileges and advantages that social position gave the upper classes in relation to militia duty. Discussing the latter factor, mention has been made of the requirement for "gentlemen" to be employed in war in a suitable position and not forced to go as private soldiers. It will also be recalled that "gentlemen" selected the officers, except during the interval of Bacon’s Rebellion when the soldiers nominated their own officers. Some financial advantage to an officer existed, but the pay scales of neither officers nor enlisted militiamen were high enough for a period of duty in the militia to be considered highly pro fitable. The system thus did provide a considerable advantage to the upper class, and conversely it was a disadvantage to be of the less fortunate classes. Military service could be imposed upon certain individuals by lav? just as the law excused others. In spite of this tendency to draft the poor, as the period advanced there was less mention of the "rights" of gentlemen and an increased number of exemptions from militia duty were awarded to the class of artisans, i_.£. millers and persons involved with producing copper, iron and lead. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 2 3 6 The other aspect of the relationship of the social structure to the management of the militia is perhaps more important, i_.£. , the fact that the leading families of the Colony held the key positions in the militia structure. This monopoly existed for the entire period, particularly in the higher ranks. The key point is, therefore, to what use did the gentry put their official position of leadership? For the first century they did provide the leadership in the militia units of the colony. Since the militia was the device for protecting the plantations, exposed, in general, to the threat of attack, it was reasonable that the plantation owner should welcome control of the organization that pro tected his family and possessions. The planters were not ’•absentee landlords" but in most cases were deeply involved in the daily management and working of the plantation. As late as 17 00 the number- of the well-to-do was limited and "not one planter in fifty could be classed as a man of wealth".^ But in the eighteenth century the martial spirit of Virginians, in general, had not been aroused not even, as mentioned by Washington, by the French and Indian War, the greatest military threat of the century up to that time. It was expensive to support a war, and further, the apparent necessity for all to "carry a gun with them in the field" had passed and with its passing the continuing support of Thomas Wertenbaker, Planters of Colonial Virginia (Princeton; Princeton University Press, 1922), p. 157. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 2 3 7 the colonists as a whole declined. Declined too, was the personal interest of the wealthy families, whose heads of household and sons formerly provided large segments of the militia leadership. The frontier was no longer in or near Tidewater, where aristocracy was concentrated, and dirty, 6 dangerous Indian wars were not popular. Gipson concludes that "the planters of Maryland, as well as those of South Carolina and Virginia, were too busy with their personal affairs in the boom war years to care to be discommoded in any manner by the urgencies of the war that, in their own 7 most vital interests, had to be fought to a conclusion." In sum, the key positions of leadership in the militia remained with the gentry, but the interest of the upper class, as a group, in making the organization a viable one had declined during the eighteenth century. The presence of the gentry was to be very apparent in the Revolution, however,- This was demonstrated in part by the rapid tran sition from Committees of Safety to the regular courts and from "Minute Men" back to the traditional militia. The ruling class of Virginia was thus to be able to set the pace of its "revolution." When the gentry chose to involve themselves, the organization of the colony, county and the militia itself permitted the upper classes to exert great § H. J. Eckenrode, List of Colonial Soldiers in Virginia (Richmond: Virginia State Library, 1917), p. 8 . "Considerably less than half the officers" who commanded Washington’s troops belonged to the gentry class. 7 Gipson, o d . cit., VII, p. 144. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 238 influence upon the defense of the colony. II. