CIDOB • Barcelona Centre for International for Affairs Centre CIDOB • Barcelona notesISSN: 2013-4428 internacionals CIDOB THE LONG ROAD TO THE SPANISH 39 SECURITY STRATEGY SEPTEMBER 2011 Laia Mestres Researcher, CIDOB ecurity today is everyone’s responsibility”. On 24 June forty years of the Franco dictatorship, Spain was an inter- 2011 the Spanish Government approved the first Na- nationally isolated country. But over the past thirty years of tional Security Strategy with this motto as the pillar on democracy, the role of Spain in the world has significantly “Swhich Spain has to build for the next decade its international changed. It has gone all the way from a reluctant partner strategic role in a new, multi-polar, and ever changing world. within NATO but a “good pupil” within the EC/EU dur- ing the eighties, to a committed European partner in multi- The goal of any security strategy is to provide a long-term lateral peace operations from the nineties on. In this sense, and comprehensive approach to security, identifying both po- the long road to the Spanish Security Strategy has had tential threats and challenges, and the available instruments two different routes. On the one hand, Spain has mapped to meet them. Following the pattern of the European Union a domestic route, from a dictatorship security culture to a with the European Security Strategy of 2003 (and its review of democratic one, in which the once-despised Armed Forces 2008) and other European countries such as France, the Unit- have become one of the most positively-valuedinstitutions ed Kingdom and the Netherlands, José Luis Rodríguez Za- in Spain. On the other hand, Spain has also pursued the patero announced in the inaugural speech of his second term European route. By becoming an EU Member State, Spain the commitment to develop a started to participate regu- comprehensive national se- The Spanish Government has approved its first National Security larly in the debates about the curity strategy which had to Strategy, subtitled “Everyone’s Responsibility”, following the pat- development of a common be broad enough to include tern of the European Union with the European Security Strategy security and defence policy, and other European countries such as France, the United Kingdom other instruments apart from and the Netherlands. it contributed to deepening the purely military ones. To the EU external geographic this end, the Spanish govern- However, the evolution of Spain’s security culture has been the priorities, paying special at- ment appointed Javier Solana result of three overlapping and long-lasting processes: the demo- tention to Latin America and cratisation of the armed forces, a gradual participation in the main to lead the process of elabo- regional organisations as well as in international peace operations, the Mediterranean Region, ration of the Spanish Secu- and the politicisation of security and defence policies. and it showed interest in rity Strategy (SSS), only one taking part in almost all ci- month after finishing his du- Membership in the European Union has strengthened Spain’s sta- vilian and military missions tus in the international arena through the adoption of the princi- ties as High Representative ples and values of European security culture. Moreover, both Spa- abroad. Nowadays, as the for the CFSP in November nish and European narratives share a commitment to the Human Spanish Security Strategy 2009. Security Concept. states, Spain perceives itself as “a medium-sized power The adoption of a Security Strategy has been a crucial step for However, the road to the Spain to adapt its security and defence policies to a wider appro- with its own particular pro- Spanish Security Strategy ach to security, which includes diplomatic, military, political and file and great potential for has been long. During the foreign aid means. external action”. notes internacionals CIDOB 39 . SEPTEMBER 2011 1 First Stop: Democratizing the Armed Forces reached with the United States in 1953, Spain suffered a peri- od of isolation vis-à-vis various Western European economic “As an open country and a member of the EU, Spain plays and political institutions. Another reason for its isolation was its part in the international order while seeking to promote that during the Franco regime, Spain’s security and defence and defend national, regional and global interests. We are an policy was mainly directed toward the South, primarily Mo- influential and respected voice”. If Spain can be considered rocco, and therefore it had little in common with the security today, as the SSS attests, an influential and respected voice in concerns of its European neighbours (such as those related to the international arena, it is because in the internal process the former Soviet Union). of consolidating democracy, it also started a process of con- solidating a new external role. This goes a long way towards This multilateralisation process took place