Pascal’s Anti- Augustinianism Vincent Carraud Université de Caen I analyze the complex relations between Pascal and the three ªgures of Montaigne, Descartes, and St. Augustine, and the relations the ªrst two ªg- ures bear to St. Augustine. For Pascal’s philosophy, one is in effect a resource (Montaigne), another a way of thinking that he makes his own (Descartes), and yet another serves as a model (St. Augustine). I further investigate Pas- cal’s anti-Augustinism, that is, some of the points of resistance in Pascal against the thought of St. Augustine. Central to this investigation is the fa- mous rapprochement between the cogitos of Augustine and Descartes, which requires a consideration of what, for Pascal, it means “to say the same thing.” This analysis leads us to two conclusions: ªrst, Augustine’s The City of God should be placed among the number of works that Pascal did not read; second, there are fundamental philosophical reasons for Pascal to reject certain theses central to that work. Above all, there should no longer be any need to assume a merely abstract conception of an unproblematic Augustin- ianism in Pascal. Montaigne, Descartes and St. Augustine do not have the same status in the composition of Pascal’s thought. Montaigne’s presence is nearly con- stant: he is cited, paraphrased, glossed, discussed, and criticized. The Es- says, especially the Apology of Raymond Sebond, abound throughout Pascal’s texts. The Essays are a frequent resource for Pascal—a resource in the sense that they are the fund, the soil of the Pensées. Next to this fund continu- ously extracted from Montaigne, Descartes is fundamental. Cartesian philosophy1 constitutes the foundation of Pascal’s thought, by which I In memory of Geneviève Rodis-Lewis, author of Augustinisme et cartésianisme, an inovative study that appeared in Paris just over 50 years ago at the end of September 1945. Translated by Nathan D. Smith. 1. In a sense, what follows could also provide a connection between natural philosophy Perspectives on Science 2007, vol. 15, no. 4 ©2007 by The Massachusetts Institute of Technology 450 Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/posc.2007.15.4.450 by guest on 24 September 2021 Perspectives on Science 451 mean: Pascal is a Cartesian—even the ªrst Cartesian. He thinks as a Carte- sian, and it is on the basis of this Cartesian foundation, always reinter- preted, that is, rethought, that a precise and decisive anti-Cartesianism of certain of his theses could arise and develop. Thus, the Pascalian interpre- tation of Descartes is able to create a space for what I have recently called a “conceptual subversion.”2 On the other hand, the presence of St. Augus- tine in the Pensées is neither fund nor foundation. Pascal had not been nourished by the thought of Augustine as essentially as by that of Montaigne or Descartes, neither in the years in which he was principally establishing his scientiªc works, nor even at the time when he wanted to demonstrate the failure of philosophy and clear the way to true religion, nor a fortiori when he discovered an original anthropology and became the thinker of human existence. De Vera Religione undeniably constituted, at least for a time, the model of his apologetical project3 and the renewal of a thoroughly Augustinian opposition between miseria and dignitas4 to which Pascal had wanted to give back its relevance. This would entail that it take an Augustinian focus and frame, but nothing more. Pascal did not seek the same degree of textual resources in Augustine, and he never thought as an Augustinian. The Conversations with Monsieur de Saci should be sufªcient to convince us of that: the voice of St. Augustine is heard in Saci, while Epictetus, Montaigne and—under the pseudonym of Montaigne—the Descartes of the ªrst Meditation, speak through the mouth of Pascal.5 Saci plays the Augustinian while Pascal is the philosopher: and what Saci admired—recall the introduction to the Conversations—in Pascal is that “in all things he agreed with St. Augustine,” he who had “not read the Church fathers.”6 I will come back to the idea of “agreement” later: not with respect to the agreement between Pascal and St. Augustine according to Saci, but that between Descartes and St. Augustine according to Pascal. and the method that it requires, particularly in the experiments on the void: see Carraud 2001 and the comments of Chevalley 2005. 2. The opening section of this study will make frequent use of Carraud 1992. Please ex- cuse these allusions to my former work, which convenience requires, but which also indi- cate that the present study is a continuation of previous work. 3. This text was translated by Arnauld in 1647, with a second edition in 1652. 