Council Special Report No. 79 March 2017 Kimberly Marten Reducing Tensions Between Russia and NATO Reducing Tensions Between Russia and NATO Council Special Report No. 79 March 2017 Kimberly Marten Reducing Tensions Between Russia and NATO The Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) is an independent, nonpartisan membership organization, think tank, and publisher dedicated to being a resource for its members, government officials, business execu- tives, journalists, educators and students, civic and religious leaders, and other interested citizens in order to help them better understand the world and the foreign policy choices facing the United States and other countries. 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Contents Foreword vii Acknowledgments ix Acronyms xi Map of Western Russia and Eastern Europe xiii Council Special Report 1 Introduction 3 Why NATO Matters 7 The Growth of NATO-Russia Tensions 9 Understanding Russia 13 Arms Control Issues 15 How a Crisis Might Erupt 20 How to Assess and Respond to a Crisis 24 Recommendations 28 Conclusion 37 Endnotes 39 About the Author 43 Advisory Committee 44 Mission Statement of the Center for Preventive Action 45 Foreword Since the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the relationship between the United States and Russia often has been difficult and, in recent years, worse than that. From the American per- spective, the fault lies clearly with Russia, the result of Russia’s 2014 invasion and annexation of Crimea, its continued incursions in east- ern Ukraine ever since, its intervention in Syria on behalf of a brutal regime, and its use of hacking and cyberattacks to tamper with the 2016 U.S. presidential election. From Russia’s vantage point, the blame falls squarely on the United States, and stems from enlargement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), American-led military inter- ventions in Europe and the Middle East, a perceived lack of respect for Russia, and the belief that Washington seeks regime change in Moscow. Whatever the perceptions, the reality is that Russia remains a major power willing to use its modern military and seat on the UN Security Council to pursue its interests. As a result, what has become clear is that the United States needs to act deliberately if it hopes to temper Russia’s actions beyond its borders and perhaps create a more constructive rela- tionship between the two countries. In this new Council Special Report, Kimberly Marten, a professor of political science at Barnard College, at Columbia University, and direc- tor of the program on U.S.-Russia relations at Columbia’s Harriman Institute, addresses the rising tensions between Russia and both the United States and the rest of NATO. Marten is convincing when she writes about the tensions between NATO and Russia—tensions that could boil over into conflict if there were an accidental or intentional encounter between Russian and NATO militaries, a Russian incursion into NATO territory, or a hybrid war that included cyberattacks and sowing seeds of discontent in Eastern Europe. Marten also recommends several policy steps that the United States and NATO should take to avoid any such crisis. She weighs the needs of vii viii Foreword deterrence—including the United States publicly committing to uphold NATO’s defense clause, positioning troops in vulnerable NATO coun- tries, and enhancing cyber defense and offense capabilities across the NATO bloc—and reassurance—including treating Russian President Vladimir Putin and other Russian leaders with respect, refraining from undermining each other’s domestic political stability (including formally stating that the United States does not seek Russian regime change), reestablishing arms control negotiations and agreements, and halting further NATO expansion, especially in Ukraine. Operating firmly in the tradition of foreign policy realism, Marten makes the case that both deterrence and reassurance measures are necessary and can in fact work in harmony. The stakes are indeed high. So far this century, major powers have avoided conflict, but the current era is rife with other regional issues, including an unraveling Middle East, economic stagnation and politi- cal discontent across Europe, and tension in Asia over a rising China and reckless North Korea. Not only would a crisis between Russia and NATO compound this daunting foreign policy landscape, but it would result in a missed opportunity for both sides to work together on tack- ling some of the world’s greatest challenges. The new U.S. administra- tion would be wise to consider Marten’s advice as it develops a policy toward Russia that manages to avoid being passive on one hand and overly confrontational on the other. Richard N. Haass President Council on Foreign Relations March 2017 Acknowledgments My deepest gratitude goes to CFR President Richard N. Haass, Senior Vice President and Director of Studies James M. Lindsay, Director of the Center for Preventive Action Paul B. Stares, and Micah Zenko for giving me the opportunity to write this report and for useful comments and criticism along the way; to Jennifer Wilson and Sarah Collman for their able administrative assistance; and to Micah and Jennifer espe- cially for their continuing encouragement and heroic efforts to con- dense one of my earlier drafts. I am grateful beyond words to members of the advisory committee who shared their supportive criticisms and suggestions for improvements with me, especially Committee Chair Angela Stent and William Courtney, Heidi Crebo-Rediker, Karen Lea Dawisha, James M. Goldgeier, Thomas Edward Graham, David J. Kramer, Robert Legvold, Jeffrey Mankoff, Cynthia Roberts, Stephen R. Sestanovich, David R. Slade, Julianne C. Smith, and Constanze Stel- zenmüller, as well as Paul B. Stares and Micah Zenko once again. I am also extraordinarily grateful to all of the additional policymakers and analysts who agreed to speak with me as I wrote this report. Some wish to remain on background, but my thanks go publicly to Daniel Fried, Austin Long, Wolfgang Richter, Brad Roberts, Strobe Talbott, and Alexander Vershbow. I also want to thank Robert J. Elder for a conversation several years ago that first sparked these ideas and Niall Henderson for able research assistance on Russian force levels. These individuals do not necessarily agree with my arguments, nor did I take all of the advice that was given. The statements made in this report are solely my own.