ISSN: 2560-1601 Vol. 31, No. 4 (MK) July 2020 North Macedonia external relations briefing: 2020 Parliamentary Elections: External Relations in the Electoral Programmes of Parliamentary Political Parties Adela Gjorgjioska 1052 Budapest Petőfi Sándor utca 11. +36 1 5858 690 Kiadó: Kína-KKE Intézet Nonprofit Kft. [email protected] Szerkesztésért felelős személy: CHen Xin Kiadásért felelős személy: Huang Ping china-cee.eu 2017/01 2020 Parliamentary Elections: External Relations in the Electoral Programmes of Parliamentary Political Parties Following the Parliamentary Elections held on July 15th, six political parties secured at least 1 MP seat in the Macedonian Parliament. The representation in the legislature for the period 2020-2024 will be distributed as follows: The SDSM-led coalition - 46 MPs; VMRO- DPMNE-led coalition - 44 MPs; Democratic Union for Integration (DUI) - 15 MPs. The coalition ASA (between the Alliance for Albanians and Alternative) - 12 MPs. Levica “The Left” - 2 MPs and the Democratic Party of Albanians - 1 MP. This report takes a look at the electoral programmes of each of these parties, focusing specifically on their proposed strategies with regards to foreign policy. SDSM-led coalition In May 2017, when the SDSM-DUI coalition government was formed one of its key pledges was EU and NATO integration. As part of this approach, two bilateral Agreements were signed with two neighbouring countries: the Prespa Agreement with Greece signed in June 2018 and the Friendship Treaty with Bulgaria in August 2017. The first entailed the country’s name change into North Macedonia and paved the way towards the country’s NATO membership in March 2020. The second aimed at achieving a similar effect by neutralising a possible Bulgarian veto on the Macedonian EU accession pathway. The SDSM strategy has divided society between on the one hand those who have criticised it as an act of national betrayal, and on the other hand those who have supported it by focusing on the benefits of NATO membership and (the prospect of) EU membership. The political campaign ahead of the 2020 elections continued to follow the Euro-Atlantic path. In the preface of the political programme of the SDSM, the leader of the SDSM Zoran Zaev declared: “Today, North Macedonia is the 30th member-state of NATO, and we are also starting the accession negotiations with the EU. We have entered into NATO, we can also enter the EU. 1 That means a certain future for all of us, and for our children, and a guaranteed economic development, because we are gaining access to new european markets”.1 NATO membership is also described as “an entry ticket to the EU”. It is stated that the key goal of the next SDSM-led government would be to start EU accession negotiations aimed at “Europeanising the country”. The party pledges to open 80% of the negotiation chapters with the EU by 2024. Furthermore, it pledges to secure 2,5 billion euros from EU funds for “dealing with Covid 19, building a new economy, the green agenda, energy, competitiveness, capital investments, agriculture and infrastructure”.2 VMRO-DPMNE-led coalition VMRO-DPMNE’s foreign policy strategy is not very dissimilar to that of the SDSM-led coalition. It states that “the VMRO-DPMNE considers membership of Macedonia in the EU and NATO to be necessary for completing the Macedonian statehood”.3 Thus the focus of a VMRO-led government would be on: achieving full-fledged EU membership; continuous fulfilment of the obligations arising from the NATO membership; better utilization of EU funds; strengthening the institutional capacities for EU membership. The programme aims to balance between the expectations of the VMRO electorate (which opposes the Prespa Agreement) on the one hand and the party’s close relations with influential NATO and EU states on the other. In the programme, the new name “North Macedonia” is not used and there is (only implicit) criticism of the Prespa Agreement: “under the veil of unrealistic promises, the citizens of Macedonia have faced the biggest national humiliation”. VMRO doesn’t propose any measures to annul the Agreement, instead caling for the establishment of an academic institute which would examine the implications of the Prespa Agreement with Greece and the Friendship Agreement with Bulgaria, in order to “neutralise their negative aspects”. VMRO-DPMNE also states that it would aim to “send a clear message that in the 21st century, diplomacy should not be used as an instrument which exploits the wishes of the Macedonian people for a European future in order to advance nationalist agendas policies from the 19th century”. This is a nod to Bulgaria, which as an EU member state, has an asymmetrical bargaining position vis a vis the non-member state (N.Macedonia), allowing it to impose conditions on the latter in exchange for an open pathway to EU membership. 