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE VIRGINIA MILITIA Having considered the organization of the militia and factors influencing its combat readiness, what was its effectiveness? An inference of inadequacy can be drawn from the repetition of the militia acts in practically the same form. "The constant repetition of legislation on the same subjects is the most convincing testimony of the impotence of such legislation."8 Egerton was referring specifically to the Factory Acts in England, not to colonial laws regulating the militia; nevertheless, the point cannot be dismissed— the acts were repeated and repetition often reflects previous non-compliance. On the other hand, reissue is a normal practice in military organizations to insure that those currently in billets have received the instructions. In further extenuation of the principle of reissue, the colonists continually faced new conditions that required modifications of existing acts. In addition, it was not the practice of the Assembly to continue indefinitely authority on military affairs but rather to reissue. It thus appears that the repetition of major elements of militia acts is significant but does not in itself lead to a conclusion that the militia g Hugh E. Egerton, A Short History of British Colonial Policy, 1606-1909 (London: Methuen and Company, 1950), p. S7T. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. acts were impotent. The solution for providing a satisfactory defense of the colony varied with the times* from total defense by everyone in the earliest years to defense by a selected few— people or counties— as the colony’s population and boun daries grew. During the first few decades of the seventeenth century, for the defenders to be inefficient meant death to many colonists and a setback for the colony as a whole. Governor Dale’s stringent regulations recognized the absolute requirements for a ready, well-disciplined force, and for this reason Virginia was initially organized on a military basis, later turning to a militia organization when it appeared that "survival" was probable. Even during its first century when the Indian presence was a reality to the colony as a whole, there were such obstacles to militia efficiency.as a shortage of weapons. In fact, throughout the entire period there was never enough arms of the proper type. Basic reasons for the shortage was the increase in population and the continuous deterioration of weapons used more for hunting than war. Further, in spite of a consistent effort by most of the governors of Virginia, support of defense was fitful on the part of the legislature of the colony. In general, however, the seventeenth century militia Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 2 4 0 appears to have come to grips with the enemy, Indian or white, when need be. ’ Although Berkeley had been concerned in 167 3 over the willingness of his men to face the Dutch, who were attempting to land, the colonists stood their ground; and it will be recalled that Sir Robert Quary in 1703 had placed the Virginia militia above the other colonial g militia. Quary's evaluation of the efficiency of the Virginia militia was, of course, relative. The constant Indian wars had caused the people to recognize the need for a viable militia system and they supported it. "Military service was regarded as such an imperative duty that its evasion was considered to be a crime against the safety of the community. Indicative of this concern were the series of laws governing the militia, published in 1675, that were in some ways as harsh as those of Dale early in the century. The interest of the community in defense and the hunting skills and hardiness of the individual colonist that came; from living a life in the outdoors provided good material for the body of militia. Further, the designated leaders of the colony, the counties and of the militia had their direct personal welfare at stake and readily provided the leadership to defend t h e 'community. These factors, plus ^British Colonial Papers, Class CO 324/8 (Microfilm in C. W. R. L., SR #943, Reel M-439). 10 Bruce, Institutional History, II, p. 626. