PARTY SYSTEM CARTELIZATION: THE CASE OF CROATIA By Vuk Vuković Submitted to Central European University Department of Political Science In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts Supervisor: Zsolt Enyedi CEU eTD Collection Budapest, Hungary (2019) Abstract The aim of this thesis is to offer alternative explanation for long-lasting stability of the Croatian party system. So far, the predictive pattern of party competition has been analyzed through the lens of cleavage politics. Although useful tool, especially in historically divided society such as Croatia, cleavage theory offers static interpretation of party politics. In order to track the development of Croatian party system throughout time, cartel theory is applied. The outcome of the analysis is that cartelization is heavily dependent on the cleavage that structures party competition. Therefore, for most of the time there is no evidence of closed party competition, which consists one of three dimensions in proposed operationalization. However, the contribution of the thesis is related to the scope of cartel concept. As cartel is found in collusive manipulation of referendum on Croatian accession to EU, it seems that cartel concept can be applied beyond competition exclusively related to parties. CEU eTD Collection ii Table of Contents Abstract ................................................................................................................................ ii List of tables ........................................................................................................................ iv List of figures ........................................................................................................................ v Introduction .......................................................................................................................... 6 Chapter 1 – The concept of cartelization................................................................................ 8 1.1. Defining characteristic of cartelization ...................................................................... 10 1.2. Literature overview .................................................................................................. 12 Chapter 2 – Towards three-dimensional operationalization .................................................. 15 1.1. Interpenetration of party and the state ....................................................................... 16 1.2. Cartel cooperation .................................................................................................... 16 1.3. Cartel competition .................................................................................................... 19 2.2. Seven levels of the cartelization ................................................................................ 20 Chapter 3 – The case of Croatia........................................................................................... 22 3.1. Interpenetration of party and the state ....................................................................... 26 3.2. Cartel cooperation .................................................................................................... 29 3.2.1. Party System Permeability ............................................................................. 30 3.2.2. Cartel-like behavior (collusion) ...................................................................... 33 2.3. Cartel competition .................................................................................................... 37 2.3.1. Policy convergence ........................................................................................ 37 2.3.2. Representativeness ......................................................................................... 45 2.3.3. Depoliticization.............................................................................................. 48 2.4. Cartelization fostered by accession to EU ................................................................. 54 2.4. The success and failure of cartel ............................................................................... 56 Conclusion .......................................................................................................................... 60 CEU eTD Collection Bibliography ....................................................................................................................... 62 iii List of tables Table 1 Research Design ..................................................................................................... 10 Table 2 Three-dimensional operationalization ..................................................................... 15 Table 3 Seven levels of cartelization ................................................................................... 21 Table 4 List of relevant parties ............................................................................................ 25 Table 5 Ratio between electorate and party membership...................................................... 28 Table 6 Legislative cooperation of MP’s ............................................................................ 36 Table 7 CMP policy range (and difference) ......................................................................... 40 Table 8 Chapel Hill policy range ......................................................................................... 44 Table 9 Congruence between parties and electorate ............................................................. 46 Table 10 Issue congruence between voter and party ............................................................ 48 Table 11 Cartelization of Croatian party system over time ................................................... 56 CEU eTD Collection iv List of figures Figure 1 Financial sources of parties' revenues .................................................................... 27 Figure 2 State subsidies per voter ........................................................................................ 27 Figure 3 Ratio between electorate and party membership .................................................... 28 Figure 4 Lack of confidence in parties and parliament ......................................................... 29 Figure 5 Electoral turnout .................................................................................................... 29 Figure 6 Programmatic positions of parties (CMP data)....................................................... 40 Figure 7 Programmatic distance between HDZ and SDP (CMP data) .................................. 41 Figure 8 Party positions on super-issue dimension (Chapel Hill data) .................................. 43 Figure 9 Party positions on socio-economic dimension (Chapel Hill data) ........................... 43 Figure 10 Party positions on GAL-TAN dimension (Chapel Hill data) ................................ 44 Figure 11 Left-Right congruence ......................................................................................... 47 Figure 12 Number of depoliticized issues ............................................................................ 50 Figure 13 Percentage of parties supporting/opposing EU ..................................................... 51 Figure 14 Public opinion on accession to EU....................................................................... 53 Figure 15 The effectiveness of party system permeability.................................................... 58 CEU eTD Collection v Introduction On the parliamentary elections in 2015, Croatian party system experienced significant turbulence. For the first time ever, two parties with strong anti-establishment rhetoric entered the parliament, of which one even formed the government in the same year. Consequently, the long-lasting stability of the Croatian party system was disturbed. This stability has been reflected in the continuous domination of two parties, which had been leading two opposing blocks since 2000. In literature, this bipolarism is explained by the application of social cleavage theory (Zakošek and Čular 2003, Čular and Gregurić 2007, Henjak et al. 2013). Accordingly, the events in 2015 are interpreted as a consequence of the weakening of traditional divisions that have structured party competition (Henjak 2018). As a historically divided society, Croatia indeed serves as a good context in which cleavage theory could be applied. Nevertheless, since the competition reflects divisions from the past (Bartolini, Mair 1990), social cleavage theory provides mostly static explanations. The aim of this thesis is to offer an alternative explanation of stability and disorder of the party system by applying cartel theory to the context of Croatia. The cartel theory depicts the process in which parties, in order to survive, exploit the state resources and restrict the competition in collusive manner. There are two advantages cartel theory can offer. First, since cartelization is the process not the event, it is possible to monitor development of party system throughout the time. Second, while on the one side, restricting competition increases the stability, on the other “attempts at exclusion may also prove counter-productive… the CEU eTD Collection more recent success of the cartel inevitably generates its own opposition” (Katz Mair 1995:24). Therefore, by monitoring cartelization, it is possible to predict disorder of the party system. In order to follow the development of the cartelization