Number 21 — August 2014 RESEARCH NOTES THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY MINDING THE HOME FRONT Hezbollah in Lebanon Mona Alami riggered by the March 2011 uprising against the egie’s online journal Sada, have addressed Hezbol- regime of Bashar al-Assad, the civil war in Syria lah’s involvement in Syria.1 However, this paper goes Thas been marked by the extensive military involve- beyond the emphasis of such reports—which often ment of Hezbollah, the Lebanon-based Shiite Mus- discuss the effects of Hezbollah’s war involvement on lim militant group and political party. Although con- the regional power balance and Lebanon’s economics sidered a terrorist organization by the United States, and security—by also probing the party’s relationship the “Party of God” is embraced by Lebanon’s Shiite with its Lebanese constituency. population as a resistance movement and represented Alongside the experts named in this report, some within the Lebanese government. Backed by Iran and forty Lebanese Shiites were interviewed, including Syria, Hezbollah has an extensive security apparatus fifteen from southern Lebanon, twelve from Beirut, and a wide-reaching social services network. Hez- ten from the largely Shiite Beqa Valley, and two Shi- bollah has always framed itself according to its resis- ite party members, in addition to security sources and tance against Israel and its commitment to moumana Hezbollah fighters. The interviews were conducted (securing immunity from Western influence) in the off the record due to security concerns. A request for Middle East, alongside Syria and Iran. In recent years, an interview with Hezbollah’s public relations arm especially since the end of the Pax Syriana—a period was declined. of stability brokered by Syria in the mid-1980s and This study begins with a brief look at Hezbollah lasting until 2005, when Syria ended its occupation prior to the Sunni-led uprising in Syria, which has of Lebanon—the organization has become a power- shifted the region’s sectarian and political power bal- ful foreign policy arm for Iran. Hezbollah’s involve- ance, threatening Hezbollah’s main ally, the Alawite ment in the Syrian civil war, revealed by the deploy- Assad regime. It then reviews Hezbollah’s expres- ment of its fighters around the Sayyeda Zainab shrine sions of support for other Arab Spring uprisings in Damascus in 2012 and in the al-Qusayr region in and discusses how the group’s support for the Syrian early 2013, helped tilt the odds in the regime forces’ regime changed that trend, followed by a discussion favor. It also led to a series of reprisal bombings in of Hezbollah’s strategy and missions in Syria. Next Hezbollah-controlled areas of Lebanon by members comes a focus on the political repercussions of the of the predominantly Sunni Muslim Syrian rebellion. Syrian war involvement, accompanied by a look at Several papers, sponsored by organizations such how Hezbollah’s various Shiite constituents view the as the International Crisis Group and the Carnegie group’s actions. The next sections explore the sectar- Endowment for International Peace, including Carn- ian religious dimensions of the war in both Syria and Mona Alami is a French Lebanese journalist focusing on political and economic issues in the Arab world. She has conducted extensive research on radical Islamist movements in Palestinian refugee camps, Salafi movements in Lebanon and Jordan, al-Qaeda’s reach to the West, as well as Hezbollah. © 2014 The Washington Institute for Near East Policy. All rights reserved. Mona Alami Lebanon, and discuss the resulting radicalization. The the region. Working through the Assad regime, the conclusion highlights Hezbollah’s thus far success- Islamic Republic has directed a steady supply of weap- ful four-pronged management of the war’s fallout ons into the hands of the Lebanese militia, which ini- in Lebanon: (1) securing victories in border regions tially devoted its energy to targeting the Israeli troops where Syrian rebels have staged attacks against Hez- who began occupying southern Lebanon in 1982. The bollah; (2) relying on the Lebanese army to curb the armed resistance registered a major success in 2000 terror threat in sensitive areas; (3) creating a Lebanese when it drove the Israelis to withdraw from Lebanon. unity government in which the party and its oppo- Yet this victory also forced Hezbollah to rearticulate nents responded together to the war’s impact; and (4) its need to simultaneously serve as a political party cracking down on internal Shiite dissent. and bear arms. Hezbollah’s position was further threatened in Hezbollah: Origins and Development 2005, when Syria ended its political and military pres- Hezbollah was not always the state-within-a-state ence in Lebanon following massive protests attending that it is today. The group, headed by religious clerics, the assassination of Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri, a emerged in 1982 as a guerrilla faction during Lebanon’s Sunni. Many blamed the