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 2 4 1 experience in border war by the last decades of the seventeenth century had made the. Virginia militia adequate for the mission it was established to perform. It is less easy to evaluate the militia during the first half of the eighteenth century since there was a limited external threat against which to measure the militia. The Indians, having been stripped of all power east of the Blue Ridge, there was, with the turn of the century, a period of peace that was to contibute to inefficiency in the organi- zation^responsible for the defense of the colony. The period of calm had actually begun earlier, for Virginia was sin gularly unaffected•by war during the three quarters of a century before 17 50. The peaceful planter civilization devoted itself to material activities or, in the case of some of the more prosperous, the enjoyment of leisure. With general peace on their borders little was done by the Assembly to pro vide for its own defenses, and to aid other colonies or British expeditions. That the militia had deteriorated is reflected in the judgment of governors, particularly Dinwiddie just prior to the French and Indian War. In the French and Indian War the militia, unlike that of the previous century, proved inadequate to the challenge. Traditional militia organization did not respond quickly enough to threats along an extended frontier and did not have the staying power to maintain forces Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 2 4 2 for periods of time at a distance from the home counties. The experience of the French and Indian War had, by 1757, led to the final militia "solution" of the colonial period. The county militia units in close proximity to a threat were to be prepared to march immediately, leaving a third of its strength for local defense. In addition, it was planned that there should be another force to fight at a distance and for a longer period— the men for this body were to be preferably volunteers. The defense system was still based, in theory, almost entirely upon the militia organization— the county lieutenant even using the militia muster rolls as the initial source for gaining recruits for the Virginia Regiment.^ These two types of forces were the culmination of the mobile defense system of colonial Virginia. But was this a satisfactory solution? The Virginia Regiment, for its part, had been developed with great difficulty during the French-Indian War, and was neither completely militia, nor body of regular troops,' but possessed elements of both forms. Rarely employed as a single force, Washington1s regiment was gathered together for Forbes’ attack on Fort Duquesne in 1758. The Regiment gave a good account of itself exhibiting many of the r ;■ \ », characteristics of a unit of regular troops. Near the end of the colonial period, in the early 1760’s, the Regiment was Hening, 0£. cit., p. 70. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. ( 2 4 3 considered an efficient body by the Assembly: "(the Regiment) . . . acquired a Superiority over all other Provincial Troops, and rendered it universally admired 12 by all with whom it did Duty." Yet even at their peak of efficiency the Virginia regiments had the organic weakness of being manned by those who enlisted for only a single campaign; This resulted in a loss of trained men and required an annual rebuilding of Virginia’s only force-in- being. The militia units were even more "short lived" in terms of any prolonged action due to the. unwillingness of its members to be committed for long periods or far from their homes. This reluctance to leave the local area could have been based on several reasons. Washington, for his part, considered that the underlying factor was a lack of "martial spirit." Those near the border were naturally slow to leave their homes to defend another threatened sector, when their own families were exposed to possible Indian raids. The men of Tidewater, for their part, not feeling the threat directly, had limited interest on going to the border. Fur ther, in Tidewater- Virginia servile insurrection appeared to many as an ever-present peril within the community, as opposed to the remote threat of Indian raids. In large areas of Virginia, the prosperous could see that their way 12 Mcllwaine (ed.), Journals of the House of Burgesses, 1758-1761, op. cit., p. 162. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 244 of life was not joined directly with a need to support the war, and a great proportion of the colonists could pay to gain exemption from military service. The militia itself suffered from several defects. Basic was the difficulty in controlling the militia due to weaknesses in the laws and to laxity in the enforcement of discipline. Militia units being separated as they were by great distances and lacking tight centralized control would tend to reflect the characteristics of tits local area and the ability of fclie commander. The standards of training and discipline would vary widely as would the enthusiasm and efficiency of the militia units. All things considered there appear to have 'been more factors that ledc! to making poor units than those which contributed to the efficiency of the militia. The militia grew less important as the effective - agency for