PHILIPP FRANK NOTES [Editorial note: Numbering of Notes refers to numbered paragraphs in each chapter. Where English translations are available or the works were originally in English, they are noted here in brackets with the date of first publication. See also the list of publications of Philipp Frank, cited here by year.] PREFACE 1. Frank, P., 'Kausalgesetz und Erfahrung', Annalen der Naturphilosophie 6 (1907) ['Experi­ ence and the Law of Causality', in 1941b and 1949a]; 'Mechanismus oder Vitalismus? Versuch einer prizisen Formulierung der Fragestellung'. [Lecture to the Philosophischen Gesellschaft Wien (1907) Ann.d.Naturphilos. 7 (1908). 2. The report of the meeting in Prague (1929) is in voU of the journal Erkenntnis, pp.93-339 (1930--1931) [with an introductory address by Philipp Frank, 93-951, that of the meeting in Konigsberg (1930) in Erkenntnis, vol.lI, pp.91-190 (1931). Bavink, Bernhard Ergebnisse und Probleme der Naturwissenschaften. Eine Einfuhrung in die heutigre Naturphilosophie, fourth edition, Leipzig (1930). CHAPTER I 1. In the claim that the statements of science are an 'Instrument', a 'tool', invented by the scholar, Henri Bergson sees the nucleus of WJlliam James's pragmatic teaching. In his introduction to the French translation of James's main work, Bergson writes concerning scientific statements in the sense of pragmatism: "They have existed before the activity of the scholar as little as the phonograph existed before Edison. The phonograph is not therefore arbitrary. It rests on the study of real observations of sound But its invention is added as an entirely new fact to these facts. Thus scientific truth also certainly has its roots in facts; but these are only the ground from which scientific truth grows. Other flowers might have sprouted there as well, if the wind had brought up other seeds". 2. Schlick, M., following Wittgenstein, says that the laws of nature themselves are not statements about the real world, but only directions for the formation of such statements ('Die Kausalitat in der gegenwartigen Physik') Naturwissenschaften, 19 145-162 (1931) ['Causality in contemporary physics', Moritz Schlick Philosophical Papers, vol.lI, pp. 176- 209 (Vienna Circle Collectwn 11, 1979)]. The essay: Schlick, Moritz: 'Erleben, Erkennen, Metaphysik', is in Kant-Studien 31 146-158 (1926). Also, Schlick, M.: 'Die Wende der Philosophie', Erkenntnis, I, 4-11 (1930--31) ['The Thrning-Point in Philosophy', Ibid 154- 160; also in Logical Positivism, ed. A.J. Ayer, 53-59 (1959)]. 281 282 PHILIPP FRANK 3. See H. Hahn's lecture at the Prague Congress, 'Die Bedeutung der wissenschaftlichen Weltaufl"assung, insbesondere fur Mathematik und Physik' (Erkenntnis I), 196-105 (1930- 31). 4. Schlick, M., 'Erleben, Erkennen, Metaphysik' (i.c.) - Carnap, R.: 'Scheinprobleme in der Philosophie', Berlin (1928) [Pseudoproblems in Philosophy, included with the Logical Structure ofthe World (1967)]. 6. The problem about the whole and its parts is given by Othmar Spann in his Kategor­ ienlehre, the first supplementary volume to the series Herdflamme, Jena (1924); The problem of the nothing by Martin Heidegger in his little book Was ist Metaphysikr (Bonn 1929) [What is Metaphysics? in Martin Heidegger, Basic Writings, ed. D. Krell] . The views of W. Troll are taken from the general introduction to his book Organisation und Gestalt im Bereich der Blute, especially p.33. 7. Westphal, W., Physik (second edition, Berlin 1930). Hahn, H.: l.c. 8. Neurath, 0., Empirische Soziologie, p.3, Wien 1931 ['Empirical Sociology', ch.10 of Otto Neurath, Empiricism and Sociology 319-421 (Vienna Circle Collection, voLl, 1973)]. Deborin, A., Dialektika i estestvoznanie [Dialectics and Natural Science}, Moscow (1929) (Russian) (A collection of essays from the journal Unter dem Banner des Marxismus). How strong among Marxist philosophers of Russia is the apprehension that under the cover of factual sciences philosophical views could be smuggled in, becomes clearly evident when one reads in this journal (1931, Nr. 4-5), how the Russian translation of an English chemistry textbook is critically reviewed under the title 'Against the propaganda of idealism in chemistry'. 13. Concerning the formulation that deviations from inertial motion must be given by simple functions of position and velocity, if something about reality is to be expressed, see Richard v. Mises: 'Uber Kausale und statistische Gesetzmassigkeiten in der Physik' [lecture at the Prague meeting of physicists] , in Naturwiss. 18 (1930) [also, Erkenntnis I, 189-210 (1930- 31)]. Concerning the conception that the mechanics of relativity theory is distinguished from Newton's by the way deviation from inertial motion is measured, see Philipp Frank, 'Relativitatsnechanik', in Handbuch fur Physikalische und Technische Mechanik, 2, 52ff (Leipzig 1928). 