SOCRATIC METHOD AND MORAL MOTIVATION by Jacob Duane Stump A thesis submitted in conformity with the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Graduate Department of Philosophy University of Toronto © 2017 by Jacob Duane Stump Abstract SOCRATIC METHOD AND MORAL MOTIVATION Jacob Duane Stump Doctor of Philosophy Graduate Department of Philosophy University of Toronto 2017 I argue for a new account of the role of philosophical argument in changing a person’s core values. As philosophers, we tend to think it is possible to cause someone to change his values by directing some piece of reasoning at him. But that is often naïve, as can be seen by the trajectory of many political disputes: one side takes an argument to be persuasive, and the other refuses to accept it. As it happens, this is the exact progression of many Platonic dialogues. Socrates argues that his interlocutor’s core values are mistaken, and his interlocutor, despite being unable to identify where, if anywhere, the argument goes astray, rejects its conclusion. Is, then, argument out of work when it comes to changing a person’s core values? Many scholars, including Martha Nussbaum, Gregory Vlastos, and Alexander Nehamas, hold that Plato believes as much. On the standard view, Plato thinks that philosophical argument is an ineffective way of reforming a person’s life, and he rejects Socrates’ project, as outlined in the Apology, of using philosophical argument to persuade his interlocutors to value wisdom more than money, honor, and everything else. ii Against this standard view, I argue that Plato offers a compelling account of how philosophical argument can be effective at transforming a person’s values. As has not been appreciated by other scholars, Socrates uses his methods of refutation and exhortation in most cases not to advocate wisdom’s overriding importance, but rather to motivate pursuing wisdom merely for its instrumental value, and this because it is the instrumental pursuit of wisdom that is meant to be transformative. Socrates’ overall strategy, then, is not unlike that of the professor who recruits a student to philosophy with the promise that it will improve her LSAT scores, all the while anticipating that, once the student experiences the thrill of abstract, intellectual inquiry, she will lose her legal ambitions and devote herself to philosophical studies. What justifies this strategy, in our eyes and Plato’s, is that, in some important contexts, including the choice of a way of life, the right reasons can come into view only after taking up some practice, and so the practice cannot be motivated by the right reasons until it is taken up on some other basis. iii Acknowledgements Many people have supported me, both personally and academically, and I am pleased to be able to thank them here. I am thankful to my parents, Kris and Connie, for their unfailing love and encouragement, and this even when, at 18, I decided to move to the other side of the world, knowing no one, with little more than a sketch of a plan. I am thankful to those who improved my ability to think: to Amanda, for believing in words; to Tobi, for contesting my beliefs; to Maxwell, for introducing me to film; to Mark, to whom this thesis is dedicated, for teaching me how to converse philosophically, for inspiring me still by his curiosity and courage; to Imogen, Jessica, and Phil, for improving my writing; to Jennifer, for her relentlessness and trust; and to my thesis committee—to Rachel above all, for more things than I can list, for always expecting better, for her confidence and generosity, for the line ‘the heart that has tired of Toronto has tired of the world,’ for modeling the practice of philosophy as good citizenry, for, more than anything, teaching me how to think and write about Plato; to Brad, for his morale-boosting and keen eye for detail; to James, for his wit and insights into fundamental concepts; to Tom, for his joviality, pressuring me to make precise my foggy thoughts, and thoughtful engagement with my project. I also want to thank here Sean Kelsey, my external examiner, for identifying spots in the thesis that needed clarifying; and Frisbee Sheffield, for her encouragement to think better about erōs. I am thankful to my friends: to David, Michael, Brett, Casey, and Jonathan, for always being there; to Seth, Josh, Adam, Royce, Michael R. and Michael P., for their joie de vivre and pursuit of excellence; to Larkin, Robbie, Willie, Sukaina, Daniel, and Valerie, for their camaraderie and goodness; to Irene and Laura, for