defense of the colony, primarily due to disuse in its martial purpose. Although the militia actually grew in membership, by the end of the colonial period the majority of militia units were largely untouched by war. The requirement was now for a force that could be employed at a distance from the heart of the colony and for relatively long periods. It was a burden for the average individual to participate in expeditions that were unpleasant, dangerous, and unprofitable. Units that were willing and able to "go" to Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 24 5 war were obviously needed. • A' second reason for the decline of the importance of the militia was that the militia units were ceasing to be a satisfactory source of trained men for "marches" and expeditions against the enemy. The Act of 17 57 was very specific that the least productive members of the community were to be put into the Virginia Regiment, the most effective defense force of the colony. Thus the Virginia House of Burgesses decided that the men who were to fight the most important war of the pre-Revolutionary period were to be those who were not only outside the militia system but to a considerable degree on the edges of society. Porter cor rectly judged that the emergency of the French and Indian war was approached by employing a "socially selective draft." The militia was not depended on to the degree that it had been during the previous century, and conversely the militia 14 was not dependable. The organization and administration of the Virginia colonial militia remained primarily traditional, retaining throughout the period many of the organizational forms and practices that had their origins in the British militia. The Virginia militia system was modified to a degree * how- Albert Porter., County Government in Virginia (New York: Columbia University I^ress^ 1947), p.-S’2. 14 A more sweeping evaluation of all colonial troops was made by Lord Loudoun. Boorstin, _op. cit.. p. 364. The Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 2 4 6 ever, and with its peripheral forms, the rangers and "volunteer militia,” proved to be effective enough to defend the colony against its enemies. It is vital to recall, however, that, first, the Indian did not present a major threat to the existence of the colony after 1644. Second, the militia was .not employed against the enemy in the form of its regularly organized . local units. In the early years volunteers from the militia fought the Indians, and at the end of the colonial period, those who fought were, in general, drafted, or needed the bounty money. The militia had become "an impractical political 1 5 concept . . . ." The virtues of the system became, never theless, part of Virginia tradition. Dinwiddie, who was to suffer from the inefficiency of this military form was most sanguine when he stated that: "... Our Militia, under God, is our chief Dependence, for the Protection of our Lives and X 6 Fortunes." This image of the militiamen has apparently improved with time. more Loudoun learned of colonial troops and colonial ways, the less he came to rely on them-— whether as recruits for the ranks of his regular regiments or as supporting forces organized in their own militia. ^Frederick Todd, "Our National Guard: An Intro duction to Its History," Military Affairs, V (Soring, 1941), p. 74. 16 Message from Dinwiddie read to Burgesses, November 17, 1753, in Mcllwaine (ed.), Journals of the House of Burgesses, 1752-1755, op. cit., p. TOT. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. B13 LI OGVRAPHY Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. A. BIBLIOGRAPHIES AND GUIDES Andrews, Charles M. (ed.). "List of Commissions, Instructions Issued to the Royal Governors and Others in America," Annual Reoort of the American Historical Association, 1911, I, Washington: American Historical Association, 1913. pp. 393-528. - - Guide to the Materials for American History to 1783 In the Public Record Office of “Great Britain. 2" vols. Washington: Carnegie institution, 1912J Brigham, Clarence. History and Bibliography of American Newspapers, 1690-1820. 2 vols. Worcester. Mass: T&nerican Antiquarian Society, 194 7. Cappon, Lester J. and Stella F. Duff. Virginia Gazette Index. 2 vols. Williamsburg: Institute of Early American History and Culture, 1950. Kingsbury, Susan M. "An Introduction to the Records of the Virginia Company of London with bibliographical list of extant documents," The Records of the Virginia Company of London, 1619-1626^ I". Washington: Government Frinting <37f ice, 1905. Swem, E. G. Virginia Historical Index. Roanoke: Stone Printing and Manufacturing Company, 19 34. and John M. Jennings. A Selected Bibliography of Virginia, 1607-1699. Jamestown 3 50th Anniversary Historical Booklet, No. 1. Williamsburg.:. . 