0 • ( • '.,us . ( • BULLETIN of the ATOMIC SCIENTISTS 11~6 EA::>'I' .i.<'u'TY- IN'l'H tl·rRF..l!:'l' UHWAGO 37, ILLINOIS JIO.llW OJ!' SPONSORS .) . HOBEHT QPPl:,'HEDtET< Institute for Advanced Study Chairman HAROLD C. UREY September 8, 1950 University of Chicago Vice~Chairmsn To the Secretary of State II. A. BETHE Cornell University Washington, D.C. 1'. W. HRIDGMA:s" Harvard University JJF.TLEV W. BRONK Sir: Johns Hopkins University .\. II. Co~£PTO.­ Washington University I have the honor of transmitting to you a coP,Y of a letter !':. U. CoNDo.· National Bureau of Standards which will be sent to seventeen American scientists whose names I·' \RRlNGTON D.\NIELS University of Wisconsin are listed in the enclosure. Lt· r,; A. DUBRIDGE California Institute of Technology ,\!,BERT ErN::;TEI.· Hans J. Morgenthau, of the Department of Political Science Institute for Advanced Study ,] A~!ES FRANCK at ~he University of Chicago, has expressed what I believe ma~ University of Chicago ~A~WEL .A.. GounsMIT Brookhaven National Laboratory scientists feel when he wrote i n the May issue of the Bulletin THOR} !:SO R. ROGNESS University of Chicago of the Atomic Scientists as follows: 11 ••• I do not know whether 1•'. WHEELER LOOMTS University of Illinois a negotiated settlement vQth the Soviet Union is possible. I l'lULT,[P M. MORSE Massachusetts Institute of Technology do know, however, II. ,J. :MULLER that no such attempt at a negotiated settle- University of Indiana LINUS PAULJ.'G ment has been made; instead we have wasted our time with polemics California Institute of Technology U. B. PEGRAM Columbia University over isolated secondary issues which must remain insoluble as I. I. RABI Columbia University long as t he basic issues remain unsettled. I also know that, .] I I.IA.- SCHWINGE!t Harvard University in view of the present and foreseeable distribution of power ~ 'YR!L s. SMITH University of Chicago between the Unit ed States and the Soviet Union, the choice Lr,o SziLABD University of Chicago ED\\-AilD TELLER before the world is between negotiated settlement and war, that University of Chtcago Y. 1•'. WEISSKOPF is, universal destruction. I finally know that no nation can Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1-'EIVaLL WHIGHT University of Chicago survive the ordeal of a third world war, if it can survive it at .ThltROJ,D ZACHAHIA::; Massachusetts lnst1tutc of Technology aJ..l, withOUt being COnVinced in its COllectiVe COnscience that Professional aililiations for uicnti!Jcation purposes only it has done everything humanly possible to preserve peace. It is for these reasons that I deem it worth .while and even imper- ative to consider seriously the possibility of a negotiated l'ubltslttrl by Bnuc.\TIO. ,\L Ful. DATION .1-0lt. TL<LB.\H ~en:. t•J:., l~c. 2. settlement with the Soviet Union." Vfuat is the proper time to start negotiations with Russia aimed at a comprehensive settlement? Wilkie was of the opinion that the proper time for negotiating a settlement vvi th Russia was during the war, before Russia and America lost their common enemy. Many believe that he was right and that if reaching an agreement with Russia is at all possible, it becomes more difficult with eve~ year that is allowed to pass. I do not mean to s~ that the government of the United States ought to enter into negotiations with Russia at this time. It is doubtful whether such negotiations could produce aqy useful result at this time or any other time if they were entered into without a clear concept of just what would constitute a satisfactory settlement. There is no evidence to show that the State Department has a clear concept of this and in aqy case the absence of an adequate public discussion of the real issues would make the task of the State Department very difficult at this time. To outline a satisfactory settlement that might be acceptable both to Russia and America as well as to all other nations involved, is clearly a difficult task. For a settlement to be satisfactory it would have to create conditions which would induce both America and Russia to maintain the agree­ ment in operation over a long period of time. Such an agreement would have to include measures of general disarmament, far-reaching in scope, and provide adequate safeguards against violations. While Russia and America might retain the right legally to abrogate the disannament clauses of the agreement, such a right could obviously not be given to all nations, and therefore, the creation of some machinery of enforcement would probably be deemed to be necessary. Perhaps a group of outstanding American citizens, free from any govern­ mental responsibility and devoting their full time, from three to six months, ... 