Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive DSpace Repository Theses and Dissertations 1. Thesis and Dissertation Collection, all items 2010-06 Abacus of frozen conflicts Karimov, Reshad. Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School http://hdl.handle.net/10945/5280 Downloaded from NPS Archive: Calhoun NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA THESIS ABACUS OF FROZEN CONFLICTS by Reshad Karimov June 2010 Thesis Advisor: Michael E. Freeman Second Reader: Frank R. Giordano Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503. 1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 2. REPORT DATE 3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED June 2010 Master’s Thesis 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Abacus of Frozen Conflicts 5. FUNDING NUMBERS 6. AUTHOR(S) Reshad Karimov 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION Naval Postgraduate School REPORT NUMBER Monterey, CA 93943-5000 9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSORING/MONITORING N/A AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. government. IRB Protocol Number: ________________. 12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT 12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited A 13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words) One of the central topics of international relations study is the function of military threats as a mean to deter international crises and war. Rational choice models provide the groundwork for theorizing circumstances under which conventional deterrence is likely to thrive or fail. According to Paul Huth, rational deterrence theorists have focused on four sets of variables: the balance of military forces, costly signaling and bargaining behavior, reputations, and interests at stake. By using the case of the Russian-Georgian War of August of 2008, one can argue that an actor’s perception, in addition to signaling, is another essential variable for successful deterrence. 14. SUBJECT TERMS Russian-Georgian War of August of 2008, Deterrence Theory, Security 15. NUMBER OF Dilemma, Perception, Accidental War, Spiral Model, Game Theory, Game of Chicken, USSR, Fall of PAGES the Soviet Union, Republic of Georgia, Russia, South Ossetian Conflict, Abkhaz Conflict, Frozen 75 Conflicts, Frozen Peace Processes 16. PRICE CODE 17. SECURITY 18. SECURITY 19. SECURITY 20. LIMITATION OF CLASSIFICATION OF CLASSIFICATION OF THIS CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT REPORT PAGE ABSTRACT Unclassified Unclassified Unclassified UU NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89) Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18 i THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK ii Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited ABACUS OF FROZEN CONFLICTS Reshad Karimov Research Fellow, Center for Strategic Studies, under the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan M.A., Azerbaijan State University, 2001 Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of MASTER OF SCIENCE IN DEFENSE ANALYSIS from the NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL June 2010 Author: Reshad Karimov Approved by: Michael E. Freeman Thesis Advisor Frank R. Giordano Second Reader Gordon H. McCormick, PhD Chairman, Department of Defense Analysis iii THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK iv ABSTRACT One of the central topics of international relations study is the function of military threats as a mean to deter international crises and war. Rational choice models provide the groundwork for theorizing circumstances under which conventional deterrence is likely to thrive or fail. According to Paul Huth, rational deterrence theorists have focused on four sets of variables: the balance of military forces, costly signaling and bargaining behavior, reputations, and interests at stake.1 By using the case of the Russian-Georgian War of August of 2008, one can argue that an actor’s perception, in addition to signaling, is another essential variable for successful deterrence. 1 Paul K. Huth, “Deterrence and International Conflict: Empirical Findings and Theoretical Debates,” Annual Review Political Science, Vol. 2 (1999) 25. v THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK vi TABLE OF CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................1 A. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND METHODOLOGY .....................3 II. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE.................................................................................5 A. SOVIET LEGACY ..........................................................................................5 B. REPUBLIC OF GEORGIA............................................................................6 1. South Ossetian Conflict .......................................................................8 2. Abkhaz Conflict ...................................................................................9 3. Frozen Peace Processes......................................................................10 C. DETERIORATING SECURITY .................................................................10 D. RUSSIA’S ROLE...........................................................................................16 E. THE WAR OF AUGUST OF 2008...............................................................19 III. THEORIES.................................................................................................................23 A. THE SPIRAL MODEL .................................................................................23 B. ACCIDENTAL WAR....................................................................................25 C. THE DETERRENCE THEORY..................................................................26 D. PERCEPTION ...............................................................................................29 IV. GAME THEORY APPROACH ...............................................................................33 A. INITIAL CONDITIONS...............................................................................33 B. THE GAME....................................................................................................36 1. Rankings .............................................................................................37 V. CONCLUSION ..........................................................................................................47 LIST OF REFERENCES......................................................................................................53 INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST .........................................................................................59 vii THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK viii LIST OF FIGURES Figure 1. USSR Nationalities, 1982 ..................................................................................6 Figure 2. Map of Georgia, 2008........................................................................................7 Figure 3. Map of Georgia................................................................................................14 Figure 4. Map of 2008 Georgia-Russian War .................................................................20 Figure 5. Outcome Matrix...............................................................................................37 Figure 6. Payoff Matrix, Georgia’s Point of View..........................................................39 Figure 7. Payoff Matrix, Russia’s Point of View............................................................40 Figure 8. Likely Outcome without Communication .......................................................43 Figure 9. Decision Tree...................................................................................................45 ix THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK x LIST OF TABLES Table 1. Strategic Options for Georgia ..........................................................................38 Table 2. Strategic Options for Russia ............................................................................38 xi THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK xii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS Completing a thesis is a challenge, thanking all those who contributed to it are an even greater one. Due to the nature of my study, many people were involved in one or the other way in it. I want to thank all of them, including those not mentioned here by name. I thank Prof. Michael E. Freeman and Prof. Frank R. Giordano in the acknowledgements and because each one of you has contributed to my knowledge, learning, and growth. Special thanks to my wife and best friend, Shafag, for her love and patient support—you always go the extra mile, and do so with incredible grace. Javad, when you’re old enough to read, I hope you’re as proud of your Daddy as he is of you. I also want to thank my mother, Elmira Karimova,