350th Anniversary Celebration Corporation, 19 57. Tyler, Lyon Gardner. Encyclopedia of Virginia Biography. 5 vols. New York: Lewis Historical Publishing .Company, 1915. I and II. Virginia Historical Society. Catalogue of the Manuscripts. Richmond: Virginia Historical Society," i"9’0TI Virginia State Library. Calendar of Transdripts (In the Virginia State Library). Richmond: Public Printing Office, 1905. B. PRIMARY SOURCES 1, Manuscripts Chesapeake Civic Center: Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 2 4 8 The Court Orders and Minutes of Norfolk County were reviewed. Colonial Williamsburg Research Library: The collection of microfilm was reviewed and the material originating in the Colonial Office (British Public Record Office) was examined. Of primary interest was material catalogued as Colonial Office Class 5, although some pertinent information was drawn from Classes 1 and 3 24. The specific information available was the correspondence between governors of colonial Virginia and their "home office," copies of proclamations and orders issued both in Virginia and in England et al. Virginia State Library: The county records were surveyed and the DeJarnette, McDonald, and Winder Transcripts reviewed. The micro film of the holdings of the British Public Record Office was examined for those reels not presently held by the Colonial Williamsburg Research Library. 2. ' Printed Sources "A Description of the Government of Virginia," Letter from Ludwell to [Arlington], September 17, 1666, Virginia Magazine, V (1898), pp. 54-59. "Abstracts by Sainsbury, W. N., and Copies of the McDonald and DeJarnette Papers," Virginia Magazine, XII (1905). "Acts, Orders and Resolutions of the General Assembly of Virginia, Sessions of March 1643-1648," Virginia Magazine, XXIII (1915), pp. 226-255. "Affairs in Virginia"in 1626," Virginia Magazine, II (1895),’ pp.-50-55. Ames, Susie M. (ed.). County Court Records of Accomack- Northampton, Virginia, 1632-1640. Washington! American Historical Association, 1954. Andrews, Charles McLean (ed.). Narratives of the Insur rections , 167 5-1690. New York: Barnes and Noble, 1915. Arber, Edward (ed.). The Travels and Works of Captain John Smith. 2 vols. Edinburgh: J. Grant, 1910. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 2 4 9 Bancroft Transcripts in H. R. Mcllwaine (ed.). Journals of the House of Burgesses , 1758-1761. Richmond: Virginia State Library, 1908 , pp“ 5T0-2 9 8 (Appendix). Bassett, J. S. (ed.). The Writings of Colonel William Byrd of Westover, in Virginia, Esquired Rew York: DoublecTay"^ Page and- Company, 1901. Boddie, John Bennett. Seventeenth Century, Isle of Wight County, Virginia. Chicago: Chicago Law Printing Company, 1938. Brown, Alexander. The Genesis of the United States. 2 vols. Boston: Houghton, MiTFlin and Company, 1897. "Captain William Lee of Northumberland County," Virginia Magazine, XXXVIII (1930), pp. 79-82. - 4 "Causes of Discontent in Virginia, 1676," from Winder Collection of MSS in the Virginia State Library, Virginia Magazine, II (1895), pp. 166-173. Chalkley, Lyman. Chronicles of Scotch-Irish Settlement in Virginia. Extracted from the originalcourt records oT Augusta County, 1745-1800. 3 vols. Roselyn, Virginia: Commonwealth Printing Company, 1912. Crozier, William Armstrong. Virginia Colonial Militia. Baltimore: Southern Book Company, 1954. "Decisions of the Virginia General Court," Virginia Magazine, V (1898), pp. 113-118. DeJarnette Transcripts (1606-1691), 2 vols. Transcripts of papers in British Public Record Office. (In Virginia State Library). Draper Manuscripts in H. R. Mcllwaine (ed.). Journals of the House of Burgesses, 1758-1761. Richmond: Virginia State Library, 1908. pp" ?6i-280 (Appendix). Eckenrode, H. J. List of Colonial Soldiers of Virginia. Special Report of the Department of Archives and History for 1913. Richmond: Virginia State Library, .1917. "Extracts from the Proceedings of the House of Burgesses, 1652-1661," Virginia Magazine, VIII (1901), pp. 386- 397. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 2 5 0 Fitzpatrick, John C. (ed,). The Diaries of George Washington, 1748-1799. 4 volsT" Boston: Houghton Mifflin and Company, 1925. ______. The Writings of George Washington. 13 vols. Washington! (Sovernment Printing £>f£ice, I-III, 1931, Fleet, Beverley, and L. 0. Duvall. Virginia Colonial Abstracts. 34 vols. Richmond. (Mimeographed). Force, Peter. Tracts. 4 vols. New York: Peter Smith, 1947. Freeman, Douglas Southall. George Washington. 