strike on the Assad regime, civil war after splitting with the secular Amal Party. and Hezbollah responded by becoming more active in Iran’s Islamic Revolution of 1979 was central to Hez- internal Lebanese politics, demonstrating remarkable bollah’s creation. In the early 1980s, some five thousand resilience in the face of domestic and regional stress- members of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps ors. Today the group justifies its continued militari- (IRGC) had traveled to Lebanon to oversee “the pro- zation by citing the need to defend Lebanon against cess of mobilization, recruitment, religious education Israel and its “occupation” of the disputed Shebaa and military training” of Lebanese Shiites.2 Farms on the Lebanon-Syria border. Hezbollah only joined the Lebanese political sys- After the Hariri assassination—for which five tem after the 1989 Taif Accord, which set the terms Hezbollah members are currently being prosecuted for ending the country’s fifteen-year civil war. The in absentia by the Special Tribunal for Lebanon agreement attempted to end the sectarian rivalry (STL)—the March 14 coalition coalesced, consist- that sparked the war by establishing a new division ing of Christian, Druze, and Sunni parties, and of power based on a Muslim-Christian balance. Taif demanded that the party disarm. Hezbollah fought stripped the presidency, reserved for Maronite Chris- off such pressures, even as tensions mounted in tians, of extensive powers, reallocating them to the light of more assassinations targeting March 14 Council of Ministers, also equally divided between leaders. Hezbollah also emerged strong from its Christians and Muslims and headed by a Sunni prime bloody thirty-four-day war with Israel in summer minister. The position of parliament speaker was left 2006, retaining its southern Lebanese base of sup- to the Shiites. In what would be a consequential port despite the loss of more than 1,100 Lebanese move, Taif allowed Hezbollah to remain armed while lives. A study conducted during the war by the Bei- other parties were forced to relinquish their weap- rut Center for Research and Information showed ons. This provision, devised by Syrian power brokers that 87 percent of Lebanese backed Hezbollah’s 3 in Lebanon under the banner of resistance against response to “Israeli aggression.” However, the war Israel, allowed the Assad regime to exert pressure on was not without consequences for the group, with 4 the Israelis in negotiations over the Golan Heights. corruption scandals ensnaring several members. Demonstrating its political viability, the group offi- According to Shiite activist Lokman Slim, “[The cially entered politics in 1992, when it won 8 parlia- war] created nouveaux riches within the Hezbollah ment seats out of 128. party structure, something that was becoming more Since Hezbollah’s creation, Iran has used the and more apparent to many Shiites, even among the 5 group to advance its strategic and political aims in party’s backers.” 2 RESEARCH NOTE 21 Minding the Home Front: Hezbollah in Lebanon Outcomes for the organization have been mixed The March 2011 Syrian uprising challenging in the years since the war with Israel. In particular, the Assad dynasty’s forty-year rule—sparked when Hezbollah’s military takeover of downtown Beirut children were arrested for painting antigovernment and parts of the Choueifat, Aley, and Chouf Druze graffiti in the southern city of Deraa—forced Hez- regions in May 2008 sparked a week of civil unrest bollah to sharply shift course. Nasrallah soon called that resulted in sixty-seven deaths. The Qatari- on Syrian rebels to support Assad and enter into dia- mediated Doha agreement, which ended the con- logue with the government. “Bashar is serious about flict, granted Hezbollah veto power in the cabinet. carrying out reforms, but he has to do them gradually This meant that the resignation of any Hezbollah- and in a responsible way,” said Nasrallah in a televised led coalition would prompt the government’s fall. speech in May 2011. “He should be given the chance Indeed, in 2011 Hezbollah used its veto power to take to implement those reforms.”8 down Prime Minister Saad Hariri’s government over Nasrallah’s narrative was motivated by geopoli- its support for the STL. Since then, Hezbollah has tics and his group’s reliance on Iran, which had spent participated in two successive governments. Despite the past decade consolidating its gains in the Shiite residual challenges associated with the Syrian army’s Crescent, the area stretching from its border with 2005 withdrawal, the organization’s domestic military Iraq westward to Syria and Lebanon. Iran’s ally in the and political power has increased. However, its local Syrian regime, whose Alawite faith is an offshoot of and regional standing has suffered over its continued Shia Islam, led to the creation of the moumana axis, backing of the Assad regime in Syria, in turn fueling built on a common enmity toward Israel and Western sectarian violence in Lebanon.