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S2n
Scalable Scanning and Automatic Classification of TLS Padding Oracle Vulnerabilities
Arxiv:1911.09312V2 [Cs.CR] 12 Dec 2019
A Security Analysis of the WPA-TKIP and TLS Security Protocols
Directed Greybox Fuzzing
The Rocky Road To
An Analysis of the Transport Layer Security Protocol
IETF Hackathon
Coming of Age: a Longitudinal Study of TLS Deployment
Coming of Age: a Longitudinal Study of TLS Deployment
Projektzusammenfassung
The 9 Lives of Bleichenbacher's CAT: New Cache Attacks on TLS
Investigating the Multi-Ciphersuite and Backwards-Compatibility Security of the Upcoming TLS 1.3
Lucky Microseconds: a Timing Attack on Amazon's S2n Implementation Of
Secure Tunnels for Constrained Environments
Heartbleed: a Case Study
TLS 1.3 a New Standard and Its Security
Vorbemerkung Zu Projekt 197 „Sichere Implementierung Einer Allgemeinen Kryptobibliothek – Arbeitspaket 1: Sichtung Und Analyse Bestehender Kryptobibliotheken“
Pseudo Constant Time Implementations of TLS Are Only Pseudo Secure Eyal Ronen, Kenny Paterson, Adi Shamir Talk Outline 1
Top View
Verified Models and Reference Implementations for the TLS 1.3 Standard Candidate Karthikeyan Bhargavan, Bruno Blanchet, Nadim Kobeissi
CCS'16 ~ Systematic Fuzzing and Testing of TLS Libraries
TLS and Certificates
Using DPI and Statistical Analysis in Encrypted Network Traffic Monitoring
Secure Content Delivery with Amazon Cloudfront AWS Whitepaper Secure Content Delivery with Amazon Cloudfront AWS Whitepaper
Curl User Survey 2020 Analysis
TLS Panel Discussion
Proving the Correctness of Amazon's S2n TLS Library
Attacks on TLS Douglas Stebila
Prototyping Post-Quantum and Hybrid Key Exchange and Authentication in TLS and SSH
Differentially Analyzing Side-Channel Traces for Detecting SSL/TLS Vulnerabilities in Secure Enclaves
Systematic Fuzzing and Testing of TLS Libraries
Sidetrail: Verifying Time-Balancing of Cryptosystems
Classification of Cryptographic Libraries
05 Korthaus Eine Allgemeine Kryptobibliothek Fuer Hersteller Von
Automated Detection of Side Channels in Cryptographic Protocols: DROWN the Robots!
Raccoon Attack: Finding and Exploiting Most-Significant-Bit-Oracles in TLS-DH(E)
Post-Compromise Security and TLS 1.3 Session Resumption