NPS 56-88-021 / NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL Monterey, California A STRATEGIC PLANNING FRAMEWORK FOR PREDICTING AND EVALUATING SOVIET INTERESTS IN ARMS CONTROL VOLUME II: THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TALKS, 1981-1983 by KERRY M. KARTCHNER // AUGUST 1988 Approved for public release; distribution Unlimited. i Prepared for: Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California 93943 FedDocs D 208.1M/2 NPS-56-88-021 . X LIBTIABY NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA 1 OS. I *!* Rear Admiral R. West Harrison Shull Superintendent Provost The work reported herein was prepared for the Naval Postgraduate School Reproduction of all or part of this report is authorized, This report was prepared by: Dean of Informatibiv^nd Department of National Policy Sciences Security Affairs DISCLAIMER: The views expressed in this report are the author's alone and should not be construed as necessarily representing those of the Department of the Navy or any other U.S. government agency. DUDLEY KNOX LIBRARY NA\ GRADUATE SCHOOL NCLASSIFIED MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA 93943-8002 CuRiTy Classification OF This page REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION lb RESTRICTIVE MARKINGS UNCLASSIFIED SECURITY CLASSifiCATlON AuTmO«iTy ) DISTRIBUTION /AVAILABILITY OF REPORT Approved for public release; DECLASSIFICATION/ DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE Distribution unlimited. PERFORMING ORGANISATION REPORT NUMBER(S) S MONITORING ORGANISATION REPORT NUMBER(S) NPS 56-88-021 NAME OF PERFORMING ORGANISATION 6b OFFICE SYMBOL ?* NAME OF MONITORING ORGANISATION (If 4fipl«ibl») AVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL 56 ADDRESS (Ofy SUtt *nd ZiPCodt) ?b ADDRESS (City Jf«f». tnd lit* Cod*) jnterey, CA 93943-5000 NAME OF FUNDING /SPONSORING 8b OFUCE SYMBOL 9 PROCUREMENT INSTRUMENT IDENTIFICATION NUM8ER ORGANISATION (if tppixtbt*) O&MN, Direct Funding ival Postgraduate School ADDRESS (Cry Suit *nd HP Cod*) io source of funding numbers PROGRAM PROJECT TASK WORK JNiT ELEMENT NO NO ACCESSION jnterey, CA. 93943 NO NO TiTiE (,ntiudt setunty Cft*f,<st,an) A STRATEGIC PLANNING FRAMEWORK FOR PREDICTING AND EVALUATING 3VIET INTERESTS IN ARMS CONTROL: VOLUME II: THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TALKS, 82-83 PERSONA,. AuThOR(S) KERRY M. KARTCHNER hrP£ Of REPORT ' 3b T'ME COVERED 14 DATE OF REPORT (Yt*i Month 0*y) 'S PAGE COoNT FINAL ! "ov_ .9/87 T Q R/Q8 AUGUST 1988 389 SUPPLEMENTARY NO T AT:QN COSAT CODES '8 SUBJECT TfRr/S 'Continut on rtvtrit if r\KtU*>y *nd idtrw.h, by blO(k n u mb*r) ' ElD GROUP SuB GROUP SOVIET POLICY TOWARD STRATEGIC ARMS CONTROL, START -L 1 T -8S T FLAC (Contmut On rrvfrj* ,f ntctmry *rtd identify by blOfk number) lis report takes the framework developed in Volume I regarding levels of Soviet iterest in arms control, the four factors conditioning that level of interest, and )plies them to a specific case study: the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) betwee 382 and 1983. It concludes that none of the four variables necessary for Soviet iterest in signing an agreement were present, and therefore provides a conceptual iderstanding for Soviet policy toward strategic arms control in the era immediately ^ceding the emergence of SDI and strategic defenses as a major factor in Soviet :lculations. S'R 3j" ON AvA.lvAB , TY Of ABS'RACT 21 ABSTRACT SECURITY CLASSifiCATlON -NC.ASS'f ED'jN. M TfD D SAME AS RP T DTiC lSERS UNCLASSIFIED '-AVE Of RESPONSIBLE NDviDuAl 22t> TELEPHONE (irxludt Ar t »Cod*) 22c OFFICE S*M8G. KEP.Pv M. KAC"CHNEP (408) 646-2521 56Kn • ORM 1473, 84 mas 83 APR ed on b« used uM I «ir-» u \T*d t "»t SEC^R y ClASS f CA' All oth*' «Ot.O"l i't OD»Ol»t« UNCLASSIFIED TABLE OF CONTENTS VOLUME II CHAPTER ONE. U.S. AND SOVIET START PROPOSALS, 1982-198 3 1 ITNRODUCTION 1 EARLY POSTURING 4 THE INITIAL U.S. AND SOVIET START POSITIONS 2 3 FIRST MAJOR CHANGES IN NEGOTIATING POSITIONS 53 START'S FINAL ROUND: FALL 198 3 CHANGES IN U.S. AND SOVIET POSITIONS 81 THE SOVIET WALKOUT 90 TWO. SOVIET THREAT PERCEPTIONS AND NEGOTIATING INCENTIVES 98 THREAT PERCEPTIONS AND THE CORRELATION OF FORCES IN SOVIET ARMS CONTROL CALCULATIONS 9 8 SOVIET PERCEPTIONS OF THE CORRELATION OF FORCES AT THE BEGINNING OF THE 1980S 108 SOVIET PERCEPTIONS OF REAGAN'S STRATEGIC MODERNIZATION PROGRAM 12 8 INF AS THE PRINCIPAL THREAT DURING START NEGOTIATIONS 149 CONCLUSIONS 166 - 1 - . TABLE OF CONTENTS, VOLUME II, CONT THREE. U.S. AND SOVIET BARGAINING POSITIONS IN START 170 COMPONENTS OF THE U.S. BARGAINING POSITION IN START 17 THE SOVIET BARGAINING POSITION IN START 19 6 SOVIET ATTITUDES TOWARDS CONSTRAINTS ON THEIR OWN SYSTEMS 22 5 CONCLUSIONS REGARDING BARGAINING LEVERAGE 2 2 8 FOUR. SOVIET LEADERSHIP SUCCESSION AS AN OBSTACLE TO A STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION AGREEMENT 235 LEADERSHIP PRECONDITIONS FOR SOVIET INTEREST IN ARMS CONTROL 235 THE ANDROPOV SUCCESSION 248 ANDROPOV'S ARMS CONTROL POLICY 2 56 CONCLUSIONS 2 65 FIVE. SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY ORIENTATION AND INTEREST IN A STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION AGREEMENT 268 THE HISTORICAL CORRELATION BETWEEN PERIODS OF DETENTE AND SOVIET INTERESTS IN DISARMAMENT 2 68 THE SOVIET VIEW OF DETENTE IN THE 1980S 278 SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY AND DETENTE, 1981-1984 290 THE DETERIORATION OF U.S. -SOVIET RELATIONS IN THE FALL OF 198 3 3 05 CONCLUSIONS 313 SIX. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 319 SUMMARY OF RESEARCH FRAMEWORK AND OBJECTIVES 319 CONCLUSIONS 3 27 BIBLIOGRAPHY 334 - 11 - TABLE OF CONTENTS, VOLUME II, CONT LIST OF TABLES VOLUME II 1.1 CHRONOLOGY OF START. ROUNDS 2 6 1.2 SOVIET JULY 198 3 START PROPOSAL AND SALT II LIMITS 7 5 1.3 SOVIET PROPOSED START REDUCTION TIMETABLE 7 6 3.1 THE REAGAN STRATEGIC MODERNIZATION PROGRAM: INITIAL DEPLOYMENT DATES AS OF 1982 183 3.2 U.S. -SOVIET STRATEGIC BALANCE IN TERMS OF UNITS OF LIMITATION PROPOSED BY THE UNITED STATES IN START 185 6.1 SUMMARY OF SOVIET ARMS CONTROL OBJECTIVES 328 - Ill - CHAPTER ONE U.S. AND SOVIET START PROPOSALS, 1982-1983 INTRODUCTION This chapter presents an overview of U.S. and Soviet START proposals from 1982 to 1983. It is important that this history be reviewed prior to examining sources of Soviet disinterest in strategic arms reductions for several reasons. First, Soviet START proposals reveal Soviet negotiating priorities. Second, Soviet reactions to U.S. START proposals shed valuable light on Soviet strategic threat perceptions and objectives. Third, changes and modifications in Soviet START proposals can be tracked over time. Comparing these changes with changes in U.S. START policy may suggest which side made the most movement from its original position and hence was prepared to be the most flexible. This should give one indication of relative U.S. and Soviet interests in a strategic arms reduction agreement for the period under consideration. Fourth, reviewing the - 1 - U.S. AND SOVIET START PROPOSALS, 1982-1983 overall negotiating record will provide the basis and context for examining leadership, threat perception, foreign policy, military, and domestic sources of Soviet disinterest in agreeing to reduce strategic arms to be discussed in the chapters that follow. Furthermore, this history will show that considerable domestic pressure on the U.S. side undermined whatever incentives the Soviets may have had to make compromises in the negotiations to achieve a START agreement. This theme is taken up in greater detail in Chapter Five on bargaining leverage. Finally, it should be noted that no thorough and publicly available history of U.S. and Soviet START proposals exists, although there is a lengthy journalistic account of the domestic U.S. inter- agency bargaining process that treats the evolution of the U.S. START position. Brief descriptions of basic U.S. and Soviet START positions exist but do not track their evolution and development. 1 Strobe Talbott, Deadly Gambits: The Reagan administration and the Stalemate in Nuclear Arms Control , updated version, (New York: Vintage Books, 1985) . While this book has been the source for some material used in this chapter, its focus is heavily on the U.S. side of the START (and INF) negotiations. Soviet proposals and policy are treated by Talbott only incidentally, and then superficially. 9 In particular,. see National. Academy of Sciences,. Committee on International Security and Arms Control, Nuclear Arms Control: Background and Issues , (Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1985), pp. 58-80; Coit D. Blacker and Gloria Duffy, eds., International Arms Control: Issues and Agreements , 2nd ed., (Stanford: Stanford - 2 - U.S. AND SOVIET START PROPOSALS, 1982-1983 A certain school of thought in the United States has held that the principal source of Soviet disinterest in consummating a strategic arms reduction agreement between 1981 and 1983 was the non-negotiability of the U.S. START approach. The following history of U.S. and Soviet START proposals invalidates this thesis. A comparison of U.S. and Soviet START positions supports the notion that the main reasons for the failure to achieve a strategic arms reduction agreement during this period have to do with the Soviet Union, not the United States' negotiating posture. That posture was in flux for much of the time the talks were in session and the Soviet Union never gave the U.S. START position a chance to settle. There was considerable movement in the U.S. START position during the 18 month course of the negotiations, and while much of it was obviously motivated by strictly domestic political considerations, there were non-trivial concessions to University Press, 1984), pp. 272-276; Congressional Budget Office, An Analysis of Administration Strategic Arms Reduction and Modernization Proposals , (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Budget Office, March 1984) ; Charles R. Gellner, U.S. and Soviet Proposals in Negotiations to Reduce Strategic Armaments (START) — Brief Outlines , (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 1 Jan. 1984); Robert Kennedy, "START: Problems and Prospects," in Robert Kennedy and John M.