No. 3 • May 2009 The “Idea of India” after Mumbai By Apoorva Shah India’s founding ideal of multicultural democracy is critical to both domestic cohesion and geopolitical interest, and it has defined how the country confronts terrorism at home. Modern India has much experience with terrorism, but most attacks have been rooted in separatist and ethnic insurgencies in rural frontier provinces. In the last decade, however, India has seen a steep rise in the number of attacks in urban areas, aimed at civilians, and committed not by rural insurgents but by young, middle-class jihadists. These domestic threats, which expose fault lines in the “idea of India,” have been welcomed and at times supported by Pakistan, whose existence is founded in opposition to India. In fact, the apparent paradox between Pakistan’s tolerance of the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) terrorist group leading up Asian Outlook to the November 26, 2008, attacks in Mumbai and Pakistan’s internal struggle against extremists can be understood in the framework of these conflicting ideologies. For India, countering the threat of domestic jihadism is not only a security imperative; it is also a strategic necessity. This merits a new counterterror- ism response by the Indian government and a renewed understanding of Indian Muslims and their place in India’s pluralistic society. n 1947, as the British Raj prepared to devolve its I former colony to the newly independent Repub- Key points in this Asian Outlook: lic of India, Jawaharlal Nehru and Mohandas Gandhi envisioned a modern, multicultural, and • In the past ten years, India has seen a new secular democracy whose first priority was eco- kind of terrorism aimed at civilians and nomic progress, not ethnic communalism.1 Nehru committed by young, middle-class jihadists. and Gandhi’s “idea of India” rejected the Balkan- ization of the subcontinent based on religious or • Pakistan has tolerated (and some elements ethnic division. Prior to and following independ- within Pakistan have supported) the ence, they strived to create and then preserve a jihadists, despite its own internal struggle unified nation. against extremists. Indian foreign policy and strategic interests, especially in relation to Pakistan, are closely • The growing strength of domestic Islamist linked to this founding idea. Since the partition terrorism undermines the “idea of India,” of India and Pakistan in 1947, Pakistani founder the multicultural and secular founding Muhammad Ali Jinnah’s “two-nation theory” of principle of the Indian nation. a separate, united Muslim state has inherently contradicted the “idea of India.” This conflict has • India must renew its focus on the integra- played out in a series of geopolitical skirmishes tion and assimilation of minorities, espe- throughout the subcontinent.2 cially its Muslims, and reassess its strategy Apoorva Shah ([email protected]) is a research to fight terrorism. assistant at AEI. 1150 Seventeenth Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036 202.862.5800 www.aei.org/asia - 2 - The disputed territory of Kashmir has been at center no longer relegated to the mountains of Kashmir or the stage in this struggle, with each side justifying accession valleys of Manipur, and the culprits are not poor locals based on its founding theory. On the Indian side, the but rather well-trained urban soldiers.7 secession of Kashmir would be “a defeat for secularism, Insurgencies employ terrorism for short-term tactical [which] is not acceptable if the Indian gains, but their preferred modus operandi 8 republic is to be nurtured and brought to Terrorism in India is is ideological indoctrination. Many ter- fruition,” K. Subrahmanyam, an Indian rorists, however, favor indiscriminate vio- strategic analyst, writes.3 For Pakistan, no longer relegated lence aimed at generating feelings of majority-Muslim Kashmir is critical to insecurity and provoking harsh responses to the mountains of the “two-nation theory.” If India relin- by the targeted governments.9 Terrorism quishes Kashmir, then Muslim “self- Kashmir or the valleys in India has moved away from the ideo- determination,” not secular identity, can logical cast of insurgency. The indiscrimi- define the division between the two of Manipur, and the nate nature of Indian jihadist violence rivals. And, as Stephen P. Cohen notes, culprits are not poor today is evident in the terrorist attacks the Kashmir dispute is specifically conducted over the last three years by radi- important “to those Pakistanis who focus locals but rather well- calized members of the Students Islamic on strategic and security issues, notably trained urban soldiers. Movement of India (SIMI) and the the army.”4 Indian Mujahideen (IM), a prominent The “idea of India” has also under- and well-networked