1 https://mojotizbor.mk/images/programi2020/Programa-2020_Mozeme.pdf 2 https://mojotizbor.mk/images/programi2020/Programa-2020_Mozeme.pdf 3 https://mojotizbor.mk/images/programi2020/programa2020vmro.pdf 2 Democratic Union For Integration (DUI) DUI’s electoral programme outlines the following as its key achievements as part of the SDSM-led Government between 2017-2020: “Solution to the name issue; Agreements on good neighbourly relations with Bulgaria and Greece; NATO membership; opening of accession negotiations with the EU; EU visa liberalisation; free movements without passports in Albania and Kosovo; reduction in the cost of “roaming services”. Istates that its key goals in the next period will be the fulfilment of all of the responsibilities that arise from NATO membership, as well as achieving full-fledged EU membership by 2025. The coalition ASA (between the Alliance for Albanians and Alternative) The coalition ASA advocates an active role in NATO, as well as close neighbourly relations with regional member states of NATO. Describing itself as pro-EU, it calls for the improvement of the institutional capacities necessary for the EU accession negotiations, the harmonization of the domestic and the EU legislature and the utilization of EU funds. Furthermore, it proposes the development of a strategic partnership between Macedonia and both Kosovo and Albania. Supporting Kosovo on the international and the regional diplomatic arena is described as its central strategic objective: “we will work on strengthening Kosovo’s position as a sovereign and equal state in all the regional processes in which N.Macedonia participates”.4 Finally, it calls for the increase of ethnic-Albanian personnel across the macedonian diplomatic network, and for the provision of official communication in Albanian on all levels across the diplomatic network and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Levica “The Left” Levica’s foreign relations programme is radically different from all the other parliamentary parties. It is the only parliamentary political party which calls for the annulment of the Prespa Agreement5 due to the “criminal and illegal way in which it was forced on the country” but also due to its contravening of the principle of self-determination. It also calls for the withdrawal of the country’s membership in the NATO Alliance, arguing that according to the Macedonian constitution membership in military alliances is conditional on the successful 4 https://mojotizbor.mk/images/programi2020/Alijansa%20za%20Albancite%20i%20alternativa.pdf 5 The Prespa Agreement was was ratified internally in spite of a failed referendum. The referendum on the name change posed the question “Are you in favour of EU and NATO membership by accepting the Agreement between the Republic of Macedonia and the Republic of Greece?” Following the successful campaign of the informal movement #Бојкотирам (I’m Boycotting), with only 36,89% turn out, the Referendum failed. Following the failed Referendum, the two third majority in parliament required to pass 4 Constitutional Amendments was achieved by providing selective amnesty to 8 MPs from VMRO-DPMNE accused of violations for abuse of office, in exchange for their support in passing the constitutional changes. 3 passing of a referendum, a criteria which has not been satisfied. Levica also calls for a revision of the Friendship Agreement with Bulgaria arguing that it is an example of historical revisionism and rehabilitation of fasicsim from the Second World War. The party is in favour of EU membership. Levica is the only Parliamentary Party which calls for closer economic and social cooperation with PR China as part of the 17+1 and the BRI: “Lifting of the bilateral relations with the People’s Republic of China to the level of strategic partnership (including cooperation in the framework of the 17+1 initiative as well as support for the Belt and Road Initiative), with a focus on infrastructural connectivity and cultural cooperation.” It stands for anti-imperialist international relations (including a withdrawal from participation in all military missions unless they are under an UN mandate. Finally, it calls for the country’s withdrawal from the Prague declaration which “shamefully equates communism and fascism thus revising the historical role of the Macedonian national liberation movement and the anti-fascist movement in the Second World War”.6 The Democratic Party of Albanians (DPA) DPA’s programme reiterates its supports for the Euro-Atlantic integrations of the country, including the fulfilment of all obligations arising from NATO membership, and the achievement of EU membership status by 2025. Conclusion The electoral programmes of 5 out of the 6 Parliamentary Parties are very similar. SDSM, VMRO, DUI, DPA and ASA are all in favour of active participation in NATO, as well as a focus on the attainment of EU membership. What is more, all 5 parties, portray EU and NATO membership as almost automatic guarantors of peace, stability and prosperity. In view of this apparent consensus amongst the large majority of parliamentary parties, it is to be expected that Macedonian foreign relations course will remain unchanged in the next 4 years.