14. Whereas Bertrand Russell regards the statement of mere predetermination as not a statement about reality, James, in his essay 'The dilemma of determinism' (in his book The Will to Believe), in spite of his pragmatism, cannot quite make himself abandon the conception that predetermination means something about the world, though he quite rightly sees the main meaning in the sad feelings that are connected with words like 'predetermina­ tion' because they imply the ineradicability of evil in the world. 16. Max Planck concludes this from simple psychological observations (for example in his essay 'Positivismus und reale Aussenwelt', Leipzig 1931), whereas Niels Bohr refers to the uncertainty of the future following the initial states of most delicate events of matter, which follows from the quantum theory ('Wirkungsquantum und Naturbeschreibung', Naturwiss. 17, 483-486, 1929) ['The Quantum of Action and the Description of Nature', in Atomic Theory and the Description of Nature, 92-101, Cambridge (1934]. Moritz Schlick, 'Das Kausalgesetz in der gegenwartigen Physik', Naturwissenschaften 19, 145-162 ['Causality in Contemporary Physics', in Moritz Schlick Philosophical Papers, voUI, 176-209 (Vienna Circle Collection II, 1979)]. 17. Planck's formulation of the law of energy in his 'Das prinzip von der Erhaltung der Energie' (Leipzig 1887, third edition, Leipzig 1913). See my criticism of this formulation in Mh.Mathematik und Physik 2-7 (1916). Henri Poincare, Wissenschaft und Hypothese, and Der Wert der Wissenschaft [Science and Hypothesis and The Value of Science, Eng. tr. G.B. Halsted, first published with Science and Method under the title The Foundations of Science (1913) with preface by Poincare and an introduction (pp. 9-251 by Josiah Royce)]. Einstein, Geometrie und Erfahrung ['Geometry and Experience', first published with 'Ether and Relativity' under the title Sidelights on Relativity (1922) (Berlin 1921)]. THE LAW OF CAUSALITY AND ITS LIMITS 283 18. Dingler, H., Das System. Das Philosophisch-rationale Grundproblem und die exakte Methode der Philosophie (Munich, 1930). Hugo Dingler, Der Zusammenbruch der Wis­ senschaft und das Primat der Philosophie (Munich 1926). Hans Reichenbach, Die philoso­ phische Bedeutung der modernen Physik, Erkenntnis 1,49-71 ['The Philosophical Significance of Modern Physics', Hans Reichenbach Selected Writings. 1909-1953, vol.one, 304-323 (Vienna Circle Collection, vol.4, 1978). CHAPTER II 1. Laplace, Theorie analytique des probabilites, Introduction, in the Oeuvres de Laplace 7, 6ff. (1847) [Introduction, 'Essai philosophique sur les probabilires' (153 pages) to the Theorie analytique, published in English as 'A Philosophical Essay on Probabilities' (1951»). 4. Weyl, H , Raum. Zeit. Materie [Space-Time-Matter, Eng. tr. (1950) of the 4th German Edition (1922»). 6. That Laplace's hypothesis states something definite about real experiences only in the case of the introduction of 'simple' laws of force, but not in its most general form, is very clearly shown by Mises in his Prague lecture (printed in Naturwiss. (1930), 145ft) [ibid). He says "The deterministic approach of classical physics can be maintained purely formally, or, better, in accord with its main idea, in the whole sphere of directly observable phenomena, but in many cases they will be oft' center, they no longer contribute anything to the prediction of the course of phenomena ... Who ever sees in forces, densities, etc ... things that are endowed with an existence independent of the task of describing nature, will regard determinism as preserved in principle and excluded only in practice. However for one who conceives these concept-formations only as means to make an orientation in the world of phenomena possible, the limits of applicability and the limits of determinism itself will coincide". Otto Neurath stresses the metaphysical nature of Laplace's hypothesis in his Empirische Soziologie, p.128 [ibid.). 14. Planck's law for a vibrating mass-point whose vibration is reduced by radiation of electrical energy, was first published in 1896, in Sitzungsberichte der preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Physikalisch-mathematische Klasse as 'Uber elektrische Schwingungen, die durch Resonanz erregt und durch Strahlung gedampft werden'. 17. On the significance of 'occult forces' in the development of physics, see Duhem, P., Levolution de la mecanique (1903), chapter V [The Evolution ofMechanics (1980»). 19. Driesch, H., Philosophie des Organischen, second edition, p.414f, Leipzig 1921. Schlick, M., Naturwiss. (1931). CHAPTER III 1. The 'elan vital', in German translation 'Lebensschwungkraft' (vital force), is introduced by Henri Bergson; he describes its operation