Indian terrorist lined domestic policy in India since the days of Nehru organization. In July 2006, SIMI militants detonated and Gandhi. For example, in 1947, civil servant V. P. seven bombs on the suburban Mumbai railway system, Menon spent two years negotiating with the leaders of killing two hundred commuters. Then, in 2008, the five hundred princely states and chiefdoms in order to cities of Jaipur, Bangalore, Ahmedabad, and New Delhi absorb them into the Indian state.5 (He did not succeed were all sites of IM bombings whose casualties were all in Kashmir.) Since then, ethnic separatists, from the civilians. This is distinct from separatist operations, which Nagas in the northeast to the Tamils in the south, have tend to target security personnel.10 The IM and rogue attempted to undermine the idea, but the country has members of SIMI are based domestically, and their responded with both military force and socioeconomic attacks are intended to target major urban and suburban assistance in order to deter secession. areas in order to inflict heavy civilian casualties. Not only are their motives fundamentalist and pan-Islamist, The Changing Threat to the “Idea of India” but the groups are also fueled by domestic grievances, such as ethnic riots, religious discrimination, and opposi- For most of India’s history, dissenting parties to its tion to Hindu nationalist politics. founding idea—at least the ones that also pose threats of The IM, an umbrella organization that includes mem- secession and violence—have metastasized in the form bers of SIMI and other smaller groups, networks Indian of separatist insurgencies. The majority of terrorist inci- terrorists across the country and organizes attacks. Its dents in India have been the work of these insurgencies. leaders, Riyaz Bhatkal and Abdul Subhan Usman Qureshi, Therefore, India’s original counterterrorism strategy has both former engineers raised in middle-class families in been, in fact, a counterinsurgency strategy. For example, Mumbai, have built a network of young radicals (includ- the Rashtriya Rifles, a specialized counterinsurgency ing former software engineers and small businessmen) to force, was created to fight small-scale, low-intensity manufacture bombs and attack India’s largest cities.11 conflicts in Jammu and Kashmir, and the Indian army Consider the July 2008 bombings in Ahmedabad. learned to integrate former insurgents, called ikhwanis, The IM prepared for these attacks in a highly coordi- into cohorts that gather local intelligence in conflict nated, albeit decentralized, manner. Atif Amin, an IM zones. The government also provided civilian support commander, led the assault team, which planted the and development assistance to insurgency areas in Pun- bombs, while a computer graphics designer, Qayamuddin jab and Mizoram, addressing socioeconomic issues like Kapadia, provided safe houses and logistical support. At unemployment, wealth disparities, and lack of education the same time, Bhatkal designed the bombs, and Qureshi that exacerbate local tensions.6 But terrorism in India is coordinated the entire operation.12 A few days before - 3 - their mission, three IM operatives took a train from simply another operative in Pakistan’s quest to corrode New Delhi to Ahmedabad to conduct reconnaissance, the idea of India, and as LeT’s proxy war raises tensions finding unsecured wireless Internet sites for use during the on the border, the Pakistani military can also shift focus bombings.13 Based in several cities, including Ahmedabad, away from a difficult mission in the tribal areas of Mumbai, New Delhi, and Mangalore, these terrorists used Baluchistan and the North West Frontier Province.16 cell phones, Wi-Fi, and GPS to run a sophisticated and Even though Pakistan fights the same Islamists at home, efficient operation that was difficult to track in real time. the benefit provided by their operations in India makes In an e-mail entitled “The Rise of Jihad, Revenge the Pakistani choice more complex than it appears. Yet, of Gujarat,” sent by the IM following the Ahmedabad Pakistani attempts to chip away at the idea of India are bombings, the terrorists invoke distinctly political tones nothing new. in their tirade against Hindu nationalist organizations In the late 1980s and early 1990s, Punjabi Sikh mili- such as the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), the Rashtriya tants who were part of the Khalistan independence Swayamsevak Sangh, and the Vishwa Hindu Parishad, movement, which advocated for the creation of a sepa- calling for Gujarati Muslims to take revenge for the 2002 rate Sikh state, engaged in a series of riots, assassinations, Hindu-Muslim riots in their state. The e-mail also lashes and bombings across India. During this time, Pakistan out at counterterrorist