3. to this task could think through the problems involved and might emerge with a plan which in their opinion ought to be acceptable both to Russia and America as well as to the other nations involved. It is, however, difficult for Americans to take into account all the points of view which might legitimately enter into the considerations, of the Russian government. The danger of overlooking important points would be greatly diminished if the group engaged in such study were to include Russians as well as Americans, without in a~ way committing either of the two govern­ ments. And because a fruitful exchange of views in this difficult field is possible only between men who have mutual respect for each other's intellectual integrity, scientists--Americans, Russians, a nd others--might be able to render a unique public service at this time. The chances that the plan outlined in the enclosed letter can, in fact, be realized are slim; but so are the chances of every other effort that provides a real possibilit,y of making progress toward peace. The text of the enclosed letter will be published in the October issue of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists and will be communicated to the addressees two weeks later. It is row intention to keep you informed of their response as well as a~ further steps that might be taken. Very truly yours, Leo Szilard wv . ... ' •.J ] ' .. Septer:i)er 6, 19!)0 'i'o the Soc.•· •t. ·~J or ~)ta ashin_,ton, !J.r.., Sir: I have tho horu • of tl--· • lltting to you a cow oi' a letter no.~ l'1i.ll be oent. to s ventecn Aroorican acientist.s mooe Ml:¥38 at'O listed in the oncloDUro. Hans J. Mot·~onthau, of t..~c ep :-tment of Political So.i.OI co at the Universit-y o£ Chic· o1 has expreaso6 1at I boliove ociont:l.ot9 f'ecl OD he \"ll''te i the a:J iS'lUC o£ the Dull.etin of the Atomic ('!eicntiots ao follows a " ••.• I o not, know thor a nozoti tod sottl0ment th tho Sovlct Union is poosiblo. ! do l'no , ho rove..~, that no ouch otto t at nt has been made J inste ;ro have -; sted our time with lom:lea avu isolated ocoond~J issuo!J Whic~h must ror · n innolubla as lo as t 'o bas' c issues r .........·,,..,u unsettloo. I also know that1 in lT:\. 0 t )0 )4'00Cnt ' r ~'orescoablo cistrlb.uti n o£ ml" n tho Uni Pt tos rxl tho Soviot Unio , tho choic before ""~ e , ~ld lo bot c n oeotioter oottl<JfolOnt on1 we.r1 that is, univorsal doat."Uction. I i'1Mlzy kno ., that oo nation can survive the o cal o a t.hir ,;u:;:•ld ar1 ii' it c. n :7<.U"V''.ve it at all, \,1 t11 ut oin convinc · n its colloct.:vo conocionca that it . s d n ev ythin humanl;t- posoible to p. servo· peac • It is for thoGO re ~ na ti at I de . .1 t rrurth hilo a:ld cvon impel'- . ative t cono~aor ncrio zy" the peu ·ibility o a nocot' tod .• settlement 1ith the Soviet ·Union. " i'.hat is the o r time to start negotiations trlth Russia aimed at e. ccmprohensivc oottlocont? ·. ~ ~do \7tlS of tlu~ opinion that the p~opcr t for nogot:i.atin a sottlmnont lith Russia :ras durinG the war, before Russia and Aneric lost t"lo · r comr:t>n onen:rr. ony believe thnt he woo ri,.ht and that if roaching a"1 ,roc..~nt ·with Russia is at alJ. p::>ss~bl.e, it becpmes ooro dif~cult · ith every yo· that is a.ll.owed to puss. I do not meon to sey that the t,ovcrntJCnt of the United States ou:jlt t..o enter into necotiations with ru.osia at this two. It is doubtful tber ch ne otiationo could produce anv useful result at this time or aqy other time if t110'J nero entcrod into 't7ithout a. cleor concept of just uhat \"11Uld consti tuto a s rtisfactocy sottlc.".lOnt. Thoro is no oviucnco to sho 7 that the State Dcpart-:tent has a clear concept of t is and in a case the absence of an adc4uato public discuosion of the re31 issues would make the task of \V the State partrnent vcr:~ difficult at this tine ~ , To ouUine a satisfactory settle nt tlnt might bo accopta! le both to Russi~ and ric as roll as to all o "'ber nations invol ved, is cl oarl\v a difficult tasl<: . For a settlomnt to be satisfactocy it would have to create conditiono 1ich t10uld irrluce both America an:l Russia to maint in the .aeroo­ .nt in operation ovur a long period of tine.