4. See Courcelle 1974–1975, 3 vols. The second part, vols. 2 and 3, is dedicated to the “vues platoniciennes et chrétiennes sur la misère et la grandeur de l’homme.” For Pascal and the “paradox of man,” see the conclusion, 732–35. 5. See Courcelle 1981, §6c, after the exposition in the column of “sources.” 6. Courcelle 1981, 1:10–11, cf. 51–52 and 43. Cf. Pascal 1994, 91 and 92. The editors of that volume remark: “Afªrmation inexacte, du moins en ce qui concerne saint Augustin: cf. Philippe Sellier, Pascal et saint Augustin, Paris, 1970”! According to Pascal, Saci knows St. Augustine so much better than he, Pascal, “possesses” Montaigne (Courcelle 1981, l: 366–71; Pascal 1994, 117). Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/posc.2007.15.4.450 by guest on 24 September 2021 452 Pascal’s Anti-Augustinianism Many elements play a role in the complex relations between Pascal and the three ªgures of Montaigne, Descartes, and St. Augustine, and in the relations each of the ªrst two ªgures themselves bears to St. Augustine. I will be content for the moment to point out their respective roles in the always-continuous formation and elaboration of Pascal’s thought. One is in effect a resource (Montaigne), another a way of thinking that one makes one’s own (Descartes), and yet another serves as a model (St. Augustine). One ought to be able to return to relevance a proposed model without at the same time agreeing wholeheartedly with the thought of its author, a fortiori without following it on certain topics which, not to strip them of their importance, do not belong to those contemporary debates tend to privilege, especially the question of grace. This is why we ªnd in Pascal several points of resistance against the thought of St. Augustine. These points of resistance are all the more remarkable insofar as they constitute, at the same time, points of divergence with those contemporaries whom one could also call Augustinian, particularly Arnauld. There is therefore what we might call an anti-Augustinianism internal to the surrounding Augustinianism of the time—limited and brief, yet in that very way so much more acute—an anti-Augustinianism consisting of fault lines so much more clear, of crests so much more distinct in as much as they are separated from the whole of Augustinianism, or, to employ a more pru- dent formulation, from the ensemble of what could qualify as Augustin- ian: in short, a culture, a feeling of belongingness, and even a militant Augustinianism, which we today would call an ideology. In this sense, it is without doubt that Pascal is Augustinian. This Augustinianism in Pascal ought to be explored, and in fact this is exactly what Sellier (1995) does in a thematic rather than conceptual way in his ªne book. (I want to take a moment here to express my debt to this book which has given me the means, albeit a contrario, to better measure the elements of anti- Augustinianism in Pascal’s thought.) And I will add at the same time that these elements are what I would call points of resistance were they in themselves essential, in contrast with elements of doctrine. The relation between Pascal and St. Augustine will not be expressed in terms of sys- tems: this will have nothing in common with the much debated question of Malebranche’s systematic Cartesianism—or of his Augustinianism— in the sense in which Alquié (1974) could be opposed to the “anti- Cartesianism of Malebranche” in someone like Blondel (1916).7 No, none of that for Pascal. There is little sense—in any case little philosophical in- terest, it seems to me—in judging Pascal’s Augustinianism or anti- 7. Without, of course, being reduced to this opposition, as the opening remarks of Alquié (1974, 9) are sufªcient to point out. Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/posc.2007.15.4.450 by guest on 24 September 2021 Perspectives on Science 453 Augustinianism en bloc.8 In fact, such an endeavor would be ill suited to the nature of his own thought. I will not address therefore the long list of elements of Augustinian doctrine over which Pascal passes in silence, which would no doubt be of little use. Given the lack of space, I will not try to delineate all of the anti- Augustinian theses in Pascal whether epistemological,9 philosophical, or theological.10 This important task remains to be done, because what I call those anti-Augustinian points of resistance in Pascal are numerous. In- stead, I will be content to demonstrate the following: (1) I will show brieºy that The City of God should be placed among the number of works that Pascal did not read. Not only does nothing indicate to us that he had read it, but there are a certain number of convincing textual indications that establish quite clearly that he had neither read the text nor even leafed through many of the books of The City of God he nonetheless cites.11 There is nothing blameworthy in that.