III. EXTENT OF licit trade AND latest trends IN trafficking IN precursors 11 minimum, to use such information to generate actionable and cases of diversion or attempted diversion from inter- intelligence for use in further investigations.16 national trade, as well as activities associated with illicit drug manufacture. The chapter is based on information 59. Unfortunately, the information INCB has about the provided to the Board through various mechanisms, such level of voluntary partnerships worldwide continues to be as form D, the PEN Online system, PICS, Project Prism incomplete. Similarly, INCB only rarely receives informa- and Project Cohesion, and through national reports and tion about suspicious requests or denied orders, thus other official information from Governments. limiting the Board’s ability to alert authorities worldwide. With a few exceptions, Governments rarely inform the 62. Information about non-scheduled chemicals not Board about the extent of suspicious shipments whose included in Table I or Table II of the 1988 Convention, export has been stopped by the authorities or about cases including designer precursors, which are nonetheless used in which companies have voluntarily refrained from ful- in illicit drug manufacture, is reported to INCB pursuant filling an order. One of those exceptions is Germany, a to article 12, subparagraph 12 (b), of the Convention. country with a long-established and well-functioning Governments also share such information through PICS, partnership between authorities and relevant industries. which has thus developed into an early warning system for In the country in 2019, there were 14 incidents in which precursors, although the identification of non-scheduled substances in Table I or Table II of the 1988 Convention, or chemicals frequently presents forensic challenges due to chemicals not under international or national control, the mislabelling and misdeclaration of products that are were not supplied, representing a decrease from 23 such often found in clandestine laboratories or at points of incidents recorded in 2018. entry. INCB would like to thank all Governments for the information received and remind them that comprehen­ 60. INCB wishes to reiterate the importance of coopera­ sive reporting on form D of information regarding non­ tion with relevant industries in the successful and sustain­ scheduled substances and of circumstantial information able prevention of chemical diversion. While the nature, is critical to establishing and addressing new trends at an extent and scope of such cooperation is the prerogative of early stage and globally. INCB therefore again encour­ individual countries, INCB wishes to highlight the impor­ ages all Governments to improve the quality and compre­ tance of the voluntary aspect of such cooperation, in par­ hensiveness of their annual form D submissions and ticular with regard to designer precursors and other reiterates its recommendation to make better use of PICS. chemicals not under national control, which may present a global challenge. The Board also wishes to reiterate the importance of sharing information about suspicious A. Substances used in the illicit requests and denied orders and transactions globally, with manufacture of amphetamine- INCB, in order to prevent traffickers from shifting from type stimulants one supplier to another, across borders. 1. Substances used in the illicit manufacture of amphetamines III. Extent of licit trade (a) Ephedrine and pseudoephedrine and latest trends 63. Ephedrine and pseudoephedrine are precursors used in the illicit manufacture of methamphetamine but can be in trafficking in substituted with P-2-P, phenylacetic acid, APAAN, APAA and a number of non-scheduled substances (see subsects. precursors (c) and (d) below, and annex VIII). Both ephedrine and pseudoephedrine are also used for legitimate medical pur- poses and are therefore among the most frequently and 61. The present chapter provides an overview of the widely traded substances included in Table I of the 1988 major trends and developments in both licit trade and traf- Convention. ficking in precursor chemicals, by substance group, with a view to addressing gaps and weaknesses in precursor con- Licit trade trol mechanisms. It summarizes information on seizures 64. Between 1 November 2019 and 1 November 2020, 16 INCB report on precursors for 2019 (E/INCB/2019/4), para. 159, exporting countries sent almost 4,600 pre-export notifica- and INCB report on precursors for 2017 (E/INCB/2017/4), chap. IV. tions through the PEN Online system for planned 12 INCB REPORT ON PRECURSORS 2020 shipments of ephedrine and pseudoephedrine, in bulk and Figure V. Seizures of ephedrine and pseudo- in the form of pharmaceutical preparations. The noti- ephedrine reported by Governments fications were for a total of more than 950 tons of on form D, 2010–2019 pseudoephedrine and almost 80 tons of ephedrine. The 90 000 40 shipments originated in 41 exporting countries and terri- 80 000 35 tories and were destined for 166 importing countries and ) 70 000 territories. Overall, the level of trade in both ephedrine s 30 m a r 60 000 and pseudoephedrine was about 25 per cent lower than g 25 o l i k 50 000 the average of the past three reporting periods. ( d 20 e Governments z 40 000 f i o e r s 15 e 65. Table 2 below presents the 10 largest importers of t 30 000 b n u m ephedrine and pseudoephedrine, ranked in terms of o 20 000 10 u m N volume notified through the PEN Online system, in the A 5 reporting period. 