their insights; to Erin, for seeing things in me that I couldn’t see in myself, for the happiest and prettiest times; and to Mingus and the members of SQWISH, for their examples of kindness and empathy. Many more are left unnamed here: my thanks are also to you. iv I am thankful to my sister, Ashley, for her cheerfulness, enthusiasm for life, and friendship. Many adventures await. I am thankful to my extended family: to Bill, for his resolve and love of music; to Joyce, for her mischievousness and aphorisms; to Richard, for his encouragement from a young age to take seriously and pursue a life of learning; to Shelda, for her kindheartedness and handwritten letters; to Ken, Stephanie, Mike, Ronda, Kevin, Peggy, Kim, Chance, Luke, Dannie, Geoff, Cathy, Austin, Garrett, Ethan, and Ava, for all the good times. Finally, I am thankful to the benefactors of the Connaught International Scholarship and Robinson Graduate Fellowship in Ancient Philosophy, for their generous financial support and belief in the value of learning and research. v Contents Abbreviations vii Introduction 1 1. Socrates’ Project of Conversion 22 1.1 Uses of epimeleisthai 25 1.1.1 Taking care 25 1.1.2 Taking an interest 26 1.1.3 Valuing 28 1.1.4 Complex unity 28 1.1.5 Complications 34 1.2 Epimeleisthai in the Apology 35 1.2.1 Radical change 38 1.2.2 Lasting change 42 1.3 Life of philosophy 46 2. Socratic Refutation 52 2.1 Background 53 2.1.1 Ignorance and motivation 55 2.2 Template of refutation in the Apology 58 2.2.1 Ephebic oath 61 2.2.2 Initial advantages 63 2.3 Role-based epistemic duties 67 2.3.1 Apology 67 2.3.2 Euthyphro 69 2.3.3 Charmides 70 2.3.4 Hippias Major 71 2.3.5 Laches 72 2.3.6 Protagoras 73 2.3.7 Hippias Minor 75 2.3.8 Euthydemus 76 2.3.9 Gorgias 76 2.4 Motivational benefit of negative emotions 80 2.4.1 Shame and anger 80 2.4.2 A finely-tuned method 84 vi 3. Erotic Psychology 86 3.1 Erōs as obstacle 87 3.1.1 Inherited notion of erōs 89 3.1.2 Plato’s use of erōs 91 3.1.3 philo-x and erōs 94 3.2 Formal object of erōs 98 3.2.1 Symposium 204d-205d 101 3.2.2 Ruling desires, episodic erōs, and desire for the good 106 3.2.3 Cognitive desire 112 4. Motivated Reasoning 114 4.1 Ruling desires at large 116 4.2 Lovers follow beloveds 118 4.3 Ruling desires and intransigence 120 4.3.1 Callicles 120 4.3.2 Polus 123 4.3.3 Thrasymachus 127 4.3.4 Special cases 129 4.4 Erōs-driven reasoning 130 4.5 Ruling desires and bodyguard beliefs 136 4.5.1 Tyrant 137 4.5.2 Democrat 138 4.6 Complementary pictures 141 4.6.1 Is erōs-driven reasoning defensible? 142 4.7 Direct vs. indirect approaches 145 5. Socratic Exhortation 147 5.1 A “crisis” for Socratic method? 151 5.2 The prototype of Socratic exhortation: Euthydemus 278d-282d 154 5.3 Socrates’ exhortation of Alcibiades 155 5.3.1 Apotreptic of Alcibiades 157 5.3.2 Protreptic of Alcibiades 161 5.4 Socratic exhortation in the Lysis 163 5.4.1 Apotreptic of Hippothales 165 5.4.2 Exhortation of Lysis 167 5.4.3 Apotreptic of Lysis 167 5.4.4 Protreptic of Lysis 169 5.4.5 Protreptic of Hippothales 170 vii 5.5 Socrates’ exhortation of Phaedrus 173 5.5.1 Apotreptic of Phaedrus 176 5.5.2 Protreptic of Phaedrus 177 5.5.3 Socrates’ prayer revisited 179 5.5.4 Complete success? 181 5.6 Again, a finely-tuned method 183 6. Transformative Philosophy 185 6.1 Setup 185 6.2 Content as catalyst 189 6.2.1 Resistance 192 6.2.2 Repetition 194 6.3 Pleasure as catalyst 198 6.3.1 Pleasure of philosophy 200 6.3.2 Widely applicable 205 6.3.3 A complication 206 6.4 Conclusion 207 Bibliography 209 viii Abbreviations Alc. Alcibiades Ap. Apology Chrm. Charmides Cr. Crito Euthd. Euthydemus Eu. Euthyphro G. Gorgias Hi.Ma. Hippias Major Hi.Mi. Hippias Minor Ion Ion La. Laches Ly. Lysis M. Meno Phd. Phaedo Phdr. Phaedrus Phil. Philebus Prt. Protagoras Rep. Republic Smp. Symposium Tht. Theaetetus Thg. Theages ix Introduction What if someone has not been properly brought up?... [It is a] massively implausible implication that someone who has not been properly brought up— someone who has slipped through the net, so to speak—can be induced into seeing things straight by directing some piece of reasoning at him. On the contrary, reasoning aimed at generating new motivations will surely stand a chance of working only if it appeals to something in the audience’s existing motivational make-up… and the trouble with someone who has in some radical way slipped through the net is that there may be no such point of leverage for reasoning aimed at generating the motivations that are characteristic of someone who has been properly brought up.