7 vols. New York: Scribner's Sons, 194¥T Hartwell, Henry, James Blair, and Edward Chilton. The Present State of Virginia, and the College. Edited E y ”Tn I). farisHT Williamsburg: Colonial Williamsburg, Incorporated, 1940. Hening, William Waller. The Statutes at Large: Laws of Virginia. 13 vols. Mew York: R. and W. and G. Bartow, 182 3. "Instructions to Yeardley, 1618," Virginia Magazine, II (1895), pp. 154-165. "Instructions to Berkeley, 1642," Virginia Magazine, II (1895), pp. 281-288.' "Instructions to Yeardley, 162 6 ," Virginia Magazine, II (1895), pp. 393-396. James, Edward W. (ed.). Lower Norfolk County Virginia Antiquary. 2 vols. New YorF: Peter Smith, 19 51. Jensen, Merrill (ed.). English Historical Documents, American Colonial Documents to 17*7(Tl Vol. IX of1 English Historical Documents Series. Mew York: Oxford University Press, 1955. Kingsbury, Susan Myra. The Records of the Virginia Company of London, 1619-162 6 . 4 vols. Washington; Government Printing Office, 1906-1935. Labaree, L. W. (ed.). Royal Instructions to British Colonial Governors, 167 0-1776. 2 vols. New York: Appleton-Century Company, 19 3 5. "Letters of William Fitzhough," Virginia Magazine, II (1895), pp. 259-275. "Lower Norfolk County Records, 1636-1646," Virginia Magazine, XXXIX (19^1), pn~. 1-2 0; XLI (1933 ), op. 335-345 . Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 2 5 1 Maryland Historical Society. Archives of Maryland, Proceedings and Acts of the General-Assembly. 57 vols. Baltimore: Maryland Historical Society, IS S3-. Mathews, Thomas. "Narrative,” Narratives of the Insur rections, 1675-1690. Edited by Charles Andrews. New York: Barnes and Noble, 1915. pp. 15-41. Maury, Ann. Memoirs of a Hugenot Family.- New York: George Putnam and-Company, T8 5T^ McDonald Transcripts, (1619-1695). 7 vols. Transcripts of papers in British Public Record Office (In Virginia State Library). Mcllwaine, H. R. (ed.). Executive Journals of the Council of Colonial Virginia, 16S0-175*4. 5 vols. Richmond: Virginia State Library, 1925-1945. Mcllwaine, H. R. (ed.). Journals of the House of Burgesses of Virginia, 1619-177FT 13 voTs. Richmond! Virginia State Library, 19 0 5-1915. Legislative Journals of the Council of Colonial Virginia. 1680-1774. 3 vols. Richmond: Virginia State Library, 1918. Minutes of the Council and General Court of Colonial Virginia. 1622-1632; 1670-1676. Richmond: Virginia State Library, 1924. "Narrative of the Commissioners," Narratives of the Insurrections. 1675-1690. Edited by Charles Andrews. New York: Barnes and Noble, 1915. pp. 10 5-141. "Notes from the Records of Stafford County Virginia, Order Books," Virginia Magazine. XLVII (1939), np. 126-132; 248-252. "Observations on Several Voyages and Travels in America," William and Mary Quarterly. XV (1906-1907),pp. 143-159. Palmer, William P. (ed.). Vol. I of Calendar of Virginia State Papers. 11 vols. Richmond: Department of Public Printing, 1875-1906. "Proceedings of the House of Burgesses," Virginia Magazine, VIII (1901), pp. 386-397. "Proclamation by 'Admiral' Argali," Randolph Manuscripts, Virginia Magazine, IV (1897), pp. 28-29. Purchas, Samuel. Purchas his Pilgrimes. 20 vols. Glasgow: James MacLehose and Sons, T5"0T-l906. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 2 5 2 "Randolph Manuscripts, "Seventeenth Century Records," Virginia Magazine, XV (1908), pp. 390-405; XXII 7. "Report of the Commissioners," Virginia Magazine, XI (1904), pp. 32-3 7. Robinson, Conway (ed.). Abstract of Proceedings of the Virginia Company of London, rS’lF"^T6 24. 2 vols. Richmond: Virginia Historical Society, 1888-1889. Robinson, Conway. "Decisions of the Virginia General Court." Transcripts. Virginia Magazine, IV (1897), pp. .23-27; 154-160. ______. "Notes from Council and General Court Records, 164*1-1659 ," Virginia Magazine, VIII (1901). op. 64-78; XIII (1906), pp. 3 83-4317 Robinson, Morgan. "Virginia Counties." Bulletin of the Virginia State Library* No. 9 (January*, April and July 1916*51 Sainsbury, W. N. and others (eds.). Calendar of State Papers, Colonial Series, 1574-1660. London: Longmans, Green, Longmans, and Roberts, 1860. Saunders, W. L. (ed.). The Collected Records of North Carolina. 30 vols. Raleigh: Hale, Printer to the State, 1*886-1914. Smith, John. "General History of Virginia," Narratives of Early Virginia, 1606-1625. Edited by Lyon G. Tyler. Hew York: Scribners, 19(57. pp. 25-71. The General History of Virginia, New England, and the Summer I lei"! 2 voTs*. Richmond! Franklin Press, 1819. Stock, Leo Francis. Proceedings and Debates of the British Parliaments Respecting Hortn America, 1542^1*754. 