10 000 0 0 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Table 2. The 10 largest importers of ephedrine 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 and pseudoephedrine, by volume, Pseudoephedrine and prepara�ons 1 November 2019–1 November 2020 Ephedrine and prepara�ons Number of Governments repor�ng seizures of Ranking Ephedrine Pseudoephedrine ephedrine and/or pseudoephedrine 1 Republic of Korea United States 2 Nigeria Switzerland main methamphetamine precursor seized in Australia and 3 Indonesia Egypt New Zealand. Yet, as in the past, no information was avail- 4 Egypt Turkey able on the origin of the ephedrine, i.e., whether it had 5 Denmark Indonesia been diverted from legitimate trade or illicitly manufac- 6 Ghana Brazil tured, either by synthesis, from chemical pre-precursors, 7 United States Republic of Korea or by extraction from the Ephedra plant. Both synthesis 8 Singapore Japan from propiophenone or its precursors and extraction of 9 Switzerland Canada ephedra are illicit manufacturing methods that have been 10 Germany France encountered in China. Considering that the approaches to addressing diversion from legitimate trade will differ from the approaches needed to address the illicit manufacture Trafficking of precursors and that, in the latter case, the approaches 66. On form D for 2019, seizures totalling about 5.7 tons needed will further depend on whether the ephedrine was of ephedrine and pseudoephedrine were reported to INCB illicitly synthesized from pre-precursors or extracted from by 38 countries and territories in all regions (see figure V). naturally grown Ephedra plant, the Board reminds That represents the lowest amount seized in several years, Governments to invest in determining the nature, or falling even short of the amounts seized in 2017 (12.1 tons), origin, of seized ephedrine. INCB therefore also and also falling significantly short of explaining the reiterates its recommendation to have selected samples amount of methamphetamine seized in those regions of seized precursors forensically analysed in order to where ephedrines-based manufacturing methods are provide strategic information about their origin, as a known to prevail. means to subsequently address any weaknesses in control mechanisms. Oceania 68. On form D for 2019, New Zealand reported sei- 67. In 2019, the largest seizures of ephedrines were zures of about 440 kg of ephedrine raw material, about the reported in Australia, amounting to almost 1,300 kg, of same amount as in 2018 (412 kg), thus indicating an end which 99 per cent was seized in a single incident, as the to the downward trend observed since 2016. The amount result of joint investigational efforts under a partnership of ephedrine was seized in 45 incidents. In over 90 per cent agreement between the Australian Federal Police and the of the cases, the origin of the substance was unknown; National Narcotics Control Commission of China. That single incidents could be traced to China, including Hong seizure provides another piece of strong evidence Kong, the United Arab Emirates and the United Kingdom. indicating that pseudoephedrine tablets (known as Most of the seizures were made by customs authorities at “ContacNT”) have replaced ephedrine raw material as the points of entry, including international mail centres. III. EXTENT OF licit trade AND latest trends IN trafficking IN precursors 13 East and South-East Asia ephedrines. In both countries, the amounts seized were the largest in many years. While Pakistan seized 80 kg of 69. The illicit manufacture of methamphetamine in East ephedrine, the largest amount reported since 2011, and South-East Asia continued to be predominantly Afghanistan seized 440 kg of pseudoephedrine prepara- ephedrines-based, but with increasing indications of the tions, the largest amount reported since the reporting of use of P-2-P-based methods, starting from non-scheduled seizures of pseudoephedrine started in 2016. The sus- chemicals or chemicals recently placed under inter national pected origin of 350 kg of the seized pseudoephedrine was control (see subsect. 2 (d) below). Pakistan; 90 kg allegedly originated in the Islamic Republic of Iran. The seizures provide further evidence of the illicit 70. Nevertheless, seizures of methamphetamine manufacture of methamphetamine in Afghanistan and of precursors in East and South-East Asia continued to fall the continued use of pharmaceutical preparations, in addi- significantly short of explaining the dramatic increase in tion to use of the Ephedra plant as a source for the seizures and abuse of methamphetamine in that and extraction of ephedrine.