in three different explaining the construction of Spain’s democratic security spheres. The first is the European sphere, consisting of Spain’s culture, which is a result of three different but overlapping accession to the European Union (EC/EU) in 1986 and to the and long-lasting processes: democratisation, multilateralisa- Western European Union (WEU) in 1988. All Spanish politi- tion and the politicisation of security. cal parties, as well as public opinion, regarded membership in the EC as a step forward on the road to the consolidation The process of democratising the armed forces was under- of democracy and as an opportunity for economic develop- stood in Spain as a way of limiting the military’s power and ment. As far as the WEU was concerned, the Socialist govern- modernising its structures and perspectives. Under Franco, ment perceived this institution as the most appropriate Eu- the military had the exclusive mission of preserving the re- ropean defence organisation and, hence, one in which Spain gime; that is, ensuring internal defence. It is for this reason had to become a member. that military headquarters were placed in the centre of the country’s principal cities. The second sphere of multilateralisation is the North At- lantic Treaty Organization Zapatero announced in the inaugural speech of his second (NATO). Spain joined the Atlantic Alliance in June term the commitment to develop a comprehensive national 1982, six months after the Spanish Parliament ap- security strategy which had to be broad enough to include proved Spain’s membership by a narrow margin. In fact, other instruments apart from the purely military ones membership in NATO re- mained a controversial is- During the democratic transition, in order to avert any hitch sue during the subsequent electoral campaign in October in the overall democratisation process, the reform and control 1982, when the Socialist Party (PSOE) under the leadership of the armed forces became a top priority for Spanish lead- of Felipe González pledged to call a referendum on Spain’s ers. The first military reform in 1977 consisted of the creation continued membership in NATO. However, once in office, of a single Ministry of Defence, which integrated the army, the Socialists perceived NATO membership as a vehicle for the navy and the air force into a single common structure. the country’s integration into Western Europe and became The purpose of this reform was to achieve a “separation of aware of the problems involved in a hypothetical abandon- powers” by setting apart the military organisation from the ment of the organisation. Hence, the referendum, held in government. The Socialist Party victory in 1982 accelerated March 1986, was really more of a plebiscite on the popular- ensuing reforms, such as the approval in 1984 of the Law for ity of Felipe González than a vote on the issue of NATO National Defence and Military Organisation which strength- membership. The Yes vote (52.5 per cent in favour, 39.8 per ened the Prime Minister’s authority and clarified the rela- cent against, with an abstention of 40.6 per cent) preserved tionship between the government and the armed forces by Spain’s membership in NATO, although on the condition creating the post of the Chief of the Defence Staff (JEMAD). that it would not form part of the military command struc- ture. The post-1989 international scenario favoured the de- Other important reforms included the suspension of com- velopment of a new Spanish role within the Atlantic Alli- pulsory military service, the reduction in size of the armed ance, which led in 1997 to its full military integration into forces, the admission of women, and the reorientation of the the reformed Alliance. army towards new functions, particularly peace support op- erations. The 2003 Strategic Defence Review defined a more The third sphere within which Spain has multilateralised its flexible approach to the role of the armed forces according security policies is in its participation in multinational peace- to which military resources can be used for three types of keeping missions, especially since the end of the Cold War. missions: traditional defensive missions, missions related to In 1989, its participation in operations under UN mandate international cooperation, and missions to support the civil started with the contribution of troops to missions in Africa administration in ensuring the security and well-being of (Angola, Namibia, Mozambique and Rwanda) and in Cen- Spanish citizens. tral America, where Spain headed some of them (El Salvador, Guatemala and Haiti). Apart from these contributions, it has The multilateralisation process can be observed in Spain’s to be mentioned that Spain also participated - though in a gradual participation in the main regional organisations, as limited manner - in the multinational military operation dur- well as in international peace operations. Despite Spain’s ing the 1991 Gulf War.