5 vols. Washington: Carnegie Institution, 1924-1941. Thwaite, Rueben Geld and Louise Phelps Kellogg (eds.). Documentary History of Dunmore * s War, 1774. Madison, Wisconsin: Wisconsin Historical Society, 1905. Tyler, Lyon Gardner, Narratives of Early Virginia, 16 0 6- 1625. New York: Scribners, 1315*7. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 2 5'3 . "Washington and His Neighbors," William and Hary Quarterly, IV (1895), pp. 75-89. "Valley of Virginia Notes," Virginia Magazine, XXX (1922), pp. 398-402. "Virginia Committee of Correspondence," Virginia Magazine, XI (1904), pp. 1-25. Virginia Gazette April 17, 174 6 July 3, 1746 March 12, 1767 Virginia Historical Society. The Official Letters of Alexander Spotswood. 2 v o l s T "Richmond! Virginia Historical Society, 1882. The Official Records of Robert Dinwiddie. 2 vols. Richmond: Virginia Historical Socie'ty'i 1884. "Virginia Under Governor Gooch," Virginia Magazine, III (1896), pp. 113-123. Vollmer, Arthur, Military Obligation: The American Tradition. Special Monograph #1, Volume II, Part 14, Virginia Enactments, in Backgrounds of Selective Service. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1947. Winder Transcripts (1607-1578). 2 vols. Transcripts_of papers in British Public Record Office. (In Virginia State Library). Waddell, Joseph A. Annals of Augusta County, Virginia, from 1725 to 187 2. Bridgewater, Virginia: C7 J . Carrier Company, 1958. Wright, Louis B. and Marion Tinling (eds.). The Secret Diary of William Byrd of Westover, 1709-1712. Richmond: The I5Tetz Press, 194TT C. SECONDARY SOURCES Baker-Crothers, Hayes. Virginia and the French and Indian War. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 192FI Beer, George L. The Old Colonial System, 1660-1754. 2 vols. Gloucester, Massachusetts: Peter SmitH^ T951TI Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 25 4 Beverley, Robert. The History and Present State of Virginia. Edited by Louis 6 . Wright. Chapel Hill! University of North Carolina Press, 1947. Boorstin, Daniel J. The Americans, The' Colonial Experience. New York: Randem house, 1958. Bradshaw, Herbert Clarence. The History of Prince Edward County, Virginia. Richmond: The Dietz Press, Incor porated, 1955. Brown, Alexander. The First Republic in America. Boston: Houghton, Mifflin and Company, T89"5T Bruce, Philip Alexander. Social Life of Virginia in the Seventeenth Century, Richmond: WETttet and ShepDerson, 1907. Economic History of Virginia in the Seventeenth Century. 2 vols. Mew YorTcl Peter Smith, 19 35. History of Virginia, Colonial Period, 1607-1763. Chicago: American"Historical Societ'y'J 1924. Institutional History of Virginia in the Seventeenth Century. 2 vols. Mew York: "S’! FI Futnarns 5ohsl 19lt). . The Virginia Plutarch, 2 vols. Chapel Hill: University of Morth Carolina Press, 192 9, Burk,' John Daly. History of Virginia from Its First Settle ment to the Present Day. 4 vols. II. Petersburg: Dickson and Pescud, 1§04. Campbell, T. 'E. Colonial Caroline. Richmond: The Dietz Press, 1954. Channing, Edward. Town and County Government in the English Colonies of North America-! Johns Hopkins University Studies. Baltimore! Johns Hopkins University, 1884. Cheyney, Edward P. A History of England from the Defeat of the Armada to the Death' of Elizabeth. 2' vols'. Mew York: Peter Smith, 1948. Chitwood, Oliver Perry. Justice in Colonial Virginia. Johns Hopkins University Studies'! Baltimore: The Johns. Tlonkins Press, 1905. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 2 5 5 Crane, Verner W. The Southern Fron.tier, 1670-17 32. Ann Arbor Books. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, (Ann Arbor Books), 1929. Craven, Wesley Frank. Dissolution of the Virginia Company. New York: Oxford University Press, 19 32. The Southern Colonies in the Seventeenth Century. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University, 1949. Doyle, John Andrew. English Colonies in America. 5 vols. New York: Holt and Company, 1889-1907. Depuy, R. Ernest. The Compact History of the United States Army. New York: Hawthorn Books, 19 56, Egerton, Hugh Edward. A Short History of British Colonial Policy, 1609-1909. London: Methuen and Company, 19 50. Fiske, John. Old Virginia and Her Neighbors. 2 vols. Boston: Houghton, Mifflin and Company, 1897. Flippen, Percy Scott. The Royal Government in Virginia, 1626-1775. New YorlcI Columbia University, l§l9. Fortescue, J. W. A History of the British Army. 13 vols. London: Macmillan and Company, 1910. Gipson, Lawrence H. The British Empire Before the American Revolution. 10 vols. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1936-1961. Hatch, Louis Clinton. The Administration of the American Revolutionary Army. New York: Longmans, Green, and Company, 19 0^. Hayes Baker - Crothers., Virginia and the French and Indian War. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1928. Irving, Washington. Life of George Washington. 5 vols. New York: G. P. Putnam7^ Sons, 1855. Journal of American History, 1913 -. Karraker, Cyrus H. The Seventeenth Century Sheriff. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 19 30. Kegley, F. B. Kegley's Virginia Frontier. Roanoke: South west Virginia Historical Society, 1938. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 2 5 6 Koontz, Louis K. The Virginia Frontier, 17 54-1763. Johns Hopkins University Studies in Historical and Political Service., Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1925. Mead, Spenser. "The Colonial Military— First American Soldiers," Journal of American History, I (19 07), d d . 120-128. ' Morton, Louis, "The Origins of American Military Policy," Military Affairs, XXII (Summer, 1958), pp. 75-82. Morton, Richard Lee. Colonial Virginia. 2 vols. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1960. ______. Struggle Against Tyranny and the Beginning of a New Era, Virginia, 1677-1699. Jamestown 35 0th Anniversary Historical Booklet, Mo. 9. Williamsburg: 350th Anniversary Celebration Corporation, 1957. Oman, C. W. C. Article in H.^J). Traill and J. C. Mann, Social England. 6 vols. London: Cassell and Company, 1901-1904. Osgood, Herbert L. The American Colonies in the Eighteenth Century. 4 vols. New York: Columbia University Press, 1924. ______. The American Colonies in the Seventeenth Century. 3 vols. New York: Macmillan, 1904-1907. Palmer, John McAuley. America in Arms. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1941. Porter, Albert Ogden. County Government in Virginia, A Legislative History ,~T 6 07-1914. New York: Columbia „ University Press, 1947. Ripley, William Z. The Financial History of Virginia, 1609- 1776. New York: Columbia College, TsCT. Scharf, J. Thomas. History of Maryland. 2 vols. Baltimore: John B. Piet, publisher, 1879. Shy, John W. "A Jew Look at Colonial Militia," William and Mary Quarterly, XX (April 1963), pp. 175-185. Spaulding, Oliver Lyman. The United States Army in War and Peace. New York: G. P . Putnam's Sons, 1937. Stanard, Mary Newton. The Story of Virginia's First Century. Philadelphia: . Lip p m c o T F Company^ 192 8 . Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 2 5 ? Stith, William. The History of the First Discovery and Settlement of Virginia. Williamsburg: William harks, 1747, Reprinted for Joseph Sabin, 1865. Stubbs, William. The Constitutional History of England. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 18 80. Todd, Frederick P. "Our National Guard: An Introduction to Its History," Military Affairs. V (Spring, 1941), -d -d . 73-86. Trail, H. D. and J. C. Mann. Social England. 6 vols. London: Cassell and Company, 1^02-1904. Trevelyan, G. M. History of England. 3 vols. Anchor Books, New YorKl DoubTeday and Company, 1953. Tyler’s Quarterly Historical and Geneological Magazine, 1919-1952. Virginia Magazine of History and -Biography. 18 9 3 -. Washburn, Wilcomb E. The Governor and the Rebel: A History of Bacon* s Rebellion in Virginia. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1957. ______. Virginia Under Charles I and Cromwell, 1625-1660. Jamestown 350th Anniversary Historical Booklet, No. 7. Williamsburg: 3 50th Anniversary Celebration Corporation, 1957. Wertenbaker, Thomas J. Bacon’s Rebellion. Jamestown 3 50th Anniversary Historical Booklet", I'JcTI 5". Williamsburg: Virginia 35 0th Anniversary Celebration Corporation, 1957. ______. Planters of Colonial Virginia. Princeton: Princeton University Press’^ 1922. The -Government of Virginia in the Seventeenth Century. Jamestown T5"0 th Anniversary Historical Booklet, No. 16, Williamsburg: 35 0th Anniversary Celebration Corporation, 1957. ______. Torchbearer of the Revolution. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1940. . ______., .Virginia Under the Stuarts, 1607-1688. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1914, West, Gerald Montgomery. The Status of the Negro in Virginia During the Colonial PeriodT New YorHl William Jenkins, 1889 (?7T“ * ‘ Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 2 5 8 William and Mary Quarterly. 1892 Wright, Louis B. The First Gentlemen of Virginia. San Marino, California! TKe Huntington Library, T940. U. S. Department of the Army. American Military History, 1607-1953. ROTC Manual No. 11+5-20. Washington: Government Printing Office, 19 56. Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.