The Local Dimension of Transnational Activity in Environmental Conflicts: Tambogrande, 1961-2004 By Jorge Ernesto Thieroldt Llanos Submitted to the graduate degree program in Sociology and the Graduate Faculty of the University of Kansas in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. Chair: Eric Hanley Robert Antonio Ebenezer Obadare Emily Rauscher J. Christopher Brown Date Defended: 9 June 2017 The dissertation committee for Jorge Thieroldt certifies that this is the approved version of the following dissertation: The Local Dimension of Transnational Activity in Environmental Conflicts: Tambogrande, 1961-2004 Chair: Eric Hanley Date Approved: 9 June 2017 ii Abstract Based on the in-depth analysis of the Tambogrande case, the most well known case of social mobilization in Peru, I argue that the success or failure of transnational activity is closely linked to actions performed on the grassroots level by local organizations before the arrival of outsiders. Between 1999 and 2004, Tambogrande was the site of intense transnational activity. The support given by international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) like Oxfam Great Britain and Oxfam America was crucial to stop a Canadian mining company, Manhattan Minerals Corporation (MMC), interested in the extraction of the minerals lying underneath. The existing literature about this case of environmental conflict highlights the contributions of the INGOs neglecting a deeper account of the past trajectories of the local actors. I argue that this successful case of transnational activity was the direct result of a long series of protests that began in 1961 when hundreds of farmers from different regions of Peru arrived to colonize the desert to create what is now the San Lorenzo Valley. The reconstruction of four previous decades of protests shows that the key elements that facilitated the success of the transnational alliances established in the period 1999-2004 were domestically created long before the arrival of INGOs. Specifically, I maintain that these key elements were three. First, a social movement organization (SMO) composed of representatives of pre-existing grassroots organizations such as agricultural, labor, commercial and political guilds. Second, a porous state office (PSO) that remained at the service of social mobilization as a source of democratic and legal legitimacy for more than twenty years. Third, a domestic non-governmental bridging organization (DNGBO) that functioned as a broker between grassroots organizations, social leaders, national NGOs and international NGOs. iii Table of Contents Introduction 1 Synopsis 38 Chapter One: Concepts 51 Chapter Two: Before 1961, Irrigation Projects and the World Bank 71 Chapter Three: 1961-1968, War over the Reservoir Water 91 Chapter Four: 1968-1975, Redefinition of the Territory 122 Chapter Five: 1975-1980, Agriculture vs Mining 144 Chapter Six: 1981-1982, Foundation of the Defense Front 156 Chapter Seven: 1983-1985, The Archbishop and the Reconstruction 172 Chapter Eight: 1986-1992, Peace Yes Violence No 186 Chapter Nine: 1993-2004, Agriculture Yes Mining No 223 Conclusions 284 Informants 292 Acronyms 294 References 296 iv Introduction MAIN ARGUMENT The aim of this dissertation is to contribute to the theoretical perspective claiming for more attention to the local or domestic dimension in the study of transnational advocacy alliances. This dissertation argues that the success or failure of transnational activity is closely linked to actions performed on the grassroots level by local organizations before the arrival of outsiders. The in-depth analysis of the Tambogrande case, the most successful case of social mobilization and transnational activity in Peru, allows me to defend this proposal. Tambogrande is a district located on the northern coast of Peru, bordering Ecuador. Inside this district of a desert landscape and temperate climate is the fertile San Lorenzo Valley, the main producer of lemons and mangoes of the country. Between 1999 and 2004, Tambogrande was the site of intense transnational activity. The support given by international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) like Oxfam Great Britain and Oxfam America was crucial to stop a Canadian mining company, Manhattan Minerals Corporation (MMC), interested in the extraction of the minerals lying underneath. Coarsely summarized, the intended mining activities meant the relocation of a city, the diversion of a river, the digging of a massive open pit in an area rich in underground water, and the extraction of minerals like gold and copper right below hundreds of thousands of lime and mango trees. 1 As part of the resistance strategy against the Canadian mining company, Tambogrande district residents organized and held a popular referendum to demonstrate their agricultural vocation in a democratic way. This referendum also known as consulta vecinal or neighborhood consultation was the first of its kind and a model that was replicated by dozens of social movements facing similar threats in other countries in the region. The worldwide significance of Tambogrande’s neighborhood consultation explains in part why attention of the analysts has focused on the global forces that intervened in this conflict. The existing literature on the Tambogrande case focuses exclusively on the events that occurred between 1999 and 2004, the years of intense transnational activity. The great recognition that INGOs have received has been fair and well deserved. However, we must not forget the contributions of local, domestic or national actors. Based on more than 50 interviews conducted over six years, multiple fieldwork visits, and consultation of personal archives retained by local leaders, as well as consultation of periodicals and journal collections kept in public institutions, I argue that the social mobilization that took place in the Tambogrande district between 1999 and 2004 was the final period of a long series of protests that began in 1961 when hundreds of farmers from different regions of Peru arrived to colonize the desert to create what is now the San Lorenzo Valley. During the 1950s, the Peruvian government used public funds and loans granted by the World Bank to irrigate the desert, placing new agricultural lots for sale. This laudable initiative was, at the same time, the origin of a long series of conflicts between the settlers of the valley and successive governments that tried to reformulate, to cut or to cancel this irrigation project during 2 the decade of 1960. The protests continued during the decades of the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s against the governments that tried to impose mining in that agriculturally rich and ecologically fragile territory. Before the arrival of the INGOs, the inhabitants of Tambogrande already had extensive experience confronting the central government. They were organized and ready to resume the mobilization against the interests of the mining industry. The INGOs arrived after four decades of uninterrupted social mobilization. The ideas and theoretical proposals of this dissertation are based on the reconstruction of those four decades of protest that were sustained without any intervention of external allies. The reconstruction of this long chain of protests allows me to affirm that the key elements that facilitated the success of the transnational alliances established in the period 1999-2004 were domestically created long before the arrival of INGOs. Specifically, I maintain that these key elements were three: • First, a social movement organization (SMO) composed of representatives of pre-existing grassroots organizations such as agricultural, labor, commercial and political guilds. This SMO succeeded in representing local discontent without dividing or defrauding the population’s expectations. This SMO was the Tambogrande Defense Front, founded in 1981. • Second, a porous state office (PSO) that remained at the service of social mobilization as a source of democratic and legal legitimacy. This PSO was the Municipal District of Tambogrande. Mayors of this district led the protests during the 1980s and 1990s. 3 • Third, a domestic non-governmental bridging organization (DNGBO) that functioned as a broker between grassroots organizations, social leaders, national NGOs and international NGOs. This DNGBO was Diakonia for Justice and Peace, a church-based NGO founded in 1987 by an archbishop famous for his courageous commitment to the defense of human rights. The reconstruction of forty years of social mobilization, which took place without the intervention of external allies, allows me to argue that these three components (PSO + SMO + DNBGO) are the key elements for understanding the strength of the local dimension of transnational activity practiced in Tambogrande during the period of 1999-2004. Tambogrande District, as the scene of four decades of uninterrupted social mobilization, offers us sufficient arguments to ensure that the success or failure of transnational activity stems from the grassroots level. PARTIAL BOOMERANG The most cited and mentioned approach in the analysis of transnational activity has been proposed by Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, and is known as the “boomerang strategy” (Keck, 1995; Keck & Sikkink, 1998a, 1998b; Sikkink, 1993, 1998). According to these authors, when state apparatuses block and ignore citizen claims on issues linked to universally accepted principles such as the defense of human rights or environmental protection, local activists, social movements